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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 222D Aviation Battalion

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 222D Aviation Battalion for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

222ND AVIATION BATTALION

QUARTER ENDING
31 JANUARY 1967

222D AVIATION BATTALION

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SUBJECT: Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 January 67, (U)

TO: See Distribution

Section I

Significant Unit Activities

A. GENERAL: (C) During the reporting period, the 222d Aviation Battalion experienced major changes in organization, physical location of assigned units, and enlisted billeting arrangements. The battalion gained a CH-47 (Chinook) helicopter company, the first rotary-wing company to be assigned. Three (3) CV-2 (Caribou) companies were transferred to the USAF. All battalion units were consolidated in the Northwest Cantonment area of Vung Tau Airfield. All assigned companies were centrally located and oriented on their respective maintenance and aircraft parking areas. Battalion enlisted personnel, billeted in Vung Tau proper, were moved to on-post billets in their respective company areas.

B. MISSION: (U) The 222d Aviation Battalion provides Army Aviation support to ground and naval forces operating in the Republic of Viet Nam.

C. ORGANIZATION: (C) During the reporting period, the 222d Aviation Battalion was organized and located as follows:

   (1) 85th Medical Detachment.

2. 54th Aviation Company (AH-FW), Vung Tau.
   (1) 255th Transportation Detachment.

3. 57th Aviation Company (AH-FW), Vung Tau. Loss: 1 Jan 67
   (1) 138th Transportation Detachment.

4. 61st Aviation Company (AH-FW), Vung Tau. Loss: 1 Jan 67
   (1) 326th Transportation Detachment.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

5. 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (OV-1), Vung Tau.

6. 134th Aviation Company (H-46), Can Tho. Loss: 1 Jan 67
   (1) 260th Transportation Detachment.

7. 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company (CH-47), Vung Tau.

Gained: 7 Nov 66.
   (1) 171st Transportation Detachment.
   (2) 772nd Medical Detachment.

D. COMMAND: (U)

1. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Thompson assumed command of the battalion
   on 5 Jan 67 vice Lieutenant Colonel Athol M. Smith.

2. Major Joseph R. Knudsen assumed command of the 73rd Aviation Company
   on 5 Dec 66 vice Major Dwight R. French.

E. PERSONNEL: (C)

1. Reassignment of Army personnel within the OV-2B (Caribou) companies
   generated the only incident of significant personnel turbulence during the
   reporting period. One-hundred eighty-nine (189) personnel were reassigned
   within USARV. The three (3) OV-2B companies assigned to the battalion were
   inactivated on 1 Jan 66 by Paragraph 1, General Order 2, Headquarters, USARPAC,
   dated 2 Jan 67. The remaining units of this command maintained a relatively
   stable, operational manning level during the quarter.

2. One (1) warrant officer applied for a USAWR direct officer commission.
   Two (2) enlisted personnel applied for direct appointment to USAWR warrant
   officer. Two (2) enlisted personnel returned to CONUS for training in the
   warrant officer aviation program. No applications for OCS were submitted.

3. Recommendations for awards submitted during the quarter - 571. Awards
   received during the quarter - 1,842. Approximately one-half of the awards re-
   ceived were Basic Air Medals or Oak Leaf Clusters to the Air Medal.

F. INTELLIGENCE: (U)

1. The battalion S-2 section during this quarter continued to function as the
   guiding authority for the units of this battalion in all matters pertaining to
   intelligence and security.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

2. The battalion S-2 section was delegated the authority to validate TOP SECRET and SECRET clearances during this period. This enabled the section to establish a positive and effective program without detracting from the accuracy and effectiveness of the security clearance program.

3. The S-2 section published a weekly intelligence summary throughout this reporting period. Information was obtained from INTSUMS and attendance at weekly intelligence briefings.

G. OPERATIONS

1. During this quarter, the battalion provided Army Aviation support on each of the ninety-two days, committing an average of thirty aircraft daily. Missions conducted included troop transport, artillery battery transport, cargo resupply by air drop, air landing and low level extraction (IOLEX), medical evacuation, radio relay, and visual, photographic, and electronic aerial reconnaissance. Statistics generated while accomplishing these missions are listed in Annex A.

2. A liaison schedule was published and liaison visits conducted by battalion representatives to units and agencies in the III and IV Corps areas. The liaison visits were considered essential when the 147th Assault Helicopter Company was assigned to the battalion. Supported unit's problems and CH-47 operations were the primary topic of discussion.

3. An incident involving an unreported, considered "down", CV-2 aircraft revealed the fact that some battalion units did not fully understand Viet Nam flight following procedures; consequently, aircrews failed to establish contact with correct flight following agencies and further, failed to notify their respective units of mission deviations. As a result of this incident, the battalion published a letter, subject, Battalion Flight Following Policy, dated 8 Dec 66. The letter reiterated information listed in U.S. Army Aviation Flight Information, EE Asia, Airfield Directories and outlined battalion policies for compliance.

