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AUTHORITY

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 937th Engineer Group (Combat) for period ending 31 January 1967.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 937th Engineer Group (Combat) for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by GDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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937th Engineer Group (Combat)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS GSPOR-65), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

THRU: Commanding General
18th Engineer Brigade
ATTN: AVBC-C
APO 96377

Commanding General
United States Army Engineer Command Vietnam (Prov)
ATTN: AVCC-BC
APO 96491

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-NH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (GSPOR DA)
Washington, D.C. 20310

Section 1. Significant Unit Activities

1. Command:
   a. Mission:

   To command assigned or attached units.

   To plan and coordinate the operations of the units assigned or
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attached to the Group.

To provide all non-divisional engineer support required for tactical operations in the Group area of responsibility. (See Incl 1, 937th Engr Op (C) Area of Responsibility)

To serve as construction agency for all Army troop labor construction projects to include cantonment, airfield, logistic and line of communication construction in the Group area of responsibility.

To act as focal point of contact for, and maintain liaison with the Director of Construction, Qui Nhon, Regional Officers in Charge of Construction in An Khe and Pleiku and to provide a Contracting Officer's Representative on Army Contracts for which responsibility has been assigned to the Group.

b. Organization:

To accomplish this mission the following units were assigned or attached to the Group during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th Engr Bn (C)</td>
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<td>70th Engr Bn (C)</td>
<td>5-35D</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
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<td>299th Engr Bn (C)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>630th Engr Co (LE)</td>
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<td>Attached to 559th Engr Co (PB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two Pits + 40% of Spt</td>
<td>5-78E</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

A chart showing the organizational structure of the Group is attached as Incl 2.

c. Command Relationships:

The 937th Engineer Group (Combat) is attached to the 18th Engineer Brigade and has a conventional relationship with its parent unit with the exception that the Group responds directly to First Field Force, Vietnam (IFFORCEV) requests for operational support missions. This arrangement is in accordance with long-standing instructions of the CG, 18th Engr Bde, to ensure timely response to operational support requirements of the combat forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

2. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline:

   a. Personnel: The average present for duty strength of the Group remained within the range of 93% to 101% with an average of approximately 95% during the period November through January. The Group maintained a present for duty strength of approximately 96.6% from 10 November, when the 20th Engineer Battalion was attached, until 3 December when that unit completed its one year in-country. The 20th’s present for duty strength at the time attached was about 109%, of which 125 were infantry basics. From a standpoint of personnel turnover this period was not nearly as turbulent as the previous period. The Group experienced approximately 500 personnel rotations during the 1 Nov. - 1 Feb period as opposed to over 1,000 during the previous quarter. While the average present for duty strength was higher than the preceding quarter, the critical MOS shortages remained unchanged i.e., radio operators, combat engineers to include platoon sergeants, squad leaders and assistant squad leaders, equipment operators, and supply sergeants. Again, the most critical shortage was in the 62B (Equipment Operator) MOS. The present for duty strength in this category, while slightly improved over the preceding quarter, dropped to 84% during the latter half of January.

   (1) Officers: The present for duty strength of the officers remained between 85 to 89% with an average of 87%. The Group was without the services of two (2) of the authorized seven (7) maintenance warrants (62B) for most of the reporting period. At the close of the period there remains a shortage of one. Probably the most significant officer shortage is in the field of supply warrants (761A) of which there is a shortage of two of the four authorized. At the close of the period, the overall present for duty officer strength is 85.0%.

   (2) Senior NCO’s (E7-E9): The present for duty strength of senior noncommissioned officers ranged from 77% to 85% with an average of 78%. All of the shortages are in the E7 rank, except for one (1) E8 First Sergeant. The most critical shortage is in the personnel field.

   (3) Enlisted Grades (E1-E6): The enlisted present for duty strength ranged from 94% to 101% with an average of 95%. While the strength remained high there is now a shortage of squad leaders and assistants. At the close of the last report the Group was full of combat engineer squad leaders; however, due to the large number of losses by the 20th Engineer Battalion (C) in December without sufficient replacements, it became necessary to pull E5’s from the other combat battalions to maintain an acceptable situation in the 20th. There presently exists a shortage of approximately 25 E5 and E6 Combat Engineer (12B) NCO’s.

   b. Morale and Discipline:

   Morale continued to run high in all units throughout the reporting period. This high state of morale can be attributed to competent leadership at all levels of command and effective orientation and information programs which inculcate in the individual soldier a strong feeling for the importance of his task.
as a result, disciplinary problems have been minimal with only one Special and no Summary Court Martial cases being tried during this period. Though the heavy engineer workload necessitates a 6 1/2 day work week, thereby minimizing off-duty time, recreation and welfare programs have received considerable command attention.

All units show movies on a regular basis with the average being five nights per week. Post Exchange facilities, containing all the basic necessities and many luxury items, are available to all troops when in their respective base camps. When on combat support missions, units are issued supply packs gratis. Unit EM, NCO and officer's clubs, though generally austere, provide popular relaxing spots. The out of country R & R program continues to be well subscribed and no individual desiring to take advantage of this program has been unable to do so.

Unit chaplains conduct religious services and character guidance classes on a regular basis. In addition, they spend many hours in individual counseling sessions as requested and in local hospitals visiting, cheering and helping the sick and wounded men of the unit in many ways.

3. Security, Intelligence and Reconnaissance:
   a. Safeguarding Defense Information:

      Continued emphasis was placed on the employment of proper procedures for handling classified material. All officers and enlisted personnel assigned to HHQ received a briefing on the contents of all pertinent security regulations and the Subversion and Espionage Directed Against U.S. Army (SAEDA) program.

   b. Local Security:

      The relocation of Group headquarters and elements of the 509th, 595th and 554th Engineer Companies from Qui Nhon to Pleiku, and the occupancy of new base camp areas by the 299th and 20th Engineer Battalions necessitated the expenditure of many man-hours for the construction of personnel protective bunkers and fighting positions. Continual improvements were made on all unit perimeters to include the installation of perimeter lighting, protective fences, trip flares and claymore mines. A physical security survey team from Headquarters, IFFV conducted a survey of the above listed units on 12 January 1967 and made several recommendations for further improvements of their defensive posture. All recommendations have been implemented.

      The Group units located in the Pleiku area were also involved in the reorganization of the overall Pleiku Defense Plan. The Group physical security officer participated in several meetings concerning this reorganization. It is felt that better coordination, command and control procedures, as well as increased troop commitments to manning the early warning perimeter, have greatly enhanced the overall Pleiku security posture.
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c. Reconnaissance

Increased enemy activity within the Group area of responsibility limited the amount of route reconnaissance that could be performed. Deliberate reconnaissances were conducted on National Route 14 (Dak To-Dak Pok) and Route 511 (Kontum-Poloi Klang) by the 299th Engineer Battalion. This unit also conducted an updating reconnaissance of Route QL-14 between Pleiku and Dak To.

Reconnaissances of National Route 19 (An Khe Pass-Pleiku), the principal MSR to the Central Highlands, was patrolled virtually on a daily basis by reconnaissance teams from the 70th and 299th Engineer Battalions in their respective sectors of responsibility. Daily reconnaissance of Route 14 from Pleiku to Kontum was conducted during Operation PICKETT (3 Dec 66 to 22 Jan 67). Reconnaissances of Route 14 between Pleiku and Duc Lap were conducted by the 20th Engr Bn (C) in conjunction with and in preparation for convoy movements on operational support missions at Ban Blech and Duc Lap.

d. Intelligence

Continued coordination was maintained with intelligence gathering agencies operating within the Group area. Arrangements were made to receive prisoner of war interrogation reports from the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment, 4th Infantry Division. Regular contacts with II ARVN Corps and the Special Forces "C"-Team located in Pleiku insured up-to-the-minute information on enemy activities in our sector.

4. Operations and Training

a. General

Two very significant changes occurred in the operational responsibilities and capabilities of the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) during this period.

