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31 Dec 1979, DoDD 5200.10; DoDD 5230.24, 18 Mar 1987

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep), Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
Operational Report
Lessons Learned
1 May - 31 July 1967

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FOR OT RC FILE 070319

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
(1 May 1967 - 31 July 1967)

THRU: Commanding General

ATTN: Unit Historian (Maj Stewart)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USAVE Regulation 1-19 and AR 1-19.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. L. Kvasnicka
LTC, AG
Asst AG
AVHE-SC
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 15 August 1967

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   1. Roster of Key Personnel Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
   2. Brigade Organization Chart
   3. Supply and Combat Service Activities
   5. Map Depicting Contact - A/2/503d Infantry, 22 June 1967

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 May to 31 July 1967. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) has continued to conduct operations to locate and destroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces, supply lines and communications of the enemy and installations. Operations were continued within the Brigade base TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). The Brigade has also continued Civic Action/Civil Affairs activities in both operational areas and in the immediate area of Bien Hoa.

In accomplishing its mission, the Brigade has conducted seven (7) battalion size or larger operations: Operation FORT WAYNE (1-4 May 1967), Operation DAYTON (5-17 May 1967), Operation CINCINNATI (17-23 May 1967), Operation WINCHESTER (23-31 May 1967), Operation FRANCIS MARION (1-16 June 1967), the 1/503d Infantry's Operation ST. FRANCIS (18 June to the present) and Operation MOON (18 June to the present). Highlights of the Brigade's activities during this quarter was the deployment to the Hc Corps Tactical Zone and the initiation of aggressive search and destroy operations in that area.

2. Organization:

The internal structure of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) had remained essentially the same during the reporting period. No new units were assigned, attached or detached. For a breakdown of the Brigade strength, see paragraph 8, Personnel and Administration. In addition, see Organization Chart (Incl. 2).

3. Intelligence:

a. The enemy's order of battle in the TAOR remains the same. The following units continue to conduct sporadic harassing small unit tactics in and around the Brigade's TAOR against ARVN and US forces:

   (1) C-300 LF VC Platoon
   (2) C-301 LF Company
   (3) C-302 LF Platoon
   (4) C-303 LF Company

b. Probable reinforcements continue to include elements from the D-800 NF Battalion and the 273d Viet Cong Regiment.

c. The enemy situation before and during each operation conducted by the Brigade during this reporting period is as follows:

   (1) Operation FORT WAYNE (1-4 May 1967)

      (a) Enemy Situation Before the Operation: Prior to the commencement of the operation the following enemy units were believed to be in the area of operation: C-300 LF Platoon, C-301 LF Company, C-302 LF Platoon and the C-303 LF Company. The enemy had the capability to:
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1. Attack with force up to company size and to harass friendly forces with local and guerrilla units.

2. To defend with the above mentioned forces.

3. To reinforce his attacks with the above mentioned forces and possibly elements of the D-800 NF Battalion and the 273d Viet Cong Regiment.

4. To withdraw from contact or avoid contact at the time and place of his choosing.

(b) Enemy Situation During the Operation: From 1 - 4 May 1967 the Brigade maintained sporadic contact with the enemy. These contacts/incidents were usually meeting engagements with small groups of Viet Cong harassing friendly troops. Approximately 70% of these engagements were friendly initiated. No large engagements occurred and Brigade findings were limited to scattered bunkers. The enemy used grenades and claymore devices to harass Brigade elements. Due to the limited nature of the operation the enemy did not have time to initiate a detailed harassing program.

(c) Terrain and Weather: The AO was within Long Khanh Province and bounded on the west and north by the Song Dong Nai River. The eastern and southern edge of the area was generally within the YT31 N-S grid line and YZ16 E-W grid line. The Song Dong Nai River is the major drainage system within the area of operation. The primary forms of vegetation consist of bamboo thickets, cultivated fields, grasslands and rubber plantations. Small intermittent streams are found within the AO. Intervenotional Highway's 24 and 34 provide routes of ground access into the area. The weather during the operation was generally clear and humid with heavy rainfall on the night of 3 May. The average high temperature was 84 degrees with an average low of approximately 77 degrees.

(d) Following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT &amp; STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNITS</th>
<th>WEAPONS &amp; EQUIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR-1</td>
<td>YT2040</td>
<td>Corps Type Headquarters Unknown and administration of the III Corps Provinces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 NVA Regt 1800</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
<td>1 NVA Bn</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 NVA Bn</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 NVA Bn</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84A NVA Arty Regt 1800</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800 BN Bn</td>
<td>YT466193</td>
<td>C1 Inf Co</td>
<td>2-81mm Mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>C2 Inf Co</td>
<td>3-60mm Mortars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-57mm MG</td>
<td>C3 Inf Co</td>
<td>4-50cal MG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-NM</td>
<td>Assorted SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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C-300 LF Plt YT20340 Unknown Unknown
35

C-302 LF Plt XT9224 Unknown Unknown
35

C-303 LF Co YT090310 Unknown Unknown
100

(2) Operation DAYTON (5 - 17 May 1967)

(a) Enemy Situation Before the Operation: Prior to the commencement of this operation the following enemy units were believed to be in the area of operation: 5th Viet Cong Division, 274th Main Force Regiment, 275th Main Force Regiment, 89th Artillery Regiment, 84th Rear Service Group, D-800 Main Force Battalion, D-145 LF Battalion, H3 LF Platoon and the H4 LF Platoon. The enemy had the capability of:

1. Attacking in platoon, company, battalion and regiment strength.

2. Defending with the above mentioned forces.

3. Withdrawing at the time and place of his choosing.

(b) Enemy Situation During the Operation: From 5 - 17 May 1967, the Brigade maintained sporadic contact with the enemy. These contacts were usually meeting engagements with small groups of Viet Cong harassing friendly forces. There were twenty-nine (29) friendly initiated contacts. No large engagements occurred with the exception of an enemy mortar attack on the last day of the operation during the withdrawal of troops from the landing zone by helicopter. The Brigade's findings were limited to scattered base camps and bunkers throughout the area of operation. There were a number of incidents where the Viet Cong threw grenades and used claymore devices and booby traps against friendly forces. A number of small enemy units were observed by LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) teams during the operation. There were a total of fifty-one (51) incidents of which twenty-two (22) were enemy initiated.

(c) Terrain and Weather: The area of operation is defined by the following coordinates: IT5016, YT9016, YS0580 and YS9080. The land was characterized by flat to rolling plains with isolated mountains. The NUI EE Mountain complex has an elevation of 874 meters. CHAU CHAN Mountain was used as a communication relay point. The vegetation with the area of operation is predominantly thick jungle with multiple canopy. This 2 - 4 layer canopy is generally continuous with the uppermost layers extending from 85 to 100 meters. Small rubber plantations and rice paddies border the area, but there are no extensive cultivated areas with the center of the AO. National Highway 1 is the major east - west road in the AO and it was effectively utilized for ground resupply. The weather during the operation was marked by the beginning of the southwest monsoon. Precipitation occurred periodically but in no way interfered with ground operations. Cloud ceilings generally reached higher altitudes and as the month progressed the afternoon cloud ceilings increased markedly. Temperatures ranged from 75 to 93 degrees.
The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT &amp; STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNITS</th>
<th>WEAPONS &amp; EQUIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
<td>Y592528</td>
<td>274 MF Regt</td>
<td>13-81/90mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4250</td>
<td></td>
<td>275 MF Regt</td>
<td>12-60mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89 Arty Regt</td>
<td>6-75mm RR, 6-75mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RR, 9-MG, 9-BL0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AT Grenade L, 3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.7mm MG, 15-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cal MG, Assorted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA &amp; AW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th MF Regt</td>
<td>Y56714330</td>
<td>800 VC Bn</td>
<td>14-81/92mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td></td>
<td>265 VC Bn</td>
<td>16-60mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>308 VC Bn</td>
<td>9-75mm RR, 5-57mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RR, 2-200 RL, 30-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BL0 AT GL, 10-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.7 MG, 2-50 cal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MG, 11-30 cal MG,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assorted SA &amp; AW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th MF Regt</td>
<td>Y7755081</td>
<td>1 VC Bn</td>
<td>2-120mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 VC Bn</td>
<td>6-81/62mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 VC Bn</td>
<td>6-75mm RR, 3-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mm RR, 21-12.7 MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assorted SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th Arty Regt</td>
<td>Y5749370</td>
<td>2-39 Arty Bn</td>
<td>2-63mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-60mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-30 cal MG, 3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57mm RR, 2-1MG,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assorted SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Rear Service</td>
<td>Y5470840</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group - 900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-800 MF Bn</td>
<td>Y518002</td>
<td>C1 Inf Co</td>
<td>2-81mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>C2 Inf Co</td>
<td>3-60mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C3 Inf Co</td>
<td>4-30 cal MG, 3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57mm RR, 2-1MG,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assorted SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-445 LF Bn</td>
<td>Y5641760</td>
<td>C443 Co</td>
<td>5-81mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>C444 Co</td>
<td>3-60mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C445 Co</td>
<td>2-57mm RR, 2-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75mm RR, 4-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cal MG, 2-50cal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                 |              |                   | MG, 50 BL0 RCT L,
|                 |              |                   | Assorted SA       |
| H3 LF Plt       | Y3810940     | Unknown           | Unknown          |
| 20              |              |                   | Unknown          |
| H4 LF Plt       | Y560939      | Unknown           | Unknown          |
| 50              |              |                   | Unknown          |
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(3) Operation CINCINNATI (18 - 25 May 1967)

(a) Enemy Situation Before the Operation: Prior to the commencement of this operation the following enemy units were believed to be in the area of operation: 273d MF Regiment, D-800 MF Battalion, 84th NVA Artillery Regiment, C-33 LF VC Platoon, C-370 LF VC Platoon, and the Cho Thanh LF VC Platoon. The enemy had the capability to:

1. Attack with size forces up to regimental strength.
2. Defend with the forces mentioned above,
3. Withdraw at the time and place of his choosing.

(b) Enemy Situation During the Operation: From 18 - 25 May, the Brigade maintained sporadic contact with the enemy. These contacts were meeting engagements with small VC groups. Approximately 7 of the contacts were friendly initiated. No large engagements occurred and the Brigade findings were limited to abandoned base camps and bunkers scattered throughout the area of operation (AO). There were a number of incidents where the VC used claymore mines and booby traps against the Brigade units. The most significant incident of the entire operation was the capture of a 122.4mm spin stabilized rocket of the type that was used to bomb the BIEN HOA Airbase on 12 May 1967.

