**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**AUTHORITY**

31 Dec 1973, per doc markings; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980
SECURITY MARKING

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (9 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670474

17 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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9th Infantry Division
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-MH July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65)

TO: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCS-MH
APO San Francisco 96307

The inclosed Operational Report-Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with paragraph 6d, Appendix II, USARV Regulation Number 870-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/R. L. Phelps

Incl
as

t/R. L. PHELPS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL, HQS, DEPT OF THE ARMY.
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<td>Unit Locations (as of 30 April)</td>
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SUMJUCT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (RCS/GSPER-65) (U)

1. (U) Introduction
   b. Location: Vicinity, Long Thanh North (TS 164996), RVN.
   c. Reporting Officer: Major General George S. Ehrhardt.

2. (U) Activation through Deployment
   a. Approval for activation of the 9th Infantry Division was issued by Department of the Army on 22 January 1966. The division was activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 1 February 1966 by Fifth US Army General Order 22 dated 26 January 1966, as a standard ROAD division with eight infantry and one mechanized battalion.
   b. Included in the DA message authorizing activation, was authority to assign 2200 individuals receiving basic training in a provisional basic training brigade at Fort Riley to the 9th Division. These individuals had originally been programmed for assignment to the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado.
   c. The plan for training the division provided for units to conduct basic combat (BCT), advanced individual (AIT), basic unit (BUT), and advanced unit (AUT) training in three major increments. Each increment was to consist of a brigade headquarters, three maneuver battalions, an artillery battalion, and a proportionate share of the combat service and combat service support elements of the division.
   d. Automatic issue of basic TOE items (rifle, bayonet, scabbards and protective masks) was effected prior to commencement of BCT. Fifty percent of authorized equipment was issued during BCT and the remainder issued during AIT.
   e. The division staff was satellited on the Fort Riley Staff initially, to release as many personnel as possible to training increments during early organization.
   f. DA indicated that cadre personnel would be late. Resulting cadre shortages, MOS and grade imbalances of cadre assigned, necessitated the first change to the training program. To resolve this shortage General Ehrhardt directed CO, Division artillery to organize a cadre training committee. This committee was organized using cadre resources then assigned to the second and third increments. This committee presented rifle qualification instruction, bayonet, hand-to-hand combat, and grenade training to newly inducted trainees. Although planned starting dates for BCT could not be realized, the training committee facilitated a more rapid schedule than would otherwise have been possible.
   g. As the 2200 BCT trained personnel originally programmed for the 5th Division (M) were assigned to the division in February, a majority were placed in schools to acquire hard skills (skills requiring ten or more weeks training). Remaining soldiers from this group were placed in non-divisional units with the ultimate goal of providing the division with as many school trained soldiers as possible.
   h. During March and April 1966, the division received two thousand AIT trained personnel who were not programmed. Many of these soldiers were sent to division base units and others were sent to schools to develop hard skills. Approximately two hundred of these soldiers were trained engineers.

1Message, DCSPER (FOOD), 1A 748172, Headquarters, Department of the Army, subject Activation of 9th Division, dated 222137Z, January 1966.
and become the nucleus of the 15th Engineer Battalion scheduled to commence training with the third increment in July.

1. In March the division was informed by USCONIC that 2,930 AIT trained fillers would be provided for the units in the third increment, thereby enabling these elements to organize and go directly into unit (AIT/BCT) training. This action had an impact on both the training and logistical support of the third increment. It meant that the third increment would commence training in July with BCT rather than XCT and that 100 percent of the TOE equipment for this increment would have to be on hand at that time. It also placed a burden on the support command as it meant that the 3d Brigade support slice would have to be trained and ready to function.

2. The first cycle of BCT in the division commenced training on 11 April. Each division unit was then phased into training on a progressive schedule (Appendix 2, Phases of Training). Emphasis during BCT was placed on development of physical fitness and basic fundamentals of soldiering. Tactical foot marches and bivouacs were integrated early in the training program. After completion of the first eight weeks of training, BCT graduates were given two weeks leave.

3. In May the division was alerted for deployment to Southeast Asia. Subsequently a request was received from ACV to have the engineer battalion in country by September to assist in preparing base camp areas for arrival of the division. Fortunately, four hundred fillers had already been assigned to the engineer battalion. These men had come from the 4th Brigade six hundred short of authorized strength. Although they had been scheduled to commence AIT by 4 August, two companies began BCT in June. The battalion was able to complete basic training, combat maintenance management inspections and its operational readiness test in August, and deploy by the end of September.

4. A plan from HCV also indicated the 9th Division would be actively engaged in riverine warfare. As very little doctrine was available about riverine warfare and the division was already operating under an accelerated training schedule, plans were made to develop doctrine and modify organizations in NRV.

5. General Eckhardt directed that the division and post staffs be separated on 1 July 1966. The significant impact was the requirement to train the division staff to become self-sufficient and retention of a post staff to administer deployment of thirty-three units during the following year.

6. When the division was activated, it was not a deploying unit; therefore, there was no requirement established that personnel assigned to be deployable to RVN. Consequently, many Vietnam returnees and personnel returning from Korea and other unaccompanied tour areas were assigned. The division was informed initially that deployability criteria would be as outlined in H Circular 61-6. This was later amended during a meeting of the JCS, 1st, and representatives of Fifth Army, US Corps and DIV which resulted in a loss of 2,284 non-deployable personnel including almost half of the staff.

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2Message, #SPFOR (CON), H 654134, Headquarters, Department of the Army, subject: Warning Order—Deployment to SE(A) (Southeast Asia), dated 04 2208Z May 1966.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS/COPR-86) (W)

The division's aggressive support of the officer candidate school program also had a considerable impact on filling NCO leadership positions. The loss of four hundred of the best soldiers in the division to the program virtually removed the top layer of potential leaders.

The last two battalions in the division to be given BCT mission were the general support artillery battalion, the 3d Battalion, 28th Artillery (Honest John) and the lst Battalion, 84th Artillery (155/6-inch). There was a critical shortage of cadre and supervisory personnel for these battalions and little prospect for improvement. As a consequence the command and staff resources were consolidated under the senior commander in a battalion group. In effect, this organization conducted BCT for six batteries (four from the 1-84 Artillery and two from the 3-28 Artillery). The 3-28 Artillery was reduced to zero strength effective 25 August 1966, and its personnel were transferred to other division organizations.

Division strength as of 24 June was (authorized/assigned): 928/694 Officers, 128/70 Warrant Officer, and 14,506/17,872 Enlisted Men for an aggregate strength of 15,562/17,836 personnel. At this time the division was short 2,738 reportable items of equipment.

On 12 July 1966, Hq provided an MTOE for the division's review. The MTOE provided four rifle companies, a headquarters company, and a combat support company in each infantry battalion. The MTOE created approximately 1,200 additional spaces in the division. Hq withheld authority to organize the fourth rifle company until the availability of resources could be determined.

Before unexpected assignment of troops in February and April, the division had made provisions to receive one hundred percent of cadre and filler personnel strength plus a five percent average to accommodate losses to OCS, administrative and hardship discharges, etc. Some of these personnel were just completing BCT as part of the overstrength created by eliminating the Honest John Battalion and other deployable personnel were available in Fort Riley, SLEFP and CONUS operating units. Although there had been a short fall in personnel programmed for the 3d Brigade, sufficient personnel were available on station to fill the six hundred vacancies created by the overstrength created by the MTOE.

General Eckhardt, based on these factors, determined it necessary to immediately reorganize existing resources into the new MTOE structure and fill the six hundred vacancies created by the shortfall in personnel programmed for the 3d Brigade.

The brigade commanders then adjusted their training programs to compensate for a small cross section of personnel who had completed BCT but were assigned to units entering the BCT phase of training. This especially held true in the 1st Brigade which had just completed AIT and the 3d Brigade which would not conduct AIT.

When the 3d Brigade entered the unit training cycle, the range and training areas became overcrowded. This situation was eased by culmination of rotation taken by Fort Riley Post earlier in the year to increase the size of the reservation by fifty thousand acres (Appendix 3, Sketch Map, Fort Riley). Fort Riley responded to other training requirements of the division by constructing seven squad live fire tactical ranges, five rotary wing aircraft mockups, and one replica of a Vietnamese village consisting of 19 huts, a boat dock, and tunnel complex.

On 16 July an advance movement directive was published by division establishing equipment and personnel readiness dates.

Lottery #42 (1000), Hq 2nd Bn, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, Subject Advance Movement Directive, dated 16 July 1966.
x. Project "Helping Hand", was initiated on 20 July 1966, between division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The project was designed to facilitate an exchange of information between command and staff organizations of the two units. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided much helpful information concerning tactical operations, and civil affairs/psychological activities during the project.

y. On 8 August, information concerning logistical preparation for overseas movement was published (Appendix 4, Logistical Preparation for Overseas Movement). This directive provided definitive guidance on actions to be taken before and after receipt of orders, packing and marking equipment and other general information.

z. The 9th Military Intelligence, 18th and 19th Public Information Detachments were organized on 15 August 1966, for attachment to the division.

a. Provisional advance planning group consisting of officer representatives from operations, logistics, signal, civil affairs, and engineering elements of the division arrived in Vietnam in late August. This group, headed by Brigadier General Morgan G. Roseborough (Appendix 5, Instructions for Division Group), was instrumental in providing information on which to guide training and preparation of the division for deployment.

b. Division strength as of 30 September was (authorized/assigned): 987/867 Officers, 175/92 Warrant Officers, 14,721/15,610 Enlisted Men for an aggregate strength of 15,685/16,568 personnel (Appendix 6, Critical MOS Shortages). At this time the division was short 1,097 reportable items of equipment.

c. Other training restrictions imposed centered around the lack of mission essential equipment and the national short supply of certain types of ammunition. Signal equipment and repair parts for signal equipment were a major problem. Major items were not issued with component parts, i.e., power cables, crystals, generators, etc, required to make them operational. The lack of communication equipment virtually eliminated the capability of establishing intelligence and logistical nets to train personnel in the major command and control system. The communication equipment problem was alleviated somewhat by loan and lateral transfer of none of the required equipment by Fifth Army. The status of other essential equipment was expedited by liaison from the Army Material Command which was established at Fort Riley on 1 September.

d. Command Maintenance Management Inspections were conducted by Fifth US Army between 1 August and 21 October 1966. Only four of the 101 individual units inspected required reinspection. Material readiness of all equipment within the division upon deployment was satisfactory.

e. The plan for processing for overseas movement (Appendix 7, Administrative Order 2 and 4) outlined in detail the routines that were to be taken by each unit. A POM inspection was conducted for each increment by division units and Fort Riley Post. After completion of the POM inspection each increment packed and separated equipment for deployment. Equipment was categorized as General Cargo, Red Circle, or Yellow Disc. Conex containers were used to pack General Cargo (unit impediment shipped without unaccompanied vehicles) and Red Circle (cargo which was to accompany troops on the same vessel or arrive simultaneously). Yellow Disc Cargo was hand carried.

ff. The major influx of aviators for the 9th Aviation Battalion arrived in September and October 1966. Airmobile training conducted prior to their arrival was supported by the 176th Aviation Company from Fort Benning, Georgia. The late arrival of organic aircraft caused problems in aerial transition and unit training of the battalion. Approximately twenty-five
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFOR-65) (U)

aviators assigned required twenty-five hours transition training in the UH1 and the remainder of aviators assigned required a minimum of one hour standardization training. A large percentage of aviators were received directly from flight school which necessitated several hours of additional training and orientation. Due to airmobile training commitments for the brigades, much of the aviator training had to be combined with this support.

As of 1 November 1966, the personnel and equipment status of the division had shown some improvement (Appendix 8, Personnel, MOS and equipment Shortages).

