UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD386356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FROM:                  |
| Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 29 SEP 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 1978, DoDD 5200.10 GP-4; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.
Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
1. (U) Mission: In addition to the TOE mission assigned, this headquarters was assigned the additional functions on 7 May 1966 of operating truck terminals and trailer transfer points in the US Army Support Command, Saigon area of responsibility; providing port clearance, line haul, and local haul motor transport services; providing direct motor transport support to tactical units in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones; and coordinating and controlling specified civilian contract motor transport missions to include those contracts using government furnished equipment.

2. (U) Command and Organization: On 12 January 1966, this headquarters was re-organized as HHD, 56th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) under TOE 55-123, 61 (SRC 55-022 0001), the authorized strength being 13 commissioned Officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 48 Enlisted Men. The 56th Transportation Group (MT) was assigned to the US Army Support Command, Saigon on 6 May 1966.

3. (U) Key Personnel Changes:
   a. Sergeant Major Wilbert L. Hopkins was assigned as Group Operations Sergeant on 3 May 1966.
   b. Capt Dale Hungerford was assigned as Group Maintenance Officer on 15 May 1966.
   c. CWO W-2 Thomas E. Dunklee, Food Services Officer, was reassigned to Headquarters Area Command, APO 96213 on 22 June 1966.
CONFIDENTIAL

d. Chaplain (Capt) Charles G. Locke was reassigned to 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) on 1 July 1966.

e. Captain Harold B. Guarino was assigned as Assistant Operations Officer, 15 July 1966.


4. (U) Change in Station:


b. Unit APO number changed to 96491 on 16 May 1966. No change in location of unit involved.

5. (U) Accomplishments:

a. Significant Accomplishments:

   (1) Unit departed Fort Eustis, Virginia on 13 April 1966; departed Oakland Army Terminal on 15 April 1966 and arrived at Long Binh, Vietnam, 6 May 1966.

   (2) Unit assumed operational control of the following units effective 12 May 1966:

      (a) 62nd Transportation Co (M Trk)
      (b) 120th Transportation Co (L Trk)
      (c) 163d Transportation Co (L Trk)
      (d) 534th Transportation Co (M Trk)
      (e) 670th Transportation Co (M Trk)

      (3) The 670th Transportation Co (M Trk) was detached and reassigned to Cam Ranh Bay on 15 July 1966.

b. Operations:

   (1) (C) Participation in Operations: (1 May - 31 July 1966)

   Units of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) have participated in Operations Moonlight, Wahawai, Birmingham, El Paso, Kahama, Yorktown, Aurora, Hardinwood and Boomerang. Support has been furnished to 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) at Tay Ninh. 


2

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Lad Khe, Di An, Phu Loi, Phouc Vich, Cu Chi, Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau and Long Binh Area. The remainder of the support furnished has been to units of US Army Support Command, Saigon and 4th Transportation Command. Total tonnage moved is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>TNS MILES</th>
<th>TON MILES</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>90,570</td>
<td>476,202</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>11,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>105,035</td>
<td>369,131</td>
<td>3,432,722</td>
<td>10,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>76,967</td>
<td>348,222</td>
<td>1,341,519</td>
<td>10,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>272,572</td>
<td>1,193,555</td>
<td>5,877,241</td>
<td>32,516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) (C) Joint Operations: Support has been rendered to Australian Forces during their movement from the Bien Hoa Area to Vung Tau. Due to limited bridge capacity and questionable security of Route 15, it was decided to truck the cargo to barge sites and move to Vung Tau via water. Part of the operation was accomplished by transshipping loaded twelve-ton trailers by Landing Ship Tank (LST) to Vung Tau.

(c) (U) Force Development: The 556th Transportation (Hdqs Trk PTL) a lodger unit not under operational control of the Group departed the Camp TC Hill compound on 16 July 1966. Two trailer transfer points have been established from internal resources in order to effect better control over vehicle and trailer movements. This reduced overall unit capability by reducing the number of personnel available to the units to accomplish their assigned missions. The advance party of HQ, 7th Transportation En (Trk) arrived on 20 July 1966. The Battalion will become operational during the month of August. Increased tactical support missions have caused transportation to be in short supply for port clearance and support of other agencies within the Saigon/Long Binh complex. Inspection of troop plans show only 50% of requirements are programmed for 4th Transportation Group (MT). Estimated requirements indicate a need for units and augmentation listed below:

1. (U) Return to parent unit of authorized resources assigned to Vung Tau Sub Area Command (one light truck platoon, one squad (-) and (-) trucks).

