<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD386077</strong></td>
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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

<table>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2D Battalion
(175mm) (SP), 94th Artillery (Un) (G)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2D BATTALION (175mm) (SP), 94th ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco, 96269

AVFA-A2-2/94 5 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967

TO: Commanding General, U.S. SPAC, APO 957
    Commanding General, U.S. AN, APO 96307
    Commanding General, IFFORGE Artillery, APO 96350

SECTION I: (C) SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General - This is the initial report of this unit.

   a. (C) Activation, Training, Preparation for Overseas Movement, Embarkation, as well as intelligence, operations and training activities, logistics, civil affairs, and personnel data are presented.

   (1) This battalion was activated as a 175mm gun battalion, Sr, M-107, at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, on 1 June 1966 with a personnel on station date of 20 June 1966 and began an intensified combat training program on 20 June 1966. On 3-9 August 1966 the battalion training test was successfully completed and preparation for overseas movement was begun on 10 August 1966.

   (2) All vehicles and equipment less that which was to accompany the unit, minimum essential equipment (MKE), were packed, processed and shipped by 2 September 1966 from Ft. Sill, Oklahoma to the Beaumont, Texas port of embarkation where it was loaded aboard the Drake Victory. On 14 September 1966 all Wil TAT equipment (WIE to accompany the unit but not to be accessible during the ocean voyage) was shipped from Ft. Sill, Oklahoma to the Oakland Army Terminal for loading on the troop transport USNS Altingo. On 18 September 1966 the unit was notified that some WAT equipment could not be loaded on the Altingo due to cargo limitations of the vessel. Therefore, part of the equipment was loaded aboard the Purdue Victory which was due to arrive at the same port of embarkation prior to the USNS Altingo. No problems were expected but one officer from the battalion was detailed to accompany the equipment shipped on the Purdue Victory.

   (3) Personnel of the unit, less a 25 man rear detachment/advance party departed Ft. Sill, Oklahoma on 22 and 23 September 1966 by rail movement, commercial air and chartered air flights. All personnel arrived at the Oakland Army Port of Embarkation by 0000 hours, 24 September 1966 and immediately embarked on the USNS Altingo which sailed at 1500 hours 24 September 1966.

   b. (C) Ocean Movement, Debarkation, Preparation for Tactical Deployment.

   (1) Ocean Movement. Two significant problems occurred during
the voyage aboard the USNS Eltinge.

(a) Space. Because of the limited space available and the number of troops aboard (approximately 2600) there was very little space to store and safeguard the Yellow TAT equipment (M35E which was to be accessible for use during the voyage). Crated individual weapons had to be uncrated and issued; the cryptographic equipment had to be stored in a hospital ward and facilities for classroom type training were extremely limited. Only one very small windowless stateroom was available to the battalion personnel section for payroll preparation and record processing.

(b) Laundry. Basic issue of fatigue uniforms was 4 sets per individual and had been issued to individuals when this unit departed the United States. Laundry facilities were not available aboard ship. By the 4th of October (10th day at sea) individuals were prohibited from doing their own laundry by a water shortage aboard ship. Conditions due to heat and work details were not enhanced by the laundry problem. Although arrangements were made to have laundry processed at Okinawa, these were not successful and resulted in loss of individual clothing on an extensive basis throughout the battalion.

(2) Debarkation. After departure from Okinawa on 11 October 1966 the USNS Eltinge was diverted from its original destination (Qui Nhon, 80°) north to Da Nang, 14°, to debark the battalion and the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery. Debarkation of personnel was satisfactory. Equipment of the two battalions, however, was in the bottom of the ship's hold since other units had been scheduled to debark first when loading was done at Oakland. All equipment aboard the ship had to be unloaded into lighters and then much of it reloaded. The operation required 4 days.

(3) Preparation for Deployment. The unit landed at Da Nang, Vietnam on 15 October 1966, and was staged at An Beach on the North border of the city. The Drake Victory with all vehicles and other equipment had arrived on 11 October 1966, was off loaded and equipment was being processed and guarded by the 25 man advance party. However, because of the facilities of port, the equipment was located approximately 17 road miles from the troop staging area. The Red TAT equipment off loaded from the USNS Eltinge was brought to a third location. The balance of the Red TAT equipment was still at sea aboard the Anduo Victory destined for Vung Tau. It was not received until mid November after being transhipped twice.

c. (C) Tactical Deployment.