(c) Terrain and Weather: The weather during Operation Cincinnati was influenced by the Southwest Monsoon. Cloudiness increased during the month but nocturnal low ceilings were infrequent. Rainfall increased throughout the month as the month progressed. Thunderstorm activity increased during the latter days of the operation. The temperature ranged from 76 to 92 degrees. The contour of the land is characterized by relatively flat land with gentle sloping hills. The hills become more numerous and prominent in the central portions of the area of operation. Few of these hills are above 75 meters and the vegetation within the area is predominantly dense forest. A large rubber plantation, CAT GAO, is located at XT 282L. Extensive rice fields border the banks of the main rivers and streams near populated areas. The SONG DONG NAI and SONG HS Rivers form the major drainage pattern in the area. There were no bridges spanning these waters north of BIEN HOA. The area is surrounded by usable road networks to the south, east and west.

(d) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT &amp; STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNITS</th>
<th>WEAPONS &amp; EQUIPMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>273d VC Regt</td>
<td>YT0325</td>
<td>1 Bn (AKA 700-707-7 T80)</td>
<td>12x81/62Htr: 13x66Gtr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Bn (AKA 800-709- 70)</td>
<td>12x50G: 12x30G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Bn (AKA 900-711- 55)</td>
<td>6x75RE: 9x75RR:33xR12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AT GL: 9x12.7KG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assorted Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th A NVA Arty</td>
<td>YT1028</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 800 MF Bn</td>
<td>YT1232</td>
<td>C1 Co</td>
<td>2x81Htr: 2MG: 3x60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C2 Co</td>
<td>Mtr: Assrt Sa: 4x30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C3 Co</td>
<td>MG: 3x75R: 1x75mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RB: 2x22Htr: 2x30Gtr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3x50Gtr: 3x40G:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2x12.7KG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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15 August 1967

UNIT & STRENGTH
LOCATION
SUBORDINATE UNITS
WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT
58th VC Arty Bn
300
YTO08267
Unknown
Unknown
(4) Operation WINCHESTER: Operation WINCHESTER was the code name for the movement of Brigade elements to the II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (vicinity of PLEIKU). The movement began on the 24th of May and terminated on 31 May 1967.

(5) Operation FRANCIS MARION (31 May - 18 June 1967)

(a) Enemy Situation Before the Operation: Prior to the commencement of this operation the following enemy units were believed to be in the AO: 6th Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment, 66th Regiment Headquarters with 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions and the 95B Regiment. The enemy had the capability to:

1. Attack in multiregimental force using elements of the 88th NVA Regiment, 66th Regiment and the 95B Regiment.
2. Defend in fortified base areas for a limited period.
3. Withdraw at the time and place of his choosing.

(b) Enemy Situation During the Operation: No significant contact was made while operating in the vicinity of the IA DRANG Valley. Many base camps, fortifications, and some supply caches were located. Enemy activity consisted of boobytraps and harassment.

(c) Terrain and Weather: The area of interest was defined by the following coordinates: Y750800, Y750750, ZA220480 and ZA220750. The area included the western portion of Pleiku and a portion of eastern Cambodia. The contour of the land is characterized by rolling hills with wide valleys.

(d) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

UNIT
B-3 Front
NONG TROUNG 1
15th Engr Bn
16th Sig Bn
88th NVA Regt
6th Bn
ESTIMATED STRENGTH
500
6157
230
200
1600
425
LAST CONFIRMED LOCATION
Y741339
Y670300
Y8792
Y8792
Y700175
Y911170
DATE
25 May 67
NA
11 Apr 67
11 Apr 67
NA
NA
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UNIT | ESTIMATED STRENGTH | LAST CONFIRMED LOCATION | DATE
---|---|---|---
66th NVA Regt | 1600 | YA 860135 | 29 Apr 67
7th Bn | 400 | YA 820330 | 2 May 67
8th Bn | 300 | YA 823370 | 2 May 67
9th Bn | 450 | Unlocated, possibly vic 66th Regt Hq's | 2 May 67
95B Regt | 1490 | YA 763120 | 2 May 67

(6) Operation GREELEY (16 June - present)

(a) Enemy Situation Before the Operation: Prior to the commencement of the operation the following enemy units were believed to be in the area of operation: 24th NVA Regiment, 304th VCMIC Battalion, 200th VC Artillery Battalion and the H-15 LF Battalion. The enemy had the capability to:

1. To attack in up to regimental strength.
2. To defend and reinforce with the above mentioned elements.
3. To withdraw at the time and the place of his choosing.

(b) Enemy Situation During the Operation: During the operation many base camps, fortified bunkers and trenches and enemy supply points have been located. All indications point to an enemy build-up within the area of operation. Significant contacts that occurred during the reporting period are listed below:

1. On 22 June at ZB 000171, Company A/2/503d Infantry made contact with an NVA unit that was determined to be the K6 Battalion, B-3 Front which was the 6th Battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment. The enemy unit suffered 106 KIA (BC) and 369 KIA (POSS) and was no longer believed to be combat effective. Friendly losses were 76 KIA and 28 WIA.

2. On 28 June at YB 916143, Troop B/2/12th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division made contact with an estimated reinforced NVA platoon. The enemy unit was later determined to be an element of the K-101D Battalion.

3. On 10 July at YB 860140, Company A/4/503d Infantry made contact with elements of the K-101D Battalion. This contact resulted in the capture of a North Vietnamese soldier. Interrogation revealed that the POW was a member of the K-101D Battalion of the Doc Lop Regiment. This is a new NVA unit. Based on comments given by the POW, the Doc Lop Regiment is fully combat effective with three (3) rifle battalions and support from one organic artillery battalion. POW also revealed that his unit had been in contact with CIDG elements on 14 June, MIKE Force elements on 15 June and B/2/12th Cavalry on 28 June.

(c) Terrain and Weather: The area of operation lies within KONTUM Province. It is bounded on the west by the Cambodian/Lao border, to the east by grid lines AS 9259 to ZB 1200, to the north by the Dak Pak Special Forces Camp and to the south by the VB0 east - west grid line. The terrain is characterized by high mountain ranges interlaced by river valleys and streams. Vegetation is marked by heavy

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Jungle. Weather during the operation has been characterized by the influence of the Southwest Monsoon. Frequent and heavy precipitation has been the norm with temperatures ranging between 66 and 85 degrees.

(d) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT &amp; STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUBORDINATE UNITS</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th WVA Regt</td>
<td>2BU0340</td>
<td>4th Inf Bn</td>
<td>L-120mm Mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5th Inf Bn</td>
<td>21-82mm Mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6th Inf Bn</td>
<td>12-40mm AA MG's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27-RP's (75mm &amp; 57mm), 12-Goryunov MG's, 9-RPD/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMG's, Assorted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 24th Regt</td>
<td>2BU02180</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 24th Regt</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 24th Regt</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304th VCMF Bn</td>
<td>ZBU15385</td>
<td>D1 Inf Co (C1)</td>
<td>21-SMG's, 36-AR's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
<td>D2 Inf Co (C2)</td>
<td>9-60mm Mortars,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D3 Inf Co (C3)</td>
<td>assorted SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D4 Arty Co (C4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th VC Arty Bn</td>
<td>YBU993830</td>
<td>1st Co</td>
<td>19-22mm AA MG's,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>2d Co</td>
<td>38-AK/47's, 57-SKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3d Co</td>
<td>rifles, possibly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75mm and 105mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arty pieces, as-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sorted SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15 LF Bn</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>01 Inf Co</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>02 Inf Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>03 Inf Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>04 Inf Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Throughout this quarter, operations have substantiated the fact that the Viet Cong/NVA still maintain the capability of engaging ARVN and US forces when he believes the odds are favorable and that he will continue to harass in any event.

e. Viet Cong/NVA losses for the period 1 May through 31 July 1967 are as follows:

**Enemy Personnel:**

KIA (BC) ........................................ 206
KIA (FOSS) ...................................... 469
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- **KBA (Killed by Air):** 0
- **VCC:** 6
- **Detainees:** 0
- **Ralliers:** 0

**Equipment/Supplies**

**Weapons:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKS Rifles</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 Rifles</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPD Machine Guns</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossbows</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbines</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Rifles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 Cal Thompson Sub-Machine Gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom MAS Rifles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26 Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm Recoilless Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom K-50 Sub-Machine Gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser Pistol</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester Rifle (1917)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122.4mm Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ammunition:**

- 7.62mm Rounds: 5,000
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.30 Caliber Rounds</td>
<td>2,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm Rounds</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 Caliber Rounds</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Rounds</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 Caliber Rounds</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm Recoiless Rifle Rounds</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56mm Rounds</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar Rounds</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 Rounds</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Rounds</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar Rounds</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm Recoiless Rifle Rounds</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mines, Grenades and Demolitions:**
- DH-5 Claymore Mines: 22
- DH-10 Claymore Mines: 28
- AP Mines: 19
- Grenades: 119
- Chicom Stick Grenades: 242
- VU Stick Grenades: 21
- Chicom Frag Grenades: 58
- Smoke Grenades: 2
- WP Grenades: 1
- AT Grenades: 1
- Shape Charge: 13 kilos
- Satchel Charge: 1 (20 lbs)
- US Blasting Caps: 106
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Chicom Dynamite ........................................... 20 lbs
Chicom TNT .................................................. 452 lbs
Chicom Blasting Caps .................................... 32
Chicom Nitrate Capsules ................................. 215
Grenade Fuses ............................................... 190
Fuse Lighters ............................................... 300
RPG-2 Rocket Propellant Charges ......................... 7
82mm Charge Cans ........................................ .10
1000 lb Bomb ................................................ 1
Butterfly Bombs ............................................ .20
Hand Flares .................................................. 4
Trip Flares .................................................... 9
Installations:
BanQers ....................................................... 486
Huts ............................................................. 731
Foxholes ....................................................... 83
Trench Systems ............................................ 1,395 meters
Cache ........................................................... 1
Tunnel Systems ............................................. 8
Classrooms ................................................... 1
Lean-Tos ...................................................... 22
Gun Positions ............................................... 7
Food:
Cooking Oil .................................................. 10 gals
Pet Milk ....................................................... 7 cans
Rice ............................................................. 15,595 lbs
"C" Rations .................................................. A cases

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Corn ........................................ 15 lbs
Salt ........................................ 11 1/2 lbs
Chickens .................................... 10

