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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(Initial Report) Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

TO: See Distribution

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SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. GENERAL

a. Organization and Activation. This Battalion and attached Battery G, (Caliber .50 MG), 65th Artillery were activated 1 March 1966 by General Order 2, Headquarters U.S. Army Air Defense Center, dated 10 January 1966. The organizational structure of this Battalion is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION (AW)(SP) 44TH ARTILLERY

ASSIGNED

HQ Battery, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP) 44th Artillery
A Battery, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP) 44th Artillery
B Battery, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP) 44th Artillery
C Battery, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP) 44th Artillery
D Battery, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP) 44th Artillery

ATTACHED

G Battery (Machinegun Caliber .50), 65th Artillery

b. Activities. Unit training was initiated on 11 April 1966 and culminated by successful completion of the Army Training Test on 1 July 1966. Following the successful completion of a Command Maintenance Management Inspection on 15 July 1966, the unit began Operational Readiness Training which was completed on 3 September 1966. POM was initiated on 6 September 1966 and equipment prepared for loading on 30 September 1966. The Battalion main body departed Fort Bliss on 16 October 1966, with the Rear-Advance party departing on 24 October 1966. The Battalion being VOOG attached to 1st Cav Division, the advance party began preparations at An Khe upon arrival, 27 October 1966. On 4 November 1966, the advance party was notified the Battalion was further assigned to...
AVFA-AT-1/44-C
11 February 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
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52d Artillery Group, Pleiku, and would split into two segments; one-half to be OPCON 4th Division at Pleiku and the other half OPCON 1st CAV Division at Hammond LZ (near Phu Cat). The main body arrived Qui Nhon on 6 November 1966 and troops and Red TAT equipment was shipped to both points. On 14 November 1966, the Battalion was assigned OPCON III Marine Amphibious Force, Da Nang. Unit was further assigned OPCON III Marine Division, and moved on 29 November 1966 to Dong Ha, with one battery each to Phu Bai and Camp J.J. Carroll (coord. 060540). Battery G, 65th Artillery was attached as follows: Two (2) sections to Battery D at Phu Bai; one (1) section to Battery C at Camp J.J. Carroll; Headquarters Battery, Battery G, 65th Artillery and three sections remain with the Battalion at Dong Ha.

c. POM. The Battalion conducted POM activities at Fort Bliss, Texas, a distance of fifty (50) miles from the Battalion Camp located at Orogrando Range Camp, New Mexico. This distance created additional administrative and logistical problems for the Battalion. Radios required for deployment were only received in time for checkout prior to packing, giving the unit no time for conduct of training on the AN/CRC-19 and the new FM series radios. Prime weapons for the Battalion were sent directly from depots to ports of embarkation. There was no opportunity for the unit to check for completeness of OVE equipment prior to embarkation. Generally, it must be said that the rebuilt M42's and M55's received were in excellent condition. However, the M42's were received less the crew headsets for communications. These items did not come with the OVE as expected, and limited the employment of these weapons initially. The most general problem encountered during the period of movement was the loss of supplies and equipment, both organizational and personal due to weather and shipment damage.

d. Movement. Unit moves from Qui Nhon, An Khe, Pleiku, Hammond LZ to Da Nang were administrative in nature, normally involving air transport of men and equipment. Four (4) days were involved in this movement and seven (7) days for movement of Red TAT equipment. Tactical equipment was received and processed in Da Nang. Move from Da Nang to points of assignment was made by "Rough Rider Convoy". Marine Air and Security Forces along with Battery G (Caliber .50 MG); 65th Artillery were utilized for convoy protection. Two (2) days were required to convoy men and equipment North less M42 vehicles and 5 ton trucks which were shipped on LCU's to Phu Bai and Dong Ha. Some WABTOC supplies are still in process of being shipped from Da Nang.

