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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Long Binh Post, US Army

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Long Binh Post, US Army (Prov) for quarterly period 1 August - 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)
Quarterly Period 1 August - 31 October 1966

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
Attention: AVGCH
APO San Francisco 96307

Commander in Chief
US Army, Pacific
Attention: GPOP-MH
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION I, SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) On 28 August 1966, a staff study conducted by the Special Assistant to the Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, on the proper command organization for the Long Binh Complex was completed. It recommended establishment of a post headquarters directly subordinate to HQ USARV and designation of a colonel as post commander. Advantages of this plan are:

   a. Direct subordination of post headquarters to HQ USARV ensures more effective responsiveness to the senior USARV headquarters.

   b. CG, 1st Logistical Command, is not further diverted from his primary mission of logistic support to USARV elements.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)
Quarterly Period 1 August - 31 October 1966

An experienced nucleus for the post headquarters was available in the Long Binh Sub-Area Support Command which had as its mission the coordination of post-type activities at Long Binh.

Disadvantages of this plan are:

1. HQ USARV would be subject to becoming more involved in post operations.

2. HQ USARV would be responsible for another subordinate headquarters.

3. Establishment of the post headquarters must be done from scratch, unless the existing subordinate logistical command unit were absorbed.

On 29 August 1966, a decision paper on this subject was completed and announced the following recommendations:

1. That Long Binh Post be organized as a subordinate element of HQ USARV, with the mission of controlling and supervising post-type activities in support of all tenant headquarters and activities.

2. That the nucleus of the headquarters be provided from those personnel currently performing similar duties in the Long Binh Sub-Area Command.

3. That a post commander (colonel) be designated by 15 September 1966, and that the headquarters be organized and operational no later than 1 October 1966.

HQ USARV Letter, AVHDC, Command Organization for Long Binh, was published on 20 September 1966. This letter announced establishment of a post headquarters at Long Binh effective 1 October 1966 and designates CO, Long Binh Post, as Installation Coordinator for Long Binh Post, II Field Force Victor Compound, and Saigon Support Command Supply and Maintenance Area which includes the balance of the Long Binh area. Responsibilities of Installation Coordinator are as prescribed in USARV Regulation 10-U. It further cited general and specific functions that the post will perform for tenant units.

On 30 September 1966, HQ USARV General Order 5863 announced the organization of Long Binh Post, US Army (Provisional), effective 1 October 1966, and assigned it to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam. Authorized strength consists of 34 officers, 1 warrant officer, 107 enlisted men, and 12 civilians.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)
Quarterly Period 1 August - 31 October 1966

4. (U) The Long Binh Post area is defined as that area inclosed by a west boundary of vertical gridline YT Cl; east boundary of vertical gridline YT 14; north boundary of horizontal gridline YT 13; and a south boundary of horizontal gridline YT Cl. Except for brushwood and occasional rice paddies in a strip approximately 1 kilometer wide east of and adjacent to Routes 316 (identified as Highway 1A on older maps) and Route 15, the eastern section of the post is covered by a dense growth of brush and short trees. The following hourglass-shaped area is presently considered to be the built-up portion of Long Binh Post: bounded on the west by Route 316 to Widows Village at YT 0511, then northeast in a direct line to Route QL 1, east on Route QL 1 to a road at coordinates YT 087127, south to the GA HO NAI railroad station, southwest in a direct line to the intersection of QL 15 and Route 316, southeast along Route QL 15 to Route 317, and west to Route 316. Attached as Inclusion 1 is a current map overlay of Long Binh Post.

5. (U) The post population as of 1 October 1966 totaled 20,377 military personnel. As of 31 October the post population totaled 23,111; an increase of 2,734 military personnel.

SECTION II, COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SECTION II, PART I: OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

SECURITY

(C) Item: Coordination of security and defense of Long Binh Post.

