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COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION
SEWARD

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J3
APO 96213


1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation SEWARD.


3. (U) Location: PHU YEN Province.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson,
Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization: The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation SEWARD was as shown below. The only significant changes to this organization during the operation were the detachment of B 1/22 Inf on 1 October and the termination of operational control of the 1/22 Inf on 13 October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/327 Inf</th>
<th>Bde Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/327 Inf</td>
<td>Bde HHC (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502 Inf</td>
<td>A 2/17 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/22 Inf</td>
<td>A 326 Engr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/22 Inf</td>
<td>IRRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320 Arty</td>
<td>MP Plat (-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/320 Arty</td>
<td>181 MI Det</td>
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<td>22 Cal Det</td>
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<td>2/320 Arty</td>
<td>22 Mil Hist Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>B 1/30 Arty</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27 Arty</td>
<td>101st Avn Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn FSE</td>
<td>106 RRD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.
   b. B 1/30 Arty (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.
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c. 5/27 Arty (-): Provided general support fire during the operation.

d. 10th Army Avn Bn: Provided two air mobile companies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and resupply missions.

e. 179th Avn Co: Provided two flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.

f. 183 Avn Co: Provided four and five O-1 aircraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment and radio relay.

g. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Psy War Ops.

h. 245th Psy Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

i. 7th US Air Force: Flew 1144 tactical air missions totaling 306 sorties; of these missions 18 were preplanned and 126 were immediate. The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the average response time from the initiation of the requests until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 9 KBA (BC), 52 KBA (EST), 78 structures destroyed, 68 structures damaged, 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed, 7 automatic weapons positions damaged, 2 boats sunk, 2 boats damaged, and trench complexes damaged.

j. 45th Eng R: Provided general support along Highways 1, 68 and 7B.

k. 496th Med Det (Aml): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct operations to protect the rice harvest in the TUY HOA and TUY AN areas; to conduct search and destroy operations to locate VC/VNA forces in the AO; and to provide security from VUNG RO Bay to TUY HOA.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Offensive search and destroy tactics were generally used throughout Operation SEWARD to include securing the rice harvest areas. The four maneuver battalions available to the Brigade were generally utilized by protecting the TUY AN rice harvest with one battalion, protecting the rice harvest in the HIEU XUONG Valley with one battalion, securing the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area with a third battalion, and having a fourth battalion as an immediate action force to exploit any contact or suspected enemy locations elsewhere in the AO. See Inclosure 2 (Operation Schematics) Tabs A, B, and C.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation SEWARD was characterized by counterguerrilla tactics, primarily encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces and small unit immediate action forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included
b. **SEWARD** was initiated concurrently with the termination of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES at 0500H September 1966. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area.

c. At the beginning of **SEWARD** the 1/327 Inf (-), previously deployed as the I TFORCE reserve to NINH HOA, continued search and destroy operations to counter enemy threats in that area. Company A, the Mortar and Reconnaissance Platoons 1/327 Inf remained at TUY HOA to protect the rice harvest in the HIEU XUONG Valley. The 2/327 Inf continued the protection of the rice harvest and conducted search and destroy operations in the TUY AN area. Concurrently, search and destroy operations were conducted by the 2/502 Inf northwest of TUY HOA. Defense of critical terrain and security of the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area was provided by the 1/22 Inf which was under the operational control of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (See Inclosure 2, Tabs A and B). On 7 September, A Troop, 2/17 Cav conducted an amphibious assault with one platoon northeast of TUY HOA establishing blocking positions in support of the search and destroy operations of the remainder of the troop. The 1/327 Inf (-) departed NINH HOA between 8 and 10 September after being relieved by Company P 1/22 Inf, and returned to conduct operations in the HIEU XUONG Valley. The mission at NINH HOA was soon thereafter cancelled and Company B, 1/22 Inf returned to the VUNG RO Bay area. The 2/502 Inf was extracted on 10 September from its area of operation and the battalion minus was deployed to TUY HOA to counter an enemy threat to the rice harvest storage there. Company A 2/502 Inf remained at TUY HOA South Airfield as an immediate action force. On 13 September the 2/502 Inf provided security for a 145th Engt Gp convoy moving on Highway 1 from NINH HOA to TUY HOA, and on 15 and 16 September the 2/502 Inf returned to TUY HOA South by helicopter and began preparation for future combat operations. On the night of 17 September the command post of Company B 2/327 Inf came under attack and was overrun by an estimated one hundred VC. Ten US troops were killed and twelve wounded in the action. The 2/502 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into an AO northwest of TUY HOA on 19 September. The LRRP was also inserted in conjunction with the 2/502 Inf and discovered a VC base camp complex. The 2/327 Inf (-) moved both by helicopter and overland to the southwest portion of its AO and established blocking positions in coordination with the 2/502 Inf attack. Two CIDG companies from DONG TRE provided blocking forces for these battalions. The 2/327 Inf discovered an extensive tunnel complex in the area which was mapped and then destroyed by the engineers. Between 28 and 30 September the 2/502 Inf was extracted and moved to TUY HOA South by helicopter and overland. Based on information received from an escaped PCN, the 2/327 Inf raided a VC prisoner of war camp in the southwest portion of its AO and twenty-three Vietnamese Nationals were liberated in the action on 3 October. Company C and the Mortar Platoon of 1/22 Inf was deployed by helicopter into the TUY BONG area to protect the rice storage there. On 4 October the 2/502 Inf deployed by helicopter and overland by vehicle to TUY AN and assumed the mission of the 2/327 Inf. Concurrently, the 2/327 Inf deployed to TUY HOA South and began refitting and preparing for future combat operations. (See Inclosure 2, Tab C). On 7 October the 2/327 Inf conducted an airmobile assault west of TUY HOA. The battalion secured critical terrain along Highway 7B and conducted search and destroy operations in six until 10 October when it returned to TUY HOA South. This operation was in conjunction with an engineer effort to repair the road and bridges along Highway 7B. During the period 11 and 12 October, two platoons from Company A 2/327 Inf were deployed to a location near PHAN RANG to provide security for the Air Force extraction of a downed C-130 aircraft. The 2/502 Inf conducted search and destroy
operations in an area southwest of TUY AN during the period 10 through 16 October to exploit sightings and contacts made by LRRP teams. On 13 October the 1/22 Inf was relieved in place by the 1/6 Inf, and the 1/22 Inf deployed to PLEIKU by C-2 and C-130 aircraft and returned to the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. On 19 and 20 October the 1/327 Inf and 2/327 Inf, respectively, were relieved by elements of the 26th ROK Regt of their missions in the HIEU XUONG Valley and for the security of TUY HOA South Airfield. On 21 October Company A 2/327 Inf conducted an airmobile assault west of TUY HOA to provide security for engineer work parties repairing Highway 7B. Operation SEWARD terminated at 2400 hours 25 October following the relief of the 2/502 Inf in the TUY AN area by the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div.

12. (C) Results:

a. The lst Bde, 101st Abn Div accomplished its mission of protecting the TUY AN and HIEU XUONG Valley rice harvests, securing the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area, and conducting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC and NVA forces in the AO.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 230 VC/NA KIA (LC), 122 VC/NA KIA (ET), 9 VC/NA KIA (BC), 52 VC/NA KIA (E), 6 NVA/VC civil defendants, 2 VCC, 871 detainees, and 10 rafiers. In addition, 80 individual and crew served weapons, 40.5 tons of rice, ammunition and other equipment were captured.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 26 KIA, 169 WIA.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:


b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: The first lot of "Eagle Brand" washing machines was contracted for and delivered to the Brigade. Five of these machines have been donated to orphanages, hospitals and dispensaries in the TUY HOA area.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. In order to effectively employ CS agents and flamethrowers, teams were made available at Brigade level to be employed on an "on-call" basis. A helicopter rigged for CS employment and charged flamethrowers were maintained on a thirty minute standby.

b. 1000 and 2000 pound bombs with instantaneous fuses are good expedients for clearing landing zones in certain types of jungle terrain. With the 1000 pound bomb, clearing team work is still required to improve the landing zone; however, the 2000 pound bomb can be expected to create a clearing sufficient to land one UH-1 helicopter. The use of an instantaneous fuse clears the vegetation with a nominal ground crating effect.

c. Unloading troops by ladder from a CH-47 helicopter is an extremely slow process, and normally only landing zone clearing teams should be unloaded in this manner. When on a resupply mission where landing zones are not readily accessible, the majority of the items can be free dropped to the units and the more sensitive items can be lowered by rope.
d. The Brigade artillery mobile training teams continued training of indigenous forces during the period.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) When units are operating in a limited area, patterns of action must not be established. Tactical techniques must be varied in order to prohibit enemy forces from anticipating friendly movement or reaction.

(2) Company command posts must be relocated at least every forty-eight hours to safeguard against the enemy fixing the location and conducting raids. Enemy probing action against such locations at night is likely to be followed by an attack.

(3) When small units are halted for any extended period of time, every precaution must be taken, to include extensive use of LPs, OPs and early warning devices, to preclude a surprise enemy attack.

(4) The VC frequently, having conducted a successful operation at one location, will return to the location at a later date to conduct an identical operation. This applies particularly to raids and ambushes.

(5) When a patrol moves for an extended distance, consideration should be given to establishing hasty ambushes at irregular intervals behind the patrol. In many instances this technique will prove successful in surprising and destroying a following enemy.

(6) Units must insure that available communications are separated into two or more locations. In the event communication facilities at one location are destroyed by the enemy, an alternate means of communication will still exist.

(7) Following the extraction of friendly forces from an area of operation, the enemy frequently infiltrates back into the same locations from which he was previously routed. The technique of leaving a small "stay behind" force in the area, following the extraction of the majority of the unit, is often successful in trapping the returning enemy.

(8) IPFW teams should be attached at battalion level in order to speed the segregation and processing of detainees.