2. (U) Flight section SRC 50CR-5-50.

3. (U) Two Trailer Transfer Points (TCE 55-50CR team GF) (now programmed).

4. (U) Augmentation for Contracting Officer's Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

(5) (U) Three (3) additional light truck companies and three (3) additional medium truck companies. (1 light truck company, 1 light truck company 5 ton, and 1 medium truck company are programmed through the 2nd quarter, FY 67).

(6) (U) Sufficient trailers to equip medium truck companies with 120 trailers each. (one of the two medium truck companies has only 60 trailers assigned).

d. (U) Transportation furnished by contract: The Equipment Incorporated (Sea Land) contract is administered by personnel of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) acting as Contracting Officer's Representative. To date the company has received 206 of 240 two-ton Ford trucks furnished by the government, and 200 ten-ton International Harvester trucks furnished by the contractor. Adequate control and maintenance is hampered by a lack of an acceptable motor pool area. Estimate that new motor pool facilities under construction at Thu Duc will be operational during month of August. Clearance of indigenous drivers to enter Air Force installations has also caused slowdowns because the Vietnamese Air Force has complete authority to authorize or deny entrance of all indigenous drivers onto Air Bases. Their requirements change daily.

e. (U) Movement of ammunition:

(1) (C) A serious backlog of ammunition ships had developed as of 1 June 1966. There were 214,718 short tons (S/T) of ammunition aboard vessels in Vietnam and in a hold status, and a total of 38,327 S/T of ammunition enroute due to arrive in June.

(2) (C) Col S. H. Coggins was appointed Project Manager for Ammunition Movements in the Saigon/Long Binh/Vung Tau Area on 2 June 1966. As per VCOC, 1st Logistical Command, the Project concluded on 15 July 1966. During the period 1 June to 15 July 1966, 29 ships were offloaded at Nha Be for a total of 61,237 S/T of ammunition.

(3) (U) See enclosure 1 for After Action Report

e. (U) See enclosure 1 for After Action Report

f. (U) A major problem area has been encountered in Signal equipment. Supported tactical units are equipped with the new VRC-12 series radios. Units of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) are equipped with VRC-10 and 18 radios. This results in a lack of adequate communications during convoy operations due to the difference in bandwidths between the two sets of radios. Transportation companies in direct support of tactical units should be authorized radios that can not with tactical units.

6. Other:

a. (U) Inclement weather has caused accidents during operations that probably would not have occurred during dry weather. Such incidents, i.e.
slipping off road or stuck in mud, occur predominantly on dirt or light gravel roads and in loading/unloading areas. Further attention could be paid, in training, to recovery methods and operations. In general, weather has not had a significant effect on operations to this date.

b. (U) Security

(1) (U) Internal Security: No significant problems have been encountered as regards internal security. Expansion of the perimeter, addition and deletion of units have caused revision to guard posts and the internal security plan. Improvement of defenses continues. Test Exercises have been conducted both by this headquarters and Long Binh Sub Area Command. Several instances of light small arms fire from outside the unit perimeter, have occurred but have had no significant effect on operations. Requirement for illumination exists in the form of fixed lights for the perimeter, and hand flares or M-79 illumination rounds.

(2) (U) Convoy Security: Small arms fire has been received during convoy operations but have had no great effect on operations. The need for constant alertness and security consciousness on all operations must continue to be stressed. Insufficient personnel are available within the truck units to furnish assistant drivers or security guards for vehicles scheduled for convoy duty, because fresh and rested drivers must be available upon the return of the convoy for vehicles to be recommissioned due to the twenty-four hour day, seven day per week operation. Assistant drivers/guards are essential for all around observation and to provide fire coverage in the event of ambush. At present guards are being furnished by units other than 5th Transportation Group (MT). Better security of personnel and equipment could be realized if sufficient resources were available internally to provide the assistant driver (guard) because they will be qualified to operate the vehicle in event of casualty or fatigue.

SECTION II

Part I

OBSERVATIONS - LESSON LEARNED

1. (U) I-om: Commercial contractor cannot effectively dispatch and maintain vehicles without proper facilities.

Discussion: Vehicles operated by Equipment Inc (Sea Land) under contract to the United States Government were dispatched and maintained on the streets of a congested civilian area in the vicinity of Saigon Port. Adequate control was impossible. A facility is presently under construction at Thu Duc.
Observation: Adequate motor pool facilities should be available prior to receipt of equipment.