The division moved overseas (Appendix 9, Division Deployment Schedule) by air (advance party) and surface (main body) transportation. Included in each advance party were approximately two hundred junior leaders who received on-the-job-training with their counterparts in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade, 1st and 25th Divisions. This program proved invaluable in acquainting a cross section of the division with the combat environment in Vietnam.

The official arrival of the division was celebrated on 19 December 1966, when support units of the division debarked the USNS Barrett at Vung Tau, Vietnam. General Eckhardt presented the division to General William C. Westmoreland who addressed debarking troops and welcomed the division to Vietnam.

Division personnel were transported (Appendix 10, Arrival of 9th Division) to the division base camp by truck convoy. The two hour and forty-five minute journey went north along National Route 15 to Camp Martin Cox located near Long Thanh North (YS 1600). The final element closed on 31 January 1967.

A total of 16,524 personnel and their Red Circle TAT equipment and approximately 250 Conex containers and 1,268 short tons of cargo debarked from eight MSTS troop transports at Vung Tau. At the Saigon Port twenty-three transports discharged 28,386 long tons of unit impedimenta and equipment which included 2,945 wheeled vehicles, 2,326 trailers, 313 tracked vehicles, 90 other major items of equipment, 62 howitzers and 1,631 Conex containers.

3. DELETED, HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.
4. (FOUO) Personnel

a. During the period of this report the enlisted posture of the division has been excellent. However, the problem of shortages of Captains and NCO's grade (E-5) prior to deployment has been further aggravated by a casualty rate which has exceeded the rate of fill. The rotational hump (Nov 67-Jan 68) has been eased by participation in the USARV infusion program. As of 30 April 128 officers and 1600 enlisted personnel had been infused. This represents completion of approximately one-third of the infusion program. Shortly after arrival in country it became readily apparent that sufficient personnel were not provided in the division ROAD Organization to support base camp activities. Approval of a recommended base camp augmentation was received and implemented at the close of the reporting period.

b. Division strength as of 30 April 1967:

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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1600</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1800</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2200</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200-2400</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Miscellaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Since arrival in Vietnam the division has received 2,868 enlisted and 69 officer replacements.

5. (C) Intelligence

a. Enemy main force units in the division TICOR/AO have avoided contact with division elements with only small scale sporadic encounters recorded. The large scale battle fought during Operation ENTERPRISE was friendly initiated. The only large scale battle recorded that was enemy initiated occurred outside the division TICOR while the 1st Brigade was under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

b. Enemy losses to friendly operations during the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served weapons</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition (rounds)</td>
<td>1848/35</td>
<td>3976/906</td>
<td>6032/5448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades (tons)</td>
<td>14.13/2.08</td>
<td>49.65/13.68</td>
<td>143.75/8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sappers</td>
<td>5/11</td>
<td>9/85</td>
<td>12/103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Captured/destroyed

5. (C) Intelligence

a. It is estimated that enemy combat strength in the division TICOR/AO is approximately 9,000 while strength of VC personnel assigned as members of irregular guerrilla units, or to administrative and political tasks was estimated to be approximately 28,000. The following is a list of VC units in the TICOR/AO:

(1) Regiments

274 (Base Area 305, Bien Hoa, subordinate to the 5th VC Division)
Dong Thap I (Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa)
Dong Thap I (Dinh Tuong, Long An)

(2) Battalions

Dung Hoi (Bien Hoa)
506th Bn (Long An)
514th Bn (Dinh Tuong)
516th Bn (Kien Hoa)
518th Bn (Kien Hoa)

(3) Companies

C240 (Long An)
C312 (Long An)
C314 (Long An)
C315 (Long An)
C316 (Long An)
C212 (Dinh Tuong)
Cho Co (Dinh Tuong)
Chua Thanh (Dinh Tuong)
Dong Hoa (Dinh Tuong)
C207 (Dinh Tuong)
Cai Ley (Dinh Tuong)
Cai Be (Dinh Tuong)
C330 (Kien Hoa)
C340 (Kien Hoa)
C550 (Kien Hoa)

The following is a list of VC units in the TICOR/AO:
d. During the three month reporting period, there have been many reports of ABN and regular force installations being attacked by VC throughout the division. S/12R/10. It is believed that this may be an effort to discourage the Viennese from supporting US forces in the counterinsurgency effort. The manner of attacks, acts of terrorism, wireless entry, propaganda and sabotage incidents during the reporting period are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raid Entry</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Significant sources of intelligence have included the use of prisoners and Chieu Hoi. Much useful information concerning VC organization and operations has been obtained from documents, Red Hoa, SED, SPAR and other reports have been considered useful in fixing enemy locations and activities. However, unless intelligence information has pertrined to fixed targets it usually has been received too late to react. For example, on 12 April an aerial photographic mission was flown over the HCLG S/LT Special Zone. It was a priority three mission and the results were not received until one week later. The photographs showed a large field of troops of varying lengths being unloaded along the river banks. A subsequent visual inspection and later a ground search of the area revealed no indication of enemy activity. This is one of the many examples of information received too late for decisive action.

f. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and possible sources of action for the reporting period:

(1) The 5th VC Division (headquarters and support elements) and the 275 MP Regiment remained in the Kwai Yoo area. The 274 MP Regiment departed its customary area (Hoi Dinh) west of Highway 2 and its main elements apparently joined the remainder of the 5th VC Division in Kwai Yoo. The combat effectiveness of the 5th VC Division, particularly the 275 MP Regiment, was generally poor. Rice was in short supply and morale low because of the general lack of success by the 5th Division units and large caches of VC rice captured on Operation TRANSFER, 4-15 April 1967. 5th Division units avoided contact with US and Australian forces and attempted to improve their logistical situation by seeking rice and obtaining supplies from LOC's running through the Hoi Dinh area from HCLG S/LT and Saigon.

(2) Bien Hoa Province: Local VC forces in Bien Hoa maintained the capability of launching up to company size attacks. There were an estimated 1600 VC guerrillas and members of district units in Bien Hoa while the 273 MP Regiment occasionally operated in the southerm portion of Bien Hoa area. A VC combat group known as 7-10, with a strength of approximately 1000 men, attempted to interdict shipping moving in and out of Saigon throughout the HCLG S/LT Special Zone. VC forces in Bien Hoa were under considerable pressure and were mainly committed to countering the SVN Revolutionary Development Program.

(3) Long An Province: VC forces in or targeted against friendly installations in the Long An Province consisted of the 306th and 2d VC Battalions; and in addition to the 312th, 315th, and 315th district companies and approximately 20 village guerrilla units. Many forces were able to recruit with facility and apparently replaced in a large extent their heavy battle and Chieu Hoi losses, to maintain unit strengths. However, the VC lost much freedom of action in the province due to constant search and destroy sweeps by the 9th Division and SVN Forces that kept VC forces off balance. The VC in Long
An Province continued to avoid contact with division units and reported to
several harassing attacks of US installations with snipers and mortars. The
enemy also staged several attacks against GVN outposts in an effort to destroy
GVN influence and discredit the Revolutionary Development Program.

6. (c) Operations

a. The 9th Infantry Division conducted 17 major and 2,343 small
unit operations. Seventeen major and forty-seven small unit operations resulted
in contact.

b. Operation SILVER LAKE (9-19 January), was a search and destroy
operation conducted in the Minh Son rubber plantation area (YS 2393). The
platoon had served as a major entry point for supplies, including twenty
of the twenty-six tons of rice, destined for the 2741h Regiment in the
Phuoc Chi/Anh Thich Secret Zones. During its first operation, the 3d Brigade
effectively denied the VC a significant source of rice revenue and a means of
movement of supplies by controlling vehicles on the plantation. Upon
completion of this operation a battalion size security force was employed vic-
inity Minh Son until 24 February. Following withdrawal of this battalion the
platoon was patrolled by forces from Camp Martin Cox on an almost daily
frequency. (App II, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SILVER
LAKE).

c. The first operation conducted by the 1st Brigade was operation
COLBY (20-28 January). The 5-60 Inf (K) and the 3-5 Cav (-) participated
under operational control of the brigade. This was an encirclement and search
operation vicinity (YS 3088) in the Phuoc Chi/Anh Thich Secret Zone. During its first operation the 3d Brigade
effectively denied the VC a significant source of rice revenue and a means of
movement of supplies by controlling vehicles on the plantation. Upon
completion of this operation a battalion size security force was employed vic-
inity Minh Son until 24 February. Following withdrawal of this battalion the
platoon was patrolled by forces from Camp Martin Cox on an almost daily
frequency. Results of this operation were included in enemy losses for Operation
COLBY/IOL (App 12, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation COLBY/
IOL).

d. Operation IOL was initiated on 28 January by the 1st Brigade
immediately upon termination of Operation COLBY. Forces under operational
control of the 1st Brigade included 3-5 Cav and 1-11 ACR. This operation was
designed to secure Highway 15 during arrival and movement of the 3d Brigade
and division rear elements from Vung Tau to Long Thanh North (Camp Martin Cox).
The operation was highly successful in that closure of these elements marked
the closing of the division without incident. (App 12, Combat Operations After
Action Report, Operation IOL).

e. TF TRUSCOTT was formed on 28 January by 5-60 Inf (K). Initially
the 5-60 Inf (K) with 2-60 Inf conducted operations vicinity the Minh Son
rubber plantation in support of Operation IOL. At 31 January TF TRUSCOTT
assumed OPCOM of 3-5 Cav, 1-11 ACR and responsibility for security of Highway
15 from the 1st Brigade. TF TRUSCOTT then secured Highway 15 during movement
of supplies from Vung Tau to Long Thanh North (Camp Martin Cox) until 5 February.

f. Operation PECCHER (28 January-30 April) was initiated by Head-
quarters, 3d Brigade at Dong Tam near My Tho (YS 5045). The 3-60 Inf and two
engineer companies began deploying to Dong Tam (YS 45345) on 24 January. The
mission of this task force was to begin development of the base and secure
construction sites in preparation for arrival of additional elements of the
division. Company size search and destroy operations were conducted in the
local area and development of the base proceeded on schedule. The 5-60 Inf (K)
entered the Dinh Tuong Province on 4 February to secure the Minh Doi airstrip
(YS 4845). The first major action occurred on 7 March when a platoon of 3-60
Operations Progressing After The Fall of Saigon

The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, marked the end of the Vietnam War. The United States, having poured billions of dollars into a conflict that had lasted for more than a decade, was forced to withdraw its troops and承认 its defeat.

The treaty signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, had called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. However, the communists had refused to abide by the terms of the agreement, and the fighting had continued.

On April 29, 1975, the North Vietnamese army began a massive offensive that quickly overran the South. The capital city of Saigon was captured on April 30, and the last U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were evacuated by helicopter from the rooftop of the American Embassy.

The fall of Saigon was a blow to the nation's morale, and it marked the end of an era. The United States had been involved in a war that had cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars, and it had failed to achieve its goals.

The United States had attempted to create a stable government in South Vietnam, but it had failed to do so. The communists had been able to take advantage of the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, and they had been able to seize power.

The fall of Saigon was a reminder of the lessons of history. The United States had been involved in a war that had lasted for more than a decade, and it had failed to achieve its goals. The United States had been forced to withdraw its troops and承认 its defeat, and it had been left with the task of trying to make sense of a terrible mistake.

The fall of Saigon was a reminder of the importance of preventing wars from escalating out of control. The United States had been involved in a war that had cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars, and it had failed to achieve its goals.

The United States had attempted to create a stable government in South Vietnam, but it had failed to do so. The communists had been able to take advantage of the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, and they had been able to seize power.
and a half day battle resulted in 247 VC KIA (K), 1 FM and 42 small arms captured. (App 17, Combat Operations After Action Report, BATTLE OF DOI MA CHAI). Extensive search and destroy and pacification operations continued through the end of the reporting period. VC losses for the period: 816 KIA (K), 27 FM, 24 Chieu Rong and 14 tons of rice. US losses were 74 KIA, 350 MIA and 2 APC destroyed.