(9) Interrogation techniques should be oriented on the local guerrilla in addition to the conventional ESI line of questioning. This can best be accomplished by having the unit commander prepare a list of questions which he would like the MI interrogator to ask the detainee.

(10) When clearing teams are required to clear a helicopter landing zone, valuable time can be saved by having an aviation representative present to provide guidance.

(11) Personnel should be extremely cautious upon discovering an obvious booby trap. This is often just bait for a better concealed, more effective booby trap.

(12) An effective technique which can be employed to clear a village is to surround it at night and use artillery illumination to flush out the VC. This method catches the enemy off guard and precludes
having innocent civilians hamper troop movement.

(13) During the monsoon season, fords and by-passes are only fair weather friends. Heavy rains and rapid runoff make it virtually impossible to satisfactorily install culverts to maintain by-passes. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in some cases, rafting.

(14) The standard Medevac Request Form was revised by the Brigade to reduce the number of items from fourteen to seven. This revised form has proven to be simpler and more efficient than the old form.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Although the Brigade had an excellent kill rate in Operations JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD (208 VC KIA (BC), and 239 VC KIA (BC) respectively. Our biggest problem has been and remains one of target acquisition. Our second major problem is the need to reduce reaction time once the enemy is detected.

(2) To improve our kill rate during forthcoming operations, battalion commanders and the cavalry troop commander will fully exploit, develop, and utilize the concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics". By this I mean we must become more like guerrillas, i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics, during search and destroy operations until contact is made. Then we remove the cloak of being a guerrilla and operate conventionally using all available firepower, mobility, and reserves.

(3) Listed below are some techniques of stealth, deception, and surprise which I desire be employed more fully in our forthcoming operations. I am confident that the airborne soldier, once imbued with the necessity to "act-guerrilla the guerrilla", will, with his native ingenuity and resourcefulness, devise additional effective techniques and tactics.

(a) Clandestine Entry into the Battlefield: Move into the battlefield by foot rather than ride by helicopter, the noise and sight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battlefield at night.

(b) Night Operations: Steal the night away from the guerrilla. Night airmobile assaults, ambushes, patrols, and movement must become routine.

(c) Stay Behind Forces: When a unit is extracted following an engagement, leave or insert a stay behind force on the battlefield.

(d) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's): More aggressive and frequent employment on long range missions. Insert at dusk or dawn along likely avenues of enemy movement; vary on occasion by insertion overland and resupply by air drop. Experiment with platoon size LRRP's to provide for immediate offensive capability when enemy is sighted.

(e) Reinforce Rather than Extract: When a stay behind force or a LRRP makes contact, plan to reinforce promptly rather than extract. For this, employ an immediate reaction force (platoon) on air strip alert with helicopters on stand-by, or insert platoons in advance on the ground concurrently with the LRRP or stay behind unit. The platoon and helicopter pilots on air strip alert must be briefed in as much detail as possible and motivated to react promptly.
F. Reaction Force: Since the helicopter reveals the presence of US forces, C&G ships should not be the first helicopters in the area in which a reaction force is to be committed. As long as there is excellent radio communications, the first helicopter in the area should carry combat troops. Upon arrival at an LZ the reaction force should promptly move out to block enemy escape routes while final coordination is being made between the unit on the ground and the reaction force commander.

G. Limit Helicopter Traffic: Provide stay behind forces, LRRPs, and units entering battlefield clandestinely with a minimum of 3 to 5 day's rations to obviate need for helicopter resupply which promptly telegraphs to the enemy the presence of our forces. Prior to contact with the enemy use helicopters for medevac or tactical emergencies only.

H. Resupply Techniques: Unlike the VC guerrilla who lives off the land, we are limited in our clandestine operations by the bulk and weight of C rations which limit the number of days our troops can operate without resupply by helicopter. The following are suggested ways to solve this problem:

1. Use LRP rations when available or in combination with C rations.

2. Use rice and powdered soup alternately with C rations or the LRP rations.

3. Cache supplies and operate clandestinely from a base carrying only one day's supplies on the soldier.

4. Resupply by helicopter at night.

5. Resupply during the day with the helicopter flying map of the earth and supplies "kicked" out onto a LZ.

I. Silence the Battlefield: Eliminate artillery & ML fires, long range artillery, and Tac Air strikes near friendly troops unless promptly exploited by ground forces.

J. Dummy Position: Construct and occupy obvious positions during daylight hours and then abandon them during the hours of darkness to move to ambush sites or to attack suspected enemy positions.

K. Doubling Back: Move out from a position in the afternoon and after darkness falls, radically change direction of march to attack a preselected target before dawn.

L. Use of Trails: "Beat the bush" rather than move along main trails. The enemy employs trail watchers along main trails where he can generally observe advancing troops. Search along secondary and tertiary trails used by guerillas which offer the guerrilla excellent concealment as well as an escape route.

M. Springing the Trap: When feasible, follow or observe a single or small party of enemy to locate larger forces or determine critical intelligence such as enemy positions, supply points, CPs, etc. Maneuver forces to ensure closing the trap and killing or capturing the enemy force involved. Move on a wide front supported by reserves and firepower.

N. Cordon and Search: Encircle a village at night as secretly as possible, then search at first light using PT, RF, or AV.
forces. Rehearse using same forces until this type operation can be accomplished effectively. Consider use of stay behind forces after the search.

(c) Improve Marksmanship: Marksmanship is extremely important in fighting guerrillas. Generally the enemy will offer only fleeting glimpses of himself while trying to escape the advancing US soldiers. Therefore, if a continuous and supervised marksmanship program is established -- each man firing 20-40 rounds daily except when on clandestine operations -- the enemy casualty statistic will rise, enemy morale will be lowered, and the enemy will be forced to engage US troops at a maximum range. This will reduce the effectiveness of his fire and give us time to commit immediate reaction forces.

(p) Improve Effectiveness of the Sniper: Greater emphasis should be placed on the role of the sniper. Too often we receive reports of the enemy escaping at ranges of 500-5000 meters. A well trained sniper should be able to kill or wound the enemy at that range. Platoons should habitually employ the sniper.

(q) Counter Enemy Snipers: Enemy snipers are a great deterrent to US morale. Therefore, companies should organize sniper killer teams to operate semi-independently to harass the enemy. A sniper with a sniper rifle and telescopic sight could selectively kill while another team member adjusts artillery on the target.

(r) Specialized Training: To be successful guerrillas, troopers must be instilled with patience and taught the fundamentals of camouflage, concealment, light and noise discipline, and to remain still for long periods of time. Too often a potentially effective ambush is prematurely disclosed by coughing, scratching, movement to relieve oneself and other restless activities. Our troops camouflage at night but seldom camouflage for day operations. Training should give added emphasis to proper conduct of the individual during ambush operations.

(s) Squad Area of Operations: Consistent with communications capabilities, emphasize squads operating in areas of operation for 3 days without resupply. For example, one company operating by squads in zones, separated but mutually supporting, can cover a large area with thoroughness and stealth. Mission of squads: ambush at night, observe during daylight, and engage small enemy groups. Upon locating a significant enemy force the platoon/company consolidates on the squad to fix the enemy and the battalion (-), standing by as an immediate reaction force, is brought to bear on the enemy to destroy him.

(l) Once contact is made react rapidly with all available firepower and reinforcements without further regard to deception, stealth, or surprise. Following the engagement with the enemy, revert to semi-guerrilla tactics until a subsequent contact is made.

16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade when supporting artillery is to be moved by an air LOC and forward logistical supply points are established where no land LOC is available and that a minimum of two med evac helicopters be provided as discussed in Inclusion 4 (Logistics).

b. That the use of APRN, CIDG and other indigenous paramilitary forces (RF and PF units) in cooperation and coordination with US forces continue to be maximized to conserve or augment the forces available to a US commander, as well as improve training, aggressiveness and confidence of the Vietnamese unit.
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AVRD-7

6 November 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (RCS: MACV J3-32) (U)

c. That consideration be given to investigating apparent high dud rate of CBU in air strikes throughout Vietnam. It appears that a high percentage of the bomblets do not explode and are later picked up by the VC and used in making booby traps and mines.

d. This Brigade continues to recommend O-1 aircraft, equipped with spray tanks, be made available to province and sector for immediate and selective use in crop denial. This will eliminate long delays in obtaining approval and insure greater responsiveness.

WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Incllosures:
1-Intelligence
2-Schematic Diagram of Operation
3-Personnel and Administration
4-Logistics
5-Communications
6-Civil Affairs
7-Psy War
8-Artillery
9-Engineer

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2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
10 - S3
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - IO
1 - Sig
1 - FSE
3 - ALO
1. (C) **Terrain:** The area of operations consisted of flat lowland used for the cultivation of rice; sandy beach areas bordering the South China Sea; rolling hills covered with grass and brush; and rugged forested mountains forming a northern, southern, and western barrier around the area of operations. The sparse vegetation in the lowland provided good fields of fire, but poor cover and concealment. In the mountains, the heavy forest afforded poor fields of fire, but good cover and concealment. The two main avenues of approach were along Hwy #1 (N-S) and Hwy #7 (E-W). The hydrography of the area was critical with the flooded lowlands making overland operations difficult.

2. (U) **Weather:** The period of the operation fell largely within the autumn transition season. Heavy rains fell as predicted on approximately twenty of the fifty operational days. Overland routes were partially flooded and air operations were restricted by poor visibility and low ceilings. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and movement from aerial observation.