2. (U) Item: Transportation units equipped with the VRC 10 and VRC 18 series radios cannot maintain adequate communications during tactical operations.

Discussion: Division and separate Brigade Srei's utilize the entire range of VRC 12 series radios. Tactical unit convoy commanders may be infantry, artillery, armor or military police. Units of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) are integrated into tactical unit convoys in a support role for an extended period of time. Sufficient flexibility does not exist with the VRC 10 and 18 series radios to allow supervisory personnel to communicate with supported units. This has resulted in reduced effectiveness and could have grave results.

Observation: Motor Transport units should deploy to Republic of Vietnam with the VRC 12 series radios.

3. (U) Item: High LDS 465-1 Multifuel Engine Mortality

Discussion: Early production LDS 465-1 multifuel engines were susceptible to connecting rod and/or piston failures. Engines with serial number 460900 and below are suspected to be in this category. Investigation of previous reports of engines thus failing should be inspected to determine whether they are economically repairable and classified accordingly. Recurring failures should continue to be reported in accordance with TM 38-750.

Observation: Since lugging and down shifting to reduce vehicle speed are considered to result in engine damage, diesel and multifuel engines cannot and will not be used as a braking force. All truck drivers should be instructed accordingly.

4. (U) Item: Self Help

Discussion: The self help program for Repairs and Utilities (R&U) and construction projects have proven to be the answer to a low engineer priority. The program was established and approved through engineer channels. A special R & U Section was established consisting of 1 CWO, 4 EM and 50 local nation hired craftsmen.

The greatest problem encountered was a shortage of building materials. This problem was overcome by aggressive follow-up and substituting available items for items out-of-stock.

Observation: Units should look into the possibility of establishing such sections as soon as possible after arrival in country.
SECTION II
Part 2
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Recommend that transportation units presently in RVN equipped with the VRC 10 or VRC 18 radios be re-equipped with the VRC 12 series radios on a first priority basis and as an interim solution, recommend that sufficient PRC-25 radios be issued until VRC-46 and 47 radios can be obtained.

2. (U) That motor transport units deploy to Vietnam be equipped with VRC-12 radios.

S. M. COOKER
Colonel, J3C
Commanding
TO: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
APO US Forces 93207

SUBJECT: Project Officer for Ammunition Movements Report

1. (U) Reference classified TWX number 52232 AVIC 63 (03 USARY, 7TH Арм). Subject: Ammunition Movement in the Saigon Area (U).

2. (C) A serious backlog of ammunition ships had developed as of 1 June 1966. There were 24,118 short tons (S/T) of ammunition aboard vessels in Vietnam and in a hold status, and a total of 38,327 S/T of ammunition enroute due to arrive in June.

3. (C) Col S. M. Coggins was appointed Project Manager for Ammunition Movements in the Saigon/Long Binh/Yung Tau Area on 2 June 1966 (Incl 1). As per TCO 03, the Project concluded on 15 July 1966. During the period 1 June to 15 July 1966, 29 ships were off loaded at Nha Be for a total of 64,207 S/T of ammunition.

4. (U) Coordination was effected between Ammo Director, 1st Log, CO 5th Terminal Command, CO 11th Trans Br., all operating elements of the ammo discharge facilities, (Nha Be, Cogido, Bu Long, Ctg Inc., etc.) and the receiving agencies that controlled the ASP, i.e. 60th Ord Grp and 3rd Ord ASP.

5. (U) Factors which increased the flow of ammo from deep draft vessels to ASP's,
   
   a. (U) Increased emphasis on the movement of ammo from Nha Be to ASP's by all parties concerned.
   
   b. (U) Increased Barge - Small Craft, Terminal Barge Sites and Truck capabilities.
   
   c. (U) Around the clock operation at Cogido, and Bu Long.
   
   d. (U) Increased capabilities for off loading vehicles at ASP's, both in personnel, equipment and around the clock operation.
6. (U) Nha Be.

a. (C) 42,724 S/T were discharged in June and 21,833 S/T discharged 1 - 15 July 1966.

b. (C) There are three anchorages for ammunition ships at Nha Be. The anchorages are too close together for safety factors and are in the vicinity of the POL storage area.

c. (U) Electric fork lifts have been obtained for discharging ammunition in the hatch of vessels. Use of these fork lifts should preclude dragging most of the ammunition from the wings of the cargo holds which results in damaged ammunition or crating. This also should help in separating ammunition by lots and reduce the possibility of explosion. A 30 KW generator, battery charger and batteries are also on hand. These are being installed on a barge for movement alongside vessels.

d. (U) There has been no improvement in the condition of ammunition arriving in Vietnam. The lots and consignees are still being mixed in the hatches. This greatly reduces the speedy discharge of vessels at Nha Be and barges at barge sites.

e. (U) Ammunition ships are scheduled to keep available berths working as much as possible.

f. (U) Tonnage discharged at Nha Be is shown on graph (Incl 2).

