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AGAM-P (M) (4 May 67) FOR OT

23 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Infantry Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Infantry Division dated 1 Aug 1966 - 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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1st Infantry Division
Operational Report - Lessons Learned
1 August - 31 October 1966
(BCS CSECR-65)

1. Significant Organization and Unit Activities

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. This Operational Report - Lessons Learned, covers the period 1 August - 31 October 1966. During this period the 1st Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnam Army forces and installations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. These operations have contributed materially to the expansion and consolidation of SVN control and influence throughout the 1st Infantry Division TAGR and adjacent areas. The Civic Action program, now known as Revolutionary Development, has been expended and continues to play a key integrated role in the division counterinsurgency effort. The National Elections held in September served as a good indicator of progress being made towards providing a more secure environment in the III CTZ. In spite of VC efforts to disrupt the elections through the use of terror tactics, over 80% of the eligible voters went to the polls in the III CTZ.

b. In addition to conducting combat and area pacification operations, the 1st Infantry Division acted as host for new US troop units arriving in country during the reporting period. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, arrived in Vietnam during the month of September. The 1st Infantry Division assisted these units by establishing and securing staging areas and providing security for their convoys as they moved from the port area at VUNG TAU to the staging area at LONG BIEN. In October the division acted as host to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and turned over the base camp at BEAR CAT (CAMP COX) to the newly arrived unit.

2. ORGANIZATION:

a. The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy five major base camps at DI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE, PHUOC VII, and BEAR CAT during the first two months of the reporting period. In October, the base camp at BEAR CAT (CAMP COX) was turned over to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and the 2d Brigade 1st Infantry Division was relocated at DI AN.

b. There were no major changes in the internal structure of the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period. The current division organization is shown at Inclosure 2.

3. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Enemy units in the 1st Infantry Division area of interest include 2 division headquarters, 12 infantry regiments, 2 artillery regiments, and 2 separate battalions. Minimum enemy troop strength is 38,700 of which 29,500 are combat troops and 9,200 are support troops. Additionally, there are approximately 18,000 militias.
(2) Immediate reinforcements from II CTZ include two main force battalions and one heavy weapons battalion. Reinforcements available in IV CTZ include one main force regiment (DONG THAP I) and four local force battalions.

(3) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th VC Div (MF)</td>
<td>Northeast PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274 Regt</td>
<td>Northeast PHUOC TUY-BEIN HOA Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275 Regt</td>
<td>Northeast PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Div (MF)</td>
<td>Northwestern PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th VC Div (MF)</td>
<td>Central TAY NINH, vic SONG SAIGON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271 Regt</td>
<td>Northern LONG NGUYEN, vic NICHIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272 Regt</td>
<td>Central TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273 Regt</td>
<td>Central HAU NGHIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONG THAP II Regt (MF)</td>
<td>Northern TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Regt (MF) (Security)</td>
<td>Probably Northeast TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Regt (NVA)</td>
<td>PHUOC LONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Regt (NVA)</td>
<td>PHUOC LONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250th Regt (NVA)</td>
<td>Western TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>580th Regt (MF) (Training)</td>
<td>Northeast TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180 Arty Regt (MF)</td>
<td>Northwest TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Northwest TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Northwest TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Northwest TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Northeast TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Northwest TAY NINH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164A Arty Regt (MF)</td>
<td>II CTZ - III CTZ Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>North of HO BO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn</td>
<td>Northeast of HO BO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn</td>
<td>Southwest of BINH DUONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn</td>
<td>North of DI AN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn</td>
<td>BEIN HOA - CRM Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn</td>
<td>Eastern LONG AN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn</td>
<td>LONG AN - CRM Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 independent Bn (IF)</td>
<td>North of HO BO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C10 Sapper Bn (IF) (AKA P100)</td>
<td>Southern LONG AN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D14 Bn (IF) (AKA C320)</td>
<td>BOI LOI WOODS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225 Engr Bn (IF)</td>
<td>Western RUNG SAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506 Bn (IF)</td>
<td>Northern LONG AN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>860 Bn (IF)</td>
<td>Southern PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONG NAI Bn (IF)</td>
<td>Northern BEIN HOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHU LOT Bn (IF)</td>
<td>VINH LOI Secret Zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Unconfirmed units are located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>245 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0803 Bn</td>
<td>Northeast BINH DUONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900 Bn</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VINH QUANG Bn</td>
<td>HAU NGHIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division had contact with the PHU LOT Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 272d Regiment. There were indications that the 3d Battalion, 164A had also been contacted north of DI AN.
b. The VC main force units conducted no attacks of battalion size or larger during the reporting period against units of the 1st Infantry Division. The contact with the 272d Regiment on 26-29 August 1966, was the result of offensive action by the 1st Infantry Division. The contact with the 3d Battalion, 272d Regiment on 28 October 1966, was the result of accurate intelligence and the timely insertion of 1st Infantry Division troops into the area. On 10 August 1966, a company of the 5th ARVN Regiment was attacked by the 265th Battalion of the 274th Regiment and on 21 August 1966, the Royal Australian Regiment engaged the 3d Battalion, 275th VC Regiment.

c. It would appear that the VC have used this period to train their personnel, plan future operations and recruit replacements. They have continued their terrorism and harassment activities throughout the period with a very sharp increase in such activity during the September 11 national election period. However, it is felt that the great majority of this harassment activity has been performed by local force personnel with the main force units remaining in their secret zone secure areas.

d. Because the VC have been unwilling to defend their base camps, they have suffered heavy losses in the food and munition storage areas, especially along the SAIGON River and in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE.

e. VC losses for the quarter include:

471 KIA (BC)
465 KIA (Prob)
76 WOC
19 Crew served wpns captured
35 small arms captured
3 60mm mortars

f. VC Capabilities:

1. Conduct large scale attacks (battalion to multi-regimental size) on isolated outposts throughout the 1st Infantry Division’s area of interest. Primary targets are believed to be eastern TAY NINH, southwest BINH LONG, and northwest BINH DUONG.

2. Conduct mortar attacks on US and ARVN bases throughout area.

3. Continue terrorism and harassment activities.

4. Interdict LOC's and conduct ambushes of up to regimental size.

4. COMBAT OPERATIONS:

a. General. The 1st Infantry Division continued to conduct combat and Revolutionary Development operations designed to further extend and consolidate RVN control throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone. Operations were conducted outside the 1st Infantry Division TAOR as the situation required, and when directed by IIFFV. The major operation outside the TAOR was Operation BATON ROUGE, conducted in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE. Combat Operations varied in size from squad ambushes and patrols to multi-brigade operations controlled by the division headquarters. All operations were characterized by close cooperation and coordination between 1st Infantry Division and RVN Forces.

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b. August. During the month of August, 1st Infantry Division forces were employed on eleven major operations throughout the III CTZ Provinces of BINH LONG, BINH DUONG, PHUOC LONG, HAU NOI, BINH HOA, and PHUOC TUY. All operations resulted in contact with Viet Cong forces, with the major contact resulting from Operation AMARILLO. During this operation the PHU LOI Battalion was severely damaged. All operations were characterized by rapid reaction to intelligence information, with extensive operations conducted to interdict VC communication/liaison routes, and to locate and destroy VC bases and supplies.

(1) Operation AMARILLO was initiated on 23 August under OPCON 1st Bde with two infantry battalion (1/2, 1/26) and 1 Troop, 1/4 Cav clearing Interprovincial Route 16 for resupply convoys between DI AN and PHUOC VINH. This operation was conducted in conjunction with PHU GIAO District Forces and the 48th ARVN Regiment. Significant contact was made with VC 854383 on the morning of 23 August by a stay behind patrol with the PHU LOI Battalion reinforced by C62 Company. A rapid reaction force composed of C/1/4 Cav and C/1/2Inf moved to assist, followed by 1/2Inf (-), which made heavy contact. Company C, 1/26Inf, reinforced by A/1/4 Cav also made heavy contact and was immediately reinforced by the remainder of the battalion. The 1st Bn, 16th Infantry was airlifted to an LZ near the battle area at 1100 hours and attacked to assist C/1/2Inf. At 1815 hours the 2nd Bn, 28th Inf was airlifted to an LZ and occupied blocking positions for the night. During the period 26-31 August, the battalions conducted search and destroy operations in AO's to police the battle area and destroy the numerous tunnel, trench and base camp complexes that had been discovered. Convoys were conducted between PHUOC VINH and DI AN on 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, and 31 August without incident. Losses inflicted on the Viet Cong include 1C2 KIA (MO), 100 KIA (Proh), 6 VC, three 60mm mortars, and one complete battalion medical cell. A reliable ARVN agent reported on 1 September that the PHU LOI Battalion and attached C62 Company had suffered the loss of 171 personnel KIA on 25-26 August as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>25 AUG</th>
<th>26 AUG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHU LOI Bn</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C62 Co</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This represents destruction of 50% of the enemy force. 1st Infantry Division casualties included 43 KHA and 243 VHA. The operation terminated on 1 September.

(2) Operation EL PASO III (INCL 12) was initiated 13 July as an extension of Operation EL PASO II continued in August with the 1st Infantry Division providing security for the QUAN LOI - AN LOC complex. Forces deployed in this area conducted extensive squad, platoon, company, and Long Range Reconnaissance patrols. Armored cavalry, reinforced with infantry, conducted reconnaissance along National Route 13 north and south of AN LOC and other main roads throughout the AO. Reports of VC intentions to attack LOC THANH (XU 742132) prompted the movement of forces to LOC NHIN for possible operations during the period 5-11 Aug.

Further VC freedom of movement and activities were severely curtailed by the physical presence of 1st Infantry Division and 5th ARVN Division Forces in the AN LOC - QUAN LOI - LOC NHIN area. Contact was limited to skirmishes with small groups of VC and the operation terminated 3 September.
(3) Operation LAM SON II, the joint US - ARVN pacification effort initiated on 23 May, continued with emphasis on strengthening local defense, insuring a secure environment, and developmental projects. The PHU LOI Pacification Task Force, consisting of 2d Bn, 2d Infantry, 5th ARVN Division elements (varying in size from a company to three battalions), and BINH DUONG Sector Forces, conducted clearing and saturation patrolling operations in key areas of BINH DUONG Province.

Offensive operations by the 2/2 Inf and 5th ARVN Div included platoon size search and destroy operations, squad size ambush patrols and hamlet seal operations. Ninety-six platoon search and clear operations were conducted, VC contact resulting from 74. Ambush patrols numbered 326.

The hamlet seal operation conducted in HOA LOI, vic XT 823265, on 17 August was the first attempt of a completely heliborne hamlet festival. Due to an inaccessible road net and insufficient security forces, all festival and search forces were transported to and from HOA LOI by helicopter. Results of the operation included the capture of a VC Agricultural Cell leader; a VC Supplier; and three guerrillas. The success of the heliborne lift proved the feasibility of this technique for future operations. On 26 August a successful Hamlet Festival was conducted in TAN AN XA, vic XT 771250. Planning and execution of the festival was conducted almost entirely by 5th ARVN Division personnel and this part of most future operations will be handled by Vietnamese.

(4) Operation SPRINGFIELD commenced on 27 July after Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols located two battalion size base camps and evidence that two VC battalions were operating in the 3d Bde TAOR. After two B-52 strikes on 28 July, two battalions (1/16, 2/28), under OPCON 3d Bde swept the area, but contact was limited to engagements with small groups of VC. Losses inflicted on the VC included 10 VC KIA (EC), 7 KIA (Prob) and three base camps destroyed. The operation was concluded on 1 August with the relocation of villagers from the contested village of BINH DONG SO to BINH CAT.

(5) Operation CHEYENNE, a two-brigade operation (1st and 2d Bde) was initiated on 2 August 1966 in coordination with 5th ARVN Division to open and secure National Route 13 for a resupply convoy moving to AN LOC. VC activity in the area of operations along Route 13 had been continuous since 8 June and the VC were aware of the critical supply shortage in northern BINH LONG Province. Brigade operations in addition to clearing, securing and repairing the highway, included operations in AO's adjacent to Route 13 to locate and destroy VC forces and bases and to interdict VC communications/liaison routes. The 2d Brigade cleared the highway from AN LOC south and 3d Brigade from LAC KHE north, with both brigades linking up with ARVN forces. On 3 August a 263 vehicle convoy moved from PHU LOI to AN LOC and returned on 4 August without incident. Contact was made with small groups of VC within battalion A0's. The operation had three highly significant results: Inhabitants of AN LOC were resupplied with badly needed rice and supplies; a large amount of rubber and other products was shipped out of AN LOC for markets in the south; and most significant, the VC and other RVN inhabitants living along Route 13 were shown that contrary to their claim, the VC do not have the capability to control Route 13 at will. The operation terminated 5 August.

