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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (12 Jun 67) FOR OT 19 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation WINCHESTER by the
173D Airborne Brigade (Separate) 8 Oct - 4 Dec 66

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for
Operation WINCHESTER. Operation WINCHESTER was conducted by the
173D Airborne Brigade (Separate) during the period 8 October -
4 December 1966. Information contained in this report is provided to
insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during
current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training
material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
AFO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-SC

4 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER)

THRU: Commanding General
II FORCERV
ATTN: G-3 DAT
APO 96227

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

The following report is submitted in accordance with MACV Directive number 335-8. (RCS Exempt)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. B. ROBERSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 20 YEARS
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.21

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1. **Name of Operation**: Operation WINCHESTER

2. **Type of Operation**: Search and Destroy, Security and Relief

3. **References**: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659 III, IV, 6559 II

4. **Date of Operation**: 8 October 1966 to 4 December 1966 / OPORD 9-66

5. **Location**: DA NANG (AT 939783), TINH QUANG

6. **Command Headquarters**: 4th Battalion 503d Infantry (Airborne)

7. **Reporting Officer**: LTC Michael D. Healy

8. **Task Organization**:

   **TF 4/503d Inf - MAJ SPINKS, Acting Commander**

   a. **A/4/503d Inf**
      Engr Demo Team
      Arty FO

   b. **B/4/503d Inf**
      Engr Demo Team
      Arty FO

   c. **C/4/503d Inf**
      Engr Demo Team
      Arty FO

   d. **D/4/503d Inf**
      Engr Demo Team
      Arty FO

   e. **TF Control**
      B/3/319th Arty
      1st Plt X/17th Cav
      4.2 Mortar Platoon
      335th AMCL
      505th FAC Team (USAF)
      173d Engr Platoon (–)
      172d MI Det
      173d MP Squad
      173d Spt Bn
      Scout Dog Platoon
9. **Supporting Forces**: Units in support of TF 4/503d Inf were Co B (-), 1st Marine Division, 1st Tank Battalion and Co B (-), 1st Marine Division, 1st AT Battalion.

10. **Intelligence**:
   b. Reference Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER).

11. **Mission**:
   a. **OPORD 9-66 (Operation WINCHESTER) 071700H October 1966**:
      TF 4/503d Inf deployed by C-130 aircraft from BIEN HOA Airfield to DA NANG Airfield commencing 071830H October 1966. Upon arrival at DA NANG, TF 4/503d Inf became under the OPCON of the 3d Marine Division.
   b. **Frag Order 1 to OPORD (Operation WINCHESTER) 301600H November 1966**:
      TF 4/503d Inf relieved the 2d Battalion, 26th Marine (Composite) Division at 081800H October 1966, occupied and controlled assigned sector of the DA NANG TAOR, established and maintained reconnaissance screening throughout the assigned sector of the TAOR, conducted unilateral offensive operations within the assigned sector of the TAOR, conducted unilateral and/or coordinated offensive operations in the division area of responsibility as directed, and prepared to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated offensive operations throughout the ICTZ as directed.
   c. **Frag Order 4 to OPORD 9-66 (Operation WINCHESTER) 301600H November 1966**:
      TF 4/503d Inf upon relief by elements of 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment executed air movement during the period 2 - 4 December 1966 from DA NANG to BIEN HOA Airbase to rejoin parent organization in the III CTZ.

12. **Concept of Operation**: TF 4/503d Inf conducted Operation WINCHESTER in four (4) phases:
   a. **Phase I**: TF 4/503d Inf conducted air movement from BIEN HOA Airfield to DA NANG Airfield in accordance with Annex D to OPORD 9-66 Operation WINCHESTER.
   b. **Phase II**: TF 4/503d Inf conducted relief in place of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marine (Composite) Division; conducted position defense with three (3) rifle companies, one (1) rifle platoon and one (1) Cav platoon to deny enemy access to vital areas throughout the assigned sectors; and maintained two platoons from Co D as reaction force to counterattack, block, relieve, or reinforce units within sector. All companies conducted aggressive patrolling to locate and destroy enemy offensive capability, conducted search and destroy operations within their assigned sector, and were prepared to conduct coordinated and combined operations as directed.
   c. **Phase III**: TF 4/503d Inf was relieved in place by the 3/9th Marine Regiment
   d. **Phase IV**: TF 4/503d Inf conducted movement from DA NANG Airfield to BIEN HOA Airfield in accordance with Annex H (Air Movement Table).
13. Execution:

D - Day (7 October 1966)

Operational Summary: TF 4/503d Inf was alerted for Operation WINCHESTER at 1315 hours. The first C-130 aircraft was located and enroute for DA NANG at 1835 hours. By 2400 hours, 80% of the personnel had departed BIEN HOA Airfield.

D + 1 (8 October 1966)

Operational Summary: TF 4/503d Inf continued movement from BIEN HOA Airfield to DA NANG. The move was completed at 1445 hours. TF 4/503d Inf assumed responsibility for assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR at 1800 hours. No contact was reported during this period.

D + 2 (9 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted local security patrols and two (2) squad size patrols. Co B relieved E/2/26th Mar in the southern sector of the TAOR. The relief was completed by 1200 hours. At 0930 hours, Co C reported that at AT 090915 a grenade type boobytrap was tripped resulting in 3 US WIA. Medical evacuation was requested and received with the wounded personnel taken to C/3/3d Marine Division. At 2315 hours, an order was received to provide security the following day for a Rough Rider Operation (Marine convoys moving north and south along Highway 1 within 4/503d's TAOR).

D + 3 (10 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted local security and two (2) ambush patrols. Co D alerted that a Rough Rider was moving south into the Battalion TAOR at 1055 hours. At 1145 hours, Co D reported the lase vehicle in the convoy had cleared their area. At 1400 hours, OPCON of 4/503d Inf passed from the 3d Regiment, 3d Marine Division to the 1st Marine Division. At 1645 hours, Co C's CP received 2 sniper rounds from CHO MA village hamlet (AT 899817) and was investigated by combined action company 15 (CAC 15) with negative results.

D + 4 (11 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted six (6) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the DA NANG TAOR and continued to improve defensive positions. The 1st platoon of E/17th Cav was given the mission of providing security for a Rough Rider Operation at 0700 hours. Co A conducted a platoon size combat patrol and night ambush. Co C observed 1 VC at AT 892826. The VC was taken under fire with unknown results. LT GEN Walt, CG 3d Marine Amphibious Force; MAJ GEN Nickerson, CG 1st Marine Division; Mr. Peterson, ABC News; and correspondents from UPI visited the 4/503d Inf's CP.

D + 5 (12 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and nine (9) ambush patrols. Co D attached one squad to the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav for a Rough Rider Operation. LTC Healy returned and resumed command at 1230 hours. Co D observed 2 boats on the SONG CU DE River at AT 926842. The boats failed to stop when challenged and were engaged with small arms and automatic fire at 2035 hours. Results: one (1) boat sunk, one (1) VCW WIA. The second boat fled to the west. At 2145 hours, Co C observed five (5) VC at AT 888823. The VC were taken under fire with artillery and small arms fire with unknown results. Co D received 2 rounds of sniper fire from AT 938788 at 2331 hours with negative results.
Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and nine (9) night ambush patrols. Co D attached one squad to the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav for a Rough Rider operation. The CAC unit in the Co C area reported receiving automatic weapons fire at 095821 from an unknown number of VC at 1950 hours. Illumination was fired and the area was maintained under surveillance with negative results. There were no US casualties.

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and eight (8) night ambush patrols. Co D attached one squad to the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav for a Rough Rider operation. Co B's ambush patrol at 2225 hours, observed twelve (12) to fifteen (15) VC at AT 913707 moving in an open rice paddy along the south side of the river. The VC were taken under fire with small arms, machinegun and M-79 fire. Results: six (6) VC KIA (Poss) (1 VC observed falling), no US casualties. A body count check was not made because of the river obstacle and because the VC were just outside the 4/503d Inf's TAOR.

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols, in the assigned sector of the TAOR. No enemy contact was reported during this period.

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. General Abrams, Army Vice Chief of Staff and Maj Gen Hickerson, 1st Marine Division visited the 4/503d Inf's CP. No enemy contact was reported during this period.

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and seven (7) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the DA NANG TAOR. At 1040 hours, a patrol from Co A tripped a boobytrap at AT 931861 resulting in 2 US WIA. A/82d's Cowboy Operations completed dustoff evacuation at 1125 hours. At 1235 hours, Co B received sniper fire from 4 VC at AT 905718. The VC fled south with negative casualties to either side.

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) combat patrols and seven (7) night ambush patrols. At 2045 hours, an ambush patrol from Co C tripped a boobytrap at AT 895823 resulting in 3 US WIA. Marine medical evacuation was requested but was unable to complete the mission due to adverse weather conditions. The battalion surgeon was dispatched by vehicle to give medical assistance throughout the night. At 2110 hours, Co B reported spotting 3 VC at AT 895708. The VC were taken under fire and fire was returned by the VC. Results: 1 VC KIA (Poss) was observed being evacuated from the area and negative US casualties.

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted five (5) squad size combat patrols and eight (8) night ambush patrols. Co B and the 1st platoon from E/17th Cav provided security for engineer equipment to clear portions of Highway 1 and land.
slides caused by monsoons. At 1055 hours, Co C (AT 888823) spotted 3 VC at AT 872832. The VC were taken under fire by M-60 MG with unknown results. A second group of VC (number unknown) were observed crossing the SONG CU DE River at AT 874832. An OH-13 armed helicopter was dispatched to investigate but no VC were spotted.

**D + 13 (20 October 1966)**

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols and seven (7) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Brigadier General Paul F. Smith, CG 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), visited the 4/503d Inf’s CP and company positions.

**D + 14 (21 October 1966)**

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and seven (7) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. The lst platoon of E/17th Cav secured Highway 1 for a Rough Rider Operation. No contact with the enemy was reported during this period.

**D + 15 (22 October 1966)**

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size patrols and eight (8) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. No enemy contact was reported during this period.

**D + 16 (23 October 1966)**

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eleven (11) squad size patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. The lst platoon of E/17th Cav conducted route reconnaissance of bridges on Highway 1 and provided security for a Rough Rider Operation along with one platoon of Co A. At 2345 hours, a listening post (LP) from 2d platoon of Co C reported that it heard what sounded like VC setting up mortars at AT 912825. Co C dispatched a reinforced squad to check this out.

**D + 17 (24 October 1966)**

Operational Summary: At 0230 hours, Co C received approximately fifteen (15) rounds of 60mm mortar rounds at AT 898821. The firing was believed to have come from AT 905825. Results: 1 US WIA and unknown VC casualties. Prior to the attack a twenty (20) man combat patrol had been dispatched to search the area earlier reported to be a VC mortar position by a night listening post. They were searching the area when a VC was apprehended. A reaction force composed of one (1) platoon from Co C, two (2) platoons from Co D and one (1) squad from E/17th Cav began conducting a house to house search of the entire area in question at 0630 hours. Negative results were reported. The remainder of the Task Force conducted squad size patrols and four (4) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co A and the lst platoon of E/17th Cav secured an assigned area for a Rough Rider Operation.

**D + 18 (25 October 1966)**

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co A and the lst platoon of E/17th Cav (-) provided security for a Rough Rider operation.
D + 19 (26 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. At 1305 hours, Co C reported sighting eight (8) sampans moving south from AT 908836. The village chief of HOA LAC stated that the sampans were VC and that they were in an off limits area for water traffic. The VC were taken under fire by .50 caliber MG with the following results: one (1) VC KIA (Poss) was observed falling, two (2) sampans sunk.

D + 20 (27 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co A and the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav provided security for a Rough Rider Operation.

D + 21 (28 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. LT GEN Engler, Deputy CG MACV, visited the 4/503d Inf's CP. At 1105 hours, Co A and the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav provided security for a Rough Rider Operation.

D + 22 (29 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols and four (4) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co B, 1st Tank Battalion, lst Marine Division was placed under the OPCON (7 tanks) of 4/503d Inf. One (1) platoon (-) of Co D provided security for the recovery of drone aircraft.

D + 23 (30 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co A and the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav provided security for a Rough Rider operation. One (1) platoon (-) of Co D provided security for the recovery of a drone aircraft.

D + 24 (31 October 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols. Co D provided one (1) squad for security of the lst Marine Division's Claims Team at AT 933824. Co C conducted one combat patrol (platoon) to investigate a reported VC cache at AT 917826. The 1st platoon of E/17th Cav conducted a road reconnaissance in the eastern portion of Co B's AO. One squad from 2d platoon of Co B while conducting a combat patrol detonated two (2) boobytraps at AT 885715 and AT 8867716. The boobytraps were detonated at approximately 13:40 hours and 14:20 hours respectively and resulted in 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA. The KIA and 3 of the WIA were evacuated by Cowboy operations dustoff.

D + 25 (1 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols. Co A and the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav provided security for a Rough Rider Operation. Brigadier General Paul F. Smith, CG 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) visited the 4/503d Inf's CP and company positions.
Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. No enemy contact was reported during this period.