3. (C) **Analysis:**

   a. The 5th NVA Division Headquarters remains situated in the vicinity of the Ky Lo Valley (BQ 7585). This area has not been exploited by US forces and is undoubtedly a well developed safe area in which NVA/VC forces realize complete freedom of movement.

   b. The southern portion of the Hieu Xung District is another relatively rugged and unexploited area which is presently being occupied by the 1st NVA Regiment. Discovery of two FW camps provides positive proof that FW camps are located well into enemy dominated territory and outside of friendly Artillery fans.

   c. Although the total enemy strength in Phu Yen Province built up during the summer, friendly forces successfully accomplished the mission of denying enemy access to the rice produce which was harvested. The enemy, however, was able to obtain sufficient rice to sustain themselves in outlying clandestine paddies. The impact of major rice denial however, is bound to be felt during the months to come since enemy stores are significantly lower than last year.

   d. The enemy has consistently returned to well known base areas via established routes and will continue to do so as long as friendly forces are not physically capable of occupying this terrain. They are thus based in areas they are familiar with, which meet logistical requirements and allow them to maintain established local contacts. This feeling of security in the outlying areas makes the enemy particularly susceptible to a heliborne type assault in which reaction time may be sluggish.

   e. It has been conclusively determined that enemy resupply is being effected from the coastal areas north of Tuy An.

   f. There are indications that the local populace are responding favorably to friendly presence in Phu Yen Province. The number of informants has increased and in many cases provided accurate information leading to the discovery of enemy installations. There has also been a recent increase of enemy atrocities and terrorism used in retaliation.

   g. Due to the fact that we were operating in generally the same area as Operation JOHN PAUL JONES adequate recent photo coverage of the TAOR was quickly acquired. Extensive use was made of this photography to locate small concealed LZ's and to brief LRP personnel going into the area. In addition an extensive mosaic was made to aid in properly assessing the terrain in connection with the rice harvest in Tuy An. Due to the familiarity with the terrain, the pilots and observers were able to more readily notice small changes during visual reconnaissance. Red Haze missions are still not frequent enough or capable
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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD, (cont'd)

of being controlled as to their TOT to the extent that significant intelligence can be gained.

h. The following COMSEC was provided during Operation SEWARD:

(1) 6,854 transmissions over the Command Net, Op/Intel Net, and admin/log Net were monitored during the period 1-15 September 1966.

(2) 3,287 transmissions through the "Strike" switchboard were monitored during the period 15 Sep - 25 Oct 1966.

(3) Telephone violations consisted of: disclosure of a VIP itinerary; compromise of a classified call sign; and disclosure of unit strength.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. The location of enemy POW camps, way stations, storage areas, and base camps have often been reported but past exploitation produced negative results. Some success along these lines has been met in Operation SEWARD, particularly in one instance when a unit successfully surprised a POW camp by utilizing a devious route of entry thereby avoiding the early warning system established by the enemy. In the exploitation of entry into suspected areas all efforts should be made to utilize unorthodox means to gain maximum surprise.

b. There are indications that the enemy methods of attack on FOB's and CIDG camps may be slightly modified now. Emphasis is being placed on obtaining support from agents within the friendly perimeter. It is also anticipated that attacks will be conducted without the use of preparatory fires; the absence of preparatory fires reduces friendly reaction time.

c. The enemy has sophisticated its efforts to obtain information on friendly forces through the use of indigenous labor and friendly countermeasures must be improved.

d. With the advent of more stringent requirements in the handling of captured personnel has come added requirements for the IFW Section. It is necessary that IFW teams be attached to separate battalions in order to properly categorize captives and facilitate proper processing of these individuals.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of enemy weapons and material losses during Operation SEWARD:

a. Weapons Captured:

- Mauser rifle - 28
- M-1 Garand rifle - 4
- M-1 carbine - 19
- Pistol - 2
- Flare pistol - 1
- SKS - 8
- AK-47 - 10
- M43 30 rifle - 1
- M1 49 SMG - 1
- Thompson SMG - 4
- M-16 rifle - 1

b. Ammunition:

- Grenades - 65
- Rifle grenade - 1
- Mines - 16
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEMJRD, (cont'd)

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<td>KPG-2 rocket</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolitions (lbs)</td>
<td>19 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c. Other:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 gal oil cans</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshing machine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Mask</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats (dust)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats (dea)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt (tons)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish (tons)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (tons)</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWIRD

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle Within 1/101 TA0X:

a. At the beginning of Operation SEWIRD the 95th and 18th NVA Regiments were confirmed as being present in Phu Yen Province and consequently within the 1/101 TA0X. The 18th NVA Regiment was believed to be deployed in the eastern portion of Phu Yen Province (vicinity of Son Long Village, Cu - 0164) and the 95th regiment was believed to be deployed to the west (vicinity of border of Phu Bon/Phu Yen Province Bq 6878).

b. The 95th Battalion (561st arty Bn), 68th arty Regiment (NVA) was confirmed in Phu Yen Province, exact location unknown.

c. The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was believed to be located southwest of Cung Gon in the vicinity of Bq 9135.

d. Nine (9) District and local force units were believed to be located in the province.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in Operation Area:

a. Summary:

(1) The 5th NVA Division Headquarters is believed to be located in the vicinity of Bq 6892.

(2) Elements of the 95th regiment (NVA) were contacted by 2/502 during the period 5-7 September 1966 vicinity Bq 9056.

(3) As a result of numerous "Search and Destroy" missions, personnel from elements of the 18th regiment were captured on 8 Sep 66. Interrogation reports revealed information indicating the movement of all elements of the 18th NVA Regiment from vicinity of Bq 9056, across the Da Bang River and to the Phu Yen/Khanh Hoa Province border vicinity Cu 0225. Mission of the 18th Regiment was to move to area 4-3 (probably northern Khanh Hoa Province) and attack ARVN/US troops in order to disrupt enemy operations permitting the acquisition of rice and food materials. See Appendix 1 for Order of Battle information pertaining to organization and strength of the 18th NVA Regiment.

(4) The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was not contacted in force during this operation. However, small elements of 377th VC Co (subordinate to 85th VC Bn) were located at Cu 115091 (20 Oct 66), Bq 030338 (8 Oct 66), Bq 966338 (9 Oct 66) and Bq 940303 (10 Oct 66). It is believed that the 85th VC LF bn is still located vicinity of Bq 9135 with its subordinate units operating independently and separately.

(5) Elements of the 307th VC NF were contacted for the first time and as a result of detailed interrogation, information was obtained revealing dispositions of the following subordinate units: Hoc Co - Bq 940391, Thap Co - Bq 940391, Duong Co (-) Bq 930375 on 1 Sep 66. See Appendix B for Order of Battle information pertaining to organization and strength of 307th VC NF Battalion.

(6) Small resistance groups (5-10 personnel), which were elements of the nine (9) district and local force units were contacted periodically with insignificant intelligence results.

b. Final VC/NVA dispositions at termination of Operation SEWIRD are located in Appendix 3.
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Appendix 1 to Tab. 1. Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF 183 REGIMENT

a. HISTORY

The regiment was formed in March 1965 from cadre of the 308th Division and new recruits. In July 1965, the regiment moved from the Thinh Province VN to Hung Thin Province VN where it began preinfiltration training. In late December 1965 the regiment departed SVN. On 29 Jan 1966 the 183 regiment arrived in Laos, and in early March it arrived in Cambodia Co Kong Lt. The regiment moved to Daklak province in April 1966 and remained for one month. During this month the regiment is believed to have participated in a battle in conjunction with elements of the 33rd and 66th regiments, VN. In May 1966 the regiment moved to the Yen Prov to relieve the 95th NV. At this time, giving the 95th a chance to reorganize after having made contact with US troops. The date of relief was reported to have been 15 June 66. During the period 20-25 June 66 the 183 Regiment sustained 459 KIA (35) most of which were from the 7th BN. Elements of the 183 regt have been encountered in Mekong Valley, and at present the regt is believed to be located on the Thu Yen Nang Hoa border.

b. TRAINING

The 183 regt was subordinate to the 325th NV Div before entry into SVN. The regt went through a 9 month training program prior to entry into SVN. This training program lasted from March to December 65. Training was conducted in the following two major areas to company level.

1. POLITIC
   a. The NV
   b. Civilian Prost盈利能力
   c. Military Prost盈利能力
   d. Prisoners and Deserters
   e. War Trophies
   f. The Disabled and Wounded
   g. Hate against US Imperialists
   h. Land and Rice reforms
   i. Ethnic Minority policy

2. MILITARY TRAINING
   a. Individual Combat
   b. Digging Trenches
   c. Firing Practice
   d. Ambush Tactics
   e. Raid Tactics
   f. Attack of Strongholds
   g. Attack of Helicore Operations
   h. Attack of Tanks
   i. Carrying Heavy Loads.

c. COST EFFICIENCY

(1) At present the regiment consists of 3/4 experienced personnel and 1/4 Draftees. It has been reported that there is friction between NV and VC personnel.

(2) Morale is low because of the following reasons:
   a. Fear of air Strikes
   b. Lack of Medical Supplies
   c. Lack of Food
   d. Prior to leaving NV, personnel are not permitted to visit their homes.
(1) Malaria caused the greatest number of casualties. During the infiltration into JN, the 7th Bn lost 100 personnel who contracted malaria or sorted. Personnel who contracted malaria during infiltration were left behind. Despite losses, the regiment is a cohesive fighting organization with well trained cadre.

d. RECENT SUBORDINATION: The 18B Regt, along with the 95th NVA, is subordinate to the 5th NVA Division (aka Hong Truong 5 or Agricultural Site 5), which is possibly the 325th Division. No third regiment has been identified. Last reported location of the 5th Div was via Phuoc Tan Binh, 6092.

e. LOGISTICS: Front line troops carry a five day ration, and rear personnel maintain a 15 day ration supply. (1 day ration is 400 grams of rice per man). When going into combat each man carries 2 sets of pajamas, 1 set of underwear, hammock, gas mask, mosquito net and plastic sheets (raincover). Since arrival in country the 18B has had no medical resupply. Uniforms consist of Tan/Gray (Service Issue) and black (Local Issue) pajamas. Rice supply points for the regiment during May and June were at Tinh To (B930330) and Doc Phuong (B920269).

f. COVER DESIGNATIONS: The following cover designations have been used by the 18B:

(1) In NVN - Song Chu

(2) During infiltration - Hung Dao, Cong Truong 6, Werksite 60, Infiltration Group 303 a, b, c.