(6) Operation EVANSVILLE was conducted during the period 5 - 15 August under OPCON 1st Brigade. Two battalions (1/2, 1/26) using a combination of foot and heliborne search and destroy techniques interdicted VC routes for moving rice and other supplies and equipment north...
and south of PHUOC VINH within the brigade TAOR. During Phase I, reconnaissance and combat patrols operated in the inner zones, with Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols operating in the outer zones. Based on intelligence obtained during Phase I, Phase II was initiated with battalions executing company sized raids. On 8 August contact was made with an estimated VC company, however, other contact was limited to engagements with small (6 - 8 man) groups of VC. Three VC were KIA (BC) with an additional 25 KIA (Prob).

(7) Operation AKRON a two-day 3d Brigade - 5th ARVN Division operation was initiated on 10 August to clear and secure Route 13 from LAI KHE to PHU CUONG, and escort resupply convoys between DI AN and LAI KHE. Contact with the VC was limited to sporadic harassing fire.

(8) Operation MANITOMOC was initiated by the 3d Brigade on 12 August with one infantry battalion and elements of the division cavalry squadron opening Route 13 north of LAI KHE, repairing the road as necessary and conducting reconnaissance in force along the route. The operation was terminated on 13 August without significant contact as the division redeployed forces to the EL DORADO AO.

(9) Based on intelligence from ralliers that indicated a VC battalion was located in the 25th Division (US) TAOR northwest of PHU CUONG via AP BAU TRAN (XT 7417), the 1st Brigade initiated Operation EL DORADO on 13 August. Three battalions (1/26, 1/16, 1/28) conducted airmobile assaults into the area, support from a forward artillery base, Contact was immediately made when the first lift landed on the LZ at 1500, but as darkness fell the contact was broken. Subsequent search and destroy operations resulted in only light contact before the operation terminated on 14 August. Thirty-four airstrikes were made in support of forces committed on Operation EL DORADO. Fourteen VC were KIA (BC) with an additional nine VC KIA (Prob). Seventeen tons of rice and three tons of ammonium nitrate were discovered during the operation.

(10) On 14 August, the 1st Brigade commenced Operation GALUFP to destroy VC aid interdict routes of communication and supply in the northern sector of the brigade TAOR. Two battalions (1/2, 1/26) conducted search and destroy operations, south, southwest, and west of PHUOC VINH. Extensive use was made of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and platoon size combat patrols and heliborne assaults throughout the AO's. The operation terminated 19 August without significant contact.

(11) During the period 20 - 22 August, the 3d Brigade conducted Operation CASTINE in the area east of MICHELIN Rubber Plantation. TwoLong Range Reconnaissance Patrols operating in the vicinity of XT 6547 reported that a VC battalion and possibly a regiment, was assembled there on 19 August. A Forward artillery base was established by the 2/33d Artillery (-) at XT 590502 after the 1/26th Inf had conducted a heliborne assault to secure the area. The 1/16 and 2/28 Inf then conducted airmobile assaults to the southwest of the objective. No significant contact was made on 20 - 21 August as the battalions conducted search and destroy operations. One hundred seventy tons of rice were discovered and then scattered by airstrikes. Thirty 60mm mortar rounds and 189 grenades were captured.

(12) On 23 August, Company C, 1/28th Inf was sent to the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE to secure the US merchant ship BATON ROUGE VICTORY which had been mined and grounded via YS 035631. Two 105mm Howitzers were airlifted to a forward artillery base via YS 035698 to provide artillery support for the security force. Company C was relieved by a provisional company from the 2d Brigade on 25 August. The latter element was extracted to CAMP COX on 30 August.
(13) The 2d Bn, 18th Inf, Company B, 1/28th Inf, and Battery A, 1/7th Artillery were placed under OPCON 173d Abn Bde (Sep) on 24 August for participation in Operation TOLEDO. Company B, 1/28th Inf was extracted from the AO on 26 August.

(14) There were 112,694 rounds of artillery fired and 1,025 fighter bomber sorties flown in support of the division during August. Air delivered ordnance included: High Explosive - 551.6 tons; Napalm - 330.8 tons; CBU - 54 cans; and Rockets - 42 pods.

c. September. Operation BATON ROUGE was the major operation conducted in September. Twelve operations of battalion size or larger were conducted in the BINH LONG, BINH DUCO and BINH HOA Provinces of the III Corps Tactical Zone. Operation BATON ROUGE was conducted in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE.

(1) Operation LAM SON II continued to improve the secured environment in the vital central BINH DUONG Province between the SAIGON and DONG "II Rivers. Offensive operations be the 2/2d Infantry and elements of the 5th ARVN Division consisted of platoon size search and seal operations, squad size ambush patrols and one major hamlet seal operation. It is noteworthy that in this key province the national elections held on 11 September were conducted without major incident and 72.9% of the eligible voters cast ballots. From 20 - 22 September the first major LAM SON II hamlet seal outside of BINH DUONG Province was conducted (see para 4c(11)). This operation expanded the joint operations of 1st Infantry Division/ARVN forces to include elements of the 10th ARVN Division and BIEN HOA Sector Forces.

(2) Operation DECATUR was initiated under OPCON 1st Brigade on 3 September by 1/26th Inf with B Troop, 1/4th Cav attached. The operation had as its objective, the security of the QUAN XI - AN LOG area, and was characterized by numerous patrols of all types, and squad to company sized search and destroy activities. Minor contact with VC forces was made on 17 September and 5 October. A small VC base camp was located and destroyed on the latter date. Enemy losses for the operation are unknown. US losses were limited to two US UHAs. The operation terminated on 8 October.

(3) The 2d Brigade initiated Operation BATON ROUGE (Incl. 11) on 4 September with one infantry battalion (1/18) supported by Battery C, 1/7th Artillery moving by air and sealift into the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE with a search and destroy mission. The operation was initiated after intelligence sources indicated that the enemy had mounted a major effort in this area to halt ship traffic moving from the South China Sea into the Port of SAIGON. It was suspected that the VC 225th Engr Battalion was in the RUNG SAT to accomplish this mission. A major incident was the mining of the US merchant ship BATON ROUGE "VICTORY" on 23 August. The operation which terminated 8 October resulted in 59 VC KIA (BO), 43 VC KIA (Prob), 10 VC WIA (Prob), 12 VCS, and 6 CH1EU HOI.

(4) Operation CRANSTON, a one day search and clear and resupply operation along Highway 13 from LAI XHE to DI AN was initiated by 1/16th Infantry and elements of the 8th ARVN Regt on 5 September under OPCON 3d Brigade. 1/16th Infantry cleared Highway 13 from LAI XHE to XP 777C77. Elements of the 8th ARVN Regt cleared and secured the route south of that point to DI AN. Convoy number 1 (97 vehicles) departed LAI XHE at 1144H and closed DI AN at 1400H. Convoy number 2 (232 vehicles) departed DI AN at 1435H and closed LAI XHE at 1815H. Both convoys moved uninterrupted without incident.
(5) Operation BANQOR, a six day search and destroy operation was initiated 6 September after intelligence reports indicated local guer- rilla's would increase terror activities prior to the National Elections on 11 September. The operation commenced at 0800H under OPCON 3d Brigade with the 2/16th Infantry being air lifted from PHU LOI into an LZ vicinity XT 7614 to conduct search and destroy operations west of SAIGON River. On 7 September four VC were KIA (BG) via XT 759163 following a short fire fight with approximately eight to ten VC. At 0800H Sep operational control of the operation and 2/16th Infantry passed to the 1st Brigade. During the next four days the battalion conducted extensive squad, platoon and company sized search and destroy operations in the AO. Several bunkers and booby trapped huts were located and destroyed. 3200 pounds of rice, 1000 pounds of salt, 102 rounds of 7.62mm ammo, two grenades, and two butterfly bombs along with miscellaneous items of equipment were found and destroyed. The operation terminated 12 September.

(6) Operation SEASIDE, a one day search and destroy operation under OPCON 3d Brigade was initiated 0900H Sep with a 30 minute B-52 strike via XT 7746. At 0900 an artillery and air preparation was conducted, followed by a helicopter assault by the 2/28th Inf to an LZ approximately 1000 meters south of the strike. The battalion swept to the northeast some 4000 meters without enemy contact. The operation resulted in 39 enemy bunkers destroyed and another 196 marked for future destruction. A 1000 meter trench system was also marked for future destruction. Troop C, 1/4th Cav participated in the operation conducting a paint northeast of LAI KHE along Highway 13 departing LAI KHE at 0900. The troop occupied a blocking position via BAU BANG (XT 7846). At 0950 the troop received sporadic small arms fire from via AP BEN DONG SO (XT 7947). The fire was returned with unknown results. At 1045 the troop called artillery fire on 20 VC at XT 816388. Results of this fire are unknown. The troop had no further contact. 2/28th Infantry closed LAI KHE at 1707 and the operation terminated with the closing of C Troop at 1715.

(7) Operation WILTON, a one day artillery repositioning operation was initiated on 9 September under OPCON 3d Brigade when elements of 1/16th Infantry were airlifted to an LZ via XT 7632. By 1240 Route 13 from LAI KHE to LAI KHE had been cleared of several mines and booby traps and was secured. At 1045 the convoy consisting of Battery B, 2/32d Artillery and two 8" tubes from Battery B, 2/32d Arty departed LAI TUI and 2/32d Artillery without incident at 1345. Elements of the convoy made the return trip closing LAI KHE at 1720. The operation terminated at 1800 when C Troop, 4/4th Cav tasked as Rapid Reaction Force for the move closed LAI KHE.

(8) Operation LINCOLN was a joint US/ARVN effort to prevent VC intimidation of RVN voters using Highway 16 between PHUOC VINH and AP BO LA (XT 3839). The operation was initiated under OPCON 1st Brigade 9 September when 1/28th infantry commenced saturation patrolling to secure AO's in the vicinity of, but not adjacent to Highway 16. US troops operated as inconspicuously as possible so as not to interfere with voters in any way. Eight brush roadblocks were cleared via XT 9043. Contact with enemy forces was light during the three day operation with US troops receiving occasional small arms fire which was returned with unknown results. On 11 September several US aircraft received AV fire causing airstrike and artillery fires to be placed into the area with unknown results. The operation terminated 1100H Sep when ground elements closed PHUOC VINH.
(9) Operation DANDURY, a two battalion search and destroy operation (Incl 13) was initiated on 15 September after unidentified enemy units were reported east of the DAU TEN area (X 490470). Activities of these units extended into the western portion of the 3d Brigade TAOR. Aircraft had been fired on in the area, and numerous supply locations, base camps and fortified positions had been previously located. A forward artillery base was established by 2/3d Arty (-) with B Battery, 1/8th Arty attached, at X 729351 after Company A, 2/8th Infantry had conducted a heliborne assault to secure the area. On 16 September 1/16th and 2/28th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults to the northwest of the artillery base, landing at the northeastern portion of the DE THANH-DIEN Forest Reserve. The two battalions conducted search and destroy operations to the south from 16 - 21 September, with only light contact. Seven VC were KIA (BC) with an additional nine KIA (Prob) and three KIA. Ten VCs were detained. A total of 102 tons of rice, 7000 pounds of salt, and 3500 pounds of wheat was discovered during the operation. Fifty-two tons of the rice was extracted and 50 tons destroyed. The operation terminated 21 September.