1. Operation CHAPMAN (16 February-30 April) was initiated by 3-47 Inf in the HUE CITY Special Zone. A battalion CP was established vicinity Xs G10701. Two companies were employed in search and destroy operations throughout the southern portion of the zone on a rotating basis to preclude VC interdiction of the main shipping channel between the South China Sea and Saigon. The 3-47 Inf was relieved by 4-47 Inf on 17 March. (App 18, After Action Report, RIVER RAIDER I).


3. Operation FITZBURGH (25 February-3 March) was a highly successful reconnaissance in force operation conducted by the 1st Brigade. The 2-47 Inf (M), 4-39 Inf and one cirmobile company allocated on a daily basis, were employed to reconnoiter the southern portion of Wz Zone D during the latter phase of Operation BIG SPRING. Although only light contact was made, elements of the 7th VC Division were denied freedom of movement out of the zone. (App 20, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FITZBURGH).

4. Operation JUNCTION CITY (1 March-30 April) was conducted by 199th Brigade (Sep) (Light) in the Gia Binh Province under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division.

5. Operation JUNCTION CITY (3-29 March), Headquarters, 1st Brigade with 4-39 Inf and 4-47 Inf (M) and 3-5 Cav participated in Operation JUNCTION CITY under OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division. On 20 March 1 Troop, 3-5 Cav was attacked by major elements of the 2734 VC Regiment vicinity Bien Hap (Xs 786450), while providing security for an artillery fire support base. During the attack 67 air sorties were flown and over 2900 rounds of artillery were fired. Results were 251 VC KIA (K), 4 VC FM, 5 US KIA and 26 USCIA. (App 21, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation JUNCTION CITY).

6. Operation FORTRESS (Phase II) (3-15 April) was conducted by the 1st Brigade in cooperation with the 11th ACR and one squadron of the 18th ACR. Headquarters, 1st Brigade (with 2-39 Inf and 2-47 Inf (M), and 3-5 Cav) was employed to disrupt the logistical supply system of the 5th VC Division, extend GVN influence, and destroy VC forces where found along Route 327 from Binh Hin (YS 5077) to Xuyen Moc (YS 6568). This operation forced the enemy to regroup forces throughout the province to avoid significant contact. Results of the operation were: 44 VC KIA (K), 6 WPM, 77 weapons, 219,163 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 18 tons of rice captured. (App 22, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FORTRESS).

7. Operation PORTSEYM (Phase III) (19 April to continuing) is being conducted by Headquarters 1st Brigade with 4-39 Inf and 2-47 Inf (M) under OPCON of the 25th Infantry Division in the Tay Binh Province.

7. (FONU) Training

a. The initial problem of training the division after rotation was a lack of sufficient qualified and experienced cadre. Although this trend continued throughout deployment, it was resolved initially by conducting approximately one-half of BCT by rotation rather than unit training entered AIT, training was conducted at unit level. The Army approved period of sixteen weeks was used to conduct BCT and AIT. To meet proposed deployment schedules the provisions of USMACV Circular 350-33, Subject: Guidance for Training Newly Activated Units, permitted units to complete the unit training phase (normally thirteen weeks) in eight weeks (App, Phases of Training).
b. Opeational activities

(1) During the month of January the chemical section initiated defoliation operations along the north and east side of Camp Martin Cox. A helicopter mounted spray apparatus consisting of a 10 foot length of pipe with 1/4" holes drilled every six inches, mounted across the aircraft sides was used. A fifty-five gallon drum filled with herbicide inside the helicopter was connected to the pipe by a one inch diameter rubber hose. The drum was slightly pressurized with a 31/2 cubic compressor to force the solution into the spray box. A hand pump was used to refill the drum after a spray of five minutes. This method is a satisfactory for small areas unaccessible by ground vehicle however, in thick jungle areas only the top layer of the canopy was affected. Against grass and brush the agent was considered successful.

(2) During February 10,000 gallons of herbicide was dispensed from a power decontaminating apparatus mounted on a 2 1/2 ton truck. This method of delivery was hampered on several occasions when equipment was damaged by stumps, logs, etc., hidden by foliage.

(3) During April perimeter defoliation was performed at Rach Kien (XS 740966) and Tan Tru (XS 655621). The defoliation solution was sprayed using Mity-Mites and portable flamethrowers. Both methods were suitable however, the Mity-Mite proved a more effective range dispenser for ground defoliation.

c. Riot Control Agents (RCA)

Several RCA operations were connected during the period using...
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFM-65) (U)

A variety of delivery methods. On one occasion ninety barrels of RCA CS-1 fitted with bursters were dropped from 3200 feet and exploded at tree top level. Ground contamination was accomplished however, prevailing winds carried some agent forty kilometers downwind. Powdered CS was employed with success in tunnel denial operations particularly in support of Operation COLBY.

9. (FWD) Logistics

a. Supply and Services

(1) During the reporting period supply and service operations within the division were established and improved. The division relied mainly upon organic support for all operations but received excellent support from 1st Logistical Command when needed. Listed below are resumes of logistical support activities.

(a) Operation PALM BEACH: Operations from Dong Tam base are being supplied from a division forward supply element which receives supplies from the 53rd General Support Group, Vung Tau, RVN, through the Dong Tam Logistical Support Area established by 1st Logistical Command. All classes of supply are being delivered by barge, LST, or aircraft to the base.

(b) Operation ENTERPRISE: When the division undertook Operation ENTERPRISE, several logistical problems became apparent. One of the major problems was the obtaining of fresh water from a salt water source in Tan An. The area of operations for ENTERPRISE is inside the salt water intrusion line, therefore, rendering surface water unfit for consumption. To solve this problem two actions were required. The first was to contract for purchase of water from a well at Tan An. This was accomplished by contract prepared by 1st Logistical Command. Water is now purchased for about five cents a cubic meter. Approximately 12,000 gallons a day are used. Secondly, a source was needed to transport water in large quantities to the battalions in the field. The division requested temporary loan of water tankers from 1st Logistical Command and received three 1000 gallon and one 5000 gallon tanker. Another major problem was acquiring sufficient land (five acres) to establish a division forward supply element. This was accomplished by upgrading and expanding an airstrip west of Tan An to accommodate the FSE as well as providing a C-123 capable airstrip. Class I and III are delivered to the FSE by 1st Logistical Command and Class V is received through Dong Tam.

(c) Operation CH/PMN: The infantry battalion conducting Operation CH/PMN in the RUNG S.T Special Zone is supplied from Camp Martin Cox by air and from Vung Tau by LOC. Both methods have proven satisfactory.

(2) Upon arrival in RVN basic loads of ammunition were filled by receiving ammunition at the civilian supply rate (ASR). Because initial ammunition expenditures were light, the first units to arrive were able to rapidly establish basic loads for the arrival of subsequent units. This procedure was followed until all basic loads were established.

(3) The two major areas of concern in supply have been the shortage of TA 50-901 and communication equipment. Shortage of bulk storage refrigerators resulted in spoilage of perishables because of storage limitations.

b. Maintenance

(1) Along with forward supply sections, maintenance companies have been positioned at Dong Tam, Ben Luc, and with the lst Brigade to provide support maintenance for division units.

(2) The division decline rate has fluctuated between approximately 450-600 items. Signal items constitute about 80% of the total decline with engine and wheeled vehicles accounting for the majority of the remaining 20%. An increase in aircraft decline occurred when the 90 day
stockage of PL44th which the aviation battalion deployed, was depleted. Deadline rates can be attributed to dust, heat and continued combat operations.

(3) The 709th Maintenance Battalion had the following number of job orders received and completed during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy construction equip</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeled vehicles</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracked vehicles</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal equipment</td>
<td>2982</td>
<td>3922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and mortar</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Medical. The 9th Medical Battalion treated 2,054 patients from the division and 238 non-divisional patients during the reporting period, of these 1,380 were wounded in action. During the same period MEDCAP treated 18,277 patients and DENTCAP treated 553 patients.

(5) Graves Registration. The graves registration section of the 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion processed 131 remains and 169 personal effects. Of the remains 3 were non-divisional.

10 (U) Civic Action and Psychological Operations

c. Civic Action

(1) Area Coordinating Committees have been established throughout the division's AO. At present, three ACC's are at province level and three at district level. These committees are composed of US-US personnel. Area Coordinating Committee functions deal with both military operations and military-civic affairs problems encountered in an area. It acts as an instrument for the coordination, planning and execution of all combined operations within its jurisdiction. Progress has been made in the following areas:

(a) Support for MEDTF outposts.

(b) Security for Revolutionary Development activities and work.

(c) Combined planning and operations.

(d) Reporting on incidents between US and VN personnel.

(e) Civic Action programs.

(f) More Community Relations Committees being established.

(g) Subcommittees such as youth and self-help committees being programmed.

(h) The ACC has proven itself to be valuable in solving common problems and keeping both US and GVIT informed of what the other is doing and methods of reinforcement.

(2) Civic Action projects must be conducted one at a time, at any one location, otherwise no activity will achieve the results desired. For example, holding a MEDCAP and food distribution to needy people at the same time give doctors only a small number of people to treat.

(3) Constant command emphasis is being placed on civic action projects to preclude assigning a low priority to CA activities for the more urgent demands of the tactical situation.
(4) Other units have paid skilled Vietnamese laborers for civic action projects. The division is refusing to do this in order to make the Vietnamese officials and civilians work toward becoming responsible citizens.

(5) The 9th Division has helped refugees in the village of An Nhu to move back into their village by providing technical assistance, labor equipment and food aid. The market place, school, dispensaries and roads are being repaired and returned to operating condition. Needy people are receiving foodstuffs and clothing.

(6) Civic action projects in hamlets having RD teams present were designed to fill in and complement RD team work. If an RD team required assistance by heavy equipment, every effort has been made to make it available. Several of these requests were filled by a bulldozer provided by division engineers.

(7) RD team security has been assigned to commanders as part of their mission. This is to ensure that the RD teams are afforded ample opportunity to perform their mission.

(8) Specific goals have been assigned in the areas of MEDCAPS. MEDCAPS are conducted at the rate of one per day per battalion or larger size unit having a surgeon in its headquarters. Schedules are provided for more effective utilization of medical personnel. A schedule assures that all doctors are used on a regular basis, rather than indiscriminately using a few doctors all the time and some doctors not at all.

b. Psychological Operations

(1) Since arrival in Vietnam, the Division PSYOPs campaign has increased in effectiveness and volume to support division operations. PSYOPs have been employed in every major division operation during the reporting period. The increase in both volume and effectiveness can be attributed to the experience gained by division PSYOPs personnel and the increased support rendered by the 266th PSYOPs Company. There has also been an increased awareness on the part of the key commanders within the division on the importance of PSYOPs. These have been directed in support of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program and aimed at separating VC from the population. Emphasis is being placed on rapid reaction PSYOPs to exploit Hoi Chanh and tactical successes. Rapid reaction PSYOPs has contributed immeasurably to the marked increase of Hoi Chanh rallying to the GVN. The non-availability of authorized equipment has however, severely limited the rapid reaction PSYOPs capability and effectiveness.