The first and most obvious change was that the Group’s area of responsibility (AOR) was increased in size by approximately 30% (See Incl 1, 937th Engr Gp (C)’s AOR). As a result of this change, the 19th Engr Bn (C) and the 84th Engr Bn (Const) were detached from the 937th Engr Gp (C) effective 100001 H Nov 66 and attached to the 45th Engr Gp (Cbstnt), which assumed responsibility for that portion of the former area of responsibility east of the An Khe Pass, including Qui Nhon and the coast. The 20th Engr Bn (C), located at the 4th Infantry Division’s Dragon Mountain Base Camp area 10 km south of Pleiku, was changed from an operational control to attached status effective 100001 H Nov 66. The 70th Engr Bn (C) and 299th Engr Bn (C) remained attached and headquartered in their respective An Khe and Pleiku base camp locations. HHC 937th Engr Gp (C), the 585th Engr Co (DT) and the 509th Engr Co (FB) less one platoon and reinforced with elements of the 554th Engr Co (FB) moved from Qui Nhon to Pleiku during November. Additional details of these attachments, detachments and changes of locations are given in Hq, 937th Engr Gp (C) OPORD 1-66, attached as Enclosure 3.

The second change was the continuation of a trend which began during the preceding quarter. During their first eleven months in-country, Sep 65 - July 66, the Group was normally called on to respond to operational support missions so
quickly that there was insufficient time available for proper reconnaissance, coordination and detailed planning. However, the tactical situation gradually improved and as U.S. and Free World forces increasingly seized the initiative and with it the attendant ability to forecast areas of operations (AO's) and the engineer support required for these operations, a much more orderly and deliberate approach to combat engineer operations could normally be taken and the fullest benefits of reconnaissance and detailed planning gained. To be sure, both weather, particularly the monsoonal rains, and changes in the local tactical situation gave rise to unexpected missions requiring an immediate response; but on the whole this and the last reporting periods witnessed the transition of operational engineer activities from fire-brigade reactions to fully planned responses to forecast requirements taking maximum advantage of available resources. While the officers and men justifiably take considerable pride in their unit's rapid responses to unexpected requirements, the benefits of the more deliberate approach are obvious and have resulted in far more productive and efficient use of engineer resources.

The division of available resources between construction tasks as opposed to operational support, line of communications work, and other related missions remained essentially unchanged from the 50 - 50 breakdown reached at the end of the previous ORLL reporting period. The 20th Engr Bn (C) was almost entirely committed to operational support missions while the 78th Engr Bn (C) was almost entirely committed to construction tasks. The 259th Engr Bn (C)'s commitments in these two areas fluctuated but averaged out to almost even breakdown between construction projects and operational support/LOG work.

Substantially degrading the operational capability of the Group by the end of the period was the steadily increasing nonavailability rate of both ordnance and engineer items of equipment, principally due to shortages of repair parts for both organizational and support maintenance. Lower priority projects in particular suffered to varying degrees because of decreased equipment availability. Further details on the Group deadline rate and maintenance posture are given in Section I.e., Logistics.

b. Operational Support

On 1 November 1966, the beginning of the reporting period, several missions were in progress that had been initiated in the previous period.

(1) OFM THAYER

Elements of the 19th Engr Bn (C) continued to upgrade and maintain Hwy #1 North of Quí Nhơn in support of OPERATION THAYER, a search and destroy operation conducted in upper Bình Dinh Province by the 1st Cavalry Division (AHC). In the first ten days of November, Co B, 19th Engr Bn (C) continued its work of repairing the ravages of both VC and weather to keep Hwy #1 between Quí Nhơn and Bong Son open to class 12 traffic. The
unit repaired two bridges and several by-passes, constructed two (11F) culverts and conducted regular mine sweeps before 10 November when the 19th Engr Bn (C)'s attachment to the 937th Engr Gp was terminated and responsibility for the maintenance and upgrading of Hwy #1 transferred to the 45th Engr Gp (Const).

(3) 45th Engr Gp (Const)

Similarly, with the change in the sectors of responsibility on 10 November the attachment of the 84th Engr Bn (Const) to the 937th Engr Gp (C) was terminated, with the 45th Engr Gp (Const) receiving the attachment of this unit and the responsibility for work at English Airfield. At the time of transfer, the earthwork was completed and the construction force from the 84th Engr Bn (Const) was in the process of returning to Qui Nhon.

(3) OPN TIGER HOUND

OPERATION TIGER HOUND, a mission to construct bunkers, aircraft revetments and cantonment facilities for USAF observer teams at Kham Duc, was within a few days of completion when the reinforced platoon of Co C, 19th Engr Bn (C) on site passed to the control of the 45th Engr Gp (Const).

(4) DUC CO CIDG CAMP

Another mission in progress at the beginning of the reporting period was the enlargement of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group/Special Forces (CIDG/SP) Camp at Duc Co to include construction of a cantonment area and gun positions for a composite artillery battery of 175mm and 8 inch guns by Co C, 299th Engr Bn (C). This project was necessitated by requirements for additional fire support for elements of the 4th Inf Div conducting OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, a search and destroy operation in western Pleiku Province. The unit constructed twenty-six 8x8x8m living-fighting bunkers, four gun positions, two 75' x 75' ammunition storage areas, a mess hall, defensive works consisting of tactical perimeter fencing, an 8 ft deep moat and other miscellaneous facilities. The project was completed on 10 November.

(5) RT 14 - PLEIKU to DAK TO - Upgrading

Another project in progress at the beginning of November was the upgrading of Route 14 North to all-weather class 31 capability between Pleiku and Dak To and the repair of the C-130 airfield at Dak To by elements of the 299th Engr Bn (C). This operation was generated by the requirement to support a brigade-sized force out of the Dak To forward supply area (FSA) as part of planned tactical operations in that area. The existing 4,200t double bituminous surface treatment (DBST) airfield had sustained severe damage during OPN HAWTHORN from the combined effects of heavy use and monsoon rains. During the last week of October elements of Companies A and B, 299th Engr Bn (C),
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reconstructed four heavily damaged timber trestle bridges, installed a 90-ft M476 dry span and a 180-ft float bridge, and emplaced numerous culverts in four days to open the road to class 31 (fair-weather) traffic. The construction force convoyed to the airfield site on 30 October 1966 to begin the task of repairing the airfield. All of the numerous soft spots and rutted areas were refilled and compacted and double surface treatment applied. Maximum advantage was taken of the night and periods of slack traffic in order to keep the airfield operational to C-123 traffic throughout the repair period of 31 October to 18 November. The airfield repairs and route upgrading were conducted concurrently. Due to a lack of security on the stretch of Rte 14 between Kontum and Dak To, permanent bridging was not installed. Abutments and approaches were prepared to allow the rapid emplacement of tactical bridging to enable the road to be opened to all-weather class 31 traffic on short notice. Stocks of panel bridging were pre-positioned in Kontum for this purpose.

(6) PLEI MRONG AIRFIELD AND RT 3B

Another mission underway during November was the upgrading of Rte 3B and the repair of Plei Mrong dirt airstrip by the 1st Plt of Co C, 799th Engr Bn (C). In the first week in November the airstrip was restored to usable condition by extensive ditching, grading and compacting, thus making the airfield available for use as an FLD for combat operations. Shaping, compacting and construction of drainage structures continued on Rte 3B until 23 November, giving the road a limited all-weather capability.

(7) PHU TUC AIRFIELD

The construction in progress of an all-weather C-130 airfield and ancillary facilities adjacent to the CIDG/SF camp at Phu Tuc became a 937th Engr Gp (C) responsibility with the change in the Group area of responsibility on 10 November. Progress by Co B, 20th Engr Bn (C) on this task was adversely affected by continual rains throughout November and December. Its isolated location made resupply and maintenance of equipment difficult. In spite of these factors, by the end of the reporting period the runway and parking apron were nearly ready for the installation of T-17 membrane surfacing.

(8) NHON CO AIRFIELD

As early as July 66 the requirement existed to rehabilitate and upgrade the C-130 airfield at Nhon Co by repairing its surface and giving it a double bituminous surface treatment. Due primarily to the non-availability of the light airmobile dozers, graders and compaction equipment required for this inaccessible site, the project was not started until mid-October. In

addition to accomplishing the runway repair, the platoon of Co D, 20th Engr Bn (C) also cleared 300,000 sq yds for helicopter parking and bivouac areas and applied MC-2 to 5,000 sq yds in the helicopter refueling and rearming area to suppress the dust there. The unit was airlifted back to its Dragon Mountain base camp following completion of the project on 8 December.

(9) ROUTE 509 UPGRADE AND EXTENSION (509B)

Directly west of Pleiku, Rte 509 was in poor condition as far as Plei Djereng due to considerable erosion by the monsoon rain and a destruction campaign on the part of the Viet Cong. To the west of Plei Djereng, the road had atrophied to a winding trail. At the Se San River it disappeared altogether.

