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**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned (RC5 CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

1. (U) The attached Operational Report—Lessons Learned for quarter ending 30 April 1967 summarizes the activities of the 4th Infantry Division from 1 February to 30 April, except those covered in the Combat After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON, which was forwarded to all addressees on 17 May 1967.

2. (U) Since Operation SAM HOUSTON terminated on 5 April and the after action report covered in detail operations, intelligence, fire support, PSYWAR and logistics, this report is an add-on and covers other activities such as civic action, training and base camp development. The tactical lessons learned reported in the SAM HOUSTON After Action Report and the After Action Critique Notes, which presented the tactical commander's viewpoint, provided a comprehensive and complete analysis for the reporting quarter, therefore, lessons learned are not included in this report.

3. (C) On 6 April 1967 a new operation, Operation FRANCIS MARION, was initiated by the 4th Infantry Division and continued at the end of the reporting period. This operation began after the Division withdrew east of the SE SAN River to conduct surveillance of the CAMBODIAN border and search and destroy operations in an area of operations generally extending from the CHU PONG mountains north to New PLEI DJERENG. In addition to the primary tactical mission, the Division also supported the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP ENWANG program involving the resettlement of approximately 8,000 MONTAGNARD natives and their personal possessions.

4. (C) The Division had one major contact in Operation FRANCIS MARION during the reporting period. This involved the engagement of an estimated NVA battalion south of the Oasis, in which an armored infantry company size task force decisively defeated the enemy. The results were 138 NVA killed (body count) with friendly casualties being only one US KIA. Increased emphasis has been placed on the utilization of long range reconnaissance patrols in a border surveillance mission. The success of these patrols has been beyond expectations, and they have made a most significant contribution to the intelligence gathering effort. One infantry battalion was converted to a mechanized infantry battalion and initiated operations during the reporting period. This unit has successfully conducted mechanized operations south, southeast, and southwest of the Oasis.
5. (c) During the reporting period, enemy tactics and techniques have continued to be those employed during Operation SAM HOUSTON. The tactical concepts and operations of the 4th Division have been essentially the same as those employed in Operation SAM HOUSTON.

W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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OPRATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC 15 June 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSPQ-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

   a. During the period covered by this report, the division terminated Operation SAM HOUSTON and initiated Operation FRANCIS MARION and Operation HANCOCK. At the end of the reporting period the latter two operations continued.

   b. Organizational Structure.

      (1) Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON, contains the task organization during the period 1 January to 5 April 1967.

      (2) Task organization for Operation FRANCIS MARION for the period 6-30 April is at inclosure 1.

      (3) The attached 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was OPCON to the lst Air Cavalry Division during the period 1 February to 24 April 1967. On 25 April the brigade was released from OPCON to the lst Air Cavalry Division and placed OPCON to TF Oregon. Therefore, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is not included in this report.

      (4) The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, attached to the 25th Infantry Division and operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone, is not included in this report.

   c. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

   d. Mission.

      (1) The mission of the 4th Infantry Division is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and to the east within the assigned area of operation; to block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces; to conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations; to destroy enemy base areas and supply installations; to clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility; to support the Revolutionary Development and the Government of VIETNAM Refugee Resettlement Program; to open, secure and maintain land lines of communications; to be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Regional and Popular Forces and critical signal sites, sector and subsector headquarters Downgraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years DOD DIR 5200.10
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within II Corps Tactical Zone and to provide I Field Force, VIETNAM battalion size reserve on order.

(2) The specific missions of the division at the end of the reporting period were to conduct Operations FRANCIS MARION and HANCOCK and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's EDNAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE

2. General. Enemy activities during this period consisted of defensive preparations by the 32d, 66th, 88th and 95B NVA Regiments in the lower PLEI TRAP Valley and in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN Border west of route 1AB, against 4th Infantry Division operations in these areas during Operation SAM HOUSTON, and preparation of positions in the IA DRAONG Valley and area northwest of DUC CO (YA840250) for the monsoon campaign. Mining activity increased along major LLOC's and mortar attacks increased in frequency and intensity.

(1) There were a total of 164 contacts with enemy forces during the reporting period. Thirteen of these contacts involved enemy units of platoon-size or larger.

(2) During February and March, search and destroy operations west of the SE SAN River in the lower PLEI TRAP Valley resulted in contact and identification of the 32d, 66th and 88th NVA Regiments. Operations southwest of New PLEI DJERENG (YA875457) established contact with an element of the 95B Regiment east of the CAMBODIAN Border at YA75387.

(3) Following the apparent withdrawal of the major portion of these NVA regiments into CAMBODIA in March, an estimated two battalions of the 95B Regiment infiltrated to ZA107178 where they prepared fortified positions and living areas apparently in preparation for major NVA operations planned for May or June 1967.

(4) Contacts with NVA units southwest of DUC CO during the latter half of April resulted in identification of elements of the 88th NVA Regiment along the CAMBODIAN Border in the area between the IA DRAONG River and DUC CO. Other contacts and sightings indicated the presence of NVA units, possibly belonging to the 88th Regiment in the CHU FONG Mountain area (YA9000).

(5) Northwest of DUC CO contact with elements of the 66th NVA Regiment in late April resulted in discovery of NVA unit positions including a hospital complex at YA715325.

(6) It is believed that the enemy acted during the month of April to displace four NVA Regiments of the B-3 Front to positions in the
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CHU PONG Mountain-LA DRANG Valley-DUC CO area for deployment in attacks
against DUC CO, PLEI ME, LE THI NH, Dragon Mountain Base Camp and FMNAP unit
positions in the EDAP ENAN area.

(7) During the reporting period the number and intensity of
enemy mortar attacks showed an increase over the previous reporting period.
The heaviest enemy mortar attack occurred on the night of 13-14 March when
the Forward Command Posts of the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st and 2d
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division received an estimated 330 rounds of 82mm
mortar fire plus 75mm RR and B-40 RL fire at LZ 3T (YA850455). On 22 April
a fire support base occupied by Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery at
YA898382 received the second heaviest attack of the period when 205 rds of
82mm mortar fire were received with 140 rounds falling within the unit's
perimeter.

(8) An incident of enemy use of chemical agents was experienced
on 6 April by a CIDG outpost and a US mortar platoon position at YK775223.

b. Operation SAM HOUSTON: Reference Combat After Action Report,
Operation SAM HOUSTON.

c. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength, as of
30 April 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ESTIMATED</th>
<th>LAST REPORTED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st NVA Div</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>YA 4966</td>
<td>Apr 67</td>
<td>Agent Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d Regt</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>YA 6952</td>
<td>3 Feb 67</td>
<td>FW</td>
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<tr>
<td>66th Regt</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>YA 6055</td>
<td>26 Feb 67</td>
<td>Captive</td>
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<tr>
<td>88th Regt</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>YA 6058</td>
<td>15 Mar 67</td>
<td>Documents</td>
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<td>10th NVA Div</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>CAMBODIA 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>95B Regt</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>ZA 1317</td>
<td>18 Apr 67</td>
<td>Documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>101C Bn</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>YA 7518 2</td>
<td>21 Nov 67</td>
<td>Documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>200th Arty Bn</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>PLEIKU/KONTUM</td>
<td>18 Apr 67</td>
<td>Agent Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>407th MF Bn</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>N. PLEIKU 3</td>
<td>27 Apr 67</td>
<td>Agent Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.15 LF Bn</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>E. PLEIKU 4</td>
<td>4 Apr 67</td>
<td>Agent Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Counterintelligence

(1) Increased sightings of mixed NVA, VC and VPA elements
indicate a possible effort by the enemy to increase the effectiveness of

1The 1st and 10th NVA Division Headquarters are believed to be in CAMBODIA.
2The 101C Bn was formerly the 101C Regiment.
3The 407th MF Bn normally operated in platoon or company-sized elements.
4The H.15 LF has company-size elements in dispersed locations to the east of
PLEIKU city.

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NVA/VMC units by providing NVA cadre to local and main force VC/VMC units within PLEIKU Province.

(2) The VC infrastructure northwest and northeast of PLEIKU city has suffered some disruption during the reporting period as evidenced by the increased number of propaganda lectures which account for most of the incidents in this area.

(3) No incidents of enemy espionage or subversion were reported during the period, however, on 16 April, the VC attempted to demolish the bridge on highway 19E at B143535 causing minor damage. The large number of indigenous laborers employed by US forces in local area provide the enemy with excellent opportunities to create incidents of espionage, subversion and sabotage.

e. Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

(1) General. During the previous reporting period, enemy activities had included a sharp rise in intensive VC guerrilla activities. From 1 February through 15 March small scale guerrilla activities continued with emphasis on the mining of roads, tax collections and scattered ground air harassing fires. This coincided with the deployment of two US infantry battalions west of the NAM SATHAI River into the PLEI TRAP Valley. The incidence of mining activities throughout the reporting period indicated a coordinated effort on the part of NVA units and VC elements in the 4th Infantry Division AO. The increase in sightings and reports of mixed NITA and VC/VMC elements in the PLEIKU-EDAP EMAE area further indicated increased NVA/VC/VMC cooperation in PLEIKU Province.

(2) Significant changes in enemy tactics.

(a) Enemy use of mortars: During Operation PAUL REVERE IV NVA units employed their mortars to support assaults by their infantry against night defensive positions and in one instance, against a US fire support base. However, during the period February-April the enemy showed a significant change in his tactic of attacking prepared US positions. During this period enemy mortars were the primary weapon in his attacks and his infantry was employed to defend the mortars instead of assaulting prepared US positions.

(b) Hugging Tactics: The enemy also demonstrated greater emphasis on "hugging tactics" to reduce his casualties from friendly supporting fires. Contacts with NVA units were characterized by the enemy's efforts to either initiate the attack against US units from very close range or, when contact was initiated by US units, either break contact or move in close to the US position with large numbers of snipers.

(c) Use of route watchers: The enemy has made greater
use of route watchers than in previous reporting periods. All indications pointed to an extensive reconnaissance effort against friendly forward fire bases and night defensive positions by positioning route watcher parties on trails or routes leading from the US positions. Early warning of the direction of travel of US units from these positions provided the enemy with the information necessary for establishment of defensive positions along the US route. Several contacts initiated by the enemy against US units on the move showed his troops occupied hastily prepared positions on the ground with a large number of his personnel positioned in trees at the time the contact was initiated.

(3) Enemy Use of Imitative Communications Deception: Several instances of the enemy's use of imitative communications deception were noted during the report period. In one instance a voice speaking English attempted to answer a call transmitted from a friendly station, however, when the station was challenged it could not authenticate. A homing device in a helicopter picked up the signal and indicated a location across the CAMBODIAN Border. Another case during the reporting period occurred when a voice, without a trace of oriental accent and using the call sign of a friendly unit, asked for help at a road junction. The sender, when challenged by a friendly unit, could not authenticate. A check revealed that no friendly units were near the road junction indicated by the sender.

(4) Enemy Use of Chemical Agents: On 6 April, the mortar platoon, 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry along with one platoon of a CIDG company from DUC CO Special Forces Camp, experienced three separate chemical attacks on their position at XA?5223 between 0050 and 0105 hours and a fourth attack at 0140 hours. Individuals affected were partially incapacitated for several minutes due to tears, running nose, a burning sensation in the throat, nostrils and eyes; however, they were still able to see. It took three minutes for the effects to wear off. No nausea, vomiting, or after effects were noted. The effects experienced by affected individuals was described as being similar to that of US CN agent. A check of the area revealed 12 dark grey, plastic bags measuring 4"x7"x3/8" containing a white powder which had been strewn on the ground and was carried by a 5-8 knot wind to the friendly positions.

(5) Enemy Propaganda:

(a) Enemy propaganda directed toward US forces during the report period followed the theme that the United States was waging an unjust war in VIETNAM; that the US soldiers were being misled by their superiors; and that all honorable soldiers should refuse to fight and seek repatriation (sic) to the United States.

(b) Enemy propaganda directed toward the civilian
population during this period followed the theme that the war will be long and hard, that much sacrifice will be required, but that the cause is just and will bring freedom to all VIETNAM.

(c) Enemy propaganda leaflets recovered during this period showed considerable improvement in composition and printing when compared with leaflets recovered during the previous reporting period.