Miscellaneous:
US Ponchos .................................. 3
Khaki Uniforms .............................. 1
Mount & Sight .50 Caliber AA Weapon ..... 1
Clothing .................................... 27 1/2 lbs
Black Shirts .................................. 250
Blue Shirts .................................. 100
Blue Trousers ................................. 100
Nylon Material ......................... 100 ft (25 yds ea)
Chicken Wire .............................. 1 RL (100 ft)
Magazines, short ......................... 3
Web Gear ................................... 10 lbs
Grenade Launcher Attachment ........................... 1
Medical Supplies .......................... Assorted
Thompson Sub-Machine Gun Magazines ........ 54
35mm Film ................................ 300 ft
First Aid Kit ............................... 2
Wallet ...................................... 2
US Gas Mask ................................ 1
Commo Wire .................................. 410 ft
Cigarette Lighters ......................... 3
AK-47 Magazines .......................... .15
.45 Caliber M-2 Magazines .................. 7
BAR Magazines ............................. .18
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claymore Stands</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar Base Plates</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Entrenching Tools</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Canteens</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Gas Masks</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rucksacks</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMC WWII 2½ Ton Truck</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½ Ton Truck</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Ponchos</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Boxes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Volt Batteries</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Helmets</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol Belts</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking Utensils</td>
<td>Assorted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Kerosine Lamp</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Scarf</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairs and Tables</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 gal Drums</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottles</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>25 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Flashlights</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axle Grease</td>
<td>11 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>60 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginned Cotton</td>
<td>60 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pith Helmets</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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- Boots: 2 pr
- Shovel: 1
- M-1 Carbine Magazine: 1
- Fishing Line: 2
- Fish Net: 1
- Briefcase: 1
- Bayonets: 2
- Suspenders: 1
- French Tooth Paste: 1
- Soap Bar: 1
- Shoes: 2 pr
- Flashlight Batteries: 8
- Weapons Cleaning Equipment: Assorted
- Mortar Shipping Plugs: 11
- Sniper Scope: 1
- Binoculars: 2
- LBE Sets: 11
- Wool Blankets: 75
- RPD Magazines: 13
- Chicom B-71 FM Transceivers: 2
- PRC-25 Radios: 2
- US HT-1 Radios: 3
- Penicillin: 3 bottles

4. Combat Operations:

General: The Brigade continued to conduct combat and Revolutionary Development (Civil Affairs and Civic Action) operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong/NVA Forces, logistical installations and to further reduce his hold on the Vietnamese people.
May

During the month of May the Brigade conducted normal security operations in and around Bien Hoa, initiating and finishing four operations and beginning a fifth operation.

The Brigade initiated Operation FORT WAYNE on 1 May 1967 in LONG KHANH Province, bounded on the west and the north by the SONG DONG NAI RIVER. During the operation enemy contact was light, providing valuable training for new arrivals for forthcoming operations with a minimum number of casualties sustained. The operation was terminated at 1745 hours on 4 May with all elements closing back to BIEN HOA.

Prior to the termination of Operation FORT WAYNE, the Brigade received instructions from II FFORCEV to prepare for immediate deployment to PHUOC TUY Province in an area known as the MAO TAO SECRET ZONE. The Brigade's mission was to conduct offensive operations in the southern portion of the area of operation and to destroy forces and installations within the area. Operation DAYTON was aimed at the 274th and 275th Main Force Viet Cong Regiments which had been identified through documents captured by the 18th ARVN Division as the forces in the area. At approximately 1800 hours on 4 May, the Brigade began deployment of the 1st and 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 3/319th Artillery (-), D/16th Armor and a Brigade quartering party to Position BLACKHORSE by a combination of helicopter, fixed wing and motor movement. From the 5th of May to the 17th of May, the Brigade maintained sporadic contact with the enemy. The engagements were mostly meeting engagements involving small groups of Viet Cong harassing friendly troops. Approximately 29 of the contacts were friendly initiated. No large engagements occurred and the Brigade's findings were limited to abandoned base camps and scattered bunkers throughout the area of operation. On 17 May at 1730 hours the Brigade terminated Operation DAYTON suffering a mortar attack during the withdrawal of units resulting in 1 US KIA and 19 US WIA. This was the second time that the Brigade had operated in this undisputed enemy stronghold.

On the following day, the Brigade initiated Operation CINCINNATI in the BIEN HOA and LONG Binh Areas in order to secure the area against possible Viet Cong ground, mortar and rocket attacks, such as occurred on the night of 12 May 1967. On the afternoon of 23 May, the Commanding General was briefed at II FFORCEV to prepare the Brigade for immediate deployment to the II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE in the vicinity of PHUOC TUY. The Brigade's mission would be to establish a base camp and to act as a reserve force for at least three months. All Brigade units were briefed as to requirements of the movement operation at 1800 hours by the Commanding General. At 0520 hours on 24 May an advance party departed BIEN HOA AIR BASE and arrived at the NEW PLEIKU AIRFIELD at 0620 hours. At 1219 hours the first C-130 aircraft departed BIEN HOA carrying the Brigade's main element, thus initiating the movement operation that was code named Operation WINCHESTER. Air movement of the Brigade continued through 27 May with a total of 2,239 personnel and 2,900.7 tons of equipment being transported utilizing a total of 208 sorties. From 27 May through 30 May the Brigade continued improvement of its base camp at CATEKOA and general improvement of the roads in the area. The Brigade was further placed under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and began participation in Operation FRANCIS MARION, commencing patrols and search and destroy missions to the south and east in the IA DRANG VALLEY. Operations during the month of May were supported by a total of 52 TAC sorties, during which a total of 139.50 tons of ordnance was dropped. Supporting artillery (3/319th) fired 598 missions expending a total of 10,460 rounds. The Brigade organic Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon) supported all operations. A statistical report of their activities follows:

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Mission

- Resupply ........................................ 600
- Command and Control ................................. 1,400

TOTAL ........................................... 1,400

Sorties

Operations during the month of May resulted in the following VC and friendly casualties:

Viet Cong Losses

KIA (BC) 41
KIA (POSS) 33
VCC 0
Detainees 0

US Losses

KIA 20
WIA 79
MIA 1
Non-Battle Injured 16
Non-Battle Dead 0

June

From 1 - 18 June 1967, the Brigade continued participation in Operation FRANCIS MARION searching further south and east in the LA URANG VALLEY. The Brigade deployed the 1st and 2d Battalions (503d Infantry) into the operational area, holding the 4/503d Infantry in reserve as a reaction force at CATTECKA. During the Brigade's participation in Operation FRANCIS MARION, several OPLANs were published. OPLAN DECATUR directed the relief/reinforcement of US/RWAF/GVN installations in Kontum and OPLAN AVENGER was directed in support of US/RWAF/GVN installations in the FRANCIS MARION AO. The Brigade made no significant contact during its participation. On 17 June, prior to the termination of the Brigade's participation in Operation FRANCIS MARION, the Brigade deployed a Task Force to NEW DAKTO (TF QUARRIE) named for the Brigade's Deputy Commanding Officer, COL Claude R. McQuarrie. The Task Force consisted of the 1/503d Infantry, E/17th Cavalry, Alpha Battery, 1/319th Artillery, one platoon from D/16th Armor, one platoon from the 173d Engineer Company, Alpha Battery, 1/52d Artillery, elements of the 173d Military Police Platoon, the 335th Assault Helicopter Company and the 39th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon. The decision was further made to deploy the 1/503d Infantry into the operational area. On the 18th of June, the Battalion was deployed into the area by helicopter. The Brigade's (-) mission at NEW DAKTO was to assume the operational control of the Special Forces/CHIHD Camp and to further assist in its defense. The operation was code named GREELEY. Upon the Task Force's arrival, the area was being threatened by the 24th North Vietnamese Regiment from the northeast and southwest. The Brigade Headquarters (-) and the 4th Battalion 503d Infantry remained at CATTECKA under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. The Operation STILLWELL area had a relatively high rate of enemy activity. Nineteen sightings had occurred since 8 April 1967. However, no significant contact had been made. Consequently, the 1/503d Infantry terminated participation on 22 June.
In the DAKTO area, on the 23d of June 1967, Company A/2/503d Infantry made contact 6,800 meters south of the NEW DAKTO (Bde (-) CP) which was to become one of the important battles of the war. See Inclosure 6, A/2/503d Infantry After Action Report. The Brigade Headquarters (-) and B/16th Armor (-) which had remained at CACEKIA, departed for NEW DAKTO by road. Operations continue into the month of July. Operations during the month of June were supported by 120 TIC sorties and 20 FAC sorties dropping a total of 90.33 tons of ordnance. Supporting artillery (3/319th Fty) fired a total of 1,042 missions expending a total of 20,847 rounds. The Brigade's Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon) supported all operations. A statistical report of their activities follows:

**UH-1D Sorties**
- Pasupply ........................................ 140
- Command and Control ........................ 2,346
- Maintenance .................................... 395
- Other ........................................... 455
- Total Hours Flown .............................. 974
- Total Passengers ............................ 3,429

**OH-13 Sorties**
- Command and Control ........................ 705
- Reconnaissance ................................. 30
- Maintenance .................................... 41
- Training ......................................... 14
- Other ........................................... 10
- Total Hours Flown .............................. 321
- Total Passengers ............................ 354

Operations during the month of June resulted in the following Viet Cong and friendly casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA Losses</th>
<th>US Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BG) 131</td>
<td>KIA 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (ROSS) 427</td>
<td>WIA 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC 5</td>
<td>MIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Battle Dead 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Battle Injured 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JULY

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and supporting units under Brigade control continued Operation GREELEY throughout the month of July. Brigade elements met with light contact in July while searching for infiltrating/exfiltrating NVA units near the tri-border area. The largest enemy contact was made on 10 July 1967 when Alpha Company, 4/503d Infantry engaged an estimated NVA Battalion (-) at grid coordinates YB 860140 while conducting search and destroy operations in that area. The lead element of the company initially received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from two bunkers. The enemy (NVA) force was estimated to be of company size and were well entrenched in fortified positions approximately 35 meters to A/4/503d Infantry's northwest (front). The company (-) reinforced the lead element as artillery and airstrikes were directed on the NVA. B/4/503d Infantry deployed to the vicinity of YB 862141 (northeast of A/4/503d Inf). As they maneuvered to attack the enemy positions, they came under heavy fire from two additional light machineguns, small arms, automatic weapons, 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. This enemy force was also estimated to be at company strength and was mutually supporting the NVA unit engaged with A/4/503d Infantry. D/4/503d Infantry maneuvered elements to reinforce the two friendly companies in contact. All units continued to receive fire until 1800 hours. Artillery support was rendered both in direct firing upon enemy positions and in blocking fires, deterring the enemy's access to routes of withdrawal. Results of this engagement were: 25 US KIA, 50 US WTA, 0 MIA, and 1 CIDG KIA. Enemy losses: 9 NVA KIA (BC), 1 RPG RPO, 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 pistol and one (1) 7.62mm Chicom rifle. Security in the Brigade Rear Area (BIEN HOA) was provided by elements of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions on a rotation basis as directed by II FFORC. The Base Camp perimeter security was provided by 173d rear detachment personnel. Operations during the month were supported by 260 TAC sorties and 4 FAC sorties, dropping a total of 183,85 tons of ordnance. Supporting artillery (3/319th Arty) fired 2,576 missions expending a total of 21,318 rounds. The Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper Platoon) supported all operations. A statistical account of their activities follows:

**UH-1D Sorties**

- Resupply ........................................... 57
- Command and Control ......................... 1,469
- Maintenance ...................................... 27
- Total Hours Flown ............................. 732
- Total Tons of Cargo ......................... 28
- Total Passengers .............................. 1,277

**OH-13 Sorties**

- Command and Control ......................... 390
- Reconnaissance ................................ 0
- Maintenance .................................... 14
- Training ........................................ 2
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Total Passengers .................................. 317
Total Hours Flown ................................. 223

5. Training

a. Brigade Jungle School: On 3 June 1967, ILT Alfred J. Paul was appointed commandant of the 173d Airborne Brigade's Jungle School. During this reporting period, the school has trained over 1600 personnel in the replacement training phase. During the months of July and August, specialized weapons training was given to units comprising the rear detachment, on the 90mm recoilless rifle, and the L-2 inch mortar. In addition, during this same period, the entire 34th Engineer Battalion of the 20th Engineer Brigade was trained in the use of the M-16A1 claymore mine, the M-26 Fragmentation Grenade, and the M-60 Light Machinegun. In the 16th of July, the 3d Civil Engineering Squadron was put through a complete course of training on the M-16 rifle, including characteristics, mechanical training, zero and quick kill.