On 18 November, elements of Co C, 20th Engr Bn (C), began upgrading Rte 509 between Pleiku and Plei Djereng to a class 31 all-weather road and also pioneering a class 12 all-weather road from the Se San River through heavy double canopy jungle into the Plei Tram area only a few miles from the Cambodian border. The upgrading of Rte 509 will be covered later under LOC upgrading. In pioneering the road to the north and west beyond the Se San River, Rome Plow Blades were used for the first time in this area to cut through some of the thickest jungle in Vietnam. This project proved the value of Rome Plow blades for clearing heavy jungle growth and contributed greatly to the development of both concepts and techniques within the Group for land clearing operations (See Section 11). A major part of this road building mission was the clearing of advanced fire support bases (FS3) for the 4th Inf Div artillery. As the road and FS3's were constructed, the artillery was able to relocate to sites more favorable for support of the advanced infantry elements operating in the area. A change in the tactical situation required the withdrawal on 8 December of the combat units of the 4th Inf Div from the area, thereby requiring the withdrawal of those elements of Co C, 20th Engr Bn (C), for lack of bivouac and job-site security. However, on 4 January military operations were resumed in the area and Co C returned to the task. By the end of the reporting period the pioneer road had been extended to the proposed airfield site at Plei Tram, an FS3 had been cleared at that location, and the runway centerline was in process of being cleared-end surveyed.

(10) NEW PLEI DJERENG AIRFIELD

The only airfield in the vicinity of Plei Djereng was a dirt strip, poorly sited for the support of FSA operations and unlikely to remain operational during the rainy season. The 20th Engr Bn (C) was given the mission of constructing a new, all-weather, C-130 airfield at a more suitable site 3 miles south of the existing dirt strip at Plei Djereng. Co D, 35th Engr Bn (C), which had only recently arrived in Vietnam with its parent battalion, was moved to the Central Highlands from Qui Nhon, attached
to the 20th Engr Bn (C) and immediately moved to Plei Djereng to begin this task in early December. The construction of this airfield attracted considerable interest in that a new aluminum matting, MX-19, was made available for the surface, this being its first application in a theater of operations. This matting, an aluminum honeycomb sandwiched between 4-foot square aluminum sheets, is strong, light and easily emplaced on a prepared base. The airfield was operational by end of January. Detailed records of the MX-9 installation were maintained and a report summarizing experience factors has been prepared.

(11) NEW PLEI DJERENG CIDG CAMP

Simultaneously with the construction of the new Plei Djereng airstrip and adjacent to it, Co D, 35th Engr Bn (C) also constructed a combined CIDG/SF - U.S. artillery camp. Facilities for the U.S. artillery unit, a composite battery of 175mm and 8 inch weapons, included four permanent gun positions, each with an associated ammunition and personnel bunker, a large fire direction center bunker, a mess hall, and several lesser structures. The bunker and gun position construction was all of native timber and over 4000 logs of tropical hardwood were used. This project was completed by end of January.

(12) OPN PICKETT

In early December the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division mounted an operation west of Kontum on short notice. Among the key requirements for this operation, code named Operation PICKETT, were the opening of Rte 511 to class 35 traffic as far west as Polei Kleng and the upgrading of the G-123 dirt airstrip at the latter location to an all-weather capability. Another requirement was the upgrading and maintenance of the Kontum Airfield taxiway, parking apron, and access ramps, which showed signs of base failure. Within a matter of hours of notification the 299th Engr Bn (C) dispatched a platoon to Kontum to begin the airfield repairs required to sustain the flow of C-130's airlifting the 1st Brigade. By the next day a full company was in the area of operations and had constructed four expedient bridge crossings, including one 90 ft M4T6 dry span, in order to reach the Krong Poko River at Polei Klong. The unit, Co A, 299th Engr Bn (C), supported by elements of both the 554th Engr Co (PB) and Bridge Company of the 4th Engr Bn, worked through the night and by the following morning had constructed a 450 ft float bridge across the river. Within 48 hours of receiving the mission two platoons had crossed the Krong Poko River and pioneered their way to Polei Kleng to begin the airfield repairs and construction of an FSH and FASH area. Work continued on upgrading the Kontum and Polei Kleng airfields and Rte 511 between the two locations until Operation PICKETT was completed on 20 January 1967. At that time the Kontum airfield had been repaired, the Polei Kleng airfield had been given a T-17 membrane surface and Rte 511 had been widened from a narrow winding trail to a two-way class 35 limited all-weather capability. The float bridge and the 90 ft M4T6 dry span were removed upon conclusion of Operation PICKETT on 21 January. On 27 January a requirement for re-installation arose, this time in support of the 4th Inf Div engaged in Operation SAM HOUSTON.
Once again the long float bridge was installed, this time by Co C, 299th Engr bn (C), and was in place and in use at the end of the period.

In early December it became apparent that several other important airfields would require extensive repairs to remain operational. The T-17 membrane surfaced airfields at Ban Blech and Oasis fell into this category as did the dirt strip at Plei Me. Each of these three airfields is a vital link in the chain of airfields generally paralleling the Cambodian border.

13) BAN BLECH AIRFIELD

Rehabilitation of the Ban Blech Airfield required removing the T-17 membrane surface, adding a 12-inch compacted fill base course, a 6-inch select fill cap, reshaping the runway, reconstructing the drainage system and patching and repaving the T-17 membrane. Co C, 20th Engr bn (C), less one platoon, convoyed to the site and commenced work on 23 December. Though hampered by a week of almost continual rains in late December, the unit completed repairs on 30 January.

14) PLEI ME AIRFIELD

The Plei Me dirt strip was repaired by elements of the 20th Engr bn (C) during the first two weeks in January. The ditching, filling, reshaping and compacting accomplished, while modest in scope, represented an important contribution to maintaining tactical capabilities in this area and to logistic support of the CIDG/SF camp there.

15) OASIS AIRFIELD

The T-17 membrane surfaced airfield at Oasis requires complete reconstruction to include the addition of a substantial select fill base in order to become operational for extensive C-130 traffic. Co D, 35th Engr bn (C) moved from its completed projects at Plei Djerem to the Oasis site on 30 January and immediately went to work. It is estimated that the complete rehabilitation of this airfield will take the company six weeks.

Unmentioned in the preceding descriptions of the larger combat support tasks are many smaller but no less important tasks: several hundred thousand gallons of pentene prime sprayed on FSA's and FASH's represent safety and maintenance benefits which cannot be numerically tabulated; the quick repair of the mortar craters at the Camp Holloway airstrip following the attack of 7 January; the construction of many short stretches of maneuver road; the shoring up or replacement of under-class timber bridges; the emplacement of hundreds of feet of GF culvert — each enabled some commander to complete his mission or do it a little bit better or more easily.
c. Construction:

When, on 10 November, the 84th Engr Bn (Const) was detached, the Group lost a considerable portion of its overall construction capability. The loss of the 19th Engr Bn (C) was compensated by the gain of the 20th Engr Bn (C), but the loss of the skilled men and equipment unique to an engineer construction battalion could not be made up. The 84th Engr Bn (Const) had provided a reservoir of journeymen plumbers, fitters, electricians and other key trades which were most useful on all Group projects.

The change in the Group area of responsibility on 10 November quite expectedly presaged a considerable shift in construction effort. The major portion of the Group's construction activities was formerly centered on the Qui Nhon - Hue Tal Valley area, with the harbor facilities and large logistic complex being predominant. However, the heavy influx of personnel into the Pleiku area just prior to this time created requirements for construction that more than matched the resources made available by the release of the Qui Nhon area projects and attachment of the 20th.

(1) AN KHE

Neither the shifting of the Group area of responsibility nor the changes of attached units had a pronounced affect on the 70th Engr Bn (C) and its construction efforts at An Khe. The major effort there was devoted to the development of Camp Radcliff and its associated facilities. These facilities encompassed such diverse tasks as the An Khe Logistic Depot, a large central bakery, a 65,000 barrel 1OL tank farm, a tropospheric scattering type communications facility and rehabilitating an AM-2 surfaced airfield. Co B, 84th Engr Bn (Const) was attached on 15 December with the primary mission of constructing the concrete runway for the new An Khe Airfield. The addition of this company has considerably strengthened the 70th Engr Bn's construction posture.

In late December Co B, 84th Engr Bn (Const), completed construction of a 60-ton ice plant capable of producing ice for the entire population of Camp Radcliff. A 10,000 barrel storage bladder, intended to receive 1OL pumped through the Qui Nhon - An Khe pipeline until the tank farm is operable, was completed by Co B, 70th Engr Bn (C) on 23 January. A dial central office was completed during the period to permit installation of the signal equipment. The Base Dental Clinic and an underground Division Tactical Operations Center were completed and are in use. Other 70th Engr Bn (C) projects completed include the erection of twenty-four 1600 cu ft prefabricated refrigerators and their protective sheds and the Camp Radcliff security lighting system consisting of six generators and sheds and 374 poles with floodlights.