(1) The battalion (minus Battery A) was to move to Camp J.J. Carroll, coordinates X035545, 12° miles Southwest of Dong Ha to provide general support for the 3d Marine Division. The guns and all heavy equipment departed Da Nang by sea on LCU's on 18 October 1966 and arrived at Dong Ha on 19 October 1966. The balance of Hqs, B, C and Svc Batteries lost 20 vehicles and 40 men motor marched from Da Nang to Phu Bai to Hu to Dong Ha on 20 October 1966 arriving at Dong Ha at 1700 hours. Service Battery
CONFIDENTIAL

5 February 1967

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

occupied a position at Dong Ha. The guns and heavy equipment joined the remainder of the column and moved to Camp J.J. Carroll arriving at 1010 hours. The final movement of 20 vehicles and accompanying personnel moved from Da Nang on 25 October 1966 to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll. Upon arrival at Camp Carroll, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery was attached thereby forming a full 12 gun battalion at this location.

(2) Battery A. Battery A moved by sea aboard a Landing Ship Tank on 20 October 1966 arriving at Chu Lai (vic coordinates 13535075) on 21 October 1966. The battery occupied a temporary position in the vicinity of coordinates 13535075. On 26 October 1966, the battery moved to its present position at coordinates 13631851. They are in general support of elements of the 1st Marine Division.

2. (U) Intelligence

a. General. Most of the intelligence information available to this battalion is provided by the U.S. Marine Corps. Some information has been obtained from organic forward observers and air observers although an organic air section is not available.

b. Weather. The monsoon season had begun in this sector when the battalion arrived. It has been characterized by torrential rains of several days duration and prolonged periods of low overcast cloudy days with temperatures in the low fifties. Obviously air observation has been restricted since aircraft could not fly and ground observations limited by poor visibility.

c. Forward Observers. The forward observers of this battalion are not assigned or attached to specific units but do accompany separate patrols as requested during search and destroy missions. One observation party is usually located with a Marine force on the "Rock Pile" at coordinates XD9566. This particular location provides excellent observation of three major valleys south of the DMZ.

d. Aerial Observations. All aerial observations is coordinated through the 12th Marine Regiment. Army and Marine aerial observers are consolidated and are assigned missions on a rotational basis. All aerial observers underwent a 40 hour refresher course during the month of January 1967. This course was conducted by the 12th Marine Regiment. Battery A provides one air observer to the U.S. Marine Corps 1st Field Artillery Group at Chu Lai.

e. Survey Data. Obtaining accurate survey data has presented no particular problem to this battalion. Survey control points with updated data are scattered throughout the Northern Quang Tri Province. Information contained in the recently updated L7014 series 1:50,000 maps have also contributed to improve survey data.

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f. Meteorological Data. The meteor section of this battalion has thus far provided electronic data in an excellent manner. The section normally provides three net messages each day ranging from 8 to 10 lines. The section has provided, on occasion, six net messages in one 24-hour period.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities

a. (U) Plans. 3d Marine Division OPLAN 377-66 (currently under revision)

b. (C) Operations.

(1) Mission. The mission of this battalion at Camp J.J. Carroll is to provide GS for the 3d Marine Division. In addition, supporting fires for the A Co. 2nd Special Forces Camp can be provided as required. Battery A provides GS for the 1st Marine Division in the vicinity of Chu Lai and can fire in support of the Special Forces Camps Tra Bong, Ha Thanh and Minh Long.

(2) An organizational chart is attached (Inclosure 1).

(3) Capabilities. From the Camp J.J. Carroll position the battalion can support A Co. and fire into and across the DMZ from the Gulf of Tonkin on the east to coordinates XD755651 in the West. Only the Western 13 km of the DMZ are out of range of the battalion. Battery A can support the Special Forces Camps at Tra Bong, coordinates BS344380, Ha Thanh, coordinates BS394702 but must displace to coordinates BS636785 to support Minh Long at coordinates 540518.

(4) Displacements.

(a) Battalion. One platoon (2 guns) was displaced from Camp J.J. Carroll to coordinates XD987553 on the night of 26 January 1967 to provide protection and support of a large patrol and extraction force. There were no difficulties encountered although the displacement occurred at 2350 hours. Protection for the displacement consisted of two M-42 Twin 40mm, 5P, Guns and a security force of 40 Marines.