4. The 73rd Aviation Company, assigned to this battalion, receives surveillance missions from, and reports results directly to MACV J-2. After analyzing intelligence information being forwarded to J-2, it was decided that certain items reported would be important to II FF V if relayed expeditiously. Arrangements were made for the 73rd Aviation Company to report "Hot" reports (significant surveillance sightings) to II FF V, in addition to MACV J-2. Extensions were added to the battalion operations - II FF V, A&5 direct line of communications which facilitated direct reporting from the surveillance company to II FF V, G-2.
5. Operation Red Leaf was completed on 31 Dec 66. The USAF aviator in-country transition program progressed satisfactorily through the months of November and December. The program met its goal of providing an adequate number of trained USAF flight crews to assume full responsibility for OV-2 operations in Vietnam by 31 Dec 66. The total number of qualified USAF pilots assigned to the three (3) OV-2 companies on 31 Dec 66 was 114, as opposed to 150 authorized. The formal transfer of OV-2 operations from Army to Air Force control was accomplished in ceremonies held at Cam Ranh Bay on 1 Jan 67. Outgoing Army and in-coming Air Force unit commanders participated in the observance.

6. On 7 Nov 66, by authority of GO No 42, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, dated 3 Nov 66, the 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company was released from the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and reassigned to the 222d Aviation Battalion. The 147th Ass't Sp Hl Co was the first rotary-wing unit to be assigned to this, a previously all fixed-wing battalion.

7. In anticipation of an imminent battalion reorganization, the battalion S-3 section published OPLAN 1-67 to replace OPLAN 5-66. This plan is this battalion's airfield defense plan; it supports the Vung Tau Sub-Area Command OPLAN 5-66 and became effective 010001 Jan 67. The new battalion plan includes the recently assigned 147th Ass't Sp Hl Co and deletes the two (2) OV-2 units stationed at Vung Tau, the 57th and 61st Aviation Companies.

8. The battalion received four (4) quotes to the USAF Jungle Survival School, Clark AFB, Philippines. Command guidance was received to give priority to operational OV-1 pilots. The four (4) quotes were filled by OV-1 pilots assigned to the 73rd Aviation Company (A3).

9. The 161st (INDP) RECCE FLT, Australian Forces contacted this headquarters requesting occasional flight time for their pilots. The Australian pilots are experiencing some difficulty in meeting flight requirements. The request was forwarded, through channels, to Headquarters, USAF. Permission was granted to allow Australian pilots fly as co-pilots in U.S. Army aircraft provided they were previously qualified in the category aircraft to be flown. Lieutenant Salmon, Australian Forces, began flying missions with the 54th Aviation Company (U-1A) on 23 Dec 66. Lt. Salmon will be replaced by Captain Wright on or about 1 February 1967.

10. The 147th Ass't Sp Hl Co (AHC) conducted a study on the feasibility of airlifting a 155mm Howitzer by CH-47. On 27 Jan 67, the 147th AHC successfully demonstrated the capability to the Commanding Officer, 12th Cmbt Avn Gp and several interested artillery commanders.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

H. TRAINING: (U)

1. In order to comply with requirements for individual weapons familiarization firing, the battalion S-3 section coordinated with the Republic of Viet Nam's Revolutionary Development Cadre School, Vung Tau, for range facilities. Ranges were available to this organization only on Sunday afternoons. On 26 Dec 66, this headquarters published a letter of instruction and range schedule for individual weapons familiarization. As of 31 Jan 67, three (3) companies have completed their range firing.

2. The 73rd Aviation Company placed into operation an ejection seat simulator which was used to train and/or refresh aviators and observers in proper ejection techniques.

I. LOGISTICS: (U)

1. Most of the essential construction in the battalion area was completed during the quarter. Included in the facilities, under civilian contract, was the completion of the sewage systems, five shower-latrines, a motor pool and consolidated mess. Battalion Self-Help Teams completed 6 NCO huts, 9 regular single story huts, and 3 two-story huts. The teams also renovated several other buildings and offices. Other facilities, beyond the capability of the self help team, were planned in detail and submitted to the Area Engineer for construction; these include an aircraft maintenance and parking area for the 477th Spt Hq Co, an aviation dispensary, a recreation center, additional shower-latrines and an additional motor maintenance shop.

2. Final implementation instructions on the CV-2 transfer were received on 15 Dec 66. Due to the long delay in obtaining this directive, necessary actions were taken to turn-in and laterally transfer non-essential property. The property was returned to the Army supply system and to units having a critical need for this equipment. Maintenance responsibility for the aircraft was transferred to the Air Force during intermediate and periodic inspections. Final transfer of remaining property was accomplished on 31 Dec 66 with no significant problems.

3. The construction of a consolidated mess and the move of all battalion units to the Northwest Cantonment Area made possible the feeding of all enlisted personnel in battalion operated mess facilities. Plans for improvement and expansion of mess facilities were developed and work was initiated. A battalion food service officer, under the staff supervision of the S-4, was appointed. Mess inspections were initiated to monitor the food service program.

4. The CV-2 transfer created the opportunity to provide a more suitable aircraft parking arrangement in proximity of present and future maintenance facilities and living areas. All three of the present battalion units and one CV-2 unit effected such a move, resulting in advantages to all concerned.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

5. Command maintenance and supply inspections were completed in the three companies that were not inspected during the last quarter. All units will be scheduled for pre-AGI inspection during the next quarter in preparation for the AGI scheduled for 27-31 March 67.