7. (U) Bien Trieu. (Ammo Discharge Points)

a. (U) Bien Trieu was closed during a portion of March, April and May for repairs. The site is utilized mainly to discharge AN/VQ ammunition. During June, some U.S. ammunition was discharged at this site and some right deliveries were made to the ASP at Long Binh.

b. (U) Discharge tonnage is shown on graph (Incl 3).

8. (U) Cat Lai.

a. (U) Six anchor bouys were installed prior to 1 June off Cat Lai for the mooring of deep draft vessels. These berths have not been utilized due to questionable depth of water and security of the area.

b. (U) There is a small pier at Cat Lai, in need of repair, over which the USAF moves most of its ammunition from LCH's and preloaded trucks from the Nha Be vessels.

c. (U) When these bouyed anchorages are utilized, it will reduce the distance from off loading site to large discharge points.
20 July 1966
SUBJECT: Project Officer for Ammunition Movements Report

9. (U) Then Tu. Ha

a. (C) This barge site and storage facility is the main storage depot for ARVN and VNAF ammunition.

b. (U) Since 1 June 1966, four additional fork lifts and extra contract personnel have been added to increase the discharge rate.

c. (U) Night discharge and depot operations began on 13 July 1966.

d. (U) Discharge tonnage is shown on graph (Incl 4).

10. (U) Cau Binh Loi

a. (U) This ammo barge site was closed during June and is still under repair.

b. (U) Discharge tonnage is shown on graph (Incl 6).

11. (U) Buu Long

a. (U) The addition of more transportation and the institution of night discharge has increased the discharge rate.

b. (U) Discharge tonnage is shown on graph (Incl 7).

12. (U) Cogido

a. (U) The barge sites at Cogido and Buu Long were placed under the control of the 11th Trans Bn (Tnl), which is attached to the 11th Terminal Command. This central control has improved the overall operation at each site.

b. (U) Higher priority was given to construction of crane piers and dolphins at the Cogido barge site. Two crane piers with a pier frontage have been completed since 1 June 1966 in addition to repair of existing facilities.

c. (U) Mooring spuds were installed in the vicinity of Cogido to provide a barge holding area to relieve congestion at the piers and to reduce delays in shifting barges. The spuds have since pulled out and steel moorings were used for replacements.

d. (U) Tugs and LCN's are now assigned to the Cogido barge site and work at and between Cogido and Buu Long. The tugs are under the operational control of the OIC at the barge site. This expedites the movement of ammunition and barges in and out of the site.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVIC-SGN-48-3  
SUBJECT: Project Officer for Ammunition Movements Report.

20 July 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Project Officer for Ammunition Movements Report.

- (U) Tonnage discharged at Cogido is shown on graph (Incl 8).

13. (U) Ammunition Depot, Long Binh (ASP)

a. (U) The Ammunition Depot at Long Binh is operated by the 3rd Ordnance En.

b. (U) The area was congested with ammo on 1 June and is still congested.

c. (U) Twenty-Seven (27) ammo pads have been constructed at the ASP since 1 June. Sixteen (16) are now under construction. Seventy-Two (72) additional pads are projected to be completed by 1 November 1966.

d. (U) The following additional equipment has been obtained by the ASP since 1 June, 1 ea 15,000 lb fork lifts, 1 ea light sets without generators. The added fork lifts has greatly increased the ability of the depot to off load vehicles. The light sets are of no value without generators.

e. (U) The 48th Trans Op (MT) has designated the ASP as an area responsibility for one of the 48th Trans Op's attached companies in so far as transportation is concerned. The company controls the flow into, within and out of the depot. This tightens the discipline of the transportation personnel, reduces speeding, corrects poor loading procedures, speeds turnaround time, and insures that trailers are properly checked. Shuttle tractors are also committed to the ASP as needed to speed the movement of trailers.