(b) Battery A. Battery A has displaced from its base camp to coordinates BS636785 on two occasions, 8 December 1966 and 12 December 1966. Both displacements were carried out without incident. Protection for the displacements consisted of a reinforced platoon of Marines plus a Marine engineer squad to check and sweep all bridges. In both cases, the battery A displacements were in support of search and destroy operations being carried out by the 1st Marine Division.

(5) Ammunition Expenditures. The following are the total rounds fired during the period:
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

5 February 1967

October 2,311
November 5,693
December 6,415
January 6,039

20,450

(6) Guns: Expended. There have been 19 tubes changed during the reporting period.

(7) Other Attachments. The battalion has exercised operational control of B Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (155mm Howitzer, M-109), since the 16th of December 1966.

c. (U) Training.

(1) Training for the battalion encompassed three phases:

(a) Individual replacement indoctrination
(b) Formal unit instruction
(c) Integrated training

(2) "Classroom" instruction for the thirty-day period preceding the date of this report stressed the following subjects:

(a) Geneva Convention
(b) Safety
(c) Character Guidance
(d) Code of Conduct
(e) Command Information
(f) Safeguarding Defense Information
(g) First Aid
(h) Material Readiness

(3) Integrated subjects included in day-to-day operations were those required in any tactical operation, i.e., light discipline, map reading, range estimation, etc.

(4) Familiarization firing with individual weapons was stressed. Each individual in the battalion fired at least once a month.
d. (U) Chemical. Restraining in CWK subjects will be emphasized during the second calendar quarter of 1967.

e. (U) Isfnd. Not applicable.

f. (U) Firing Platforms.

1. The monsoon began in the area when the battalion arrived. The soil is a clay type, not the usual laterite frequently found in Vietnam. Serious problem of the guns sinking in the mud developed requiring frequent repositioning of the guns in the battery area. Retardation of the guns at night was necessarily slow and it became difficult to position the guns without cant. Assistance in building permanent platforms to position the guns on was provided by III Marine Amphibious Force. To date 5 gun platforms have been completed in accordance with the plan attached (Inclosure 2). The gun platforms have provided a stable base from which to fire, have kept the guns out of the mud thus reducing the maintenance problem, and have facilitated relaying the pieces, especially at night. Displacement of the weapons during firing is also minimized (normally 2-4 miles after 4 rounds of charge 3 vrs 10-15 miles when emplaced in soft earth).

4. (U) Logistics.

a. Support Structure. The battalion was deployed in the 3d Marine Division area of operation and the normal Army logistics structure naturally did not exist. Forward support elements (FS) of the 1st Logistic Command were established at Dong Ha and Chu Lai with a support company at Da Nang and the following procedures were established:

1. Class 1 and 3 supplies are drawn from Marine Corps facilities.

2. Class 5 is provided by the 1st Logistical Command and stored in UsMC ammunition dumps at Dong Ha and Chu Lai.

3. Class 2 and 4 items common to both the Army and Marine Corps are requisitioned through the FS from the US Naval Support Activities at Da Nang and Chu Lai.

4. Repair parts are provided by the 1st Logistical Command from Nhon. A parts supply facility has been established at Da Nang and limited parts are available at Dong Ha.

5. Third echelon maintenance support would be provided by the FSS at Dong Ha and Chu Lai.

b. Support Adequacy.

1. General Support. The unit's advance party included sufficient supply personnel to establish accounts and begin requisitioning on 3 October 1966. Class I, III and V items have posed no problem to date.
Of a total of 932 requisitions for Class II and IV, 292 have been validated and 149 have been filled or partially filled. Few expendable II and IV supplies were received through the forward support element until approximately 1 January 1967. Although the battalion had brought the authorized 15-day supply of expendable items from CMBL, they in essence had to last 27 months supplemented with what could be borrowed locally from other military units. With the expansion of the supporting FSE in Dong Ha and Chu Lai, logistical support improved markedly during the month of January 1967.

(2) Maintenance Support and Supply.

(a) Gun Maintenance. Support of the battalion guns has been excellent. The ordnance mechanics and repairmen have been knowledgeable, experienced, and were invaluable in keeping the guns operational.

(b) Gun Repair Parts. There have not been any severe problems in obtaining deadline parts for the guns. The request for such parts have been expedited by TWK's, telephone calls and air supply. This procedure was used extensively prior to the stockage of an appreciable amount of parts by the forward support element.