(6) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SAM HOUSTON (1 Feb-5 Apr 1967)</th>
<th>FRANCIS HARION (6 Apr-30 Apr 1967)</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVAC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>358</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>928</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>1,163</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Arms Crew Served</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>217</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>231</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>271</td>
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<td>(c) Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Arms (rds)</td>
<td>14,216</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>17,556</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crew Served (rds)</td>
<td>9,593</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9,623</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar (rds)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81/82mm Mortar (rds)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>521</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Selected Items of Equipment Captured.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives (lbs)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>186</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documents (inches)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>382</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice (t cms)</td>
<td>8.896</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>10,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt (lbs)</td>
<td>252.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>263.2</td>
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<td>(e) Material Destroyed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fortifications</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>3602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

f. Significant Sources and Collection Techniques: In the course of an average month the C2 section received at least 40 different types of reports on a regular basis from higher, lower and adjacent units and civilian agencies. During an operation however, the majority of information of immediate tactical value came from the division’s own collection agencies and in particular the interrogation section of the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment at division and brigade level.

g. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Enemy Capabilities are:

(a) Attack single, or multiple targets simultaneously with up to multi-regimental size forces supported by local VC elements in the western portion of the FRANCIS MARION AO.

(b) Reinforce the units committed in Operation FRANCIS MARION with the 24th NVA Regiment in KONTUM Province, elements of the 5th NVA Division PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Province or other as yet unidentified units inside CAMBODIA.

(c) Defend base areas and landing zones in southwestern KONTUM and western PLEIKU Provinces with up to battalion-size forces.

(d) Withdraw NVA Forces into CAMBODIA, thereby avoiding contact.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(a) The enemy’s logistical system (NVA/VC/VMC) is vulnerable to disruption through friendly operations. Enemy units operating within RVN are reliant on resupply from base areas in CAMBODIA or from pre-positioned supply bases/caches in RVN.

1. Insertion of US Forces between enemy locations in RVN and the CAMBODIAN Border can interdict logistical support from CAMBODIA, as demonstrated in Operation PAUL REVERE IV.

2. Sustained efforts to search out supply caches in the area of operation have resulted in numerous caches being uncovered. In the western EDAP ENANG area alone, over 60 tons of rice have been discovered since the initiation of Operation PAUL REVERE XV in October 1966.

(b) The enemy’s need for extensive combat preparations and his inflexibility in execution of a plan makes him vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling attacks. Locating of enemy units by friendly forces prior to initiation of major offensives by an enemy force offers the opportunity to destroy the enemy force and disrupt major enemy plans for multi-unit operations in an area.
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(c) Enemy forces, when massed, are especially vulnerable to air strikes, artillery fires and vertical envelopment by heliborne forces. This vulnerability increases as an enemy force penetrates deeper into RVN from CAMBODIA. However, it must be borne in mind that planned, major NVA contacts initiated by the enemy at relatively extended distances from CAMBODIA can reasonably be expected to include NVA preparations to ambush US ground or heliborne reaction forces.

(d) VC dependence on support by the indigenous population requires the establishment of a VC infrastructure which must remain in place to be effective. Individual members of this infrastructure are vulnerable to detection and apprehension. Sustained friendly operations in an area produce a sense of physical security and trust among local inhabitants, and when augmented by intensive village sweep operations, have achieved noticeable success in disruption of the VC infrastructure and detection and apprehension of VC cadre and officials.

(e) The enemy is vulnerable to the use of chemical defoliants and crop destruction agents. The enemy's need for concealed base areas coupled with the need to produce his own rice to augment foodstuffs procured from the local populace, renders him particularly vulnerable to the effects of these weapons.

(f) Enemy personnel have several psychological vulnerabilities which can be exploited as separate targets or used in combination against specific enemy units.

1. The enemy's limited medical facilities, equipment and supply of drugs and medicines render the NVA susceptible to malaria and pulmonary diseases, especially during the southwest monsoon period.

2. Several intelligence sources have indicated that dissension exists between NVA units commanders and political officers, and between NVA cadre and VC/VMC cadre in mixed NVA/VC units. If such dissension does not already exist, it can be created by persistent psychological attacks.

3. Intangible vulnerabilities that can be exploited to our advantage include: Fear of being killed or wounded, fear of improper burial or no burial at all and fear of having to fight a long protracted war.

(3) Probable Courses of Actions.

(a) The NVA achieved some measure of success in committing battalion-size forces against company-size or smaller US units, and will undoubtedly use this same tactic in future operations.

(b) During the reporting period, all intelligence (PW reports and captured documents) indicated that the four NVA regiments
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contacted (32d, 66th, 88th and 95B) were initially at 60-70% TO&E strength. These understrengths will greatly reduce their capability to generate significant combat power in terms of battalion and regiment-size attacks. However, the enemy does retain the capability to concentrate or weld understrength companies and battalions into specially tailored forces to attack multiple targets, particularly those targets vulnerable to mortar attacks.

(c) In all probability the NVA will continue to attack US units operating in the proximity of the CAMBODIAN Border and south of the Oasis. The most probable areas of enemy operations are in the vicinity of the IA DRANG River, in the area west of route 14B, PLEI ME and DUC CO Special Forces Camps, the EDAP ENANG Refugee Center, THAN AN District Headquarters and US/ARVN unit positions in this general area.

h. Recommended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization.

(1) The Military Intelligence Detachment has no assigned US personnel qualified as VIETNAMESE linguists. This makes counterintelligence and interrogation personnel completely dependent upon ARVN interpreters. The ARVN interpreters have a limited knowledge of military terminology and the English language. At a minimum two VIETNAMESE qualified linguists should be assigned to the Military Intelligence Detachment.

(2) A Blacklist for PLEIKU Province was assembled and distributed to divisional units by the 4th MI Detachment. As an additional aid, individual village sheets containing all known information on each village were prepared. All units were furnished counterintelligence EEI worksheets for the purpose of gathering more information from the units operating in these villages. At the present time there are insufficient counterintelligence personnel assigned to analyze and update the incoming information for each village. To compensate for this shortage, daily updating of individual village study sheets was discontinued and a counterintelligence supplement to the daily TWSUM was substituted.

(3) Combined infantry and intelligence cordon and search operations resulted in the apprehension of several VC and VMC suspects and temporarily upset the VC infrastructure through the loss of cadre, caches and the security they had previously enjoyed. There were insufficient counterintelligence personnel available, therefore, villages were not always searched nor people questioned as completely as desired. There is a definite need to augment field counterintelligence units in direct support of infantry operations. In addition closer coordination between infantry units and CI personnel in the selection of villages for search operations will increase the overall effectiveness of the operation.

Comparison of Intelligence Estimates Versus Actual Enemy Found. As of 1 January, the B-3 Front was accepted as consisting of the 1st and 10th
NVA Division, with the 32d, 33d, and 66th Regiments subordinate to the former, and the 88th, 95B and 10IC Regiments subordinate to the latter. The status of the 33d and 10IC Regiments was questionable, however, as it was known that both had suffered severe personnel losses during Operation PAUL REVERE IV. Several captives had already reported that both regiments had been disbanded and their personnel used as replacements for other regiments. It was further estimated that the enemy would commit his forces (both NVA and VC) in several scattered locations to offset US reaction capabilities. The most likely areas at the time appeared to be the KONTUM panhandle and the IA DRANG River valley for NVA units; the center of PLEIKU Province for VC main and local force units. This estimate proved valid. The only discrepancy that emerged between the intelligence estimate and the actual enemy found was in the composition of the NVA divisions. The majority of the captives stated that the 1st NVA Division now consisted of the 32d, 66th, and 88th Regiments, which indicated that a major realignment had taken place since Operation PAUL REVERE IV. At the close of the reporting period, the status of the 10th NVA Division was not clear as it appeared to have only one major combat element, the 95B Regiment.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans.

(1) OPORD 2-67 (FRANCIS MARION), 7 April 1967. The division mission included the following tasks: To detect NVA infiltrating into Republic of VIETNAM; to destroy NVA/VC troop concentrations; to provide security for engineer construction and logistical installations; to provide security for Government of VIETNAM resettlement areas within the area of operations and to provide security for highway 19 east of PLEIKU to vicinity of MANG YANG pass.

(2) OPLAN 8-67 (CHASE), 1 February 1967. It outlines division plans for the conduct of joint operations for the relief of installations in the PLEIKU complex to include the PW camp. ARVN forces pursue and drive enemy forces into blocking positions established by 4th Infantry Division units.

(3) OPLAN 9-67 (WALTER REED), 5 March 1967. This plan calls for the deployment of a battalion task force to northwestern KONTUM to conduct search and destroy operation; block infiltration routes; upgrade route 512 and construct and record locations of fire support bases within the AO.

(4) OPLAN 10-67 (DRAGON MOUNTAIN BASE CAMP AND TAOR DEFENSE), 16 April 1967. It prescribes procedures for the organization and the defense of the division base camp and division TAOR, and for the conduct of hamlet visits within the base camp TAOR.

(5) OPLAN 12-67 (RED BALL), 13 April 1967. It prescribes the procedures for rescue of personnel, the security of sensitive documents and
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equipment and recovery operations for downed aircraft.

(6) OPLAN 13-67 (WEST of the SE SAN), 17 April 1967. The plan provides planning guidance for the employment of one brigade west of the SE SAN River.

(7) OPLAN 14-67 (LZ CAT), 20 April 1967. The Division would continue Operation FRANCIS MARION; commit a mechanized battalion task force on an operation from FLEI ME to the CHU PONG mountains.

(8) OPLAN 15-67 (101st), 25 April 1967. It provides planning guidance for receipt of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in support of 4th Infantry Division operations.

b. Operations.

(1) Operation SAM HOUSTON began on 1 January 1967 and continued until 5 April. The detailed record of division operations is contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

(2) The 4th Infantry Division began Operation FRANCIS MARION on 6 April 1967. The area of operation remained the same as Operation SAM HOUSTON. For a chronological summary of significant activities from 5 April — 30 April see inclosure 3.

(3) On April 26, Operation HANCOCK I was initiated by FRAGO 3-1-67 to OPORD 2-67 with change 1. Task Force 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry supported by Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery Battery Group conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of BAN BIECH. At the end of the reporting period the operation continued.

c. Training.

(1) The 4th Division Replacement Training program was revised to incorporate combat lessons learned and to institute changes directed by USARV in replacement training programs. A gas chamber exercise and increased emphasis on patrolling and ambush/counter-ambush techniques were among the significant changes. Additionally, due to the large number of replacements being received by the division and 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, it was necessary to initiate two replacement training classes per week. During the reporting period, 1,387 replacements participated in this training.

(2) The division's Combat NCO Leadership School program of instruction was revised to incorporate combat lessons learned. There were 205 students who attended this school, 195 of whom completed the course successfully.
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(3) The Recondo Preparatory School program of instruction was revised to incorporate training which would better prepare candidates for successfully completing the MACV Recondo School. There were 129 personnel who successfully completed the recondo preparatory training.

(4) Division personnel received the following new equipment training:
   (a) AN/PSR-1 anti-intrusion device, 112 individuals.
   (b) Trace metal detection kit, 37 individuals.
   (c) Position locator, Eight individuals.

(5) Other training conducted by the division consisted of projectionist training to 60 individuals. Rope ladder and rappelling training was presented to a cadre of 27 individuals using the division's newly constructed 40 foot tower and CH-47 helicopters. During the period 5 through 11 April, Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry presented mortar training to 35 CIDG personnel.

(6) Projected training: A division sniper and Hawkeye (hunter-killer) training program will be initiated early in May. The POI for this training is divided into two phases of five days each. The first Hawkeye training class is scheduled for 24 US personnel and 30 ARVN personnel and 51 US personnel will take sniper training.

d. Chemical.

(1) Chemical operations consisted of defoliation, Riot Control Agent (RCA) employment, and installation and maintenance of flame devices.

(2) Chemical operations in support of Operation SAM HOUSTON are contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.

(3) Defoliation Planning. Requests were coordinated and submitted for aerial and ground defoliation for portions of PLEIKU, DARLAC and KONTUM Provinces.

   (a) In PLEIKU Province the aerial request was partially approved on 8 April.

   (b) In KONTUM Province the request was approved on 17 February.

   (c) In DARLAC Province enlarged target areas were added to the initial aerial defoliation request.
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(4) Aerial defoliation by the C-1231's of the 12th Air Commando Squadron in the division AO commenced on 18 February. Twenty-six missions were flown, totalling 62 sorties in Pleiku and southwest Kontum Provinces. (See inclosure 4 and SAM HOUSTON After Action Report).

(5) Ground Based Defoliation.

(a) Ground based defoliation continued throughout the period using the UH-1D spray rig. A total of 252 sorties were flown.

(b) On 22 April two sorties were flown using the 179th Aviation Company's newly fabricated spray rig for the CH-47 helicopter (See Inclosure 4). Characteristics of this rig are:

1. Tank capacity - 600 gallons.
2. Rated pump capacity - 80 gallons per minute.
3. Tested length of time to spray all defoliant in tank - 8.5 to 10 minutes.
4. Optimum speed and altitude for spraying - 50 knots at 50 feet.
5. Width of path covered - 12 to 15 meters.

(c) During the period a Buffalo Turbine, on loan from II Crops Engineer (202 Committee) was used to defoliate the Dragon Mountain Bare Camp Perimeter.