D + 27 (3 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted six (6) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols. Co C conducted reinforced (tanks) company operations in an assigned AO. At 1300 hours, a squad from the 1st platoon of Co B, while conducting a combat patrol detonated a boobytrap at AT 899709 resulting in 3 US WIA. The WIA's were evacuated to C Medical by Cowboy operations dustoff. Two volleys of artillery were fired into the area of the boobytrap incident.

D + 28 (4 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols. One platoon (-) from Co D provided security for recovery of 2 drone aircraft.

D + 29 (5 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted six (6) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. One platoon (-) of Co C provided security for recovery of drone aircraft.

D + 30 (6 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted four (4) squad size combat patrols and five (5) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co C conducted a one platoon combat patrol and provided one platoon for security patrol and to aid in the evacuation of the THUY TU Hamlet. At 0407 hours, a squad from Co B, while securing a bridge at AT 908741, received a grenade. Three (3) VC were seen fleeing to the west. The VC were taken under fire with an M-79 grenade launcher with unknown results. There were no US casualties and no damage to US equipment. At 1130 hours, General Westmoreland, LT GEN Walt, and MAJ GEN Hickerson visited the 4/503d Inf's CP and Co B's CP. Co C conducted a one platoon combat patrol and provided one platoon for security operation in Co B's AO. One platoon (-) from Co D provided security for the recovery of drone aircraft.

D + 31 (7 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols and eight (8) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. Co C provided one platoon for security and evacuation of the THUY TU Hamlet. At 1930 hours, a patrol from Co C, while enroute to a night ambush position, detonated a boobytrap at AT 931882. Four (4) US personnel were wounded. At 1950 hours, the 4 WIA were evacuated by Cowboy operations dustoff.

D + 32 (8 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. At 0720 hours, a 3/4 ton truck from Hqs Co, carrying the morning meal to Co A's position on hill 358 (AT 931884), detonated a land mine in the vicinity of AT 931886. Results: 2 US WIA and 1 3/4 ton truck destroyed. The 2 WIA's were evacuated by Cowboy
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operations dustoff. One platoon from Co D provided security for the recovery of a drone aircraft.

D + 33 (9 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted ten (10) squad size combat patrols and seven (7) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. At 1135 hours, two (2) vehicles from the 1st AT Battalion received enemy automatic weapons and small arms fire at AT 935887. The fire consisted of 2 single shots and several bursts of automatic weapons fire from the west side of the road. The first vehicle had been allowed to pass and only the second vehicle was taken under fire. The ambush resulted in 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA. There were unknown VC casualties. The casualties were evacuated by Cowboy operations to Co C Med. A reaction element from Co A was dispatched to search the area but had negative results. Surveillance of the area in the vicinity of the incident continued. At 1225 hours, a report was received from the 1st Marine Division Command Operations Center that a VC ambush was in progress at AT 930920. An OH-13 helicopter was dispatched to investigate the report. There were two civilian vehicles, and one ARVN vehicle hit by the VC ambush. The ambush consisted of automatic weapons fire from an unknown location. No known friendly casualties were sustained. An ARVN reaction force was dispatched to reinforce the element under attack but were engaged with the following results: 2 ARVN KIA, 4 ARVN WIA and unknown VC casualties. A medical evacuation dustoff (Cowboy) was called in and the 4 ARVN WIA were evacuated to Co C Medical. At 1240 hours, a 2½ ton truck from the 1st Marine Tank Battalion struck a land mine at AT 899815 resulting in 6 USMC WIA. It is believed that the mine was of the pressure type. The truck sustained minor damage and 4 of the casualties were evacuated to Co C Med by helicopter. The area was searched by elements of Co C with negative results.

D + 34 (10 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted ten (10) squad size combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols in the assigned sector of the TAOR. At 1530 hours, a 3/4 ton truck from MCB 58, while traveling north on Highway 1, was ambushed by a claymore mine at AT 936908. There were negative US casualties. Elements from the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav were dispatched to escort the vehicle back. At 1530 hours, three VC were observed and took under fire 200 meters south of White Elephant Pier at AT 038757 by NSA Shore Patrol, USMC MP's and elements from HHC 4/503d Inf. The exchange of small arms fire resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC captured one of whom was wounded. There were negative US casualties. One (.45 caliber pistol and 3 hand grenades were captured. At 1945 hours, contact was made with ten (10) VC by a popular force patrol from CAC 11 at AT 900806. The VC squad then split in half and fled to the east and west breaking contact. Two volleys of artillery were fired to the west of the contact location by B/3/319th Arty. An AC-47 aircraft sprayed likely avenues of escape with 45,000 rounds of ammunition. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 M-1 carbine captured. There were negative US casualties. Blood trails were found the next day indicating the probability of additional VC casualties.

D + 35 (11 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eleven (11) squad size combat patrols and nine (9) night ambush patrols. Co D conducted one platoon size patrol. At 1205 hours, Co A reported that their vehicles were being fired upon by automatic weapons at AT 925925. The fire was coming from AT 928912. Co A returned fire with .50 caliber MG and the hostile action ceased.

D + 36 (12 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted five (5) squad size patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols. Co B conducted one (1) platoon size combat.
patrol and one (1) platoon night ambush patrol. TF Stilwell (one platoon from Co D, 1st platoon of E/17th Cav, section of tanks) participated in route clearing operations from AT 907973 to AT 857975. At 1020 hours, Co C's patrol detonated a boobytrap at AT 895874, sustaining 2 US WIA. Immediately upon detonation of the boobytrap, the squad sprayed the area with small arms fire resulting in three (3) local huts being set on fire by tracer ammunition. One large secondary explosion and several smaller explosions were heard from one of the burning huts. A search of the immediate area located a secondary boobytrap which was blown in place. At 1031 hours, the 2 WIA were evacuated by Cowboy operations dustoff.

D + 37 (13 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) combat patrols and six (6) night ambush patrols. Co B conducted one (1) platoon combat patrol and one (1) night ambush patrol. At 0900 hours, the 2d platoon of Co B at AT 871732 fired at 3 fleeing Vietnamese Nationals, believed to be Viet Cong, resulting in the death of 2 of the individuals and the wounding of the third individual. This incident report (Blacklash Report) was submitted on 18 November 1966 to the CG of the III MF by the S5.

D + 38 (14 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols and seven (7) night ambush patrols. Co B conducted one (1) platoon size combat patrol.

D + 39 (15 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size combat patrols and nine (9) night ambush patrols. No enemy contact was reported during this period.

D + 40 (16 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and seven (7) squad ambush patrols. Maj Gen Stilwell, CG COMUS MAC THAI visited the 4/503d Inf's CP and remained overnight. No contact with the enemy was reported during this period.

D + 41 (17 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) combat patrols and twelve (12) night ambush patrols. At 0909 hours, the 3d platoon of Co A received 3 rounds of small arms fire from an unknown direction at AT 937873. The area was searched with negative results. There were negative US casualties. Maj Gen Stilwell departed the CP.

D + 42 (18 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted seven (7) squad size combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and nine (9) ambush patrols. Co A conducted one (1) platoon size combat patrol. No enemy contact was reported during this period.

D + 43 (19 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force eight (8) combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and six (6) squad night ambush patrols. At 1755 hours, CAC 15 reported being in contact with 20 VC at AT 926859. Co C sent a squad to search the area.
D + 44 (20 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and six (6) squad ambushes. At 1120 hours, a patrol from Co C apprehended one (1) VCS at AT 910816 and at 1135 hours this same patrol apprehended a second VCS. Both VCS were turned over to the 172 MI Detachment.

D + 45 (21 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted ten (10) combat patrols, one (1) fire team and seven (7) squad ambush patrols. Co D provided security for recovery of a drone aircraft. At 1115 hours, CAC 32 (AT 922724) received 10 - 15 rounds of automatic fire. Illumination was fired by Co B with negative sightings and negative casualties. At 1050 hours, CAC 32 apprehended two (2) VCS who were turned over to the MP's. At 1045 hours, Co D's patrol found an AF mine at AT 871795 and had the demo team blow it in place. At 1321 hours, Co C located and destroyed one (1) bunker in the vicinity of AT 909834. At 1439 hours, Co A reported two (2) 2½ ton ARVN vehicles were hit by a claymore mine. The lead vehicle was partially damaged. There were negative casualties.

D + 46 (22 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols, one (1) fire team and six (6) squad ambush patrols. At 0158 hours, Co C detected movement in the vicinity of AT 885832. One volley was fired by artillery with unknown results. At 1135 hours, a Co B patrol was charged by a water buffalo in the vicinity of CAC 32. The patrol was forced to shoot the water buffalo. At 1600 hours, LT GEN Walt, CO III MAF visited the battalion CP and Co's B and C CP's.

D + 47 (23 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad size patrols, two (2) fire teams and seven (7) squad ambush patrols. At 0716 hours, one platoon from Co C conducted a search and destroy operation which entailed crossing the SONG CU DE River in rubber boats with one platoon from Co A moving to a blocking position at AT 988838. The operation uncovered one bunker in the vicinity of AT 898871 which was blown in place. At 1006 hours, MAJ GEN Smith arrived in the area and was briefed by LTC Healy and staff. After visiting the company positions MAJ GEN Smith departed the battalion area at 1100 hours. At 2100 hours, Co B reported a fire fight in the vicinity of AT 910710. A patrol was dispatched and returned with no contact. A PF roving patrol spotted and engaged with 20 VC in a fire fight. There were 2 PF KIA and VC casualties were unknown.

D + 48 (24 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted six (6) squad size combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and three (3) squad ambush patrols. At 1805 hours, Co D reported that the Marines were in a fire fight in the vicinity of AT 932766. B/3/319th Arty fired illumination. The incident resulted in negative casualties.

D + 49 (25 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size patrols, four (4) fire teams and three (3) squad ambush patrols and two (2) platoon (Co D and C) combat patrols.
D + 50 (26 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad size combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and seven (7) ambush patrols. At 0753 hours, CAC 15 reported detaining fifteen (15) VCS at their location at AT 899818. Interrogation by 172d MI Detachment resulted in three (3) VCS. The advanced party from 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division began arriving at 1140 hours. At 1313 hours, the 1st Marine Division requested aircraft for moving TF 4/503d Inf back to BIEN HOA.

D + 51 (27 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and eight (8) squad ambush patrols. One platoon (-) from Co D provided security for the recovery of a drone aircraft. At 1555 hours, a patrol from Co B tripped a boobytrap at AT 898715 resulting in 1 WIA. Cowboy operations evacuated the WIA to Co C Med.

D + 52 (28 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted eight (8) squad combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and six (6) squad ambush patrols. One platoon from Co D provided security for recovery of a drone aircraft. Negative enemy contacts were reported during this period.

D + 53 (29 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad combat patrols and eight (8) squad ambush patrols. One platoon from Co D conducted one combat patrol with negative contact.

D + 54 (30 November 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted nine (9) squad combat patrols, four (4) fire teams and seven (7) squad ambush patrols. Co A and the 1st platoon of E/17th Cav provided security for a Rough Rider operation. At 1710 hours, one (1) UH-1D (Cowboy 902) detonated a boobytrapped grenade while making a landing at Co C's LZ (AT 901820) resulting in heavy damage, i.e.; tail rotor partially blown off, several holes in the fuselage and fuel tank. There were 2 US WIA who were evacuated by Cowboy operations dustoff to NSA. The LZ was secured when the UH-1D made its landing. Co C sprayed the area with small arms fire immediately after the incident. At 1750 hours, Co C apprehended two (2) VCS who were in the vicinity of the UH-1D incident. The VCS were evacuated to 172d MI Detachment and subsequently admitted to placing a hand grenade wrapped in paper under the PSP on the LZ.

D + 55 (1 December 1966)

Operational Summary: Task Force conducted one (1) fire team, five (5) squad combat patrols and seven (7) squad ambush patrols. Co C conducted one (1) platoon size combat patrol with attached tanks. The patrol proceeded up Elephant Valley south of the SONG CU DE River to AT 820857. Co D conducted one (1) platoon combat patrol. The 1st platoon of E/17th Cav provided security for Co I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division during relief in place of Co A. The relief completed at 1545 hours. Co D (-) provided security for recovery of a drone aircraft. At 1227 hours, a patrol from Co D found a small cache of hand grenades. The patrol was led to the cache by one of the VCS apprehended on 30 November. The cache contained three (3) M-26 frag grenades. At 1800 hours, the Heavy Mortar Platoon was relieved in place by SlEa Mortar Section from 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division.
**Operational Summary:** Task Force conducted three (3) squad combat patrols and three (3) night ambush patrols. At 1030 hours, Co B was relieved in place by Co M, 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division. At 1045 hours, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division assumed control of TF 4/503d Inf's TAOR. Co C, 1st platoon E/17th Cav; Co B (-), 1st AT Battalion, 1st Marine Division and Co B (-) 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division reverted to ORCON of 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division. At 1030 hours, the 1st A/C with elements of the 4/503d Inf departed DA NANG Airbase enroute to BIEN HOA. At 1200 hours, MAJ GEN Hickerson, CO 1st Marine Division, addressed Co A, Co B and the Mortar Platoon in the area. At 1255 hours, a command detonated mine was set off immediately in front of a 173d MP (M-151) vehicle escorting a party from Co M, 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Division at AT 908227. The mine made a hole 4 feet deep by 4 feet wide. Two (2) US WIA (173d MP's) resulted when VC threw several hand grenades from the vicinity of the incident. The VC were taken under fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and one (1) VC seen fleeing west. Captured items included two (2) M-14 magazines, 50 rounds of 7.62 ammo and three (3) chicom concussion grenades. The US WIA were evacuated to Co C Medical at 1210 hours by Cowboy operations dustoff.