(c) Repair Parts for Automotive and Engineer Equipment. Some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining repair parts for automotive and engineer equipment. This is especially true of major components such as engines, transmissions, fuel injector pumps, etc.

(d) Tech Supply. The overall functioning of tech supply was very slow during the first months in country. The authorized 15-day supply of DLL brought with the unit was about 92% fill. This DLL had to last for approximately 2 months since the first DLL parts that were requisitioned were not received until the 3d week of December 1966. By mid January 1967, the supporting tech supply began to improve and requisitioned parts began to arrive in satisfactory quantities. During January the unit also began receiving validations and status cards on outstanding requisitions. As of 31 January 1967, over 50% of the requisitions have either been filled or validated. As of 31 January 1967, 2237 parts requisitioned have been submitted, 652 validated and 513 filled or partially filled. The DLL status as of 31 January is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>COL 1</th>
<th>COL 2</th>
<th>COL 3</th>
<th>COL 4</th>
<th>COL 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total of</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line items</td>
<td>at 100%</td>
<td>at 50%</td>
<td>at 25%</td>
<td>at 0%</td>
<td>balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Artillery</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Auto &amp; Eng</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Signal</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Artstr &amp; Chmn</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Total</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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e. Transportation.

(1) Transportation of supplies and equipment to both the Dong Da and Chu Lai areas has been a major problem. All material must be transported by air or by sea using LCU's to Dong Ha from Da Nang and LST's from Da Nang to Chu Lai. In addition, pilferage is a problem at the immediate loading and shipping points. Road networks from Da Nang to Dong Ha and Chu Lai can not be used extensively since they are in contested territory.

5. (U) Civil Affairs. A MEDCAF program was started in mid January in conjunction with the 3d Marine Regiment in their TAOR. Although this battalion has been assigned 7 villages, only 2 are secured at this time. Liaison has been established in these 2 villages and 43 patients treated during two visits. The program will be expanded as quickly as possible.

6. (U) Personnel

a. (C) Administration/Personnel.

(1) This battalion is assigned to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for Army peculiar administration. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery became attached to this battalion for administration on 15 October 1966.

(2) Normal 51 activities have been conducted since arrival in Vietnam.

(3) Strength.

(a) Authorized and assigned strength for the period ending 31 January 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGN3D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/94</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/6/27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Changes during the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GAINS</th>
<th>LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/6/27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Casualties during the period indicated:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Death</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(4) Personnel Management.

(a) During the reporting period normal personnel work has been accomplished. Pay has been a problem in that the unit had to convert all finance records to the Marine Corps Pay system (the data card system formally used by the Army) since there was no Army finance office in the area to pay the battalion. In addition, the finance records of Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery were also converted. A total of 673 records were involved. In January 1967 an Army Finance Office was established at Da Nang, the records were reconverted and the unit is now under the Army pay system. Paydays for the battalion have been as follows:

1. 17 October 1966 - Partial pay for September
2. 14 November 1966 - Balance of pay for September
3. 5 December 1966 - November pay
4. 31 December 1966 - December pay
5. 31 January 1967 - January pay

Very few complaints were received on the January 1967 payday when pay data sheets were distributed with the pay.

(5) Morale. The morale of the unit is outstanding.

(6) R&R Program. The following out-of-country R&R's have been allocated to this battalion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Decorations and Awards. The following awards and decorations have been presented during the period:

Army Commandation Medal

9.

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(8) Mail. This battalion experienced some difficulty with mail initially in that mail was forwarded from the last CAS US duty station to APO 96291 which was the planned debarkation point in Vietnam. Later, this was changed to 96289. Upon arrival in Vietnam the battalion was initially serviced by the Air Force APO 96362 at Dong Ha until the Army APO could be set up, APO 96269. This change of APO's, four within a month, initially caused delay of mail forwarded from Fort Sill.

(9) Religious Services. Religious services are scheduled and held weekly by Protestant and Catholic Chaplains assigned to serving Marine Corps units.