(3) Recent cover names - Hung Dao, Cong Truong 6, Werksite 60, Quang Trang, Cong Truong.

(4) Battalions: 7th - Cong Truong 2, 1st Bn, H1, H3, D204.
   1st Co - H31
   2nd Co - H32
   3rd Co - H33
   4th Co - H34

   8th Bn - 2nd Bn, H2, 3033, agri. Site 8.

   5th Co - H35
   6th Co - H36
   7th Co - H37
   8th Co - H38

   9th Bn - 3rd Bn, 305C, agri. Site 9, H3.

   9th Co - H39
   10th Co - H40
   11th Co - H41
   12th Co - H42

(5) Support Companies: 13th DLB - H3
   14th Mort - H22

   15th mort - H45

   16th Info - H46

   17th Trans - H47

   18th Med - H48

   19th Engr - H49

   20th Recon - H50

   Chem Unit - ?

(6) Letter Box Designations:

(a) Regt Hqs
   1 Staff - 92.201
   2 Pol Sec - 92.202
   3 Rear Sec - 92.303

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Appendix 1 to Tab A to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Seward

(b) 7th Bn - 5111/41
   1st Co - 92.218 (5112/41)
   2nd Co - 92.215 (5113/41)
   3rd Co - 92.216 (5114/41)
   4th Co - 92.217 (5115/41)

(c) 8th Bn - 92.218
   1 5th Co - 92.219
   2 6th Co - 92.220
   3 7th Co - 92.221
   4 8th Co - 92.222

(d) 9th Bn - 92.223
   1 9th Co - 92.224
   2 10th Co - 92.225
   3 11th Co - 92.226
   4 12th Co - 92.227

(e) Support Units
   1 H43 - 92.225
   2 H44 - 92.226
   3 H45 - 92.207
   4 H46 - 92.208
   5 H47 - 92.209
   6 H48 - 92.210
   7 H49 - 92.211
   8 H50 - 92.212
   9 Chos - 92.204

h. WEAPONS

(1) The 10s is armed with a combination of manufactured ChiCom and Soviet weapons to include:

(a) 82mm mortars
(b) 12.7mm MG
(c) AFl 40 LMG
(d) AK-47s
(e) SAS carbines
(f) Pistols
(g) SG-43 MG
(h) 7.95mm NR
(i) B40

(2) ...possible total of heavy weapons for the regiment is indicated below. No accurate report has been received on this matter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>H.1 Bn</th>
<th>H.2 Bn</th>
<th>H.3 Bn</th>
<th>13 Co</th>
<th>14 Co</th>
<th>15 Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82mm mortar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm MG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm ex</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Ammunition appears to be in adequate supply but not plentiful. Reported caches do not indicate large quantities of mortar and no ammunition on hand and not much has been captured.

1. ACTIVITY OF REGIMENTAL IN THE YEN PROVINCE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>B-983675</td>
<td>1st Es</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>B-993655</td>
<td>5th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>B-955905</td>
<td>7th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>B-928210</td>
<td>Weir services and Production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Appendix I to Tab A to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Seward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Jun</td>
<td>R.4926629</td>
<td>7th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.4973705</td>
<td>9th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.0085656</td>
<td>8th Bn and Regt Hqs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>R.4939564</td>
<td>Regt CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.4983690</td>
<td>7th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.4000700</td>
<td>8th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.4950510</td>
<td>9th Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>R.4970670</td>
<td>8/I Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jul</td>
<td>C.4000630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jul</td>
<td>R.4950510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug</td>
<td>R.4927847</td>
<td>7th and 9th Bns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Aug</td>
<td>R.4924690</td>
<td>8/I Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug</td>
<td>R.4925553</td>
<td>133 Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>R.4925622</td>
<td>8/I 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug</td>
<td>R.4964588</td>
<td>133 Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.4003473</td>
<td>8/I 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug</td>
<td>R.4750354</td>
<td>8/I Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep</td>
<td>R.4752870</td>
<td>8th Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep</td>
<td>C.4010290</td>
<td>Elements of 183 Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sep</td>
<td>C.4020270</td>
<td>7th and 9th Bns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Strength

As of Sept 66 the strength of the 183 Regt is as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
<th>Combat Qualified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>183 Regt</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Bn</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.43 Co (Rfn)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.44 Co (Mort)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.45 Co (Tm)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.46 Co (Sig)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.47 Co (Trans)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.48 Co (Med)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.49 Co (Engr)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.50 Co (Recce)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regt Hqs</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix I to Tab A to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation SEWARD

2. Organizational Chart, 163 NVA Regiment
1. Organizational Chart, 307th VC Main Force Battalion.

2. 307th VC MF In Order of Battle Findings:
   a. The 307th VC MF In has a strength of approximately 300 personnel effective 4 Sep 66. Each company has approximately 100 personnel. The battalion has 2 LMG (French Tullier) and approximately 250 rifles to include US caliber .30 M1, German Kershner, US carbines and Soviet carbines.
   b. The 307th VC MF In was last located in vicinity D-940791 on 1 Sep 66.
   c. The mission of the 307th VC MF In was to organize cadre in the hamlets of Phu Yen Province. The battalion was to avoid contact with the 1st Cav, 11th Arm Div at all cost.
   d. Personalities:
      Thap - CO of Thap Co and 307th VC MF In
      Duong - CO of Duong Co.
      NGO - CO of Ngo Co
      Tuân - Plt Ldr of K-3 platoon, Duong Co.
      Phu - Asst Plt Ldr of K-3 platoon, Duong Co.
## ZENNY LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th NVa Div HQ</td>
<td>Bu1692</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th NVa Rogt</td>
<td>Bu9899</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183 NVa Rogt</td>
<td>Bu9656</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>8 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 183 NVa Rogt</td>
<td>Cu2227</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn, &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>Cu2227</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Bn, &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>Cu2227</td>
<td>430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Bn, 68th Arty Rogt</td>
<td>Bu7877</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>12 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duong Co, 307th VC MF Bn</td>
<td>Bu940891</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngoc Co, &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>Bu940891</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thao Co, &quot;&quot;</td>
<td>Bu940891</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Co</td>
<td>Cu075955</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I 3 VC Squads</td>
<td>Cu009195</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;&quot; Concentrated atoon</td>
<td>Cu112934</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Dispensary</td>
<td>Bu741712</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Co</td>
<td>Bu838845</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>28 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Bn</td>
<td>Bu915840</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>12 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Co</td>
<td>Bu984775</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>22 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I 2 VC Cos</td>
<td>Cu023704</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>16 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Bn</td>
<td>Cu009708</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>17 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC 1 lat</td>
<td>Cu107936</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I 2 VC Cos</td>
<td>Cu070703</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>12 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I 2 VC Cos</td>
<td>Cu135650</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>6 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I 2 VC Platoons</td>
<td>Cu093614</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Bn</td>
<td>Cu090595</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>24 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Bn</td>
<td>Bu918325</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>16 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I 2 Platoon</td>
<td>Cu098470</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I VC Platoon</td>
<td>Cu125369</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th VC MF Bn</td>
<td>Cu177335</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operation schematics for the three phases of the operation are attached as follows:

TAB A - Rice Harvest Protection Areas
TAB B - Period 5 Sep - 3 Oct
TAB C - Period 4 - 25 Oct
1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
OPERATION SEWARD
PERIOD 5 SEP-30 OCT
1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
OPERATION SEWARD
PERIOD 4-25 OCT
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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

1 (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation SEWARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation SEWARD were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Strengths</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</td>
<td>4490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>(3354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>(1002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>1153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 122% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 97% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the Not Present for Duty Strength; 410 were hospitalized, 403 were intransit, 237 were on TDY/SD status, 67 on leave, 22 in confinement, and 14 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation SEWARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation SEWARD were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Strengths</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</td>
<td>4517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>5057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>(4065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - Phan Rang</td>
<td>(992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 131% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 112% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the Not Present for Duty strength; 304 were hospitalized, 310 were intransit, 158 were on TDY/SD status, 55 on leave, 21 in confinement, 9 AWOL, and 23 detached.

(4) A "Scout Dog" platoon was assigned to the Brigade on 4 September 1966, however, they did not arrive until 26 September 1966.

(5) An Army Postal unit was attached to the Brigade on 1 October. The arrival of personnel for this unit will permit better postal service in the forward area and release of troopers presently engaged in postal activities.

c. The increase in strength during Operation SEWARD was due to the arrival of 751 replacements who were reassigned to subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Companies</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC-IHRP</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Total casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1713</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit began an accelerated program during the operation. These young ladies made weekly visits to Tuy Hoa to distribute literature and serve in the mess lines. The response to this program has been excellent.

b. Two USO shows visited the Brigade during the period. They performed for approximately 4 hours for the troops located at Tuy Hoa South.

c. Classes were given in administration and postal operations.

d. A vigorous program to purge from unit morning reports all personnel assigned, not joined, was initiated. One hundred two personnel who on arrival in Vietnam were diverted to other units, were identified. Similarly, 187 personnel who were diverted before they departed CONUS were identified. A team from USARV visited the Brigade to identify by name every man carried not-present-for-duty. As a result of these actions over 250 personnel were dropped from the assigned strength of the Brigade.

4 (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: Planning during the period involved the following areas:

a. Coordination continued for the scheduled rotation of approximately 900 personnel during the month of December 1966. Replacements are being closely monitored to insure their arrival is commensurate with anticipated rotational losses.

b. The Brigade hired 5 civilian interpreters to replace ARVN interpreters in administrative and rear area jobs. This will allow better utilization of ARVN interpreters attached to the Brigade.
1. (C) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control of the Forward Support Element (FSE). It was organized into command, operations, communications and movement control elements.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigger section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and contact team.