(1) In keeping with the school's policy of giving training to anyone who might ask for it, innumerable units have been given instruction upon request in such subjects as weapons training, survival, setting up an operational base and medical evacuation hoist operations.

(2) Depending upon the availability of aircraft, since July, the weekly field operation has included an airmobile assault.

(3) At present, a VC Base Camp is being completed which will be used in conjunction with a course which includes: VC/NVA mines and boobytraps, booby-trap detection, searching techniques employed in VC/NVA Base Camps, a period of practical application during which the students will be required to negotiate a boobytrapped trail and clear a VC Base Camp and tunnel system of boobytraps. This course will be fully operational by 13 September 1967, after which date as per USARV requirement, it will be mandatory for all members of the 173d Airborne Brigade and supporting units to attend.

(4) At this time, instructors are being trained in the use and employment of Ground Surveillance Radar Sets (AN/TPS-4 and AN/TPS-55) for purposes of training radar teams to man the Bien Hoa defense perimeter.

b. Operation REVENGE: The following is a press release submitted by the 173d Airborne Brigade's Information Office concerning a contact made by students and cadre of the Brigade Jungle School on 11 May 1967.

As far as the cadre and students of the 173d Airborne Brigade Jungle School were concerned, the operation could have had no other name. It had to be called "Operation REVENGE."

The paratroopers were confident and ready that morning, knowing that this was to be no ordinary mission. Just prior to moving out, each man received an equipment check, and was asked questions about the terrain, compass azimuths, tactics to be employed, and his individual mission.

Quickly and skillfully, the final touches of camouflage make-up were applied to faces, hands and arms. Foliage was added to the paratroopers' helmets. Moving out at nine-thirty, they knew the weather would be unbearably hot, and the jungle as thick as any in VIETNAM. No one doubted that the VC would be there.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHE-67
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Sergeant Santos Rodriguez, Benito, Texas, lying on a bed in the 93d Evacuation Hospital at LSTD BING, had a particular stake in the outcome of "Operation REVENGE". One week earlier, he was seriously wounded while leading an element of the Brigade Jungle School on a routine field training exercise in WAR ZONE "D".

While moving across a road to set up claymores, Sergeant Rodriguez, accompanied by Sergeant Donny R. Jones, Ocala, Florida, was spotted by four VC. The enemy fired burst from automatic weapons, and tossed a grenade that landed between the two sergeants. Though critically wounded, Sergeant Rodriguez continued to command his men, ordering them to take cover. Sergeant Jones fired at the VC, seeing one go down, and advanced to aid his wounded buddy, who was evacuated on a Dustoff helicopter.

The cadre and students at the Jungle School reacted to the news of Sergeant Rodriguez with mingled sadness and anger. Plans were immediately set in motion to avenge the wounded NCO, who had been voted "outstanding instructor" by the students for four successive weeks.

The new arrivals to the Brigade who comprised the Jungle School class had been waiting four days, preparing for the revenge patrol. Though they had not met Sergeant Rodriguez, each man felt as if he owed a personal debt to the wounded NCO.

As the students moved out, weapons at the ready, they passed the scenes of earlier encounters with the enemy. This heightened their resolve to carry out their own particular mission.

As darkness set in, delta element, a twelve-man ambush squad, moved into position along a road. Working in a monsoon rain, Sergeant Robert Parham, Fayetteville, North Carolina, carefully positioned his men and set out six claymore mines in front of the ambush position. As they set in for the night, he cautioned each man to stay awake and alert.

Just before midnight, four VC approached, moving silently east to west along the road. The night was dark and moonless, and the enemy troops were able to slip through the killing zone before being detected.

Further down the road, the guerrillas were fired upon by another Jungle School ambush patrol, and turned around, heading back toward delta element. Sergeant Parham detonated his claymore, instantly killing one of them. Two other VC, wounded and downed by the blast, could be heard attempting to escape.

Sergeant Parham quickly threw out a trip flare, lighting up the entire area. Sergeant Edward J. Smith, 19, from Philadelphia, finished off the two wounded VC with fire from his M-16.

The next morning, a search of the area yielded a Chicom submachinegun and twenty-one (21) 82mm mortar rounds. The captured weapon, along with a plaque for "outstanding cadre", were presented to Sergeant Rodriguez. "Operation REVENGE" was completed.

6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action

a. May 1967: During this reporting period, 12 speaker missions were flown while a total of 390,000 leaflets were dropped. The following is a Psy Ops breakdown by date, theme and time/amount:
SUBJECT: Operational Resort Lessons Learned

DATE THE MISSION: TDI/4OUNT

2 May 67 | Rally Instructions Speaker | 1 hour
6 May 67 | Rally Instructions Speaker | 1 hour
7 May 67 | Rally Instructions Speaker | 1 hour
11 May 67 | Special 246-240 Leaflet | 100,000
7 May 67 | Special 246-240 Leaflet | 100,000
12 May 67 | Special 246-240 Leaflet | 100,000
13 May 67 | Rally Instructions Speaker | 1 hour
13 May 67 | Rally Instructions Speaker | 1 hour
13 May 67 | JUSPAO 11A Speaker | 1 hour
15 May 67 | Special 246-240 Leaflet | 25,000
15 May 67 | Special 246-240 Leaflet | 25,000
15 May 67 | JUSPAO 1A Speaker | 1 hour
15 May 67 | JUSPAO 11A+B Speaker | 1 hour
16 May 67 | Special 246 Tape Speaker | 1 hour
16 May 67 | Special 246 Tape Speaker | 1 hour

1. Civic Action: MEDCAP teams treated 7,173 patients along with 740 DENTCAP patients during the month of May 1967. Distribution for the month of May are as follows:

- Milk: 16 cases, Tooth Brushes: 40 each
- Rice: 1,970 lbs, Tooth Paste: 40 tubes
- Keen Drink: 35 cases, Scap: 600 bars
- Oil (cooking): 18 cases, Sand: 6 mtrs
- Powdered Eggs: 1 case, Rock: 3 mtrs
- Steaks: 73 pieces, Sewage pipe: 11 each
- Candy & Gum: 25 lbs, Lumber: 4,000 bd ft
- Cereal: 8 cases, Nails: 50 lbs
- Pencils: 2250, Hangers: 125
- School Paper: 12 packs, Clothes: 200 lbs
- Magazines: 25, Cigarettes: 10 cases
- Chalk: 20 pieces, Cigars: 10 boxes

b. June 1967: The Brigade S5 continued its construction program. During the month of June, 12 see-saws were constructed. MEDCAP treated a total of 6,896 patients while DENTCAP treated a total of 1010 patients.

2. Distribution for the month of June was as follows:

- Milk: 1,300 lbs, Rice: 2,000 lbs
- Keen Drink: 23 cases, Cooking Oil: 37 cases
- Powdered Eggs: 3 cases, Candy and Gum: 60 lbs
- Bulgar Wheat: 720 lbs, Corn Meal: 1,600 lbs
- Rolled Oats: 360 lbs, Cigarettes: 7 cases
- Tooth Brushes: 32 ea, Tooth Paste: 32 tubes
- Soap: 1,762 bars, Sand: 3 mtrs
- Rock: 3 mtrs, Sewage Pipe: 60 ea
- Lumber: 3,280 bd ft, Nails: 50 lbs
- Clothing: 600 lbs, Cigars: 10 boxes

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

C. July 1967: During the month of July, the 173d Airborne Brigade S5 Section participated in Operation GREELEY. MEDCAP, DENTCAP, distribution, English classes and construction continued in the BIEN HOA Area. MEDCAP and DENTCAP treated a total of 5,087 and 502 patients respectively.

1. Distribution for the month of July was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toothbrushes</td>
<td>179 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking Oil</td>
<td>32 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1,240 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap Lumber</td>
<td>3,815 bd ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>7,983 bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corneal</td>
<td>2,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereal</td>
<td>9 large boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgar Wheat</td>
<td>1,400 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1,873 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap Tin</td>
<td>191 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1,660 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy and Oat</td>
<td>160 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolled Oats</td>
<td>950 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap Tin</td>
<td>191 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>7,983 bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1,240 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking Oil</td>
<td>32 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothpaste</td>
<td>246 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Floss</td>
<td>346 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking Oil</td>
<td>32 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1,240 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap Lumber</td>
<td>3,815 bd ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>7,983 bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corneal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereal</td>
<td>9 large boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgar Wheat</td>
<td>1,400 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap Tin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1,660 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy and Oat</td>
<td>160 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolled Oats</td>
<td>950 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In addition, the following construction projects were completed:

- Classroom Schools - 1
- Principals Office - 1
- Waiting Room - 1
- Library - 1
- Boys/Girls Divided Latrine - 1
- Playground, w/swings, see-saws and slide - 1

3. JUSPAO Newsletters were distributed with MEDCAP/DENTCAP.

7. Logistics: During the reporting period, the logistical posture has continued to remain excellent. Tactical operations were supported by air, and land lines of supply. A logistical summary by classes of supply is furnished by month in Inclosure 3.

8. Personnel and Administration

a. Personnel

(1) Brigade Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>Died</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Brigade Strength:
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned  

AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASG 1 MAY 67</td>
<td>ASG 31 JUL 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>24h</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3955</td>
<td>4210</td>
<td>24h</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4266</td>
<td>4523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4031</td>
<td>4328</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4355</td>
<td>4654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GAINS AND LOSSES BY MONTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY 1967</th>
<th>JUNE 1967</th>
<th>JULY 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gains</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-222</td>
<td>-222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ During the reporting period, the assigned units authorized strength for officers increased and the assigned units authorized strength for EM decreased.

2/ During the reported period, the attached units strength of the Brigade decreased. The decrease was the result of the change of status of the 46th PI Det being changed from attached to assigned.

3/ Represents all assigned gains to include both in-country and out-country.

4/ Represents all assigned losses to include DEROS, ETS, in-country reassignment and deceased members.