(d) A total of 2760 gallons of defoliant were used for these operations (1860 gal WHITE and 900 gal ORANGE). Since these agents must be mixed with a solvent for proper application, approximately 15,000 gallons of defoliant mix were sprayed by the Chemical Section using ground based defoliation systems over approximately 340 hectares.

(6) Riot Control Agent (RCA).

(a) Three Riot Contr. 1 Agent (RCA) drum drops and one grenade drop were made on suspected enemy positions. In each case the RCA drop was followed by artillery concentrations. Negative results were reported.

(b) Two drum drops were made in support of the 1st Brigade at YA 789385.

1. 7 April 1967 - 29 drums (2320 lbs) of CS powder were dropped from two CH-47's.
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2. 12 April 1967 - 30 drums (2400 lbs) of CS powder were dropped from two CH-47's.

(7) Installation and Maintenance of 55 Gallon Flame Devices.

(a) At the end of the last reporting period Division Chemical personnel had placed 68 operational 55 gallon flame devices on the base camp perimeter. During February, March and April, new devices were installed completely ringing the Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(b) Thirty-nine of the mines required replacement for the reasons noted:

1. Set off by electrical storms - 31. (16 on 4 April, 10 on 27 April and 5 on 30 April).
2. Tested - 5.
3. Damaged and required destruction - 3 (two by small arms fire from the perimeter, one by a bulldozer).

(c) There were a total of 123 operational flame devices around the base camp on 30 April 1967.

e. PSYWAR.

(1) An overall CA/Psyops evaluation of the indigenous population's attitude shows an acceptance of both GVN and US officials and the program initiated in their hamlets. There was a marked increase in the amount of information volunteered by inhabitants and an apparent willingness to openly assist military and government officials.

(2) During the period over 50 million leaflets, 100 hours of airborne loudspeaker and 85 hours of ground loudspeaker time were used. The themes emphasized the strength of Government of VIETNAM and American Forces and were designed to instill fear into the ranks of the NVA soldiers. Additional themes included the CHIEU HOI program and encouragement of civilians to provide information concerning NVA/VC activities and to deny support to the NVA/VC. Loudspeaker missions were also used to warn the civilian population of danger.

(3) Psychological operations included such new innovations as; No-Doze, CH-47 missions along the CAMBODIAN Border; floating shingles with psyops messages for use in the rivers; and pledge of allegiance cards. Additional psyops was gained through the use of district psyops personnel and HOI CHANH during visits in the TAOR by the District Chief.

(4) Problem area: The motivation of ARVN Psyops teams attached
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to the 2d Brigade left much to be desired. Many attempts were made to improve their effectiveness. Special lectures were presented on the importance of their mission and mission schedules were adjusted to be more in line with their previous work loads. Comfortable and protective shelters were provided them and several items of personal equipment were temporarily issued for their added comfort. All of these efforts produced no lasting impact on their attitude toward their jobs or an effective psyop program. To effectively use an ARVN psyop team, good planning is necessary. In some villages, an effective program was implemented through the use of conscientious MONTAGNARD (Civilian) interpreters.

f. G3 Air operations.

(1) Air operations in support of SAM HOUSTON are contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.

(2) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation FRANCIS MARION during the period 6-30 April.

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</table>

(3) No B-52 bomber strikes have been flown in support of Operation FRANCIS MARION to date.

(4) Weather conditions did not significantly restrict air support during the period. Twenty of the approved missions were canceled due to adverse weather.

(5) The preparation and submission of preplanned requests between 2400 and 0600 hours facilitated the processing and resulted in more requests being filled.

(6) Orientation flights on "Spooky" missions were scheduled for commanders and staff officers of the division to provide first hand experience with this weapons system.

g. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) The Aviation Battalion enhanced the division's ability to accomplish its assigned mission with responsive and effective combat aviation support. Combat support missions flown included combat assault, resupply, command and control, armed helicopter and casualty evacuation.

(2) Staff planning was principally directed toward the direct
support and general support role of the Aviation Battalion supported by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion. This normally consisted of one Assault Helicopter Company and one Assault Support Helicopter Company in direct support.

(3) Plans were updated for the improvement of Hensel Army Airfield. Major changes included completion of a 2500 foot hard top runway, the building of four prefabricated operations buildings and the addition of a non-directional beacon. The runway was in the process of being extended by 1000 feet and remade into a 3500 foot steel matting runway capable of handling C-130 type aircraft at the end of the period.

(4) The majority of training was conducted along the lines of lessons learned. Where possible, this training was spontaneous and conducted informally during mission breaks to a group as small as a helicopter crew. Concurrent training in gunnery was conducted while on routine missions. A free fire range area provided crew training and testing of aircraft gun systems.

(5) Newly assigned aviators were given a thorough in-country orientation. This training consisted of as much as 200 flying hours in-country prior to an aviator being assigned as an aircraft commander. Newly arrived in-country personnel were assigned to experienced aircraft commanders for on-the-job training during operational missions.

4. (c) Logistics.

b. A chronological and statistical summary of the 1st Brigade's tactical and logistical moves from TUY HOA to the 4th Division Base Camp is at inclosure 5.

c. 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division commenced relocating to Dragon Mountain Base Camp by using organic vehicles on 10 April. The target date for completion of relocation is 30 May 1967.

d. Base Camp improvements in logistical support facilities accomplished during the period were:

(1) Construction of a building to house the 1st Logistical Command Laundry Detachment was completed. Laundry production averaged 9,000 pounds per day.

(2) Construction of a 15 ton ice plant was completed in the
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Class I distribution area. Ice is now being distributed with Class I rations.

e. Conversion of 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry to a mechanized infantry battalion was accomplished. The major equipment was shipped in packets from SAIGON to QUI Nhon and arrived at Dragon Mountain Base Camp on 15 March. A shortage of tools and spare parts resulted in an approximate 30 day delay in conversion.

f. Project Counter Teams, Department of the Army Technical Assistance Teams, arrived at the 4th Infantry Division to assist in purifying PLL's and ASL's of units of the division. At the end of the reporting period Project Counter Teams had completed a review of approximately 50 percent of unit PLL's.

g. Division CMAT teams were organized to maintain high state of Material Readiness. CMAT's were conducted in accordance with standard procedures as outlined in AR 750-8 and DA Pamphlet 750-10. Initiation of the CMAT and Roadside Spot Check programs emphasized the importance of preventive maintenance.

5. (U) Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP).

a. For detailed report of MILCAP operations in the division AO during period 1 February - 5 April see Combat Operations After Action Report, S/M HOUSTON.

b. On 1 February the Good Neighbor Program was initiated in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) around the Dragon Mountain Base Camp and thus became the focal point of the division's Civic Actions.

c. Civic Action activities during the months of February, March and April continued to shift to the long-range nation building projects designed to compliment the Government of VIETNAM's Revolutionary Development Program. The main effort was directed through the Good Neighbor Program, which, building on the earlier Hamlet Visitation Program, expanded civic action activities to visiting 41 hamlets five times per week in the TAOR. Enthusiastic acceptance by the hamlets of these self-help projects led to the development of a farming program, irrigation projects, recreational items such as swings and seesaws, the opening of a PX souvenir store as an outlet for the cottage industry and an expanded health workers training program. A pilot livestock program was given impetus with the assignment of a veterinarian to the division.

d. The success of this expanded program is reflected in the increased participation by the villagers and GVN officials. Weekly visits by the LE TRUNG district chief and monthly visits by province officials are
welcomed by the people. Construction of the Good Neighbor Council house was begun, and with VIETNAMESE, MONTHAGUARD and US personnel working side by side represented the growing community spirit. As the people became more convinced of the GVN's interest in their well being, they began to turn to the local GVN officials for assistance. For example, when a plague epidemic broke out in one village, the people went to their district headquarters and within three hours district officials had inoculated 250 people. The success of the program is also borne out by a village, which having observed the spillway construction in a nearby hamlet, purchased cement and pipe in PLEIKU, and with the assistance of their neighbors built their own spillway.

e. To capitalize on the successes gained in the TAOR and to meet the increased requests for assistance, Good Neighbor Program was initiated on 13 March in the forward areas. Around the fire bases and CP's of the 1st and 2d Brigade and along highways 1A and 19, the divisional combat elements began visiting the local hamlets several times weekly. In addition the TAOR was extended on 17 April to 70 kilometers from the base camp and the Good Neighbor program expanded to 59 hamlets. In a constantly expanding program, the 4th Infantry Division is conducting an aggressive civic action program which is specifically designed to assist the GVN in conducting revolutionary development in an area which is not a National Priority Province. Cooperation between US Army and ARVN forces, between USAID and GVN representatives, and civilians and military personnel on both sides is the hallmark of this "Good Neighbor Program".

f. EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

(1) On 2 April the GVN initiated the EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program employing one ranger battalion as a security force and supporting the program with 200 TRUNG SON cadre and a staff organization. Although EDAP ENANG is an ARVN program, the division is committed to support this program consistent with the tactical mission.

(2) The 2d Brigade assisted in the resettlement program by moving 18 villages with a total population of 2,757 people and 90,000 pounds of food and rice from insecure areas, south of THANH AN District Headquarters, to the secure resettlement area along route 19 West. The move required more than 90 CH-47 sorties and 30 2½ ton truck loads. Other support included temporary issue of 21 general purpose tents for shelter, 39 dozer days and five 5 ton truck loads of gravel and sand for construction projects. In addition medical assistance was provided through the brigade surgeon.

g. Efforts not otherwise mentioned above.

(1) Cottage industries were initiated in PLEI CHUNG KEP, THANH AN District.
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(2) Audio-visual team accompanied the CA teams on night visits to hamlets in the TAOR and showed movies during the visit and performed other civic actions.

(3) The division continued its policy of providing packages of food and sundry items to persons detained and then released as innocent civilians. In addition, toilet articles and medical treatment were provided to the PW compound.

(4) The division veterinary program continued to grow to a total of 14 hamlets participating. A total of 280 cattle were examined and 84 treated for various diseases. Additionally, many chickens and swine were examined and two hamlets constructed hog pens in an effort to control diseases. The units provided edible garbage to supplement the diet of the animals.

(5) Twenty hamlet health workers completed their training and graduated on 15 April 1967. They were presented diplomas signed by the Province Health Director and the Division Surgeon. Additionally, each was presented with a complete first aid kit for use in their hamlet. A second class is scheduled to begin on 1 May 1967.

(6) English classes at the Highland Junior Military Academy were concluded with the end of the school year. Classes will resume on 2 June 1967. Units and personnel have continued to donate reading material such as magazines, books and newspapers for use in the school library.

(7) Six one hour periods of instruction were presented to replacement personnel to emphasize their individual role in Civic Action and PSYOPS.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

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(2) Close of period

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b. Replacements. A total of 159 officers and 2,857 enlisted replacements were received. The total division losses were 533. A total of 172 emergency leaves were processed.

c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements is excellent.

(2) Decorations awarded:

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(3) Combat Badges awarded:

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</tbody>
</table>

d. Promotions. A total of 2,765 enlisted personnel were promoted during the period.

e. Reenlistments. A total of 188 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was as follows:

(1) First term RA reenlistments | 32
AVDHW-OC

S U R J E C T: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

(2) Career RA reenlistments 129
(3) AUS reenlistments 21
(4) RA extensions 5
(5) AUS extensions 1

f. Postal:
   (1) Money Order Sales $2,907,914.37
   (2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees $61,527.00
   (3) Incoming Mail 20,394 sacks
       Daily Average 243 sacks
   (4) Outgoing Mail 5,577 sacks
       Daily Average 63 sacks
   (5) Number of incoming mail days 84
   (6) Number of outgoing mail days 89

g. Special Services.
   (1) Total of four USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 12,000.
   (2) R&R quotas received were 4,980 out-of-country and 200 in-country.
   (3) During the reporting period a total of 90 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the division.

h. Chaplain activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SERVICES</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>14,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>13,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial (Non-Denominational)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Maintenance of discipline, law and order.
   (1) A total of 194 incidents were reported to the Provost 21
SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

Marshall's office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice.

(a) General Courts Martial 4
(b) Special Courts Martial 80
(c) Summary Courts Martial 109

7. (C) Artillery.

a. General. During the reporting period the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery and the 3rd Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) participated in Operations SAM HOUSTON, FRANCIS MARION, and HANCOCK. Division Artillery was responsible for the defense of the base camp.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Metro.

(a) Two electronic meteorological sections were employed in the TAOR during the quarter, one from the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, 52d Artillery Group, and one from Division Artillery.