f. (U) The ASP has designed slings for palletized ammo so that cranes can supplement fork lifts on palletized cargo and, with organizational personnel and equipment, constructed five (5) additional ammo pads. The ASP has also coordinated with barge sites on the proper shipping of ammo to the ASP (i.e. lot integrity, no pallets on 2½ ton military vehicles as far as possible, and proper loading of pallets on vehicles so that fork lifts can readily unload trucks).

g. (C) Since 1 June 1966, the ASP has received 33,075 S/T and shipped 12,013 S/T, successfully supported four (4) tactical operations and trained sixteen (16) additional fork lift operators (Military and Local Nationals).

h. (U) Depot operations continue to be handicapped by mixed lots of ammo arriving at the depot. This requires a vehicle to go to three or four pads to unload instead of one. This increases turnaround time.

i. (U) A U.S. Coast Guard detachment arrived 1 June 1966. The unit provides technical advice concerning vessel loading and discharging capabilities and limitations, inspection of barges and self propelled vessels and monitors safety practices during ammunition discharge. Makes recommendations to try to improve the safe and expeditious handling of ammo.

II. CONFIDENTIAL
15. (U) Procedures, now in being, are considered adequate to continue a successful ammunition movement program. Cooperation received from J-4 and TMA MACV, Hq USARV, Hq 1st Log Comd, 4th Term Comd and Support Command, Saigon was outstanding.

Tele: TC Hill 352

/s/ S. M. Coggins

/\ S. M. COGGINS

Colonel, TC

Commanding

Reproduced at Hq, 48th Trans Op (MT), 1 Sep 66.
SUBJECT: Appointment of Project Manager for Ammunition Movements

TO:

1. I have appointed Colonel Samuel M. Coggins as Project Manager for Ammunition Movements in the Saigon/Long Binh/Vung Tau area, effective this date. His responsibilities and authorities are shown in the enclosure.

2. Colonel Coggins will report directly to me in his capacity of Project Manager. All 1st Logistical Command personnel are requested to cooperate fully with Colonel Coggins and to render him any assistance he requests.

/s/ C. W. Eifler

C. W. EIFLER
Major General, USA
Commanding

Reproduced at Hq. 48th Trans Op (MT), 1 Sep 66.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF AMMUNITION MOVEMENTS PROJECT MANAGER

1. Advises Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on all matters relative to the movement of ammunition regardless of recipient in the Saigon/Long Binh/Vung Tau area to include:
   a. Discharge from deep-draft ships.
   b. Movement of barges.
   c. Unloading of ammo barges at barge discharge sites.
   d. Loading on and movement by trucks to ammunition Supply Points.
   e. Unloading at Ammunition Supply Points.

2. Acts as Project Manager for ammunition movements in the Saigon/Long Binh/Vung Tau area and has authority to issue instructions in the name of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

3. Insures optimum utilization of resources to gain maximum movement of ammunition tonnage through barge loading and discharge sites, and ammunition supply points.

4. Monitors that portion of the construction program that affects ammunition movement and recommends new construction projects or modifications to the current construction program.

5. Determines priorities for movement of ammunition in coordination with the Director of Ammunition and attends the 1st Logistical Command ship priority meetings.

6. Monitors resource requirements utilized in ammunition movements to include personnel, units, equipment and supplies and makes timely recommendations to the Commanding General for necessary modifications to program.

7. Monitors procedures utilized in the handling of ammunition and institutes improvements.

8. Is authorized direct contact with USARV, MACV, US Air Force, US Navy, and RVNAF, and other agencies in RVN as required.

9. Monitors civilian contractor performance on those contracts involving stevedoring and trucking services that affect ammunition movements and issues appropriate instructions to the contracting officer.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3330</td>
<td>4276</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td></td>
<td>2067</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5536</td>
<td>3126</td>
<td>3562</td>
<td>3522</td>
<td>2815</td>
<td>2629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>JUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3139</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>5189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27,000</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Power on a rampage is like a tornado...smashing, raging and destroying whatever gets in its way. But harnessed and controlled, that power will purr for you and serve you like a devoted Jinal.

Vehicle speed is power. Allowed to run wild, it becomes uncontrollable and can hold back a gung-ho truck on a downhill slope.

It takes a combination of right gear selection and foot braking to keep the engine speed down, particularly on high-compression diesel and multifuel engines.

A governor can't control your engine speed on a downhill slope. The vehicle's wheels can rev up an engine to the point where it can do a lot of damage.