(2) During the reporting period, PSYOPs activities were directed mainly in support of Operations HUNTED, GREENKILL, CHIMAYE, PITTSBURGH, JUNCTION CITY, JOURSSE II, EGERIA, ENTREPRISE, and Operation PALM BEACH. Leaflet drops and/or manpower were made daily during the reporting period. A total of 21,911,000 leaflets were distributed throughout the division area of operation. These were supplied by the supporting PSYOPs Company. In addition, to air leaflet missions, there were a total of 70,439 JUSPAO newsletters, posters, and miscellaneous publications had distributed. Distribution by hand is made to bring to the forefront the proven PSYOPs technique of "Face to Face Persuasion". This technique will be stressed in future operations. A total of one hundred hours of ground and aerial loudspeaker support was provided in support of MEDCAPS and division operations to complement leaflet drops. Movies shown by the mobile PSYOPs team have become an effective propaganda medium and very popular with the target audience. For the period 1 February to 30 April, 82 movies were shown with an average attendance of 183. Films consisted of comedies, westerns, public health and VN psychological appeals. A total of 33 Hoi Chanh rallied to division units and 1608 rallied to GVN forces in provinces where division units have been operating during the reporting period. In the Long An Province, this represents an increase of 688 over the number of Hoi Chanh recorded during the same period in 1966.
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SUMMARY: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (257/CSPOR-65) (c)

11. (c) Internal Security

a. Each base camp area occupied by division elements is contained within a perimeter or berm. Each perimeter/berm consists of a series of bunkers, fully sealed during darkness or periods of reduced visibility and covered by observation during daylight. Patrols are circulated outside perimeters/berm to provide security or established ambushes. Helicopters are maintained on airstrip alert at key installations to provide observation for countermeasures fire and gunship support.

b. Camp Martin Cox (Seaboard)

(1) The mission for security and defense of Camp Martin Cox was initially delegated to division artillery. A base security CP was established at Headquarters, 9th Division Artillery. The security CP coordinated defense of the berm and conduct of local patrols (out to 4000 meters) with forces allocated from tactical and tenant units at Camp Martin Cox. Fire support was provided by elements of division artillery on a twenty-four hour basis. Area responsibilities and mission requirements were coordinated with a US Special Forces Camp located adjacent to Camp Martin Cox.

(2) The security CP was organized with one base security officer (BSO), three assistant BSOs, three MDOs and three NCO/sergeants. The area was divided into four sectors, with sector had a SGT. command of one junior duty officer, an assistant duty officer, three MDO's, three NCO/sergeants and the proportional share of the eighty-six bunkers which constitute the terrain.

(3) The minimum number of personnel and weapons required for security are:

<table>
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<th>MG, cal.50</th>
<th>3</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>2014/79</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2A-312 (telephone)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>M-2 (twin 40)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>M60</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>M35 (quad 50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M60</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Searchlights</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, cal .45</td>
<td>20</td>
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</table>

(4) On 3 March 1967 responsibility for security of Camp Martin Cox was extended to include the entire (Seaboard) tactical area of responsibility.

(5) A provisional detachment was organized on 1 April to assume responsibilities for base camp security of Camp Martin Cox. The detachment is called TF Forsyth. The TF mission is the command and control combat support and combat support elements during conduct of operations within the EOR associated with Camp Martin Cox to include perimeter defense.

c. Dong Tan Base.

(1) The security and defense of Dong Tan includes construction and employment of the responsibility of the commanding officer, 21 Brigade. The perimeter is divided into five sectors (four land and one water) with each tactical and tenant unit assigned a sector. The principal means of defense are bunkers, fire and light towers and obstacles.

(2) One innovation used at Dong Tan which has proven highly successful is construction of portable bunkers. Due to the rapid expansion of the base, construction of permanent bunkers was not practical. Portable bunkers were constructed of timber 6" x 6" x 10 ft and covered with skins. As the perimeter in expanded sections are removed and the bunkers are towed to new positions by dozers. Once bunkers are in position they are rearmed and covered.

d. Each of the other base areas are organized for defense in the same manner as Dong Tan and Camp Martin Cox. The senior tactical commander at outlying base areas is charged with responsibility for security and defense of these bases.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (05/03 FC-65) (U)

12. (U) Base Development

a. Camp Martin Cox

(1) Base Development started at Camp Martin Cox with arrival of the 15th Engineer Battalion on 20 October 1966. At that time Camp Martin Cox consisted of a cleared area 887 x 1992 meters or approximately 441 acres. The battalion's mission was to expand the camp to support division main, two infantry brigades and necessary support units. The 15th Engineer Battalion effort was to have been supplemented by the 35th Engineer Battalion in November 1966, however, support of the engineer battalion was withdrawn prior to its arrival. The resulting loss of approximately 203 line company days caused the 15th Engineer Battalion to work 24 hours a day in order to accomplish its mission. By 31 January 1967, the battalion had constructed 44,315 feet of road using approximately 110,648 cubic yards of laterite, constructed associated drainage, prefabricated 97 latrines, 69 showers, 67 mess hall forces and poured concrete pads for each of the prefabricated buildings. In addition, the battalion cleared approximately 1470 acres of unsecured jungle. Vertical construction was facilitated by arrival of the 169th Engineer Construction Battalion in February 1967. At the close of the reporting period Camp Martin Cox is approximately 1355 x 2754 meters or 1,070 acres (APP 28, Camp Martin Cox).

b. Dong Tam Base

(1) On 21 November 1966 COMVVN directed that a feasibility study be made to determine if one infantry battalion could be deployed to Dong Tam in January 1967 and a brigade in February. The construction (fill) of Dong Tam was progressing on schedule. However, no vertical construction had been started. Once again loss of the 35th Engineer Battalion impacted on the base development effort as approximately 95 company days were lost.

(2) Reasons for selection of the site for Dong Tam were:

(a) The site was near the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone boundary which facilitated coordination of operations.

(b) Sand was readily available that could be dredged to provide a required fill of 8'.

(a) The site was above the salt water intrusion line which would facilitate fresh water resupply. NOTE: The line reaches a point between My Tho and Dong Tam during the dry season before receding toward the South China Sea during the wet season.

(3) An engineer planning group for Dong Tam was formed on 28 December 1966. This planning group subsequently became a task force command and control group and was expanded from an OIC (35, 15th Engineer Battalion) and NOIC (OIC) to include an operations/survey officer, operations NCO, two recon NCO's, a draftsman, two surveyors, a clerk typist, and supply and water point personnel. By 9 January 1967, the planning group had complete scheduling transport/equipment, resupply, requisitioning construction materials, and coordinating with logistical, security, advisor and SVN personnel to support phased development of the base. E and G Companies, 15th Engineer Battalion arrived at Dong Tam on 10 January 1967 and began construction of perimeter defense bunkers, nacre shelters, boat and barge landing sites, showers, latrines, roads, and drainage structures. At the end of the reporting period 300 of the programmed 600 acre site had been completed. (APP 27, Dong Tam Base).

13. (C) Fire Support

a. Artillery

(1) Upon arrival in Vietnam, each artillery battalion supported base camp security from Camp Martin Cox (YS 1600). Fire missions
included support of local patrols, tactical operations, ARVN advisors and harassment and interdiction fires. On 10 January 3-34 Arty deployed from Camp Martin Cox to support Operation SILVER LACE. Following support of this operation the 3-34 Arty deployed to Dong Tam were it became operational on 27 January. During January there were no major changes in artillery organization for combat.

Seven thousand eight hundred thirty-three rounds of artillery were expended during 896 missions fired during the month.

The 1-84 Arty (155mm) arrived and became operational from Camp Martin Cox on 5 February 1967. Division artillery continued to support tactical operations during the month from Camp Martin Cox, Dong Tam, the KIKE SLT Special Zone, the division T/Os and 1-11 Arty accompanied the 1st Brigade on Operation HIGH SPRING and FISTWEATHER. Due to the lack of available landing zones in the Kinh Ngang Province (Dong Tam area), the 3-34 Arty developed a method of providing artillery support from a K IKE barge. Two howitzers were mounted on each barge (App 24, Photograph). The barge is approximately 30' x 90' and is maneuvered by an LCM-6 (boat). The barge provides sufficient space for a cargo of ammunition and limited troop living space. A fire direction center is mounted in the LCM-6. The following observations were noted:

(a) Aircraft and map reconnaissance are inadequate for determining firing positions. Reconnaissance can be made by boat.

(b) Careful consideration of tide conditions must be made to insure that barge will not be grounded when the tide is out.

(c) Movement against tides is very difficult.

(d) Night vision devices proved to be very effective. Infrared searchlights simplify navigation and permit constant surveillance of river banks.

(e) Direct fire on beaches prior to landing troops instills confidence, reduces landing defences and has a tremendous shock value on enemy troops.

(f) Proper application of HET and VE techniques in maintaining GFT conditions provides accurate fire without conducting daily registrations.

During March the effectiveness of harassment and interdiction fires (HAI) was realized when a Ho Chinh surrendered to ARVN in the Kinh Ngang Province. The Ho Chinh explained that he and his fellow VC took precautions to pass under overhead cover but even then they were still suffering casualties from HAI fires from Dong Tam. Two major changes were made in artillery organization for combat during the month. The mission of 2-4 Arty was changed from DS 3d Brigade to DS 54 Brigade and the 3-34 Arty BS mission from 3d Brigade to 2d Brigade.

Division Artillery continued to support division operations during the month. On 1 April 1-84 Arty successfully fired an eighth M-109 self propelled howitzer from a Do Long work barge. During April division artillery submitted a request for issue of an additional AN/TPS-25 radar set. The one set authorized had been employed from a sixty foot lower in support of Operation PUM Breeze. During the period the set had been in operation it had detected over 200 targets in the Dong Tam area. Seven phase of the targets were in free fire areas or in areas where ARVN granted permission to fire. The set has proved unusually successful in the flat areas. Upon receipt of another AN/TPS-25 it will be employed from Ten in support of Operation ENTERPRISE.

During the period 1 February-30 April, units of Division Artillery fired 30,007 missions and expended 165,700 rounds.

Tactical air support flew 1,947 sorties delivering 1,002 tons of bombs and 523 tons of napalm.
Observations and Recommendations

1. (C) Observation

(a) (FOOO) Personnel

ITEM: Deployability Criteria

DESCRIPTION: Policies, procedures, and criteria governing individual deployability criteria are contained in En Circular 614-2. This criteria originally applied to personnel in the division. On 19 September 1964, after the division was well into its unit training phase, there had been 21 modified conditions of non-deployability imposed on the division causing a loss of 2,286 personnel. The net effect of not having firm deployability criteria at the outset caused the following problems:

1. NCO’s who had trained with and knew their men, were reassigned to non-deploying units prior to deployment. This required the reassignment of deploying NCO’s from units marginally affected to those affected the hardest. It also necessitated the assignment of lower grade, lesser skilled personnel to positions of leadership.

2. Considerable strength accounting turbulence was created when many of the non-deployable personnel were assigned to non-divisional units and others remained assigned to the division. In some cases personnel were reassigned from one division and attached back for duty. This coupled with new internal adjustments caused by filler assignments created turning report errors, random unit rotors obsolete even before they were published, and made it extremely difficult to account for enlisted promotion vacancies.

3. In certain cases the inherent vagueness of the non-deployability criteria permitted a few personnel to avoid deployment yet they later were declared deployable when the criteria was further defined. This added to the strength accounting turbulence and caused hardship to those who had to reconsider relocation of their families.

4. The personnel records in a IOOD Division are centrally maintained in division headquarters. Each time the deployability criteria was modified, it required a 100% records check to determine those who were affected by the criteria change. This could not be done mechanically by any of the conditions were not listed in established AF files. Since these no longer eligible for deployment had to be identified immediately, it required the concentrated resources of the entire Personnel Services Division to review records in a crash basis.

5. Once non-deployable personnel were identified, they were reported for reassignment to either the Post, Army Headquarters, C.215C, or B, depending on the requirements for personnel and the # of those declared non-deployable. Sufficient time was rarely given for units to release, clear, and ship them in an orderly manner.

6. The 21 conditions modifying deployability criteria were specified and covered in almost as many regulations, circulars, and messages. This provoked rumors at various times and unnecessary requirements to interpret the provisions of the publications to newly assigned personnel at unit level who were unfamiliar with them or had only been advised of part of them.