**Operational Summary:** Task Force continued air movement of elements from DA NANG Airfield to BIEN HOA Airfield (See Annex H, Air Movement Table). At 0600 hours, a Cowboy operations dustoff evacuated 4 Vietnamese Nationals injured in a car accident the previous night on Highway 1 at AT 938867. At 0930 hours, the 1st platoon from S/17th Cav was relieved in place at Hamo Bridge by C/3/9th Marine Division and reverted back to TF control. The Cav platoon moved to DA NANG Airfield holding area. At 1048 hours, Co C was relieved in place by K/3/9th Marine Division and reverted back to TF control. Co C moved to DA NANG Airfield holding area. At 2355 hours, chalk #35 (last C-130 A/C moving TF 4/503d Inf) departed DA NANG for BIEN HOA.

**Operational Summary:** Task Force closed in BIEN HOA base camp at 0245 hours.

**New Equipment and Training:**

1. **New Equipment:**

   a. **Ontos** See Paragraph 15, a, (10)

   b. **M48 Tanks** See Paragraph 15, a, (10)

   c. **Rubber Rafts** were used by Co C on a number of squad and platoon size patrols to cross the SONG CU DE River. They proved to be quite valuable for this purpose alone.

2. **Training:**

   a. **A boobytrap class was provided by the 1st Marine Division. A total of 58 NCO's and enlisted men attended this basic two day course given to members of the Task Force on two separate occasions. The training was most beneficial and well received.**
15. **Commander's Analysis:**

a. The composition of TF 4/503d Inf proved to be the optimum for the assigned mission. Each element played an equally important integral part in the combined effort which resulted. A synopsis of the accomplishment of each of the attachments and units placed under operational control of the TF 4/503d Ins is as follows:

(1) **Battery B 3/319th Arty:**

This Battery was equipped with six M102 Howitzers and deployed to the area of operations with sufficient transport to move all elements of the unit by road. The Battery provided direct artillery support from a single position to TF 4/503d Inf throughout most of the TAOR with one important exception being the HAI VAN Pass position in the northern portion of the TAOR which was out of range. To compensate for shortfall in fire support the Battalion's organic 4.2" mortar platoon was attached to Co A and employed in that area, further, alternate artillery positions were selected (not occupied) from which the pass could be supported if needed. The support rendered by Battery B 3/3/19th Arty was absolutely essential to the conduct of the operation.

(2) **1st Platoon, E/17th Cavalry:**

This Cavalry Platoon of one officer and thirty seven (37) EM contained six machinegun vehicles (two .50 Caliber and four 7.62mm), one rifle squad and one mortar squad - each mounted in a 3/4 ton truck. They were primarily used to defend the key Namo Bridge along Route 1 (the only road open to Marine units and supplies moving north to DA NANG) and to twice daily patrol from this bridge north to the extent of the Task Force TAOR. In addition, they were frequently used to clear other routes within the TAOR. As a highly mobile reserve, they added a great deal of flexibility to the Task Force, and were an essential attachment.

(3) **Platoon (-), 173d Engineer Company:**

This platoon (-) consisted of one officer and eleven EM. They were equipped with one 1-ton truck and one 5 ton truck, pioneer tools, carpenter tools and a demolition kit. They were instrumental in the construction of bunkers, defensive positions and barriers around the Battalion CP and company positions. In this connection, one of their primary missions was to construct an ammunition supply point for our logistical support element. Although they were detached from the Task Force after thirty days, their assistance was important.

(4) **335th Aviation Detachment:**

The detachment was composed of seven officers and ten EM with three UH-1D helicopters and two OH-13 helicopters. They flew a total of 23 dust-off missions as well as countless resupply missions, reconnaissance missions, and troop movements. For a two week period, Co B was completely cut off by road from the Task Force due to a washed out bridge and had to be totally resupplied by helicopter. This detachment was invaluable to the accomplishments of the Task Force mission.
The Tactical Air Control Party was composed of one officer Forward Air Controller (FAC) and three EM with a M109 communications vehicle. The FAC conducted daily reconnaissance flights, contingent upon weather conditions over the TAOR. During the operation a limited number of preplanned air-strikes were required to support Battalion operations. They were all directed by the FAC. Had any significant contact been made, the FAC would have been of invaluable assistance because of the order of magnitude of the area the battalion was required to screen.

This detachment was composed of an AIS officer, an ARVN interpreter, and two enlisted interrogators. In a short period of time, they developed a network of agents actively reporting information on enemy locations, movement and intentions. The team was also highly successful in gaining information through interrogation of VC, local Vietnamese officials and villagers. They accomplished an essential mission for the Task Force. (See Annex B, Intelligence).

The squad was composed of an NCO, eight enlisted MP's and were equipped with three M-151 MG vehicles. They were fully utilized in apprehending, securing and transferring VC and VCIG to and from the 172d MI Detachment and the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) compound. In addition, they provided security for resupply vehicles, troop movement and visitors to the Battalion CP and company positions. They also assisted the S-1 in maintaining law and order by regularly patrolling the local areas for 173d Airborne Brigade personnel. This MP squad was of great assistance to the Task Force.

The four attached ARVN interpreters, one with each rifle company and one with the Battalion S-2, were essential in maintaining communications and liaison with CAC/PF units, local VN officials and villagers. They were used extensively during interrogations of suspects and to translate Vietnamese letters and other official documents.

The detachment was composed of three dogs and three handlers. They were assigned to the rifle companies and used on patrols and ambushes. The mountainous terrain and the abundance of flooded rice paddies coupled with the monsoon rains made movement most difficult for the dogs. The environment under which the dogs worked was quite different from the jungle setting for which they were trained. As a result, these conditions put limitations on their ability to pick up a scent. They were not essential during this operation - ever, their great value in a jungle environment is well recognized.

While under the operational control of the 4/503d Inf, B/1/1 Marine Division provided a total of ten Ontos. The Ontos were employed as follows: Four (4) attached to Co A, two (2) attached to Co B, and four attached to Co C. The Ontos were located to provide additional heavy caliber fire support for the positions which were most isolated and where long range fields of fire were comparable. They were employed both in support of offensive ground operations and
for firing harassing and interdictory fires. These fires were also an integral part of several positions defensive fire plans. In view of the terrain in a large sector of the DA NANG TAOR assigned to the 4/503d Inf, the Ontos support was a most valuable asset.

(11) Company E, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division:

While employed in the DA NANG TAOR the 4/503d Inf had a total of seven tanks from B/2/1 Marine Division under its operational control. The tanks were disposed as follows: Four (4) attached to Co C, two (2) attached to B/3/319th Arty and one (1) attached to the 1st platoon E/17th Cav at Namo Bridge. During their employment with the 4/503d Inf, they rendered valuable support in form of participation in ground operations, direct and indirect fire support from static positions, road clearing operations and additional security of defensive positions. In this connection, the flame tank demonstrated for psychological purposes in the villages of HOA TANH and HOA VINH eliminated incidents involving mines and boobytraps in an extremely troublesome area. The punch and flexibility that this element added to the Task Force was most valuable.

(12) Combined Action Company (CAC):

The company was composed of five platoons and totaled fifty-two (52) Marines and 220 Popular Force Troops. Each platoon consisted of a squad of Marines and some forty PF's, centrally located in four village hamlets in the Task Force TAOR. Operationally, all CAC activity was monitored and coordinated by the 4/503d Inf's headquarters and the rifle companies located in the immediate vicinity. These CAC units were of great assistance in gathering intelligence from the indigenous population amongst whom they lived, and on two occasions located VC mines and boobytraps. The first incident involved an AT mine placed on the well traveled road to 4/503d Inf and the second was locating and destroying a booby-tramped 105mm artillery round. In addition, the CAC units provided the security for their local hamlets by conducting daily clearing patrols and night ambushes.

(13) Support Battalion Detachment:

This detachment initially consisted of the Battalion XO, supply officer and EM in anticipation of a Brigade movement. After receiving notification the the entire Brigade would not move to this TAOR, the detachment moved back to BIEN HOA. However, while in this TAOR, they were of great help to the operation. (See Annex C)

(14) 1st Logistical Detachment:

The 1st Logistical Detachment arrived in the operational area with a Hq section, an ammunition section, a laundry and bath section, Class I, II and IV sections and POL section. They supported the Task Force very well and were essential to this operation. (See Annex C).

b. The need of a fourth maneuver element with the Airborne Infantry Battalion in the form of a TO & E rifle company and the break-out of the present Headquarters and Headquarters Company into two (2) separate organizations of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Service Support) and a Combat Support Company is here reemphasized. Because of the extremely large TAOR occupied, this unit was seriously handicapped in not having a fourth TO & E rifle company. Although a provisional rifle company consisting of some ninety men (composed primarily of Recon and AT platoon personnel) is employed, a full rifle company was needed to adequately provide the mandatory reaction force and the necessary flexibility for company size offensive operations and rotation of units in the TAOR.
The lesser accumulated advantage of having a Provisional Company all but removed the Recon capability, a required element, from the battalion's ability to satisfy an extensive screening mission.
Operation Order 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

Reference: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659 III, IV, II.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A

1. Situation:
   A. Enemy Forces: (See Annex B, Intelligence)
   B. Friendly Forces:
      (1) 173d Bde (-) continues Operation Sioux City.
      (2) 7th AF supports Operation WINCHESTER.
   C. Attachments and Detachments: Task Organization.


3. Execution:
   A. Concept of Operation: TF 4/503d Inf conducted air movement from Bien Hoa Airfield to Da Nang Airfield in accordance with Annex D (Air movement Table).
      B. A/4/503d:
      C. B/4/503d:
      D. C/4/503d:
      E. D/4/503d:
      F. 1st Platoon E/17th Cav:
      G. Battery B 3/319th Arty:
      H. Heavy Mortar Platoon:
      I. 173d Engineer Platoon (-):
      J. Coordinating Instructions:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

   Supply:
      (1) Individuals will carry two (2) C rations.
      (2) Units will carry 15 days administrative supplies (i.e., acetate, grease pencils etc.).
      (3) S-4 carries three (3) days "C" rations per individual.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. Signal: Current SOI in effect.

B. Command: CO moves in Chalk #1.

Acknowledgment:

SPINKS
MAJ

ANNEXES: A (Task Organization)  
          B (Intelligence)  
          C (Air Movement Table)

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S-3
Annex A (Task Organization) to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

4th Bn (Abn), 503d Inf

HHC
1st Plat/E/17th Cav
B Btry e/319th Arty
Hvy Mort Plat
173d Eng Plat (-)
172d MI Det
173d MP Squad
AF LNO Team
Spt Bn Det

A/4/503d Inf
Arty FO Team
Engr Demo Team

B/4/503d Inf
Arty FO Team
Engr Demo Team

C/4/503d Inf
Arty FO Team
Engr Demo Team

D/4/503d Inf
Arty FO Team
Engr Demo Team

Acknowledges:

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DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPORD 9-66

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S-3
Annex B (Intelligence) to OPEP 9-66 Operation WINCHESTER (U)

REFERENCE: Map Series L-701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6659 III & IV

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: (See Appendix 1, Intelligence Estimate)

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:
   
a. Essential Elements of Information: What are the VC objectives in the TAOR? When and how will it be attacked?
   
b. Other:
      (1) "What VC units operate in the TAOR? Where are they located? Who are the leaders? How are they equipped? What are the VC tactics?"
      (2) "What are the VC routes into the TAOR?"
      (3) "What are the means of VC communications in the TAOR?"
      (4) "Who are VC sources of Supply? How and when do VC contact them or vice versa? What supplies do VC receive from local population? Are these supplies in the form of taxes or voluntary contributions?"
      (5) "Are there any VC caches or tunnels in the area? If so, where?"

3. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL:
   
a. VC & VCS: Upon capturing a VC or detaining a VC suspect, conduct a preliminary interrogation to obtain information of immediate tactical value, then VC will be tagged and sent to Battalion S-2.
   
b. Documents: Documents should be screened for information of immediate tactical value, tagged and sent to Battalion S-2.
   
c. Material: Captured material and weapons should be tagged and evacuated to Battalion S-2.

4. DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED:
   
   
b. Pictomaps: Distribution completed.
   
c. Photos: Requests for aerial photos will be forwarded to Battalion S-2 NLT 24 hours prior to desired receipt.