(2) FLEIKU

In the Pleiku area the 299th Engr Bn (C) is heavily committed to the development of the large new logistics complex. Major tasks include
the construction of warehouses, administration buildings, open storage areas,
and a fifty-pad ammunition storage facility. In addition, work continues on
an interim refrigerator storage complex, aircraft and ordnance maintenance
buildings, and cantonment areas for the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division,
the 52nd Aviation Battalion, the 52nd Artillery Group and other U.S. troop
units in the Pleiku area.

(3) DRAGON MOUNTAIN

At the Dragon Mountain base camp of the 4th Inf Div, the 20th
Engr Bn (C) is participating in the construction of the 4th Inf Div's base
camp and logistic complex. In early November Co A, the 20th Engr Bn (C),
completed the Dragon Mountain water distribution system, tapping a nearby lake
to provide water for the entire camp.

During the reporting period a total of 75 construction projects, excluding
LOC upgrading and maintenance, were actively prosecuted by Group units in the
An Khe, Pleiku and Dragon Mountain areas. These projects consumed a total of
446,991 man-hours.

d. LOC Upgradings and Maintenance:

In addition to the previously described construction projects,
Group units expended varying amounts of effort on upgrading and maintaining
various highways and roads. The most important, Hwy 19, the MSR for both An Khe,
and Pleiku, received considerable attention from both the 70th and 299th Engr Bns.

The 70th Engr Bn (C) worked on the section between An Khe-Fass and Mang
Giang daily. Much effort was expended improving the road's drainage system
and repairing many potholes with a cold mix. Several stretches which had
deteriorated beyond repair were scarified, reshaped and compacted, and given
a road mix surface.

The 299th Engr Bn (C) was responsible for the Mang Giang Pass - Pleiku
stretch. This unit, like the 70th Engr Bn (C), made daily reconnaissances of
its portion of the road to insure that any serious impediments to traffic
would be corrected without delay. Reactions to problems were always swift.
When a tank retriever pulling a tank collapsed a 90-ft double-single Bailey
bridge 30 miles east of Pleiku on the afternoon of 24 December, thereby halting
all traffic, the unit's response was swift. By 2000 hours the necessary
replacement bridging had been loaded and the unit was on the road. By working
through the night, a triple single Bailey was emplaced and bearing traffic by
early afternoon the next day, Christmas.

The 20th Engr Bn (C) was given the mission of upgrading Route 19 East
between Dragon Mountain and Duc Co to a two-way Class 35, one-way Class 50,
all-weather road. By the end of the reporting period the unit had constructed
or repaired several sizable bridges and widened and improved 15 kilometers
The 40-kilometer stretch of route 509 from Pleiku to Plei Djereng is a second road that the 26th Engr Bn (C) is upgrading to an all-weather capability. To date, several of the narrower sections have been widened, excessive gradients reduced, and the first of four 50 - 70 ft steel stringer bridges emplaced.

v. Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Officer (CLIMFO):

Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office was established as a separate staff agency within this headquarters on 24 November 1966. At the same time Regional CLIMFO's were established at each of the major installations within the Group area, i.e., Camp Radcliff, Pleiku, and Dragon Mountain.

The CLIMFO has essentially three responsibilities: (1) Assist area commanders in master planning and act as a field repository of approved plans; (2) Provide an information/coordination service to both customers and construction agencies to best meet requirements and priorities and (3) Provide a means for local coordination with DIRCON's and ROICC's to include the monitoring of contract construction.

The Group S3 Officer functions as the Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Officer, as an additional duty. He is assisted by one officer and one NCO on a principal-duty basis. This staff is co-located with the Group construction officer and shares the use of the S3 facilities, clerical and engineering staff, and library.

A regulation was published by this Headquarters on 15 December which lists in detail the responsibilities of the CLIMFO and furnishes the guidance necessary to discharge these responsibilities. A copy of this regulation is attached as Inclosure #4. In addition, letters were sent to all major units in the Group AOR advising them of the services available and inviting them to take advantage of these services. A copy of this letter is attached as Inclosure 5.

The response to this letter has been quite gratifying. The CLIMFO has assisted many units in preparing or updating their installation master plans. This office monitors all master planning in the Group area of responsibility and keeps a file of all such plans.

During its first two months of existence, the majority of the CLIMFO's activities have been in the contract construction field, performing customer/contractor coordination and assisting in solving site, scope of work and materials problems.

Some of the projects under contract to RMK-BRJ on which the CLIMFO has been active are:
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

New 400 Bed Pleiku Evacuation Hospital

4th Division Access Road

3/25th Access Road

Pleiku Sub-Area Command Mass Hall and Latrines

Bien Ho Lake to MACV compound water supply system (Pleiku)

MACV IMCS Facility (Pleiku)

An Khe Primary Power Distribution System

f. Aviation

With the Group area of responsibility covering nearly one-fourth the land area of South Vietnam and with many units engaged on projects at locations accessible only by air, the aviation assets of the Group have been absolutely essential to command and control. During the period November 1966 thru January 1967, the Aviation Platoon of the Group performed its mission using 3 UH-1B and 2 U-6A aircraft. Aviation was primarily utilized for the transport of command and control personnel, aerial reconnaissance, re-supply of critical items such as repair parts to units in isolated locations, for essential administrative traffic including mail for outlying areas, and in several cases for medical evacuation of sick and wounded. A change of operational area and a reduction of the number of pilots to four required readjustment of flight policies and methods. The following problem areas were encountered: protection of parked aircraft against hostile fire; operation in dusty areas; aircraft availability and maintenance; operation in density altitudes above 4,000 feet; minimum crew requirements for UH-1B aircraft; storage of loose objects in aircraft; preflight coordination with supported units; minimum exposure approaches. Each of these problems and the attempted solutions are discussed under "Lessons Learned”.

Statistically, the platoon accomplished the following during the three month period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U-6A</th>
<th>UH-1B</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours Flown</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>417.3</td>
<td>549.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>7,200 lbs</td>
<td>36,800 lbs</td>
<td>44,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Platoon was accident and incident free during the period.

g. Logistics:

(1) Supply: The most noteworthy development during this reporting period was the fact that Class IV Construction Materials be
available in increasing quantities. The change in Group boundaries and relocation to the Pleiku area required that new requisitioning procedures be initiated for both the An Khe and Pleiku Areas. These procedures are outlined in the following paragraphs:

(a) An Khe Area: Group units in the An Khe Area submit bills of materials (BOM) to Group headquarters for approval. After receiving Group approval on the BOM, the units submit requisitions to the Qui Nhon Support Command Depot thru the 70th Engr Bn (C) S-4 who acts as a reviewer and consolidator. All materials are drawn from Qui Nhon and transported to An Khe on organic transport of both the 70th Engr Bn (C) and the USASC, QN. Because there is no supporting Class IV yard in the An Khe Sub-Area Command, the 70th Engineer Battalion operates as Class IV supplier for the An Khe area. Since the TO&E makes no provision for operating a Class IV yard, the S-4 section has required augmentation of personnel and equipment at the expense of the remainder of the Battalion. The lack of operable cranes and forklifts has constantly hindered the Bn S-4 Section in this endeavor.

(b) Pleiku Area: Group units in the Pleiku area submit bills of materials to Group headquarters for approval. After receiving Group approval on the BOM, the units submit requisitions through the Group S-4 to the Engineer Materials Commodity Manager, Pleiku Sub-Area Command. All materials are drawn through the Pleiku Sub-Area Class IV yard, although frequently Group transportation resources are used to transport materials from Qui Nhon to Pleiku and normally from Pleiku to the work site.

The recent influx of engineer units into the Pleiku area has created a much greater demand for construction materials in this area. Simultaneous increases in support units, particularly transportation units, has resulted in the ability of Pleiku Sub-Area Command (PKSAC) to keep pace with the material requirements to a marginally satisfactory degree. New facilities, now under construction, will improve the capability of PKSAC to receive, store, and issue construction materials.

h. Maintenance:

The maintenance management program in this Group has been almost completely overhauled since the changes in boundaries and units which occurred in November.

Of particular significance is the fact that since 10 November, there has been no organic direct support maintenance capability within this Group.