J. MAINTENANCE: (C)

1. Tech supply activities in all units of the battalion were completely revamped and reorganized. The 147th Aalt Spt Hel Co consolidated their PLL with the ASL of the 171st Transportation Detachment under the provisions of USARV Circular 711-2. This combined system has provided excellent results.

2. Because of difficulties encountered in obtaining high priority aircraft parts, a battalion liaison officer was stationed at AMMC in Saigon. Primary problem areas on EDP parts were as follows:

   (1) Shipping time from Saigon to Vung Tau was as high as 14 days.
   (2) Many requisitions did not reach AMMC.
   (3) Numerous parts shipped by AMMC did not reach Vung Tau.
   (4) Notification of cancellation did not reach the unit until 8 days after cancelled by AMMC.

The battalion liaison officer provided a list of all EDP requisition and DSU numbers to AMMC daily. Parts were receipted for and shipped by the liaison officer utilizing battalion aircraft returning each day through Saigon. The number of items on EDP have been reduced by two thirds primarily as a result of the establishment of this liaison.

K. SIGNAL: NONE

L. SAFETY: (C)

1. Pilot standardization and proficiency continued as an area of maximum emphasis to reduce "pilot error" type accidents. Continuous personnel turbulence, receipt of less than fully qualified aviators, and a shortage of aircraft prevented this program from becoming completely satisfactory.

2. Accidents and Combat Losses:

   (1) Combat Losses- None
   (2) Major Accidents- 5

3. Cumulative accident rate for the battalion- 22.2%.

4. Problem Areas:

   (1) Congestion at the Vung Tau Airfield continued to be a major problem, partly caused by airfield renovation and construction. A hazard to fixed wing
aircraft caused by rotor downwash from CH-47 helicopters was eliminated by relocating the CH-47 to a different ramp space, closer to the helipad. This also provided fixed wing aircraft with a less obstructed access to the runway. Excessive vehicle traffic on ramps, taxiways, and runways continued to add to the congestion, partially as a result of construction projects. This battalion has acquired and initiated the use of standard orange and white ramp flags on vehicles operating on the ramp. This has noticeably reduced the vehicles on the ramp immediately adjacent to the battalion aircraft, and has sharply reduced the number of vehicles from this battalion which are operating on the airfield.

(2) The requirement for organic armed helicopters to provide immediate security of a crash site was confirmed when a CH-47 crashed in an insecure area. Delay was experienced in recovering bodies, and some wreckage was removed by local inhabitants before the area could be adequately secured for the accident investigation board and recovery crews to begin their work.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

Section II

Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. PERSONNEL (U)

1. ITEM: Late Assignment Instructions:

DISCUSSION: Frequently, assignment instructions for personnel rotating are not arriving within the prescribed time frame. The lack of, or late arrival of assignment orders creates morale problems and generates an unnecessary administrative burden. The lack of accurate information upon which to make future plans or advise dependents adversely affects the performance and esprit-de-corps of personnel concerned.

OBSERVATIONS: Individuals in a combat zone should be informed at the earliest practicable time of their next assignment. Even highly motivated and capable soldiers tend to lose faith in announced Army policies when they reach IEROS without assignment instructions.

B. INTELLIGENCE: NONE

C. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. ITEM: Liaison Visits:

DISCUSSION: Prior to the assignment of the 147th Abt SpHel Co (ASHC) the nature of the battalion's fixed-wing support did not generate a requirement for close coordination between this headquarters and supported units. After the 147th ASHC was assigned, a requirement existed to gain more knowledge of supported tactical unit operations and how CH-47 support provided these units was utilized. A schedule of liaison visits to supported organizations in the III and IV Corps areas was published and visits conducted. The liaison visits are rescheduled on a monthly basis.

OBSERVATIONS: Changes in unit organization may significantly alter operations, requiring a major change in liaison techniques.

2. ITEM: Flight Following:

DISCUSSION: In addition to the flight following problems described in paragraph 6, 3, Section I, a continuing requirement exists for CH-47 (Chinook)
helicopters to be in constant communication with their unit. This requirement is generated by a lack of sufficient CH-47 helicopters to perform routine daily missions and to maintain sufficient reserve to meet tactical emergency requirements. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain positive contact with all operating CH-47 helicopters in order to divert any or all to emergency missions with minimum delay. To solve this problem, a radio relay station was installed on a nearby mountain top. The relay station provides an extended range capability by furnishing retransmissions to the unit. Communications coverage from this point allows direct contact with the aircraft from approximately 90% of the III and IV Corps areas. Information concerning the relay station was disseminated to all units of the battalion, who use it as the need arises.

**Observations:** The TOE equipment and personnel authorized at company level are not capable of operating a station of this type from any location other than garrison. For a sustained field operation, additional equipment and personnel must be obtained from battalion resources.