(10) Medical. This battalion operates a battalion aid station and has an organic surgeon. The following statistics are submitted:

(a) Total patient visits (Unit personnel) 399
(b) Admitted to hospital (In-Country) 25
(c) Evacuated out-of-country 3
(d) Malaria cases 2

(11) Discipline, Law and Order. Judicial and non-judicial actions include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE 15</th>
<th>SUMMARY COURT</th>
<th>SPECIAL COURT</th>
<th>GENERAL COURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(12) Safety Recordable Accident by unit are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(13) Education. There are presently no education facilities in the battalion.
Operational Report For Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967

SECTION II: (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I: OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

1. (U) Personal
   a. Item: Late Receipt of Allotments
      Discussion: Some of the dependents did not receive their allotments on schedule although the requests were processed in what appeared to be adequate time. The following month, two allotment checks were received.
      Observation: All allotments of units departing for overseas should be forwarded 10 weeks prior to initial starting date rather than 6 weeks which is now used as the planning factor.

   b. Item: Protection of Blank Forms
      Discussion: A good supply of blank forms was brought with the battalion and carefully packed. However, the movement of the unit during the monsoon season and inadequate dry storage facilities proved that inadequate protection was afforded. Many forms were ruined, especially the D Form 2159, Annual Pay Voucher.
      Observation: Blank forms should be packed in waterproof wrappings before shipment to Vietnam.

2. (C) Operations
   a. Item: Damaged or otherwise unserviceable Powder Components
      Discussion: Approximately 20% of the 175mm powder is not safe to fire, under existing inspection criteria, when it reaches the gun position. One lot (63318-57) was suspended when the primer burned a hole through the igniter pad but failed to set off the charge, thus causing a dangerous hangfire. The hundred forty-two cannisters of this lot were trucked 19 miles over marginally safe roads to the gun positions before attempting to fire them. The powder in the foregoing instance was dry, however, the characteristic odor of other was missing. The majority of unserviceable powder is unserviceable because of mishandling in transit. Severely dented cannisters from which powder cannot be extracted are found daily. The denting caused broken and flaked igniter tubes which, under present inspection procedures, must be destroyed. Some powder has been found to be wet when opened, although the amount to date has been an insignificant part of the total.
      Observation: Powder cannisters are relatively thin and fragile containers and must be treated as such in the supply chain. Care by fork-lift operators, in particular, will help to eliminate or reduce this unsatisfactory condition.

CONFIDENTIAL
b. Item: Anticipating Location of NVA/VC

Discussion: This battalion has tried several systems to enhance rapid response to requests for fire. Upon initial occupation of position, guns were laid by platoons on various azimuths around the compass. Despite the wide coverage afforded by this system, too often platoons, a battery or the battalion had to be realigned to bring under fire a target in a totally new direction. Subsequently, guns remained laid in the direction of the last target fired; this, too, proved to be unsatisfactory. The present system for anticipating targets shortens response time considerably. By using all available intelligence information, studying the trends of enemy movement, and knowing his fondness for striking lightly defended outposts, the guns can be aimed toward the most likely target areas well ahead of the need for fire. Guns are laid after dusk to deny the enemy knowledge of the direction of fire. Generally, one or more tubes are pointed toward advisor outposts which are subject to attack or harassment, and two or more tubes are pointed toward the infiltration routes from the DMZ. Other guns are laid for H&I fires or pointed toward NVA/VC harboring areas. Rarely, is a gun realigned to fire upon a target which has surprised the battalion. On these occasions when a gun must be realigned, the new area of fire is evaluated in light of the current enemy situation and, if necessary, a new balance is struck in the lay of the battalion. The current prediction system has saved very precious minutes when a target was open to attack.

Observations: Guns may be laid at leisure which reduces wear and tear on the carriage. The benefits of preliminary targeting are obvious.

c. Item: Surveillance of Effect

Discussion: The preponderance of 175mm gunfire has been expended upon unobserved neutralization and H&I missions. Several missions fired upon targets of opportunity have been observed by Marine Patrols or aerial observers. The usual immediate surveillance report is "Effect on Target" or "Good Coverage." Rarely, because of dense trees or thick vegetation, has a specific affect surveillance been reported to FDC. Many damage reports have been received hours or days after completion of a mission; however, actual casualty assessments, for practical purposes, have not been too frequent.