Another significant point in the current maintenance management program is the prohibition of third echelon repair by organizational shops and the rigid enforcement of this rule by an increasing number of inspections by Group Maintenance Staff covering FLL’s, shop operations, motor stables, and log books. An assistance team composed of both Group and supporting DDU Maintenance Supervisors visits those units with deficiencies on these inspections and assists
them in establishing correct procedures. The team remains with the unit until satisfied that assigned personnel are thoroughly familiar with and implementing sound maintenance practices. Corrective action is taken when deficiencies remain uncorrected or insufficient improvement is noted.

Semi-permanent maintenance facilities are being constructed in all Group units as an additional means to improve maintenance of equipment. Except for the most urgent combat support requirements, adequate time for maintenance activities is scheduled. Maintenance training is emphasized and proper tools provided.

In spite of the implementation of this vigorous maintenance management program there has continued to be a substantial increase in deadline equipment. One reason for this increase is that units are now required to inspect equipment more thoroughly and turn in equipment with third echelon deficiencies immediately to their respective DSUs. In addition, the prohibition of third echelon repair by organizational shops has resulted in more accurate reporting of deadline equipment.

This maintenance management program is designed to have the following long-term effects:

a. Equipment requiring higher than organizational maintenance will be turned into the DSU promptly. This will permit maintenance personnel to devote their attention exclusively to preventive maintenance, organizational repair, scheduled services, on-the-spot checks of operators, and the development of sound motor stables procedures.

b. The demands data to the DSU, which is so vital to their efficient operation and realistic requisitioning and stocking, will be furnished in a more timely manner and with greater accuracy.

c. Based on this more accurate demand data, the DSU's can anticipate their future requirements and organize more effectively to meet these requirements.

This maintenance management program, now being implemented in the Group, conforms to current regulations and has the long range goal of substantially improving the maintenance posture of the entire organization. The short-range problem of an unsatisfactorily high deadline rate must be endured in order to develop a sound program to reduce future problems. The improvement already shown in organizational maintenance operations is serving to enhance preventive maintenance standards and detect potentially serious deficiencies in an embryonic stage.
Section 2, Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel:

ITEM: Reassignment of personnel to relieve the inequitable distribution of skills due to rotational humps.

DISCUSSION: Rotational humps have caused an inequitable distribution of skills within units attached to the 937th Engr Gp (C). In order to alleviate this problem, the unit with the highest percentage of the required skill was directed to divide the number of personnel in the desired skill by the number of people to be transferred to other units, thus obtaining a number "n" rounded off to the nearest whole number. The losing unit then compiles "n" lists encompassing all personnel in the desired skill in their unit for submission to the parent organization. This procedure insures that the losing unit divides the levels of proficiency equally among the lists as the parent unit selects which list(s) will be transferred. This system has met with approval of the losing as well as the gaining unit, and at the same time has maintained an equitable distribution of talent.

OBSERVATION: That other units faced with a similar problem may consider the technique described above as a means to effect equitable transfers of personnel between units.

2. Operations:

ITEM: Construction of semi-permanent 175mm and 8 inch gun pads.

DISCUSSION: Non-divisional artillery units, providing area fire support for tactical operations and interlocking protective fires for outlying U.S. Special Forces camps, are now locating batteries of 175mm and 8 inch self-propelled howitzers within the perimeters of CIDW/SF camps on a semi-permanent basis. This unit has constructed semi-permanent firing pads at two such locations to provide greater accuracy and rate of fire from these weapons during all weather conditions. An octagon-shaped (8 position) pad design was used during construction at the first camp. With 8 spade backstop positions the tubes must traverse 45 horizontal degrees in each position to provide full 360 degree coverage. Guns firing at the extreme deflection from a given backstop position (22 degrees) experienced an undesirable amount of movement between rounds and had to be frequently re-laid to maintain desired accuracy. Pads constructed at the second camp followed a ten-position pattern. This decreased the required horizontal traverse by 15 degrees, reducing the differential stresses within the gun carriages when fired at extreme deflection. The gun displacement when fired was minimal, allowing a significant increase in the number of rounds that could be fired before re-lying was necessary.

OBSERVATION: Firing positions constructed for heavy artillery should be of ten-position design for best results even though the nominal traverse capability of the guns would seem to indicate that an eight-sided pad is sufficient.
ITEM: Road alignment selection in hostile jungle.

DISCUSSION: Rome Flows were used to clear right of way for construction of a pioneer maneuver road through a very dense, enemy-infested jungle area. The thick double-canopy vegetation coupled with the proximity of sizeable enemy forces severely limited our ability to reconnoiter and survey the alignment ahead of the flows. The ideal alignment often did not become apparent until substantial effort had been expended in clearing unprofitable avenues.

OBSERVATION: While gross alignment can be selected by aerial and map reconnaissance, in order to optimize productivity of Rome Flows and insure most rapid construction of the roadway, an advance patrol with adequate security forces should be provided to allow alignment and marking of the centerline, maintaining a lead over the flows of at least one day.

ITEM: Radio control of Rome Flow operations.

DISCUSSION: Heavy vegetation during Rome Flow road right of way clearing operations in dense jungle areas caused operator difficulty in following selected centerline alignment. An NCO, using a compass and PRC-25 radio, followed behind the flows and guided the operators, who wore headsets, by radio directions. This technique proved highly successful in controlling the flows and in obtaining maximum progress during the right of way clearing.

OBSERVATION: Radio control procedures were found to be most effective when conducting road right of way clearing operations in dense jungle areas.

3. Logistics:

ITEM: Emergency starting of 5-ton dump truck with inoperative in-tank fuel pumps.

DISCUSSION: During tactical operations in isolated areas it has been necessary on occasion to use extraordinary procedures to start 5-ton dump trucks with inoperative in-tank fuel pumps. Two methods used successfully were:

(a) Loosen drain cock on secondary fuel filter, remove left fuel pump, insert air hose muzzle, form a tight seal between nozzle and fill hole, and force air into fuel tank. This will force fuel through lines and up into fuel filters. After a steady flow of fuel from secondary filter is established, close the stopcock and attempt to start engine.

(b) Attach an intervehicular air line from the rear air coupling of an operational vehicle to the front left air coupling of the stalled vehicle. Close the pressure release valve, open flow valves at air hose connections, and open the stopcock on the secondary fuel filter of the stalled vehicle. Start the operational vehicle. Watch the air pressure gauge in the stalled vehicle.
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and when it reaches 60 psi disconnect the intervehicular air line. Pump brakes on stalled vehicle until a steady flow of fuel from secondary fuel filter is established, and then close the stopcock. Open pressure release valve, and attempt to start vehicle.

Similarly, when it was necessary to shut down trucks with this defect overnight before continuing a road march the next day, the vehicles were left facing down an incline, providing sufficient fuel in the lines to start the engine.

OBSERVATION: Though the methods described above have been successful they entail certain risks and should not be used except in an emergency. Forcing fuel out of the tank with compressed air may also force fuel through the fording system and cause dilution of crankcase and transmission lubricants as well as possibility of creation of a combustible mixture in the crankcase and attendant risk of explosion.

4. Aviation:

ITEM: Protection of parked aircraft against hostile fire.

DISCUSSION: Upon relocation in the Pleiku area, it was decided to keep the rotary wing aircraft within the Group headquarters perimeter. Dust and rotor wash problems necessitated the parking areas be placed in a far corner of the perimeter, at least 50 yards from the tent area. A dilemma then confronts the commander, for adequate dispersion of three UH-1D aircraft results in a greatly extended perimeter, adversely affecting a headquarters already hard pressed to provide sufficient security from within its own resources.

OBSERVATION: Revetments are being constructed in stall form of dimensions 60' by 60', open at one end, five feet high. The stalls are placed as close as possible to the edge of the tent area with the approach ends oriented toward the nearest friendly unit. The perimeter will be relocated outside the stalls with bunkers on both ends of the revetment and a sufficient buffer zone of wire to permit helicopter operations without extending the guarded perimeter to unreasonable dimensions. Turbulence within the stalls requires landing and unloading be accomplished outside the stalls.

ITEM: Minimum exposure approaches.

DISCUSSION: Requirements to descend into small arms range for the purpose of landing or close observation afford enemy elements a relatively lucrative target.