3. **ITEM:** Airfield Security Plan;

**Discussion:** This organization is assigned a specific area of the Vung Tau Airfield to defend. This assignment, plus necessary coordinating instructions, are outlined in the Vung Tau Sub-Area Command (VTSAC) OPLAN 5-66. It was necessary to rewrite the battalion supporting plan when one helicopter unit was assigned to and three CV-2 units were transferred from this battalion. The plan, OPLAN 1-67, was published on 29 Dec 66, to be effective at 010001 Jan 67. On 30 Dec 66, a battalion conference was held with all unit ground security officers. The plan was reviewed in detail. Unit positions were surveyed and discrepancies noted. A copy of the plan was hand carried to the S-3, Vung Tau Sub-Area Command for review. Some discrepancies were: Areas assigned for defense had no fields of fire; bunkers, previously prepared, were removed during airfield expansion; and vehicle parks located were troop positions intended.

**Observation:** Defense plans must be constantly revised as the base development plan is implemented.

4. **ITEM:** CH-47 Utilization;

**Discussion:** A number of supported units stationed in RVN lack an understanding of effective utilization of CH-47 aircraft. Small units, utilizing CH-47 aircraft on an infrequent basis, fail to adequately pre-plan for the best utilization of the aircraft. The most efficient use of CH-47 for cargo transport is external sling loading. Units frequently plan for internal loading from lack of knowledge of advantages of external loading or because they lack necessary sling equipment for external loading.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

OBSERVATIONS: Publication of a directive by higher headquarters concerning planning and CH-47 load preparation would alleviate this problem. Aircrews are not in a position to debate this problem in the pickup zone.

5. ITEM: Air Movement of a 155mm Howitzer by CH-47:

DISCUSSION: Preliminary studies were made and a plan developed for tactical movement of a 155mm Howitzer by CH-47 aircraft. The feasibility has been clearly established by tests conducted jointly by the 1st Infantry Division Artillery and the 147th Abit Spt Hel Co.

OBSERVATIONS: Tactical moves of 155mm Howitzers by CH-47 are feasible and practical. A certain amount of preparation is involved but preparation time does not exceed 30 minutes.

6. ITEM: Inflight Adjustment of SAR Equipment:

DISCUSSION: In the past, numerous mission aborts involving the OV-13 "Aerial Radar" aircraft, equipped with the RO-165 inflight processor, have occurred as a result of poor imagery. One of the major adjustments effecting the quality of imagery had to be performed while the aircraft was on the ground due to the location of adjustment controls. A member of the 73rd Aviation Company devised a modification to the system, using parts currently in the military system. The modification kit innovation has been enthusiastically received by representatives from Army Material Command and agencies in the Republic of Vietnam.

OBSERVATIONS: The modification kit has been used experimentally by the 73rd Aviation Company and has significantly decreased the number of radar mission aborts.

7. ITEM: Buffalo Combat Aviation Battalion (Prov):

DISCUSSION: This battalion was directed to sponsor the Buffalo Combat Aviation Battalion (BCAB) which was activated on 15 Jan 67 at Bear Cat. The 222d Aviation Battalion Liaison Officer established liaison on 12 Jan 67 with the 12th Combat Aviation Group Assistant S-4 and the BCAB S-4 to initiate coordination and support. All units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group provided a list of T/1 and TOE equipment necessary for the establishment of the BCAB Headquarters and Headquarters Company. Each unit responded with the equipment that was excess to their needs. This equipment was provided to the BCAB on a hand receipt or lateral transfer basis. The 222d Aviation Battalion provided 16 enlisted men to the BCAB to aid in the preparation of the BCAB area. As of 31 Jan 67, this battalion is continuing its support in both personnel and equipment.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

OBSERVATIONS: The primary difficulty experienced to date in the establishment of the BCAB was obtaining the necessary TA and TOE equipment. Many items of equipment were not available from the 12th Combat Aviation Group units, and the BCAB was not authorized to submit requisitions. Some items were made available by requisitioning equipment through units and then laterally transferring them to the BCAB. This process was found to be time consuming and placed an excessive work load on the supporting units supply personnel. Thus far many required items are still not available.

D. TRAINING: (U)

1. ITEM: Individual Weapons Familiarization:

DISCUSSION: Plans for individual weapons familiarization were formulated in early December. USAF Training Circular No. 3, though not applicable to this organization, was used as a guide. Range facilities proved to be a major problem. There were two possibilities, the RNW ranges at Baria and the RNW Revolutionary Development Cadre School (RDCS) ranges at Vung Tau. Although the ranges at Baria are available on a more suitable time schedule, they were not acceptable for security reasons. The 5-3, U.S. Advisory Team #79, Baria, indicated that the minimum size element that could safely use the range was fifty (50) men or more and at least ten (10) of these men would have to man security positions. The use of the RDCS range, Vung Tau, was obtained on Sundays from 1200-1600 hours. On 26 Dec 66, a weapons familiarization LOI was published by this headquarters and forwarded to assigned units. A tentative range schedule accompanied the LOI. A search for targets, markers and pasters was initiated. These materials were requested through 12th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade, and USAF Operations sections. The requested materials were not available. Targets were fabricated, markers and pasters were improvised. The first company fired on 7 Jan 67. As of 31 Jan 67, three (3) companies have fired. The one remaining company is scheduled to fire on 5 Feb 67. A battalion make-up is scheduled for 12 Feb 67.

OBSERVATIONS: Range facilities are extremely limited in the Republic of Viet Nam. Targets, markers and pasters are not readily available to requesting organizations. Individuals qualify with their weapons prior to departing for Viet Nam. One familiarization, upon arrival, to determine battle sight zero for a newly assigned weapon is considered sufficient.