Observations: Units to fire into jungled terrain should not expect schoolbook surveillance reports. It is important for the morale of the gun crews to give them all available surveillance reports.

d. Item: Survey Control

Discussion: Survey control was extended from Hill 250 located approximately 1000 meters from the battalion position area.
CONFLICT:

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Observations: The trig marker placed by the Vietnamese Geographical Society and verified by the French in 1962 proved to be a valid control point. Closing accuracy exceeded 1:19,000.

e. Item: Effects on Targets

Discussion: The variety of vegetation abounding in this area of operation critically effects fuse selection. Current maps accurately depict the type of ground cover and must be studied carefully before planning fires. The most satisfactory fuse or fuse combinations are as follows:

(1) Dense, heavily canopied jungle: 100% delay will penetrate to ground level causing tree blow-down and wood fragmentation.

(2) Lightly forested regions: Mixed fuse (quick and delay) causes immense damage, tree blow-down, cratering and, depending upon the angle of fall, some air bursts.

(3) Elephant grass and brushwood: Fuse quick (VT on troops in the open) produces excellent effect.

The Comp 3 projectile fill appears to create a sharp pressure wave which uproots or snaps trees as much as fourteen inches in diameter. Patrols which have crossed jungled areas report that tree blow-down from a single shell is so severe that one to three hours is required to traverse the impact point.

Observations: The S3 should make as thorough a map study of the strike zone as time permits to learn the requirement of a particular target. It may be just as critical to eliminate tree blow-down during LZ prep fires as it is to cause it when firing upon enemy troops. Unless firsthand knowledge exists of the target area, maps should be trusted to accurately depict the type of vegetation.

f. Item: Second Strikes

Discussion: The NVA/VC will expend every effort to recover their dead for burial, and will effect recovery from the battlefield as rapidly as possible. Therefore, after shelling troops, this unit makes it a practice to wait 15-45 minutes, then fire several rounds randomly into the area already saturated to hit the recovery details.

Observations: Whether this procedure actually works is speculative at this point of time.

3. (U) Security and Intelligence, loss Communications Intelligence.

a. Item: Gummed paper tape for sealing classified material.

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Discussion: AR 380-5 requires that gummed paper tape be utilized to secure classified material for shipment. Experience in storing gummed paper tape indicates that it should be stored in a cool dry place. During monsoon seasons, the humidity causes the paper tape to adhere to itself rendering it useless. Postal regulations prohibit the use of self sealing tape, i.e., masking or scotch tape as it can be removed and replaced very easily with properly applied heat. The use of gummed military envelopes also involves the same difficulty.

Observations: Units expecting to arrive in the Republic of Vietnam should consider stocking a good supply of gumless tape and liquid glue or mucilage, which can be applied to the tape at the time of utilization. Facilities responsible for procurement of gummed envelopes should make available gumless tape and envelopes to units in the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Item: Current Station List

Discussion: After arrival in country this unit was unable for an extended period of time to locate or have access to a current station list with APOs and town locations. The unit was required to contact other units in RVN for transfer of equipment without benefit of information as to town location or APO.

Observations: Current station lists with the APO's and town locations should be made available to units immediately upon arrival in country and should be updated monthly.

c. Item: Warning System

Discussion: Units usually use various sound producing devices or methods such as vehicle horns, beating on shell casings, etc., to provide warnings in the event of ground or air attack, CBR attacks, etc. Although such devices are frequently satisfactory at battery or company level, the large base camps that are frequently established in Vietnam cover too great an area for such systems to provide timely warnings. This unit has received a siren from the citizens of Pompa, Texas. The siren is mounted on a tower, centrally located in the camp and is activated by the unit responsible for defense of the camp. In the event of ground attack or mortar attack, immediate warnings can be sounded camp-wide through the use of the siren. When installing such a device, a back up power source should be provided so that a power failure or change over will not render the siren useless.

Observations: Large base camps can install a positive rapid warning device to cover the entire area by the use of a properly installed siren.

4. (U) Logistics

a. Item: Tentsage Requirements
5 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

Discussion: Prior to departure from CONUS, this battalion was issued enough tents, GP medium, to house the unit on the basis of 16 men to each tent. It is extremely difficult to house 16 men and their equipment in one GP medium tent.

Observations: GP medium tents should be authorized on the basis of 1 tent per 10 men.

b. Item: Damage or Loss of Equipment

Discussion: Due to the lack of conex containers at Port Biss, a large amount of equipment was palletized for shipment. Many of the palletized loads were damaged in handling at the ports and some pilferage did occur. During the offloading and sorting of equipment in the staging area (an all-night operation) pallets were difficult to identify since the equipment of two battalions was being offloaded at the same time.