(4) Co D, 326th Medical Battalion: Established a clearing station with an 80 bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Tuy Hoa Sub Area, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command: Provided command and control of the supporting logistics area.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two AirMobile companies equipped with UH-1B and UH-1D helicopters for support of both tactical and logistical operations.

(3) 35th Aviation Company: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts and personnel to and from the forward area. Inconsistent allocation of CV-2 aircraft adversely affected transportation planning and disrupted the generally smooth flow of supplies to the forward area.

(4) 179th Aviation Company AirMobile Medium provided CH-47 Helicopter Support.

(5) 498th Aviation Company (Air Ambulance); provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply: Tuy Hoa Sub Area was located in the vicinity of the Brigade's Forward Support Element (FSE). This reduced movement time of supplies.

(1) Class I: "B" and "C" ration meals were consumed during the operation. Supplements to the "B" ration consisting of fresh meat, flour, bread, fresh fruit and vegetables, condiments and ground coffee were received sporadically and often in far less quantity than desired or authorized. The Brigade experienced a critical shortage of starches to include potatoes and rice. Ground coffee was unavailable for approximately five weeks. A total of 428 short tons were issued to include 104 "A" ration supplements, 171,782 "B" rations and 51,040 rations of meal, combat individual. The shortage of ice remained a problem throughout the operation. Per capita allowance of ice normally remained below one pound per man per day. The ice shortage was partly solved by the shipment of ice by "A" boat from Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa and the air transport of 4000 pounds daily from Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa South Airfield aboard the Brigade's D6 CV-2 aircraft. Neither expedient was able to cope with the demands of the Brigade, as all ice so obtained was shared with the rapidly expanding PHMAF troop strength in the Tuy Hoa Area. The opening of a 15 ton per day ice plant by Pacific
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

Architect and Engineer Corp greatly alleviated the problem for a short time. However, the cancellation of M-boat and air shipments of ice, plus the continuing troop build-up in the Tuy Hoa area soon created a demand exceeding the plants output.

(2) Class II and IV: Support Battalion (Rear), at Phan Rang provided 43 short tons of Class II and IV items. Jungle boots and Jungle Fatiques were received in sufficient quantity to support all combat elements of the Brigade. Barrier materials were occasionally in short supply and sandbags became an especially hard to obtain item.

(3) Class III: The Tuy Hoa Sub Area provided all types of Class III and IIIA in sufficient quantity to support logistical and tactical operations. A total of 395.9 short tons of POL were issued during the operation, to include 25,200 gallons of DIESEL and 18,400 gallons of AVGAS, and 89,700 gallons of MOGAS. Contaminated AVGAS was received on three separate occasions and curtailed activities of the Brigade Aviation Section.

(4) Class V: The Brigade entered the operation with its basic load. Tuy Hoa Sub Area maintained a 4 day level of ammunition. A total of 801 short tons of Class V were issued. Yellow, green and violet smoke grenades and signal illuminating ground star clusters were in short supply throughout the operation.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion established a water point at Tuy Hoa North Airfield utilizing a 1500 GPH Erdalator. Units at Tuy Hoa South Airfield drew water from the Tuy Hoa Sub Area water point.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 117 automotive, 583 signal, 120 armament, 177 instrument, 177 service, and 105 engineer job orders. Of this number, all but 5 automotive, 23 signal, 3 armament, 4 instrument, 9 service and 7 engineer jobs were completed.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: An average of 20 - 25 ton trucks per day were utilized in support of the Brigade.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) Fixed Wing:

1 CV-2 aircraft flew 637 sorties totalling 8,506 PAX and 753 short tons of cargo.

2 C-123 aircraft supported the Brigade with 3 sorties for a total of 29 PAX and 14 short tons of cargo.

3 C-130 aircraft flew a total of 16 sorties carrying 400 PAX and 83 short tons of cargo.

(b) Rotary Wing:

1 Both UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters were used in support of committed forces. Normally, two CH-47 aircraft supported the Brigade on a day to day basis. Their utilization was restricted primarily to bulk hauling of artillery ammunition and Class III.

2 Army helicopters lifted a total of 3928 short tons of supplies in support of the Brigade.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by the 229th Quartermaster Company.
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Seward

(2) Bath facilities were provided at both Tuy Hoa North and South Airfields by the 226th Quartermaster Company.

(3) Laundry services were established at Tuy Hoa South Airfield by the 226th Quartermaster Company.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The revised Medevac Request Form was used for the first time throughout an entire operation. It proved much simpler and more efficient than the older form.

b. Stringent measures were taken to reduce the incidence of malaria. Command emphasis was placed on the rolling down of sleeves at sundown, use of mosquito bars and insect repellent, continuous insecticide spraying programs, and enforced dosage of Chloroquine Primaquine and Diaminodiphenylsulfone (DDS). These precautions depressed the rate of malaria significantly during the month of September 1966. The extensive area of operations, combined with an increase in FWMAF troop strength overran the capability of one medevac helicopter. Accordingly, an urgent request was made for additional medevac helicopters. Eventually, a "LUSTOFF" Operations Center was established with several aircraft to provide coverage through the area of operations.

c. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA 121
(2) KIA 26
(3) Non-Battle Injury 157
(4) Disease 563
(5) Returned to Duty 232
(6) Evacuated to Hospital 583
(7) Remain in Holding 26
(8) Total Patients Treated 841

d. Hospitalized Personnel Categorized by Wounds:

(1) Head 13
(2) Chest 9
(3) Abdomen 3
(4) Upper Extremities 55
(5) Lower Extremities 57

4. (U) SUMMARY:

a. The organization for logistical support during Operation Seward was adequate.

b. One medical evacuation helicopter cannot provide adequate coverage for a Brigade deployed over an extensive area of operation. Frequently, two or more medevac mission requests are received at the same time from widely separated units. The problem becomes critical if the medevac aircraft must leave the area of operations entirely to transport patients to a supporting field hospital. This necessitates diversion of
utility helicopters for medevac backup until the medevac aircraft returns to the area of operations.

5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Except for continued refinements the current organic organization for support should be continued.

b. Additional medevac helicopters must be provided when the area of operations becomes too extensive for one aircraft to support. It is preferable that at least two medevac helicopters be provided in order to answer two simultaneous medevac requests from widely separated points. One medevac helicopter can then remain in the area of operations when the other aircraft is transporting patients to a field hospital outside the area of operations.
Inclosure 5 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (3)

1. (M) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters Company Communications Platoon and the FASCP had the joint mission of maintaining the communications systems established during the previous operation.

2. (C) Operations:

   a. VHF Section - Provided communications between Brigade CP and Battalion Trains areas at TUY HOA South Airfield and displaced the systems to the new Battalions Trains Areas in the vicinity of PHU HIEP (3).

   b. Communications Center Section - Continued to provide secure teletype service to I FORCE. The services were expanded from a half duplex circuit to a full duplex and another half duplex circuit to enable the Brigade to handle the increased traffic. The section also continued to provide internal motor messenger service.

   c. Switchboard/Wire Section - Continued to maintain the established systems. The number of local subscribers increased to 85 while terminating lateral circuits to 1st Bn, 4th Inf Div.

   d. FM Radio Section - Provided FM Radio Nets within the Brigade extending retransmission stations to CHAP CHAI Mountain with relay stations at the DONG TRE and VUNG RO BAY areas.

   e. AM/RTT Radio Section - Continued to operate a secure RTT Net between TUY HOA and PHAN RANG, extending secure nets to the maneuver battalions at DONG TRE and TUY WI.

   f. Maintenance Section - Continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

   g. I FORCE Signal Support - 5th Signal Battalion continued to provide circuits into the area system, a secure RTT to I FORCE, and single side band phone patch net between TUY HOA, PHAN RANG and NHA TRANG.

3. Problem areas:

   a. Equipment shortages - Twelve 3KW AC generators were requisitioned on "O2" priority in November 1965 and requisitioned on 23 Aug 66 as replacements for the PE75 generators, which have proved unreliable.

   b. T195 transmitters continue to present critical maintenance problems. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational system, even though all AM radios are consolidated under Brigade control.

   c. Typhoon and Strike Rear telephone circuits continue to provide marginal service with numerous interruptions.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD.

1. Civil Affairs Activities during Operation SEWARD centered mainly on improving and expanding programs initiated during Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

   a. A significant step in this direction was the expansion of the weekly meetings between the Commanding General and the Province Chief to include participants from all other U.S. governmental agencies present in this Province.

   b. There was also increased cooperation at the District - Battalion level. As the battalions spread out and started operating independently within districts, they also tied in closely with District Chiefs and MACV Sub-Sector Advisors.

   c. New MACV regulations concerning categorizing civilian detainees into one of several categories were implemented during this period as were new orders concerning death, injury and property damage to non-combatants.