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:
   
Proper radio communication security procedures will be utilized at all times. KAC Codes will be used to the maximum extent possible in transmitting messages.
CONFIDENTIAL
Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 9-66 Operation WINCHESTER (U) Con’d

Acknowledge:

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Appendicies:

Appendix 1: Intelligence Estimate

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S-2
1. MISSION: See OPORD 9-66

2. THE AREA OF OPERATION:

   a. Weather: The northeast monsoon, which effects the entire I Corps area, begins in September and lasts through January. The average rainfall is 23 inches in October, 15 inches in November, tapering off in December and January. Temperatures average in the high 80's and low 70's.

   b. Terrain: The area in the vicinity of DA NANG (BT 0176) is sandy beaches extending inland to lowlands, and are surrounded by mountain spurs from the highlands that extend out to the sea. Key terrain in the TAOR includes the CU DE River providing the major drainage, HAI VAN Pass (AT 9492), TI TOU Mt (AT 8986), and DONG DEN Mt (AT 8483). Highway 1 traverses the TAOR as the major artery, with several good hard-surface roads in the adjacent lowland area.

3. ENEMY SITUATION:

   a. Disposition, Composition, Strengths: The area around DA NANG has been used extensively both by Main Force and Local Force VC units. The 51st VC Main Force Battalion is reported in the vicinity of AT 8487, with a strength of 400 men, and operates in two groups, called the North Section and the South Section. Weapons include; 2 60mm mortars, 1 81mm mortar and 3 machineguns. HOA VANG Local Force Company (AT 8481) and Q-16 Local Force Company (AT 8674) are also reported to be operating in the TAOR. The 402d Main Force "Sapper Battalion" (Strength: 450 - 500) is reported to be located in the south of the TAOR, Vicinity AT 8465. It consists of a heavy weapons company and five (5) "sapper" infantry companies trains for combined mortar attacks and sapper assaults against arty positions and air facilities such as DA NANG. The central lowlands and foothill area is reportedly heavily mined and boobytrapped, and the area north of CU DE River is suspected to have numerous bunkers, tunnels and caves.

   b. Strengths and Weaknesses:

      (1) The VC are thoroughly familiar with the area and existing defensive positions, and have a well established intelligence net and material support system.

      (2) The VC are vulnerable to attack by air and artillery.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

   a. Attack with 402d Sapper Battalion against key positions and installations,

   b. Scattered attacks against isolated out posts and ambushes of reaction forces by elements of 51st MF Battalion, HOA VANG and Q-16 Local Force companies.

   c. Ambush and harass with local guerrilla forces.

   d. Withdraw and avoid contact.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

   Conduct scattered attacks against isolated outposts and positions by local guerrilla forces with increased intensity. Attack key facilities, such as artillery positions and air base facilities, by special operations units, i.e., sapper battalion. Conduct ambushes of reaction forces by main force units.
Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 9-66
Operation WINCHESTER (U) Con'd

Acknowledge:

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S-2
Annex C (Air Movement Table) to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

Departure Airfield: Bien Hoa
Arrival Airfield: Da Nang
Unit: TF 4/503d Inf
Type Aircraft: C-130
ACL: 30,000 pounds

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Annex C (Air Movement Table) to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER) Con’d

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<td>21</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0335</td>
<td>0410</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>0500</td>
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<td>1115</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/4 Ton, 1/2 Ton w/trl, 2 ammo pallets - 8 passengers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Abort


Total Move Time: 16 Hours 50 Minutes.

**TOTALS**

1. Passengers:
   - A/4/503d; B/4/503d; C/4/503d; D/4/503d; HHC; 3/319th Arty; E/17th Cav;
   - 150 143 145 93 166 82 34

2. Vehicle:
   - 5 Ton; 2 1/2 Ton w/trl; *3/4 Ton; 3/4 Trl; 1 Ton; 1/2 Ton; 274;
   - 1 4 15 4 29 17 5

*6 with M102

Note: One aircraft contained palletized loads ("C" rations, ammo, etc.)
Annex C (Air Movement Table) to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER) Con'd

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FRAG ORDER 1 to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

REFERENCE: No Change

1. Situation:
   b. Friendly Forces:
      (1) 3d Marine Division occupies and controls assigned sector of Da Nang
           TAOR and defends Da Nang vital areas in sector.
      (2) 2d Bn, 26th Marine Regiment occupies and controls the southern
           portion of the 3d Marine Division's sector of Da Nang TAOR.
      (3) 2d Bn, 26th Marine Regiment occupies and controls the portion of
           the 3d Marine Division's sector of Da Nang TAOR.
      (4) 2d Bn, 26th Marine Regiment occupies and controls the northern
           portion of 3d Marine Division's sector of Da Nang TAOR.
      (5) 1st Bn (Reinforcement), 12th Marines supplied direct support (DS)
           to the 3d Marines.
   c. Attachments and Detachments: No Changes

2. Mission: TF 4/503d Inf relieved 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (Composite) at
   081800H October 1966, occupies and controls assigned sector of Da Nang TAOR,
   establishes and maintains reconnaissance screening throughout assigned sector of
   TAOR, conducts unilateral offensive operations with Division Area of Responsi-
   bility as directed, and prepares to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated offensive
   operations throughout I CTZ as directed.

3. Execution:
   a. Concept of Operation: TF 4/503d Inf conducts relief in place of 2d Bat-
      talion, 26th Marines (Composite), conducts position defense with three rifle com-
      panies to deny enemy access to vital areas throughout the assigned sector and
      maintains one platoon reaction force to counter-attack, block, relieve, or rein-
      force units with sector. All companies will conduct aggressive patrolling to
      locate and destroy enemy offensive capability, conduct search and destroy op-
      erations within their assigned sector and be prepared to conduct coordinated and
      combined operations as directed.
   b. A/4/503d Inf:
      (1) Relieve A/2/26th Marines in place.
      (2) Occupy and control assigned sector.
      (3) Provide security for Esso POL Terminal (AT 939868).
      (4) Provide security for Route #1 and railway in sector.
(5) Conduct patrols and search and destroy operations throughout assigned sector.

(6) Conduct civic action program in sector.

(7) Be prepared to conduct operations as directed.

c. B/4/503d Inf:

(1) Relieve E/2/26th Marines in place.

(2) Occupy and control assigned sector.

(3) Conduct patrols and search and destroy operations throughout assigned sector.

(4) Conduct civic action program in sector.

(5) Be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.

d. C/4/503d Inf:

(1) Relieve B/2/26th Marines in place.

(2) Occupy and control assigned sector.

(3) Conduct patrols and search and destroy operations throughout assigned sector.

(4) Exercise operational control of Combined Action Company (CAC) in sector.

(5) Provide security for Regimental Observation Post Dong Den (AT 838 827).

(6) Be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.

e. D/4/503d Inf:

(1) Relieve D/2/26th Marines in place.

(2) Occupy Flame OP (AT 934782) and Burn Hill (AT 926777) with one squad each location.

(3) Occupy and defend Namo Bridge (AT 927842).

(4) Maintain one platoon Battalion Reaction Force.

(5) Be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.

f. 1st Platoon E/17th Cav:

(1) Battalion Reaction Force

(2) Be prepared to conduct operations as directed.

g. B/3/319th Arty:

(1) Occupy position vicinity AT 924792.

(2) GS.

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h. Heavy Mortar Platoon: Attached to Company A.

i. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) All Vietnamese personnel west of NS Grid Line 88 are considered VC.
(2) No river traffic allowed under Namo Bridge.
(3) Song Tuy Loan River responsibility of 2d Battalion 26th Marines.
(4) Units submit operational overlay to Battalion S-3 two days prior to operations.

4. Administration and Logistics: (See OPORD 9-66)

5. Command and Signal:

a. Signal:

(1) SOI Index 1-6 in effect.
(2) Red smoke marks enemy location for Air Strike.

b. Command: CP location AT 939782.

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ANNEXES:

A - Not Used
B - Fire Support Plan
C - Operations Overlay

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### Target List A/503d Inf

**Annex B (Fire Support Plan) to FRAG ORDER 1 to ORDER 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)**

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FRAG ORDER 2 to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

1. Situation: No Change

2. Mission: No Change

3. Execution:
   a. Concept of Operation: Battalion realigns units for purpose of:
      (1) Providing a larger Battalion Reaction Force.
      (2) Providing a more flexible base for the conduct of company size operations in assigned TAOR.
   b. Co A: Move one section Heavy Mortar Platoon to Vicinity HAI VAN Pass (AT 928916) NLT 221200H October 1966.
   c. Co B: Be prepared to conduct coordinated offensive company size operation in assigned TAOR beginning 240800H October 1966.
   d. Co C:
      (2) Relieve Co D at Naao Bridge (AT 927842) NLT 221200H October 1966.
      (3) Be prepared to conduct coordinated offensive company size operation in assigned TAOR beginning 240800H October 1966.
   e. Co D:
      (1) Upon relief by Co C, withdraw platoon from Naao Bridge to Battalion Base NLT 221230H October 1966.
      (2) Attach 106HR section to Co C effective 221600H October 1966.
      (3) Be prepared to assume mission of Co B on order.
      (4) Be prepared to conduct coordinated offensive company size operations anywhere in Battalion TAOR.

4. Administration and Logistics: No Change

5. Command and Signal: No Change

Acknowledge:

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FRAG ORDER 3 to OPCRDI 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

1. Situation:
   a. Enemy: 60mm mortar squads located vicinity (AT 905825) or (AT 903815)
   b. Friendly Forces: No Change

2. Mission: TF Belanger conducts house to house search of hamlets AP Quan Nham (1), AT 905817 (Obj A&B), and AP Quan Nham (2), AT 905824, (Obj C) beginning 240630H October 1966.

3. Execution:
   a. TF Belanger establishes three Fire Team size blocking forces north of position Obj C, establishes control point (TF CP, 173d MP Squad (-), and 172d MI Team) initially at CP #1, and conducts house to house search of Obj's A, B, and C in order.
   b. Co D (-), conducts house to house search of Obj A, 240630H October 1966, and Obj's B and C in order.
   c. Rifle Squad B/17th Cav: Provides reaction force
   d. Rifle Squad (Reinforced), Co C: Establishes north blocking force (Obj C).
   e. 173d MP Squad (-):
      (1) Provides control point security
      (2) Reinforce reaction forces
   f. 172d MI Team: Provides interrogation team

4. Administration and Logistics: No Change

5. Command and Signal:
   a. Command: CP initially located at CP #1.
   b. Signal: Current SOI in effect.

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Annex A (Operation Overlay)

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FRAG ORDER 4 to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

Reference:

Task Organisation: Annex A, (Task Organisation)

1. Situation:
   a. Enemy Forces: (See OPORD 9-66)
   b. Friendly Forces: (See Annex A, Task Organisation)
   c. Attachments and Detachments:
      (1) 335th Avn Det detached effective on order.
      (2) Co B (-), 1st AT Battalion, 1st Marine Division released from OPCON effective relief by Third Battalion, Ninth Marines.
      (3) Co B (-), 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division released from OPCON effective relief 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.


3. Execution:
   a. Concept of Operation: Execution of this mission will be in three phases: Phase I - TF 4/503d Inf maneuver elements and Arty Btry are relieved in place by rifle companies, 3/9th Marine Regiment and a Marine 105mm Arty Btry. Phase II - TF 4/503d Inf maneuver elements move by vehicle to staging area. Phase III - TF 4/503d Inf executes air movement from Da Nang AB to Bien Hoa AB.

      (1) Maneuver:
         (a) Phase I:
            1. TF 4/503d Inf maneuver elements are relieved in place by rifle companies, 3/9th Mar Reg't as follows: Co A; 1st Plt E/17th Cav; Co B and Co C.
            2. B/3/319th Arty is relieved in place by a Marine 105mm Arty Btry.

         (b) Phase II:
            1. Co A; 1st Plt E/17th Cav; Co B and Co C move by vehicle to staging area vicinity AT 947762. (Annex D, Staging Area)
            2. B/3/319th Arty remains at present location.

         (c) Phase III: TF 4/503d Inf (-) executes air movement from Da Nang AB to Bien Hoa AB as follows: Sel elements, HHC; B Btry; Co A; Co B; Co C; Co D; HHC (-) and TF 4/503d Inf attachments and Rear Detachments. (Annex B, Aircraft Lead Priority)
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FRAG ORDER 4 to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER) Con'd

(2) Fire Support: B/3/319th Arty DS.

b. A/4/503d Inf;
c. B/4/503d Inf;
d. C/4/503d Inf;
e. C/4/503d Inf;
f. B/3/319th Arty;
g. 1st Plt E/17th Cav;
h. 4.2" Mortar Platoon;
i. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Each unit will prepare to have one (1) NCO and two (2) EM (one with PRC-25 radio) to assist S-3 Air (DACO) during outloading.

(2) All personnel will be thoroughly briefed on 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) Policy, Carrying of Loaded Weapons, dated 21 June 1966.