Discussion: Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post, is responsible for, and coordinates the security and defense of Long Binh Post to include those tenant combat support and combat service support units that are attached. No resources are made available for this purpose.

a. External Security: The primary axis of enemy attack is from the south, with axis along coordinates YT 043035 - YT 052048; the secondary axis is from the east with axis along coordinates YT 114059 - YT 070060.

b. Internal Security:

(1) When development of Long Binh Post reaches its peak, approximately 6,000 local nationals will be employed in the confines of the post. This massive build-up requires establishment of an area civilian personnel office to hire permanent and daily-hire personnel. At present daily-hire personnel are not required to have security clearances but must be kept under surveillance by armed personnel during the time that they are allowed access to the post.

(2) At present 2 large gaps exist in the Long Binh Post perimeter. The first one is approximately 1,500 meters wide and extends from the southern boundary of the 158th Transportation Group to the western boundary of the 277th
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)
Quarterly Period 1 August - 31 October 1966

Supply and Services Battalion on Route 317. The second gap is approximately 2,300 meters wide and extends from the southern portion of the 160th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company to the eastern boundary of the 66th Quartermaster Battalion (POL) on Route 317.

(3) When construction is completed a total number of 12 access routes will exist; at this writing 6 access routes are in existence and are manned by Military Police personnel on a 24 hour basis.

(4) At this writing Long Binh Post lacks a perimeter fence, a perimeter road, and perimeter lights. This observation has been brought to the attention of the USARV Engineer.

(5) The Military Police personnel manning the 6 access routes are made available by Commanding Officer, 89th Military Police Group, from the resources of the 720th Military Police Battalion, a unit stationed at Long Binh Post. Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post does not exercise operational control over those personnel.

Observation: Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post must have sufficient security forces available and must exercise operational control over them.

ESSENTIAL FACILITIES

(U) Item: Minimum essential facilities for incoming units.

Discussion: Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post has the responsibility for providing incoming units the following minimum essential facilities: roads, drainage, latrines, showers, flooring, and a suitable mess hall at the earliest possible date.

Observation: Post Commander must participate in base development planning and have authority to establish contractor priorities.

POST ORGANIZATION

(U) Item: Organization of a post on short notice.

Discussion: The organization of Long Binh Post on short notice points up the immediate mandatory requirement for authorized personnel and equipment. Items in acute short supply urgently needed to meet operational day-to-day requirements are: 2 AN/VRC-47 and 1 AN/VRC-49 radios and numerous vehicles of all types.

Observation: The TA should be developed concurrently with the TD and the assignment of personnel and equipment must be given top priority.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)
Quarterly Period 1 August - 31 October 1966

LOCAL NATIONAL PERSONNEL

(c) Item: Control of local national personnel.

Discussion: Control of local national personnel must be exercised in order to preclude sabotage. Methods of control available to the commander are evaluation and authorization of required TD positions, publishing of directives pertaining to control of daily-hire personnel, and exercise of command supervision and control over civilian personnel hire operations. Evaluation and assessment of the utilization of military police assets must be a continuing process in order to be immediately responsive to new or different requirements.

Observation: Failure to exercise control over local national employees is an invitation for sabotage.

TRAFFIC CONTROL

(U) Item: Traffic Control.

Discussion: An adequate road net does not exist within Long Binh Post, at the present time. Inadequate roads present a traffic hazard.

Observation: A perimeter road and secondary interior roads, in that order, should be constructed at the outset in order to establish positive control over vehicular traffic.

REPAIRS AND UTILITIES

(U) Item: Repairs and Utilities (R&U) Services.

Discussion: Under the present system R&U services are provided by the 1st Logistical Command through a civilian contractor. Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post is "another customer" in regard to obtaining R&U support for tenant units.

Observation: Post Commander must exercise operational control over R&U resources in order that they be responsive to day-to-day requirements of tenant units.

MILITARY POLICE

(U) Item: Assignment of Military Police Units on an area basis.

Discussion: The 720th Military Police Battalion, stationed at Long Binh Post, is assigned duties on an area basis under the control of a Group and Brigade. The Post Commander must request Military Police support subject to the approval of another commander.
Observation: The Post Commander must be provided organic Military Police support to maintain law and order, control traffic, and provide internal security.

USARV STOCKADE

(U) Item: Operational and Administrative Control of the USARV Stockade.