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in the Brigade has been excellent during the reporting period. There were no stragglers.

(2) During the reporting period, there were 9 General Court Martials, 39 Special Court Martials, 1 Summary Court Martials and 268 Article 15's.

(3) Assistance from the Brigade ID was readily available throughout the months of May, June and July 1967.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The state of morale within the Brigade remains excellent resulting from improved services and facilities.

(2) Finance: The Brigade Finance Section (Company "A" Admin) continued to provide outstanding financial support throughout the reporting period. The Soldier's Savings Program, various allotments etc. were brought to the attention of newly arriving troops through an orientation and various newsletters.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

(3) Chaplain: During the reporting period, there were 524 religious services conducted (all faiths with a total attendance of 11,727).

(4) Rest and Recuperation: Brigade R & R allocations during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In-Country)</td>
<td>(In-Country)</td>
<td>(In-Country)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manilla</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) There were a total of 1,400 awards given for valor and meritorious service during May, June and July 1967, a breakdown of which follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal (Merit/Achieve)</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

May 0
June 26
July 116

Army Commendation Medal (Merit/Achieve) 149
Soldier's Medal 1 0
Purple Heart Medal 72 22 23
TOTAL: 530 193 677

9. The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) provided readily available Chemical Support on a standby basis whenever requested by elements of the Brigade.

II. Commander's Observations and Recommendations:

1. During the operational period, various lessons were learned. These lessons learned were drawn from all the operations which occurred during the period extending from 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967.


Discussion: Extensive use of the KY-8 was made during Operation NEWARK. This equipment enabled the battalions to communicate confidential data to the Brigade CP without using codes. No difficulties were encountered in coordinating helicopter operations and in receiving operational instructions.

Observation: Whenever directed, Brigade units can make use of this effective means of transmitting classified information.

3. Item: LZ Clearing Teams

Discussion: The Engineer Company delivered instant LZ clearing teams by Chinook helicopter during Operation FT WAYNE. This was accomplished in spite of the dense vegetation.

Observation: The delivery of demolition packets and clearing teams by Chinook helicopter was tested extensively. The system was found to be sound. Teams can be delivered by ladder from the helicopter through the jungle canopy from a height of up to 90 feet.

4. Item: Smoke

Discussion: Smoke was a critical item for Company A/2/503d Infantry during its encounter in the month of June with an NVA battalion in the central highlands. Lack of sufficient smoke greatly reduced the effectiveness of airstrikes.

Observation: Inasmuch as sufficient smoke was unavailable, the use of artillery exclusively would have provided more effective firepower.

5. Item: Reinforcement of Units in Contact

Discussion: The unit sent to reinforce "A" Company experienced an administrative problem in carrying their dead during an urgent movement.

Observation: Units moving to reinforce must anticipate the probability of receiving casualties and plan for their rallying and evacuation of casualties so as not to interfere with the movement. Unnecessary gear may have to be stockpiled for later pick-up. Movement to reinforce must be aggressive and accomplished rapidly.
AVDDH-GC (15 Aug 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RGS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO San Francisco 96262, 7 October 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operation Report – Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section I, para 3c(4) pg 6: The addition of the following to the referenced paragraph would provide the rationale behind the movement of the 173d Airborne Brigade to the vicinity of Pleiku. – As a result of several heavy contacts by 4th Infantry Division units during May with elements of four NVA regiments (32d, 66th, 88th and 95B), COMUSMACV directed that the 173d Airborne Brigade move to the vicinity of Pleiku, and that it be placed under OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division with the proviso that the Brigade not be employed in the operation without the expressed approval of COMUSMACV. Elements of the Brigade remained under the OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division during operations FRANCIS MARION, STILLWELL, and GREELEY.

b. Reference Section I, para 3c(5)(d), pg 6: The enemy order of battle list omits the 32d NVA Regiment. Although this enemy unit was not contacted during the period of the brigade's participation in Operation FRANCIS MARION, it was in Cambodia, adjacent to the area of operations, and represented a significant part of the enemy's capability.

c. Reference Section I, para 3c(6)(b) pg 7: The NVA Doo Lop Regiment (K101 D Battalion) should not be positively identified as a new regiment. It is very probable that this unit is the remainder of the 101C Regiment, as indicated by a similarity of unit history.

d. Reference Section I, para 4, pg 16: The 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry terminated participation in Operation STILLWELL on 22 June and was airlifted to Dak To as a result of the heavy contact by the 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry south of Dak To on 22 June.

e. Reference Section II, para 4, pg 25: The supply of smoke became a critical item for Company A, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry because the platoons' basic loads were used up calling in the numerous airstrikes received early during the contact. The tactical situation prohibited resupply. Moreover, it is noted that the calling off of artillery to bring air strikes required the use of additional smoke. Such action further reduced the overall effectiveness of the artillery support.
f. Reference Inclosure 6, para 12a, pg 5: It is not considered prudent for units to be prepared to take casualties from friendly artillery fires; In the dense jungles of the Central Highlands, artillery can be walked in as close as 50 meters in front of friendly forces without inflicting more than an occasional injury to friendly troops. It is essential that this be well understood in order to obviate any inclination to call in fires on friendly formations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MARTIN L. AFFERTY, JR.
CPT, AG
Ass't AG
2F Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Hq Quartes, I Field Force VIetnam, APO 96350 26 Oct 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the 173d Airborne Brigade Operational
Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 and
concurs with the basic document as modified by the 1st Indorsement and the
following pertinent comments:

a. Reference Section I paragraph 3e (pages 8-14) - Viet Cong/NVA
   losses. The quantities of US weapons, ammunition, mines, grenades and
demolitions captured from the V/C/NVA reinforces our knowledge that the enemy
and does use US material against F/F, not solely in its design mode,
but also in expedient mines and booby-traps. He is known to reuse extracted
bulk explosive from captured duds or found ordnance. The most difficult
mines for F/F to locate are those using electrical firing systems due to
the minute amounts of metal used therein. Such devices are usually powered
by batteries and it is known that the enemy frequently uses US batteries.
Virtually every military battery discarded by US forces, including the com-
mon flashlight battery, is capable of being employed in electrical firing
systems even after it is no longer usable for its original purpose. These
facts emphasize the continuing necessity for all units to exercise every
precaution to prevent friendly ordnance and batteries from falling into ene-
my hands. Batteries should be crushed or otherwise totally destroyed be-
fore discarding to prevent their use against F/F.

b. Reference inclosure 3 paragraph 3b (page 2) class II and IV:
   These items were in short supply during July, however, adequate
   supplies have been received since that time.

c. Reference inclosure 3, paragraph 3, maintenance b: The 106
   Service Radio has been a maintenance problem throughout USAR-V.
   An emergency requisition for a 180 day repair parts package was submitted to
   MACV with follow-up action in August. MACV reports that parts requested are
   now beginning to arrive in theater. Red ball requisitioning is required
   until parts are distributed.

d. Reference inclosure 3, paragraph 3, maintenance c: Since the
   submission of this report, storage batteries have been received and are on
   hand in sufficient quantities at DS level. There is no apparent shortage
   of spare parts at this time. Conversion of FEC-74 power requirements to
   the dry cell B1 386 battery is scheduled for November. This should elimi-
   nate the battery problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

D.O.D. 5200.10

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2LT. AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHCC-DST (15 Aug 67) 3 Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375
3 NOV 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 173d Airborne
Brigade (Separate) (ARJA) as indorsed.

2. (U) Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl
cc

HQ, 173d Abn Bde
HQ, I FFV
GPOP-DT(15 Aug 67) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 67 from HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (UIC: WARJAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 6 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl nc

Heaven Snyder
CP, AGC
Asst AG
Organization 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
SUBJECT: Supply and Combat Service Activities

1. May:
   a. Supply:
      (1) Class I: No critical shortages.
      (2) Class II & IV: The fill of II and IV requisitions remains good, however, shortages as listed in bi-weekly periodic logistics reports do not exist.
      (3) Class III: The Brigade POL Level was maintained at above stockage objectives, however, OR 30 was in critical supply in the early part of the month.
      (4) Class V: 105mm - G44A was in short supply in the early part of the month.
   b. Maintenance:
      (1) A class in repair parts support and PLL's was given to all units in the Brigade on 17 and 18 May 1967. The objective was to assist the units in establishing and maintaining their PLL's. In addition, emphasis was placed on proper requisitioning procedures, follow up and reading of status cards.
      (2) 207 handsets for the AN/PRC-25 radios have been in direct exchange with Company "D" Maintenance within the past 60 days. These sets show an extensive amount of abuse and careless handling by personnel. Currently this item is in critical supply within this command. Communication at the unit level will be reduced for these handsets unless all commanders take a positive attitude toward the maintenance of this item. The common failures are:
          (a) Broken or cracked sets due to dropping or allowing something to fall on it.
          (b) Missing ear or mouth pieces.
          (c) Missing switches.
          (d) Cut cords.
          (e) Cut or missing jugs.
          (f) Internal wires or components removed.
      (3) Units continue to move to the field and leave their PLL in base camp. In addition, units are not turning their equipment in for repair immediately.

2. June:
   a. Maintenance:
      (1) Continuous effort is being made by "D" Maintenance Technical Supply to obtain the following items:
      Spark Plugs, FSN 2920-835-7724  Due in: 798  Due out: 323
      2920-752-4258  725  311

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Direct contact has been made with the 356th Field Depot in Saigon. However, results have proven negative. Efforts will continue since this issue of supply is critical to forward units at this time.

(2) "D" Maintenance had six (6) five ton trucks deadline due to zero balance on 5 Ton Multi Fuel Engines, FSN 2815-911-3645. This is a controlled item and is critical throughout Vietnam. Although "D" Maintenance has received five (5) each of these engines through various means, it still remains a problem with "D" Maintenance Technical Supply at zero balance. 1st Logistical Command, Saigon, indicated that forty (40) such engines are entering country daily and this problem should be resolved by 10 July 1967.

(3) Due to the improper use of various types of power chain saws, a technical representative was called in from HMC. Instructions on proper use of this equipment was presented to units of this Brigade from 12 - 17 June 1967.

3. July:

a. Class I: There was little significant Class I activity. "A" rations were available to units in the field for breakfast meals and supper meals. "C" rations were utilized for the dinner meal. Long Range Reconnaissance Rations (LRRP) were utilized at a much higher rate than previously. The allocation of 8,000 packets per month was exceeded.

b. Class II & IV: The fill on expendable supplies was particularly low during the month of July. Items of II and IV that have been a continuing problem are: Certain dry cell batteries, particularly BA 386; wire WD-1; insect repellant; pulverized limestone; jungle fatigues and tropical boots. Many items of TA 50-901 (clothing and equipment) were depleted due to heavy attrition from combat operations, large numbers of replacements and lack of fill from depot.

c. Class III: Normal operation.

d. Class V: Normal operation. No significant items of concern.