(b) It was noted by comparison of meteorological data taken at DUC CO, New PLEI DJERENG, and Dragon Mountain Base Camp, that metro data should be taken from the immediate area in which fires originate. There were similarities between data from DUC CO and New PLEI DJERENG but units operating in either area should use meteorological data from another area only as a last resort. There were few similarities noted between Dragon Mountain Base Camp and the western areas.

(c) A continuing comparison will be obtained for the rainy season to observe if the change of season increases or decreases the capability of using metro data from a central location.

(2) Radar.

(a) Division Artillery had one AN/TPS-25, one AN/TPS-33, and one AN/MQ-4 (235th Radar Detachment) in the base camp. One AN/MQ-4 was employed in a GS role in the forward area by the 237th Radar Detachment.

(b) The AN/TPS-25 located 316 contacts during the reporting period. It was operational 104.6 hours, and was non-operational for 77 3/4 hours while awaiting parts.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

(c) The AN/MPS-4 Radar, 237th Radar Detachment, was operational 1012.25 hours. The set was non-operational 25.25 hours. The radar in the forward area operated by the 237th Radar Detachment was operational 799 hours and was non-operational 160 hours.

(3) Searchlights: The deployment of a searchlight in support of roadblock and check point operations was valuable during the hours of darkness. The surprise effect and capabilities of the searchlight to illuminate a larger area assisted the military police in identifying and controlling indigenous traffic.

c. Operations.

(1) A detailed operational report for Division Artillery and the attached artillery units for the period 1 February through 5 April 1967 can be found in the Combat Operation After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.

(2) Operation VANCIS MARION - 6 APR - 30 April 1967.

(a) Concept of operations. The concept for artillery employment was to provide direct support artillery to the maneuver elements; to use medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support missions and to provide artillery support for USSF/CIDG camps at PLEI ME, DUC CO and New PLEI DIBRENG.

(b) Execution.

1. During the initial phases of the operation direct support artillery was provided by attaching artillery to the brigades. During the last week of the reporting period the 6th battalion, 29th Artillery and 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery were detached from the brigades and given missions of direct support. The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was placed in DS of the 1st Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was placed DS of the 2d Brigade. There was no additional artillery OPCON during this operation. The 52d Artillery Group had the mission of general support-reinforcing the 4th Infantry Division Artillery. With the concurrence of the group commander, the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was used to provide DS artillery for the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. The remainder of the artillery battalions provided general support reinforcing fires.

2. An additional platoon and section from Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery was attached to the division and then detached and placed under the control of the 52d Artillery Group. With the concurrence of the 52d Artillery Group Commander, locations of Battery B weapons were not changed. The weapons of both Batteries B & D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery provided increased fire power for artillery fire support bases and brigade tactical command posts during the night, while providing strong points...
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
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for route security during the daylight hours. Their use permitted accomplish-
ment of multiple missions with economy of force, freeing additional maneuver
elements for employment by the maneuver battalions. Because of rapidly
changing requirements, the flexibility permitted by the attachment of these
units to the division was essential.

(d) Division Artillery headquarters exercised increased control
over artillery ammunition expenditures and provided guidance for expenditures
to both direct support and general support reinforcing artillery. During
periods of contact all ammunition expenditures were increased and likewise
when contact diminished, expenditures were proportionally reduced. The
same held true with H&I programs.

(3) Operation HANCOCK I 26 April- 30 April 1967. Light and
medium artillery support was provided by forming one artillery battery group
attached to Task Force, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. The battery group
consisted of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and Battery A, 5th
Battalion, 16th Artillery.

d. Ammunition expenditures.

(1) By caliber 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>17,545</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-42</td>
<td>78,428</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-29</td>
<td>39,083</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-13</td>
<td>4,177</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>16,618</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-92</td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>22,917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>6,386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>6,599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) By unit:

SAM HOUSTON 1 Feb - 5 Apr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>17,545</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-42</td>
<td>78,428</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-29</td>
<td>39,083</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7-13</td>
<td>4,177</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>16,618</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-92</td>
<td>218</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>22,917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>6,386</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>8,767</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>6,599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FRANCIS MARION 5 Apr-30 Apr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-42</td>
<td>12,146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-29</td>
<td>11,259</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>6,258</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-92</td>
<td>4,898</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>232</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Training. Scheduled training was expanded to a minimum of 15
hours per week and included MOS refresher training, safety during firing and
rules of engagement. To further improve performance, a Division Artillery
Instruction-Safety Team was formed and regularly inspected all batteries.
The battalion and battery training programs concentrated on deficiencies discovered during team visits. Lessons learned during operations and reviews of firing accidents were particularly emphasized during team visits.

f. Aviation.

(1) During the quarter the two aircraft attached to the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery were transferred from TUY HOA to Dragon Mountain Base Camp and incorporated into the 4th Division Artillery Aviation Section. Helicopter support was provided the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery on a mission basis. This method of employment provided a more efficient use of helicopter support, improved maintenance and increased aircraft use.

(2) Each newly assigned aviator received 10 hours of flight transition orientation training prior to being assigned operational missions.

(3) Disposition of aircraft during the reporting period.

(a) OH-23G,

1. 4th Battalion, 42 Artillery: two.
2. 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery: two.
3. Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 4th Division Artillery: three.

(b) UH-1C: Attached to 4th Aviation Battalion: two.

(4) Operations. The Aviation Section of the 4th Division Artillery accomplished the following:

(a) During the month of February, 246 combat support missions were flown and 327 passengers were transported requiring 404 sorties. A total of 193 hours were logged and aircraft availability was 69.5%.

(b) In March 516 combat support missions were flown and 649 passengers were transported requiring 776 sorties. A total of 514 hours were logged and the aircraft availability was 80.1%.

(c) In April 694 combat support missions were flown and 739 passengers were transported requiring 1025 sorties. A total of 416 hours were logged and the aircraft availability was 80.2%.

(d) The quarterly totals were:

1. Missions Flown - 1456.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFRP 65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

2. Passengers Transported - 1715.
4. Hours Logged on aircraft - 1023.
5. Average Aircraft availability - 76.6%.

Aircraft attached to 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, and 4th Aviation Battalion.

5. Logistics.

(1) Basic loads of artillery ammunition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>TYPE OF AMMUNITION</th>
<th>ENTRY POSITION</th>
<th>BN AMMO TRAINS</th>
<th>BN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm How</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm How</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>3150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch How</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) These basic loads were developed to insure an adequate stock of ammunition at both the battery positions and the battalion ammunition trains area to meet the demands of continuous firing in support of infantry units during periods of heavy, prolonged contact. These maximum amounts were reduced when the battery positions were too small to safely accommodate a large number of rounds, when a move was imminent, or when the number of rounds being expended daily did not justify stocking a large amount of ammunition. When the ammunition was not stocked in the battery positions, it was held at the battalion ammunition trains area and earmarked for the batteries, thus insuring resupply when required.

(3) The base camp defense ammunition stockage level was revised and determined to be adequate for base camp defense purposes based on past firing experience.

*Excess of this figure requires division approval.*
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

WEAPON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>ILL</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>SMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>106 rds/wpn</td>
<td>20 rds/wpn</td>
<td>18 rds/wpn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 inch Mortar</td>
<td>155 rds/wpn</td>
<td>37 rds/wpn</td>
<td>30 rds/wpn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzer</td>
<td>300 rds/wpn</td>
<td>20 rds/wpn</td>
<td>20 rds/wpn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Howitzer</td>
<td>150 rds/wpn</td>
<td>10 rds/wpn</td>
<td>10 rds/wpn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch Howitzer</td>
<td>100 rds/wpn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) FSA stockage levels of artillery ammunition.

(a) The FSA stockage level was in accordance with the theater stockage level and no real problems were encountered.

(b) On 24 April, the FSA at LE THANH was closed and DISCOM began operation of an FSE by supply point distribution except Class V. Class V supplies were maintained in a trains area. Stockage levels were revised and are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON TYPE</th>
<th>ANMO</th>
<th>BTRY POSITION</th>
<th>RN TRAINS AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzers (3 Btrys)</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>800 - 1000</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMK</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Howitzers (2 Btrys)</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMK</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) On 26 April, Operation HANCOCK I with one 105 howitzer battery, one 155 howitzer battery, two M2's (Dusters) and two M55's (quad mounted .50 caliber machine guns), began an operation in the BAU BLECH area. The following ammunition was stocked initially at the battery positions and the FSE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>TYPE OF ANMO</th>
<th>BTRY POSITION</th>
<th>FSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzers</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMK</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Howitzers</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMK</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M55</td>
<td>50 Cal</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>40000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

(6) Available supply rate of artillery ammunition:

(a) The following ASR's were in effect during Operation SAM HOUSTON and Operation FRANCIS MARION (105mm How only):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>HE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>151800 Feb - 281800 Feb 67</td>
<td>30 rds/wpn/day</td>
<td>151800 Mar - 311800 Mar 67</td>
<td>33 rds/wpn/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281800 Feb - 151800 Mar 67</td>
<td>30 rds/wpn/day</td>
<td>311800 Mar - 151800 Apr 67</td>
<td>34 rds/wpn/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,51800 Mar - 311800 Mar 67</td>
<td>30 rds/wpn/day</td>
<td>151800 Apr - 301800 Apr 67</td>
<td>34 rds/wpn/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) During the period ending 281800 February, units of the 4th Infantry Division Artillery were authorized a total of 15,616 rounds of 105mm HE. A total of 23,662 rounds were drawn from the FSA for a total of 8,052 rounds in excess of the authorization.

(c) During the period ending 151800 March, Division Artillery units were authorized a total of 21,660 rounds of 105mm Howitzer HE. A total of 32,539 rounds were drawn from the FSA for a total of 10,879 rounds in excess of the authorization.

(d) The over-expenditures were justified by tactical emergencies due to heavy contact with the enemy.

(7) The average percentage of howitzers deadlined by month was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>M10A1</th>
<th>M109</th>
<th>M110</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) The average percentage of vehicles deadlined by month was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>AVG % D/L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (C) Engineer.

a. General. During the period the 4th Engineer Battalion efforts were directed in support of tactical operations and development of the division base camp at Dragon Mountain. The battalion participated in Operation
CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFCR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

SAM HOUSTON (1 Jan - 5 Apr 67) and FRANCIS MARION (6 Apr - continuing) as well as Operation PERSHING (1 Mar - continuing) with Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion. Combat support activities of the battalion expanded, especially base development at the Dragon Mountain Base Camp. The base development expansion was due in large measure to reorganized and accelerated self-help construction programs which facilitated the rapid erection of facilities. Use of self-help permitted a better than four-fold increase of divisional engineer forces forward in support of tactical operations. At the end of the quarter approximately 50% of the battalion resources were committed in support of the tactical operations in widely scattered areas throughout VIETNAM.

b. Operations.

(1) Operation SAM HOUSTON began on 1 January 1967 and was completed on 5 April. The 65th Engineer Battalion supported the operation with Companies A (-) and B (-) in direct support of the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively, with Headquarters Company, Company D, and Company E (Bridge) in general support of the division. Company C, with bridge elements of Company E, was attached on 18 February to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in III Corps Tactical Zone. Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion, with appropriate bridge elements, attached to the 4th Engineer Battalion on 12 March in support of Operation PERSHING. For a detailed report of tactical operations during Operation SAM HOUSTON see: Combat Operations After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON.

(2) Operation FRANCIS MARION began on 6 April and is currently in progress. The 4th Engineer Battalion continues to support the operation as noted in (1) above.

(a) Company A (-) provided direct support to the 1st Brigade at LE THAN (YA892300). The company conducted mine sweeping operations from the 96 grid line west on route 19 to Duc Co (YA841252), and north on route 14B from route 19 to route 509, then west on route 509 to the New LEI Djereng CIDG camp. Mine sweeping operations were conducted from multiple locations to allow rapid and simultaneous movement of the teams. Security for the operations was furnished by 1st Brigade and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. On 12 April, Company A (-), augmented with two Rome Plows, constructed 16.5 kilometers of fair weather tactical road (route 44) from junction with route 14B westward toward the CAMBODIAN Border to a .5 km support base at YA760385. The company continued to develop the FSB, helipad, and defensive perimeter at LE THANH and provided support to the infantry battalions for clearance of IZ's and FSB's as required.

(b) Company B (-) provided direct engineer support to 2d Brigade at Oasis and provided extensive road and defensive construction at that location. The company constructed numerous interior roads, and laterite

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susurfacing and drainage structures to allow use of the Oasis base on an all-weather basis. The readily available source of laterite at the Oasis facilitated use of the 18 yard motorized scrapers and greatly accelerated the placement of laterite on the roads and helipads. The distribution of penemate as a dust palliative proved to be most effective in reducing the excessive dust problem associated with helicopter operations. On 9 April Company B was augmented with two Rome Flows and assigned a land clearing operation in conjunction with EDAF ENANG resettlement program. This required the clearance of 800 acres of land for the resettlement of approximately 10,000 MONTAGNARD refugees within the FRANCIS MARION AO. Security for the land clearing teams was furnished by tankdozers or APC flame throwers from the 4th Engineer company. The Rome Flows cleared an average of 25 acres per day in light to medium clearing. Small leaves from bamboo thickets clogged radiator grills of the dozers and tended to cause overheating and numerous stops to cool equipment. The use of air compressors to blow out radiators aided but did not solve the problem.