OBSERVATION: The general methods adopted by Group pilots employ non-standard erratic approach patterns coupled with high-approach speed. This may take the form of a contour approach over pre-selected heavy growth areas, or a spiraling high-rate of descent pattern. Rotary wing terminations are critical under high-density altitude conditions and are normally best
handled through use of a simultaneous flare deceleration and left pedal turn; leading power at the point of maximum flare, and coming to full power at the completion of the turn which will coincide with a slight right pedal pressure, stopping the turn and releasing some power for the termination. Flare decelerations into a right turn may cause rotor overspeeds. Fixed wing approaches from high speed can best be adjusted using a relatively long, close-in base leg, so that last minute 'lap and power adjustments can be made with minimum time on final approach leg.

ITEM: Operation in dusty areas.

DISCUSSION: Thick dust is both a hazard to aircraft and a detriment to the morale of ground personnel. The Group's operation requires frequent landings at construction sites prior to any surface preparation or dust palliative application. The dust can completely obscure pilot reference to the ground, and has caused numerous accidents within Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: While primarily a problem in pilot training, ground units which establish helipads should recognize the hazards involved and choose an area with maximum vegetation at least 50 yards from their eating and living facilities. Policies established by the Group pilots are as follows: Any vegetation, regardless of density will aid in depth perception during the critical termination period of an approach. Approaches should be to and from the ground, with hovering avoided except for brief power checks. Special caution is exercised to avoid a slight downwind condition on takeoff since the dust cloud will be carried along with the aircraft further obscuring the ground and lengthening the crucial period prior to translational lift. The copilot should remain on the controls, monitoring the instruments and prepared to continue the takeoff under IFR conditions if he observes an indication of an unusual attitude.

ITEM: Operation in Density Altitudes above 4,000'.

DISCUSSION: Temperature and moisture conditions in the Group area of operation required reduced payloads from both fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

OBSERVATION: Since most flights were of short duration (one-hour or less) standard fuel loads were changed to 800 lbs rotary wing, and 70 gallons fixed wing unless the mission dictated otherwise. The "Go-No Go" placard was used prior to all rotary wing takeoffs with the copilot announcing limiting power and actual hovering power. The placard was found to be accurate under all circumstances and its use was mandatory.

ITEM: Aircraft availability and maintenance.

DISCUSSION: The supply of parts and workload imposed upon direct support units makes it mandatory that organizational maintenance function at top efficiency. Experience has proven that in order to keep two out of three
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aircraft flyable, one must be grounded for short periods for inspection and maintenance.

OBSERVATION: Lubrication intervals were shortened, and scheduled maintenance was re-planned in crew to minimize down-time. Ten hours prior to any scheduled maintenance, meetings were held by the Maintenance Officer with the maintenance supervisor, maintenance records clerk, technical inspector, crew chief, and tech supply clerk. Items discussed included work force assigned, time change components due change, special tools and parts required, and instructions on torque, one-time use items, etc. The resources were assembled prior to the maintenance-due time.

ITEM: Pre-flight coordination with supported units.

DISCUSSION: Cargo capacities of aircraft vary greatly with meteorological conditions. Temperature, moisture, and wind effect often cause last minute changes in mission loads. Without firm controls cargo is often delivered unpackaged and in excess of the amount requested. Passengers often change destinations and ground time at the last minute, causing the aircraft to fly in excess of the amount of flight time previously planned.

OBSERVATION: Proper flight planning assures the safe accomplishment of the mission, and proper mission planning enables the maintenance section to make resources available at times determined by command priorities. The pilot must consider weather, fuel requirements, fuel locations, route of flight to maintain radio contact with flight following agencies, and the amount of flight time available to the aircraft prior to its next scheduled maintenance. Last minute changes in mission force the pilot to rely on experience and ingenuity rather than sound planning, and make the long range forecast of resources available next to impossible. Supported units must be furnished adequate information in this regard so that last minute changes will be at a minimum. The inherent flexibility of organic aviation is severely hindered when constantly utilized on a "crisis" basis.

ITEM: Minimum crew requirements for UH-1B aircraft.

DISCUSSION: Reduced personnel availability often presented situations in which only one pilot was available for UH-1B missions and requests were made to substitute a passenger for a door gunner, reducing the actual crew to pilot and crew chief.

OBSERVATION: The practice of reducing the crews was strongly discouraged for the following reasons: Aircraft and pilots are subject to ground fire at all times while in flight and the aircraft and passengers' lives may be saved by having a back-up capability in the cockpit. Any mechanical malfunction requires instant reaction on the part of all crew members which may include
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diagnostics, corrective action, preparation of passengers for landing, radio distress calls of position and situation, and preparation of aircraft for crash landing. During routine operations in dust or high density altitude conditions, both pilots are involved in the safe operation of the aircraft. Door gunners are apprentice mechanics, trained in passenger and cargo operations, fire commands, and in-flight anti-collision measures. No satisfactory substitutions can be made of any member of the four man UH-1B crew. In instances where exceptions were made, actual flight training was given to the maintenance supervisor (MOS) and to selected officers from within the Group whose travel requirements were such that they were frequently aboard and, if placed in the copilot’s seat, could actually perform back-up functions.

ITEM: Storage of loose objects in aircraft.

DISCUSSION: Loose passenger gear, weapons, and small unpackaged parts create a hazard in flight since they may damage rotor systems if allowed to fall from the aircraft and become deadly missiles during a crash landing or turbulence.

OBSERVATION: Kit bags and duffel bags were obtained for normal storage, and passengers were briefed by instruction card to secure weapons and loose gear. Small unpackaged cargo was secured by web nets to the floor of the aircraft.

Section 2, Part II. Recommendation

NONE

5 Inclosures
1 - 337th Engr Gp (C) Area of Responsibility
2 - Organization Chart
3 - OPORT 1 - 66
4 - Regulation 405-6
5 - CENPO Letter

E. P. BRAUCHER
Colonel, CE
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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3 - CG, 18th Engr Bde, ATTN: S3 (COURIER)
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937 Engineer Group (G)
Area of Responsibility

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GP Boundary 1-10 Nov 66
GP Boundary 10 Nov 66 - 8 Jan 67

INCL 1
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OFORD 1-66

References: Map Sheets (See attached list, Incl 1)

Task Organization: 937th Engr Gp (C)

20th Engr Bn (C) 70th Engr Bn (C) 299th Engr Bn (C)
584th Engr Co (LE) 517th Engr Co (FB) 630th Engr Co (LE) (-)
1 Plt, 630th Engr Co (LE) 509th Engr Co (FB) (-)

585th Engr Co (DT) HHC, 937th Engr Gp (C)

1. SITUATION:
   a. Enemy forces: Current INTSUM
   b. Friendly forces:
      (1) 18th Engr Bde relocates from Saigon to Dong Ba Thin o/a 15 Nov 66.
      (2) Following major elements attached to 18th Engr Bde:
         (a) 35th Engr Gp (Const), Cam Ranh Bay, RVN
         (b) 45th Engr up (Const), Tuy Hoa, RVN
         (c) 937th Engr Gp (C), Pleiku, RVN
      (3) Following major elements detached from 18th Engr Bde:
         (a) 79th Engr Gp (Const)
         (b) 159th Engr Gp (Const)
   c. Attachments and Detachments:
      (1) Task Organization, Attachments effective 100001 Nov 66.
      (2) Detachments effective 100001 Nov 66:
         19th Engr Bn (C) 84th Engr Bn (Const)
         1 Plt 509th Engr Co (FB) 73rd Engr Co (CS)
         554th Engr Co (FB) (-) 444th Engr Det (CONC)

2. MISSION: 937th Engr Gp (C) relocates from Qui Nhon to Pleiku and assumes responsibility for non-divisional engineer support in sector.
GROUP 4

DECLASSIFY AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of operation. HHC, 937th Engr Gp (C) conducts tactical OP relocation from vic Qui Nhon (CR00218) to vic Pleiku (ZA236531) during period 070001 to 100001 Nov. Attached units continue missions presently assigned by 937th Engr Gp (C) in sector. Detached units continue missions presently assigned by 937th Engr Gp (C) pending changes of missions by 45th Engr Gp (Const).

b. 19th Engr Bn (C)
   (1) Continue missions presently assigned.
   (2) Detach Hq and 1 plat 509th Engr Co (FB) and two plats plus 40% of support plat of 554th Engr Co (FB). Retain OPCON of these elements and of 1 plat 630th Engr Co (LE). Pending order by this Hq, attach 554th elements to 509th Engr Co (FB). 

c. 20th Engr Bn (C)
   (1) Attached 937th Engr Gp (C) effective 100001 Nov 66.
   (2) Continue missions presently assigned.
   (3) Re-assume operational control of 20 EBC elements and responsibility for missions now in progress at Nhoa Co (YU805254) and Phu Tue (BQ508602) effective 100001 Nov 66.

d. 70th Engr Bn (C): Continue missions presently assigned.

e. 84th Engr Bn (Const):
   (1) Continue missions presently assigned.
   (2) Detach 585th Engr Co (DT). Retain OPCON pending order by this Hq.

f. 299th Engr Bn (C):
   (1) Continue missions presently assigned.
   (2) Assume host unit responsibility for HHC, 937th Engr Gp (C) IAW VOCO, 937th Engr Gp (C).
   (3) Receive attachment of 509th Engr Co (YB) (-) with attached two plats and 40% of spt plat of 554th Engr Co (FB). These elements remain under OPCON of 19th Engr Bn (C) pending further order this headquarters.

g. 585th Engr Co (DT):
   (1) Attached 937th Engr Gp (C) effective 100001 Nov 66.
   (2) Remain under OPCON 84th Engr Bn (Const) pending further order.
h. HHC, 937th Engr Gp (C):

   (1) Relocate CP, 937th Engr Gp (C), from vic Qui Nhon (CR080218) to vic Pleiku (ZA236531).