Maintenance:

a. A class is being conducted on generators (Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance) and material handling equipment for all units in the Brigade. The objective is to assist all units in improving the material readiness of generators and material handling equipment. Similar classes are being planned for other equipment.

b. The 106 Service Radio continued to be a maintenance problem during the month of July. An exceptionally high failure rate has been experienced with the amplifier unit 3349. The down time of the amplifier unit continues to be 30 - 45 days due to the unavailability of repair parts in USAV.

c. The PRC-74 radios were issued to the Brigade during the month of July. Currently "D" Maintenance has limited stock of repair parts and no stock of storage batteries for this radio. The repair parts and storage batteries are critical items of supply.
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AVHE-SC


1. (U) Date of Operation: 22 June 1967 - 27 June 1967

2. (U) Location: Dak To District, Kontum Province

3. (U) Command Headquarters: 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)


5. (C) Task Organization:
   a. 22 June - 23 June
      A/2/503d Inf B/2/503d Inf (Squad CIDG) C/2/503d Inf (Squad CIDG)
   b. 24 June - 27 June
      B/2/503d Inf E/17th Cav OPCON to 2/503d Inf eff 241630H
      C/2/503d Inf Rcn 2/503d Inf OPCON eff 241045H

6. Supporting Forces:
   a. 3/319th Artillery (+): Employed in a direct support role.
   b. 335th HC and 189th AMCL (Ghostriders) provided assault lift, resupply and armed helicopter direct support.
   c. 7th Air Force flew seventeen sorties in support of the action, expending 30,000 pounds of high explosives, 19,000 pounds of napalm, 158 2.75 inch high explosive air to ground rockets and 76,000 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition.

7. Intelligence: An unknown size enemy force had attacked US-GVN installations in the Dak To area with mortar and rocket fire during the period 17 - 21 June. Possible firing positions/cache sites were located within 2/503d Infantry's area of operation.

8. Mission: The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations against possible enemy installations or forces south of the Dak To Special Forces Camp.

9. Concept of the Operation: A/2/503d Infantry and C/2/503d Infantry entered the area of operation by helicopter assault on 18 June and 20 June respectively. B/2/503d Infantry remained at Dak To as a reaction force. Companies were to be rotated from operational to reaction force roles in turn.

10. Execution: 18 - 21 June: A/2/503d Infantry had negative significant contact during the period 18 - 21 June, as did C/2/503d Infantry. On 211700H June, C/2/503d Infantry received orders to return overland to Dak To, choosing a route that would allow him to close NLT 221500H. Positions of the two companies were as follows: A/2/503d Infantry via YB 996162; C/2/503d Infantry via YB 987153. On the night of 21 - 22 June was without contact for "A" Company. "C" Company made contact at dusk with 5 - 6 enemy resulting in one CIDG KIA. In the early morning hours of 22 June, one US soldier wandered out in front of the perimeter and was killed by small arms fire.
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15 August 1967


22 June: 1/2/503d Infantry departed their night laager site at 220625H, with the order of march being 2d Platoon, 3d Platoon, Headquarters, Weapons Platoon and the 1st Platoon. 1st Platoon was ordered to place CS crystals around their 12 and night laager site in order to deny that hill to the enemy. The route was selected to follow the ridge line north to the Poko River. At 0438 hours, the point squad of the 2d Platoon engaged an estimated 10 - 15 NVA. The 2d Platoon (-) moved to reinforce the point squad and artillery fire was initiated. 1st Platoon was finishing the CS detail when the firing was heard and they moved to join the Company CP, vic YB 002168. The 1st Platoon sent a four man detail to carry additional ammunition to the 2d Platoon and included a machinegunner for reinforcement if necessary. The point squad fell back on the 2d Platoon with no casualties and at 0705 hours the 3d Platoon was ordered to link up with the 2d Platoon. This was accomplished by the 2d Platoon moving back approximately seventy-five meters. A common perimeter was established along the ridge line, vic YB 00007700, with the 1st Platoon on the west and the 3d Platoon on the east. The light machine gun and the personnel from the 1st Platoon were included in the perimeter. At 0810 hours the first NVA attack came from the north by an estimated reinforced platoon. The attack was repulsed, but renewed periodically for the next half hour. The CO, 1/2/503d Infantry reported his two lead elements in heavy contact.

From 0820 hours to 0825 hours an airstrike was conducted along the east side of the ridge and at 0825 hours, CO, 1/2/503d Infantry requested armed helicopter support due to the proximity of the enemy movement. The helicopter strikes were very effective at first, but immediately following the completion of the strikes the attack was renewed. At this time it was reported to the CO of "A" Company that 1/2/503d Infantry had dispatched clearing patrols prior to moving out to "A" Company's assistance. Earlier they had reported heavy movement and had called artillery fire into the area. At 0830 hours, CO, 1/2/503d Infantry declined an airstrike due to the closeness of the enemy movement. At approximately this time the enemy launched a company size attack from the northwest that lasted twenty minutes. The attack was repulsed with heavy casualties to the defenders.

By 0855 hours, armed helicopter strikes were being brought in against the NVA forces. Alternating with the gunships, A-1E's with GBU and napalm continued the attack against the enemy to the north of the perimeter until 1000 hours. Due to a lack of smoke grenades the air attacks were delayed occasionally while changes in the enemy's position were relayed by radio through the Company CP. At 0950 hours, CO, 1/2/503d Infantry committed his 1st Platoon to relieve pressure caused by the NVA attack. At 1015 hours, CO of "A" Company also deployed elements of the 1st Platoon to assist in carrying wounded back up the hill. Elements of the 1st Platoon fought their way through to the 2d and 3d Platoon's perimeter but the Weapons Platoon carrying party was unable to reach the site. NVA forces had now surrounded the forward positions.

At 0957 hours, CO, 1/2/503d Infantry reported that his forward elements were in desperate need of assistance. The CO of "G" Company was ordered to ignore the movement to his flanks and to move out immediately to the assistance of "A" Company. The decision was also made to commit 1/2/503d Infantry into an LZ vic YB 991181. Both companies were moving by 1015 hours.

At approximately 1000 hours, the forward elements were again assaulted by NVA forces. The assault lasted approximately 15 minutes and was of such magnitude as to reduce the three platoons down to fifteen effectives. All platoon leaders were killed and all platoon sergeants had been wounded three or four times. The 2d Platoon
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AVBE-SC 15 August 1967

Sergeant, the ranking survivor, directed that the wounded and the effectives be moved back to the ridge toward the Company CP.

At 1034 hours, CO, 2/503d Infantry reported that he had lost radio contact with his forward elements. He also requested that the Battalion CO terminate the air strikes that were pounding the western approaches to the forward position with napalm and 2.75 inch rockets and to call in artillery instead. At this time the Company CP itself was not under fire but all available personnel were helping to evacuate what wounded they could.

B/2/503d Infantry was inserted into a one ship LZ. This was the only LZ available. The process of this insertion was further complicated by a fire started in the elephant grass started by a smoke grenade used to mark the LZ. The lead platoon (2d Platoon) moved out of the LZ to recon the route toward "A" Company. Approximately 300 yards south the platoon received small arms fire but suffered no casualties. Succeeding platoons moved off the LZ behind the 2d Platoon which was now directing artillery fire against the enemy.

Between 1030 and 1100 hours, CO, 2/503d Infantry reported movement to his northwest and requested supporting fire vic YB 993170. "A" Company also sent a guide element back up the ridge which had been their route earlier in the morning. This element was to assist C/2/503d Infantry in navigating the CS contaminated area. CO, 2/503d Infantry reported regaining intermittent contact with two of his three forward elements but by 1100 hours had lost all contact. The group of survivors lead by the 2d Platoon sergeant reached the Company CP by 1100 hours, after which the company disposition was about thirty effectives forming a perimeter around the thirty-five wounded. At approximately 1140 hours, the remainder of "A" Company moved further up the ridge under the cover of artillery fire to the northwest and reestablished their perimeter at YB 999166. Construction of an LZ was begun for resupply and evacuation of the wounded.

The new CP position was subjected to two separate attacks from the northwest at 1220 and 1245 hours with sporadic small arms fire in between. The company withstood these assaults and continued work on the LZ as the situation permitted. Resupply of ammunition and medical supplies was made into the partially completed LZ after the second attack.

B/2/503d Infantry moved off the LZ after their insertion was completed at 1205 hours. At 1240 hours, vicinity ZB 000177, "B" Company made contact with an estimated platoon of NVA forces. Artillery was directed against the enemy positions. "B" Company formed a perimeter when they detected an NVA flanking movement to the east of their position. From 1335 until 1440 hours, airstrikes of 500 pound bombs, CBU, napalm and strafing runs were directed against the NVA. The guide element from "A" Company made contact with C/2/503d Infantry in the vicinity of the CS crystals and led them back to the new CP location of A/2/503d Infantry. C/2/503d Infantry had been burdened by 2 KIA's from the night before and this had slowed their march. Link up was effected at 1420 hours and immediate attention was directed toward LZ completion and medical care for the wounded. C/2/503d Infantry attempted police of the main battle areas at 1600 hours, to attempt retrieval of US WIA's and enemy documents but were repulsed by enemy sniper fire from the trees. Extraction of A/2/503d Infantry to the Brigade Main CP was completed at 1050 hours.

C/2/503d Infantry lagered in the hilltop position of "A" Company, vic YB 998166 with one platoon placed on ambush site at YB 997165. B/2/503d Infantry lagered vic
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YB 999181 with one platoon in ambush site at ZB 000178. Throughout the night artillery was directed against potential NVA routes of withdrawal to the west and into the area of the day's contact. The results of the 2/503d Infantry contact on 22 June are as follows:

US LOSSES

A Co: 4 KIA, 19 WIA, 75 MIA; 10 PRC-25 radios, 6 LMG M-60, 60 Rifles M-16, 2 SMG CAR-15, 3 rifles with grenade launcher XM-148, 8 M-79 grenade launchers and 6 .45 caliber pistols.

B Co: 3 WIA.

GVN Losses: 1 ARVN interpreter advisor KIA, 2 CIDG KIA (including one CIDG, KIA evening of 21 June with C/2/503d Infantry).

23 June: 8/2/503d Infantry moved south commencing at 0700 hours, making scattered contact with NVA forces ranging in size up to two squads. C/2/503d Infantry swept north, securing the main battle area by 1030 hours. "B" Company linked with "C" Company in the contact area at 1220 hours and the two companies formed a common perimeter and worked to cut an extraction LZ for the KIA's and WIA's. All MIA were accounted for with 4 MIA recovered alive. Over half of the KIA (43 personnel) had suffered head wounds inflicted at close range, indicating that the NVA had executed the wounded during the night. One MIA who was recovered alive had survived this ordeal. The Coup de Grace had merely stunned him. Final personnel losses in the "A" Company contact were as follows: 76 KIA, 23 WIA, 0 MIA.