2. Civic Action Activities during Operation SEWARD were highlighted by the increased activities of the Battalion S-5s and the enhanced capability of the Brigade to support these activities through close ties with in-country agencies and the establishment of a Brigade Civic Action Supply Point at Phan Rang.

   a. This supply point was established with about 45 tons of American Christmas Truck and Train ASSN. Supplies which were shipped to the Brigade in late August 1966. By keeping this material in the Phan Rang Ease Area, it can be held ready for distribution when and where needed, while not encumbering the forward elements of the Brigade with 45 tons of additional supplies to move around.

   b. Some 158 Civic Action Projects were accomplished and reported during Operation SEWARD. These included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Work</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Relation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Assistance</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Other notable events during Operation SEWARD included:

   a. The detachment of VA Team 9, 41st Civil Affairs Company from this Brigade. This leaves only one Civil Affairs Team in support of this Brigade.

   b. Members of the S-5 Section of this Brigade provided area familiarization and orientation training to S-5 personnel of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, which had just arrived in country.

   c. The full rice harvest in Phu Yen Province was completed on 25 October, 1966. This Brigade had protected and supported the accomplishment of this harvest, which yielded 17,343.5 metric tons or 89% of the Province goal of 19,500 metric tons of rice.

   d. A Brigade Voluntary Civic Action Fund was established and regulations governing its operations were published.
Inclusion 7 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (U)

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological Warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units and friendly civilians in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation SEWARD:

a. Leaflets: A total of 5,947,000 leaflets were dropped during the operation. See Tab A for examples of leaflets representative of those used on the operation.

b. Loudspeaker. A total of 60 hours of loudspeaker appeals were delivered by USAF U-10 aircraft, HU-1D helicopters and the Ground Speaker Team. The themes used in the appeals were CHIBU-MOI, Demoralization and Rice Harvest. A total of four special tapes were made during the operation.

c. Summary. Three personalized, specialized, and localized leaflets and four special tapes were directed toward enemy units and friendly rice harvest locations in the operational area. It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation, contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing date of the operation, a total of ten ralliers had surrendered themselves to Brigade personnel.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) When new leaflets are produced, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included; these copies will be used as handouts to VIP visitors.

(2) Leaflet boxes should be coated with a water resistant substance (i.e., plastic, wax, etc) and more securely bound as a greater precaution against inclement weather.

(3) An example of the contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the quantity and general classification.

(4) An augmentation to the Brigade of one school trained PsyWar officer and two enlisted men has been approved. The personnel have been requisitioned and should be assigned on an expedited basis.

(5) A requirement exists for one interpreter to be available to work with the PsyWar team on operations.

(6) A portable hand-held speaker is needed for use by the Ground Speaker Team.

Tab: A - Leaflets
English Translation for 245N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years.

This is a good example of the "Glorious liberation" promised by the Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat their countrymen.

Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong "Liberation".
English Translation for 245N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years.

This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat their countrymen.

Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong "Liberation".
English Translation for 24SH-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years. This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat their countrymen.

Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong "Liberation".
English Translation for 249N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease—some for almost two years. This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat their countrymen.

Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong "Liberation".
EVERYONE WILL PTY THESE PEOPLE

The people whose picture you see on the reverse side have just been liberated from a VC prison camp by members of the American 101st Airborne Division. Besides Mr. Truong, Phu-Khan, the Chief of My-Trung Hamlet, Mr. Truong-Tung, secretary of Phuoc-Thin Hamlet, Mr. Hoang-Kim, Chinh, the Self Defense Corps Private Second Class and Mr. Truong-Van Din, a Free-South Vietnamese soldier there are Mrs. Vo-Thi-Ham, Mrs. Lam-Thi-An, Mr. Nguyen-Hang and Nguyen-Huong, four innocent civilians.

Their thin bodies and their haggard faces will prove that during their imprisonment they were without clothes, mistreated, and suffered miserable at the hands of the VC. Now, all of them have been fed in a temporary camp and treated by GVN medical personnel to restore their health before returning home.

Because of the VC, we see scenes such as these.

Help the South Vietnamese Government bring security and safety to your land, and give you a new life of peace and good will.
Tab A to Inclosure 7 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

Leaflet No. 245H-17-67

Drawing of two Vietnamese working in rice field and talking. Dialogue to the effect: The harvest will go well. The free world soldiers are protecting our fields and workers, therefore we can work with peace of mind knowing we are safe from the Viet Cong attack and thievery.

(NOTE: This type leaflet was used effectively to depict the hard working peasant in VC controlled areas)

FRONT: Work in peace. The 101st is protecting your rice harvest.

Dong-bao hey tam gat luc
Su-Doan 101 dang bao-ve lua lua cua ba con.
People, you must cut (harvest) your rice. The 101st will protect you.
Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SWARD (U)


2. (C) Execution:

a. 5-7 Sep: All units were placed on standby alert. Units continued maintenance programs and training for the upcoming operation. Initial positions at the beginning of the operation were:

   (1) Hqs Btry CQ219411 GS 1st Bde
   (2) Btry A CQ219411 GS 1st Bde
   (3) Btry B BP957829 DS 1/327
   (4) Btry C BQ949421 DS 2/327
   (5) H/1/30th Arty CQ111675 R C/2/320

b. On 1 September, due to an operation in the Ninh Hoa area, Battery D (Provisional) was organized with two tubes from A/2/320th Arty and two tubes from B/2/320th Arty. This unit continued as a firing element through the end of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES and into Operation SWARD. Their initial location was CQ078347.

c. 7-10 Sep: On 7 Sep C/2/320th Arty displaced two tubes forward to BQ970455 to support elements of 2/502d Inf. Two 3/4 ton trucks were carried forward by CH-47 and closed at 1630 hours.

d. On 6 Sep, C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ945580 in DS 2/502 Inf. The unit moved by CH-47 and closed at 1630 hours.

e. On 9 Sep, A/2/320th Arty displaced by CV-2 to Dinh Trai then overland to BQ56795 in direct support of 2/327th Inf. Unit closed at 1630 hours.

f. 10-16 Sep: On 10 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ900068 by convoy at 1530 hours. Closed at 1945 hours. Unit in direct support of 1/327th Inf. C/2/320th Arty began displacement by CH-47 to CQ219411 in GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Unit closed at 1630 hours. B/2/320th Arty from CQ900068 to CQ166135 by road to give better coverage to the operation of 1/327th Inf. 1/327th Inf replaced by 2/502d Inf for this particular phase of the action.

g. On 12 Sep the base camp began moving to CQ051443 to make room for the development of Tuy Hoa South Airfield complex. C/2/320th Arty also displaced to the new CP area and located at CQ039133. Both elements closed at 1545 hours. On 16 Sep C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ078347 in DS 1/327th Inf. On this date D/2/320th Arty was deactivated. On 16 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced from CQ166135 to CQ219411 in GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

h. 17-30 Sep: On 17 Sep the Hqs element displaced back to CQ219411, its original CP area. A/2/320th Arty displaced by road from BQ956795 to coordinate BQ906704 and closed at 1630 hours. Unit in direct support of 2/502d Inf. On this date the battalion suffered losses of one Lieutenant, one Staff Sergeant, one Specialist Four KIA and one Lieutenant severely wounded in action with B/2/327th Inf.

i. On 19 Sep A/2/320th Arty displaced from BQ956795 to BQ906704 closing at 1630 hours. The purpose was to protect rice convoys.
Inclemire 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Seward (U)

which would be leaving from the TUY AN area. Unit also answered calls for fire from the SF camp elements on patrols within the range of the artillery.

j. 22 Sep: B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ11676 in direct support of 2/327th Inf. B/1/30th Arty then had its mission changed to reinforcing B/2/320th Arty. 26 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced from CQ11676 to CQ069733 in DS 2/327th Inf closing at 1100 hours. On 28 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced back to CQ11676 and closed at 1145 hours with the mission of direct support of the 2/327th Inf.

k. 1-20 Oct: On 1 Oct A/2/320th Arty displaced from EQ906704 to CQ219411 in GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Unit closed at 1150 hours on 7 Oct 66. A/2/320th Arty displaced to BQ974722 in direct support of 2/327th Inf and closed at 1130 hours.

l. 9 Oct: C/2/320th Arty moved 3 tubes to vic coordinates CQ001355 in direct support of 1/327th Inf. One section of the Bn FDC was utilized to augment the fire direction on the following day one more tube joined the battery forward. The remaining two pieces and the one section of Bn FDC displaced back to CQ219411 in GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

m. On 12 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ219411 GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.


o. On 14 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ235279 by convoy in direct support 1/22d Inf, 11th Inf Div, and displaced back to CQ219411 when it was relieved by C/5/27th Arty.

p. 21-26 Oct: 21 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced by CH-47 to CQ235289 in direct support 2/327th Inf covering engineer work parties.

q. 22 Oct Hqs 2/320th Arty displaced to CQ232369 and began setting up a new base camp.

r. 26 Oct B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ239368 closing cut at 1730 hours. GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and began training for future operations.

s. 25 Oct A/2/320th Arty and B/1/30th Arty displaced to CQ237370 and CQ237369 in GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and began training for future operations. Both units closed at 1800 hours.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. On 13 Oct 66 B/2/320th Arty had a round fall short on Highway #1, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. The cause was determined to be a malfunctioning in sight. In the future, after each heliborne assault or displacement the basic period test will be performed on each howitzer to detect and correct any irregularities. It is also SOP that the gunner continually watches the first three digits as they change.

b. On 7 Oct B/2/320th Arty was firing a mission for an artillery forward observer who was making corrections based on sound sensings from the infantry. On a subsequent valley, there were 2 US WIA and 1 US KIA. Extreme caution should be used when this method of adjustment is necessary and the words "Danger Close" included in the observer's request. Further coordination and training which is currently being conducted should remedy this problem.
c. Muzzle burst: On 8 Oct A/2/320th Arty experienced a muzzle burst while firing high angle missions in the Harrassment and Interdiction program. Ten (10) personnel were injured, seven (7) seriously. Investigation revealed no mal practice within the firing battery. Although it was an unfortunate incident it must be accepted as an occupational hazard.