(10) Operation HUNTSVILLE was initiated 20 Sep east of PHU LOI as a seal and search operation around the village of THANH VAN. This operation under OPCON 1st Brigade employed troops from 1/2d and 2/2d Infantry cooperating with elements of the 5th and 10th ARVN Divisions, BIEN HAI and BIEN DUONG Subsectors, TAN UYEN and BIEN CHUAN Sub sectors and ARVN National Police. The village seal was completed at 1825H Sep. At 1815H BG Hollingsworth, 1st Infantry Division ADC spotted four VC crossing a stream attempting to escape the seal. He and his helicopter door gunner engaged the VC resulting in three VC KIA (BC), one VC KIA (Prob). On 21 Sep search elements of the PHU LOI Pacification Task Force (HELPER) entered the village followed by HAMLET FESTIVAL personnel. During the search, several small fire fights occurred resulting in three VC KIA (BC). The festival began at 1000 and closed at 1600. The operation terminated 221500H Sep, resulting in a total of 9 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (Prob), 20 VCC, 53 VOS, and 3 Draft Dodgers apprehended. A total of 178 males were screened.

(11) Operation LONGVIEW, a nine day convoy security operation was initiated under OPCON 1st Brigade 23 Sep. The operation was conducted by two US battalions (1/28, 2/16 Inf) cooperating with ARVN forces to clear Highway 16 between DAI AN and PHUOC VINH. Daily convoys were conducted from 24 Sep through 1 Oct. Contact was limited to sporadic harassing fire, mines and booby traps, resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (Prob) and 1 VC. Nine tons of rice was captured and turned over to the 48th ARVN Regiment. The operation terminated 012400H Oct 66.

(12) Based on information obtained from a prisoner captured 25 August and post-strike visual reconnaissance following a 6 Sep B-52 strike, the 3d Brigade initiated Operation BOYD with two battalions (1/7, 2/28 Inf) on 25 Sep. Combat reconnaissance operations were conducted in the LAI KHE area for four days with only minor contact. Five VC were KIA (BC), and two VC KIA (Prob). One tunnel and one bunker were discovered and destroyed. The operation terminated 29 Sep 66.

(13) Operation MONTGOVER was initiated 301800H Sep 66 as a search and seal operation in the village of CHANH LUU. The operation under OPCON 3d Brigade employed troops from 2/28th Inf and 1/4th Cav cooperating with ARVN forces. Elements of the PHU LOI Pacification Task Force (HELPER) participated in the search and conducted a HAMLET FESTIVAL in the village on 1 Oct with a total of 200 people being screened. The operation terminated 031345H Oct 66, resulting in 9 VC KIA (BC),
A total of 51.1 tons of rice was captured with an additional 2.5 tons being destroyed along with numerous other foodstuffs, VC uniforms and miscellaneous items of equipment.

There were 110,635 rounds of artillery fired and 887 close air support sorties flown in support of the division in Sep. Artillery rounds fired consisted of: 105mm - 89,407; 155mm - 12,653; 8" - 3,156; 175mm - 1,966; 4.2" - 3,583. Air delivered ordnance included: High Explosive - 362.18 tons; Napalm - 515.75 tons; CBU - 16 cans; Rockets - 78 pods; and an unknown amount of 20mm.

The 1st Infantry Division forces were employed on 12 major operations during October. Significant contact was made with VC forces on 8 of the 12 major operations. The most important contact in terms of enemy losses was Operation SHENANDOAH where a significant blow was dealt the VC 34 Battalion, 273 Regiment.

(1) Operation LAM SON II, the rural development and pacification program being jointly conducted by 1st Infantry Division and ARVN forces continued to be highly successful. Operations BETHLEHEM and ALLEOTOWN (para 4d(11) and 4d(12)) initiated in October were merged with LAM SON II on 20 October. Because of increased VC and GVN activity in the DI An - THE DUC area, coupled with reports that the VC 34 Battalion, 165A Regiment may have moved into the area, the number of enemy contacts increased. VC losses in October due to Operation LAM SON II were 93 VC KIA (BC), 4 TO KIA (Prob), 64 VC, 221 TO, and 70 CHEU HOI. The VCS included: one individual on the blacklist; 12 ARVN/FP deserters; 120 draft dodgers; and 88 uncategorized individuals held for interrogation. Material captured in October included: 11 weapons; 900 rounds of SA ammo; explosives; and 2500 pounds of rice. Items destroyed included: enemy uniforms; 2600 pounds of rice; enemy prepared positions; explosives; 22 sampans; barbed wire; and miscellaneous items of equipment.

The name PHU LOI Pacification Task Force was changed to THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE. Operation LAM SON II was placed under operational control 2d Brigade at 15001H Oct. As a result, a series of briefings and staff meetings conducted between the Revolutionary Development Task Force Staff and personnel of the 2d. It was in which information, experience and lessons learned were shared. The Revolutionary Development Task Force Staff continued participation in Operation LAM SON II and coordinated future operations. Operation LAM SON II continues,

(2) Operation DECATUR see para 4c(2).

(3) Operation BATON ROUGE see para 4c(3).

(4) Operation MONTGOMERY see para 4c(12).

(5) Operation LITTLE ROCK a two battalion search and destroy operation in the ONG SON Jungle was initiated 2 October OPCON 1st Brigade utilizing 1/2 and 1/28 Infantry Battalions supported by elements of 1/4 Cav and 2/34 Armor. The operation, which terminated 01L3201 Oct, resulted in the destruction of 4 VC base camps and 300 pounds of rice. No contact was made with the enemy although 5 US were BUA and 26 US WHA by VC mines and ARVN artillery fire.

(6) Operation NOVEM, a six day convoy security operation was initiated 4 Oct OPCON 3d Brigade. The operation was conducted with one US infantry battalion (1/16) supported by 1/4 Cav (-). Daily convoys between DI AN and LAI KHE were conducted from 5 - 8 October. Contact was limited to sporadic harassing fire, mines and booby traps. The operation resulted in one US KIA and six US WHA. Enemy losses are unknown. The operation terminated 08L759H Oct 66.
Operation TULSA, a seven-day clear and secure operation along Highway 13 from DI AN to LOG NINH, was initiated 9 Oct. OPCON HQ, 1st Infantry Division. A division forward CP was established at LAI KHE. The operation employed seven infantry battalions supported by Division Artillery and 1/3 Cav. The 1st and 3d Brigades provided intermediate control headquarters. Contact with enemy forces was limited to occasional small arms fire, mines and booby traps. The operation which terminated 16 Oct resulted in two VC KIA (BC), a total of 2,5 tons of rice was captured and destroyed along with numerous enemy mines, booby traps and other explosives. The division CP remained at LAI KHE until 3 November when the CP returned to DI AN.

Operation CRADDOCK, a one-day search and destroy and resupply operation was initiated 17 Oct employing three infantry battalions OPCON 3d Brigade. The operation began with 2/26th Infantry making an airborne assault into an LZ at 7133 and then conducting search and destroy operations to the NE and SE of the LZ. One VC (BC) was located at XT 699425. In the same area, a village consisting of approximately 50 huts and numerous tunnels and bunkers was destroyed with 308 villagers being evacuated to BEN CAT. At 1015 a gunship fired at ten VC at XT 699410 resulting in four VC KIA (BC). The resupply convoy moved from DI AN to LAI KHE and returned without incident. The 1/16th Infantry secured LZ ALPHA (XT 789460) and conducted reconnaissance patrols in that area locating and destroying 125 pounds of rice at XT 751488. The operation terminated at 1856. There were no US losses.

Operation LEEDS, a S&D and route security operation north of LAI KHE was initiated 17 Oct under OPCON 3d Brigade. The operation was not named until 27 October when the name LEEDS was assigned retroactive to 170000H Oct 66. The operation which has employed troops of 1/16th, 2/16th, 2/28th Infantry Battalions, 2/34 Armor Battalion, B Troop, 1/4th Cav and the 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) has resulted in seven VC KIA (BC), one VC KIA (Prob), and six CHIEU HOI as of 312400H Oct 66. In addition, several small arms have been captured and 900 pounds of grain, 700 pounds of ammunition and explosives have been destroyed. Resupply convoys were conducted between LAI KHE and DI AN on 17, 22, 25, 29, 30, and 31 Oct. The operation continues.

Operation SHENANDOAH was initiated 17 Oct OPCON 1st Brigade. This multi-battalion S&D operation initially employed four infantry battalions (1/2, 1/26, 1/28, 2/28) and one cav squadron (1/4). A reconnaissance force was conducted along Highway 13 north of LOC NINH on 19 Oct. On 20-21 Oct these forces were repositioned as the AO shifted from LOC NINH to NINH-THANH. A second reconnaissance in force was conducted from QUAN LOI to NINH-THANH on 24 October. On 28 October, 10 kilometers SSE of NINH-THANH several aircraft received ground fire. Intelligence reports indicated a large VC force, possibly battalion-size, was in the area. Two infantry battalions (2/18, 2/28) conducted air assaults into the area while 1/26th and 2/28 th Infantry Battalions maneuvered on the ground. Enemy contact was made during the afternoon hours with units up to company-sized elements. Heavy volumes of artillery and 60 MM air were placed into the area. On 29 October division headquarters assumed control of the operation as elements of two brigades (1st and 3d) were committed in an effort to seal off VC routes of withdrawal. A police of the previous day battle field revealed a total of 14 VC had been KIA (BC) in the action along with 13 VC KIA (Prob) and 2 WOC. A battalion-size base camp was located consisting of over 200 bunkers, underground conference room and miscellaneous weapons and ammo. Several smaller base camps were also located.
On 30 October an air observer spotted a VC ambush along the road at XT 731791. Heavy artillery fires and TAC air strikes were called in resulting in 23 VC KIA (BC). As of 312400H Oct 66, the operation has resulted in a total of 97 VC KIA (BC), 2 WOC, 15 VC WIA (Prob), and 7 CHEU NOI. The operation continues.

(11) Operation BETHLEHEM, a four day, joint US/ARVN S&D operation west of PHU CUONG was initiated 0700H 23 Brigade 20 Oct. This operation which employed one US infantry battalion (1/18) working with ARVN forces was immediately successful with VC base camps, supply caches, and fortifications located on 21, 22, and 23 October. As of 231200H Oct, the operation had resulted in 10 VC KIA (BC), 2,500 pounds of rice captured and an additional 2600 pounds of rice destroyed along with numerous VC bunkers and foxholes, three VC sampans and miscellaneous items of equipment. Operation BETHLEHEM was incorporated into Operation ALLENTOWN 241200H Oct 66.

(12) Operation ALLENTOWN, initially a one battalion (2/16 Inf) S&D operation under OPCON 24 Brigade was initiated 21 Oct. As of 2340H Oct, the operation had resulted in 23 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (Prob), 1 WOC, and capture of 3 weapons and destruction of 7 sampans. Operation BETHLEHEM was merged with Operation ALLENTOWN 241200H Oct. Following the merger of the operations VC casualties continued to rise as the two battalion force continued to empty saturation ambush techniques. As of 261200H Oct the combine operation had resulted in 97 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (Prob), and 1 WOC. Operation ALLENTOWN was merged into Operation LAM SON II effective 2700H Oct 66.

(13) There were 109,489 rounds of artillery fired and 859 close air support sorties flown in support of the division in October. Artillery rounds fired consisted of: 105mm - 67,216; 155mm - 22,695; 8" - 4,647; 175mm - 1,944; 4.2" - 12,977. Air delivered ordnance included: High Explosive - 44.33 tons; Napalm - 38.50 tons; CBU - 175 cans; Incendiaries - 11 tons and an unknown amount of rockets and GM.

5. TRAINING:

a. The status of training in the division continues to be excellent. Replacement training programs have been initiated at all base camps to insure all replacements receive a minimum of 40 hours of instruction prior to participating in combat operations. This instruction is required for enlisted personnel in grades E-1 to E-7 and officer personnel in grades O-1 to O-2. Unit training continues for squad and platoon rotations to base camps for operational areas.

b. Division Artillery is conducting a program of gunnery instruction for artillery officers and the 1/2 Infantry is conducting APC driver training in anticipation of future mechanized conversion. The Division G-2 Section conducted a Division Intelligence School during the latter part of September and plans to continue the school as tactical operations permit. The course covers the entire division intelligence program and is scheduled so that one man per company will attend. It is anticipated that this school will increase the intelligence gathering capability of the division.
e. In September the Division Chemical Section published and distributed a training letter on the use of Powdered CS-1 for trail and small area contamination, which was distributed to all units. The chemical section also provided an instructional team to provide assistance to the Australian Task Force (RAE GP) in the construction and employment of flame field expedients for perimeter defense.

d. In August the 1st Infantry Division sent a Mobile Training Team to the Philippines to assist in training the Philippines Civic Action Group (PHILCAG). The team consisted of two officers and three NCO's and presented a 145 hour block of instruction on Vietnam Counterinsurgency operations, returning to Vietnam in early October.

6. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT):

   a. General:

      (1) During the reporting period there has been an extensive turnover of personnel throughout G5/S5 structure in the division. The turnover was largely due to strong emphasis on obtaining the highest quality personnel for G5/S5 work at all levels in the division. The result has been an increase in the number and quality of personnel working G5/S5 staff sections, and this trend will continue.

      (2) The Division PsyOps/CA program during August, September, and October has had two principal thrusts:

         (a) To improve responsive and effective support of tactical operations; and

         (b) To provide expanded, coordinated assistance to the GVN "Revolutionary Development" program. To accomplish this goal, additional PsyOps/CA resources are being requested from higher headquarters, and increased guidance and assistance is being provided to subordinate elements by the division.

   b. Psychological Operations:

      (1) Responsiveness of tactical PsyOps support was improved during the quarter; 16,400,000 leaflets were distributed during August, September and October, in support of division operations. The predominant themes of the tactical leaflets were CHIEU NOI and surrender appeals.

      (2) The division printing press continued to provide rapid reaction capability throughout the quarter. However, on 29 September the platemaker was withdrawn by the 246th PsyOps Company. The loss of this platemaker severely hampers operations by doubling the time required to react to psychological warfare opportunities.

      (3) A major portion of the PsyOps effort continued to be devoted toward encouraging the VC to defect under the CHIEU NOI Program, and increasing emphasis is being placed on this.

         (a) In August, research revealed that of the 125 ralliers in BIEN DUONG Province since 23 May 66, 34 can be directly attributed to LAM SON II operations. Two additional ralliers from the LAM SON II area turned themselves in at BIEN NOA Province.
(b) During September, 82 QUV CHANH rallied in the division area. A technique which proved particularly successful was to follow up a tactical operation with extensive loudspeaker and leaflet operations. Operation DABURY was followed up with psywar missions for four days, and six VC turned themselves in to provincial authorities.

(c) During the month of October, sixty-six Viet Cong rallied within the division AO, taking advantage of the opportunities available under the CHIEU NOI Program. For the first time, the division can relate the number of CHIEU NOI’s, psyops, and ops to our own psychological efforts. Over sixty of the sixty-six QUV CHANH credit a loudspeaker or leaflet operation to their final decision. (The total number of Viet Cong to surrender as a result of Psyops from 23 May 66 through 30 Jun 66 is 233.)

(d) The 1st Infantry Division has designated November 1966 as CHIEU NOI Month. The objective is to conduct an intensified psychological operations campaign aimed at causing the VC’s and their families to rally.

(e) One of the most important results of this seminar was the further development of the CHIEU NOI Program. The conference disclosed that information about CHIEU NOI was not reaching the VC personnel, and that in order to insure that the VC "got the word", their families should be made the target of a new program of information/propaganda dissemination. Subsequently, the program has not been expanded.

(5) An extensive psychological operations campaign has been directed at the people along Route 13. The emphasis of the campaign has been to increase upon the populace the vital role that keeping Route 13 open plays in their lives. To support this program, banners and billboards have been erected at selected points, and special leaflets have been distributed by hand and airdropped in the area. The objectives of this campaign are as follows:

(a) convince the people of the importance of Route 13 to their daily lives. Therefore, by helping their government keep Route 13 open they are helping themselves.

(b) To emphasize that the VVN and her allies recognize the importance of Route 13 to the people.

(c) To convince the people that the VC can harass the people.

(6) The 3d Brigade has initiated a special distribution system for the 969 Information Program. All north and south bound traffic and workers are given a 969 leaflet as they enter or leave the check points into the LAI KHE Base Camp. This leaflet offers a reward to any person who may have information on VC ambuses, sniping, booby traps or any other activities which can be verified.

C. Civic Action:

(1) All elements of the division continued to engage in Civic Action projects in the vicinity of their base camps. The 1st Engineer Battalion restored the TAM DINH intersection in THU Duc District.
which had become virtually impassable due to heavy traffic. Elements of
the 1st Brigade completed a bridge over the SONG HAE River, linking LE
TRANG and PHUOC VINH.

(a) The 3d Brigade has made significant progress in construc-
tion of the refugee hamlet at BEN CAT. A brick factory was established,
and it is being operated by the refugees. 31 homes have been completed
and construction is well underway on several others. An additional 610
refugees were placed in the center. After being identified and process-
sed, they were given a new and safe home.

(b) The LAI KHE Public School was completed and dedicate on 21
September 66.

(d) An active agricultural program was developed through the
combined efforts of Vietnamese technical personnel and a US veteri-
narian. A swine feeding program, using edible garbage from the 1st
Infantry Division Artillery mess hall, was started, and is now firmly
established in BINH QUOI Hamlet. The veterinarian has expanded his
services to PHUOC KHANH. A total of 105 families are now benefiting
from the program. The feeding program, which encountered some dif-
ficulty earlier, is now handled by a civilian contractor who hauls
edible garbage. A total of eight swine pens have been constructed;
five additional pens are currently being planned. The success of this
program is having a definite impact on adjacent hamlets, which is
aiding the Revolutionary Development Program.

(d) The success of LAM SON II in TAM PHUOC KHANH and BINH CHUAN
has enabled the operation to expand to include HOA NHUT and VIM IIOUNGS
Hamlets. This operation has proven the validity of Revolutionary
Development with long term commitment of military forces upon which
the villages can depend.

d. MEDCAP: The division MEDCAP program has been expanded to include
support for the dependents of the RF/PA forces. 19,750 patients were
treated during the past 3 months. MEDCAP continues to be conducted
in conjunction with all division operations, plus the normal treatment
around base camp areas.

a. The 1st Aviation Battalion continued to support the division by
planning and conducting airmobile operations, providing general
aviation support to the entire division and direct aviation support
to elements not authorized aircraft, performing visual and electronic
surveillance missions, and providing armed helicopter support of both
airmobile operations and divisional elements requiring responsive
fire support in an area out of immediate supporting artillery range.
Aviation staff advice and technical guidance were also provided to the
division staff throughout the period.

b. Weather caused by the southwest monsoons imposed restrictions
during the period due to frequent showers and thunderstorms, frequent
periods of early morning fog and low ceilings, and interference with
aircraft maintenance from inclement weather. However, the high inci-
dence of rain did not materially reduce the dust problem present
during periods of fair weather. Weather during the period forced
either postponement or cancellation of some missions, which could have
been flown by OV-1 surveillance aircraft, due to the severe attenuation
of the radar image on SLAR equipped aircraft.
c. The 1st Aviation Battalion continued its mission of general support of the division with periodic assignment of a specific mission to control the aviation assets of an airmobile operation. General support requirements were received daily as mission requirements from the Army Aviation Coordinating Center located at Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, and were flown by available aircraft. A shortage of aircraft to satisfy both general and airmobile requirements resulted in a compromise of the airlift capability of the airmobile company in its primary role. Requirements to provide an air mission commander for multiple airmobile company operation were received periodically from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division. When so directed, the coordination with the supported units and the control and direction of the aviation assets were performed by the battalion commander and his staff to insure maximum support of the ground tactical plan, and were designed to provide sufficient flexibility to react to the requirements of the situation.

d. During the reporting period the battalion flew 104 combat assaults or extractions. This is an increase of 98 over the previous quarter. Rotary wing aircraft flew 21,006 sorties and 8,787 combat hours. Fixed wing aircraft flew 1,866 sorties and 831 combat hours. A total of 24,989 passengers and 753 tons of cargo were transported during the period. All figures represent a significant increase over the previous quarter.

8. LOGISTICS:

a. General: During the period 1 August to 31 October 1966, the 1st Infantry Division continued tactical operations in its TAOR and forward operational areas. Logistical support was provided from four logistical base areas and from four division base camps. A total of 39,381.1 tons were handled during the quarter for all classes of supply. All tactical operations were adequately supported. No major logistical problems were encountered.

b. Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Incl 8).

c. Construction: Construction work in all base areas progressed steadily with primary emphasis being placed on assisting the 2d Brigade to become established in the DI AN Base Camp.

9. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) Assigned strength as of 31 Oct 66 was 110% of authorized strength. This is a decrease from the previous reporting period. The present for duty strength is 103% of the authorized strength. This is an increase of 1% over the preceding period. The decrease in assigned strength is attributed to a stabilizing of the personnel situation within the division. Following turbulence of the preceding period caused by a high number of rotations, emphasis has been placed upon increasing present for duty strength, thus contributing to an increase in that percentage over the last reporting period.
Administrative losses during the period totaled 4,715. Division gains equaled 4,672. The command remains critically short of personnel in the following MOS's:

76K (Supply)  
94B (Mess)  
57W (Helicopter Technical Inspector)  
91C (Clinical Specialists)  
02 (Bandman)

There now exists a shortage in the infantry battalions of NCO's in grade E7. The previously reported shortage of Infantry NCO's in grades E5 and E6 has been resolved through replacements and promotions from within the ranks.

Overall effectiveness of replacements able to perform the duties of their MOS and grade is satisfactory.

(b) Division strength as of 31 October 1966:

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(c) Casualties (By Month)

1. August

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(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) An additional 880 positions were approved by the industrial Relations Office, Saigon. The command now has 1,880 positions authorized, 1,165 positions established, and 1,003 positions have been filled. This is an increase of 179 positions established, and an increase of 289 positions filled since the previous quarter. Skilled labor continues to be a critical problem.
b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in the division has been excellent the past quarter. There were no stragglers apprehended. There were 57 AGOLS and 32 serious incidents reported during the three month period. This is a 50% reduction over the previous quarter.

(2) During the report period the court-martial rate increased from an average of 52 per month to 61 per month. Discipline rates continue to be excellent. Increase was due to the backlog created by the large turnover of personnel during the peak of the rotation hump.

(3) The Division IG handled 224 requests for assistance and complaints. This was a significant increase over the previous quarter. The majority of the cases were due to non-receipt of assignment instructions and other delays caused by the need to dissipate the large rotation of personnel during August and September.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The state of morale within the division remains excellent as a result of continual emphasis on improving services and facilities.

(2) Finance: Finance support to the division was outstanding during the period as a result of improvements in the system initiated during the preceding period. The Soldiers Savings Program, open to both officer and enlisted men was put into operation during the period. This program guarantees the saver 10% interest per annum, compounded quarterly on the average amount invested. At the close of the period, 200 personnel were participating in this program.

(3) Chaplain:

(a) During the report period there were 1,186 religious services conducted (all faiths) with a total attendance of 34,578. In addition, 55 persons of Jewish faith attended High Holy Day services in Saigon.

(b) Chapel construction and equipment - Work was begun on construction of three chapels: 1st Brigade, 3d Brigade and Support Command. Work on the latter was discontinued in order to divert efforts and materials to the 24-Brigade camp development program. The First Infantry Division Memorial Chapel was dedicated on 14 Aug 1966. Individual chairs with kneelers and a public address system were obtained for the division chapel. An electric organ was obtained for the 3d Brigade Chapel. Nineteen tape recorders were purchased for use of chaplains in the field. A reference library for Protestant chaplains was begun.

(e) Character Guidance - A command program known as "Know Your Chaplain Week" was conducted throughout the division and continues daily as a part of the regular orientation for replacements to the division. This program is designed to inspire willingness to fight.
(d) Civic Action - Chaplains were in contact with 45 institutions in the division area distributing charity and participating in educational and promotional activities. Designed offerings taken up in chapel services in the division and designated for local charities amounted to $3,334.00 and 393.531 plasters.

(e) Training - A program of monthly chaplains meetings was begun for the dissemination of information and for training with the use of speakers from staff sections.

(4) Special Services: In-country R&R spaces increased from 25 every 3 days to 26 every 3 days. During the period it was difficult however to take advantage of all spaces at certain times because of repairs being made to the airstrip at Vung Tau. By the end of the reporting period, the situation was corrected and all in-country R&R spaces were being utilized. 3204 personnel look out-of-country R&R during the period. This was an increase of forty two over the preceding period.