24 June – 28 June: Search operations were conducted by B Co, C Co and the Recon Platoon, 2/503d Infantry augmented by B/17th Cavalry from 25 – 28 June. Through search of the battle area and possible access/egress routes for the NVA produced substantial evidence of NVA personnel losses. A considerable amount of NVA equipment was captured and US equipment recovered. Intelligence findings produced documents and three NVA POW's, captured by B/17th Cavalry on 26 June vicinity YB 984170 and YB 983177. The enemy unit was identified as the K6 Battalion, subordinate to B3 Front (unit was formerly 6th Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment and was detached to B3 Front in August 1966).

11. Final results of the 2/503d Infantry action were as follows:

US Losses

Personnel: 76 KIA, 23 WIA, 0 MIA


GVN Losses: 1 ARVN Interpreter/Advisor, 2 CIDG KIA.

Enemy Losses:

Personnel: 106 NVA KIA (US), 407 NVA KIA (FoS), 3 POW.

Equipment: 5 82MM RDF, 2 3.540 Rocket Launchers, 1 82MM Rocket Launcher, 21 AK-47 Assault Rifles, 14 SKS Carbines, 2 US Carbines, 1 M1 Rifle and 2 radios (B-71 Transceiver AB).
12. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned:

a. The lack of smoke grenades in the main contact area, the platoons' basic load having been exhausted early in the contact, greatly reduced the effectiveness of the air strikes. Lacking smoke, artillery would have been more effective.

b. In cases of close contact with the enemy on several sides, artillery will permit closer support, a higher volume of fire and with multiple firing units within range, more portions of a unit's perimeter can be supported simultaneously by artillery than by TAC air. TAC Air would be more effective against concentrated enemy on a "point" target. In this battle TAC Air should have been used primarily on enemy withdrawal routes.

c. Commanders must move their units in formations which allow for effective reinforcement or exploitation of advantages, appropriate to the terrain. When attacked, units should attempt to form a single, rather than a multiple perimeter.

d. Units moving to reinforce a unit in contact should not, as a rule, carry their dead with them. They should drop packs and unnecessary equipment to permit more rapid movement. This equipment and the dead can be recovered later.

e. Movement to reinforce a unit in heavy contact must be aggressive.

f. Units must be prepared to accept casualties from friendly artillery and mortar fire in order to bring fires in close on the enemy.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Annexes:
Annex A - TAC Air
Annex B - Medical Statement

EARLE F. BURNS
CW4, USA
Asst AG

TRUE COPY:

SAMUEL A. BRITTON
Maj, INF
Brigade Historian
### Annex A - Air Strikes in Support of A/2/503d Infantry on 22 June 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>CALLSIGN A/C</th>
<th>UNIT SPD</th>
<th>STRIKE LOCATION</th>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0820 - 0825</td>
<td>Silver 01</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>ZB 002171</td>
<td>500 x 8, 250 nap x 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0855 - 0910</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>YB 999173y, ZB 001172</td>
<td>750 CBU x 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0915 - 0935</td>
<td>Hobo 01</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>YB 999172, ZB 001172</td>
<td>500 nap x 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0935 - 0948</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>YB 999172, ZB 001172</td>
<td>20mm x 2600 x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0955 - 1005</td>
<td>Sabre 91</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>YB 999172, ZB 001172</td>
<td>500 nap x 8, 2.75&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010 - 1013</td>
<td>Hobo 03</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>YB 993172, YB 998173, YB 995168</td>
<td>12 Rkt (19 Rkt/Pod) x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1114 - 1126</td>
<td>Litter of</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>ZB 016171</td>
<td>750 nap x 4, 20mm x 1600 x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1129 - 1140</td>
<td>Blade 03</td>
<td>A Co</td>
<td>ZB 028166</td>
<td>500 x 4, 750 nap x 4, 20mm x 1600 x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1325 - 1345</td>
<td>Hobo 29</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>ZB 003181, ZB 004181</td>
<td>500 x 12, 20mm x 1600 x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350 - 1440</td>
<td>Hobo 01</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>ZB 006178, ZB 008179</td>
<td>750 CBU x 12, 500 nap x 8, 20mm x 1600 x 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the examination of 79 bodies, dead as a result of mortar and ground assault sustained 22 June 1967 the following observations were made.

There were an abundance of bullet wounds of the skull associated with other minor wounds on the same body. Some of which were too minor to be listed on the death certificate and others which were much more severe and so listed but not sufficient to allow them to be listed as cause of death.

Initially, a number of wounds which were thought to be frag wounds of the skull were on closer inspection or on reinspection found to be the exit point of bullet wounds entering from the opposite side of the skull. Since the certificate had been signed the cause of death (listed as frag to skull) was not changed. Approximately one half of what is listed retrospect actually bullet wounds of skull and other areas. Consequently there were a total of 26 bullet wounds of the skull and other areas. There were also an abundance of bullet wounds to the skull without any other area involved. A total of 17. This brings the number of deaths due to bullet wounds to the skull to 43. It was also observed that the exit point of most of the skull wounds was the face or the forehead or the temporal area and the entrance therefore being the back of the skull. The large size of the exit wound from bullet wounds to the back of the skull was the factor which led to the initial evaluation of these wounds as frag wounds. When the frequency of head wounds was detected I suspected that I had erred in my appraisal of the large gaping facial wounds as frag wounds and so returned to the bodies and on close inspection found the small entry site at the back of the head. However, I did not change the certificate since it had already been signed, and at the time I thought there was no importance to the difference. The evaluation of data here and information obtained from survivors who spent the night of 22 June 1967 near the battle area suggested to me that many of the wounded but living had been shot through the head by the enemy after the action. Most textbooks listing causes of death from wounds sustained in combat suggest that skull wounds will account from 18 to 20 percent. The percentage here deviates from that quite noticeably. Since there were approximately 80 casualties and 47 died of head wounds the percentage is not 18 to 20 percent but over 50%.
* As explained previously many of these were bullet wounds but listed as frag wounds on first inspection.

TOTAL NUMBER HEAD ....... 79
HEAD WOUNDS ............ 43

BULLET WOUNDS OF HEAD AND OTHER AREAS .... 9
BULLET WOUND OF HEAD ONLY ............ 17
FRAG WOUND OF HEAD ONLY ............ 9
FRAG WOUND OF HEAD AND OTHER AREAS .... 8

/s/Joseph X. Grosso

JAMES H. STEWART
MAJ, INF
S3

A TRUE COPY

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CONTACT ESTABLISHED WITH ESTIMATED 5-6 NVA AT 0658 HRS.

Est. One NVA CO(-)

WPN'S & HQ'S WERE COMMITTED TO RESUPPLY & TO EVACUATE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED

1st SQD 1st PLT

TRAIL

2nd PLT 1st SQD
Est. One NVA CO.

Est. One NVA CO(-)

Two Platoon Perimeter established under heavy pressure

Est. ONE NVA SQD

141 PLT WAS COMMITTED AS REINFORCEMENT & RESUPPLY
1. (U) Date of Operation: 8 July 1967 - 18 July 1967

2. (U) Location: Dak To District, Kontum Province. Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series Nr L7014, Sheet Nr 6538III.


4. (U) Reporting Officer: Lieutenant Colonel James H. Johnson, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry. Commander during the operation covered by this report: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence W. Jackley.

5. (U) Task Organization:
   a. 8 July - 12 July
      TAC CP (11 CIDG) A/4/503d Inf B/4/503d Inf D/4/503d Inf
      Engr Team Engr Team Engr Team
   b. 12 July - 18 July
      TAC CP A/4/503d Inf C/4/503d Inf D/4/503d Inf
      Engr Team Engr Team Engr Team
      Scout Dog Tm Scout Dog Tm Scout Dog Tm

6. Supporting Fires/Forces:
   a. 3/319th Artillery (+): Employed in a direct support role.
   b. 335th AHC provided troop lift and resupply during the operation.

7. Intelligence: A suspected NVA Regimental size Headquarters was located in AO JANE (Area of Operations for 4th Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry). Whether this Headquarters was operating independently or with subordinate units attached was uncertain, but the best intelligence estimates indicated at least one battalion size unit was moving with the Headquarters.

8. Mission: 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in AO JANE, to locate, block and engage suspected NVA units operating vicinity YB 870147.

9. Concept of the Operation: A/4/503d Infantry, B/4/503d Infantry and D/4/503d Infantry, with attached TAC CP and CIDG elements, began search and destroy operations from PZ ABLE (YB 894166), moving generally south and west in AO JANE. C/4/503d Infantry remained at FSB "4" (YB 903185), providing security for the fire support base and preparing for deployment as the Battalion's reaction force.

10. Execution: 4 - 7 July: The 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry continued operations in AO JANE with companies "A", "C" and "D" as maneuver elements. At 011530H July, all companies closed on coordinates YB 893164, where a battalion size perimeter was formed and an LZ constructed. During the period 4 - 7 July, units remained at this location, conducting extensive patrolling operations and live fire battle drill exercises. Resupply and maintenance periods were conducted as the battalion prepared for future operations (air assault and conduct of S&D).
operations in AO MAC, commencing 060000H July 1967). Platoon size ambushes were conducted during the hours of darkness by all elements during this period. There was no enemy contact reported during this period.

At 07135N July, an exchange of companies was accomplished, with C/2/503d Infantry returning to secure FSB 84 (YB 901148) and B/4/503d Infantry entering AO JANE. At approximately 071600H July, the battalion received a change of mission. The air assault and the operation planned in AO MAC were cancelled and the battalion received the mission to locate, block or engage NVA units suspected of operating vicinity TB 870148. A forward TAC CP was organized and dispatched to join the three maneuver companies still harbored at YB 893144. The Battalion S3 Officer was made the ground commander at this time and arrived in the area of operation at 071725H July. Eleven (11) CIDG personnel, furnished by the Dak To Special Forces Camp, were attached at this time to be used during the operation as trackers and trail guides. The night of 6 July passed without incident.

8 - 9 July: The 4/503d Infantry (-) initiated operations in AO JANE, commencing movement at 080500H July. A report was received at approximately 080600H July that the NVA were now suspected in the vicinity of YB 860148. The battalion moved to locate and engage this force, moving west from coordinates YB 892144. Two DUSTOFFs delayed the movement during this period, one at 081000H July when one individual was evacuated for possible malaria from B/4/503d Infantry and another at 081200H July from A/4/503d Infantry with a possible broken ankle. At 081455H July the Battalion S1 Officer was ordered by the Battalion Commander to cease movement and conduct reconnaissance for a harbor site vicinity YB 897144. This site was selected at YB 895147 and a battalion perimeter formed. There was no enemy contact and no significant findings during this reporting period. On 9 July 1967, the Battalion (-) continued movement west into AO JANE, again with negative findings or contact. Units harbored as follows: A/4/503d Infantry at YB 871144; B/4/503d Infantry YB 868144 and C/4/503d Infantry at YB 872146.