2. INTELLIGENCE.

Intelligence activities conducted by this Battalion take the form of patrols, both mounted and foot, in support of Sector II, Dong Ha defense.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

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3. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. Plans. Continue support operations of 3d Marine Division in Operation Chinook and Prairie II.

b. Operations. This Battalion has been deployed since its arrival at Dong Ha, 29 November 1966. As base camp was originally outside the Dong Ha defensive perimeter, ground was taken for Headquarters A, B, and G Battery, 65th Artillery. Battery D arrived Phu Bai and Battery C arrived Dong Ha on 4 December 1966. Air and perimeter defense positions for Dong Ha were occupied on 9 December 1966; for Camp J.J. Carroll on 12 December 1966; for Phu Bai on 14 December 1966. Battery G, 65th Artillery is employed in air and perimeter defensive positions as well as in convoy escort duty which has been accomplished daily since arrival in area of operations. Inclosure 1 lists missions performed by the Battalion and Battery G, 65th Artillery during the reporting period. Inclosure 2 elaborates on the employment of this unit in the 3d Marine Amphibious Force TAOR.

c. When deployed in isolated positions or when moving in dense foliage, there is a requirement for an easily maneuverable shock weapon that can be fired from the turret of the M42. To enhance the capabilities of M42 gun crews in ground support and self-defense, M79 Grenade Launchers were requested on USARV Form 47R and DF Form 2765-1, dated 10 January 1967.

d. Training.

(1) Unit Training. Unit training was conducted under ATP 44-2, which is heavily weighted in air defense operations. Future training of automatic weapons units should be more equally divided between the air defense role and the ground role. This unit's primary mission is air defense, but the secondary mission of ground defense and direct support operations is our general day to day assignment.

(2) In Country Training. Training during the reporting period since arrival in country consisted of four (4) days prime weapons firing at Da Nang; one (1) day firing individual weapons and M60 Machine-guns; one (1) day on Claymore Mines and Booby Traps. Since becoming operational, three (3) hours have been utilized each week for crew drill.

e. Chemical. N/A

f. PSYWAR. N/A

4. LOGISTICS

a. Resupply of units and/or sections employed in various operations away from the base camp have posed few problems at this time.
CONFIDENTIAL

11 February 1967


This can be attributed to the sound resupply procedures established and maintained by the headquarters to which this organization is under operational control. The prime method of resupply utilized by our operational control headquarters is "hot lift", except for large operations where an ISR has been established. The one item that is needed, and not available in this area for hot lift, is 250 or 500 gallon rubberized fuel bladders. At present, refueling is being accomplished with 55 gallon drums, which are difficult to handle in quantity. Action was initiated through supply channels on this item on USRV Form 47-R and DL 2755-1 on 10 February 1967.

b. Due to the worldwide shortage of end items and repair parts for this organization's main weapon system (Gun, SP FTM421) it is imperative that an engineer mine sweeping team be attached to elements operating away from the base camp.

c. When tactically feasible, a unit should receive a specific assignment upon arrival in country. Debarcation of men and equipment of this unit in several areas caused loss of equipment and supplies. Although well packed upon departure, the loading and unloading operations plus the weather played havoc on expendable supplies, unpacked items in COMEX containers and non-replaceable items in W.BTOC such as refrigerators.

d. Fuel consumption experience for the M42 in infantry direct support operations across country has been .24 miles per gallon or approximately 35 miles on a full tank of gas. This is on the low end of 35-100 miles rated cruising range, and is due to slow speeds required by foot troops and terrain.

e. Ammunition supply rates, established by higher headquarters, have been adequate. The ISR is as follows:

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5. CIVIL AFFAIRS

e. Medical Care.

(1) During the period 19 December 1966 through 31 January 1967, the Battalion Medical Section provided medical assistance to approximately 600 patients at Dai An Hamlet (coordinate 242538). The principal treatments were for colds, headaches, skin infections, and skin disease.