(5) Red Cross: Total case load increased this reporting period from 2,997 to 3,392, which is an increase of 14%. The increase was caused in part by individuals requesting verification of home situations in order that they might apply for curtailment of their tours. Another reason for the increase in workload was an approximate 10% increase in the troop strength within the area served by this office. Troop morale appears to be high. This is apparent based on the small number of requests received for personal needs, loans and the number of individuals requesting information and counseling reference or reassignment.

(6) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 4,082 awards given for valor and meritorious service during this period.

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(7) Burials and Graves Registrations: During this period the Graves Registration Platoon processed and evacuated 107 remains. None were nondivisional.

10. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS:

a. The Division Chemical Section with the attached 66th Chemical Platoon and 24th Chemical Detachment continued to provide chemical support to all elements of the division throughout the reporting period.
b. On 20 August the Division Chemical Section augmented by the attached units and under the operational control of the Assistant Division Chemical Officer conducted the largest known single gas attack since World War I by dropping 820 drums of CS-1 from 3 CH-47 helicopters in support of 3d Brigade Operation CASTING. The drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 683688 and XT 677455. Each of the 3 helicopters carried 30 drums of CS-1 with 1/2 inch time fuses. 3 sorties were flown, the first sortie consisting of 3 CH-47's with 30 CS drums, each flying at an altitude of 3100 feet and an airspeed of 60 knots. The drums dropped on the first sortie burst below tree top level so the following two sorties were flown at an altitude of 3200 feet. 90 drums were dropped on the second sortie and 60 drums were dropped on the third.

c. The Division Chemical Section conducted several field tests of chemical devices during the reporting period:

(1) On 31 August, the section conducted tests of an expedient Grenade (SMK or CS) Dispensing Device using M8 Smoke Grenades. The device was made by the 701st Maintenance Battalion from plans drawn up by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The test was made using a UH-1B helicopter flying at 1500 feet and 60 knots on a target 1 km north of the DI AN base camp. Satisfactory results were obtained with all but two tubes clearing properly. The device was given to D Troop, 1/4 Cav for further testing and their future use.

(2) On 5 September a field test of the E-159 CS Cluster was made using a helicopter as the drop vehicle. The cluster functioned properly giving an area of contamination approximately 100x150m when dropped from 500 feet altitude (absolute) at an airspeed of 80 knots.

(3) On 13 September a test was conducted of flame field expedients (110 gal fougasse) used in base camp perimeter defense. The expedient functioned properly, however, the fuel was somewhat thinner than normally desired in this type of flame field expedient.

d. The Division Chemical Section continued to provide a tunnel exploration team for the division. This team was utilized on 17 different occasions during the period exploring, contaminating and destroying VC tunnel complexes.

e. Four requests were prepared and submitted for defoliation missions during the reporting period and one has been approved as of 31 October 1966. The 264th Chemical Platoon has provided personnel, equipment and materials for defoliation missions of all 1st Infantry Division base camps during the reporting period.
II Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

1. OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED):

**PERSONNEL**

**Finance**

**Item:** Communications between Finance and the Units;

**Discussion:** Rapidly expanding finance services during this period necessitated the development of a publicity vehicle to inform the units of availability of the services, and the best means of utilization.

**Observation:** The publication of a monthly Finance Newsletter has been highly successful in terms of publicizing the availability of expanded services. This newsletter has also provided a means by which the unit commanders, SI and FSNCO are reminded of their responsibilities in assuring proper administration of pay.

**Item:** Document Flow,

**Discussion:** A major source of pay complaints received by this office was a direct result of the unit's failure to submit pay change documents on a timely basis.

**Observation:** Implementation of the use of a transmittal letter for change documents as required in DA CIR 37-22 has resulted in more timely submission of such documents by the units. Use of this system has also allowed the finance office to establish suspense dates for receipt of the transmittal letters, resulting in better control of the document flow.

**Item:** Plaster Sales,

**Discussion:** Sales of plaster in the pay lines, while necessary, has proven to be of limited success in assuring that NFCS are not utilized in unauthorized locations. It became apparent that permanent plaster sales points were necessary.

**Observation:** The appointment of enlisted men as foreign currency clerks as per 2-22, AP 37-103, allows each unit of significant size to have a permanent plaster sales fund of up to $5,000. This alleviates the need to use officers as permanent plaster sales agents.

**Item:** Pay Clinics,

**Discussion:** The placement of divisional units over a large geographical area has made it increasingly difficult to handle pay problems in the units. The operational necessities of the division indicated a need for bringing finance service to the troops.

**Observation:** The establishment of monthly pay clinics at battalion level throughout the division regardless of location, will allow members to take care of their pay problems "on the job". This approach should result in increased morale, and eliminate the need for frequent travel of members between the unit and the finance office.
Item: Payments of Hospitalised Members.

Discussion: The traditional requirement that Class A Agents pay all members of their unit, to include those in the hospital, has proven to be a problem in Vietnam. Many agents must spend as much as three days in travelling to the various hospitals to pay a comparatively small number of people.

Observation: The assumption by the finance office of the responsibility of paying hospitalised members will result in the saving of a significant amount of time for most Class A Agents. Centralising this function will considerably lessen the impact of this problem on the division as a whole.

Chaplain

Item: Catholic Chaplain coverage is not adequate.

Discussion: While the division has had the normal number of Catholic Chaplains assigned, the dispersion of our forces causes a conflict between the command policy of having chaplains accompany troops on operations and the requirement to minister at base camps and clearing stations. A partial solution was provided in a coverage plan which calls for supplementary coverage of brigades by the use of Catholic Chaplains from Support Command, Division Headquarters and Division Artillery.

Observation: This policy seems to relieve the sincere anxiety of Catholic Chaplains who accompany troops to forward positions as well as commanders who wish to make certain that all their troops have spiritual ministration. It would, however, be unworkable if the entire division were committed in several widely separated areas. The need for additional chaplains remains.

OPERATIONS

Chemical

Item: E-158 CS Cluster with B-63 Initiator.

Discussion: The E-158 CS Cluster has been tactically employed with excellent results during the reporting period. The launch platform was the UH-ID and UH-IH model helicopters flying at an altitude of 600 feet and air speeds of 60 to 60 knots. The time settings on the E-63 Initiator ranged between 0.7 seconds and 1.1 seconds. At 600 feet the drops were made 50 to 75 meters prior to reaching the target resulting in excellent ground contamination covering an area approximately 100m x 100m with each munition. It should be noted that individual bomblets falling in swampy areas functioned poorly.

One experimental drop of an E-158 CS Cluster was made through thick jungle canopy approximately 50 feet high. The drop altitude was 200 feet with an initiator time setting of "0". The munition penetrated the jungle canopy and began functioning prior to ground contact giving a contamination pattern 200 feet in diameter.

In using the E-158 CS Cluster the only problem encountered was that after one hour of flight to the target, one B-63 Initiator un-threaded itself from the cluster 1/4 turns. This loosening was probably due to vibration while sitting on the floor of the aircraft during the flight.

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Observation: The E-158 Cluster is an excellent munition for covering area targets approximately 100m x 100m in size. Aircraft speed should be between 60 and 80 knots with the initiator setting between 0.7 and 1.1 seconds. The munition should be dropped 50 to 75 meters before reaching the desired target to insure a direct hit.

The E-158 CS Cluster is not effective in small areas and targets in those areas can be more effectively covered using the improved 55 gallon drums of CS-1.

Care should be taken to insure that the initiator is threaded down tightly to the cluster after prolonged flights in helicopters.

The E-158 CS Cluster can be disseminated from low levels (activating upon reaching the ground) resulting in good ground contamination of targets 200 feet in diameter.

Item: Fusing of 55 gallon drums of CS-1.

Discussion: The present system of fusing the 55 gallon drums has caused time delays and malfunctions during CS serial missions performed by the 1st Infantry Division. The fuse system used is as follows:

A non-electric blasting cap, a length of safety fuse and a pull-pin friction fuse lighter.

a. It is nearly impossible to determine the proper length (timing) of the time fuse as required from various heights. When fuses are prepared in advance they are subject to change in burning rate before they are used due to the collection of water in humid climates.

b. Many times the prearranged mission altitude must be changed while on the way to the target due to weather conditions. This causes some delay as all of the fuses must be exchanged before the mission can be completed.

c. With a long fuse some of the drums reach the ground before they explode. Several of these drums have malfunctioned due to the fuses being pulled from the bursters by limbs of trees as the drums are passing through the jungle canopy.

Observation: An adjustable time fuse should be developed for this type of mission. The fuse should be capable of being adjusted at one second intervals for time periods between five and forty seconds while attached to the bursters in the aircrafts. Once set it should be possible to change the time setting. (A requirement has been sent forward for this type of fuse).

Item: Improvised CS Grenade Dispenser.

Discussion: Eighteen CS grenades were dropped from two homemade dispensers attached to the rocket mounts of a UH-1B gun ship. Each dispenser contained nine grenades (3 grenades per rocket tube) and was activated by the gunner pulling the pin which released the door holding the grenade in the tubes. Two grenades “hung up” due to bent grenade levers and had to be pushed out of the tubes with a rod. Area coverage at impact was about 50 x 30 meters for each dispenser (9 CS grenades).
Observation: This type of system is ideally suited for tactical employment on small targets where large quantities of CS are not required. It has the distinct advantage of giving the helicopter gun ships a CS capability without hindering their primary mission of delivering high explosive ammunition in close ground support of tactical operations.

Item: Use of Powdered CS-1 for Trail Contamination.

Discussion: Powdered Riot Control Agents (NCA), such as CS-1, can be used to deny the enemy terrain and avenues of approach. CS powder dispersed on vegetation and on the ground under the jungle canopy should remain effective for several days or until a hard rain. Powdered CS can also be used to deny the enemy access to buildings and sites. CS dispersed on walls, floors and into thatched roofs can effectively deny the use of the dwelling for up to a few weeks. Since only a few Viet Cong have protective masks, and most of these are expedient type, he can be denied use of these contaminated areas. Friendly troops equipped with protective equipment can traverse these contaminated areas with only mild discomfort.

An expedient method of dispersing CS on trails and terrain is to use eight pound bags of CS-1, rupturing the bags with detonating cord wrapped around the exterior or a fragmentation grenade placed beneath the bag. This will deposit a concentrated amount of agent in a very localized area resulting in a temporary obstacle along a trail, road or small confined area.

Observation: Rupturing containers of CS-1 in such a manner that local contamination will occur is useful in hampering the enemy's movement or use of specific localized areas or buildings.

Tunnel Operations

Item: Solar Blower.

Discussion: The use of the Solar Blower and colored smoke is excellent in uncovering hidden tunnel entrances. This method is most advantageous when time is a factor. The only requirements are that the location of one entrance be known and that the shaft has no obstruction which would block the passage of smoke. The ability of the blower to displace air at 4000 cubic feet per minute greatly increased the results previously obtained using the Mighty Mite. The Mighty Mite is not suitable for long tunnels and fails when there are more than several entrances. The Solar Blower has uncovered eight entrances simultaneously over a distance of 1000 meters. This blower can be utilized with an observation helicopter spotting the smoke rising through the jungle. The blower and accessories are transportable by UH-1D helicopter or 3/4 ton truck. It must be transported to the tunnel location and can be carried short distances by hand. It is advisable and near impossible to carry it any distance in the jungle by hand due to its weight and bulk. The Solar Blower can be easily started and no maintenance problems have yet been encountered. The blower can also be utilized with CS-1 to flush people from tunnels. Desirable, the blower should be of lighter weight and its tube more flexible.

Observation: The Solar Blower's ability for locating hidden tunnel entrances is excellent, although weight and bulk pose a problem in movement by manpower. A helicopter should be utilized in spotting the smoke when in jungle areas.
Item: Tunnel Construction.

Discussion: Recently, numerous tunnel shafts have been found that have walls of bamboo at various intervals. Upon removal of these walls, loose dirt and the sides of the shaft start to cave in. The walls are usually 30 to 50 meter intervals and sometimes contain one hollow rod of bamboo which goes to the surface. These bamboo walls have only been found in long tunnels.