The same is true when you downshift at too high an RPM. Overspeeding easily occurs when selecting a lower gear—you must reduce the vehicle speed to stay within the RPM limits.

The wrong use of your engine as a vehicle speed brake can tear up bearings, pistons, connecting rods, valve train and injection equipment. In extreme cases, improper use can cost you your engine.

SPARK IGNITION VS DIESEL

The big difference is that a spark ignition engine can be used for downhill braking...but a diesel (combustion ignition) cannot be used as a braking force.

A spark ignition engine, such as the R-6602, uses spark plugs and a distributor. Although it has some braking power, you still have to be careful not to overspeed the red-line settings. You can do this very easily by constant tapping of the foot brakes...on...off...on...off.

A diesel engine, which includes the multifuels, has no braking power on a downgrade—or at any other time, for that matter. So cool it, pal...foot brakes only when you're driving a new multifuel.

GENERAL RULE

Go down the hill in the same, or one gear lower, than the one used coming up...and use the foot brake to keep engine RPM below the red line on the tech.

SO DON'T LUG

You can also get into trouble—by using too high a gear range at too low an engine RPM—overloading the engine.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATOR CONTROLLED RPM'S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum RPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½-Ton Trucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR-427-2 (multifuel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR-465-1 (multifuel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Ton Trucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR-465-1 (multifuel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR-473 (diesel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR-4652 (gasoline)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RPM's for Governors

The RPM's in the last column are limits for full load operation of diesel and multifuel engines. However, the actual governor settings will allow a slightly higher maximum RPM at less than full load — such as is shown in the next chart.

While the RPM's listed before are controlled by vehicle operators, the governor settings listed next are cranked into the engine by mechanics.

**RPM's Set By Mechanics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2½-Ton Trucks</th>
<th>Idle</th>
<th>Governed (No Load)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDS 427-7</td>
<td>650-700</td>
<td>2850 max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD 465-1</td>
<td>650-700</td>
<td>2850 max</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5-Ton Trucks</th>
<th>Idle</th>
<th>Governed (No Load)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDS 465-1 (multifuel)</td>
<td>650-700</td>
<td>3100 max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD 472 (diesel)</td>
<td>650-700</td>
<td>2200 max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-4404 (avaiable)</td>
<td>650-700</td>
<td>2950 max</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These RPM limits may not agree with the ones given in TM 9-2320-209-10 and TM 9-2320-211-10, but they are the latest established limits and will show up in future changes to the 2½- and 5-ton truck's TM's.

**Danger Arrows**

Do you need some of those curved, red "Danger" arrow decals for your wheeled or tracked vehicle's tachometers? Order: Red Arrow Decal, FSN 7690-999-3567. Just dip the decal in water for a few seconds and then slide off the backing paper onto the tachometer glass — clean glass for a good stick, of course.

**M35A1 Clutch Troubles**

Your M35A1 2½-ton truck's clutch pedal travels only a few inches — a short trip as trips go. Part of this distance is a matter of life and death to the clutch.

Too much or too little free travel — especially too much — can be fatal. The clutch won't completely disengage and the facing will wear out long before its time, maybe even getting chewed to bits in about nothing flat.

Like TM 9-2320-209-20 (Apr 65) says, free pedal travel must be no less than 1½ inches and no more than 2 inches. Figure 187 on page 262 in the TM shows the yoke and locknut where free travel is adjusted.

You can tell in a second whether the free travel is on the nose by painting two stripes across the clutch pedal shaft — one at exactly 1½ inches from the floor and the other at exactly 2 inches from the floor.

*Or, instead of painting, you can make a temporary marking by wrapping a piece of half-inch wide tape around the shaft, so you've got a solid base in the half-inch space.*

If you feel the pressure — when you press down on the pedal — either below the first line or above the second line, either for an adjustment quick.

And another "clutch murderer" is the guy who takes off in second gear.

First gear comes first — it's as simple as that.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (HCS CS FOR-65) (48th Trans Gp)

HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, SACOR, MAC US Forces 90397

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACS FOR, DA) Washington D.C. 20310

1. (c) Forwarded in accordance with paragraph 9, 

2. (c) Concur with observations and recommendations.

TOLL: Tiger H75

GILBERT P. HOW
Colonel, Oruc
Commanding
OPFOR-OT (29 Sep 66)  4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  19 DEC 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs with basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

10 Incl
nc

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From
CLASSIFIED TRANSMISSION.

C. L. McMULLIN
CGT, ASC
Asst AG