7. Other ENDC units levied for personnel for assignment to the division were often unaware of the deployability criteria and consequently the inadvertently assigned more non-deployables to the division.

OBSERVATION: It is essential that the deployability criteria for a unit be established at the outset and that this criteria remain firm throughout the activation and deployment of the unit.

ADMIN: FM Processing
DISCUSSION: A 612-35 outlines in considerable detail the policies and procedures governing the mass processing of personal in preparation to movement overseas. In actual practice there are two basic methods of accomplishing this:

1. The non-divisional garrison personnel activity can provide the processing team to accomplish this task;

2. The deploying unit can establish its own team made up of non deployable personnel.

- The task of POP processing an entire division is a monumental one that must be accomplished swiftly and in a manner that least disrupts unit training. Therefore, the latter of the two basic methods above is preferable for the following reasons:

1. The processing team is under complete control of the deploying unit and has immediate control of the personnel records.

2. Certain command training policies concerning indoctrination of personnel are normally published during activation. This indoctrination must be afforded to each deploying individual and certification of this made prior to the unit departure. A team under control of the unit can better establish a check on these certificates.

3. The division's medical, dental, supply and personnel facilities are immediately available to make on-the-spot adjustments should a need arise. Coordination is much easier when corrective action can be taken internally rather than relying on another headquarters that usually has other deploying units to administer to.

4. Once the team is operational, the members must be exact from all details and completely free to process a unit at any hour of the day or night. This is not usually the case when the division must rely on a garrison team.

5. There will be instances when a unit will not be able to meet its scheduled processing date. Last minute schedule adjustments must be made. A division team can better react to sudden changes.

OBSERVATION: Experience indicates that a POP processing team directly under the control of a deploying unit is preferable to one established by the garrison activity.

END: Records Shipment

DISCUSSION: Unless absolute controls are established, personal records of non deployable personnel will be shipped and records of deploying will be left behind. The following measures are required to insure correct records disposition:

1. Records are referenced to unit personnel rosters 24 hours prior to unit departure.

2. Records are again checked as units board transportation on the day of departure.

3. To the extent possible, personnel records accompany individuals on the same mode of transportation.

4. When surface travel is used, two personnel representatives per 450-man group are employed to update forms and process personnel actions to prevent an administrative backlog upon arrival.

OBSERVATION: It is imperative the maximum possible controls be employed during personnel records transfers.
Disposition of less than desirable personnel from a deploying unit:

**DISCUSSION:** Unit and undesirable personnel must be identified and eliminated from the service as early as possible for the following reasons:

1. It can be expected that the press of training commitments will prevent commanders from taking the necessary steps to initiate elimination action until they have been made aware of how to do it and sufficient evidence is available to substantiate the action.

2. Unless these individuals are eliminated early, there is an unmanageable buildup just prior to deployment. This is at a time when the unit commanders can least afford to be diverted from their mission of preparing their unit for deployment. From a morale standpoint, it is not good personnel management to have unfit and undesirable personnel lingering in a unit until just prior to deployment.

3. If action is taken at the last minute, there will be instances when personnel are virtually pulled off convoy, moving to the point of debarkation. Turbulence is caused in strength accounting if each of the units submitting morning reports depart QMUS carrying in its strength personnel who have not been eliminated from the service yet have remained behind.

**OBSESSION:** It is in the interest of both morale and good personnel management to identify and process for elimination those personnel who are unfit or undesirable for retention in the service as far in advance of unit deployment as possible.

**DISCUSSION:** YOS substitutions are feasible providing time is available for retraining. YOS substitution from a more difficult to a less difficult skill is acceptable in most cases.

**OBSESSION:** Currently authorized YOS substitutions from a less difficult to a more difficult skill should be reviewed.

**YOS Qualified Personnel**

**DISCUSSION:** It is not practical for newly activated units to train personnel for hard-skill YOS's (requiring ten or more weeks training), from assigned resources. While the unit is engaged in another phase of training, these individuals are required to attend YOS qualifying schools, thereby negating their maximum utilization during training.

**OBSESSION:** A portion of hard-skill requirements for newly activated units should be provided from school pipeline outputs without waiting to qualify newly assigned personnel in hard-skilled YOS's.

**Grade Substitutions**

**DISCUSSION:** The authorized two grade substitution for E5 and below, operates to fill high density, hard skill YOS positions with all grade E3 or E4. For example, the mechanical maintenance section, "Maintenance Battalion is authorized 48 automotive repairmen (YOS 63H) with a grade spread as follows: E5 = 8, E4 = 32, and E3 = 8. Provisions for all 48 personnel as described resulted in an E3 = E4, grade spread without sufficient experienced personnel to supervise.

**OBSESSION:** At least one of every four individuals authorized in areas as shown in the exam le should be assigned in the grade authorized.
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SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (JCS/CJCS-65) (b)

TEXT:

DIVISIONAL UNITS ARE NOT ORGANIZED TO MAINTAIN PERSONNEL RECORDS

DISCUSSION: When it became apparent that the engineer battalion would deploy before the remainder of the division an attempt was made to augment the battalion with personnel management personnel. Of the request, seven were provided. The battalion was then forced to provide additional clerks from its own resources.

OBSERVATION: Provisions be made to augment units operating away from its present organization for an extended period of time (over 90 days) with sufficient personnel to support a personnel management activity.

DETERRED ARRIVAL OF OFFICER AND ENLISTED CADETS

DISCUSSION: When sufficient cadre are not available to organize all units simultaneously, units must be organized in priority of need. In the case of the division support command, the supply and transportation battalions had to be organized first to issue equipment and provide transportation for units conducting training. Consequently, maintenance support requirements emerged prior to the time the maintenance battalion could be organized to effectively cope with the problem.

OBSERVATION: Units should not be organized and assigned a mission until a reasonable number of cadre are available.

(b) (c) OPERATIONS

FLEXIBILITY IN OPERATIONS

DISCUSSION: Operations must be planned and conducted without benefit of hard intelligence in many cases. However, units at all levels must be prepared to abandon unprofitable operations on short notice and react to engage a more lucrative target.

OBSERVATION: Units must maintain flexibility to divert planned operations against lucrative targets produced by hard intelligence.

CONCURRENT PLANNING

DISCUSSION: Upon initiation of an unscheduled operation, numerous contingencies must be planned concurrent with operational planning. Fire support, reinforcement and extraction contingency planning must parallel operational planning in order to be able to react to any unforeseen situation.

OBSERVATION: Upon initiation of an unscheduled operation, contingency plans must be formulated as maneuver elements are being committed to the objective area.

Pursuit

DISCUSSION: After contact has been established, units must relentlessly pursue the enemy with aid of air, artillery and gunships. Brigade and higher units must be alert to shift resources needed for accomplishment of the pursuit. Air power and artillery are most effective when ground pressure has temporarily fixed a fleeing enemy in open terrain. Additionally, air power should be available, one strike following another, to prevent the enemy from taking cover or escaping.

OBSERVATION: When an operation appears to offer lucrative results, all required resources must be made available and rapidly shifted in pursuit.

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SUBJECT: Organizational Lessons - Lessons Learned (WS/GSFC-65) (U)

ITEM: Fire Support in the Hmong S.T. Special Zone

DISCUSSION: Most operations conducted in the RSSZ will be necessary, be
forced to operate outside supporting range of land based artillery. Response
to immediate requests for TIC air were delayed because requests had to be
relyed through NHA B5 to supporting B5C.

OBSERVATION: When operating in the RSSZ fire support depends primarily on
fire power that can be delivered from supporting naval craft.

ITEM: Embarking and Debarking LST's

DISCUSSION: Embarking and debarking LST's is time consuming, causes excessive
wear and damage to equipment, and can present a fatigue factor. The later is
especially true if troops must operate in multiple objective areas during one
day.

OBSERVATION: Time required to embark and debark LST's is reduced considerably
by using the LST accommodation ladder and a pontoon.

ITEM: Equipment loads carried during dismounted operations in the delta.

DISCUSSION: Extreme difficulty has been encountered when negotiating the
numerous streams and waterways in the Delta. Unit movement is geared in direct
proportion to individual load bearing capabilities. Operations during periods
of good visibility with additional fire support i.e., air, artillery, rapid
reaction forces, etc, are readily available, reduces equipment requirements
considerably.

OBSERVATION: Small unit leaders must be very selective when defining equip-
ment to be taken on operations. Certain items which are of little use during:
daylight, stelrlight scopes, mortars, anti-intrusion devices, claymore mines,
K-49 trip flares, etc, can be delivered by air at the end of the day.

ITEM: Equipment carried by engineer troops on operations in RSSZ.

DISCUSSION: There are no roads, few trails and very little dry land in the
RSSZ. Most of the time the troops are walking in rain. Streams must be crossed
often. Troops cannot carry much equipment, yet they must be prepared
to stay two to three days on each patrol.

OBSERVATION: Most of the engineer support required takes the form of booby
trap removal or landing zone construction. Both jobs require demolitions.
Chain saws are too bulky and heavy. Give each man five pounds of explosives,
detonating cord, time fuse and blasting caps to blow booby traps.

ITEM: Booby Traps in RSSZ

DISCUSSION: The booby traps employed by the VC in the RSSZ are mostly made
from grenades or claymore type mines. Very seldom are other explosive types
found, although punji traps are used. Booby traps are often set in an area
the day after it has been cleared and used by American troops. Mine detectors
are too big and bulky to useful in the RSSZ.

OBSERVATION: The best defense against booby traps is constant awareness and
dispersion. Almost all booby traps could be seen, a few are placed under
water in streams. All can be destroyed in place with TNT and should not be
re-covered any other way if TNT is available. An area should be cleared, re-
gardless of how recently it has been occupied.
ITEM: Water Transportation in HSSZ

DISCUSSION: Streams are so numerous in the HSSZ that travel by water is a necessity, even within a bivouac area.

OBSERVATION: The three-person inflatable boat can be carried easily on a rucksack frame. It should be considered essential to any patrol. The large 15-mm assault boat should be considered for units larger than company size if they plan to stay any length of time in the HSSZ. These boats are useful for troop movement and resupply.

ITEM: Tunnel and bunker destruction

DISCUSSION: Many tunnels and bunkers with three to four-foot overhead cover and reinforced with timber have been found during operations.

OBSERVATION: It has been observed from experience that the Bangalore torpedo is the fastest and most effective for this type tunnel destruction. In contrast, for bunker destruction the 40-pound crating charge does a better job. The charge should be placed against the ceiling of the bunker or tunnel to achieve the best results.

ITEM: Helicopters are a critical commodity and their utilization must be carefully managed.

DISCUSSION: The UH-1D helicopter has proven its versatility in Vietnam as a command and control center, combat vehicle, and the preferred means of transportation. Due to the limited number of aircraft available to support the entire division their utilization must be carefully controlled. The key to obtaining maximum support for the division is an awareness by all users of aircraft that for each hour flown six hours of maintenance are required. The aircraft must be ready to obtain maximum support for the majority of this maintenance time. Users can take positive action to improve utilization of aircraft by scheduling missions only after considering the following points:

1. Is the mission an actual requirement and not simply a convenience? Can it be accomplished by another means other than aircraft?

2. Can the requirement be answered by telephone or secure radio rather than personal contact?

3. In the event of a delay mission, does the requirement still exist?

4. When requesting resupply aircraft does the request contain in type load, number of sorties, flight time, and estimated total weight? Is the resupply load actually required or nice to have? Will the aircraft be required all day? If not specify specific time periods and another unit can utilize the aircraft.

5. If the mission request changes in number of passengers, number of sorties, time, etc., has the LIE been notified?

6. Release the aircraft as soon as possible as the mission has been completed. Do not retain it on assumption or remote possibilities since other units need support also. If an extension is requested, ensure that a valid tactical requirement for the aircraft exists.