It appears that the Viet Cong have devised means of expediting tunnel construction. Instead of carrying dirt to the original entrance or starting point, they have dug excavation shafts every 50 meters from which dirt may be removed to the surface. This cuts down the time and labor involved in the removal of dirt.

When the main shaft is complete, a wall of bamboo is placed where the excavation shaft enters the main shaft. Then the wall is completed, the excavation shaft is filled with dirt. This process is continued until there is one long shaft with two entrances. At times a hollow bamboo rod is placed in the excavation shaft with one end in the main shaft and the other breaking the surface. This is a means of ventilation and in conjunction with others, provides drafts which move air through the tunnel.

Observation: This method of excavation provides the VC with the capability of rapid construction of extensive tunnel systems. The reduced number of entrances diminishes the chance of discovery. The hollow bamboo rods provide excellent means of ventilation, enabling the VC to work and live in the tunnel. It also provides means of listening for movement on the surface.

Item: Tunnel Kits.

Discussion: The tunnel kit is a vast improvement over previous makeshift equipment used in tunnel exploitation. The following are comments of the men of the 1st Infantry Division who have used this equipment.

a. .38 Cal Pistol: In its present configuration the weapon lacks balance and is awkward to handle. The aiming light is not a true aiming light in that the beam has a diameter of 3 feet at a distance of 10 feet. Furthermore, spray firing in the small confines of a tunnel is almost certain to hit the target. For these reasons the aiming light should be omitted and this would decrease the pistol weight. The weapon required is one that is multiple shot, light weight, well balanced and sufficiently quiet to avoid ear damage when fired in a confined space. Possibly a snub nose .38 cal with silencer or a .22 cal weapon with silencer would meet these requirements.

b. Baseball Cap: The design of the baseball cap with the necessary equipment is acceptable except that the bill of the cap hinders the full use of the cap-mounted light beam. A hat bill of one inch or less would eliminate this problem.

c. Cap-Mounted Light: This light works well and is of sufficient power to provide the required amount of illumination in tunnel operations. The bite switch however fails to function occasionally, shutting out the light.

d. Communication System: To date this portion of the Tunnel Kit works very well and is acceptable in its current configuration.
Observation: The Tunnel Kit is an excellent aid in performing the mission of exploring tunnels. Implementation of the few suggested changes above will greatly aid the tunnel teams.

**Herbicide Operations**

**Item:** Crop Destruction.

**Discussion:** The rice crops in BINH DUONG Province are categorized into three types depending on time of harvest. These are early, medium and late crops. Generally the early crops, which account for about five per cent of the total, are harvested in August and September, the medium rice in November and December, and the late rice in December and January. The vast majority of the rice crops from just south of the MICHELIN Plantation area to the Iron Triangle, and west from LAI KHE to the SAIGON River, are medium and late harvest crops. In addition, an insignificant portion of the rice crop may be classified as wild or unplanted rice, and includes crops sporadically planted from time to time throughout the growing season. It is estimated that the harvest from these crops constitutes only one or two per cent of the total. Within the area described above, the most ideal time for crop destruction is between 10 and 20 October for then it is too late for the VC to replant. If this rice is sprayed in August or September, new crops can be planted in time for a December or January harvest. A case in point is the rice along the tributaries of the SAIGON River running northwest from XT 7432 to XT 6639. Approximately 90 per cent of these crops were destroyed by aerial spray with agent "Orange" on 1 September 1966. One month later a recon of this area disclosed that approximately 60 per cent of these crops had been replanted. This rice will be ready for harvest in December or early January.

**Observation:** The lesson learned here is that for maximum effect, rice crops should not be sprayed prior to about 4 to 6 weeks before harvest. To do so is a waste of time, manpower, aircraft sorties and herbicides.

**Engineer**

**Item:** Prior Reconnaissance and Planning.

**Discussion:** The necessity for complete and accurate prior reconnaissance and planning in order to avoid critical delays has been proven time and again. Usually time is a very critical factor in an operation and delays due to errors in construction or in having the necessary men and equipment on hand must be avoided. On-the-ground or low-level aerial reconnaissance by Engineer Task Force Commander is a must. Recon team reports are excellent for early planning but cannot substitute for recon by the men who must do the job. Following this, adequate planning and preparation, particularly including materials and procedures for operations under adverse conditions of weather and the enemy, are a must. Preparation must also be provided for all possible eventualities.

**Observation:** Complete and accurate reconnaissance and planning, to include all eventualities, must be made prior to each operation.

**Item:** Air Lift of Prefabricated Tactical Bridging by CH-47.
Discussion: During Operation TULSA (9 Oct - 15 Oct 66) a 38 foot, 4 inch H/16 dry span was prepared for airlift as a precaution. This consisted of two external loads and one internal load. The two external loads consisted first of the H frame assembly and second of 28 normal balk stacked 4 high and 7 wide. The internal load consisted of the remaining normal balk, the short and taperd balk, and the necessary tools. The H-frame is lifted utilizing four 20-foot standard nylon slings basket-hitched to two nylon doughnut rolls at the apex. The 28 normal balk are lifted utilizing 12 foot standard slings.

Four days after preparation of the load, the VC blew a 38 foot concrete bridge. Due to earlier preparation we were able to airlift the dry span into position and place the necessary H/16 filler balk without delaying the scheduled convoy. The convoy would have been delayed for over an hour had not precautionary measures been taken.

Observation: Airlift of 38 feet, 4 inch H/16 dry span bridges by CH-47 is feasible and desirable in tactical road clearing operations where time is a critical factor. It is also desirable to have at least one dry span prepared for airlift as a precautionary measure during road clearing operations.

Item: Engineers Secondary Mission:
Discussion: During Operation AMARILLO (23 Aug - 1 Sep 66), a road clearing and security operation, the securing infantry was diverted to fight a reinforced VC battalion, and the 1st Engineer Battalion was called upon to reorganize and fight as infantry. This was accomplished quickly and efficiently, resulting in a VC body count of eight credited to the 1st Engineer Battalion. There have also been numerous other instances where elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion have been fired upon while performing their missions.

Observation: Combat engineers must train in infantry tactics and must always be prepared to revert to their secondary mission upon short notice.

Item: Use of Tractor-Drawn Rooters for Cutting Command Wires.
Discussion: A tractor drawn single tooth rooter has been found to be very efficient in cutting and/or uncovering the detonating wires to command mines. A tractor drawn rooter should be operated on each side of the road to be cleared. The rooter should be preceded by a buttoned-up tank for security and for detonating any AP mines that may be in the path of rooting. The rooters are operated anywhere from five to fifty meters off the road shoulders depending upon the terrain encountered. However, in an effort to combat these rooters, the VC have at times placed claymores 20 to 30 meters off the road, and every effort should be made to root at least 20 meters away from the road, and if the terrain permits, 30 to 40 meters off the road. The rooter is able to cut 24 inches below the surface of the ground, which is usually a sufficient depth to cut or uncover all detonating wires laid by the VC. This method has been used quite frequently by the 1st Engineer Battalion and has proven very successful.

Observation: Tractor drawn rooters should be used on all road clearing operations if at all possible.

Item: Neutralization of Command Mines.
From experience, the 1st Engineer Battalion has come up with a specific procedure to be used in the neutralization of command mines. The following procedure has proved very successful.

a. Locate command wires leading to the mine either visually or by use of a router. If a mine is detected with a detector or probes, immediately search for lead wires.

b. Cut the command wires.

c. Move all but one man at least 100 meters from the mine area.

d. One man attach firing wire to wires leading into the road, being careful not to disturb the wire or pull it; move to a safe position, and try to fire the mine electrically. Remember always that booby traps may be present.

e. If the mine does not detonate, sweep along the wire (one man only) toward the road, and blow any suspected mine or booby trap locations. If unable to locate the mine, set a row of charges on the road and blow them all.

f. After the mine has been detonated carefully attach a piece of wire or rope to the end of the wires leading away from the road. If an APC is available, use it to pull the wire out, with all exposed personal moved back to a safe area. If no APC is available, play out the wire or rope you have attached to the firing wires and pull by hand at a safe distance away. Do not pull directly on the wires or probe around the wires. This same procedure may be used for wires leading into the road.

g. If unable to pull the wire out completely, get an armored vehicle to run down the wire to its end. Above all, use care and common sense and stay alert.

Observation: The above described procedure should be used for neutralization of command mines whenever possible.

Item: Wearing of Armored Vests:

Discussion: In several operations unnecessary injuries have resulted due to failure to wear armored vests, and conversely, several lives have been saved due to the use of armored vests. The vest should be worn dealing with demolitions, when sweeping for mines, and when operating engineer equipment outside of base camp.

Observation: All personnel dealing with demolitions or mine detection and all personnel operating vehicles and equipment in insecure areas should wear armored vests.

Item: Positioning of Engineer troops for Road Repairs:

Discussion: Very often time is a critical factor in convoy operations. The road must be repaired by engineers before the convoy arrives and sometimes engineers may accompany a convoy in order to affect necessary repairs for successful convoy passage.
Observation: All engineer troops should be moved into the area of operation as early as possible to allow quick reaction to sudden requirements and to allow maximum time available for repair work. When moving out on a road repair job, the engineer convoy should be arranged so that hasty repairs can be accomplished by the first few items in the convoy to allow passage of the rest of the convoy. If the repair can be accomplished without heavy equipment, air movement of engineer troops and security elements 1-2 hours before convoy movement is the most effective way to eliminate delay.

Item: Expedient Road Repairs during the Monsoon Season:

Discussion: Craters cannot generally be filled and subjected to traffic during the wet season. This is also true for the soft spots on the road that develop due to improper drainage and constant convoy traffic. PSP can be used as expedient surfacing material; however, PSP is really only a wearing surface and must be tacked down to a solid bearing surface or else it soon becomes warped and bent by convoy traffic and becomes a hindrance to convoy passage. The most successful expedient solution to this problem has been the construction of a timber treadway over the filled crater or soft spot. In effect, this is the superstructure of a timber trestle bridge placed directly onto the bad spot of the road. Its method of construction varies with time available and the degree of road repair necessary. However, usually footers are placed parallel to the road, with deck planking placed on top of the footers perpendicular to the road, and with treadway placed on top of the decking parallel with the road and with the flow of traffic. This method proved extremely successful during Operation TULSA where heavy rains made many spots impassable mud holes, but repairs were affected by construction of these treadways without any delay in convoy passage.

Observation: During the monsoon season lumber should be used to construct expedient treadways to assist convoy passage over craters and soft spots in the road.

Item: Jeep Mounted Mine Detector:

Discussion: Recently the 1st Engineer Battalion field tested a jeep mounted mine detector consisting of a 1/4 ton jeep and a 6 foot mine detecting head attached to the front of the jeep and two feet in front of the bumper. This jeep may be operated with a driver or by a remote control unit 300 meters behind the jeep. When operated for mine detection the jeep moves at 5-10 mph and will automatically come to an abrupt stop when the detecting head passes over a metallic object. This method of mine detection proved very successful in field testing. It is to be also noted that much time may be saved in using this method of mine detection rather than using the normal man operated mine detectors.

Observation: It is highly recommended that the Army purchase this jeep mounted mine detector for use by units in Vietnam in road clearing operations. It is desirable, though, to modify the present model so as to have a wider detecting head in front of the jeep. As a minimum 8 feet is desirable to obtain a decent sweep of one lane of the road; however, if possible, an even wider head is desirable to clear as great an area as possible in one sweep.
Artillery

Item: Transportation of 105mm shell canisters.

Discussion: Due to the amount of ammunition residue which accumulates during firing, the return of shell canisters to a secure area by aircraft can become a problem. In past operations CH-47 helicopters have carried only two A-22 containers of canisters per sortie. Due to the light weight of the canisters it is felt that four A-22 containers could be carried by each CH-47 sortie, providing the containers are available.

Observation: Units should be provided sufficient A-22 containers to fill the need of ammunition resupply and evacuation of shell canisters. Also, all ammunition personnel must be thoroughly trained in loading and unloading ammunition for air transport.

Item: Use of Delay Fuzes on Mangrove Swamps.

Discussion: The dud probability rate of fuse M51A5 when set on .05 second delay is highly increased when firing into mangrove swamps.