(2) On 26 January 1967 a mass therapy for round worms was initiated at Dai An village. It was emphasized that they use soap for their hands and to prevent the recurrence of the infection.
b. On 12 January 1967 this organization picked up 320 bags of cement and 730 sheets of tin from USAID Warehouse in QuangTri, which will be used by members of the Dai An Hamlet to construct new homes where the hamlet is to be relocated.

c. On 12 January 1967 at Dai An Hamlet, this organization furnished a security force to provide protection for a property evaluation team from QuangTri Provincial Headquarters. The security force was provided for the period 1200 hours to 1600 hours, 17 January 1967.

d. On 9 January 1967, vehicles from this Battalion transported 130 bags of cement from the USAID Warehouse, QuangTri, to the Battalion area for temporary storage. This cement will be delivered to the Dai An villagers when they need it.

e. On 17 January 1967 and 18 January 1967, this organization provided 2½ ton trucks (2 on 17 January - 1 on 18 January 1967) to the Base Coordinator for use of Vietnamese grave removal operations.

f. This Battalion will furnish the transportation required for evacuation and relocation of the village of Dai An.

6. PERSONNEL

a. Officer rotational hump. It appears at this time this Battalion will be able to solve its own rotational hump problem with the number of Officers who have voluntarily extended their tour, from thirty (30) to sixty (60) days, if they might remain assigned to this Battalion.

b. Personnel were continually being assigned to this unit who were later determined to be medically or administratively non-deployable during the unit training phase. This increased the administrative burden on this unit and delayed proper fill of critical positions. It is recommended that screening be accomplished prior to ordering of personnel to a unit, training for deployment.

7. ARTILLERY

a. In support of Operation Prairie and Operation Gainook, the following number of rounds have been fired by this Battalion:

- 40mm - 62,416 rounds ammunition.
- Caliber .50 - 172,113 rounds ammunition.

b. Ammunition for the 40mm gun has been adequate and readily available. Type of ammunition available is the M353 I HEIT-SD and the
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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
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MARK 27 HE-T-SD. This ammunition is self destructing at ranges of
3500-4500 meters, depending on lot, and is suitable for air defense
firing and short range surface firing. With MARK 2 HE-T PD, ranges of
8500 meters could be undertaken in fire missions. This type of ammu-
nition was requested on DA Form 581, dated 1 February 1967.

8(c) SIGNAL

Prior to deployment from CONUS this Battalion was issued
23 radio sets AN/GRC-19 in lieu of the AN/GRC-106 radio. The AN/GRC-19
has proven to be an unsatisfactory substitute for the following reasons:

1. The Battalion mission is to provide direct support
   for III MAF maneuver elements. The AN radio equipment currently in use
   by III MAF units being supported is single-side-band radio sets, AN/TRC-75
   and AN/PRC-47. The AN/GRC-19 radio will not not with the AN/PRC-47
   radio and the AN/GRC-75 radio has to be adjusted in order to not with
   the AN/GRC-19 radio.

2. The Battalion also needs to assume an air
   defense mission at any time. USAF units in the area use COLLINS KWI-ZL
   single-sideband radios for passing early warning air defense information.
   At the present time the Battalion is relying on wire communications with
   USAF units for early warning. The AN/GRC-106 radio will not with USAF
   single-sideband radios in use while the AN/GRC-19 will not. Wire commu-
   nication is impractical in a mobile situation. This unit has requested
   issue of the AN/GRC-106.

b. Additional FM Requirements

Direct support operations have found the Battalion lacking
in communication equipment. Normally, a platoon or less of M42 weapons
is assigned in support of company operations. The platoon leader
operates from one M42 he has designated as the command vehicle. As this
vehicle is equipped with the AN/VRC-46, the platoon leader can have
only communications with his platoon. This problem has been temporarily
solved by the platoon leader carrying an AN/PRC-25 for communications
with the supported element. The communication section is in process of
installing brackets in the M42 so that an AN/VRC-47 may be mounted, thus
allowing the monitoring of two channels. One AN/VRC-47 is available for
each platoon.
SECTION II COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. PERSONNEL

Item: Assignment of non-POR qualified personnel to a deployable unit.

Discussion: Close supervision should be given the screening for assignment of personnel to a deploying unit. Many personnel in critical MOS areas of this Battalion and of the critical grade area of E-5 to E-6 were assigned who were under investigation or charges, non-security clearable or physically disqualified for deployment overseas. An added administrative burden ensued and as training had to proceed, gaps were created as these individuals were finally reassigned prior to deployment.