   (2) Advance party departs Qui Nhon 070000 Nov.

   (3) Main body close Pleiku NLT 100001 Nov.

   (4) Prepare road movement plan for main body.

   (5) Transport all TCE and station property.

   (6) Prepare and submit security plan for new location to arrive this Hq NLT 091200 Nov.

   (7) Perform required administrative actions to turn over present facilities in Qui Nhon to HHC, 45th Engr Gp (Const).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: ADMIN C (omitted).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

   a. Command: Group CP, Initially at QUI NHON (CR080218), CHIUNLOC effective 100001 Nov to PLEIKU (ZA236531).

   b. Signal:

      (1) Current SOI and SSI in effect.

      (2) Advance party, HHC, 937th Engr Gp (C), request installation of telephones from Pleiku Area Signal Officer.

      (3) Pending installation of separate telephone lines, Hq, 937th Engr Gp (C) will operate thru PIONEER switchboard.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

/Sg/ E. P. Brauchter
/C/ E. P. BRAUCHER
Colonel, CE

DISTRIBUTION:

19th Engr Bn (C) - 4
20th Engr Bn (C) - 4
70th Engr Bn (C) - 4
84th Engr Bn (Const) - 4
299th Engr Bn (C) - 2
45th Engr Gp (Const) - 2
18th Engr Bde - 4
HHC, 937th Engr Gp (C) - 4
USASOCW - 2
1st Cav Div (ARML) - 1
MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES L7014

SHEETS

6432 I & IV
6433 II & III
6437 II
6532 I & IV
6533 I thru IV
6534 I thru IV
6535 I thru IV
6536 I thru IV
6537 I thru IV
6538 I thru IV
6539 II & III
6633 I thru IV
6634 I thru IV

Incl 1

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
HEADQUARTERS
937TH ENGINEER GROUP (COMBAT)
APO 96318

REGULATION
No. 405-6

CONSTRUCTION
15 December 1966

Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning

1. Purpose: To assign responsibilities and establish procedures by which the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) will fulfill its Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Function.

2. Applicability: This regulation is applicable to all attached units of the 937th Engineer Group (Combat).

3. Organization: A 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office (CLIMPO) is established as a separate staff section of this headquarters. Regional CLIMPO's will be established at An Khe, Pleiku, and Dragon Mountain by the Commanding Officers of the 70th, 299th, and 20th Engineer Battalions (Combat), respectively, to fulfill contract liaison and installation master planning functions within their sectors of responsibility as defined in 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Letter of Instruction to Commanding Officer, 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat), dated 2 December 1966; Letter of Instruction to Commanding Officer, 70th Engineer Battalion (Combat), dated 1 October 1966; and Letter of Instruction to Commanding Officer, 299th Engineer Battalion (Combat), dated 10 October 1966.

4. Responsibilities:

a. The 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office will have the following functions:

   (1) Assist the Group Commander in providing local area commanders with technical advice and assistance to carry out their master planning responsibilities, and act as a field repository for approved master plans.

   (2) Operate as an information center for units within the Group area of responsibility providing information on current status of base construction and planning. Collect and disseminate information on
incoming units and their construction requirements. Recommend through channels, priorities to satisfy customer requirements.

(3) Act as focal point of contact for, and maintain liaison with DIRCON, ROICC's and Area Engineers within the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) area of responsibility. Maintain cognizance of contract construction plans and progress. Recommend changes in assignment between troop and contract construction agencies in the Group area.

(4) Meet, as found necessary by the Group Commander and/or the DIRCON, with DIRCON organization on contract construction matters.

(5) When appropriate, coordinate planning with using agency and serve as spokesman for user on criteria, scope, BOD's, etc. (Ordinarily, this will be done only when directed by higher headquarters).

(6) Recommend appropriate field changes to DIRCON/ROICC's, and advise higher headquarters.

(7) Act as Contracting Officer's Representative on Army contracts for which responsibility has been assigned to the Group.

b. Regional Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Offices will have the following functions:

(1) Assist the Battalion Commander in providing local area commands with technical advice and assistance to carry out their master planning responsibilities. Maintain working files of IMP's in their area.

(2) Operate as an information center for units within the Battalion area of responsibility providing information on current status of base construction and planning. Collect and disseminate information on incoming units and their construction requirements. Recommend through channels, priorities to satisfy customer requirements.

(3) Administer and monitor the self-help construction program in accordance with 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Regulation 415-7, dt 12 December 1966 and apprise Group Headquarters and local commanders of progress and problems.

(4) Act as focal point of contact for, and maintain liaison with ROICC's and Area Engineers within area of responsibility. Maintain cognizance of contract construction plans and progress and contractor's capability, current and future. Recommend changes in assignment between troop and contract construction agencies within his area.

(5) Monitor all utilities programs.

(6) Participate in final acceptance inspection when requested (Installation commander is the responsible officer, normally assisted by his Post Engineer).
937 EN Reg 405-6 (CONT'D)

(7) Recommend appropriate field changes to higher headquarters.

(8) Provide field inspection services on those contracts on which the Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office acts as Contracting Officers' Representative.

(9) The following is considered to be minimum essential information which the regional offices must have on each project:

(a) Project Title
(b) Project Number
(c) Location
(d) BOD and EDC
(e) Copy of plans and specifications with a copy of each change order.
(f) Project Cost
(g) Name of Contractor
(h) Date of Notice to Proceed
(i) Requesting Agency
(j) Project Priority
(k) Project Percent Complete

(10) Initial information will be provided to the Regional Offices by the Group Office. Changes, problems and other updating information will be provided by Regional Offices to the Group Office.

5. Reports:

a. Weekly Updating Reports will be submitted to reach the Group Office not later than 1200 hours each Tuesday.

b. The Weekly Report will contain the following minimum information:

(1) Brief synopsis of contract construction monitoring operation during the period.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

PERCENTAGE COMPLETE TO DATE ON EACH PROJECT.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ R. F. Higginbotham
/c/ R. F. HIGGINBOTHAM
Captain, CE
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY

Wayne J. Reynolds
Wayne J. Reynolds
Maj, CE
SUBJECT: Establishment of the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office

TO:

1. My superiors in the Engineer Chain of Command have charged me with the responsibility for ensuring that all units in the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) area of responsibility are provided with adequate engineer support, both operational support and construction support, regardless of whether it be by engineer troop effort, contractor effort, or self-help effort.

2. In the fields of Contract Construction and Installation Master Planning, I have been given the following functions:

   a. Provide local Installation Area Commanders with technical advice and assistance to carry out their master planning responsibilities and act as a field repository for approved master plans.

   b. Operate an information center for lodger units, providing information on current status of base construction and planning. Collect and disseminate information on incoming units and their construction requirements. Recommend, in coordination with others, priorities to satisfy customer requirements.


   d. Act as a focal point of Army contact and liaison with DIRCON and ROICC. Maintain cognizance of contract construction plans and progress. Recommend changes in assignment between troop and contract construction agencies.

   e. Monitor all utilities programs.

   f. Participate in final acceptance inspection when requested (Installation/Area Commander is the responsible officer, normally assisted by his Post Engineer).