4. Administration and Logistics: Annex C (Administration and Logistics)

5. Command and Signal:

a. Signal:

(1) Current SOL,
(2) S-3 Air (CACO) call sign: GRAVE WOUNDER 90,
(3) AN/GRC 106 radio will remain operational at DAF.

b. Command:

(1) CP remains in place until air movement.
(2) CO remains with CP.

Acknowledges:

HEALY
LTC

ANNEXES:
A = Task Organization,
B = Aircraft Load Priority,
C = Administration and Logistics,
D = Staging Area Schematic.

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Annex A (Task Organization) to FRAG ORDER 4 to OCPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

A/4/503d Inf
- Arty FO Tm
- Engr Demo Tm
- Interpreter

B/4/503d Inf
- Arty FO Tm
- Engr Demo Tm
- Interpreter

C/4/503d Inf
- Arty FO Tm
- Engr Demo Tm
- Interpreter

D/4/503d Inf
- Arty FO Tm
- Engr Demo Tm

TF 4/503d Inf Control
- 1st Plt E/17th Cav
- B/3/319th Arty
- 172d MI Det
- Heavy Mortar Plt
- 173d MP Squad
- 505th TACP (AF)

Acknowledge:

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LTC

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Annex B (Aircraft Load Priority) to FRAGO 4 to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACFT Chalk No.</th>
<th>ACFT Load</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 thru 3</td>
<td>Advance Party (Selected Personnel and Kitchens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 thru 5</td>
<td>Co A Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Co A Troops and 1 Ton Truck w/trl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 thru 7</td>
<td>Co B Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Co B Troops and 1 Ton Truck w/trl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 thru 9</td>
<td>Co C Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Co C Troops and 1 Ton Truck w/trl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 thru 18</td>
<td>B/3/319th Arty and Heavy Mortar Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 thru 21</td>
<td>1st Platoon E/17th Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Co D (-) and HHC (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 thru -</td>
<td>S-4 Cargo Loads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Co D furnishes filler personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acknowledges:

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Annex C (Administration and Logistics) to FRAG ORDER 4 to OPCORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

Reference: Same as OPCORD 9-66

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. General: This annex sets forth the policy and procedures for admin and Log Support for FRAG ORDER 4.

2. Concept: The 4/503d Inf redeploy to Bien Hoa utilizing C-130 aircraft after a relief in place has been completed.

3. Supply and Services:

   a. Supply:

      (1) Class I:

         (a) Units will redeploy with one (1) day of rations.

         (b) A rations will be fed up to redeployment date D-12 hours this location

         (c) A rations will be fed upon arrival at Base Camp

         (d) All extra A and B type rations will be left on position for relieving unit.

      (2) Class II & IV:

         (a) Units will redeploy with normal expendables i.e., footpowder, insecticide, halazone tablets etc.

         (b) Class I, II & IV items will be left on position. All borrowed material will be recovered and turned in to S-4 upon notification of movement date

      (3) Class III & IIIA:

         (a) All units will deploy with gas tanks and gas cans 3/4 full

         (b) JP-4 fuel will be available at Da Nang and Army areas in route

         (c) Supply point distribution

         (d) Class III point will be operational until D-2 hours in order to comply with (a) above

      (4) Class V:

         (a) Units will deploy with one basic load of ammo as outlined in Battalion ammo directive

         (b) All ammo and explosives, less M79 MP and 5.56mm, will be left on location to be used by relieving unit
Annex C (Administration and Logistics) to FRAG ORDER 4 to OPORD 9-66 (OPERATION WINCHESTER) Con’d

(c) All M79 MP ammo in addition to basic load of 20 rounds per weapon will be turned into S-4 prior to departure time.

(d) Request for ammo needed to comply with (a) above will be requested NLT D-12 hours.

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S-3
PURPOSE: This report describes the operations, projects, and problems of the Battalion S2 section during the period of operations in the DA NANG TACR.

1. PURPOSE AND MOVEMENT:

Upon being placed on a stand-by basis, 7 October 1966, the Battalion personnel were restricted to the area and packed equipment in preparation for the air movement.

Official notification of the movement came at approximately 1600 hours and the S2 was notified to pick up the required map coverage at Brigade at 1600 hours. Initial issue of standard 1:50,000 maps were made to the units at 1730 hours, with the remainder carried by the S2 during the movement. This initial load of maps from Brigade proved to be inadequate upon arrival in the operational area, but was promptly remedied by the large quantity of both standard 1:50,000 and Picto 1:25,000 maps obtained from the 1/3 Marines, who relieved in place.

At the time of deployment the following attachments were provided to the Task Force to facilitate intelligence/security operations: Team from 172d MI Det, including an AIS Officer, ARVN interpreter, and two EM interrogators; 173d MP Det of nine (9) EM and three (3) M151 MG vehicles; and an initial attachment of 2 ARVN interpreters.

2. ASSUMPTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL:

Upon arrival in the operational area and concurrent with relief of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment in place, the Marine Battalion S2 provided a large quantity of intelligence information, records and files, along with a thorough explanation of the operating procedures of the Marine intelligence system.

In as much as the Battalion had the commitment of functioning as a regimental level headquarters under the OPCON of the 1st Marine Division, the Battalion S2 prepared and published an intelligence summary (INTSUM), according to the established MACV format, covering the period from 1200 hours to 1200 hours, due at Division G2 by 1300 hours. The INTSUM summarized all enemy contact and VC initiated incidents, and included any intelligence reports or information the S2 may have received from available sources.

Upon assuming control of the TAOR, the Battalion Commander established those intelligence requirements and their priorities (See Appendix I, R31) necessary to facilitate the flow of sufficient information upon which to base his estimate and decisions. These were later amplified to provide more specific information regarding enemy intentions as a result of increased VC activity in the 1st Marine Division's DA NANG TACR.

The sources of intelligence information and the agencies transmitting this information cover a much broader spectrum than a battalion level S2 normally has the opportunity to utilize. This is attributed to the well established network of agents throughout the TAOR, nets that are operated by the 3d CI for the 1st Marine Division G2 and agents that collected information and reported directly to the 1st Battalion, ed Marines S2. These sources, coupled with those developed through the efforts of the 172d MI Detachment, provided a continuous flow of fairly reliable information. An additional source well worth exploiting is information from VN local officials and villagers through S5's programs such as MEDCAP, and through the Marine PF Combined Action Platoons operating within the TAOR.
Shortly after arrival in the operational area, Captain Bowen MI Officer of 172d MI Det, came forward from Brigade Headquarters and spent approximately two weeks working with LT Kasprasin of the 172d MI Det developing a network of agents actively reporting information on enemy locations, movement and intentions in the TACR. The success of this effort, is demonstrated by the number of incoming reports from VC Nationals, resulting in the apprehension of known VC personnel on tax-collecting and propaganda missions, and in at least one instance, thwarting a VC attempt to mine a bridge. Throughout the period of operations in this area, LT Kasprasin and his team were most effective in developing information concerning VC activity in the TACR and, on several occasions, accomplished ambush patrols and search and destroy operations to provide on-the-spot assistance when VN Nationals and VC suspects were encountered. The MI Det was instrumental in updating the current "black list" of VC in the TACR, cross-referenced according to name, hamlet location and VC unit.

The Battalion originally deployed with only two attached ARVN interpreters, who because of the large distances involved between units, were assigned to two (2) line companies and the battalion headquarters utilized the 172d MI interpreter. Two (2) additional interpreters were later received from Brigade Rear, enabling the Battalion to operate with the minimum effective number. A shortage of qualified interpreters currently exists throughout the 1st Marine Division and additional personnel were not available.

The attached MP detachment was fully utilized in apprehending and transferring VC and VCS to and from the 172d MI and the III MAJ POW Compound, and providing security for resupply and troop movements.

At the time this unit relieved the 1/3 Marines, a comprehensive set of reference files was turned over that provided detailed information on: (1) VC personalities, by name and location, with age, weapons, position or rank, and the source; (2) VC personalities by name and unit; (3) listing of villages and hamlets within the TACR, with information on local forces and officials, population, schools, and industries; (4) VC military units order of battle information including division, regimental, battalion, company and guerrilla size units, with designations, strength, weapons and key personnel. During the operational period, these files were maintained as current as possible. It should be noted that this system requires a great deal of clerical time and effort.

One source of information that has recently began to provide consistent intelligence input is the Combined Actions Platoons of the Marines and Popular Forces located in hamlets throughout the TACR. Although the reliability of the source and/or information is sometimes difficult to ascertain, their close association with VN officials at the lowest level and with local villagers is a source well worth exploiting to the fullest.

Acknowledged:

HEALY
LTC

Appendix 1 - EEI
2 - Reports
3 - Summary of VC Activity

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S-2
1. The following Essential Elements of Information (EEI) were established by OPORD 9-66, 8 October 1966:

   a. Essential Elements of Information: What are the VC objectives in the TACR? When and how will it be attacked?

   b. Other Requirements:

      (1) What VC units operate in the TACR? Where are they located? Who are the leaders? How are they equipped? What are the VC tactics?

      (2) What are the VC routes into the TACR?

      (3) What are the means of VC communication in the TACR?

      (4) Who are VC sources of supply? How and when do VC contact these sources or vice versa? What supplies do VC receive from local populace? Are these supplies in the form of taxes or voluntary contributions?

2. The following supplemental EEI were established on 19 November 1966 as a result of increased VC activity in the area:

   a. Will VC attack the Brigade (vicinity AT 930482)(Namo Bridge)? If so, when, in what strength, and with which unit(s), from which direction?

   b. Will VC attack other key installations or positions within the TACR? If so, when, in what strength, with which unit(s), from which direction?

   c. Will VC attack mentioned in a or b above be coordinated? If so, which will be main effort, which the secondary, in what strength(s), when, and from which direction?

3. The following specific questions were disseminated to subordinate units to determine VC intentions in the TACR:

   a. Any VC movement toward installations or positions?

   b. Any increase in VC activity in area?

   c. Any sudden change in attitude of civilian populace?

   d. Any sudden movement of civilian population into or out of area?

   e. Any change in numbers of people attending unit MEDCAPS?

   f. Appearance of new civilians or people in ARVN uniforms or of military age in area?

   g. Failure of VN laborers to report for work? Any newly deserted hamlets?

   h. Any information regarding possible attack passes to US personnel by VN?

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Appendix 2 (Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>DATE/TIME DUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel Spot Report</td>
<td>Div COC (G2)</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)</td>
<td>Div G2</td>
<td>1300 hrs, Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Safety</td>
<td>Div G2</td>
<td>1200 hrs, Every Wed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward Funds Program</td>
<td>Div CI Officer</td>
<td>15th of each month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 (Summary of VC Activity) to Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

1. VC - Initiated Incidents:
   - Mortar Attack ........................................ 1
   - Small-arms Attack .................................... 5
     (including ambush)
   - Harassing/Small-arms Fire .......................... 21
   - Mortar Rounds Incoming ............................. 15
   - Grenades Incoming ................................... 3
   - Boobytraps .......................................... 13
   - Mines (including claymores) ....................... 11
     TOTALS .............................................. 69

2. VC Casualties:
   - VC KIA (Killed in Combat) ......................... 4
   - VC KIA (Poss) ...................................... 11

3. US Casualties:
   - KIA .................................................. 2
   - WIA .................................................. 30
   - MIA .................................................. 0

4. VC Captives and VC3:  (Apprehended by)
   - Army .................................................. 22
   - CAC/PF ............................................... 20

5. Interrogation Results:
   - VCC .................................................. 4
   - VCS .................................................. 10
   - Innocent Civilians ................................. 28

6. Intelligence Reports:
   - VN Local Officials .................................. 21
   - VN Civilians ........................................ 2
   - CAC/PF ............................................... 14
   - MI Agents (Conf) .................................... 17
   - VC Suspects ......................................... 2
   - Other: 3 ITT (Marine) .............................. 2

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Annex C (Personnel) to After Action Report (OPERATION WINCHESTER)

PURPOSE: To provide information pertaining to activities and function of the SI during preparation for movement and conduct of this operation.

1. Phase I: Pre-Movement Activities: Notification for movement was received approximately 1330 hours 7 October 1966. Companies were notified and were required to submit their initial strength reports to facilitate manifesting. Each company deployed leaving their morning report clerks in the rear area to maintain the administration and break down the mail into platoon bundles. This section retained the PSNCO, En Mail Clerk, and Publication Clerk in the rear area, while the remainder of the SI section deployed.

2. Phase II: Activities During Operation Winchester:

a. Strength: Task Force, 4/503d Inf, departed BIEN HOA 7 October 1966 deploying with an initial Battalion strength of 30 officers and 592 enlisted men. In addition, attachments included within the Task Force number 19 officers and 189 enlisted men and are itemized in Appendix 1 to this Annex. The strength of the Task Force throughout the operation remained relatively static with a small increase in strength resulting from malaria patients returning from the hospital. The rear detachment at BIEN HOA maintained a minimum strength which averaged 3 officers and 95 enlisted men, to perform maintenance and provide administrative and logistical support.

b. Morale: Endeavoring to maintain the normal high morals and esprit enjoyed by the Airborne, the following activities were initiated or continued.