Observation: Personnel should be screened in accordance with existing regulations prior to assignment to a deploying unit.

2. OPERATIONS

a. Item: Increasing ammunition capacity of M55 mount.

Discussion: It has been found that 20mm ammunition containers can be adapted for use as Caliber .50 ammunition feeding boxes on the M55 Quad Caliber .50 Machinegun Mount. The larger size of these containers provides the M55 crew capability to fire 1400 rounds (350 rounds; 3 linked belts per container) without reloading instead of the normal 420 rounds. Two methods have been used to attach the 20mm containers to the mount:

   (1) The loading tray is removed and the 20mm container is welded in its place.

   (2) The loading tray is cut-down where it is attached to the mount and to the stub is welded the 20mm container.

Care must be exercised when using the larger ammunition boxes to assure that barrel life is not reduced by firing excessively long bursts.

Observation: This added capability has been especially valuable for guns on convoy escort duty where maximum sustained firepower must be applied in case of ambush.
b. Item: The effectiveness of the Quad Caliber .50 M55 can be extended with added fire control equipment.

Discussion: The M55 is an effective H and I weapon in indirect fire. However, due to lack of a gunner's quadrant, compass and binoculars, indirect fire cannot be undertaken as the mount has no indicators for elevation and azimuth. A firing table is available for this weapon. A request was initiated by USARV Form 47-R and DA 2765-1 on 27 January 1967 to obtain a gunner's quadrant, compass and binoculars for each M55 gun squad.

Observation: The requested change should be approved and equipment issued as soon as possible.

c. Item: The AN/TPS-25 Anti-Personnel Radar adds to the effectiveness of the AW mission of perimeter defense.

Discussion: One of the primary missions of the M42/M55 Battalion in Vietnam is night perimeter ground defense. On two occasions, the effectiveness of co-locating an anti-personnel radar and an M42 weapon has proved a useful tool in night defense. On these occasions the radar picked up enemy probes approaching the perimeter network. Azimuth and range were passed to the gun section which was able to swing easily to the required azimuth and elevation, and without deadtime for illumination, sweep the probe area with automatic fire. This fire control/firepower team is able to effect surprise not capable with illumination and other low muzzle velocity weapons. This unit requested augmentation with the AN/TPS-25, by USARV Form 47-R and DA 2765-1 on 4 January 1967.

Observation: That AW units in Vietnam be augmented with An/TPS-25 Anti-Personnel Radars.

d. Grenade Screens.

Item: Grenade Screens for turret protection, Twin 40mm Motor Carriage, M42.

Discussion: Much thought and some research was conducted at Fort Bliss on fabrication of a grenade screen for the turret of the M42. Operations conducted by this unit to date have indicated no requirements for a grenade screen. Besides being a hinderance in a light and fast moving situation, heavy jungle would most likely become entangled and tear off any constructed screen.

Observation: Development work in this area should not be pursued further.
e. Removal of Draw Bar, M55 MG Mount.

Item: The draw bar of the M20 Trailer is a safety hazard when the M55 Mount is employed on a 2½ ton truck.

Discussion: To prevent possible injuries to the crew, the draw bar should be removed from the M20 Trailer when the M55 Mount is employed on the bed of the 2½ ton truck. This will enable the crew to service the weapon without fear of stumbling over the draw bar or possible getting caught between the draw bar and the mount.

Observation: That M55 crews be required to remove the draw bar of the M20 Trailer when the M55 is employed on the 2½ ton truck.

f. M79 Grenade Launcher.

Item: M79 Grenade Launcher for M42 crew.

Discussion: When deployed in an isolated position or when moving on a trail in dense foliage, a requirement exists for a shock weapon for flank protection which can be easily fired from the turret if required.

Observation: Augmentation of the M79 to the M42 would greatly enhance the gun crews' capabilities in ground support and self-defense.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

Item: Authorized crew for the Caliber .50 M55 Mount is not sufficient, reference TOE 44-85 T.