Discussion: Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post has been assigned operational and administrative control of the USARV Stockade. While it is recognized that this practice is normal in CONUS, in this situation it is considered unrealistic in that the post is organized on an austere basis (i.e., a total authorized strength of 154 people) and further, the capability to administer this confinement facility is readily available in the Military Police Brigade allocated to the command.

Observation: In a theater of operations, confinement facilities should be administered by the Military Police Brigade.

SECTION II, PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

NONE

1 Incl as

W. J. CURTIS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>II FFV</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>HQS Long Binh Post US ARMY</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>DNSG, III Corps, (ARVN)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>29th GS Gp</td>
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<td>48th IC Gp</td>
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<td>68th Med Gp</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>159th Eng Gp</td>
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<td>6th Bn, 56th Arty, 97th ADA</td>
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<td>Stockade, 91st MP Det &amp; 557th MP Co</td>
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<td>Antenna Farm, Receiving site</td>
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<td>Long Binh Signal Complex</td>
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<td>Eng heavy equip motor pool</td>
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<td>Supply Point, class I, II &amp; IV</td>
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<td>Cogido Barge site</td>
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<td>303d RR, Radio and Research Bn</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>720 MP BN</td>
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<td>140 H.E.M. Co.</td>
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AVHGC-DH (19 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 3 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSFOR-0
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, Long
Binh Post, US Army (Provisional).

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph b, Part I, Section II, Item: Security,
Page 3:

(1) The Long Binh Area Civilian Personnel Office has been in existence since March 1966. However, due to the non-availability of a facility at Long Binh, the office is presently physically located at 37B Phan Chau Trinh, Bien Hoa. The master plan for the Long Binh complex has in it a building for the Long Binh Area Civilian Personnel Office.

(2) In accordance with USARV Regulation 10-4, Commanding Officer, Long Binh Post is responsible for the coordination of the security and defense of the Long Binh Post. Accomplishment of the function remains with the commander who has primary functional responsibility.

b. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Local National Personnel, Page 5: Control of local national personnel insofar as issuance of base passes, determination on area of access are rightfully those of the Post Commander. Determination of proper grades, qualifications, eligibility for hire and obtaining proper security clearances are the responsibility of the Area Civilian Personnel Officer.

c. Reference Paragraph b(2)(3) and (4), Part I, Section II, Pages 3 and 4: Action was initiated on 9 December 1966 to establish a perimeter road to close the gap currently existing between the northern boundary of the 48th Transportation Group to the western boundary of the 64th Quartermaster Battalion. When completed this
road will tie together the entire western side of the post perimeter. Meanwhile, a good portion of the gap between the 140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company and the 64th Quartermaster Battalion will be occupied by two Engineer Battalions, the first of which should be in place by January 1967. Funds for road construction as well as for security lighting and fencing are being provided in the 1967 MCA Program.

d. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Essential Facilities, Page 4: Post commander participation in base development planning will be provided by the establishment of a Base Development Planning Board approved by this headquarters on 16 December 1966. This authorization becomes effective with the approval of the Long Binh Post master plan.

e. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Post Organization, Page 4: This headquarters on 21 November 1966 approved an authorization of 2 AN/VRC-47 and one AN/VRC-49 radios for the Long Binh Post. Requirements for vehicles will be evaluated when received. In the interim, this installation is utilizing vehicles formerly assigned to the Long Binh Sub-Area Command. At present the TD is being staffed in this headquarters. Personnel were provided on a priority basis. Since unit is provisional, no authorization exists for requisitioning personnel. Those personnel provided were levied from units or diverted from other valid requirements.

f. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Traffic Control, Page 5: Traffic control problems will be alleviated upon completion of road construction programs currently approved. These include a pioneer perimeter roadway in the ammunition storage area to be replaced by a permanent roadway in 1967 as additional engineer effort becomes available.

g. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Military Police, Pages 5 and 6: Nonconcur. USARPV Circular 190-1, establishes the concept of operations for providing military police services on an area basis and is applicable to all USARPV installations and subordinate commands which are supported by non-tactical military police units.
AVMOC-DH (19 Nov 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

h. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: USAFV Stockade, Para
6: The 18th Military Police Brigade assumed responsibility for adminis-
tration and operation of the USAFV stockade, effective 3 December 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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