(c) Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at the Dragon Mountain Base Camp and supported tactical operations by augmenting the line companies with items of engineer heavy equipment and security elements from the flame platoon. On 30 April the flame platoon (four flame thrower APC's) was combined with the tankdozer from each of the four line companies and the VIR to provide an armored task force for independent engineer operations. The task force was employed initially in providing security for sand convoys between Dragon Mountain and Kontum. Use of this task force envisions a force capable of securing engineer elements involved in bridge construction, road upgrading, and haul operations within insecure areas. Initial plans for the security force call for securing the upgrading of 26 kilometers of route 60 from junction of route 14 to Plei ME (ZA164003). The use of this armored force to secure independent engineer operations greatly reduced the dependence upon infantry and armored security forces and provides greater latitude and freedom of action to the engineer to accomplish priority missions with his own forces. Headquarters Company personnel, as well as other general support elements within the 4th Engineer Battalion received additional training in infantry, artillery and armor subjects to prepare for these independent operations.

(3) Base Development. The 4th Engineer Battalion, continued to conduct an accelerated and expanded base development program at the 4th Infantry Division Headquarters at Dragon Mountain. The program, organized and directed by the 4th Engineer Battalion, used up to 700 self-help personnel from various units of the division as well as approximately 200 local hire labors. Self-help construction was facilitated by the preparation of simple "do-it-yourself" plans.

(a) A concrete batch plant was expanded to allow use of six 165 mixers averaging 175 yards daily production with peaks of over 200 yards daily. Engineer operators, truck haul and supervision were furnished
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by the 4th Engineer Battalion, with self-help from division units assisting in plant operation from 0600 to 0900 hours and 1630 to 1900 hours and MONTAGNARD villagers (average 70 in number) from 0900 to 1630 hours. Company E hauled approximately 4,000 yards of sand from KONTUM for the batch plant with an average of 15 to 20 five ton bridge trucks. These trucks were off-loaded by 3/4 ton truck-pulled "scrapers" wielded by two men in the five ton truck bed.

(b) A laterite cap was placed on 90% of the base camp roads (26 kilometers). A laterite source was developed in an area 500 meters south of the base camp. The removal of a 20 foot overburden was time consuming, however, the use of 18 cubic yard scrapers allowed the use of this pit. As a result of the close laterite source, the division airfield runway was extended from 1500 to 2540 feet (C-123 capability) with a laterite base, peneprimed, and surfaced with M8Al steel matting. Two warm-up aprons and turn arounds have been prepared and are to be similarly surfaced with M8Al steel matting. Work on the aircraft parking apron was begun. Expected completion dates of surfacing these areas with M8Al matting are:

Runway 5 May
Warm-up aprons and turnarounds 10 May
Aircraft parking apron 31 May

(e) Construction of semi-permanent wood framed buildings with concrete floors is presently 35% complete for the entire base camp. Approximately 300 buildings have been completed, of which the majority are troop billets, mess halls, and special purpose i.e. maintenance, headquarters, day room. Prefabrication of the building is accomplished by the 20th Engineer Battalion. Unit self-help teams than pour the concrete and construct the building with assistance and under the direct supervision of 4th Engineer Battalion personnel. The additional manpower, facilitates rapid construction and has resulted in from 8 to 10 buildings (20'x80' average) being poured and constructed daily, when construction materials are available.

(f) Construction of buildings in the Community Center is presently 35% complete. These buildings consist of Red Cross, Post Exchange, PX warehouse and concession buildings, MARS Station, Snack Bar and Education Center. Certain of the more complex buildings, have been constructed solely by engineer units.

(e) Thirty perimeter guard towers were prefabricated and constructed using self-help personnel. They provide a sand bagged fighting position thirty feet above the ground on an average of every 60 meters around the perimeter of the base camp.

(f) Company E operated a sandbag fill site for base camp units using MONTAGNARD laborers and the battalion's ditching machine, when
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Approximately one half million sandbags were filled.

The Assistant Division Engineer for Base Development is continuing preparation of a comprehensive base development plan for the base camp. The planning includes layouts of all unit areas, showing proposed facilities, a description and discussion of the required construction effort, and priorities.

The 4th Engineer Battalion cooperated closely with the 20th Engineer Battalion during the past quarter on base development activities as well as tactical support. Exchange of engineer equipment and coordination of construction materials has insured a smooth operation.

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion, was attached to the 4th Engineer Battalion by General Order 384 effective 12 March 1967. Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion remains attached (by operation order) to the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Operation PERSHING in DINH PROVINCE. During the period the company accomplished LZ clearance, destruction of enemy caves and defensive positions, mine clearance, airfield and helipad improvement, perimeter defense construction, and preparation and maintenance of two brigade forward CP areas. The company constructed a one-lane, class 32, dry-weather road (route 506) from its junction with highway 1 (BR917720) to an LZ at (BR802830).

c. Logistics.

(1) Class II & IV (less construction). The battalion received one launcher for the AVIB, but is still short three. New M-60A1 launchers are due in May. Two 600 gph water purification sets were received less components necessary to make them operational. There is still a shortage of four of these sets. Standardization of Caterpillar D7E tractors was completed. All of the tractor-scrapers authorized by the VTOE have been received; i.e., eight Clark Model 290-M tractors with Le Tourneau-Westinghouse Model CT-4 scrapers.

(2) Class IV (Construction). The Battalion S-4 continues to handle construction material for base camp development, including transportation from QUI NHON, primarily by bridge trucks. Great emphasis has been placed on base camp development during this period, resulting in a sharp increase in the amount of materials, including cement, 2x4's and corrugated roofing, but progress continues on schedule in an attempt to complete as much work as possible before the arrival of the monsoon season.

(3) Water Supply. The battalion continues the support of the 1st Brigade and 2d Brigade with one water purification unit each. During this period, one water purification unit was transferred to Company C for support of the 3d Brigade. The remaining two units continue operation in base.
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9. (C) Signal
   a. General,
      (1) On 1 February the Dragon Mountain television station began broadcasting on a regular schedule. The normal hours of operation are 1730 to 2300 hours Monday thru Friday and 1400 to 2300 hours Saturday and Sundays.
      (2) On 3 February a 50-pair cable was activated between the Famous and Favor switchboard to relieve some of the traffic congestion on the Famous switchboard. Twenty-nine Famous telephone subscribers were transferred to the Favor switchboard.
      (3) On 15 February a teletype circuit was installed between Dragon Mountain TV station and the II Corps Information Office to be used for news service.
      (4) On 9 March the first underground cable conduit was buried beneath the north gate in the base camp. At the present time, 15 conduits have been installed in support of the new base camp underground telephone cable system currently under construction.
      (5) On 10 March General Peers accompanied by BG R.D. Terry, USAWR Signal Officer, formally opened the 4th Division Communication Center.
      (6) On 16 April Company C, 459th Signal Battalion departed the division base camp for a new assignment. Company A, 124th Signal Battalion has assumed responsibility for base camp signal center operations.
      (7) All field telephones (TA-312/PT) have been replaced by civilian-type sets (TA236/PT) for subscribers of Famous and Favor switchboards.
      (8) A public address system was provided and operated at the Ivy Bowl for the Easter Sunrise service and four USO shows.
   b. Plans and Operations.
      (1) Plans.
         (a) A plan is being formulated for the removal of the existing communication pole lines throughout base camp as soon as the new
underground cable system can support the base telephone requirements.

(b) Plans for moving the VHF carrier equipment from the Signal Center and consolidating it with the radio equipment on Signal Hill are being made. This project will begin when the underground telephone cable system has been installed between the Signal Center and Signal Hill.

(2) Operations.

(a) VHF radio operations: VHF radio systems have been established at Dragon Mountain Base Camp providing communications between the base camp and the following:

1. One 12 channel VHF system was installed in support of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Rear on 1 February.

2. Two 12 channel VHF systems were installed in support of the 2d Brigade at Oasis on 26 March.

3. One 12 channel VHF system was installed in support of the 1st Brigade on 28 March at their new location.

4. One 12 channel VHF system was installed in support of 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry on 12 April.

5. On 12 channel VHF system was installed in support of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry on 25 April.

(b) AM Radio Operations:

1. On 25 April Division Command Net #4 (Administration/Logistics Radio-Teletype) was activated with two stations in the net. The 124th Signal Battalion provided an AN/GRC-26 at Support Gomh for NCS.

2. On 26 April an AN/GRC-46 radio was attached to 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Task Force, for entry into the Division Command Net #3.

3. The 124th Signal Battalion continues to operate Division Command Net #3 and maintains a station in the I FFORCEV RATT net.

(c) FM Radio Operations.

1. On 9 February the Division FM Intelligence Net was activated on Signal Hill and remoted to the G2 console at the DTOC.

2. On 15 February an FM retransmission station was
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activated on Dragon Mountain in support of the 2d Brigade. This net is required providing retransmission for the 2d Brigade Command Net.

(d) Wire Operations.

1. On 5 March the installation of lines to support the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor’s move into base camp was completed.

2. During the month of March, lines were extended in support of the Support Command Headquarters move across the street.

3. On 6 April the installation of lines to support the 1st Brigade’s move into base camp was completed.

4. On 6 April 4th Infantry Division main switchboard (Famous) service was changed over to a newly installed AN/MTC-9 switchboard from the AN/MTC-1. The new switchboard has nine operator positions and is capable of providing service to 600 local subscribers and 60 long distance or local trunks.

5. On 9 April the extension of lines to support the re-location of 2d Brigade in base camp was completed.

(c) Training. During the quarter, the Signal Battalion conducted classes and participated in formal training to keep the unit at a high state of operational readiness. Some of the programs of instruction were:

(1) Four personnel attended a cable splicing school at the 41st Signal Battalion.

(2) Four personnel received instruction on the AN/PSR-1 anti-intrusion device.

(3) In April familiarization training with the XM-16El rifle.

10. (U) Information Activities.

a. During the reporting period 13 issues of the division newspaper, the IVY LEAF, were published by DONG NHÃ, a publishing house, at 49-59, THAI-LAP-THANH Street, SAIGON. Five thousand copies of the six page paper were printed with a distribution ratio of one copy per three men assigned to the division. After attachment of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, the newspaper featured stories of this unit and distribution was made to the soldiers of the brigade.

b. Arrangements were made to have the IVY LEAF printed at the Stars & Stripes Printing Plant, TOKYO, JAPAN, beginning 11 June. The newspaper will...
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be increased to 7,000 copies. It will cost approximately $100.00 less per issue than the present printing costs in SAIGON.

c. The Division Information Office had 322 news feature stories and 189 photographs cleared by MACV-10 and released to the various media in CONUS and South VIETNAM; 7,106 Hometown News Releases and 26 pictorial releases were sent to the Hometown News Center.

d. During the reporting period 93 correspondents representing the civilian news media visited the division. Of these, 53 conducted formal interviews with the Commanding General or a member of the division's General Staff.

e. The forward information press center was located at 3T during February and March. After 3T was closed, forward public information detachments were established at the new locations of the 1st and 2d Brigades.

f. A system of using former infantry squad leaders and platoon sergeants as "Press Aides" was established in February. These non-commissioned officers had been wounded in action and were not capable of performing duty in their primary MOS. Their duties were to assist the correspondents with transportation, mess, billeting facilities, and most important - in "getting the story". At this time there is one press aide each with the 1st and 2d Brigades.

g. In February arrangements were made with Edward Hymoff, military historian and correspondent, to publish a combat history of the 4th Infantry Division with a publication date of December 1967. This publication will include a short history of the division in World Wars I and II and the division's first year of combat in South VIETNAM. The publishing company is M.W. Lads Publishing Company, New York City, New York.

h. The Information Office prepared short radio programs on the activities of the 4th Infantry Division. These programs were broadcast Monday through Friday each week from 1830 to 1840 hours over the AFRTS radio transmitter located at Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

i. Beginning 11 February, the IO office prepared and presented a 10 to 20 minute television show titled "Focus - 4th Infantry Division" each Sunday on the AFRTS television station (Channel 11).

j. During the month of April this office completed a photographic laboratory.

k. Work continued on a broadcasting studio to enhance the preparation of TV programs and radio broadcasts.
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SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) The majority of the observations in the form of lessons learned for the quarterly period were submitted with the Combat Operation After Action Report, SAM HOUSTON. Additional lessons learned are submitted herein.

2. (C) Operations.