Discussion: The personnel authorized by TOE are insufficient for maximum effectiveness of the M55 weapon. The weapon was designed to be manned by a crew of four; the squad leader, gunner, left and right machinegunners. If the fire unit were dismounted from its prime mover this crew would be sufficient. However, employment experience with this weapon has been generally one requiring mobility. This means that a driver is required, and under present organization this driver comes from the crew which reduces the weapon efficiency. This unit requested amendment to the TOE adding a driver to each gun squad as outlined in the 44-57 in July 1966 which was forwarded to Headquarters, 6th Artillery Group.

Observation: TOE 44-85 should be changed to add a driver to each M55 crew.
4. INTELLIGENCE

None

4. LOGISTICS

Item: Water collects in bottom of M20 Trailer.

Discussion: The heavy rainfall occurring in Vietnam has necessitated the drilling of drainage holes in the bottom of the M20 Trailer which transports the M55 Machinegun Mount to alleviate collection of water. Two (2) holes are recommended, one (1) to the front and one (1) to the rear of the trailer. In dry weather a rubber grommet or cork may be used to plug these holes to keep out dust.

Observation: That drilling of holes in the M20 Trailer has solved the water collection problem. Other units with this equipment should be informed of this modification.

6. OTHER (SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL KITS)

Item: Supplementary Medical Kits.

Discussion: The Battalion surgeon has taken Caliber .50 ammunition cans and prepared medical items to augment first aid kits when Platoons or other elements are on extended D/S missions. These kits normally contain:

Salt Tablets
Insecticide Powder
Foot Powder
Purification Tablets
Papsome Tablets
Cloroquine-Primaquine Tablets
Calamine Lotion
Extra Bandages

Observation: This suggestion should be disseminated to other combat Battalions.
PART II, Recommendations

1. PERSONNEL

Recommend that all echelons give close supervision to screening of personnel for assignment to a unit deploying overseas.

2. OPERATIONS

a. Recommend that the use of 20mm ammunition containers as ammunition boxes to increase the load capacity of the Caliber .50 M55 Mount be disseminated to other machinegun batteries.

b. Recommend that the request for binoculars, gunners quadrant and compass to allow the Caliber .50 M55 Mount to undertake indirect fire missions be approved.

c. Recommend that AW units in Vietnam be augmented with the AN/TPS-25 Anti-Personnel Radar to increase mission efficiency in perimeter defense.

d. Recommend development work on a fabricated grenade screen for the M42 turret be discontinued.

e. Recommend the safety hazard caused by the draw bar of the M20 Trailer, when the M55 Mount is employed on the 2½-ton truck, be disseminated.

f. Recommend that the request of M79 Grenade Launchers to augment the M42 gun crews' ability of self-defense and ground support be approved.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. Recommend that the training program of automatic weapons units in the ground role be increased and given equal emphasis with the air defense role.

b. Recommend that TOE 44-8 T, Air Defense Artillery Machinegun Battery Caliber .50 be changed to add a driver to each M55 crew.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(Initial Report) Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

4. INTELLIGENCE
   None

5. LOGISTICS
   Recommend that, when tactically feasible, a unit receive a specific assignment prior to arrival of main body to preclude the shipment damage and loss of supplies.

2 incl
Missions Performed
Employment of AW in 3d NAF TAOR

RICHARD L. PICKARD
Major, Arty
Acting Commander

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AVFA-AT-D (11 Feb 67) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (ROG CSFOR-65)(1st Bn, 44th Arty)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350 16 Feb 67

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GG-OAT,
APO 96350

1. Censur in observations and recommendations contained in basic
communication.

2. The following additional comments are submitted.

   a. Reference Section I, para 8a: requested unit to submit requisi-
tions for subject radios.

   b. Reference Section II, Part II, para 2a: disseminated in
February 67 I FFORCEV Arty Newsletter.

   c. Reference Section II, Part II, para 2b, para 2c and para 2f:
Requests recommending approval have been forwarded.

   d. Reference Section II, Part I, para 2e: Disseminated in the
February 67 I FFORCEV Arty Newsletters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LEO E. ELLIS
LTG, Arty
Adjutant