Observations: Shipping all equipment in conex containers would prevent damage and expedite sorting on arrival in country.

c. Item: Shortage of 50-901

Discussion: Shortly after arrival in Vietnam, replacements were received that overfilled the battalion. The replacements did not have 50-901 gear in their possession and there were none available in the battalion to properly equip them.

Observations: Units should deploy from CONUS with at least 10 average of 50-901 equipment and weapons.

d. Item: Shortage of Armor, Body Protective

Discussion: The unit arrived in Vietnam without body protective armor. The road march from Da Nang to Dong Ha and from Chu Lai to the base camp location were through contested territory. Two hundred protective armor jackets were available from the 1st Log Command and an additional 300 were borrowed from the USMC.

Observations: Issue of body protective armor to deploying units in CONUS would prevent this problem.

e. Item: Refrigeration and Generators

Discussion: This battalion was shipped a MABTC pack consisting of lumber for 60 GP medium tent frames (pre-cut), 5 kitchen tent frames and tents, and was supposed to include 5 10-kw generators, 5 70-cu ft refrigerators plus enough electrical material to wire a base camp. All generators, refrigerators and part of the electrical materials were deleted from the shipment. The battalion possesses the following TOs generators:
The 10 kw generator is used exclusively for operating the Metro Section's MAVIN set. Of the other 16 generators, 9 were deadlined as of 31 January 1967. Constant operation of these small generators has been necessary to provide minimum lighting in critical installations such as FDC's, Personnel, etc. Each battery requires at least a 10 kw generator. During the monsoon season, the weather has been relatively cool and food storage has not been a major problem although some rations have spoiled before they could be used. With warm weather about to arrive, refrigeration is necessary.

Observations: Units should deploy from COSUS with adequate generators and refrigerators.

f. Item: Cold Weather Equipment

Discussion: Field jackets, mountain sleeping bags and tent stoves were considered unnecessary before leaving Port Had. Mountain sleeping bags were issued in lieu of poncho liners, however, in this sector of Vietnam, the temperature ranges in the high 40's and low 50's during the monsoon season.

Observations: Cold weather equipment particularly field jackets and mountain sleeping bags are required in this sector of Vietnam.
PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel. Allotments should be processed 10 weeks in advance of starting date instead of the present 6 weeks.

2. (U) Logistics

   a. Units deploying from the States should be authorized and issued GP medium tents on the basis of 1 tent per 10 men.

   b. Units deploying from the States should be issued sufficient generators and refrigeration equipment prior to deployment.

   c. Units deploying to Vietnam should be authorized a 30 day PLL and expendable supply stockage level.

   d. Units deploying to Vietnam should be provided enough conex containers for all equipment.

   e. Units deploying to Vietnam should be authorized a 10% overtime of TA 50-901 equipment.

   f. Units deploying to Vietnam should be issued body protective armor prior to departure.

     Signed: [Signature]

     2 Incl

     RICHARD C. THERFY
     LTC, Artillery Commanding
SLEEPER DIAGRAM
SCALE: 3/16" = 1'-0"
PLAN of GUN PLATFORM
SCALE: 3/16" = 1'-0"

SECTION A-A
SCALE: 1" = 1'-0"
IN PLATFORMS
E: 3/6" = 1'-0"

CONC. FILLED 55 GAL DRUM WITH 2"x2" x 1/4" LS ANCHORED IN CONC.

#7 REBAR WELDED TO L

RIVER RUN GRAVEL

2 LAYERS

SLE

STANDARD 55 GALLON DRUM FILLED WITH CONCRETE

12"x12" TIMBER

2"x4" BLOCK

LAYERS 2"x12" PLANKS

5'-6" 7'-6"
SLEEPER DIAGRAM
SCALE: 3/16" = 1'-0"

2 LAYERS 3"x12" PLANKING

RIVER RUN GRAVEL

SECTION B-B
SCALE: 1/16" = 1'-0"

UNITED STATES NAVAL
MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION FIVE
GUN EMLACEMENT
for M-107, 175 mm
GUN, SELF-PROPELLED
DOUG HA, R.K.N.

DESIGN:
DRAWN: TELLEFSEN
DATE: 17 JANUARY 1967
CHECK: A. F. Johnson
ENGR OFF: C. Tumin
APPROVED: COMMANDING OFFICER
DATE 1/18/67

SCALE: AS NOTED
DRAWING NO. SHEET 1 OF 1