2. ITEM: Operation Redleaf:

DISCUSSION: Upon arrival at their unit of assignment, all USAF aviators received an orientation briefing that included general information on the Republic of Viet Nam and a detailed briefing on unit operations, unit area of operations, support units and the enemy situation.
AIRCRAFT INSTRUCTOR PILOT (AIP)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

Prior to their initial flight, each USAF aviator received a thorough briefing from the unit standardization instructor pilot (USIP) on operational procedures, flight planning, flight following and flight standardization. The individual aviator was then given an initial flight with the USIP to check proficiency and receive standardization instruction. When released by the USIP, each USAF aviator was then scheduled to fly operational missions with Army aviators designated aircraft commanders. The USAF aviators performed the duties of co-pilot for the first several missions so as to become familiar with the area of operations and flight following procedures. After several flights, they performed as pilots to improve their flying proficiency in the aircraft. After flying operational missions for a period of time, normally from one to two months, selected USAF aviators were given an aircraft commander check ride by the unit USIP. Aviators passing the check ride were placed on unit orders as aircraft commanders. Those USAF aviators demonstrating outstanding proficiency and proper attitude were selected for and trained to be instructor pilots.

The procedure of flying operational missions with Army aircraft commanders, rather than with instructor pilots, was based on several factors. First, each USAF aviator had graduated from an approved CV-2 transition school. Second, an insufficient number of instructor pilots, in relation to the number of USAF aviators, existed. Third, the USAF aviators were badly needed for operational missions due to a shortage of Army aviators created by normal rotation. Fourth, mission requirements were such that sufficient aircraft were not available to be used for training only. Last, each Army aircraft commander was thoroughly qualified in both seats of the aircraft. Each one met established prerequisites and had demonstrated their proficiency in the aircraft to the unit USIP at least once every 90 days.

OBSERVATIONS: The number of flying hours required to train the individual USAF aviator to the point of being fully qualified as an aircraft commander in the CV-2 varied slightly with the individuals experience level. With few exceptions, the average in-country flying time required was approximately 100 hours.

Army personnel losses, due to rotation during the implementation of Operation Redleaf, required that the more senior USAF aviators assume the duties of some key unit positions while still undergoing training. This responsibility prevented them from flying at a constant rate, thus, their training required more than 100 hours. Additionally, during the implementation phase, a constant change of USAF officers, assigned key unit positions, was experienced. The key personnel changes were caused by the late arrival of the more senior USAF officers assigned. This situation could have been prevented by selecting the key position officers and placing them in the first group of personnel arriving at the unit.
AVGCI

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

3. ITEM: Replacement Aviators Qualification:

DISCUSSION: In recent months the 54th Aviation Company (AM-PW) has received replacement aviators who were not qualified in the U-1A, the unit's assigned aircraft. These aviators had to be transitioned into the aircraft before becoming operational. This additional training was conducted in conjunction with operational missions which detracted from the training received and mission accomplishment.

OBSERVATION: Increased effectiveness could be realized in this unit's performance capability if all replacement aviators for the 54th Aviation Company (AM-PW) were U-1A qualified before assignment to the unit.

4. ITEM: Enlisted Maintenance Replacement Skill Levels:

DISCUSSION: The 147th Aslt Spt Hel Co received many newly trained maintenance personnel as replacements. This created a heavy burden on maintenance supervisory personnel as an extensive, closely supervised OJT program had to be conducted before these replacements could be relied upon to perform their duties with the necessary skill. The CH-47 (Chinook) helicopter is an extremely complicated aircraft to maintain with experienced personnel and a most difficult aircraft to maintain with inexperienced personnel.

OBSERVATION: Maintenance replacements would be more effective if they had two to four months experience in CH-47 maintenance procedures before arrival in RVN.

5. ITEM: Instrument Qualification of CH-47 Aviators:

DISCUSSION: An increasing number of recently transitioned CH-47 aviators are not helicopter instrument qualified. The CH-47 company's mission requires operations to be conducted under instrument conditions. An unnecessary training requirement was placed upon the CH-47 unit to bring the non-helicopter instrument rated aviator up to the minimum standards required for mission accomplishment.

OBSERVATION: Adherence to the original experience prerequisites for CH-47 transition (500 hours rotary-wing time of which 250 hours must be in utility or cargo helicopters and possession of a current rotary-wing instrument card), would improve the operational performance of aviators in CH-47 units.

E. LOGISTICS: (U)

1. ITEM: Self Help Teams:

DISCUSSION: During large scale build ups of cantonment areas and bases it was extremely difficult to obtain priority for the construction of huts.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

clubs and recreation facilities. In many cases, materials were available but construction laborers were not; they were fully occupied, building major maintenance and airfield facilities. These facilities can be easily constructed with troop labor when materials are available.

OBSERVATION: Extensive construction of huts, huts and recreation facilities can be accomplished by forming self help teams at company and battalion level. This system will greatly expedite the improvement of facilities and improve troop morale.