2 Incl
no
AVFA-CC-OT (11 Feb 67)  2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967,
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  17 MAR 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery,
and preceding indorsement with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section I, paragraph 8a: Appropriate follow-up
action will be taken to deliver the radios as soon as they become available.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part II - Recommendations.

a. Reference paragraph 1: The screening of personnel prior to
assignment to an organization scheduled for deployment does not preclude
further screening by the organization to which they are assigned.

b. Reference paragraph 2a: An equipment improvement recommenda-
tion (EIR) should be submitted by the organization.

c. Reference paragraph 2b, 2c, and 2f: The organization should
follow-up USARV form 47 action with request for MTOE change.

d. Reference paragraph 2d: In view of the experiences of this
organization, consideration should be given to discontinuance of the pro-
ject.

e. Reference paragraph 2e: The safety hazard caused by use of
the draw bar as described should be widely publicized in appropriate pub-
lications.

f. Reference paragraph 3a: Determination of the contents of an
organizational training program, except for mandatory training, is within
the prerogative of the commander concerned.

g. Reference paragraph 3b: An appropriate request for MTOE
change should be submitted by the organization.

h. Reference paragraph 5: All units are given specific assign-
ments prior to deployment, however, tactical considerations may necessitate
that such assignments be changed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charles L. Johnson
SPT, AGC

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DH (11 Feb 67) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS GSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307
27 APR 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 8a, Page 6; Paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement, concerning the requirement for AN/GRC-106 radios: Unit's TOE authorization for AN/GRC-106 radios is valid. Assets are available in CONUS depot stocks. Upon receipt of the radios in RVN they will be exchanged for the AN/GRC-19 radios.

b. Reference Paragraph 1, Page 7; Paragraph 1, Page 11; and Paragraph 3a, 2d Indorsement, concerning the need for careful screening of personnel for assignment to a unit scheduled for deployment: Concur with unit's recommendation and comment of Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, in 2d Indorsement.

c. Reference Paragraph 2a, Page 7; Paragraph 2a, Page 11; Paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement; and Paragraph 3b, 2d Indorsement, concerning the method developed by the unit to increase the ammunition capacity of the M55 mount: Concur with the comments of the indorsing headquarters.

d. Reference Paragraphs 2b, 2c, and 2f, Pages 8 and 9; Paragraphs 2b, 2e, and 2f, Page 11; Paragraph 2c, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 3c, 2d Indorsement, concerning requests for equipment in excess of TOE authorization: The appropriate procedure for requesting permanent authorization for augmentation to TOE allowances of equipment is through the submission of an MTOE in accordance with USARV Regulation 310-31 and USARV Message (U) AVHGC-OT 19073 DTG 251132Z Mar 67, subject: Changes in Equipment Authorization. Additional consideration should be given to augmentation with radar sets currently authorized infantry units (TPS-33 or PPS-4), rather than the AN/TPS-25, since the latter is an extremely low density item in RVN. Zero balances are reported in RVN depot stocks, and world-wide inventory on this set is low.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS GSFOR-65)

e. Reference Paragraph 2d, Page 8; Paragraph 2d, Page 11;
and Paragraph 3d, 2d Indorsement, concerning the development of a grenade screen for twin 40mm carriage, M42: This headquarters has not monitored the development of an M42 grenade screen and has no information on its research or fabrication. Recommend that unit's comments on this item be forwarded to the appropriate CONUS headquarters and agencies for consideration.

f. Reference Paragraph 2e, Page 9; Paragraph 2e, Page 11;
Paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 3e, 2d Indorsement, concerning safety hazard with the M20 trailer: This headquarters will dispatch a message to all units, pointing out the potential safety hazard with recommended remedial action.

g. Reference Paragraph 3, Page 9; Paragraph 3b, Page 11;
and Paragraph 3g, 2d Indorsement: Requests for personnel augmentation to TOE authorization should be submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 310-31. As the current DA policy necessitates space for space adjustments, all elements of each level of command should be screened for less essential trade-off spaces. Identification of such spaces and recommendations for their trade off for this requirement should be included in the MTOE submission.