Counter Mortar Fire

Item: Counter-Mortar fire.

Discussion: Examination of enemy mortar positions in relatively open areas revealed that the mortar crews had prepared foxholes with overhead cover. When counter-mortar fire was received, the crews took cover in these protective positions until the counter-mortar fire was lifted. Thus when impact fuses were used to attack these mortar positions there were relatively few enemy casualties.

Observation: Time or VT fuses should be used against enemy mortar positions when firing counter-mortar fire. An effective tactic is the brief lifting of fires so the enemy gains a sense of security and leaves his protected position. After this pause of several minutes, resume firing. Once the positions are silenced then the counter-mortar fire can be shifted to probable escape routes.

Cordon and Search Operations

Item: Cordon and search operations.

Discussion: Several techniques have been recognized during recent cordon and search operations as contributing to a successful operation:

1. Movement to and selection of positions should be closely supervised by the unit leaders. Since movement into an area is done under the cover of darkness, positions must be constantly reevaluated for fields of fire and concealment as daylight approaches and relocated when necessary to retain concealment.

2. After the village is given notice of the impending search, inhabitants must then be assembled immediately or they will use any intervening time hide weapons and ammunition. Trace metal detectors are very useful in this respect.

3. The use of GVN/ARVN personnel accompanied by division MI personnel to search the village while the US unit remains in concealed cordon positions has been very effective.
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Observation: Cordon and search operations have been successful, but require a
great deal of supervision by the squad and platoon leaders with particular
emphasis on the selection of positions that remain concealed from the village.

Bangalore Torpedoes

Item: Bangalore torpedoes

Discussion: A position on a hill or knoll presents an excellent opportunity
to employ Bangalore torpedoes. The torpedoes are placed on the slopes of the
terrain feature in such a manner that when the enemy approaches the friendly
perimeter to attack or to harass the position the torpedoes are fired to
destroy or discourage the enemy.

Observation: When a friendly unit's position is on a hill or knoll,
Bangalore torpedoes can be employed as defensive weapons.

Extracting Recondo Patrols

Item: Extraction of Recondo Patrols under unfavorable conditions.

Discussion: During recent operations the locating of recondo patrols by
extracting aircraft has at times been difficult. When visibility is good and
when the recondo patrol is not in imminent danger of discovery by an unfriendly
element, colored smoke in the pick-up zone (PZ) satisfactorily identifies the
patrol's location. However, during periods of poor visibility - hours of
darkness, rain, ground fog - smoke is unreliable as the sole means of marking
PZ locations. The capability of UH-1 helicopters to homing on radio signals
can be used. By the recondo patrols keying their radios for approximately 15
seconds at regular intervals, the extracting aircraft can locate them within a
few hundred meters and narrow the search area considerably for a physical
sighting of the patrol or a signal.

Observation: Recondo patrols should receive instruction on the capability and
procedure of using the UH-1 helicopter's capability to home on radio signals.
This should be a standard procedure during times of poor visibility or when
a recondo patrol is in danger of detection by an enemy element.

Xenon Searchlight

Item: Uses of the Xenon searchlight (AN/MSS-3)

Discussion: During recent operations the jeep-mounted Xenon searchlight
was successfully employed in forward fire support bases in several roles:

(1) Direct illumination of the supported unit's fire base
perimeter.

(2) Using the searchlight's infrared capability allowed
surveillance of the fire base perimeter and adjacent woodlines without
compromising its presence.
(3) The use of vertically oriented Xenon searchlight has proved the most effective ground identification signal for pilots to locate fire support bases during poor weather conditions.

Observation: The jeep-mounted Xenon searchlight with its airlift capability is very effectively employed in forward fire support bases.

Defoliation

Item: Mixing of defoliant, loading and spraying from helicopter spray rigs.

Discussion: The 55 gallon drum which holds the defoliant in the UH-1D helicopter spray rig is secured in the aircraft and refilled between sorties. The original method devised was a pressure system feed from a second 55 gallon drum on a truck bed next to the helicopter. This method was time consuming due to the necessity for switching the air lines on the pressure system from one drum to another. A system of blending the defoliant with solvent in the M9 Power Driven Decontaminating Apparatus (PDDA) and using it to refill the drum in the helicopter was found to work successfully. The use of the PDDA has doubled the number of defoliation sorties that can be flown using the UH-1D rig.

Observation: The PDDA should be used to blend and fill the UH-1D helicopter spraying rig drums for defoliation missions.

3. (C) Training.

Training Deficiencies

Item: Training deficiencies and corrective actions.

Discussion: Observations during recent operations indicated deficiencies in camouflaging of positions and individuals, marksmanship and reaction time of point elements. As result of these deficiencies; camouflage techniques are receiving constant emphasis with particular emphasis on new, low-silhouette bunkers. KD ranges have been established at fire bases and at every opportunity individual and crew-served weapons are zeroed. In addition, basic and advanced reaction courses have been established for the improvement of individual reaction time to sudden targets of opportunity. Emphasis is placed on a "snap fire" technique requiring fast aiming and firing at targets identified by sight or sound and the selective use of automatic and semi-automatic fires.

Observation: Training must be recognized as a continuing process. As specific deficiencies are noted, steps must be taken immediately to correct them with appropriate additional training.

Safety Instructional Teams

Item: Use of safety instructional teams.
Discussion: Division artillery organized a safety team which visited each battery and battalion location. The purpose of the team was to observe and assist unit commanders in MOS refresher training and safety procedures during firing. The team observed and instructed in the following areas: fire direction procedures, application of rules of engagement, operation of howitzer sections, condition of howitzer equipment, care and handling of ammunition, and overall safety requirements during firing. On the spot correction and instruction where necessary were used by the team. A refresher training program was established and the team also observed the implementation of this program.

Observation: The use of Safety Instructional Team has improved the overall technical proficiency of howitzer and fire direction sections while reducing the frequency of artillery accidents.

4. (C) Intelligence.

Mine Warfare

Item: Mine Warfare.

Discussion: The enemy has implanted mines in groups, usually of two to five, in the main roads within a linear distance of 600 meters. Additionally, these groups were employed near a major trail or road junction. For example: on 16 February, four mines were found within 600 meters; 22 February, five mines were found within 500 meters; 2 March, three mines located within 200 meters; and on 5 March, three mines were found within a 600 meter distance.

Observation: As long as detection equipment is available and time is not critical, minesweeps of the immediate area for a 1000 meters will help eliminate additional equipment damage or casualties.

5. (U) Logistics.

Contact Teams

Item: Forward support contact teams.

Discussion: During the reporting period, the average deadline rate for artillery was very low. This low deadline rate can in part be attributed to the use of forward contact teams from the supporting maintenance battalion. The contact teams were immediately responsive to maintenance problems and were so situated that travel time to the fire base was reduced to the minimum.

Observation: To maintain a low deadline rate, forward support artillery contact teams are required and essential.
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6. (C) Sigmal.

Communications

Item: Communications of Mechanized Companies (Dismounted)

Discussion: Excellent communications exist within the mechanized company
while mounted. In a dismounted role however, the company is limited to 10
organic AN/PRC-25's. Thus, each platoon has only two AN/PRC-25 radios,
which does not allow radio communications with its squads. The ability to
dismounted the four AN/GRC-53's of the weapons platoon does not add sufficiently
to the capability of the squads, platoons and company to communicate with each
other.

Observation: Additional AN/PRC-25's should be made available to insure one per
squad, two for platoon headquarters and three for the company command element.

7. (U) Civic Action.

Revolutionary Development

Item: Long-range goals.

Discussion: To supplement the province Revolutionary Development program
and give full benefit of division resources to the people of this area, long
range projects in the Good Neighbor program were advanced from the high-impact,
short duration projects to self-help building programs. In these programs,
cottage industries, health worker training, a veterinary medical program and
advanced farming techniques were introduced.

Observation: An area once pacified must be given assistance upon which to
base a stable and growing economy. Self-help projects properly supervised,
to include technical assistance, is considered the best way to achieve a
viable society in this area.

8. (U) Transportation.

Aircraft Manifests

Item: Manifesting of personnel aboard aircraft.

Discussion: During an air movement each man should be given two 3"x5" cards
to fill out to include his name, rank, service number, and unit. The cards
may be placed in the helmet and taken by the loadmaster when the aircraft
is bored. These cards, picked up by the loadmaster, will serve as a manifest.

Observation: To insure proper manifesting, cards should be issued and filled
out prior to movement to the departure airfield. This will provide a complete
manifest for each aircraft sortie.
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AIRCRAFT LOADING

Item: Loading trailers aboard aircraft.

Discussion: Vehicle drivers have delayed the loading of aircraft because of their inability to back trailers aboard. A trailer hitch, welded to the front bumper of a 3/4 ton truck, has been used successfully to rapidly push trailers aboard aircraft.

Observation: Two 3/4 ton trucks and one 2 1/2 ton truck with front bumper trailer hitches are recommended for use in any air move involving a battalion or larger force. Certain drivers in each unit should be selected and trained in loading vehicles aboard aircraft.

Part II: Recommendations

Appropriate recommendations are covered in Combat Operations After Action Report, S.M HOUSTON.

5 Inclosures
1. Organizational Structure
2. Key Personnel
3. Chronological Summary of Significant Activities
4. Air and Ground Defoliation Data (6-30 April)
5. Displacement of the 1st Bde
6. Abbreviations
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1 F LD FORC E VIETNAM, APO 96350  1 0 JUL 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the 4th Infantry Division Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967, and pertinent comments are as follows:

2. (C) Reference paragraph 3, Section 1 - Significant Unit activities.

   a. Paragraph 3e (3) - Psychological Warfare: Concur. However, employment of innovations such as No-Doze and CH-47 missions along the border have been used in II CTZ in the past. The floating of shingles down the rivers is of questionable benefit to the tactical commander in comparison with other methods of propaganda dissemination.

   b. Paragraph 3e (4) - Psychological Warfare: Concur. Direct coordination is authorized and encouraged between OPCON organizations (Psychological Operation and Civil Affairs officers) and DSA, II Corps. Through this coordination, more effective planning for the use of ARVN Psychological Operation teams can be accomplished. Additionally, command emphasis through ARVN channels can be initiated through the G5.

3. (U) Reference paragraph 5, Section 1 - Significant Unit Activities: This is a description of a highly successful Civic Action program.

4. (C) Reference paragraph 7, Section 1 - Significant Unit Activities.

   a. Paragraph 7g (6)(b) - Logistics: Non concur. The figures shown reflect only a two week period. The 4th Infantry Division was allocated a total of 30,240 rounds of 105MM artillery ammunition for the ASR period ending 231300H February 1967, and 35,446 rounds were expended which exceeded total allocation by 5,206 rounds. IFFORCEV had sufficient assets on hand to cover the excessive expenditure without exceeding this headquarters' total allocation.

   b. Paragraph 7g (6)(c) - Logistics: Non concur. The figures shown are for the period 231300H February 1967 to 151800H March 1967. A total of 62,585 rounds of 105MM artillery ammunition was allocated to the 4th Infantry Division for the period 281800H February 1967 to 311800H March 1967. During this period 56,969 rounds were expended which resulted in an unused allocation return of 5,616 rounds.