OBSERVATION: Request for helicopter support will receive every consideration in accordance with priorities established by Division G-3. Consideration of the validity and necessity of a request and plans for proper utilization must be made to enable the division to receive maximum support.
ITM: Non-compliance with published SOI frequencies.

DISCUSSION: There are several documented cases of divisional units operating their command nets on frequencies other than those published in the effective item in the SOI. Such deviations from the assigned frequency is dangerous to communications security and cause delay or failure in establishing communications. The inability to contact the ground unit may prevent an aviator from obtaining vital safety of flight or tactical information which may result in loss of life, loss of equipment, and failure of the mission.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must insure that the current SOI in effect is adhered to at all times. If a valid requirement exists for changing an SOI item, the Division Signal Officer must be notified immediately and information disseminated to all interested agencies.

ITM: Night air-mobile operations can be conducted safely and effectively if proper attention is given to planning, method of control, and training.

DISCUSSION: Night air-mobile operations, when properly planned and executed, give friendly forces a tactical and psychological advantage over the enemy. Although night operations are inherently more dangerous than daylight operations, detailed planning, reconnaissance, and communication to the supporting aviation unit will assure a smooth and coordinated execution of the commander's plan. Plans for a night operation must include the following:

1. Careful study of the tactical situation to determine if a night air-mobile assault is feasible.
2. Selection of LZ's that support the tactical situation and enhance the safety of the operation from the aviation view, i.e., minimize hazards and constructions, fairly dust free and larger than daylight LZs.
3. Thorough reconnaissance of the LZ both day and night.
4. Selection of means for terminal guidance, i.e., pathfinders, searchlights, and etc.
5. Weather and intelligence reports.
6. A complete and thorough briefing which is attended by all elements participating in the night operation.

A positive means of control must be exercised throughout the entire operation. Special emphasis must be placed on the following areas:

1. Terminal guidance in the LZ. Pathfinders, artillery illumination, or aircraft flares may be used for terminal guidance.
2. Selection of routes and check points.
3. Utilization of gunships. Friendly positions at night must be carefully marked before gunships are utilized.

OBSERVATION: Night combat air-mobile assault operations should be conducted whenever the tactical situation of an infantry battalion or brigade lends itself to this tactic. Planning must be thorough and complete and early coordination effected between the ground unit and supporting aviation unit.

ITM: Armed Helicopter Night Operations

DISCUSSION: Employment of gunships at night falls into three major categories: Combat assaults as escorts for troop carrying helicopters, in a close combat support role as an emergency reaction force and as escort aircraft for a helicopter which has a target detecting capability at night, i.e., starlight scope.
flares or lights. The most difficult problem encountered is the positive identification of a target at night. Even though communications are established with either the supported ground unit or another acquiring agency, directing the gunships on to the location of the target continues to be a difficult task. Some of the methods used recently have proven quite successful under given situations.

1. Positive identification of the supported ground element by using the HC-54 homing device.
2. Visual identification by the ground commander of the firing team when overhead by using the aircraft landing lights or rotating beacon.
3. Firing a burst of tracer rounds by the unit on the ground provides location of friendly unit as well as direction and approximate location of the target.
4. If pathfinders are used direction and distance to the target can be obtained by using a landing VES as a reference.
5. When flares are used and the target is visually identified by the gunships, a short burst of tracers and the direction of the attack should be confirmed by the ground commander for possible corrections.

OBSERVATION: Weather conditions change rapidly during the approaching monsoon seasons and pilots must continually be alert to fog and low cloud formations at night. Target positions can become quite serious at night. Pilots must keep their heads moving and not permit their eyes to become fixed on a target area.

ITEM: Decisive attacks by the Enemy

DISCUSSION: When the enemy becomes aware that friendly units are deploying to surround his positions, he will initiate probing attacks to cause friendly units to maneuver to eliminate the seemingly small pocket of resistance. As friendly units maneuver, the enemy will escape around the friendly maneuver element.

OBSERVATION: Units must be alert to continually cover all possible escape routes available to the enemy even while maneuvering against a known enemy location.

(c) (FOUO) Organization and Training

ITEM: M-79 Grenade Launcher Training

DISCUSSION: No personnel within the 15th Engineer Battalion were qualified on the M-79 Grenade Launcher due to insufficient stores of ammunition at Fort Riley.

OBSERVATION: Provisions should be made prior to overseas deployment to qualify personnel with their individual weapon.

ITEM: Machine Gun Qualification

DISCUSSION: Due to accelerated training and rescheduling only the assigned machine gun crews (2 man PD) were range qualified.

OBSERVATION: Additional personnel should be cross-trained on unit crew-served weapons and special weapons such as the M-79 Grenade Launcher, .5 Cal Pistol and M16A1 rifle.
ITEM: Modified Tank Crew

DISCUSSION: Combat engineer TOEs authorize a 3-man crew for the combat engineer vehicle. The 15th engineer battalion is equipped with the M41/J Tank Dozer in lieu of the GAV, which requires a four-man crew.

OBSERVATION: A modification to the personnel and equipment authorization should be incorporated to show a TOE position for a loader (last Gunner) and assign him a .45 Cal. pistol in place of present 10-1681 rifle.

ITEM: Construction Training

DISCUSSION: Personnel of the 15th Engineer battalion received no training in theater of operations construction methods due to inability to obtain both materials and construction equipment.

OBSERVATION: All engineer units deploying to USARPAC should have extensive training in plane surveying, earth construction, road and culvert construction, placement of concrete and associated materials and basic construction. To accomplish training of construction methods such equipment as current mixers, scrapers, bulldozers, scooper loaders, air compressors and surveying instruments must be available. In addition, supplies such as cement, reinforcing rod, PSP, lumber and nails should be procured even if limited in quantity.

ITEM: Concurrent Training with Infantry Brigades

DISCUSSION: The 15th Engineer battalion participated in no training with infantry brigades or other elements while at Fort Riley because the brigades were not far enough along in their training cycles to permit concurrent training with engineer companies. All training, therefore, was unit training within the battalion.

OBSERVATION: The Combat Engineer TOE is organized to support each of the three division maneuver elements with an engineer troops company. It is therefore imperative for both the maneuver element and engineer personnel to train together prior to overseas shipment to a combat zone.

ITEM: Advance Unit Training

DISCUSSION: The advance unit training cycle for the 15th Engineer Battalion was to consist of two (2) 50-day weeks. The final result was 8 days 14 hours and 3 days .75 Training Test.

OBSERVATION: Commentary time should be granted to units prior to deployment to make up training lost due to command inspections, reI Training Test and lack of equipment and training facilities.

(d) (C) Intelligence

ITEM: Evaluation of captured documents

DISCUSSION: Evaluation of captured documents can often be a slow and tedious process. A portion of this problem can be attributed to lack of an immediate means of evacuation. Other delays result from difficulties of relaying the report from the location where the final evacuation is made.

OBSERVATION: It is important that captured documents receive immediate attention by unit intelligence personnel and interpreters but not at the expense of causing serious delays in evacuation to the next higher unit.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS/CSFO-65) (U)

DISCUSSION: Tactical operations, to be successful against VC/NV, must be predicated on the best and most recent intelligence available. Not only must 52/62 personnel rely on their own capabilities; INT/TO/G2, bulletins and other publications from higher, lower and adjacent headquarters and the assistance of advisory personnel to JPO and representatives to area Coordination centers must also be exploited to gain intelligence. By correlating the intelligence gathering efforts of all agencies, the chance for success of tactical operations can be greatly enhanced.

OBSERVATION: Intelligence must be sought or developed from every available source.

DISCUSSION: Selection of ambush sites should be based on current intelligence. When current intelligence is not available, land or water routes of communication showing evidence of heavy use should be used to guide selection. The use of this criterion does not negate the requirement to locate ambush sites on likely avenues of approach into or withdrawal from key installations or activities regardless of whether or not these avenues show evidence of use.

OBSERVATION: All intelligence collection agencies must be fully exploited to achieve desirable results from selection of ambush sites.

(e) (FPO) Logistics

DISCUSSION: The standard floor frame for JPOC tents does not have the strength necessary when they are used for messhalls or storage.

OBSERVATION: Replacing the 2" X 8" material with 4" X 8" material increases the load capacity to four tons per 16' X 32' tent.

DISCUSSION: Maintenance

A number of vehicles and pieces of equipment which required support maintenance remained on deadline status for an excessive length of time.

OBSERVATION: The number of vehicles on deadline was lowered considerably when one or two company mechanics helped mechanics at support maintenance. Valuable experience was also gained by the organizational mechanics which could apply to their jobs on the organizational level.

DISCUSSION: Supply of repair parts for radios

PLL stockage is too low to meet all the needs of organizational maintenance. Many parts are not authorized for stockage because of too few end items. The parts, however, are still needed for repairs. Some test units are not accurate enough, a method of substituting parts must be used to pinpoint trouble spots. This necessitates a fairly complete stockage of spare parts.

OBSERVATION: Repair parts should be stock at organizational level to the extent that a part is on hand for every maintenance operation authorized at that echelon.
ITEM: Receipt of TOE - Incomplete Inventory

DISCUSSION: Upon TOE equipment such as planner sets, carpenter sets, demolition kits, entrenching tool kits, general mechanic tool sets and organizational vehicles was issued they were found to be lacking many component items including complete sets of OIL tools i.e., all OIL's issued without OIL. The filling of inventories was hampered by a lack of many items at the Fort Riley Self-Service Supply. As a result units within the battalion deployed overseas with numerous items missing from component tool sets and vehicles, therefore affecting the illusion effectiveness of the unit.

OBSERVATION: All efforts should be made to complete tool and supply inventories of units deploying from CONUS as re-supply within the Theater of Operation is uncertain and often impossible.

ITEM: Equipment Loading

DISCUSSION: Much time was lost when loading TOE equipment onto railway cars due to the fact that once cars were loaded there was no way to move them out and move empty cars to the loading dock.

OBSERVATION: To facilitate loading procedures a switch engine would be available to shuttle railway cars to and from the loading docks.

ITEM: Late Issue of Equipment and Supplies

DISCUSSION: Numerous component items and parts arrived after the initial shipment of equipment. Therefore problems were encountered in packing these items with either Red "T.T" or Yellow "T.T" baggage.

OBSERVATION: Provisions should be made as packing lists are prepared to foresee the issue or pickup of late arriving supplies and equipment.

ITEM: Individual Clothing and Equipment Packing List

DISCUSSION: Upon deployment it was observed that the Red "T.T" Duffel Bag was less the 1 1/2 full and the Yellow "T.T" Duffel Bag was overfull. Since travel uniform excluded all field equipment additional baggage was added to the individuals load. Naval and CTS vessels offer optional wearing of low quarter shoes which were packed in Red "T.T" Bags and thus unavailable to troops on board ship.

OBSERVATION: Recommen changes to packing individual clothing and equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>BAG</th>
<th>B RAG</th>
<th>WORN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Socks, cotton, black</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>
## Transfer of Equipment from Port of Entry to Base Camp

### DISCUSSION:
The transfer of equipment from port of entry to base camp involves problems concerned primarily with coordination, security, communication and local traffic conditions necessitate specific truck routes. Convoys are mandatory for security reasons. Drivers are not familiar with traffic signs, regulations and routes. Usually docks are crowded which adds to the confusion of unloading and requires rapid clearance of off-loaded vehicles, equipment and supplies.

### EXECUTION:
The task of equipment transfer should be given to a unit as a mission. This provides the retention of an experienced and veritable chain of command. It is extremely important that an officer accompany the group to the dock. It is also advisable to place an officer at an intermediate point along the route and one at the base camp to provide constant and reliable communication and coordination. The OIC should be thoroughly familiar with local traffic regulations and routes and should be given ample time to prepare assignments and brief members of his command.