F. MAINTENANCE: (C)

1. ITEM: Liaison with AMC

DISCUSSION: Numerous EDP requisitions were not reaching AMC from the DSU supporting battalion units. EDP requisitions, "filled", took up to 15 days to be shipped from Saigon to Vung Tau. Many items became lost and never reached the requesting unit. By placing a battalion liaison officer at AMC to insure timely arrival of requisitions and personal supervision of parts shipment, the problem was eliminated.

OBSERVATION: Personal and daily liaison with supporting DSU's and depots can greatly improve supply support and reduce the EDP rate significantly.

2. ITEM: U-14 Engine Life: T

DISCUSSION: During previous quarters, it was noted that the average engine life was approximately 300 hours. A program of rigid pilot standardization with strict adherence to aircraft operating limitations was instituted. Additionally, aircraft with new engines were selected for missions requiring the least landing and take-offs; thus permitting the first 25 engine hours to be acquired at lower RPM and power settings. These two factors contributed to an increased engine life of approximately 500 hours.

OBSERVATION: Improved standardization training with increased emphasis given to engine operating limitations can substantially increase engine life.

3. ITEM: Night Maintenance Lighting:

DISCUSSION: Adequate lighting to perform night maintenance posed a serious problem. Available lighting was not adequate or accessible to the flight line and other maintenance areas. As a result, a field expedient had to be devised. Two 16 inch construction flood lights were attached to a steel frame and mounted in a 1/4 ton trailer. A 1.5 KW generator was also mounted in the trailer as a power source. This system is easily moved and provides adequate lighting for most maintenance areas. Additionally, engineer construction light sets have been utilized to provide adequate lighting on the forward and aft Chinook Pylons.
AVGC-I

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

OBSERVATIONS: Adverse maintenance conditions can be overcome by using imagination and ingenuity to construct a field expedient from reasonably available items.

4. ITEM: Excessive Maintenance, CH-47's:

DISCUSSION: Of fifteen aircraft assigned, seven were 1962 models. The remaining 8 were 1965 and 1966 models. The maintenance hours versus flying hours was extremely disproportionate between the 1962 and later models. The 62 models represented 64% of all aircraft EDP's, 58% of field maintenance time, 45% of the organizational maintenance time. A common failure of this model aircraft was cracks developing at the manufacturer's field splice, station 482. This defect caused a prolonged loss of availability as the repair requirement demands higher echelon repairs than could be accomplished in this unit. These same aircraft provided only 29% of the unit's flying time during this quarter.

OBSERVATION: The 1962 model CH-47's constitute a major portion of all maintenance problems with minimum flight hour return.

5. ITEM: Premature CH-47 Parts Failure:

DISCUSSION: Premature parts failure of time change items seriously hampered maintenance output. Additionally, certain time change replacements parts have been received in this unit without the required historical data records (DA 2410) being enclosed with the parts. This caused unnecessary delays.

OBSERVATION: All repair parts requiring historical data records should be carefully checked prior to shipment overseas. Time change components having a history of premature failure should have their expected life span re-evaluated and parts procured based on new estimated useful life.

6. ITEM: Inverter Failure:

DISCUSSION: In the past, inverter failures in V-1 aircraft were occurring at such a rate that supply stockages were insufficient to maintain an adequate resupply. Consequently, aircraft were EDP for inverters. Inspections revealed that many of the failures were the result of the AC and DC inverter brushes wearing to the extent that extreme overheating occurred causing inverter bearing failures. A program of preventive maintenance inspections was initiated using experience factors for brush wear versus operating hours. Maintenance personnel developed criteria which enabled them to predict the point at which brush wear would cause a bearing failure. The resultant timely replacement of brushes reduced inverter bearing failure.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

OBSERVATIONS: An effective inspection and preventive maintenance program can significantly reduce aircraft SIP's resulting from inverter failures.

G. SIGNAL: NONE

H. SAFETY:

1. ITEM: Crash Rescue:

DISCUSSION: For the third time in the last six months, aircraft crash rescue, recovery, repair, and/or investigation was seriously delayed because of the lack of organic gunships in this battalion to provide immediately responsive security of the site. In a recent CH-47 accident, a recovery CH-47 was driven off by hostile fire before all fatalities could be evacuated or even located. It was not until the following day that the area was secured adequately for the remaining bodies to be evacuated and for the investigators and recovery crew to begin work. By this time, local inhabitants had removed portions of the wreckage.

OBSERVATIONS: Immediate security at a remote crash site is not usually immediately available unless the capability is organic to the unit.
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

Section II

Part II Recommendations

A. Personnel: (U) Establish a more liberal policy for reassigning personnel who have reached their DEROS and who do not have assignment instructions. This could be effected by authorizing assignment to CONUS transfer points earlier than seventy-two (72) hours prior to DEROS, which is the present established policy.

B. Intelligence: None

C. Operations: (C)

1. That a directive be published and distributed down to applicable company and separate detachment level, clearly outlining current doctrine and planning guidance for CH-47 utilization. This would bring all units under a standard guide and assist units, outside the influence of Army aviation, in updating their employment techniques of CH-47 aircraft.

2. That CH-47 sling load and rigging equipment be included as required equipment for all units departing CONUS for the Republic of Viet Nam. This equipment is absolutely essential to units planning on utilizing CH-47 aircraft.