4. (C) Comments:

a. To insure a better understanding of artillery adjustment all INCO's have instituted training within the Infantry Battalions to train personnel down to squad level, in artillery adjustment. During periods of little activity coordination enabled the artillery to fire several short service practices. This training will reap rewards in future operations since more personnel are now capable of adjusting artillery.

b. With the arrival of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div this Battalion set up an orientation for the officer and senior non-commissioned officers to supply them with our lessons learned and methods of operation in a counter-insurgency operation. Officers and INCO's were attached to each of the batteries for a two day period. An orientation course for both Infantry and Artillery personnel was conducted at the 4th Div's 1st Bde CP for 3 days on 13-15 Oct to orient them on the situation and problems faced by the Free World Forces in Vietnam. The Radar Section including their equipment, collocated with the Radar of Hq 2/320th Arty until their set became fully operational. Several mortar and artillery missions were fired to orient, and train their crew for their mission.
Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation SEWARD (U)

1. (C) Sweeping of Roads for Mines: In conjunction with the 39th Engr Bn, the Brigade swept total of 5535 km of roads for mines during Operation SEWARD. 26 mines were detected and destroyed. No losses were suffered by the Brigade to mines on roads during the operation. Incidents of sniping increased significantly on Route PURPLE in late September but after an airstrike and a counter-action by 2/502 Inf and A2/17 Cav sniping was infrequent. The MP Platoon did yeoman service in providing escort for the engineer sweepers on Route PURPLE. A letter describing the Brigade experience in Operation JOHN PAUL JONES and Operation SEWARD is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. (C) Road Opening: Significant road openings were accomplished during Operation SEWARD. Route 6B from TUY AN to LA HAI was opened in early September and two supply convoys were run to LA HAI. In mid-September a convoy was run from NINH HOA to TUY HOA up Hwy 1. This route was used several times subsequently, the last time being 25 October.

3. (C) Support by 45th Engineer Group: The 39th Engineer Battalion supported the Brigade in Operation SEWARD in many areas. They swept Routes YELLOW and BLACK daily and for much of the operation swept Route WHITE as well. In late September and early October they provided direct support to the 1/327 Inf in the HIEU XUONG Valley with 1 or 2 squads. A total of seven bridges were installed on Route PURPLE during the operation. A platoon from the 39th Engineers did the work on opening Route 6B to LA HAI. The 20th Engineer Battalion provided support in the NINH HOA - TU BONG area and supplied one company reorganized as infantry to operate with the 1/22 Inf in the TU BONG area.

4. (C) Support of the Engineers: The Brigade provided security for engineer moves to CUNG SON and to DONG TRE and back. Each of these moves required security of roads for periods of 1 to 5 days and required approximately one battalion.

5. (C) Destruction of Tunnel System: In late September Co A, 2/327 Inf discovered an extensive VC tunnel system. This system was destroyed/denied using CS powder and demolitions. The report on this tunnel system is attached as Appendix 1.

6. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. During the monsoon season, fords and by passes are only fair weather friends. Heavy rains and rapid runoff make it virtually impossible to satisfactorily install culverts to maintain by passes. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in some cases, rafting.

b. Sniping at convoys and sweep parties can be at least partially controlled by concerted counteraction with troops and/or air strikes.

c. CS powder and conventional demolitions can be used to successfully destroy/deny VC tunnel systems.

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SUBJECT: Viet Cong Mines

TO: See Distribution


2. Attached as inclosures 1 thru 8 are sketches and description of Viet Cong mines/fuses not listed in reference 1 above and found on MSR's of the 1st Brigade AO in Phu Yen Province.

3. Mining incidents along these routes usually occur at places where road cuts/craters have been repaired on hard surface roads and random placement along the travelled way of loose or natural surface roads. Anti-personnel mines are usually found on and near the shoulders of roads in areas where some cover exists against small arms attack.

4. Route clearing operations by A/326 Engineer Battalion during the past 40 days have resulted in removal/destruction in place of 8 each Anti-personnel mines and 30 Anti-vehicular mines.

5. The AN/FRS-3 Portable Metallic Mine Detector has proven very reliable in pinpointing the location of Viet Cong mines even where the small blasting cap is the only metal present in the mine. Extensive use of these detectors (1000 km of road cleared during month of August 1966) has caused an increased deadline rate which has been rectified by additional float items and expediting the maintenance effort required.

6. In conduct of the daily road clearing operations a close visual inspection preceding the detector is absolutely necessary along the shoulders of the road, around culverts and underneath bridges. Mounted clearing parties have proven unsatisfactory even on paved roads.

7. The initial sweep along a route will take substantially more time than subsequent sweeps done on a daily basis. Route clearing time is cut in half by having teams start at each end, meet and return to the starting point. The use of 2 detectors in one party and having 1 or 2 on stand-by with the clearing team when detectors are available has been advantageous. After the initial sweep and for planning purposes a rate of 3 km/hr for hard surface roads and 2 km/hr for loose surface roads has been established by this unit for the Phu Yen Province.

8. Under no circumstances should impatience cause a movement to go ahead of the clearing detail. Timely reporting of route clearance by the engineers to the Brigade TOC is a must. No method of mine detection is 100% foolproof, however, the unit and the individual can take positive measures to protect themselves from injuries due to enemy land mines. Vehicles should never travel roads subject to mining before they are cleared unless the tactical situation clearly demands the movement in spite of the risk of life and equipment. Insure that all vehicles are sandbagged and that personnel in the vehicles ride over the sandbags and do not sit on wheel wells. Remain alert.
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SUBJECT: Viet Cong Mines

and watchful at all times while moving on foot along roads and trails.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls

as

DISTRIBUTION:

A - Plus
1 - CO, 1 FFV
2 - CO, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1 - CO, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
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2 - CO, 28th Regt, 9th ROK Div
2 - CO, 45th Engr Bn
5 - CO, 39th Engr Bn
2 - SA, 17th ARVN Regt
2 - Hqs MACV, ATTN: S343, APO 96243
50 - XO
65 - Bde Engr

23 September 1966

WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AGC
Asst AG
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VC MINE

NOTES:
* FOUR WOODEN PEGS HOLD THE TOP BAMBOO SLEEVE FROM FOOT AND BICYCLE TRAFFIC. A VEHICLE WILL BREAK THE PEGS AND PUSH THE TOP BAMBOO SLEEVE DOWN ON THE FLASHLITE BATTERY COMPLETING THE CIRCUIT AND DETONATING THE MINE.

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VC MINE

ROAD SURFACE

WOOD SLAT BRIDGE

WOOD PEG

CBU FRAG BOMBLET

BURLAP PACKAGE

PULL DEVICE CAP

BAMBOO SLATS AND BINDING

5-40 LBS CHICOM TNT

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INCLUSION 2
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VC MINE

ROAD SURFACE

- BAMBOO
- SPIKE
- M-79 ROUND
- BURLAP PACKAGE
- BLASTING CAP
- ROCK
- PULL DEVICE CAP
- BAMBOO SLATS AND BINDINGS
- 5-40 LBS CHICOM TNT

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INCLOSURE 3
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VC MINE

ROAD SURFACE

* WOODEN PEGS

NAIL

BAMBOO

WOOD BLOCK

BURLAP PACKAGE

BLASTING CAP

PULL DEVICE CAP

BAMBOO SLATS AND BINDINGS

5.56 ROUND CRIMPED

5-40 LBS CHICOM TNT

NOTE:

* FOUR WOOD PEGS SUPPORT THE BAMBOO SLEEVE TO INSURE AGAINST DETONATION BY FOOT OR BICYCLE TRAFFIC.

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INCLUSION 4
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VC MINE

ROAD SURFACE

* WOODEN PEG

BUTTERFLY BOMB DETONATOR

WOOD BLOCK

BLASTING CAR

BURLAP PACKAGE

BAMBOO SLATS AND BINDINGS

NITRO STARCH

* FOUR WOOD PEGS SUPPORT THE BAMBOO SLEEVE TO INSURE AGAINST DETONATION BY FOOT OR BICYCLE TRAFFIC.

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INCLOSURE 5
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VC MINE

NOTE:
APRX. ACTUAL SIZE
APRX. WEIGHT 2 LBS.

NOTES

CBU FRAG BOMBLETS ARE SOMETIMES FOUND WITH ONLY A
PIECE OF PAPER OR CIGARETTE PACKAGE WRAPPER LYING ON
TOP OF THE PRESSURE PLATE.

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INCLUSION 6
VC MINE

NOTE
AP MINE FOUND OFF THE SHOULDERS OF THE ROAD

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VC MINE

ROAD SURFACE

PRESSURE PLATE

CBU FRAG BOMBLET

US FRAG BOMB OR ARTILLERY SHELL

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INCLUSION B
TO: See Distribution

1. Attached as inclosures 1 thru 4 is a description of a vast tunnel complex discovered by the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on 23/24 September 1966 in the Phu Yen Province, Republic of Vietnam, and of the methods used to destroy/deny the system. This tunnel complex, according to captured documents, was used by the 7th Battalion, 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, prior to that Regiment's engagement with the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on 20-24 June 1966.

2. It is felt that the length, depth of cover, numerous entrances/ exits and the type of soil make this system unique in comparison to any other tunnels/caves that this unit has encountered or those reported by units operation in War Zone D.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DAVID A. KORPON
1st Lt, AC
Asst AG

1. Inc1
   1 - General Data
   2 - Demolition Methods
   3 - Use of RCA
   4 - Photo Folio (Limited Distribution)

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CO, 1/327 Inf
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2 - SA, 17th ARVN Regt
2 - Hq's, MACV, ATTN: S3/3, APO 96243
20 - Brd Engr
2 - Comd, Cal Center and Sch, Ft McClellan, Ala
2 - Office of the Chief of Engineer, ENGTE-MI, Washington, DC.
60 - After Action Report (Opn Seward)
60 - Quarterly Operations Report
GENERAL DATA

1. Location. BQ962656 and BQ968653. See sketch at Tab A.


3. Date. 23/24 Sep 66.


5. Width. 2½ ft - 3 ft.

6. Height. ½ ft - ½½ ft.

7. Cover. 12 ft - 17 ft.

8. Entrance/Exits. 18 vertical shafts, 3 trench entrances.

9. Excavation Effort - 5000 man days with approx 3300 cu yds earth removed.

10. Use. This tunnel system had the necessary space and adequate ventilation to shelter more than 1000 men. Except for an occasional width constriction where boulders were encountered, this system would also allow the VC to double time throughout its course. There was evidence to indicate that the system had not been used for 2 or more months. The system had been very deliberately abandoned with no equipment left behind; however, no booby traps were left installed.