h. Reference Paragraph 5, Page 10, concerning drainage holes in M20 trailers: Unit should submit an equipment improvement report concerning their modification to the trailer.

i. Reference Paragraph 3d(1), Page 3; Paragraph 3a, Page 11;
and Paragraph 3f, 2d Indorsement, concerning training: Concur. Recommend that automatic weapons units scheduled for deployment to RVN receive additional training in the employment of automatic weapons in a ground role.

j. Reference Paragraph 4c, Page 4; Paragraph 5, Page 1; and
Paragraph 3h, 2d Indorsement, concerning the need to inform a deploying unit of its specific assignment. Unit's recommended procedure is the policy of this headquarters. Concur with comments of I Field Force Vietnam in 2d Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JERRY VAN HORN
2LT, AGC
AOG AG
16

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GPOP-QT (11 Feb 67)  4th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 1st Bn (AW)(WP)44th Arty
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  12 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period
ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters 1st Battalion (AW)(SP),
44th Artillery has been reviewed. This headquarters concurs in the
report as modified by subsequent indorsements.

2. (C) The following additional comment and recommendation is
made:

As of 31 March 1967, USARV had an overall operating strength
of 1476 personnel in MOS 13F (Automatic Weapons Crewman) as compared
to an authorized strength of 1564. Recommend action continue to
fill USARV's authorized requirements for this MOS.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. R. KIBEL
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

2 Incl
nc

Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years
DOD DIR 5200.10
### MISSIONS PERFORMED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-7 Dec 66</td>
<td>4th Section,</td>
<td>Convoy protection for 3d MARDIV from Phu Bai to Da Nang and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G/65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec 66</td>
<td>5th Section,</td>
<td>Convoy protection for C/1/44 from Dong Ha to Camp J.J. Carroll.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G/65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-18 Dec 66</td>
<td>3 Squads, G/65</td>
<td>Protection for Marine Engineer bridge detail and convoy escort, AMLO, one (1) 2½T truck, mounted M55 struck mine with light damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Dec (Con't)</td>
<td>4th Section, G/65</td>
<td>Attached 3/26 Marines for OPN Chinook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec 66</td>
<td>2 Squads, G/65</td>
<td>Convoy escort from Phu Bai to OPN Chinook and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B/1/44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Dec 66</td>
<td>2 Squads, G/65</td>
<td>Security element for survey section 12th Marines from Dong Ha to YD 181588 and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Dec 66</td>
<td>6 Squads, D/1/44</td>
<td>Attached to 3/26 Marines for OPN Chinook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>MISSION</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25 Dec 66</td>
<td>4 Squads, G/65</td>
<td>Convoy security from Dong Ha to Phu Bai and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Dec 66</td>
<td>4 Squads, A/1/44</td>
<td>Conducted roving patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Dec 66</td>
<td>4 Squads, B/1/44</td>
<td>Conducted roving patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Dec 66</td>
<td>4 Squads, A/1/44</td>
<td>Conducted roving patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Dec 66</td>
<td>1 Squad, HQ/1/44</td>
<td>Conducted foot patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Dec 66</td>
<td>2 Squads, C/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 3/3 Marines on search and destroy mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 66-1 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads, B/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 3/4 Marines at Cam Lo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Jan 67</td>
<td>1 Squad, A/1/44</td>
<td>Local security of Quang Tri Army Advisor Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads, C/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 11th Marine Engineers, vicinity 988559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads, C/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 2/3 Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-21 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads, A/1/44</td>
<td>Releaved B/1/44 in D/S 3/4 Marines at Cam Lo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jan 67</td>
<td>4 Squads, C/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 2/3 Marines, vicinity coord 987581.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan 67</td>
<td>4 Squads, C/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 3/3 Marines vicinity YD 994559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 67</td>
<td>4 Squads, C/1/44</td>
<td>Fired 60 missions preparation fire in D/S 2/3 Marines prior to assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-21 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads,</td>
<td>Augment 2 Squads presently in D/S 3/4 Marines at Cam Lo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Incl 1, Ref Section I, Para 3b)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads, B/1/44</td>
<td>D/S of unit foot patrol near Dong Ha, one (1) M42 struck small mine. Limited damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 67</td>
<td>5 Squads, G/65</td>
<td>Convoy escort from Dong Ha to OPE Chinook and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-27 Jan 67</td>
<td>6 Squads, B/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 3/4 Marines vicinity Cam Lo for search and destroy mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jan 67</td>
<td>4 Squads, G/65</td>
<td>Convoy escort from Dong Ha to Cam Lo and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 67</td>
<td>2 Squads, D/1/44</td>
<td>D/S 12th Marines for security of Arty position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EMPLOYMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS BATTALION IN THE 3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. The 1st Bn (AW) (SP), 44th Arty with Btry G, 65th Arty attached, is employed in the dual mission of air defense and the ground defense role. Both the 40mm Gun, Motor Carriage M42 and Multiple Caliber .50 Machinegun Mount M55 are utilized. These weapons are emplaced to maximize their effectiveness in both roles. Some compromise is necessary in positioning weapons for the air-ground roles, but, generally where terrain in this area has dictated a ground defense position, it has been suitable, if not the optimum position for air defense. In that these weapons employ visual air defense fire direction, and the greatest ground threat is normally during the hours of darkness, the dual ground-air role is normally a night and day operation respectively. Command and control from BMNT to EENT originates with the Battalion Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP) in the air defense role. During hours of darkness and daylight periods of ground defense alert, command and control of gun squads reverts to Perimeter Defense Sector Commanders.