### CONFIDENTIAL
ITEM: Equipment - deferred arrival; late changes in authorizations (IAW); requirement for applying Podification Work Orders (HWO); and arrival of equipment requiring organizational and direct support maintenance.

DISCUSSION: The conditions stated in this problem resulted in workloads for selected supply and maintenance elements of Support Command which would have exceeded the capability of the unit under fully manned and trained conditions.

OBSERVATION: cadre personnel were divided into two 12-hour mission work shifts working a 7 day week. Division of cadre to mission work detracted from their intended purpose for training of newly assigned personnel. Equipment should be phased into a newly activated division at an early date in serviceable condition.

ITEM: Organizational Maintenance During Field Operations

DISCUSSION: On several occasions, supported units have lost all their organizational maintenance personnel in base camp, depriving themselves of a maintenance possibility. Consequently, forward support companies were requested to perform such jobs as changing a flat tire. Normal workloads will not permit support personnel to perform the organizational maintenance of supported units.

OBSERVATION: Emphasis must be placed on the need for organizational maintenance personnel accompanying their units on field operations.

ITEM: The petroleum handling equipment is not sufficient, either in type or in quantity to meet divisional requirements.

DISCUSSION: The equipment was evidently tailored to the scope of an Infantry Division engaged in conventional warfare. Further, the equipment is designed to handle only two bulk fuels in small quantities. Upon arrival in RVN it became necessary to store and issue fuels, in much larger quantities, than organic tankage permits. Additional equipment must be obtained in order to operate satisfactorily. However, until the necessary equipment arrives, there are certain steps which can be taken to alleviate the problem.

OBSERVATION: When possible, use organic 5000 gallon tank semi-trailers for storage. Use small capacity tanks (50 GPM) to handle these products for which there are no transport tanks. Use 500 gallon collapsible tanks to supplement storage. Build up drum stocks of portable fuels to supplement storage capacity.

ITEM: Limited storage capacity causes a high product turnover. This rate requires that frequent tank deliveries be made by the supporting units.

DISCUSSION: Such an arrangement increases the probability that an error will be made resulting in misdelivery of products by pouring them into the wrong tank. Such probability was reduced by electing the following procedures.

OBSERVATION: All incinerator tanks are sampled to determine beyond doubt the product they contain. Tanks into which the product is discharged are numbered and color-coded. This permits a yard worker to identify immediately the product in the tank. The numbering system further permits control of assigning tanks to a particular fuel service. Thus, a tank is changed from one service to another, the Petroleum Officer need know only the tank number. From his records, he can determine what products have been kept in the tank, and can readily decide what preparation is needed for placing the tank in new service.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (JCS/GSPR-65) (II)

ITEM: 1. The Class III Section had been called upon to render a large amount of retail service, even though it is equipped for wholesale operations.

DISCUSSION: Equipment and manpower has been severely strained by the requirement for expanded retail service. While normally giving retail service to only those units which do not possess bulk handling capability, circumstances have demanded individual refueling service to rear echelon vehicles when unit tankers are away from the base camp. Also, the Class III Section has of necessity, provided complete aircraft refueling service. In addition, the refueling of 5 gallon cans and 55 gallon drums for mess halls, generators, etc., has placed a heavy burden upon facilities already overtaxed. Several approaches have been taken to stretch resources to meet these requirements.

OBSERVATION: 1. In order to take pressure off the vehicle refueling points and permit faster service to customers, 5 gallon cans and 55 gallon drums are refilled only when time permits. A direct exchange point has been established so that customers may exchange empty cans for full ones.

2. While heliport refueling operations are not within the normal scope of Class III 'section, being the only available unit capable of establishing aircraft refueling points, the Class III Section provided this service. By using a 5000 gallon semi-trailer and 12' hose line, tanking the tanker into a system of 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks, a portable refueling station was established which gave necessity service to three hq's. Acquisition of a few small capacity tanks, allowed the service to be expanded to a point where eighteen helicopters could refuel simultaneously.

3. Incorporation of 24 hour service permitted a spreading of the workload, thereby reducing the strain on manpower and equipment.

ITEM: 2. Contamination becomes a serious problem by causing contamination of fuels.

DISCUSSION: High temperature and humidity cause the formation of water in 55 gallon drums. Water, especially in aviation and diesel fuels, can cause equipment failure. In reading this problem, the following solutions have been useful.

OBSERVATION: 1. All products are filtered whenever possible. Normally, enough equipment is not available to filter all products at all times, so the greatest emphasis is placed on aviation fuels. Diesel fuel is filtered whenever equipment is available.

2. Containers are kept full to prevent formation of contamination.

3. Since this climate is especially conducive to the formation of condensation, filter-separator mast removal during rainy season at normal rate. Therefore, filter elements are kept on hand to meet this increased demand. Filter-separator-down time is thereby reduced to a minimum.


DISCUSSION: On paved roads and in base camps where traffic is moderate to heavy, dust quickly becomes a serious problem to the health and comfort of personnel, and in the maintenance of equipment. The following steps will minimize the condition and resulting adverse effect:

OBSERVATION: Establish and enforce right traffic control patterns which route vehicles away from living areas. Set and enforce slow speed limits. Limit to those maintenance activities which need dust free conditions in vans, gunnery huts, or similar structures. Sprinkle roads periodically with watered down products, or standard dust repellents. Furnish drivers with goggles and instruct all equipment operators to perform daily maintenance of air and fuel filters. Supervisors of maintenance activities must pursue a daily program of enforcing high standards of cleanliness.
ITEM: A very high denial rate for track and track vehicle suspension components has been experienced.

DISCUSSION: Tracks' vehicles, especially M113's, are frequently denied by mines, creating very high demands for all types of track and suspension components. Many of these components have a low failure rate during normal usage.

OBSERVATION: Stocks of track vehicle suspension components should exceed, by as much as two thirds of the requisitioning objective indicated by technical manuals.

ITEM: Deferred arrival of equipment

DISCUSSION: Many mission essential items of communication, aviation, and related equipment were received either immediately prior to deployment or not at all. This resultant impact means that equipment was not available for training and operator experience had to be acquired under combat conditions after arrival in country.

OBSERVATION: Items of equipment requiring extensive operator training should be made available to units well before deployment.

ITEM: Shipment of Red Circle T.T

DISCUSSION: Red Circle T.T shipment restrictions were developed by port authorities approximately one month prior to deployment of the first increments. To stay within carry weight and size limitations, it was necessary to determine the storage capacity of each surface vessel supporting the move and the priorities for equipment needed upon arrival in country.

OBSERVATION: Once, carry limitations and equipment priorities are determined, detailed unit planning must be accomplished to ensure that required equipment is available upon arrival at the overseas destination.

ITEM: Outloading equipment for Overseas Movement

DISCUSSION: After alert for overseas movement, several division initiated actions greatly facilitated equipment outloading.

1. Instruction was presented to selected personnel from all units on the following:
   a. Preparation of required administration
   b. Vehicular internal load limitations
   c. Organization of outloading areas
   d. Outloading procedures

2. Transportation representatives held scheduling conferences to resolve and publish:
   a. Dates and times for outloading
   b. Locations of outloading areas
   c. Routes to be used from unit locations to outloading areas

OBSERVATION: Proper planning and timely dissemination of outloading instructions prior to deployment facilitates reduced utilization of training time and equipment.
ITP: Helicopter Refueling for Airmobile Operations

DISCUSSION: Past airmobile operations have indicated that multiple helicopter refueling points are required at each heliport from which airmobile operations are conducted. The tactical employment of a division requires two helicopter refueling areas at brigade forward locations in addition to the division heliport at the base camp. Ultimately, the task for providing the fuel dispensing equipment was assigned to the aviation battalion.

1. A minimum of 10 refueling points for JP-4 are required at each heliport to adequately support airmobile operations.

2. By a 100% commitment of its organic refueling equipment, the aviation battalion was able to provide the equipment for the required number of refueling points at the two forward heliports, however, the refueling capability of the base heliport was reduced. Also, with all the battalion's refueling equipment already committed, there is no reserve equipment for replacement in case of breakdown or combat loss, or to establish a forward refueling area to support a temporary operation.

OBSERVATION: 1. The aviation battalion TOE provides sufficient personnel and equipment to provide refueling facilities full time at one heliport which is normally the division heliport. Additional refueling equipment is provided to permit the establishment of another forward refueling area, however, sufficient personnel are not authorized by TOE to operate this equipment on a full time basis. The aviation battalion is not organized to provide and operate more than one full-time heliport.

2. In order to provide the additional helicopter refueling areas required by the division, the aviation battalion must be provided with additional tactical aircraft refueling equipment and additional personnel.

ITEM: Aircraft Maintenance Procedures

DISCUSSION: The established goal for aircraft availability is 70%. During February, March, and early April, 16 out of 25 aircraft were made available to the division every day with an average flight time of 110-120 hours per aircraft/month. It was soon realized that helicopter utilization was higher than average in Vietnam and that maintenance requirements were unable to support this number of flying hours on a continuous basis. Although maintenance is performed 24 hours a day, mandatory periodic inspections and engine inspections drastically reduced the number of available aircraft during the middle of April. All aircraft were assigned to the division directly from the factory in a short period of time. Continuous constant and required transfer inspection prior to arrival in-country did little to stop the flying time. This resulted in a number of aircraft and engine inspections all due at the same time forcing a very low availability rate about the middle of April. As the aircraft completed the monthly inspection an automatic reequipment tool place which resulted in a spread of flight hours between aircraft. With careful scheduling during the next few months the problem should lessen considerably thereby facilitating support of requirements at the next major periodic inspection.

OBSERVATION: 1. Aircraft times have to be spaced and maintenance requirements staggered in order to maintain the desired availability.

2. High daily aircraft commitments on a continuous basis will eventually result in "growing" of entire fleet for a period of time.

3. To sustain an acceptable aircraft availability rate, it is mandatory that aircraft be released on time from operational missions so that proper maintenance can be performed.
ITEM: The task of obtaining publications for a newly activated unit is unnecessarily difficult.

DISCUSSION: A new unit must requisition all publications one by one after establishing an account at the Baltimore and St Louis publications centers. Piece-meal requisitioning assures the presence of catalogs in these units. These indexes are the most difficult publications to obtain. Opening an account incudes the submission of the general order activating the unit for use as a basis for an initlal issue of publications.

OBSERVATION: That a system be set up whereby a newly activated unit, upon opening a pin-point distribution account at the Publication Centers, is automatically issued a complete set of the B Pamphlet 310-series, and all requisitions appropriate to its size; i.e., A distribution to companies, and B distribution to battalions, etc. The cost of such a system would be small when compared to the price of man-hours spent preparing multiple, many-page requisitions, many of which must be later corrected because of outdated data.

ITEM: Ship Antenna Maintenance

DISCUSSION: Ship antennas have a tendency to corrode at junctions where the sections are fastened together. This prohibits electrical conduction and tends to fuse the parts together. When this occurs, an attempt to force the antenna apart usually results in breaking it.

OBSERVATION: Ship antennas should be taken apart and cleaned at frequent intervals, and the frequency should be increased in deep weather.

ITEM: Removal of Eiffel Bridges

DISCUSSION: Because of the construction of the Eiffel Bridges, it cannot cantilever out over an open gap in the same fashion as the Bailey Bridge. The bottom of the Eiffel truss will bend when the entire bridge is supported on rollers from one bank.

OBSERVATION: In the case where the bridge has intermediate supports, this problem was solved by placing Bailey plain rollers on all beams and both abutments. In the case of Eiffel Bridges with no intermediate supports, the problem was solved by supporting one end of the bridge with a crane and pulling the bridge over to the opposite side on Bailey bridge plain rollers, using an armored personnel carrier.