INCL 5
SUBJECT: Establishment of the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office

3. In order to carry out those functions, I have established the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office, which operates as a part of my headquarters, and a Regional Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office in each major installation area: An Khe, Pleiku and Dragon Mountain. Those Regional Offices are operated by the 70th, 299th, and 20th Engineer Battalions, respectively. Other areas of responsibility served by these Regional Offices are:

a. Ben Me Thout - 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat)
b. Kontum - 299th Engineer Battalion (Combat)
c. Chao Reo - 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat)

4. In order to enable me to fulfill the above functions in a way which will be of the greatest assistance to you, I invite you to contact the Regional Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Offices on routine matters relating to the functions described above and the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office, or me personally, on such matters as appear to you to require special handling or priority actions.

5. It will be most helpful if your headquarters can furnish us two copies of your Base Development Plan, and changes thereto, and also two copies of any requests for construction submitted through your command channels in accordance with USARV Reg. 405-2, Construction Priorities, Standards, Procedures and Control of Resources, dated 5 October 1965.

6. Routine correspondence on contract construction or master planning addressed to my headquarters should be marked ATTN: EGC-CLIMPO.
EGC-3

SUBJECT: Establishment of the 937th Engineer Group (Combat) Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning Office

Office can be reached telephonically by asking for DYNAMIC - Construction off of the Pleiku local switchboard.

/s/ E. P. Braucher

E. P. BRAUCHER
Colonel, CE
Commanding

A TRUE COPI

WAYNE J. REYNOLDS
Maj, CE
AVLC-C (15 Feb 67) 1st Ind Opt Miles/reg/DST-163
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (OM-LL) of the 237th Engineer Group

Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade, APO US Forces 96377

TO: Commanding General, U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Prov), APO US Forces 96401

1. This Headquarters has reviewed subject report submitted by the 237th Engineer Group, and considers that it provides an excellent report of Group activities and accomplishments during this reporting period.

2. The following comments are made:

   a. Section 1, Personnel Paragraph 2.a.(2):

      (1) A review of the senior enlisted requisitions for the period April 1967 thru September 1967 indicated that the 237th Engineer Group was not requisitioning sufficient Senior NCO's to replace losses of assigned personnel. The indication is that the requisitions were submitted in Section II with the emphasis on promotions. This is a commendable policy but consideration must be given to the fact that EM that are promoted also rotate.

      (2) This Headquarters became aware of this and requisitioned Senior NCO's to fill all authorized vacancies and projected losses. These replacements will start arriving in April 1967.

   b. Section 1, Logistics, paragraph 4.g. Personnel to operate a unit S-1 are usually supplied from levies against line companies. When the situation allows, local nationals should be hired to replace Engineer troops to perform jobs more demanding of their skills. An alternative would be to allow the 1st Air Cav Division and the Support Command to handle all construction materials directly. This would result in loss of control and accountability for the ADA projects in those areas, undesirable result.

   c. Section 2, Part I, Observation (Lesson Learned), Paragraph 2, item construction of semi-permanent 175 mm and 8 inch gun pads. This is the first indication of difficulties with 8 sided gun pads. The other users will be asked for comments.

   d. Section 2, Part I, page 19, para 3, Logistics, Item 3, Emergency Starting Procedures: These procedures for starting 5 Ton dump trucks with inoperative fuel pumps can be both safety and maintenance hazards. It is not recommended that vehicles be operated in this condition unless absolutely necessary. In an emergency situation, when fuel pumps do not work and replacements are not available, these methods could be successful.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (OR-LL) for the 937th Engineer Group

JAMES B. MEAKOR, JR
Colonel, CE
Acting Commander
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCO-HD (15 Feb 67) 2d Ind MAJ Fowler/wgk/BHA-478
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65), for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 January 1967

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER COMMAND
VIETNAM (PROV), APO 96491 17 APR 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DH
APO 96307
(U)

1. The subject report, submitted by the 937th Engineer Group (Cbt),
has been reviewed by this headquarters and is considered adequate.

2. The comments of the submitting and indorsing commanders have been
reviewed and this headquarters concurs, subject to the following added
comments:

a. Section 1, paragraph 2a(1) and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement.
Requisitions have been submitted for WO(761A).

b. Section 1, paragraph 4a (last paragraph). Action has been
taken by USAECV(?) letter to the 1st Logistical Command on this problem.
USAECV(?) teams are searching depots for parts to repair this equipment.

c. Section 1, paragraph 4f and Section 2, Part I, paragraph 4.
The following summary of actions being taken to improve aircraft and
aviation assets within this command is provided:

(1) The critical shortage of aircraft and aviation personnel,
below that authorized by TOE, is a command wide problem. As indicated by
the 937th Engineer Group (Cbt), current assets recognized by Department
of the Army and USARV are spread throughout the command's units in an effort
to provide some support to each major subordinate unit. The shifting of
aircraft and aviator assets has caused the formation of partially equipped
and manned aviation sections. This condition has existed since engineer
units first arrived in RVN and has become a critical problem with the
expansion of the Engineer Command.

(2) The comments contained in this report verify the critical
need for restoration of TOE aircraft, aviation personnel and equipment to
units presently assigned to this command and authorization of aviation
assets with engineer units scheduled for deployment to RVN. To this extent
the Department of the Army policy stated in confidential DA message 763149,
DIC 032019 May 66, concerning aviation elements which provides that non-
divisional combat support and service support (Arty, Sig, Engr, and KL,QN
and TC other than Acft Maint) units deploying to RVN will have their aviation
sections deleted and no aviation or aircraft will be requisitioned for
these units, should be immediately reviewed with the purpose of restoring
TOE authorized aviation assets.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVCC-MFHD (15 Feb 67) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65), for Quarterly
Period Ending 31 January 1967

(3) USARV has been apprised by letter and TWX of the critical
aircraft situation within the command. The following is invited to your
attention:

(a) Paragraphs 4, 5 & 6, Secret message, cite AVHAV-F

53432, HQ USARV, Subject: Aviation Support for the Combat Support and
Combat Service Support Units (U) DTG 0211362 Jul 66

(b) Confidential message, cite AVCC-CS C-0946, HQ

USAE CV(P), Subject: Aviation Support for the US Army Engineer Command (U)
DTG 110715 Z Mar 67

(c) Paragraph 1, Confidential message, cite AVHAV-R

18248, HQ USARV, Subject: Aviation Support for the US Army Engineer Command
(U) DTG 2301512 Mar 67

(d) Confidential message, cite AVCC-F&O 0692, HQ USAECV(P),

Subject: 34th Engineer Group, Aviation Section (U) DTG Feb 67

(e) Paragraph 2, cite AVHGC-FC 13605, HQ USARV, Subject:

34th Engineer Group, Aviation Section (U) DTG 040710 Z Mar 67

d. Section 1, paragraph 4g 1(a) and paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement.
Units may hire local nationals as prescribed by current funding and
personnel regulations.

e. Section 2, Part I, paragraph 2, page 19. This procedure is
contingent on the availability of security.

f. Section 2, Part I, paragraph 3 and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorse-
ment. A letter will be prepared to all USAECV(P) units to discontinue this
method of starting engines, because of the danger of fire or explosion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

RICHARD J. LUCOTE
Colonel, CE
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 12 MAY 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 937th Engineer Group as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference paragraph 4f, page 15; and paragraph 2c, 2d indorsement, concerning the shortage of aircraft:

      (1) Concur with statement that the critical shortage of aircraft and aviation personnel, below that authorized by TOE, is a command-wide problem. As recognized by the US Army Engineer Command Vietnam, their TOE-authorized aviation assets were deleted by DA. However, USARV has provided their units with that aviation support which is currently available.

      (2) The basic ORLL from 937th Engineer Group reflects that the three UH-1B type aircraft assigned flew an average of 46 hours each per month. The two UH-6A type aircraft flew an average of 22 hours each per month. This flight time is not considered excessive and is in fact well below the USARV average.

      (3) Nonconcur with statement that DA policy which deleted aviation assets for non-divisional combat support and combat service support units deploying to RVN should be reviewed with the purpose of restoring TOE-authorized aviation assets. Current shortage of aviators dictates a precise allocation of these resources in order to meet the needs of the direct combat support aviation units. Until such time as the manning level for direct combat support aviation units can be met, it is not prudent to request DA to review its position when the basis for DA's decision has not materially changed.

   b. With the above exception, this headquarters concurs with
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AVHCC-DST (15 Feb 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS OSFOR-65) (U)

the observations of the reporting unit, and considers the actions
taken by the indorsing headquarters both appropriate and adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E.L. KENNEDY
CPT. AGC
Adjutant General

5 Incl
nc

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-OT (15 Feb 67) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS GSFOR-65), for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 25 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. R. KOBALD
CPT, AGG
Asst AG

RECLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENDORSEMENT(S)