Observation: The use of delay fuzes is not recommended for use in swampland areas.

Item: Beehive ammunition.

Discussion: Beehive ammunition is frequently transported in fiber containers on airmobile operations and soon becomes unserviceable due to rain, bent canisters, etc. The wooden box is often lost or destroyed, and the box for standard 105mm ammunition is not a suitable container for the beehive ammunition due to its additional length.

Observation: Beehive ammunition should be kept in the box in which initially issued during all displacements. Further, the box should be painted a distinctive color for ready identification.

Item: Use of Logistical Nets.

Discussion: Because of the size of areas or operations, length of operations, and mobility restrictions, use of radios for administrative and logistical matters becomes imperative. Tactical nets, "FTP" and "SFP" Fire Nets, become excessively cluttered.

Observation: An administrative and logistical net should be authorized for each battalion size unit and additional radios made available.

Equipment

Item: GFT-GST Instruments swell from extreme moisture.

Discussion: The extreme ground moisture and humidity encountered in areas such as RUUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (RSZ) causes swelling of the paper cover on GFT-GST to such a degree that they often become inoperable.

Observation: Protection of GFT-GST with a moisture proof cover is mandatory. Swelling, if excessive, can be reduced by the use of a hot box. GFT-GST made of metal or other suitable materials should be issued for use in these areas.
Item: Fogging of sights.

Discussion: Howitzer sights are subject to frequent fogging due to atmospheric conditions.

Observation: Extra sights should be available in the battery to exchange for fogged sights. Use of a hot box will partially eliminate this problem.

Operations

Item: Tube displacement due to unstable soil conditions encountered in the RUNN FAT IECIAL ZONE.

Discussion: The mission of a 105mm howitzer battery sometimes requires movement into areas which will not withstand the weight of the howitzer. Movement to rice paddies, swampy areas, and river banks is common. Because of the nature of these locations and the high water content of the soil, the trails of the howitzer bury in the mud. The subsequent displacement, caused by unstable soil conditions, decreases the maximum rate of fire because howitzers have to be relayed several times during a fire mission.

Observation: As an expedient solution to combating unstable soil conditions, a length of 6″ x 6″ timber is placed behind each trail spade. Pierced steel planking (PSP) is then placed lengthwise in a vertical position to increase the bearing surface of the timbers. Additional stability may be achieved by driving engineer stakes behind the PSP. The advance party should carry sufficient PSP (6 pieces) to construct a landing pad for the first howitzer and a pad for receiving CH-47 helicopter internal loads. Each succeeding howitzer section should carry PSP for the section which follows until all gun pads are complete.

Item: Use of artillery illumination to assist flare ships.

Discussion: Flare ships have difficulty locating the area which is to be illuminated. Infantry adjustment procedures (drop and correct method) are time consuming and waste flares. Artillery units are in radio/wire contact with infantry TOC's and are capable of firing illumination missions rapidly and accurately.

Observation: Artillery illumination has the capability and should be used to mark areas of drop for flare ships.

Gunnery Procedures

Item: Requirement for GFT settings in all directions for numerous charges without being able to register as frequently as desired.

Discussion: MET plus VE GFT settings should be computed for eight directions using VE's obtained from registrations with concurrent metro computations. By computing MET + VE in eight directions for all normally used charges, N00 SML transfer limits are established. This system is further modified to utilize average metro data based on 10 day averages. This is applied to the VE's derived from registrations.

Observation: The use of average MET + VE has produced first round accuracy in all directions except periods of extreme weather change. GFT settings obtained are in most cases better than using updated registration GFT settings.
Item: Safety aiming circle.

Discussion: Direct support artillery battalions constantly change azimuth of lay to keep up with the movement of ground forces. With the frequency of relaying and the urgency for speed, laying errors are possible, particularly during the hours of darkness.

Observation: A safety aiming circle, oriented independently from the primary circle, can be used to check the lay.

Item: Jungle moppies cause tree bursts short of desired point of impact.

Discussion: Frequently, forward observers travel in jungle areas where the tree top canopy is extremely high and dense. When artillery support originates from the rear of ground units and they are on the azimuth of fire, the possibility of tree bursts short of desired point of impact and above, friendly troops exists.

Observation: In this situation forward observers should request high angle fire with fuse quick, or advise the FDC of the height of the canopy for an appropriate site correction.

Radar registrations of howitzer and mortar batteries.

Discussion: The use of the AN/MPQ 4 counter mortar radar to conduct day and night registrations provides a means of establishing a valid GFT setting. This method achieves greater importance when aircraft are not available for observation or when target clearance cannot be obtained during the daylight hours, or visibility otherwise precludes registration. Further, the data devised is often more accurate than adjusted registrations due to the inherent inaccuracy of map inspected registration points.

Observation: When normal observed impact registrations cannot be conducted, radar is a valid means for howitzer and mortar registrations.

Item: Use of AN/TPS 25 surveillance radar.

Discussion: When AN/TPS 25 surveillance radar detected vehicular movement on a road outside base camp perimeter two nights in a row, an intersection of the road was cleared for artillery fire for the following night and guns laid on the intersection. When vehicle movement was detected the next evening, artillery interdiction fire was placed on the cleared intersection and the movement abruptly ceased. No movement has been detected on that particular road since that time.

Observation: Coordination on AN/TPS 25 surveillance radar and artillery increase effectiveness of interdiction fires.

Artillery officer replacements.

Discussion: The officer replacements to Division Artillery during a three month period included 20 captains whose only experience had been in air defense. Their lack of training and experience in field artillery created a problem in their assignments. While certain positions are relatively branch immaterial, only a few of these positions are open at any one time.
Observation: Action is being taken by Division G-1 to screen and divert
from assignment to Division Artillery, officers whose training and ex-
perience are not consonant with Division Artillery needs. In addition,
a training program has been conducted by Division Artillery S-3 to
provide basic field artillery knowledge to those officers who lack such
training.

Signal Communications

Item: Better telephone service provided to subscribers at Danger Main.

Discussion: Increased subscriber requirements and expansion of base
camp facilities have increased so rapidly during the past year that the
signal battalion has gone outside its TOE in order to obtain equipment
to meet growing subscriber requirements. One of the areas hardest hit
has been the operation of the switchboard at Danger Main. The battalion
is authorized the AN/MTC-3 as the basic switchboard for operation of
Danger Main. Initially the battalion utilized two AN/MTC-1's to provide
trunking and local circuits to subscribers at Main. One AN/MTC-1 was
used for all long distant trunks while the other terminated all locals.
This system worked adequately, however, the time delay incurred by
going through two switchboards was unacceptable. The obvious solution
was to have one switchboard terminate all circuits coming into Danger
Main. On 16 August steps were taken to eliminate the Danger 1D board
by transferring all trunk circuits to the Danger Main board and the
Support Command board. This provided better and faster service to all
subscribers at Main, since direct access to long distant trunks was
now available without going through a second switchboard. In conjunc-
tion with the removal of the long distance board, a study was initiated to
investigate the feasibility of paralleling two AN/MTC-1's back to back
to obtain additional switchboard positions. The study revealed that
paralleling the AN/MTC-1 was possible and as many as 3 additional
positions could be obtained. The job was started on 13 September and
completed on 15 September thus increasing the efficiency and service
to telephone subscribers at Danger Main. Present plans are to increase
the capabilities at Danger Main further by installing a nine position
board.

Observation: The multiple arrangement of the Danger Main switchboard
has proven to be highly successful. The improvement in operator ef-
ficiency and subscriber service has been quite noticeable since the
affected change.

Item: Improvement of MARS Program:

Discussion: Availability of frequencies and operating restrictions
have been two of the major problems that have hampered the growth of
the division MARS Program. This problem is not unique to this division
but has been encountered by all MARS stations in country. Several
attempts have been made by the MARS representative of this battalion
to improve the overall operation of the program. Actions taken by
this unit are listed below:

1. Representatives visited Air Force MARS facility at BIEN MOA to
discuss present operations, common problems and methods of improvement.

2. MARS representatives visited USARV Signal to discuss overall pro-
gram improvements.

3. Relocated antennas at DI AN to new location to obtain greater
transmitting power.
Observation: Considerable improvement has been noted in the operation of the MARS Program during the past three months. Improvements noted in the program are:

1. Additional operating frequencies authorized.
2. Additional stations in the states authorized to work with MARS stations in Vietnam.
3. Twenty-four hour patching which increases the total number of phone patches that can be made.
4. Marsgram traffic authorized to be transmitted to Japan via Batt. The MARS Program is being introduced to all newly arrived personnel to the division. Blank forms for Marsgrams are now available at the 1st Administration Company and all incoming personnel are encouraged to participate in the program.

LOGISTICS

Medical Service

Item: Control of patients personal effects and weapons.

Discussion: Control of patients effects and weapons has been a continuous problem in the 1st Infantry Division. The problem has been compounded during the last quarter by large numbers of patients coming to the clearing station direct from the field on two separate occasions. Another problem is that some patients bypass the division clearing station and go direct to Army facilities.

Observation: The medical battalion SOP on handling of patient personal effects and weapons was reviewed and revised and sent to each medical company, stressing the importance of command responsibility for the control of patient personal effects and weapons. In situations where there are large numbers of patients, the CO, 1st Medical Battalion recommends that the brigade or the battalion collect the weapons and ammunition at the point where patients are loaded on the aeromedical evacuation helicopter. This would eliminate the safety hazard caused at the clearing station and also would assure a tighter control of weapons in the division. This procedure would keep the weapons that have been going with the patient to Army medical facilities in the division.

Item: Transportation of Medical Personnel and Equipment.

Discussion: During operations where the 1st Medical Battalion must displace a section of the clearing to a forward area, we experienced some difficulty in getting the medical personnel and equipment moved by air to the forward position. This difficulty was due to the low priority given the medical battalion for air movement.

Observation: Coordination with the brigade S-4, and TOC in regard to movement of the medical personnel and equipment by aircraft already allocated to the brigade has proven very satisfactory. The brigade, by moving the medical personnel and equipment along with the tactical troops, will be assured of having the required medical support to support the tactical situation.
Item: Coordination of ambulances at the DI AN helipad during heavy patient receiving period.

Discussion: It has been noted that notification to prepare for every patient input has come from more than one source. Each source is interested in making sure we have ambulances at the helipad. It is confusing to receive calls from many sources which results in too many ambulances at the helipad at one time, since calls come into the med facility, the company and the headquarters.

Observation: Upon notification of a heavy patient input into DI AN area, coming either from the Division Surgeon's office or the Support Command S-3, a vehicle with radio is dispatched both to the clearing station emergency and to the helipad and two ambulances are dispatched to the helipad. All calls regarding support should be referred to the battalion S-3 who monitors traffic between the two control locations.

Item: Utilization of Dust Off Helicopters.

Discussion: Dust Off helicopters are an extremely valuable asset in support of a medical company and must be used with discretion.

Observation: For the maximum utilization of these aircraft, it is mandatory that the whereabouts of these aircraft be made known to the supported brigade at all times. Evacuation of other Vietnamese personnel cannot be rated higher than a routine classification for aeromedical evacuation.

Item: Non-receipt of requisitioned non-medical supply items.

Discussion: Some non-medical supplies, such as boots, fatigue, underwear and socks, which were requisitioned, were not received or were slow in being issued.

Observation: Liaison trips to the supplying agent, at least twice per month, has resulted in the more timely issue of the supplies listed above.

Item: Refrigerators.

Discussion: Because of the extreme heat it is necessary that all food, drugs and biologicals be kept under refrigeration. Not enough refrigeration is provided in a TOE unit that operates in a fixed facility.

Observation: 12.5 cu ft commercial type refrigerators for drugs, and biologicals are required in the hospital and Medical Supply Warehouse. 65 cu ft refrigeration is required for the mess hall.

Item: Medical resupply.

Discussion: Some difficulties and shortages are being experienced by forward units in respect to foot powder and water purification tablets. These items are medical in nature and should be ordered through medical channels.

Observation: Closer coordination between the Area Medical Supply Officer and units supported would reduce the erroneous information being supplied to the units.

Item: Eye glasses.
Discussion: Difficulty is being experienced by units in obtaining eye glasses. This is due to the fact that units do not follow the proper channels for ordering eye glasses.