10 July: At 100700H July, the TAC CP received orders to move to Objective # 49 at YB 863147. With B/4/503d Infantry leading, the Battalion (-) initiated movement at 100700H July. The order of march for the initial phase on 10 July was as follows: B/4/503d Infantry leading, D/4/503d, TAC CP, and A/4/503d following. At 103200H July the Battalion Commander issued instructions to the Forward CP to disregard Objective # 49 and move to Objective # 40, located at YB 859138. The Battalion S3 Officer informed A/4/503d Infantry to secure this objective at YB 857138, B/4/503d Infantry to secure at YB 859138 and D/4/503d Infantry to secure at YB 859143. The Battalion (-) began moving in column with A/4/503d Infantry leading, followed by D/4/503d, TAC CP and B/4/503d. The companies were to harbor at their respective objectives on the evening of 10 July 1967.

At 101545H July, while conducting search and destroy operations in the vicinity of YB 860140, lead elements of A/4/503d Infantry received heavy small arms fire and automatic weapons fire from two bunkered light machine guns. The enemy force, initially estimated to be one NVA rifle company, was entrenched in well prepared, fortified positions approximately thirty-five (35) meters to "A" Company's front (northeast). Artillery support was directed onto the NVA positions as the first platoon maneuvered to the right to relieve pressure on the point platoon which had been pinned down. At this time, the Battalion S3 Officer requested that a light fire team be made available to support the action. The second platoon maneuvered to the right and immediately came under fire from two light machine guns. The CO, 4/503d Infantry had lost contact by radio with his third platoon but previous instructions to the

platoon was to maneuver to the right of the second platoon, which the third platoon did. Radio contact was not established again until later in the evening. Artillery, small arms and grenades silenced the light machine gun on the left of the first platoon. At this time all three platoons of the 4/503d Infantry were in contact and were receiving heavy fire on the right flank.

D/4/503d Infantry, who were following A/4/503d Infantry reported incoming mortar rounds. The Battalion S3 Officer instructed D/4/503d Infantry to maneuver to the left of A/4/503d Infantry to relieve the pressure directed in that direction. As the lead platoon of D/4/503d Infantry began moving it came under heavy fire from its right, at which time D/4/503d Infantry echeloned right (vic YB 862141). B/4/503d Infantry, maneuvering to attack the enemy position from the northeast with two platoons and the TAC CP, came under fire from two additional bunkerized light machine guns, small arms fire, automatic weapons fire and 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The first platoon of B/4/503d Infantry remained in a reserve position on high ground to the rear of the contact point. The enemy force in this sector of the fight was estimated to be an additional NVA rifle company with supporting mortars and was positioned so that it was mutually supporting the unit engaged by A/4/503d Infantry. The CO, 4/503d Infantry ordered D/4/503d Infantry to maneuver to the right of B/4/503d Infantry to relieve the pressure which had been placed on that unit. All elements continued to receive mortar and automatic weapons fire from the NVA force now believed to be a Battalion (-). B/4/503d Infantry reported that they had begun to receive heavy fire from both flanks and to the front. At 1600 hours, the S3 Officer, the artillery FO team and the CO, B/4/503d Infantry were killed or wounded by incoming mortar fire.

Artillery supported 4/503d Infantry elements with fires into NVA positions and with blocking fires on likely routes of NVA withdrawal/reinforcement to the west and southwest of the enemy positions.

At this time D/4/503d Infantry was maneuvering elements to reinforce B/4/503d Infantry. Two platoons had begun to move toward “B” Company’s location. Another was still in contact and receiving light fire where it had maneuvered to assist A/4/503d Infantry. “A” Company had broken contact and was moving towards Company “B” when CO, D/4/503d Infantry informed the CO of “A” Company that the terrain and distance would not permit the two companies to link up prior to darkness. Contact was broken with all elements at 101800H July 1967. The CO, 4/503d Infantry ordered “A” Company with one platoon from “D” Company to move back and harbor with the one reserve platoon from “B” Company at YB 861140. “D” Company had linked up with “B” Company and prepared to spend the night at YB 858140. Perimeters were formed at this location and at YB 861140, where attempts were made to return the dead and wounded. MEDIVAC was attempted throughout the night. However, due to the adverse weather conditions in the area, only three WIA’s were extracted. Companies harbored until daylight on 11 July 1967.

11 - 12 July: The 4th Battalion continued Operation GREELEY in AO JANE. The Battalion (-) reconsolidated and harbored into Objective # 40 (Hill 830) and prepared for the extraction of the wounded and the dead from the previous day’s encounter. Extraction of the wounded and dead was delayed during the early morning (0001 - 0700 hours) of 11 July 1967 due to severe weather conditions in the area of operations. The first extraction was completed at 110710H July and the last at 111918H July. The Battalion (-) continued search and destroy operations throughout the daylight hours of the 11th. Evidence of a well disciplined, trained and armed NVA force was found. Trench networks and emplacements were found to be quite
extensive, running north-south and west along the ridge line where the contact was made. D/4/503d Infantry, on a sweep of the area on 11 July, found an oval shaped base camp at YB 857141 consisting of 60 - 80 bunkers and foxholes on the outer perimeter. Fortifications had an estimated two feet of overhead cover consisting of logs and dirt. A smaller perimeter of command bunkers was found within the camp. Cooking areas were also found within the perimeter. At 121115H July at YB 855136, Companies "A" and "D" found another base camp consisting of twenty bunkers. At 121430H July a third base camp complex was found by D/4/503d in the vicinity of YB 857134. Thirty bunkers with two foot overhead log and dirt covers and two kitchen areas were found within the area.

A thorough search of the battle field produced a considerable amount of NVA equipment and sources of intelligence value. Most US equipment was recovered. At 121430H July, D/4/503d Infantry found a wounded POW at YB 857138 who was immediately extracted to Dak To for interrogation.

US LOSSES


D/4/503d: 1 KIA, 2 WIA.

HHC/4/503d: 2 KIA, 4 WIA, 2 M-2 Compass.

NVA LOSSES

9 KIA (6G); 1 FOY; 1 RPD Chicom LRG; 1 Chicom Type 54 Pistol; 480 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition; 3 New Rucksacks; 25 Chicom Grenades; 1 B-40 Rocket Round; 11 Russian 82mm Mortar Rounds; 10 pounds of clothing; assorted cooking utensils.

13 - 18 July: At 130930H July 1967, the 4th Battalion initiated movement to the south in AO JANE with D/4/503d leading, C/4/503d following (they had replaced B/4/503d) and A/4/503d in the rear. At 0930 hours Company "D" had found freshly dug holes, a latrine and a muzzle harness for a dog harness at YB 855137. At 1400 hours, Company "C" spotted one VC and took him under fire with unknown results. The Viet Cong fled to the south at YB 855126. All companies harbored in a battalion perimeter at YB 855126.

At 140715H July, the Battalion (-) initiated movement toward an objective located at Hill 807 (YB 847122) with C/4/503d Infantry leading. At 141240H July, C/4/503d found a fresh grave containing one NVA body estimated to be about three days old at YB 867112. At this same location, Company "C" spotted a path with blood stains and followed it for approximately 200 meters with negative results. All units harbored at TB 855126.

At 150712H July 1967, the Battalion (-) moved to link up with elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry at YB 864118. At 0824, the lead squad was effectuated and 4/503d Infantry began movement along an eight foot wide trail heading in a general east-west direction from YB 864118. At 151241H July, a short round from friendly artillery hit the lead squad of D/4/503d Infantry resulting in 6 WIA.

DUSTOFF was requested and completed at 1516 hours. All units then established perimeters and prepared to harbor for the night. C/4/503d Infantry dispatched one platoon size patrol to the northeast. At 1645 hours this patrol reported finding an NVA base camp containing approximately 60 bunkers at YB 877128. This complex was estimated to be 150 meters in length and seventy-five (75) meters in width. It did not appear to have been used for at least several weeks. Units harbored vicinity YB 817128, in the area where the short artillery round had landed. Two (2) of the six (6) WIA were listed as KIA in a later report.

At 160820H July 1967, 4/503d Infantry initiated movement along a wide trail with C/4/503d Infantry leading. Units harbored at 1120 hours at YB 880130 with negative findings reported throughout the entire day. "G" Company dispatched one patrol to its front (east to southeast). This patrol located several indefinable trail markings including footprints at YB 881127 at 1450 hours, a grave containing an NVA body at YB 881126 and a well constructed bamboo bridge at YB 884126. The bridge had been recently repaired and the body had been killed within the last forty-eight (48) hours by gunshot wounds. Units harbored for the night without further incident.

At 170700H July, the Battalion (-) initiated movement again in AO JANE. The bridge found on 16 July was destroyed. At YB 881124, another base camp complex was found by C/4/503d Infantry at 0907 hours. A thorough search of the complex was made with negative findings. At 1115 hours, CO, 4/503d Infantry ordered all units to move to PZ KAREN (YB 904123) and to prepare for extraction to FSB #1 at Dak To on 18 July 1967. Units were unable to reach the PZ on 17 July 1967, but closed PZ KAREN at 180945H July 1967. Airlift to Dak To began at 181000H July with all units closing FSB #1 (YB 005216) at 1145 hours.

11. Final results of the 4/503d Infantry action were as follows:

**US LOSSES**

Personnel: 24 KIA, 66 WIA, 0 MIA.


**GVN LOSSES**

Personnel: 1 WIA.

Equipment: None.

**NVA LOSSES:** As listed in paragraph 10.

12. Commander’s Analysis and Lessons Learned:

a. Unless absolutely unavoidable, units should attempt immediately to break contact from a well dug-in enemy force of sufficient size, so that supporting fires from all available sources (TAC Air, artillery, gunships) can adequately prep an area before the commitment of other elements. Where it is not possible to break contact, units must be prepared to take casualties from friendly artillery fire in order to bring fire closer in on the enemy.
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b. Units in direct contact must make an immediate and as accurate an appraisal as possible of the existing situation. Units in contact must have priority of communications with commanders, so that sound decisions by commanders can be made regarding the commitment of other elements. Nets must remain clear, as the tactical situation demands this much.

c. A chain of command must not only be established prior to any engagement but it must also be implemented when required. This is necessitated by the fact that a continuous command structure must exist throughout any encounter with the enemy.

d. Anyone must be prepared, particularly officers and senior NCOs, to adjust artillery fire quickly and with accuracy. This is of paramount importance when principle artillery attachments become battle casualties.

e. Units operating in combat areas should always have a scout dog team attached, so that early warning of proximity to enemy forces can be given.

JAMES H. JOHNSON

LTC, INF

Commanding

A TRUE COPY:

SAMUEL A. BRITTEN

MAJ, INF

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967

**CG, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)**

**15 August 1967**

**670819**

**N/A**

**N/A**

**N/A**

**OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310**