(1) The normal out-of-country R & R Program continued despite the necessity of individuals having to return to BIEN HOA for transportation. Personnel departing on R & R would leave DA NANG on the courier flight at 1400 hours the day prior to their scheduled R & R. This allowed them a full morning to attend to their personal affairs prior to their departure from the Brigade area at 1330 hours.

(2) Allocations were received from the 1st Marine Division Special Services Officer (telephone Isherwood 41 or 141) for in-country R & R's to China Beach. However, due to the onset of bad weather and plumbing difficulties at that location, we were able to send only fifteen (15) personnel on R & R to China Beach.

(3) The 4th Battalion initiated their own R & R Program on a daily basis, weather permitting, to Red Beach (coordinated 946818). Operational and tactical requirements permitting, fifteen (15) soldiers from each company were provided transportation to Red Beach by the 2½ ton trucks that were returning from the respective companies, after the morning supply run. Dinner was provided at the beach at which time cold soft drinks and beer were sold. Trucks picked the troopers up at 1500 hours, stopped at the PX to allow the men to purchase required items, and then returned them to their respective companies. One unfortunate incident occurred at Red Beach when one young trooper drowned after being separated from his air mattress by a wave. After the aforementioned incident, air mattresses were no longer allowed at the beach because it was felt non-swimmers would depend too heavily on them thereby venturing into water too deep for their capability if separated from their air mattress.

(4) Athletic and recreational equipment was provided to each company. Balls, bats, volleyball balls and volleyball nets were distributed to each company, and a movie projector was provided by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine Division for use in the Main CP area.
(5) A mobile PX truck was available from Division Special Services on a weekly basis. Coordination was effected with Special Services to insure that all desired positions were reached. The schedule provided coverage of our TAOR on Mondays.

(6) Mail was received from APO 96250 and broken down at Battalion level. Each company clerk in the rear area broke down the mail into platoon bundles and redirected all missent mail. Prior to 1800 hours the same day, mail bundles for the forward area were returned to the APO clerk who then carried the mail to the forward area on the courier flight and was met by the forward area mail clerk. Companies made daily pick ups at S-1. Outgoing mail was sent from FPO 96620 which is in the 7th Engineer's area.

(7) All personnel actions such as emergency, compassionate and ordinary leaves were processed through the 173d Abn Bde at BIEN HOA. However, some Red Cross support from DA NANG was received for verification of emergencies.

c. Accurate and expeditious casualty reporting at DA NANG was facilitated by the use of a casualty reporting clerk located at "C" Med. After receiving necessary information, it was forwarded to this headquarters by land line at which time it was transferred to the casualty report from USAV Form 130-R. Depending upon the seriousness of the injury or wound, the report was either transmitted by radio or forwarded on the daily courier flight to BIEN HOA. Casualties of a very serious nature were reported directly to USAV by land line to TAN SON NHUT.

d. Area Improvement: Numerous building and area improvement plans were introduced. In the immediate Battalion CP area, the weeds and grass were cut and all bunkers improved, a wall of sandbags was installed on the road leading up the hill to the CP to retard erosion, and sandbag walls were constructed to the rear of tents to provide protection. The sandbag wall was completed behind two tents, which left three remaining walls to be constructed behind the tents on the lower slope of the hill. The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) bunker on the top of the hill was completed and all operations moved within it. The bunker previously utilised for this purpose was improved for any future use deemed appropriate. Of particular note is the improvement in the latrine system since all old pit-type latrines were burned and closed and new latrines, utilising the burn-off can were constructed. Construction wire was strung from above the TOC bunker down along the slopes of the hill past the CO's hooch and office.

e. Internal security was accomplished by the utilization of nine (9) bunkers with each position being manned by two privates. The sergeant of the guard was posted in the TOC and had communication with each guard post by land line.

f. Chaplain's Report: See Appendix 1 to Annex C

CONCLUSION: In conclusion, the overall operation has been highly successful and beneficial to all concerned with the administration in that we have had an opportunity to work in a new environment. Of particular note is the outstanding support we received from the 1st Marine Division and especially the SI of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine Division. Additionally, enhancing the accomplishment of our mission and facilitating the smooth flow of administration was the outstanding effort extended by the company executive officers and 1st sergeants in expeditiously disseminating information and providing an accurate and timely feedback.
Annex C (Personnel) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER) Con'd

Acknowledge:

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Appendix 1: Chaplain's Report

OFFICIAL

STOWELL
Adjutant
PHASE I:

On 7 October 1966 at 1330 hours, the order was given by the Battalion Commanding Officer to have all necessary equipment at BIEN HOA Air Base at 1800 hours to sustain the Chaplain Section for as long as two months. After wine, communion wafers, hymn books and portable altar were loaded on the aircraft by the Chaplain's assistant. We deplaned at DA NANG Air Base at 2200 hours 8 October 1966.

PHASE II:

Contact was made with the 1st Marine Division Chaplain at 0900 hours 8 October 1966. Permission was granted to use the 7th Marine Engineer's Battalion Chapel located across the road from the 1/503d Inf's Headquarters. Services were scheduled for us at 1100 hours Protestant and at 1200 hours Catholic. This provided coverage to HHC, Co D and attached units. This schedule was altered the following week to coincide with the 7th Engineer Battalion services of 0800 hours Catholic and 0900 hours Protestant, there after having a combined service.

PHASE III:

1. Each company commander and platoon leader in the Bn was contacted by the Bn Chaplain between 10 October and 14 October 1966 for arrangements of weekly religious services. An overhead cover or mess hall was made available in each of the nine areas. Marked improvement was made on these places each week.

2. On 12 October, the Brigade Chaplain visited the Battalion area and arrangements were made through him to provide a Catholic Chaplain from the Brigade each weekend as Catholic coverage could not be obtained through the 1st Marine Division Chaplain due to the work load of his staff. Chaplain (CPT) Charles Waters from the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) subsequently arrived 15 October by the daily courier to provide Catholic coverage and remained until each unit was covered before reporting back to BIEN HOA.

3. Transportation for the Chaplain was made available through the Battalion S3 by helicopter to each company where organic transportation was provided to move within the companies' TAOR.

4. All platoons and attached elements were covered by both chaplains over the period from Friday to Tuesday of each week.

5. Counseling was available to the men after religious services and throughout the week.

6. A close liaison was maintained with the 1st Marine Division's Chaplain through a weekly conference held at 1000 hours each Wednesday and a visit was made to I Corps Staff Chaplain's Office to notify them of the 1/503d Inf's presence in the DA NANG area.

7. Weekly visits were made to the sick and wounded in the DA NANG area hospital.

8. Three Protestant baptismal services were held at Red Beach, South China Sea, DA NANG. A total of 16 men were baptised during these services.
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Appendix 1 (Chaplain's Report) to Annex C (Personnel) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER) Con'd

PHASE IV:

In retrospect, superlative cooperation was given to the Chaplain's section by all members of the Battalion.

1. Due to the splendid cooperation of the S3 in providing transportation, the Chaplains were able to cover from nine to twelve positions each weekend.

2. Each company commander and platoon leader exhibited a great amount of pride in preparing convenient places for worship to be held.

3. Command encouragement to attend the services resulted in an increase from 6% of the Battalion personnel attending services on 9 October 1966 to 57% in attendance on 20 November 1966.

4. The religious, moral and moral aspects of the Battalion were at all times high.

Acknowledged:

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LTC

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OFFICIAL:

SMITH
Chaplain
1. The S4 section to include the support platoon and maintenance contact team departed BIEN HOA 8 October 1966 utilising C-130 aircraft as outlined in OPORD 9-66.

2. The section deployed with one 1/4 ton truck and trailer with normal administration equipment. The support platoon was organised and deployed in the following manner:

   a. Mess Section: One (1) Mess Sergeant, two (2) mess teams, two (2) 2½ ton trucks, two (2) GP medium tents and necessary equipment for two (2) separate mess facilities.

   b. Transportation and Ammo Section: One (1) section chief, three (3) drivers, and one (1) ammo handler.

   c. Supply Section: Battalion Supply Sergeant, three (3) Supply Clerks, one (1) driver, and one (1) 3/4 ton truck with trailer.

   d. Maintenance Contact Team: One (1) Section Chief and one (1) Mechanic.

   e. Not knowing the complete operational requirements, this section deployed from base camp with sufficient amounts of supplies to last three days under normal field operating conditions. This proved to be an inadequate level of supplies in many areas (See food service, supply, transportation and maintenance Appendices).

3. General comments applicable to any unit relieving this Battalion or fulfilling this mission requirement in the future:

   a. 1/3 Marines were initially scheduled to deploy from our assigned TAOR, however their rear detachment consisting of 40 officers and 150 EM received a hold from higher headquarters, thereby utilising space necessary for our attached units.

   b. The exchange of twenty-five (25) GP medium tents had to be accomplished. This was done by the 173d Support Battalion releasing to 1st Log Command the needed tents, who in turn transported the tents to this unit, less necessary pins and poles.

   c. When the lettered units of 1/3 departed, a large amount of ammunition and explosives was left on position. This ammunition was unservicable, dirty, rusted and by no means ready to be used. The ammunition and explosives were classified and turned into Marine channels at ASP #1.

   d. The base area was wired for lights at all locations and a minimum of five (5) generators are necessary. When 1/3d Marines left, all generators were removed causing this unit to send to BIEN HOA for a generator for the CP location and the artillery location. Co A received its power from the B260 plant by running a wire line from the plant to the CP. Co B and Co C had to utilise lanterns and candles. No marine staff support in this area was received though repeated attempts were made to effect issue of these required items.

   e. Due to environment conditions, every bunker in our TAOR was found in an unsatisfactory condition upon our assuming responsibility, this initially caused a large amount of time and equipment to be used to transport needed supplies to the positions and a continuing maintenance program.

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51
f. All latrines in the area were found to unsatisfactory and unsanitary, necessitating the destruction of old ones and in two cases, the construction of new ones. The 1st Marine Division Engineers and the 3d Marine Engineers issued a number of prefab latrines, which satisfied existing requirements.

g. Needed bunker material had to secured for repairing or replacing bunkers at all unit locations. The above was done by contacting the 1st Division Engineer (COL Merrall), who was instrumental in securing the amount of materials needed for the accomplishment of this task.

h. In the warning order to deploy to this location, this unit was told the support agency would be there to support us upon our arrival. This proved to be incorrect. The unit was there, but it was approximately ten days after our arrival before the 1st Logistical Command could handle our needs.

i. The 1/3 Marines had three refrigerators which were left on location, due to the hold placed on their unit. If the move had been made, the Battalion would not have had refrigerators for their Class I supplies.

j. Due to the nature of our deployment, the men did not bring sufficient clothing to fully utilise the laundry capability set up by the 1st Log Command. Although SGT Moon (NCOIC of the laundry and bath section) did everything in his power to satisfy our needs, Recommendation would have been to inform our battalion we were moving into static position and to send advance group to obtain full information.

k. Based on the plan under which the Task Force deployed, an insufficient number of vehicles were taken. This was solved by securing permission from the CG of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) to bring necessary vehicles to the location (See Transportation Appendix). Each lettered unit needed a minimum of one command vehicle for the radio capability.

Acknowledgement:

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LTC

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APPENDICES: 1 - Food Service
             2 - Class II and IV Supplies
             3 - Transportation and Ammunition
             4 - Maintenance
             5 - Lessons Learned

OFFICIAL:

ROSSO
34
APPENDIX 1 (Food Service) to Annex D (Logistics) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER)

1. Operation WINCHESTER called for two days of "C" rations and 15 days of expendables such as pens, paper, pencils, etc. This was not sufficient for our needs. This Battalion brought five (5) days rations, two (2) days with the troops, and three (3) days on pallets. This proved sufficient for our initial requirements, and in addition, the 1/3 Marines fed our personnel for two days after our arrival. Our account at Naval Support Activity (NSA) was not operable for six (6) days there by causing us to draw under a Marine account for Class I.

2. The 1st Log Command was not able to support the Battalion until 11 October with "A" rations. With the large amount of "B" type rations left on position, supplemented with our "C" rations, hot meals were fed starting 10 October 1966.

3. Ice was issued for our troops by the Marines at 1 pound per day per man. With no refrigerators at lettered companies, the proved inadequate. The Army issued 6 pounds per day per man without refrigerators, 3 pounds per day per man with refrigerators.

4. Under the current F series TOE upon which the Battalion was organized, the support platoon is required to have four (4) unit mess teams to operate four (4) messes at DA NANG and rear mess at BIEN HOA, additional mess equipment was necessary to meet the expanded requirements.