3. That the OV-1B in-flight SLAR adjustment kit, designed and tested by a member of the 73rd Aviation Company, be considered for use in all OV-1B aircraft.

D. Training: (C)

1. That a number of U.S. Forces weapons ranges be constructed in strategic locations for weapons training.

2. That targets, pasters, markers and other required range equipment be made available through training aid channels.

3. That every attempt be made to transition aviators into the aircraft organic to the unit assigned, prior to reporting to the unit.

4. That an extensive CH-47 familiarization course be incorporated into the training of all units being deployed to the Republic of Viet Nam.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

5. That an effort be made to provide a period of practical application of skills, i.e., CH-47 mechanics, prior to RVN deployment.

6. That aviators transitioned into CH-47 be required to be holders of a standard rotary-wing instrument card.

E. LOGISTICS: NONE

F. MAINTENANCE: (U)

1. That a study be made to re-evaluate the estimated useful life of those aircraft parts that have shown a history of premature failure and that procurement schedules or standards be revised accordingly.

2. That additional efforts be expended to replace 1962 model CH-47 helicopters with newer aircraft.

G. SIGNAL: NONE

H. SAFETY: NONE

Annex A:
222d Avn Bn Statistics

THOMAS E. THOMPSON
LTC Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
1 Copy, thru Channels, to ACP, Di.
2 Copies to CG, US. Arm, ATTN: G-5/PM
3 Copies to DOG, US. Arm, ATTN: AG-DA
4 Copy to CO, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: ATTN-A
5 Copies to CO, 12th Comb Avn Grp

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Annex A

222D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers Carried</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Transported (Tons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Hit by Ground Fire</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.75&quot; FPSR</td>
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<td>7.62</td>
<td>2,138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Comments are included on observation and recommendations made by the battalion commander:

   a. Personnel: The basic premise of the 222d Battalion that non-receipt of assignment instructions prior to DEROS (page 17) is detrimental to individual morale is, of course, correct. However, USAV Regulation 614-220 establishes a system which, when followed, will in nearly all cases prevent personnel from reaching DEROS without assignment instructions and will certainly allow personnel to be shipped out by DEROS. The recommendation of the 222d Battalion that personnel without assignment instructions be reassigned earlier than 72 hours prior to DEROS appears based on incorrect or out-of-date information, since paragraph 14, USAV Regulation 614-220, states that USAV "will reply 10 days prior to DEROS with assignment instructions or authorization to return individual to CONUS pending receipt of assignment instructions." Since seats are booked for all personnel due to rotate regardless of status of assignment instructions, no person need be held beyond DEROS.

   b. Operations:

      (1) Reference paragraph 1 of operations and paragraph 4 of training on page 17. A handbook for employment and utilization of the CH-47 was written and published by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. Distribution is currently being made to units in the III CTZ. It is recognized that there is an Army-wide need for a directive which would standardize CH-47 operational procedures.

      (2) The design of the SLAR adjustment kit, page 17, was processed through the Incentive Awards and was not available for this report.
SUBJCT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period ending 31 January 1967 (RC-3SPOR-65)

11 March 1967

25

c. Training and Organization: None

d. Intelligence: Comment 1, page 19, as pertains to polaroid cameras is correct. The polaroid camera does give the command a capability of obtaining aerial photos of his area of responsibility. However, at present time the requirement for these cameras far exceeds the supply. A continuing effort is being made to obtain an adequate supply.

e. Logistics: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

SAMUEL A. CLEMENT
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant

1 Incl
no
AVFBG-X (8 Feb 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(EC3 CORFOR-65)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 15 MAR 1967
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307

The enclosed Operational Report on Lessons Learned submitted by the 222d Aviation Battalion has been reviewed by this headquarters for information and is forwarded to your headquarters for comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WAYNE D. BLANTON
WO-W1, USA
Acting Asst AG

1 Incl
no
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH
APO 96307

(U) This headquarters considers the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the 222nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion to be adequate and concurs with the contents of subject report as indorsed, with the following comments:

a. (U) Reference section II, paragraph A1, page 8: USARV Personnel Management Officer reports that several actions are being taken to prevent delays in receipt of assignment instructions. Assignment instructions for senior enlisted men and officers are delayed at Department of the Army to give individuals every chance of getting their first choice of assignment as listed on preference statements.

b. (C) Reference section II, paragraph F4, page 15: A program for the replacement of the 1962 model CH-47's has been approved by DA and should be initiated in the very near future. Replacement CH-47's are programmed for shipment to RVN, but as of this date no shipping data is available. One (1) 1962 model CH-47 has been sent back to ARADMAC for teardown in order to determine the requirements for implementation of the modernization program.

c. (C) Reference section II, paragraph C1, page 17: The 1st Aviation Brigade Operations Manual outlines the current doctrine and planning guidance for CH-47 utilization. In addition, the CH-47 Employment Manual is now being reviewed for future publication.

d. (C) Reference section II, paragraph C2, page 17: Concur, however, this headquarters has no control over equipment issued units deploying from CONUS.

e. (C) Reference section II, paragraph C3, page 17: The OV-1B in-flight SLAR adjustment kit has been submitted through the incentive awards program for worldwide application.