5. (C) Reference page 38. (Extracting Recondo Patrols) Section 2, Part 1 - Commander's observations: Concur. In addition, Aviators should receive refresher training in the use of FM homing devices. The training should be included in in-country check-out, and an in-flight check should be included in quarterly standardization training.
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6. (U) Reference paragraph 7, Section 2, Part I - Commander's observations:
The long range goals of the civic action program are in consonance with current zone and nation-wide RD support plans.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

5 Incls
nc

EARNEY G. SILVUS
CAPTAIN, AGC
ASST AG

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AVHGC-DST (15 Jun 61) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 AUG 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning logistics, Section I, paragraphs 7g(6)(b), (c) and (d), page 28 and paragraphs 4a and 4b, 1st Indorsenent pertaining to available supply rate of artillery ammunition. Concur with 1st Indorsement comments. This headquarters allocates those Class V items in short supply to the Field Forces each month. The Field Forces, in turn, manage their assets through sub-allocations to the divisions and separate brigades. While the Field Force allocation has been exceeded in several instances, the USAV allocation has not. Each Field Force retains a portion of their monthly allocation for tactical contingencies.

b. Reference item concerning Vietnamese linguists, Section I, paragraph 2h (1) page 9: Concur. The shortage of linguists within this command is fully realized by all headquarters concerned with this problem and is a matter under continuous analysis. The 4th Inf Div has an established requirement of 43 Vietnamese linguists all of which were on requisition until recent cancellation by DA due to lack of VN linguist personnel in the training base. Two validated linguist requirements remain for 4th Inf Div through October 1967 although three fluent linguists are scheduled to arrive during the month of July and August 1967 for assignment to the 4th Inf Div. Additionally, USAV is programmed to receive 400 linguists from the 12 week Vietnamese course at the Defense Language Institute, Fort Bliss, Texas. First input of these subfluent linguists is not expected to arrive in this command until October 1967. As prescribed by DA, these personnel must be temporarily utilized in 04B positions until CONUS school output can furnish sufficient 04B's to meet USAV requirements. Priority for assignment of these linguists will be to tactical MI's and the 525th MI Group.

c. Reference item concerning extracting recondo patrols, Section I, paragraph 2, page 38 and paragraph 5, 1st Indorsenent. Concur with the requirement for training of recondo personnel on the capability and procedures of using helicopter homing devices. Recommend HQ MACV be advised for possible inclusion of this area in the MACV Recondo School.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference 76 concerning Training Deficiencies, Section II, Part I, page 39. In view with requirement for continuing training program. As outlined in USARV Tng Cir 350-8 a continuing program to insure adequate unit proficiency has been established by this headquarters. In addition, units will be encouraged to establish special schools required to maintain individual and unit proficiency.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. KENNEDY
Cpt. AGC
Ass. Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 4th Inf Div (RCS CSPOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  6  OCT1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 5g(3). The policy of providing some type of remuneration to personnel apprehended in the area of operations and brought to PW compounds is considered to be very sound. These people are also transported back to their villages, if at all possible. By compensating the individual who is released as an innocent civilian, we are showing him that we are sorry for inconveniencing him. This policy could result in improved cooperation and rapport between the local people and US Forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

1 Incl
nc

[Mailmark]

47
UNCLASSIFIED

AVDHH-GC 5 June 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

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1 - CO, 52d Camt Avn Bn
2 - CO, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
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2 - CO, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
2 - CO, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
2 - CO, Div Arty
2 - CO, DISCO
2 - CO, 1st Sqdr, 10th Cav
2 - CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 6th Inf
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 6th Inf
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 12th Inf
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
1 - CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
1 - CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
1 - CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty
2 - CO, 4th Avn Br.
2 - CO, 4th Engr Bn
2 - CO, 124th Sig Bn
1 - CO, 4th S&T Bn
1 - CO, 4th Med Bn
1 - CO, 704th Maint Bn
1 - ACofS, G2
1 - ACofS, G3
1 - ACofS, G4
1 - ACofS, G5
5 - TACP (AIO), 4th Inf Div
1 - CO, C Co B, 5th USSFG
25 - CO, 29th Hist Det

UNCLASSIFIED
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (C)


2. (C) Task organization for remainder of quarter is shown below.


1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 1st Bde
1-12 Inf (On order rel to 2d Bde)
3-12 Inf
1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
6-29 Arty
B/4-29 Arty (OPCON)
(On order rel to parent unit on order)
237th Radar Plt, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)
1 Sec E/41st Arty (OPCON)
1 Slt B/29 Arty (OPCON)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plt, B/124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co TACP

TF 1-10 Cav
1-10 Cav (-)
3-6 Arty (-) DS

Div Arty
HHC, Div Arty
4-16 Arty (-)
6-14 Arty
23rd Div Arty
1-92 Arty

DISCOM
4th S&T Bn
4th Med Bn
704th Maint Bn

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 2d Bde
1-12 Inf (On order)
2-8 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
Plt, B/1-69 Armor
4-42 Arty (-)
1 Slt 29th Arty (OPCON)
Plt, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)
1 Sec E/41st Arty (OPCON)
Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plt, B/124th Sig Bn
2d Plat, 4th MP Co TACP

TF 1-69 Armor
1-69 Armor (-)
Plt, C/2-8 Inf
Cav Plt 1-10 Cav (On order)
3-6 Arty (Prov) DS
B/3-6 Arty
A/5-16 Arty

Div Troops
HHC, 4th Inf Div
D/4-60 Arty, (-)
4th Avn Bn
4th Engr Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn (-)
43rd Cal Det
29th Mil Hist Det
33rd Inf Plt (Set Dog)
50th Inf Plt (Set Dog)
4th MI Det
4th MP Co (-)
4th Div TACP
Inf Plt
4th Admin Co

Inclosure 1

(1) 1-12 Inf OPCON to 2d Bde
(2) Plat 1-10 Cav OPCON to 2d Bde
(3) USSF Det A-241 (POLEI KLENG) OPCON to 2d Bde
(4) A/5-16 Arty OPCON 4-42 Arty
(5) 1-92 Arty GSR 3-6 Arty (Prov) with one btry

(6) One sec E/41 Arty atch 2d Bde eff when 1-10 Cav (-) takes responsibility for security of hwy 19W.
(7) 3 Tns 33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog) atch 2d Bde.


(1) 1-12 Inf OPCON to 2d Bde
(2) Plat 1-10 Cav OPCON to 2d Bde
(3) USSF Det A-241 (POLEI KLENG) OPCON to 2d Bde
(4) A/5-16 Arty OPCON 4-42 Arty
(5) 1-92 Arty GSR 3-6 Arty (Prov) with one btry

(6) One sec E/41 Arty atch 2d Bde eff when 1-10 Cav (-) takes responsibility for security of hwy 19W.
(7) 3 Tns 33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog) atch 2d Bde.


(1) Add 1-92 Arty: GS - reinf 4-42 Arty w/1 btry, reinf 6-29 Arty w/1 btry vic DUC CO, reinf 3-6 Arty (Prov) w/1 btry on Rte 19E.
(2) D/4-60 Arty (+): Defend in priority 1st Bde (9 Wpns), 2d Bde (8 Wpns), TF 1-69 Armor (4 Wpns), DMBC (3 Wpns).
(3) E-41 Arty: Defend in priority 2d Bde (4 Wpns), 1st Bde (2 Wpns), DMBC 2 Wpns).


(1) Add 1-92 Arty: GS - reinf 4-42 Arty w/1 btry, reinf 6-29 Arty w/1 btry vic DUC CO, reinf 3-6 Arty (Prov) w/1 btry on Rte 19E.
(2) D/4-60 Arty (+): Defend in priority 1st Bde (9 Wpns), 2d Bde (8 Wpns), TF 1-69 Armor (4 Wpns), DMBC (3 Wpns).
(3) E-41 Arty: Defend in priority 2d Bde (4 Wpns), 1st Bde (2 Wpns), DMBC 2 Wpns).

d. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 3-2-67 and modified by change 1 to FRAGO 3-2-67 effective 26 April 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</th>
<th>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
<td>HHC, 2d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Inf</td>
<td>2-8 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12 Inf</td>
<td>1-22 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-29 Arty (-) DS</td>
<td>1-12 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/4-42 Arty</td>
<td>4-42 Arty (-) DS</td>
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<tr>
<td>237th Radar (OPCON)</td>
<td>1 Slt, 29th Arty (OPCON)</td>
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<td>Plat, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)</td>
<td>Plat D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 sec, E/41 Arty (OPCON)</td>
<td>1 sec, E/41 Arty (OPCON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/4th Engr Bn (-) DS</td>
<td>B/4th Engr Bn (-) DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn</td>
<td>ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Plat, 4th MP Co</td>
<td>2d Plat, 4th MP Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>TACP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 1-69 Armor</td>
<td>TF 1-10 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69 Armor (-)</td>
<td>1-10 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 Arty (Prov) DS</td>
<td>3-6 Arty (-) DS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| B/3-6 Arty | }
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TF 3-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
C/6-29 Arty Btry Gp
C/6-29 Arty
A/5-16 Arty (Atch for OPCON and log except maint)
Det, D/4-60 Arty
(AW) (Atch for OPCON and log except maint)
(2 M-55, 2 M-42)
1 Plat, 1-10 Cav
1 Plat, B/4th Engr Bn
Commo Sec, 4/124th Sig Bn

DISCOM
No change from OPORD
2-67

Div Arty
HHB, Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)
6-14 Arty GS
235th Radar
1-92 Arty GSR

Div Troops
HHC, 4th Inf Div
D/4-60 Arty (-)
4th Avn Bn
4th Engr Bn (-)
1-124th Sig Bn (-)
43rd Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
33rd Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MP Co (-)
4th HI Det
4th Div TACP
4th Admin Co

Task organization as changed by FRAGO 4-2-67 effective 261500H
April 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 1st Bde
3-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
6-29 Arty (-) DS
1-22 Inf
C/4-62 Arty (OPCON)
Plat (+), D/4-60 Arty (AW) (SP) (OPCON)
A/4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
TACP

TF 3-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
C/6-29 Arty Btry Gp
C/6-29 Arty (105)
A/5-16 Arty (155)
Det, D/4-60 Arty
1 Plat, 1-10 Cav
1 Plat, B/4th Engr Bn

Div Arty
HHB, Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)
6-14 Arty GS
235th Radar
1-92 Arty GSR

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 2d Bde
1-8 Inf
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
4-42 Arty (-) DS
4-6-29 Arty (OPCON)
Plat (-), D/4-60 Arty (AW) (SP) (OPCON)

B/4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
TACP

TF 1-10 Cav
1-10 Cav (-)
A/3-6 Arty DS

TF 1-69 Armor
1-69 Armor (-)
3-6 Arty (-) DS
Det D/4-60 Arty (-) (AW)

Div Troops
No change from FRAGO 3-2-67

DISCOM
No change from OPORD 2-67
I. Task organization was temporarily changed by FRAGO 5-2-67 effective 291200H April 1967. The 1st Brigade was directed to provide one infantry battalion task force to division control to deploy to the vicinity of PLEI DON LIN and conduct cordon and search operations on 30 April 1967. The unit selected, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was returned to the battalion FSB and 1st Brigade control upon completion of the mission.
KEY PERSONNEL (U)

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Headquarters.

MG Peers, William R. CG, 4th Inf Div
BG Walker, Glenn D. ADC-A
BG Ryder, Charles W. Jr. ADC-B
COL Miller, Judson F. Chief of Staff
LTC Morley, Leonard A. ACOFS, G1
LTC Crizer, Pat W. ACOFS, G2
LTC Lay, James R. ACOFS, G3
LTC Richards, William G. ACOFS, G4
LTC Allyn, John C. ACOFS, G5
LTC Friendly, Howard W. IG
LTC Hess, Frank J. Fin Off
LTC Schuwe, Willis E. SJA
LTC Hettr, William R. Chap
LTC Robinson, Herbert A. AG
LTC Cullen, Victor A. PM
LTC Peard, William G. Surg
MAJ Ansted, George W. DTO
MAJ Zenk, Daniel R. IO
LTC Henderson, William Chem Off

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

COL Jackson, Charles A. CO, 1st Bde
LTC Gannon, Timothy G. CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
LTC Lynch, Thomas P. CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
LTC Vollmer, John P. CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf

2d Brigade, 4th Inf Division.

COL Adamson, James B. CO, 2d Bde
LTC Duquemin, Gordon J. CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
LTC Wright, Corey J. CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
LTC Rosell, Thomas G. CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

COL Shanahan, James G. CO, 3d Bde
LTC Miller, William H. CO, 1st Bn, 11th Inf
MAJ Moore, James E. Jr. CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
LTC Granger, Clinton E. Jr. CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf

Inclusion 2

UNCLASSIFIED
Division Artillery:

COL
Cutrona, Joseph F.
CO, Div Arty

LTC
Holbrook, Bruce
CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty

LTC
Kuckhahn, Karl O.
CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty

LTC
Nettles, Elritt N.
CO, 5th Bn, 29th Arty

LTC
Woods, Jack C.
CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty

Support Command:

COL
Boudman, Arthur B.
CO, Support Command

LTC
Jacques, Jasper P.
CO, 4th S&T Bn

MAJ
Anderson, Kirby V.
CO, 4th Med Bn

LTC
Gilbanks, William R.
CO, 704th Maint Bn

Division Troops:

LTC
Delbridge, Norman G. Jr.
CO, 4th Engr Bn

LTC
Keefer, Loren R.
CO, 124th Sig Bn

LTC
Holloman, Robert A. III
CO, 4th Avn Bn

LTC
Cole, Thomas F.
CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav

LTC
Williams, Paul S. Jr.
CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor

CPT
Zwicker, Gary L.
CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div

CPT
Terrell, Edmond D.
CO, 4th Admin Co

CPT
Sullivan, Gerard A.
CO, 4th MP Co

CPT
Gee, John T.
CO, 4th MI Det
6 April. 4th Infantry Division commenced Operation FRANCIS MARTON. The major elements of the division were disposed as follows: 1st Brigade with three infantry battalions was northeast of DUC CO on route 14B; the 2d Brigade with three infantry battalions was southwest of PLEIKU at Oasis; 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was located west of PLEIKU on route 509; 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was located east of PLEIKU on route 19.