ITEM: Rolling an Eiffel Bridge off its abutments on plain rollers

DISCUSSION: The Eiffel truss is constructed so that the vertical and diagonal members extend below horizontal members where they are riveted to the gusset plate. This small protrusion (about 1") is enough to prevent the bridge from rolling evenly over the plain rollers.

OBSERVATION: To solve this problem it was decided to cut the metal off even with the lower horizontal member. After cutting the protrusions off with an acetylene torch, the Eiffel rolls freely on plain rollers.

ITEM: Bailey Bridge Construction in the Mekong Delta

DISCUSSION: Roads in the Mekong Delta are characteristically narrow and sharply built up at bridges to allow boat passage under bridges. The rice paddy soil is too soft to support vertical walls on new abutments.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RS/CSOM-65) (U)

OBSERVATION: The Bailey bridge is constructed to keep the work higher up in the air as it progresses. This cannot be avoided, so the bridge must be kept out over the gap as much as possible. There is usually no room for a site layout and the bridge must be loaded in dump trucks in hay loads and rammed in a course. Support of abutment wing walls was accomplished by attaching them to each other with a cable.

ITEM: Rice Paddy and Cement Test Mixtures

DISCUSSION: 1. Test #1 - A mix of 15% cement and 85% rice paddy soil was allowed to set for 48 hours. The result showed there was not a uniform mixture. The top few inches were dry and crumbly, the bottom few inches did not dry out. The sample had very little strength.

2. Test #2 - A mix of 25% cement and 75% rice paddy soil was allowed to set for 48 hours. The amount of clay in the soil caused an uneven mix and the sample crumbled on impact with a wooden mallet.

OBSERVATION: Cement does not appear to be the answer for stabilizing rice paddy soil. The clay tended to hold a large amount of water and would not give a firm bind. The properties of the test sample would vary throughout the same samples.

ITEM: Installation of a 1600' X 60' Airfield Utilizing 1611 Metal Planks

DISCUSSION: Some problems developed in the placement of the 1611 planks on the airfield in that the planks were manufactured by four different firms (Kaiser Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Syro and Pickard). The planks vary in size and spacing on the various manufactures. Considerable time and effort was expended unlocking the planks together properly. It was also found that a crown on the runway of more than 28 inches did not align the planks; and also added snow to the problem of proper locking of the lane.

OBSERVATION: If possible 1611 planking manufactured by one firm should be used in the completion of a desired project unless it is not necessary to do so, because of the size of the project and amount of cold weather available.

ITEM: Four Man Portable Bunkers, Skid Mounted

DISCUSSION: Bunkers constructed of timber, 6" x 6" x 6" and other large sizes are now being built and mounted on wooden skids. On site, this gives the perimeter security forces the ability to move their bunkers concurrently with an expanding perimeter, brought about by the developing activities presently under way at Dan Tan. The bunkers can be handled around and put in place by using a dozer. Once the bunkers are in place they can then be sandbagged. The wooden frame of the bunker provides support for the sandbags.

OBSERVATION: Bunkers constructed in a way that they can be moved easily are less vulnerable to attack on the perimeter because they do not have to stay in any one place as a permanent bunker. The positions of the bunkers can be easily changed by use of a dozer towing then from one position to another.

ITEM: Observation/Firing Tower

DISCUSSION: Towers capable of holding four men and their equipment were built on skids in 2 carpenter yards then towed to the site by dozer. They are made so they can be sandbagged on all four sides if necessary to prevent small arms fire from penetrating the tower.

OBSERVATION: The towers hold up remarkably well with all the reworking around they undergo. It is necessary to use 12" spikes in the tower construction. Before reworking the tower the spikes must be removed and then replaced after
the tower has been moved into its new location. Here the land is flat, allowing the man on 10' to give him the ability to see a great distance. The towers are extremely useful at night.

ITEM: V/H/ Radio Communications

DISCUSSION: Radio communication with the V/H/R was very poor with the original antenna and the antenna was also susceptible to breakage in jungle operations. The old antenna was composed of three mast sections (JS-116, JS-117, NS-118) and the mast base JS-5/60. It was mounted on the front deck of the vehicles.

OBSERVATION: Another antenna was substituted for the original, the Z-912/VHC with antenna matching unit ZR-2799/VHC. Radio reception and transmission have improved immensely (20-30 KHz as compared to 3-1 KHz). Because it is flexible and mounted at the rear of the overboard cylinder, the possibility of breakage was also reduced. An MRR is currently in the process of being submitted on this modification.

ITEM: Penprime

DISCUSSION: This unit has been given the mission of dust control in Corp Martin Cox. A mixture is applied consisting of M2-3 asphalt cutback and diesel fuel, M-3 and JP-4 fuel, or M-3 cutback alone based on the availability of cutback. The application is made to all areas where dust is a problem to include parking areas, roads and hulls.

OBSERVATION: To be an effective means of dust control:

1. The area to be treated must be prepared in advance with a grader and excess dust must be removed.
2. Traffic must be kept off the freshly treated areas for at least two days to allow the cutback to cure.
3. The mixture cannot be applied to a wet surface as it will not be absorbed nor should it be applied prior to expected rain as the material will be washed away.
4. The amount of mixture applied (gal/sq yd) should be varied from 0.35 to 0.85 depending on the absorption qualities of the surface to be sprayed.

ITEM: Primer Vent Scoring - Z-16 Howitzer

DISCUSSION: The battalion was plagued with a rash of howitzer failures due to primer vent bushing seizing. The demand for new vents soon doubled the batteries' PLL and exhausted the supply system temporarily.

OBSERVATION: The primary cause of these failures was traced to several lots of primers which did not meet specifications for minimum outside diameter of the cartridge body. Other contributing factors may be extensive firing of excess charge and aggragation caused by powder fouling. Operational requirements may precede firing laser charges but scrupulous cleaning of the primer vent between missions, or between rounds if possible, with an M-16 bore brush is helpful.

ITEM: 24 Hour Fire Direction Control Operations

DISCUSSION: The battalion TDCs does not provide sufficient officer and enlisted personnel to maintain 24 hour FDC operations both at battery and battalion level.
SUBJ: Operation-i I 'eport - Lessons Lrned (RCS/CSFC/65) (U)

OBSERVATION: By combining all fire direction personnel into a central FDC at battalion it is possible to organize three complete crews consisting of a Chief Computer, YOC, and four operators and two NCOs. These crews operate three 8 hour shifts daily. The two liaison officers and assistant S-3 act as fire direction officers each working an eight hour shift. Additional officers (such as an S-2, Survey Officer) and enlisted personnel (Survey Section) may be trained in FDC procedures to provide replacements in the event these batteries operate separately their battery FDCs may be augmented from the battalion FDC pool. Advantages of this system are readily apparent:

1. Centralized control
2. Uniform training and procedures
3. Increased efficiency and alertness through shorter hours and less fatigue
4. Flexibility
5. Training in depth

ITEM: Officer Requirement for 24 hour Operation of Separate Batteries

DISCUSSION: Each firing battery under the C-165 is authorized only 3 officers. When the battery is deployed separately from the battalion and must operate by its own FDC, or when the battery is split into two platoons, 3 officer cannot provide proper supervision for extended periods. The nature of the war in Vietnam, with friends and enemy intermingled, requires extremely close coordination and "visible checks" of all fire direction and intelligence procedures as trained in FDC procedures to provide replacements in the event these batteries operate separately their battery FDCs may be augmented from the battalion FDC pool. Advantages of this system are readily apparent:

1. Centralized control
2. Uniform training and procedures
3. Increased efficiency and alertness through shorter hours and less fatigue
4. Flexibility
5. Training in depth

ITEM: Artillery Stability in Firing Position - 155mm Howitzer

DISCUSSION: The loosely packed soil in the Bout-Beafort area of Vietnam enables the 155mm howitzer to move back excessively during firing - especially in the rainy season.

OBSERVATION: During field operations this problem may be alleviated by placing the howitzer on a mound or building up under the firing jack and digging the trail deeper. This causes the recoil forces to be exerted more downward than forward and greatly improves stability. In base camp situations a horizontal "platform" of two thicknesses of 2 X 6 lumber has been placed under each howitzer. This platform is placed over a mound of carefully packed 1-1/2-ft and trail s "dug down and spread by sections of telegraph poles or straw filled sandbags. This method has almost completely eliminated the wet weather overload problems.

2. (C) Commander's Recommendations

a. The reorganization, reorganization, equipping, training and deployment of the 9th Infantry Division represented a commendable task and challenge.

CONFIDENTIAL
In retrospect, the concept for accomplishment of the task proved sound. However, an analysis of execution of the concept revealed several problem areas could have been avoided if the following recommendations could have been implemented:

1. Organize the support command 60-90 days prior to organizing the remainder of the division.
2. Ensure that sufficient cadre personnel of required grade and experience are on station prior to organizing a unit.
3. Insure that equipment necessary for training is available and on hand prior to the initiation of training.
4. Assign only trained personnel to hard skill NCO positions.
5. Implement an NCO prior to entering Unit Training.
6. Resolve deployability criteria as early as possible.

b. The division had one brigade operational in Vietnam by 1 January, a second by mid-January and a third by early February. The desired initial impact on the counterrguerrilla effort after arrival was not realized for several reasons. Initially, organic helicopter support was not available and pressures of higher priority operations such as CAB I, II, III and JUNCTION CITY negated full support of division operations from non-divisional resources. Secondly, one brigade was committed to high priority operations outside the division area for the better part of the reporting period. Thirdly, the requirement to provide a battalion for security of Long Binh Post, a battalion for operations in the Khe Sanh Special Zone and a battalion for security of routing operations at Dong Tam diffused the effort of a second brigade. To ensure success of an assigned mission in a counterrguerrilla environment, it is recommended that sufficient forces and resources be provided to:

1. Effectively secure areas of operation in cooperation with GVN forces.
2. Convince the enemy through the vigor of offensive and accompanying psychological operations that he faces defeat.
3. Maintain momentum of the offensive on a seven-day-a-week, around-the-clock basis.
4. Open, secure and use both land and water lines of communication while at the same time denying their use to the enemy.
5. Destroy all Viet Cong installations.
6. Manifest a greater strength than that of the enemy, thereby, causing the population to gravitate to the GVN.

c. Success achieved while operating in close proximity to civilian population centers has prompted the following recommendations:

1. Prohibit inflation of the local economy by confining US purchases to PX outlets.
2. Resolve fixed prices through district/provincial level when it is necessary to use services provided by civilian enterprises.
3. Conduct frequent tactical operations in cooperation with GVN military units.
4. Monitor on assist Revolutionary Development Zone by paving tactical operations where possible, to complement those of the JD Program.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (HGS/CSPOL-65) (0)

(5) Conduct extensive Civic Action Operations to include
MNCLEFS, DMCLEFS and technical assistance and construction materials as
available to maintain lines of communication, reopen market places, schools,
etc.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

M. W. Kendall
Colonel, Infantry
Chief of Staff

33 Incls
Appendixes
1 thru 33

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1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 9th Infantry Division, 30 April 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 28 JUL 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section II, page 28, Item - Modified Tank Crew: USARV approved MTCE provided 9th Div fills from its own resources.

   b. Reference Section II, page 39, Item - Additional Officer Requirement for 24 hour operation of Separate Batteries: USARV approved MTCE with the same stipulation given in para 2a.

   c. Reference Section II, page 32, Item - TOE Petroleum Handling Equipment: Problem received staff study by II FFORCEV G4 on 20 May. Permanent type installation equipment was requested. This would release TOE items for use at the helipads.

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the comments, recommendations and action taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incl
nc

E.M. McGrath
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Downgraded at 8 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
Report received at Hqs, DA without indorsements from intermediate headquarters above II Field Force Vietnam.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1967

CG, 9th Infantry Division