2. As convoy escort, both the M42 and M55 can be used effectively. The M55 mounted on a 2½-ton truck is preferred due to road and bridge limitations of the M42 as well as age and maintenance requirements of the M42 motor carriage. Deployment for convoy escort is generally dispersal of weapons throughout the convoy with one weapon in the lead and one bringing up the rear of the column. Usually some weapons in the column are placed with quick reaction forces and are prepared to move to point of contact quickly if the column is ambushed.

3. With its rapid overland and maneuver capability, the M42 has been utilized for patrol duty through outlying areas of base defenses. Patrols are made with normally four (4) M42 vehicles in a 3-1 formation. Sometimes infantry are deployed on M42's so that thicket areas can be probed on foot while M42's maneuver to provide continuous fire support.

4. Both the M42 and M55 have proved effective and economical in manpower for protection of command posts, engineer work parties and defense of point targets such as bridges. The high rate of fire of these weapons lowers the guard protection requirement, therefore, releasing infantry to other priority tasks.

5. Harrassing and interdiction fires have been successfully accomplished using both the M42 and M55 weapon systems. Both direct fire and indirect fire missions have been utilized. When included in the overall fire plan, these weapons are most suitable to fire flat trajectory fires along ridge lines surrounding base camps or into probable avenues of approach. The rapid rate of high velocity fire, gives a surprise effect not possible with lower muzzle velocity weapons.

6. Due to the close proximity of the DMZ and the island of Hainan, air defense early warning is critical. The Battalion AN/GSS-1 radar is employed as a gap filler and alternate radar system to the U.S.
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Air Force Command and Reporting Post (CRP). Early warning for air defense is gathered, correlated and identified by the CRP and passed to the JDCP by the Battalion Liaison Team, located jointly with the CRP. Based on early warning, the Air Defense Commander (Battalion Commander) makes his decision as to the degree of readiness posture. Gun pointing information is passed to fire units in polar coordinates (azimuth and range).

7. In direct support of infantry on search and destroy missions, the M42 has proved its worth. Missions have been performed with the M42, being used in flank positions of infantry or just to the rear of sweeping elements. When called on, the M42 was ready to deliver its firepower. Many bunkers and other enemy strong points have been neutralized with AW fire in this manner. The M42 has also been used as part of blocking forces in these operations. Normally, four (4) to six (6) M42's are attached to a company.

8. In the near future, this AW Battalion is looking forward to extensive and new operations. With the end of the monsoon rains, greater use can be made of the M42 in large scale offensive operations. As the M55 is air transportable by medium helicopters, excellent use can be made of these weapons in securing landing zones and assembly points.