The 81mm Mortar Platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry located at YA899131 received four separate chemical attacks delivered from the southeast and drifting to the northwest across the platoon's perimeter. The fourth attack was the most severe and caused eye irritation. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry closed into the division TMOR on 2100 hours after a road convoy from TUY IIA.

7 April. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry had brief contact with an unknown size NVA force at YA788535 at 1245 hours resulting in one NVA KIA. Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with one VC at ZA075517 resulting in one US WIA. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at ZA12467.

8 April. Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry located 250 bunkers, foxholes and spider holes, 12 cooking houses, one spring-fed pool and 40 possible graves estimated six months old at YA65071. Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with four VC armed with AK-47 rifles at ZA093503 resulting in one VC KIA. The Oasis complex received 40-50 rounds of mortar fire at 1900 hours; all rounds landed outside the perimeter. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry command post at ZA092447 received approximately 40 82mm mortar rounds from the southwest resulting in three US WIA; one M577, one N62 wrecker, and one 10 KW generator damaged. At 2020 hours, a tank and a 1/4 ton vehicle from Company C, 1st Battalion 69th Armor received intensive automatic weapons and anti tank fire at AR958505 resulting in three US WIA. Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor went OPCON to the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM).

9 April.

10 April. At 1250 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged an estimated two NVA platoons at YA854555. Company A (-), 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry at 1928 hours made contact with two VC at YA993374 resulting in one VC KIA.

11 April. At 1355 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed one NVA and captured one AK-47 at ZA071484.

12 April.

13 April.

14 April. Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery received 8-10 81mm mortar rounds at ZA029937 resulting in 11 WIA.

Inclosure 3

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15 April. An APC from Troop B, 5th Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA93432 resulting in one US WIA. At ZA120167, a tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine.

16 April. At 0615 hours, a suspected VC element attempted to blow the bridge at BR43539. The bridge remained intact but would not support traffic. An AVLB was emplaced until repairs were made.

17 April. A 1st Brigade civil affairs team received automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated VC squad at YA917432 resulting in one US WIA. Two platoons from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, operating with the PESI ME CIDG company, made contact with an estimated NVN company at ZA130172. Contact lasted from 0811 until 1035 hours resulting in three US KIA, one of which was a US CIDG advisor. At 1220 hours, Company C (-), had a brief contact with an estimated two VC companies accompanied by NVN advisors resulting in one US KIA. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with seven VC at ZA109166, resulting in two VC KIA. At 1730 hours Company B again made contact with an unknown size force at ZA123377 resulting in three NVN KIA, two US KIA, six US WIA, two US KIA.

18 April. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with three VC at YA930327 resulting in three VC KIA. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted a search of the battlefield and found two US KIA from the previous days action. Company B also found five NVN KIA, one SKS rifle, one M-167 rifle, 2000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, one bag of documents, seven CHIMCOC stick grenades, 25 pounds TNT, three pounds of C-4, 500 pounds of rice, 30 sets of web gear, and five medical aid bags.

19 April. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted a village evacuation and destruction mission at ZA136153. Approximately 13 tons of rice were found in the village. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA929280. A five ton dump truck from 4th Engineer Battalion hit a mine at YA936287 resulting in one US WIA.

20 April. Company B (-), 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry had contact at 1115 hours with 10 VC at ZA017405 resulting in one VC KIA; one pistol (unknown type), one carbine, two US grenades and one document bag captured.

21 April. At 1305 hours, Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with three NVN at YA943342 resulting in one NVN KIA, one NVN CIA. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at YA929146 received five rounds of unknown type mortar fire at 2335 hours resulting in two US WIA. At 2335 hours the 1st Platoon, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 1st Platoon, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and Battery D, 5th Battalion, 10th Artillery at YA893375 came under mortar attack. The attack continued sporadically from the southwest until 0133 hours. A total of 205 82mm rounds were received resulting in three US WIA. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA938434.

22 April. Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry encountered punji stakes along a trail at YA72102 resulting in two US WIA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a large cache at YA974539 containing one
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KiA rifle, nine 12 gauge shotguns, one pair wire cutters, two VC Shu (unknown), one barrel for an unknown type weapon, one carbine barrel, one teletypewriter set, 21 telephone sets, two sewing machines, nine boxes TNT with 54 - 1/4 pound blocks per box, one box of documents and miscellaneous radio parts.

23 April. Company C (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry at ZA097167 made contact with two NVA at 1030 hours resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1217 hours they made contact with an NVA squad resulting in two US WIA; two NVA KIA; two AK-47's captured.

24 April. An APC from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine at ZA025212 resulting in three US WIA. Another APC, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, hit a mine at ZA775174 resulting in two US WIA.

25 April. Company C (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact at 1440 hours with a small NVA force at ZA07166 resulting in two NVA KIA; one AK-47 captured; one US WIA. An APC from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine at ZA45213.

26 April. 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at 1755 hours made contact with an unknown size NVA force at YA88132. Contact was broken at 1930 hours resulting in 15 NVA KIA, one AK-47 captured, two US KIA, eight US WIA. Company C (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force and received sporadic sniper fire from 1400 until 1700 hours resulting in one NVA KIA and one US KIA. At 1825 hours Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry had 30 82mm mortar rounds land 300 meters from their position at YA767393.

27 April. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry sustained one WIA when an individual stepped on a mine at YA840091.

28 April. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at YA894378 received approximately 46 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from 0045 - 0136 hours resulting in 10 US WIA, a counter-mortar radar generator and one KL19 shop van damaged. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at 1530 hours sighted two NVA vicinity YA812134 resulting in one NVA KIA and two rucksacks captured. At 1725 hours they made contact with an estimated two platoon enemy force. Contact was broken at 1830 hours resulting in five NVA KIA, three AK-47's, one SKS captured; one US KIA.

29 April. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry task force at 0104 hours received five 60mm mortar rounds at BQ972425 resulting in five US WIA. At 1130 hours Company A located an extensive VC base camp containing 180-200 one man foxholes with overhead cover, eight latrines (recently used), six kitchen areas containing post, tables, benches and recently used cooking fires, 16 CHICOK grenades, and numerous magazines. At 0730 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Task Force saw two VC crossing a stream vicinity of BQ972417. Mortar fire was called;
result one VC KIA. At 1500 hours Recondo Patrol 2 E made contact with eight VC in vicinity of Z2755116 resulting in four VC KIA. A M-42 (duster) from Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery hit a mine at Z4085251 resulting in one US WIA.

30 April. Company I, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA platoon at Z1108175 at 1025 hours. Contact was broken and regained several times until 1845 hours. The results for the action were 13 NVA KIA; three AK-47's captured, two US KIA, 11 US WIA. The fire support base, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received approximately 30-40 mortar rounds with 5-15 rounds landing inside the perimeter. The attack lasted from 2155 until 2240 hours resulting in one US WIA.

The disposition and activity of division elements at the end of the reporting period were as follows:

(a) 1st Brigade. CP located at Y4899313. Search and destroy operations were being conducted with two infantry battalions operating west of route 14B and one infantry battalion conducting operations vicinity of IA DRANG valley.

(b) 2d Brigade. CP located at Z110275. Search and destroy operations and patrolling were being conducted east of route 14B and north of route 509 with two infantry battalions.

(c) 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. CP located at ZA094447. Convoy escort and route security operations were being conducted on route 509.

(d) 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. CP located at BRO32532. Route security and convoy escort missions were being conducted on route 19 east of PLEIKU to the h.d. YANG pass.
1. (C) The following aerial defoliation missions were flown:

   a. 7 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA7650 to YA7770.

   b. 8 April - four C-123's sprayed approximately 4000 gallons of defoliant from YA7661 to YA8761.

   c. 8 April - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA6666 to YA6856.

   d. 8 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA6670 to YA6553.

   e. 10 April - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA8356 to YA8770.

   f. 11 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA765700 to YA756527.

   g. 14 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA665700 to YA756527.

   h. 15 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA8455 to YA7750.

   i. 16 April - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA6563 to YA7350.

   j. 16 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA865575 to YA754402.

   k. 16 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA7169 to YA6167 (making two passes).

   l. 17 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA6256 to YA7144.

   m. 21 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA750500 to YA797470 along highway 509B in PLEIKU Province.

   n. 26 April - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA7186 to YA6570.

2. (C) The Buffalo Turbine was used on the base camp perimeter 10-14 February and 20-24 April. A total of approximately 1500 gallons of 10/1 diesel/defoliant mix (150 gal ORANGE) was sprayed on 20 hectares. The plants sprayed showed effects within 24-48 hours.

3. (C) A 60-70 meter wide strip, centering on highway 509, was sprayed by the CH-47 spray rig from YA85485 to YA857527, using 1100 gallons of 5/1 water/defoliant mix (200 gal WHITE). Negative results by the end of the reporting period. Due to the large percent of monocotyledonous plants in this area very poor results were obtained using the WHITE mixture.
1. (C) Movement of 1st Brigade from TUY HOA to New PLEI DJERENG.

a. The troop movement of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry was accomplished on 26 January 1967. The move was conducted using C-130 aircraft. Totals are as follows:

(1) Sorties 38
(2) Personnel 666
(3) Vehicles 69

b. On 19 February, the brigade command post and a portion of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, with an attached artillery battery moved using 32 C-130 sorties. The remainder of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (-), and Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion (-) closed New PLEI DJERENG on 20 February. Aircraft used were 37 C-130 sorties. On 21 February the remaining battery of the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, along with other personnel and equipment from the Brigade Task Force moved in 17 C-130 sorties completing the move. Statistics on this move are as follows:

(1) Sorties 94
(2) Passengers 1102
(3) Vehicles and trailers 272
(4) Equipment and vehicle tonnage 1052
(5) Total tonnage 1185

2. (C) Movement of the 1st Brigade Base Camp from TUY HOA to Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

a. Phase I (Preparation) consisted of calculating requirements (total trucks required to move unit equipment, total number of conexes to be shipped by LST, desired amount of tentage to be moved by air, packing and marking of conexes, and preparation of loading plans for all vehicles).

b. Phase II (Actual Movement) began on 25 March with the road movement of Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion and 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery. The convoy consisted of 42 vehicles and 113 personnel. Coordination was made for security of the convoy along highway 1 directly with 28th ROKA Regiment; FAC coverage with MACV Sector Headquarters and overnight billeting of troops with Support Command in the QUI NHON area. On 26 March air shipment of cargo was initiated from TUY HOA South to Dragon Mountain Base Camp, using C-7A's and C-123's to transport a total of 158,000 pounds of cargo. On 1 April sea shipments were initiated by transporting cargo.
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by truck from the 1st Brigade Base Camp to VUNG RO Bay and from there by
five LST's to QUI NHON closing on 11 April. In preparing the rear elements
of the remaining units for the movement phase the following schedule was
used:

(1) 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry (rear (-) ), 4 April. (Included
all 1st Brigade 3/4 ton trucks and 1/4 ton trucks).

(2) Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 5 April (sea movement
via LST).

(3) 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 6 April.

(4) 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry (rear (-) ), 11 April.

(5) 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry 16 April.

(6) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, 21 April.

(7) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 26 April.

The movement schedule was completed on the dates indicated above, using
630 2 1/2 ton truck loads. A liaison team was established at QUI NHON to
make coordination with the Support Command for billeting, feeding, setting
up POL and water points, coordinating convoy schedules, and providing the
necessary sundry items for the comfort of the troops.

c. Phase III (Clearing of Unit Areas) was executed prior to, during
and following the movement phase. All unit areas were inspected by a brigade
S-4 representative prior to the departure of the entire unit.

d. Summary of the relocation move:

(1) 630 2 1/2 ton truck loads of cargo transported to PLEIKU.

(2) Five LST's moved cargo to QUI NHON.

(3) 158,000 pounds of cargo transported by air to Dragon
Mountain Base Camp.

(4) 131 conexes transported from QUI NHON to PLEIKU.

(5) TUY HOA Base Camp turned over to TUY HOA Sub Area Command
at 260800 hours April 1967.

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MOS  Military Occupation Specialty
LSR  Main Supply Route
NCS  Net Control Station
NVA  North VIETNAMSE Army
NVAC  North VIETNAMSE Army Captive
OPCON  Operational Control
OPORD  Operation Order
PDDA  Power Driven Decontaminating Apparatus
PIL  Prescribed Load List
PP  Preplanned
PW  Prisoner of War
PX  Post Exchange
PZ  Pick-up Zone
RA  Regular Army
RATT  Radio and Teletype
R&R  Rest and Recuperation
RCA  Riot Control Agent
RL  Rocket Launcher
PR  Recoilless Rifle
RVN  Republic of VIETNAM
S&D  Search and Destroy
SK  Smoke
SP  Self Propelled
TAC  Tactical
TAOR  Tactical Area of Responsibility
TO&E  Table of Organization and Equipment
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
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