f. (C) Reference section II, paragraph D1-6, pages 17 and 18: Concur — the incorporation of these recommendations would increase the combat effectiveness of all aviation units in Vietnam

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AVBAC (8 Feb 67) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

3 APR 1967

1 Incl
nc

J. M. GREETHAM
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE(S)
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AVHQC-DST (8 Feb 67)
4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (ROD CSFOR-66) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 222d
Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph A1, Page 8; Paragraph A, Page 17;
Paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph a, 3d Indorsement, con-
cerning late receipt of reassignment instructions: Late receipt of
assignment instructions has been a matter of great concern at this
headquarters for more than a year. Continued emphasis is being placed
on the accurate and timely submission of Advanced Overseas Returnee
(AOR) reports. Equal emphasis is required on the part of DA to insure
that reassignment instructions are promptly issued for individuals
properly reported.

b. Reference Paragraph C4, Pages 9 and 10; Paragraphs C1
and C2, Page 17; Paragraph 2b(1), 1st Indorsement; and Paragraphs c
and d, 3d Indorsement, concerning CH-47 utilization: The 1st Aviation
Brigade is currently staffing a manual for publication and distribu-
tion down to separate company level, which will provide specific gui-
dance in efficient utilization of CH-47 aircraft, to include external
sling loading operations. The brigade has instructed subordinate com-
mands to effect liaison with supported units to train them in the
efficient utilization of the CH-47. This training is considered essen-
tial and its need will not be negated by the publication of the manual.
Supported units must provide sling load and rigging equipment for CH-47
airlift operations. Availability of this equipment for deploying units
has been severely limited due to heavy in-country requirements; however,
there is an indication that more sling load and rigging equipment will
soon become available in CONUS supply channels.

c. Reference Paragraph C6, Page 10; Paragraph C3, Page 17;
Paragraph 2b(2), 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph e, 3d Indorsement, con-
cerning the in-flight SLAH adjustment kit: Concur with action taken
by indorsing headquarters.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

d. Reference Paragraph C7, Pages 10 and 11, concerning the activation of the Buffalo Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional): The provisional battalion was organized by the 1st Aviation Brigade. The command which organizes a provisional unit must support that unit from assets available within the command, since it is not a recognized unit under the provisions of AR 220-5.

e. Reference Paragraph D1, Page 11; Paragraphs D1 and D2, Page 17; and Paragraph f, 3d Indorsement, concerning individual weapons familiarization:

(1) Contrary to unit's statement, USARV Training Circular Number 3 is applicable to the 222d Aviation Battalion. The battalion is a combat support unit and is not attached to a tactical unit. Nonconcur with the statement that one familiarization firing is considered sufficient. USARV Training Circular Number 3 states that familiarization firing will be conducted as required; however, all personnel will fire familiarization at least semiannually. It is recognized that range and other required facilities are in short supply, but to insure that weapons are functional, battlesight zeros are confirmed, and individuals retain confidence in their weapons, semiannual firing is mandatory.

(2) US Forces weapons ranges are available in various locations and are supplemented by existing ARVN ranges. In addition to the ARVN ranges specified in Paragraph D1, Page 11, ranges are also available at the VAN KIEP Training Center and can be used by US Forces through coordination with the Advisory Detachment at VAN KIEP. Targets, pasters, markers and other required range equipment are available through normal supply channels. They may also be obtained for US Forces' use through coordination with the US Advisory Detachments at the ARVN Training Centers.

f. Reference Paragraph D3, Page 13, and Paragraph D3, Page 17, concerning replacement aviators' qualification: This problem can be minimized if units specify the required aircraft qualifications in their monthly requisition for aviators (DA Form 872). Intermediate commands should review the requisitions to ensure the qualifications are specified.

g. Reference Paragraph D4, Page 17, concerning CH-47 familiarization for units deploying to RVN: Concur that such training would
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AVHGC–DH (8 Feb 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report–Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

be desirable; however, it is recognized that time and facilities may not be available.

h. Reference Paragraph D4, Page 13; and Paragraph D5, Page 18, concerning experience required of maintenance personnel: Concur.

i. Reference Paragraph D5, Page 13, and Paragraph D6, Page 18, concerning instrument qualification of CH-47 pilots: Concur.

Training Circular 1-23 lists the prerequisites for transition training in the CH-47 helicopter. Recommend that no waivers be granted for these prerequisites.

j. Reference Paragraphs F4 and F5, Page 15; Paragraphs F1 and F2, Page 18; and Paragraphs b and g, 3d Indorsement, concerning CH-47 maintenance: Concur with comments of 1st Aviation Brigade in 3d Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, ACC
Assist Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 222d Avn Bn

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference paragraph D4, Part I, Section II. It is impracticable, at this time, to provide extended on-the-job training to replacement maintenance personnel because the only operational CH-47 units outside RVN are those units training to deploy to RVN. The majority of the maintenance conducted on aircraft supporting CH-47 transition school is by civilian contract; therefore, until experienced maintenance personnel are returned to RVN for a second tour, OJT will have to be conducted in RVN. When adequate CH-47 assets become available in CONUS, the OJT recommended by the basic report would be ideal.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGO
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10