5. This Battalion deployed with sufficient personnel to feed our Battalion two "A" meals per day under normal operational conditions. For this special configuration with five (5) mess halls and mess at BIEN HOA to feed our rear party, we found out TOE equipment insufficient to meet the demands. To reduce or eliminate this problem, we took the following steps:

   a. Sent to BIEN HOA (Battalion Rear) for all mess personnel, except for one (1) mess sergeant and four (4) cooks, giving us a total of twenty-five (25) cooks in the operational area.

   b. Sent for and received from BIEN HOA (Battalion Rear) six (6) additional B packs, three (3) "A" packs and ten (10) immersion heaters with 32 gallon cans.

   c. In addition to sending to the Battalion rear for "A" and "B" packs above, we requested on DA Form 2765 the following items:

      (1) Twenty-five (25) Nermite cans

      (2) Six (6) Fire Units

      (3) Spare Parts

6. This request was not filled by the 1st Log Command, the same request was sent to the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Support Battalion and again the request was refused. On 4 Nov, CWO Kondert, Food Supervisor, 173d Abn Bde (Sep), was here for food inspection directed by the CO 173d Abn Bde (Sep). After his inspection, he understood the particular configuration and the necessity for the request items. Upon his return to Bde Hqs, these items were issued to the Battalion from the Bde Support Battalion. The reason for this request was to enable for feeding of three (3) "A" ration meals a day, and to enable the nermite containers to be left on position overnight and be picked up when breakfast was delivered the next day. The same system was used for lunch.
7. Since it is the current custom of the Brigade to issue ice three times a week, ice cream was requested thru the 1st Log Command but was not issued. SGT Cox, the Battalion mess steward, went to Hld. A with the request and the request was not approved. SGT Cox then went NSA-PAC requesting the desired ice cream. NSA-PAC stated there was no problem and issued the ice cream three times a week beginning the 20th of October.

8. During the period 8 October - 14 October SGT Palmer, mess steward for the 1/3 Marines, was of untold assistance to this Battalion. With the use his mess regulations, this SGT was very beneficial to the overall success of this Battalion's mess operations. SGT Palmer should be commended for a job well done.

9. It is felt that any food service problems encountered in this area, that 1st Log Command can't handle, MAJ Hall at Flag-A food service section be contacted.

10. CPT Durbin, Brigade S4, did an outstanding job while in DA HAJC. Due to his untiring efforts, this operation was made much smoother.
1. Upon departure from BIEN HOA the initial operation order called for two days supply other than pencils, paper, and the like which called for a fifteen day supply. Upon arrival in the operation area we found this to be inadequate. Many items which were immediately needed to set up the operational area we were unable to obtain, items such as mops, brooms, and the like.

2. During this operation additional TCB items were needed to perform the mission assigned this Battalion, TA-312 telephones, fire units,ermite cans, wire WD-1, and high powered binoculars, these items were ordered from the 1st Log Command. These requests were cancelled and had to be requested thru the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Support Battalion. This caused an undue delay in obtaining these items, causing the companies to be without until the request could be filled. This could have been corrected by the 1st Log Command, telling us they would not issue major items of equipment while on this operation.

3. Jungle boots were ordered, but the only type boot available from the 1st Log command were regular combat boots. Due to the extremely wet weather, these were found to be unsatisfactory. Jungle fatigues were ordered, however, the issues consisted mostly of jackets. Many small expendable items, such as heat tablets, BA 386, BA 30's, grease pencils were not issued in adequate quantities to fulfill the Battalion's needs. In order to get items A, B and C above, issue was requested from BIEN HOA.

4. Due to the disposition of the Battalion in the operational area, most units did not have access to the PX. Sundry packs were requested for these people but were so slow in coming in a sufficient amount to sustain the Battalion, that it caused unnecessary hardships on these personnel. In one incident, this Battalion was 90 packs under drawn and never did receive an adequate issue.

5. All supply requests were submitted on a three day "Fill or Kill" basis, however it was found that most requests required ten to twelve days to be processed and filled.

6. Of all supply requests submitted to the 1st Log Command, approximately 50 percent were either cancelled, due out, or partially filled. All bunkers in the TACR were in need of repair, and large amounts of materials were requested with negative results. This was finally issued by the Marine Division Engineers.

7. It is felt that many of the problems could have been improved by having a large portion of these expendibles issued directly from the Marine and Navy Depots in the immediate area. All medical supplies were issued in this manner with expeditious results.
Appendix 3 (Transportation and Ammunition) to Annex D (Logistics) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER)

1. After arrival in the operational area the two (2) 2½ ton trucks with water trailers that were allocated for our use by operation plan WINCHESTER were not sufficient for our needs. After securing permission from the CU 173d Abn Bde (Sep), three (3) additional 2½ ton trucks were brought forward, along with them were two (2) water trailers and one (1) 1½ ton cargo trailer. This proved to satisfy all requirements for transportation and water supply.

2. During the period when two (2) each 2½'s were in the operational area, the 1st Mar Div MTO supplied necessary transportation. This requirement was discontinued upon arrival of our own trucks.

3. For approximately two weeks, one company was supplied totally by helicopter. Because of the washed out bridges, this unit would have been completely isolated without helicopter support.

4. The following ammunition supply level was maintained at each unit by a Battalion directive:
   a. M-16: 400 rounds on the man, 400 rounds in company trains
   b. .45 Caliber Pistol: 21 rounds with weapon, 21 rounds per weapon in company trains
   c. M-79 Grenade Launcher: 45 rounds with weapon, 90 rounds in company trains per weapon
   d. M-60 MG: 2000 rounds per weapon, 4000 rounds in company trains per weapon
   e. .50 Caliber MG: 500 rounds with weapon, 500 rounds in company trains per weapon
   f. 81mm Mortar: 30 rounds with weapon, 60 rounds in company trains per weapon
   g. 4.2” Mortar: 50 rounds with weapon, 100 rounds in company trains per weapon
   h. 106 RR: 8 rounds with weapon, 16 rounds in company trains per weapon

5. After the levels in the above were achieved, the expenditures report given each morning was put on the first resupply vehicle to respective units to maintain their ASL.

6. LAW’s and M79 (MP) were net en hand at the 1st Log Command. These items had to be sent from the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) rear area to satisfy our requirements.

7. Current Brigade SOI requires a large number of hand held flares to be on hand. These were requested from 1st Log Command, but were not issued in quantities to sustain this Battalion’s current operational requirements.
1. Truck 1/2 ton M151

a. Shortly after arrival at the TAOR, we had an excess number of broken prop shafts and U joints, and others were found to be excessively worn. It is felt these deficiencies were caused by the monsoon season with the continuous driving through muddy areas. This was reduced by lubricating by LO every 300 miles rather than the required 1000 miles, and by requiring to be maintained in the vehicle log books.

b. A total of ten (10) carburetors were replaced while on this operation. This averaged one carburetor per three (3) M151’s. This was caused by a number of reasons, driver maintenance (didn’t clean and service as prescribed), a large amount of water found to be in the fuel issued to this Task Force, and lastly, it was felt, by the Maintenance SOT that the close proximity to the ocean might have been a contributing factor.

c. Due to the extremely poor roads and large rocks hits while driving at night and during periods of poor visibility, it was found that a large number of rear shock absorber bushings were requested, but this request was not filled. To keep our vehicles on the road, unservicable tires were cut and shock absorbers were fabricated. After using this substitute, no further trouble was encountered. Possibly a harder substance should be used.

d. With the positions of the lettered units being widely spread and having no transportation with this section, a transportation problem was encountered. This was solved by having a 1/2 ton truck and driver sent to this location on the daily courier flight.

e. To keep wheel bearing in operating condition, it was found they had to be repacked every 15 - 20 days to prevent wear out, rather than the six month normal requirement. This reduced the down time of the type vehicle.

2. Truck, Platform, 1/2 ton M274A1

a. Shifter shaft seals: Due to the excess mud and dust, the maintenance personnel replaced 12 each shifter shaft seals, this represented an average of three (3) per truck in 45 days. To reduce this problem, we continually instructed all drivers to clean this area. Recommendation: Closer supervision by responsible persons.

b. Fan Belts: During the same 45 day period, 10 fan belts were replaced. The cause is the same as stated above. Recommendation: Closer supervision by responsible persons.

c. Starter Cables: It was noticed the starter cables were sticking even though normal lubricating was accomplished. Recommendation: Grease each day and place on LO for this vehicle.

3. Truck 3/4 ton

No major problems were encountered with this vehicle during this operation.
4. Truck 2½ ton

Ground cable: Due to extremely rough roads, this Battalion witnessed three (3) broken ground cables which were replaced and two (2) cracked ones. The ones replaced all broke again, while the welded ones produced no further problem. As a result, all ends were welded in the same place and since then no problem has existed.

5. Tires

An excess number of flat tires were caused by the type terrain the vehicles were required to negotiate. The down time of vehicles was reduced by having on hand additional tires to replace flat ones, in addition to the spares. Flat tires were fixed after operational maintenance was performed.

6. Antenna Mounts

Due to the whipping of the AB-15 antenna on the M151 truck fender, it was noticed that a number of fenders were being torn. These torn fenders were welded, only to be torn again. Recommendation: That each fender having a antenna mounted be reinforced by additional metal and an inside bracket be placed in the fender.
1. Greater knowledge of the area of operations and equipment on hand at the operational area, will be needed for planning efficiently.

2. The logistical supporting agency has to be notified far enough in advance to support an Airborne unit, to include detailed information on that unit's TOE.

3. Two days "C" rations are not sufficient for this type move. Recommend five (5) days be brought and maintained at all times at all locations.

4. The operation plan did not provide for sufficient vehicles. Recommend that return air movement be checked for adequate vehicle list (See Annex B, Return Air Movement Table).

5. That fifteen (15) days of all classes of supplies be carried into the operational area by the logistical support agency.

6. Better control of requests, issues, and cancelled requests to facilitate response to the requesting unit, due to time involved between time of request and time of issue.

7. To operate a rear area mess facility and four messes in the operations area, additional mess items must be attached. Current TOE allows for four messes only, this unit operated five.

8. With the close proximity of an airfield such as Da Nang, the JP 4 fuel was not used and should not have been carried into the operational area.

9. If the 7th Engineers had not operated a water point, this Battalion would have needed a larger engineer contingent.

10. In a stationary position like this, more ammunition is needed in addition to the basic load prescribed by the Brigade.
Annex E (Medical) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER)

The Medical Platoon arrived in the Operational Area (AO) prepared for a field operation. This consisted of five medics with each rifle company, three with our provisional company, (Co D) and seven with the Battalion Headquarters. The section with the Bn Hqs was prepared to split into one unit at the logistic base for medical resupply and one unit for treatment to deploy with the forward CP section. We arrived with no transportation or resupply capability. Also we had no known medical back-up or resupply channels. On arrival the unit moved into a base camp type set up with an Aid Station and a small patient holding unit that would be shared with a Marine unit for a five to six day period. We found that our direct treatment support would come from the 3d Marine Medical Battalion (Co C Med). This would require us to have some means of transportation from our area to Co C Med as well as transportation from the company areas to our area. Because of this requirement we brought one NHA and one M151 to this area from BIEN HOA.

In direct support of this TF was Co C Med and the Naval Support Activity Hospital. We made arrangements with NSA and Co C Med to handle all patients, laboratory, and X-ray requirements. Arrangements were made with the hospitals for us to handle all patients from this unit that needed evacuation from this area. After we had been in the area five days we were contacted by a representative of the 55th Medical Group at QUI Nhon. We were informed that this group was responsible for this unit's medical operation. After a short discussion it was agreed that patients evacuated from this area but not out of Vietnam would go to the 93d Evac Hospital and out of country evacuations would go through the 85th Evac Hospital at QUI Nhon. Also as a result of this discussion, the 55th Medical Group attached to us a liaison team to coordinate evacuation. This team consisted of two medics, as in-flight attendants, one ambulance driver and one assistant driver. Also in support was a graves registration unit from the 1st Log Command and an AG representative from the 173d Abn Bde (Sep). The liaison team, graves registration team and AG individuals were all placed at Co C Med since this was the most centralized location for their activities. The others were retained at the Battalion Aid Station.

Medical facilities available in the area are as follows:

1. 3d Marine Medical Battalion (Co C Med): This unit has about a 100 patient capacity with a 24 hour to 3 day holding policy. Psychiatry, Oral Surgery, General Surgery, Orthopedics and Internal Medicine specialists are represented. Laboratory facilities were available.

2. NSA Hospital: This unit has a 400 bed capacity with a holding policy of 30 days. This unit had all specialists represented including a Neuro-Surgeon and Ophthalmologists. Also, eye glasses could be obtained on a 24 hour basis.

3. Hospital Ship REPOSE: Operates of the coast in this area with a 450 bed capacity and a 30 day holding policy and acts as direct and back-up support to the DA NANG and CHI LUI areas.

4. US AID Hospital and ARVN Hospital: They are present in the area for treatment of Vietnamese seen on MEDCAP or injured by US troops.