11. Terrain. The tunnel and trench system is on an elongated open plateau bounded by a steep wooded bluff on the south and by rolling wooded slopes on the north. Parts of the plateau near the village of TRUNG THAN (3) BQ9665 are under cultivation with crops of corn and some areas are covered with dense vegetation. The most open parts of the plateau are covered with helicopter punji stakes 10' - 12' tall and in some areas dense bands of antipersonnel punji stakes are also encountered. The plateau has an extensive covered trench system much of which had firing positions and is concealed by running along the edge of the dense vegetation bordering the open space. This trench system connected the 3 otherwise separate tunnel systems. The area is completely inaccessible by ground vehicle but well used trails from 4 directions intersect in the village.

12. Artillery Bombardment. On 27 September 1966 the tunnel system was bombarded with 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun concentrations. Forty rounds of 8 inch ammunition with delay fusing was fired at the northernmost complex. At the range of 13,000 meters the 8 inch concentration was clustered in a fairly tight pattern approximately 200 meters by 75 meters. With the delay fusing each shell made a crater 5 feet deep and 10 feet in diameter. Although hits were scored within 5 feet of the tunnel centerline, there was no damage to the tunnel system other than minor loose dirt shaken from the air shafts. The 175mm concentration at the southern tunnel complex from a range of 21,000 meters had a much wider dispersion, created smaller craters and did no damage to the tunnels.

   a. Material. 3900 1bc explosives and 43 ea 5 lb - bag CS powder.
   b. Man power. 5 squad days for Engineers and 5 company (-) days for security.
DESTRUCTION

1. First test shot for entrance closure.

   a. Conditions. The entrance was a 4 ft. diameter vertical shaft approximately 20 ft. deep in clay soil with heavy laterite content. Two branches of tunnel approximately 3 ft. wide and 5 ft. high branch off at right angles to each other.

   b. Materials Used.

      1 ea 40 lb shape charge
      2 ea 40 lb crating charge
      1 ea 2 lb block C4
      100 ft detonating cord
      8 ea non electric blasting caps
      6 ft tino fuse
      3 ea fuse lighters
      20 ft adhesive tape

   c. Procedure. The shape charge was placed as shown on sketch with the neck recessed into the wall of the tunnel for support on the rear end and supported on the front by a scissors, made of bamboo. Stand-off was approx 18 °.

(1) Back blast of the shape charge blow out a concave area 6 ft. in dia and 2 ft. deep, and approx 1 ft. of earth from the ceiling of the tunnel. The resulting bore hole was 2½ ft. in dia at the opening and 1 ft. in dia at 6 ft. back tapering down to 3½ inches at 8 ft. back. It was not necessary to do any cleaning out of the bore hole.

Incl 2
(2) 30 minutes after the blast there were still gases and a heavy brown dust present in the tunnel. 45 minutes after the blast the NCOIC went into the tunnel and stayed for approx 30 minutes, after which he had difficulty breathing and was exhausted upon leaving the tunnel. One hour after the blast 2 men started priming and placing the cratering charges in the bore hole. After approx 25 minutes one man became unconscious from lack of oxygen and the other man was also suffering from lack of oxygen when extracted from the tunnel. Protective masks were worn at all times due to lingering CS used by A Co, 2/327 Inf. 2 hours after the initial blast the NCOIC reentered the tunnel and completed the priming of the charges.

(3) The resulting explosion from the two cratering charges blew earth and rock 50' into the air from the shaft and 20' into the air from an air shaft 30m away from the blast. A 200 ft. safety distance was adequate. Most of the earth and rock blown into the air settled back into the shaft which formed a crater approx 12 ft. dia and 4-5 ft. deep. The entrance shaft was completely destroyed and some collapse of the tunnel did occur. (Sketch).

No further effort was made to use this method due to the apparent danger to personnel and the unacceptable time required (approx 3 hrs/shaft). Safety requirements would also preclude the proper use of RCA.

2. Second test shot for entrance closure.

a. Condition. 2 each entrance shafts; 4 ft. dia. x 18 ft. deep and 40 ft. apart. Soils are red clay with slight laterite content and very stable.

b. Material. Same as para 1b except that 3 ea 40 lb cratering charges were used.
c. Procedure. The 40 lb shaped charge was placed between the two shafts at approx 20′ from each one. The resulting bore hole was large enough to allow placement of 3 cratering charges at 8 ft depths side by side.

d. Results. The resulting crater failed to extend into either shaft and the expected displacement of earth into the shaft or cave-in of the connecting tunnel did not occur. These results give testimony to the extreme stability of the soil of this area. Subsequently a separate shot at each shaft, set up as described in para 3, was used to effectively close each shaft.


a. Condition. Same as para b above.

b. Materials. Same as para a (2).

c. Procedure. Shaped charge was set up approx 8′ from the entrance shaft and at a point that is not over the tunnel proper.

The resulting bore hole allowed placement of 2 ea cratering charges one on top of the other and approx 4′-8′ below the ground surface. Charges were tamped by refilling the loaded bore hole.

Shaped charges placed on the spoil around the holes were not effective as the loose material fell back into the bore hole. Issue stand off frame was used at all times.

d. Results. The resulting blast from the cratering charges caused earth
to heave into the entrance shaft, forming an effecting seal and probable collapse of portions of the tunnel. This procedure was used to effectively close the 18 usable entrances/exits to this tunnel complex. The resulting ground shock also closed nearby air shafts.

h. Test shot for tunnel destruction.

a. Condition. Approx 100m of tunnel 3 ft wide and 4 ft - 5 ft high with 12 ft - 15 ft of over head cover (natural), soils were red clay with heavy laterite content and boulders throughout the course.

b. Materials.

7 ea 40 lb cratering charges  
1 ea dud shaped charge  
7 lbs tetrytol  
200m det cord  
15 non electric blasting caps  
4 ft time fuse  
3 ea 8 lb - bags CS powder (RCA)

c. Procedure. 7 cratering charges were placed 30 ft - 40 ft apart on the floor of the tunnel, dual primed with det. cord/caps and tetrytol, and tied into a main line of det. cord. The 3 bags of CS powder were wrapped with 6-8 turns of det. cord and tied into the main line. This priming and placement took 4 men approx. 2 hrs.

d. Results. The blast blew out all air vents and entrance shafts along the tunnel. Little damage was done to the entrance shafts. Several cracks were seen on the surface but no cave in occurred except at the air vents. Examination of the interior the following day showed quantities of loose earth on the floor and an enlargement of the tunnel cross section at the area where the cratering charges were placed, but due to the depth of cover and the blow out at the air vents there were no serious cave-ins along the tunnel. The tunnel appeared to be structurally sound after this blast and was open and passible through the entire area of the blast. Except for contamination by the CS powder, which was severe enough to cause the skin to burn, the tunnel appeared to be completely useable. Because of this result no further effort was made to collapse the entire tunnel system, but the methods previously described were used to seal all entrances after contamination of the tunnels.
USE OF RCA

1. General. The use of CS powder has been developed by a joint effort of the Brigade chemical section and the engineers on the site. On small tunnel/caves where complete destruction could be attained in acceptable time and with reasonable quantities of demolitions material the CS powder was not used. It is felt that the effectiveness and persistancy of CS powder in tunnels that can be completely sealed will be indefinite. When partially exposed to air and weather, such as in covered trenches, the life of the powder blown into the earth would deny the use of these facilities for from 2 to 3 months.

2. Materials. The CS powder, Riot-Control Agent O-chloro-benzal malonitrile, CS-I comes sealed in 55 gallon drums (which were later destroyed to deny their use to the enemy) with ten 8 lb. bags in each drum. A crescent wrench and screw driver are required to open the containers. The CS powder is further sealed in sturdy paper bags of double thickness which stand up under extensive handling. Each bag is folded one time end to end and wrapped with 8-10 turns of detonating cord with a running end of 3-4 feet left for tying into the main line of det. cord for simultaneous detonation. Approximately 25 ft. of det. cord is required for each bag.

3. Procedure. All the necessary bags are primed near the entrance shaft of a particular leg of the tunnel. The det. cord main line is directed from the surface into the shaft and run in each direction from the shaft. One man can carry 2 bags of CS in the tunnels described. These are dropped at 30 ft - 50 ft intervals along the main line of det. cord and tied onto the main line. This procedure is followed for each shaft of the tunnel system. Each main line will have a separate fuse (non electric) with a short time delay (2 - 3 minutes). As soon as all branches of the tunnel are primed the fuses are ignited at the same time so that personnel can stand clear of the entrances to avoid the minor amount of gas which blows out. Immediately after the last shot has fired the engineers start the sealing of the shafts to contain the contamination.

4. Results. After the blasting of the CS bags the fine powder could be seen suspended in the entrance shafts and on occasion the powder would be blown to the surface. A heavy concentration of the powder was present throughout the tunnel complex. The bags were completely blown to shreds and the powder could be seen embedded in the walls of the tunnel.

5. MITY MITE: The Mity Mite, a small portable air blower, has the capability of forcing colored smoke through a tunnel system. The blower produces 150 cfm of air and can be used effectively in tunnels up to 2000 ft in length to determine the location of hidden entrances, exits or air shafts. The Mity Mite was used only briefly on this tunnel complex as engineer work parties were going to search and map the entire complex for a detailed report. Since the burning smoke grenades consume valuable oxygen in the sealed tunnel shaft it was considered best not to use the Mity Mite, thereby lessening the danger of asphyxiation to personnel working in the tunnel. A potential use of the Mity Mite is to force fresh air from the surface into the tunnels.