5. Operational Procedures:

a. Med-Evac: Marine Med-Evacs was present in this area, Freq 2165 AM, call sign Landshark, with a 15 to 40 minute reaction time. However, due to procedural differences and availability of our own helicopters, Med-Evac was accomplished with the Cowboy helicopters attached to this unit. In this manner, Med-Evac was accomplished with less confusion due to these units having worked together previously in a similar fashion (Operation ATLANTIC CITY).
b. All injuries should go to Co C Med except head injuries and eye injuries which should go direct to NSA or the REPOSE.

c. We attempted to prevent our troops from going to the REPOSE due to its mobility and difficulty in keeping up with soldiers evacuated to the REPOSE incase we moved.

d. All medical supplies were obtained direct from NSA supply depot with a 48 hours reaction time.

e. Laboratory, x-ray and consultation support was furnished by Co C Med.

f. Out of country evacuation was accomplished through the 85th Evac Hospital coordinated by SP6 Major 55th Med Group liaison using our daily courier flight from BIEN HOA.

g. Dental support was furnished by the 7th Ngr Bn and Co C Med.

h. All adult Vietnamese accidentally injured by US forces were treated initially in US facilities and transferred to the US Aide Hospital in DA NANG as soon as possible.

i. All VC suspects were treated initially by US facilities and then transferred to the ARVN Hospital in DA NANG.

j. All children were treated in HOA KANNAH Children's Hospital at FISA-G Red Beach or at the US aide Hospital.

SUMMARY OF INJURIES:

A total of 37 individuals were evacuated from this area due to medical reasons. There were 30 WIA and 2 KIA during the operation. Ten of the WIA were serious enough to require out of country evacuation. The injuries were all multiple fragment wounds. All types of injuries were represented including head injuries, chest penetrations, abdominal penetration and extremity wounds, including drowning at Red Beach. There were 4 accidental discharges of weapons resulting in 4 injuries, and 1 vehicle injury. It is important to note that numerous cases of gonorrhea were noted and all could be traced directly to "houses" located directly outside the Task Force area. Attempts to correct this were stopped due to US-Vietnamese public health regulations.

It should be noted that cooperation in all medical channels was excellent.

Acknowledge:

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LTC

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PRICE
Bn Surg
1. General: This Battalion deployed from BIEN HOA to DA NANG on 7 October 1966, with the S5 section consisting of one (1) officer. The mission of the S5 section was known at this time. Three (3) days after arrival in the DA NANG area, liaison was established with the 1st Marine Division G5. At that time the Battalion S5 section was informed that they were to coordinate all their efforts thru the 3d Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company, located in the 3d Marines CP area.

2. The TAOR encompassed 8 villages as follows:
   a. HOA VANG District:
      (1) HOA HIEP
      (2) HOA LAC
      (3) HOA THANH
      (4) HOA VINH
      (5) HOA THINH
   b. HIEU Duc District:
      (1) HOA MINH
      (2) HOA LOC
      (3) HOA PHU

   Population within the TAOR was 20,600 persons.

   District advisor for HOA VANG District was MAJ Foster, located at co-ordinates 014726.

   District advisor for HIEU Duc District was MAJ Allen, located at co-ordinates 934688.

3. Projects Within the Battalion TAOR:
   a. HOA KHANH Children's Hospital was located in the Battalion CP area at co-ordinates 939782. The hospital had the capacity for 35 to 40 children. It was operated by three (3) Medics and three (3) Vietnamese Nurses. The Battalion Surgeon checked the children daily and in addition, a pediatrician visited the hospital once a week to examine all children. The children were fed three (3) meals daily from the HHC mess and received clothing and toys. MEDCAP for villagers who lived in the nearby area was conducted at the Children's Hospital daily except Tuesdays. The hospital was constructed by the 3d Marines and was the only Pediatric Clinic in the DA NANG area. The value of operating a hospital like this is that:
     (1) It gives the local populace a chance to seek expert medical help and advise for their children.
     (2) It helped to establish excellent rapport between American units and the local populace.

CONFIDENTIAL
(3) It is beneficial to the local population to have three (3) trained Vietnamese nurses who will remain permanently in the area after the Americans move out and continue on with the operation of the hospital.

4. MEDCAP: MEDCAP was conducted on a daily basis by the company medics in the hamlets with in their company's area of responsibility. Soap and Pay Ops/JUSPAO literature were distributed in conjunction with MEDCAP.

5. DISTRIBUTIONS: Foodstuffs, clothing, soap and building materials were distributed thru local officials i.e., village and hamlet chiefs. This was done in order to have the people respect their officials and also to enhance their loyalty to their government.

6. REPORTS: The following reports were required on dates indicated and were submitted to the 3d Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company.
   a. Daily Civic Action Activity Report prior to 0700 hours daily.
   b. Report of Significant Data - upon being assigned civic action responsibility in a given area, and updated as changes occur.
   c. Pacification Progress Report - 20th of each month
   d. MEDCAP Activity Report - 2d of each month.
   e. "Blacklash Report" - Serious incidents involving Vietnamese Nationals.

7. REQUISITIONS: All requisitions were addressed to CG, III MAF via CG 1st Marine Division and were routed thru the 3d Platoon 29th Civic Affairs Company.

8. PROJECTS ACCOMPLISHED:
   a. MEDCAP (Projects) .................. 251
   b. MEDCAP (Patients Treated) ........ 9,671
   c. MEDEVAC .......................... 21
   d. Food Distribution (Pounds) ......... 9,350
   e. Clothing Distribution (Pounds) .... 1,000
   f. Tin Distribution (Sheets) .......... 300
   g. Cement Distribution (Bags) ......... 200
   h. Lumber Distribution (Truck Loads) .. 25
   i. Soap Distribution (Bars) .......... 8,700
   j. Leaflets (Boxes) .................. 876
      (1) Aerial Drops .................. 100,000
      (2) Distribution by Troops .......... 18,000
Annex F (Civil Affairs) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER) Con'd

k. JUAPAO Literature ............... 18,000

l. Distribution of 32 Pigs to 4 Hamlets

m. Thanksgiving Day:
   (1) Invited 60 Village Chiefs, Hamlet Chiefs and Elders.
   (2) Furnished Thanksgiving Dinner to four (4) CAC units which included 62 Marines and 220 PF soldiers.
   (3) Distribution of fruit, nuts and candy to 1800 children

n. Construction of four (4) pig pens

o. Organised two (2) agriculture meetings.

9. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:

a. Assisted in the relocation of HOA LAC Village (28 October - 1 November) to include:
   (1) Moving of 58 families
   (2) All livestock
   (3) All personal and belongings
   (4) Security during move
   (5) Assistance in form of clothing, foodstuffs and temporary shelter.

b. Construction of a 58 family living unit refugee camp at coordinates 899819.
   (1) 50 units were completed by 3 December 1966 when the Battalion returned to BIEN HOA.
   (2) Co C furnished a 6 man detail daily to help with the construction of the refugee camp along with Vietnamese Nationals.

10. INCIDENTS:

a. On 130900H November 1966, three (3) Vietnamese, believed to be Viet Cong were fired upon by Co B when they were observed fleeing across a field at AT 871739 during a combat operation. Results of this incident were as follows: Two (2) individuals KIA and one (1) individual WIA. Solatium in the amount of 3,000 piasters was paid to the widows of the two (2) individuals who were killed. The individual who was injured received 1,000 piasters in solatium payment. A "Blacklash Report" was submitted to CG, III MAF.

b. On 151015H November 1966, a Vietnamese busdriver was accidentally shot and killed on National Highway #1, 900 meters south of HAI VAN Pass at AT 935906. The incident occurred during a road clearing and route security operation along Highway #1. The probable cause of this incident was attributed to the "cookoff" of a 7.62mm round in a M60 MG. Solatium in the amount of 3,000 piasters
was paid to the busdriver's parents in Hue by the 1st Marine Division. A "Blacklash Report" was submitted to CG, III MAF.

c. On 22 November 1966, a patrol from Company B was charged by a water buffalo at AT 925725. The patrol shot and killed the water buffalo. The owner of the water buffalo was paid 1,000 piasters solatium payment.

d. On 30 November 1966, a patrol from Company B was charged by a water buffalo at AT 937715. The patrol shot and killed the water buffalo. The owner of the water buffalo was paid 1,000 piasters solatium payment.

Acknowledge:

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HERTWECK
S5
1. No major communications problems were encountered during Operation WINCHESTER. On several occasions, to satisfy requirements of the 1st Marine Div, additional equipment was requested and brought up from BIEN HOA. However, at no time were we unable to effectively communicate with either higher headquarters or subordinate units.

2. Radio communications within the DA NANG area was all FM. To communicate with BIEN HOA our SSB capability was utilized.
   a. 1st Marine Division required TF 4/503d Inf to monitor the Division Command FM net. With the exception of periodic readability checks, no traffic was passed.
   b. It was the plan of the 1st Marine Division to activate a secure voice net. TF 4/503d Inf requested and received the necessary equipment from the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and was successful in netting with the Division. Full scale operation of the net, however, was never effected.
   c. The AN/PRC-25 proved adequate as the primary means of radio communications. Command and Fire Direction Net radios with RC-292 antennas were reacted from the top of a nearby hill (282) into the TOC. Except when precluded by breaks in the remote lines, these radios served as the primary link with subordinate units. To insure continuous communications, alternate radios were set up in the Message Center Bunker and also remoted into the TOC. From this location, utilizing RC-292 antennas, effectiveness of communications were established with two of the rifle companies. After extensive experimentation, a quarter wave long wire antenna was found to bring in the third company loud and clear.
   d. The AN/GRC-106 Radio was used to communicate with the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) at BIEN HOA. Most of the Battalion's administrative traffic to that Hqs was passed by this means. Except when precluded by atmospheric interference, continuous communications was maintained. This piece of equipment was invaluable to both the Task Force and the 173d Abn Bde (Sep).

3. The construction and maintenance of wire lines kept all available personnel occupied. Due to the density and evidenced maliciousness of the indigenous population it was necessary to trouble shot at least two company lines daily.
   a. Initially, TF 4/503d Inf was under the OPCON of 3d Bn, 3d Marine Div. Wire to that headquarters was already laid and consisted of two common users, one hot line to COG and hot line to FSCC.
   b. When the TF was placed under the OPCON of the 1st Marine Division, the need arose for entirely new lines to be laid. The wire section assisted in the laying and overheading of two common users, one COG hot line, one FSCC hot line and one teletype circuit line. Maintenance of these lines, due to the Div's lack of personnel, of necessity was a wire team function.
   c. A teletype link was established with the 1st Marine Division. Eventually the vast majority of all traffic passed between these two headquarters was by this means. Initially the equipment, including crypto, was provided by the 1st Marine Division. Later the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) sent from BIEN HOA two teletype machines, TT-4A's, and the Marines machines were returned. The 1st Marine Division provided maintenance support for the teletype equipment.
d. Wire communications was also established with two adjacent Marine units, Force Logistical Command and the 7th Engr Bn. Both units provided an alternate entry into the 1st Marine Division wire network.

e. One wire line to Co A's positions and another to Namo Bridge, along the same route, were already laid. These lines proved to be our greatest headache.

(1) During the first two weeks, daily repair was necessary. Ninety percent of the troubles encountered were one strand breaks. In an effort to offset this, a simple circuit was installed utilizing C-161 repeating coils. These coils were borrowed from the Force Logistical Command.

(2) To further improve these lines, bamboo poles and existing local telephone poles were used in overheading. Unfortunately, breakage and shorting out was experienced due to the wire rubbing against the pole connections. This was countered by suspending the wire using the basket weave technique.

f. One existing line to Co C's position was also utilized. This line was overheaded using bamboo poles and required little additional maintenance.

g. Lines to Co B and the Marine Combined Action Company units along the same route were installed. This introduction of WD-1/TT into the area resulted in a grand display of Vietnamese inventive ingenuity. New shiny black clothes lines, bundle wrappings, bridles for buffalo, and skip ropes for children appeared everywhere. In an attempt to lessen the maintenance requirement, overheading was begun but not completed.

h. Forty-two (42) phones were installed within the Battalion CP complex.

4. Message Center functioning was smooth throughout the entire operation. Initially a scheduled run was made to higher headquarters daily and special runs when necessary. After the establishment of the telegraph circuit, only special runs and the evening delivery of daily operational reports to Division COG were necessary. Upon their arrival, the 1st Marine Division scheduled its helicopter courier to make stops at LZ GERONIMO twice daily. Seldom, however, did we utilize this service.

5. The Radio Repair Section managed to get all inoperable equipment back into the hands of the users within a reasonable time limit.

6. Setting up a conventional communications system was most beneficial experience for all concerned. For the first time since the Battalion's arrival in VIET NAM, the skills of the TOE communicators were integrated simultaneously in accomplishing the mission. The result was an effective, efficient, smooth running operation.

Acknowledge:

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ALLEN
S3
Annex H (Air Movement Table) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER)

Departure Airfield: DA MAAM
Arrival Airfield: BIEN HOA
Unit: TF 4/503rd Inf
Type Aircraft: C-130
ACL: 30,000 pounds

Loading Sequence


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<th>FLIGHT</th>
<th>LOAD TIME</th>
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<td>0734</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0950</td>
<td>1030</td>
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## Annex H (Air Movement Table) to After Action Report (Operation WINCHESTER) Con'd

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Acknowledgement:

HEALY
LTC

DISTRIBUTION: Special

OFFICIAL:

ALLEN

CONFIDENTIAL

70