Observation: The Battalion Medical Platoon Assistant does not follow the proper sequence in ordering glasses. Some individuals bypass the medical company in support of their unit, instead of going to the medical company as is required.

Item: Individual follow-up of spectacle requests.

Discussion: An important oversight of an individual ordering spectacles is his failure to follow-up on these spectacles with either an injury or new spectacle order request should a significant period of time elapse (more than two months). Although most spectacle order requests will be filled within two to four weeks, there may be some not filled through human error.

Observation: Failure for an individual to follow-up his request for spectacles results in a possible hardship for the individual. Division Medical Supply must be made aware that his original spectacle order request was never filled.

Supply and Maintenance

Item: Maintenance of power in base camp.

Discussion: Because of the complex situation of semi-permanent living, qualified personnel with a knowledge of electricity are required to keep the power supplied to the area.

Observation: Generator operators properly trained are satisfactory as long as they work with the 110V sets and TOE generators. When the electrical requirements go beyond this, these men are not always capable of wiring buildings and equipment from scratch. Electricians are required when a medical unit is operating a base camp fixed facility which includes X-Ray equipment and other multiple dispersed facilities which require power. There is very little engineer supervision available for electrical wiring.

Item: Expendable housekeeping supplies.

Discussion: Due to the fact that supplies are ordered 30 days in advance for a 30-day level, this means that some items are not received or cannot be ordered when needed.

Observation: Some type of facility should be set up where units needing supplies could select needed items stock available, similar to SSSC.

Item: Tent replacement.

Discussion: Tents tend to become dry rotted and tear easily after approximately six months in normal base camp operation. Replacement tentage for salvage items has been difficult to obtain.

Observation: Replacement tentage is required approximately six to eight months after initial tents have been set up and used. Therefore, replacements for tents being used should be ordered after six months of use.
Item: Refrigerator repair.

Discussion: When refrigerators breakdown, it is necessary that repairs be made as soon as possible or a replacement issued while repairs are made. Replacements or repairs are very difficult to obtain.

Observation: Repairs or replacements are almost non-existent and when a refrigerator breaks down, a replacement must be obtained from some source other than normal channels. A PLL should be established in-country to repair parts for refrigerator units on hand will be readily available.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Civil Affairs

Item: Plate maker.

Discussion: The loss of the plate-maker to the 246th PsyOps Company has, in effect, doubled the time required to react to psychological opportunities. Now, instead of being able to produce the plates here, Division G-5 section must take the negatives to the 246th PsyOps Company in Bien Hoa.

Observation: The acquiring of another plate-maker would greatly reduce the amount of time required to produce plates for the press.

Item: CHIEU HOI Program.

Discussion: During the CHIEU HOI Seminar, it was learned that information about CHIEU HOI was not reaching VC personnel.

Observation: It is felt that, by disseminating leaflets and newspapers to indigenous personnel traveling to and from base camps, these information media will eventually come into the hands of the families of VC personnel, who will pass the information on to their relatives in the VC ranks.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Organization,

(1) A proposal for modification of the TOE for both the Division Aviation Battalion and the Direct Support Maintenance Company was initiated during the reporting period. This TOE includes a proposal to include twenty-five OH-1D's and eight armed helicopters in the air-mobile company; and increased the aircraft in the General Support Company to allow adequate support of both the command and control requirements, and the habitual support missions by utility and observation aircraft. The overall aircraft authorization would then include a capability to simultaneously lift the assault elements of an infantry company and provide armed helicopter support in the air-mobile company; and would provide fifteen utility, six observation helicopters and six OV-1 aircraft in the General Support Company. This TOE will provide urgently needed aviation support which is immediately responsive to division needs and should be implemented at the earliest practicable date.
(2) Recommend that infantry battalions be authorized S5's as a TOE position.

b. Equipment.

(1) Recommend that Radio Terminal Set's AN/HRC-68 be issued to the signal battalion to be made available to brigade headquarters for field operations. This set is mounted in a 3/4 ton truck, is air transportable, and provides 4 channels of telephone communications.

(2) Recommend that a lightweight nylon hammock be developed and issued to each soldier for use in jungle terrain.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-H (31 Oct 66) | 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 7 JAN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307
       Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 1st Infantry Division for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. Concur with the observations on pages 21 thru 37 except as follows:
   a. Page 23, Item: Fusing of 55 gal drum of CS-1. The suggested fusing devise is presently being studied at this headquarters and a recommendation will be forthcoming.
   b. Page 29, Item: Jeep Mounted Mine Detector. A study is being conducted to determine what modifications, if any, should be recommended.

3. This headquarters has concurred with the recommendations contained on pages 37 & 38.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WILLIAM K. HAGY
Major ARMOR
Act Asst AG.

1 Incl
nc

Regraded Unclassified When Separated From Classified Inclosures
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-LH (31 Oct 66) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RGSPOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 14 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-CT APO 96550

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. (U) Reference Paragraph 1, Section II, Item: Chaplain, Page 22: This command recognizes the need for additional Catholic Chaplains. However, until such time as Department of the Army can furnish additional Chaplains of the Catholic faith, the current area coverage system is considered the best utilization of assets available.

   b. (C) Reference Paragraph 1, Section II, Item: Fusing of 55 Gallon Drums of CS-1, Page 23: An improved M4 burster with an adjustable time fuse, for use with an air delivered Agent CS-1, has been requested in sufficient quantities to meet operational requirements.

   c. (C) Reference Paragraph 1, Section II, Item: Jeep Mounted Mine Detector, Page 29: The standard Jeep Mounted Mine Detector has been requisitioned for operational use. Requirement for remote controlled Jeep Mounted Mine Detector with modifications to include a wider search capability has been validated by Department of the Army.

   d. (U) Reference Paragraph 1, Part II, Item: Artillery Officer Replacements, Page 32: Nonconcur. This headquarters recently reviewed the qualifications of artillery officer replacements as mentioned in the observation. Results were:

       (1) Ten of the twenty captains were cross-trained in both air-defense and field artillery.
AVHGO-DH (31 Oct 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(2) Of the remaining 10 captains, 7 had MOS's 0200, 2260, 2900, 4010, and 9301. Captains assigned to position vacancies in these MOS's do not normally require extensive field artillery experience in order to be effective.

(3) Only three could be considered to be purely air-defense artillery officers.

e. (U) Reference Paragraph 1, Part II, Item: Refrigerator Repair, Page 37: Responsibility for refrigerator repair is assigned to Pacific Architect and Engineers (PA&E) under contract for providing installation R&M support. Inasmuch as PA&E has established stockage of required parts support, authorization for similar stockage at unit level is not favorably considered.

f. (U) Reference Paragraph 1, Part II, Item: Plate Maker; Page 37: The plate maker was on loan from the 264th Psychological Operations Company. The 1st Division has been advised to submit a USARV Form 47 justifying the need for subject item.

g. (U) Reference Paragraph 2a(1), Section 2, Page 37: MTOE has not been received at this headquarters. However, CINCUSARPAC message subject, Acceleration of NAADS, 210046Z Jan 67, states that DA had declared a moratorium on submission of MTOE except those required for the sole purpose of reflecting authorization of personnel and equipment as of 31 December 1966, MTOE's for Program 4, and MTOE for emergency requirements in direct support of South East Asia.

h. (U) Reference Paragraph b(1), Section 2, Page 33: Non-concur. Radio Set AN/MRC-112 is being issued to provide this capability. This set is mounted in a 1½ ton trailer, is air transportable and provides 4 channels of telephone communications, i.e., the same as the AN/MRC-68 in a smaller configuration.
AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

i. (U) Reference Paragraph b(2), Section 2, Page 38: A
light-weight hammock is being tested and evaluated at the present time.
Results of the evaluation will determine whether there is a need for
further development or the item be requested for operational require-
ments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

12 Incl
nc

Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-OT(31 Oct 66) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 1st Inf Div
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AGG
Asst AG

Regraded Unclassified When
Separated From Classified
Inclosures
Following is a roster of key officer personnel, during the report period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME, GRADE, SN</th>
<th>DATES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div CG</td>
<td>DEPUTY, WILLIAM E.</td>
<td>MG, 035710</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-A</td>
<td>BEAKEY, JOHN R. JR.</td>
<td>BG, 026835</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-B</td>
<td>HOLLINGSFORTH, JAMES</td>
<td>BG, 035155</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div CofS</td>
<td>GLASGOW, WILLIAM M.</td>
<td>COL, 025905</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 16 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-C</td>
<td>KITCHENS, EDWARD B. JR.</td>
<td>COL, 045791</td>
<td>16 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-D</td>
<td>STAIR, ROBERT N.</td>
<td>LTC, 063351</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-E</td>
<td>LE GOO, WILLIAM E.</td>
<td>LTC, 057577</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-F</td>
<td>HEAD, ALEXANDER M.</td>
<td>LTC, 050790</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-G</td>
<td>SPYDER, IRA V. JR.</td>
<td>LTC, 050759</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div ADC-H</td>
<td>HUMMEL, CONRAD K.</td>
<td>MAJ, 081453</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 23 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Command Co</td>
<td>GRAMLING, FREDDIE V.</td>
<td>COL, 062115</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st S&amp;T Bn Co</td>
<td>SMITH, HERBERT F.</td>
<td>LTC, 059730</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>701st Maint Bn Co</td>
<td>KOLANKIEWICZ, CHARLES</td>
<td>LTC, 079980</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 6 Aug 66</td>
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<td>1st Med Bn Co</td>
<td>RUTKE, EDMOND J.</td>
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<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Avn Bn Co</td>
<td>BUTLER, OLIVA B.</td>
<td>LTC, 050507</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st 4th Cav Co</td>
<td>LEE, LEONARD L.</td>
<td>LTC, 061744</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<td>HQ, 1st Eng Bn Co</td>
<td>KIERMAN, JOSEPH M. JR.</td>
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<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 121st Sig Co</td>
<td>CURTINGHAM, RUSSELL</td>
<td>LTC, 056170</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 4 Sep 66</td>
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<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<td>LTC, 060773</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 21 Oct 66</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CORNIN, PAUL F.</td>
<td>LTC, 062379</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<td>064583</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 2d Bde</td>
<td>WALKER, SAM S. LTC</td>
<td>028197</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq, 2/11th Inf</td>
<td>HATHAWAY, WILLIAM S. LTC</td>
<td>060598</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 1/18th Inf</td>
<td>GOODWIN, WARNER S. JR. LTC</td>
<td>064322</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 2/18th Inf</td>
<td>BAUMAN, LETIS R. LTC</td>
<td>065808</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 3d Bde</td>
<td>WALLACE, GEORGE M. III LTC</td>
<td>027556</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 6 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 2/2d Inf</td>
<td>COOK, JACK L. LTC</td>
<td>064143</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 1/16th Inf</td>
<td>WALLACE, GEORGE M. III LTC</td>
<td>027556</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq, 2/20th Inf</td>
<td>JONES, THOMAS H. LTC</td>
<td>065099</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 11 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Div Art'y</td>
<td>CAMF, HANN L. COL</td>
<td>035999</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 5 Sep 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5th Art'y</td>
<td>ROGERS, DAVID C. LTC</td>
<td>028316</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 5 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6th Art'y</td>
<td>McDUFFEE, JOHN R. LTC</td>
<td>058972</td>
<td>1 Aug 66 - 1 Oct 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7th Art'y</td>
<td>KECK, CARROLL S. LTC</td>
<td>059272</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/33d Art'y</td>
<td>DANIEL, CHARLES D. LTC</td>
<td>028590</td>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inclosure 3 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Oct 66

1st Infantry Division Switchboard Designators
(1 Aug – 31 Oct 66)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Designator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>HANGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>DEVIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 2d Infantry</td>
<td>DRACULA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 26th Infantry</td>
<td>DOOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 28th Infantry</td>
<td>DUPTANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade</td>
<td>DAGGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 16th Infantry</td>
<td>DAMAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 18th Infantry</td>
<td>DOCHRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 18th Infantry</td>
<td>DARKNESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade</td>
<td>DUTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 2d Infantry</td>
<td>DECOY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 16th Infantry</td>
<td>DEVOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 28th Infantry</td>
<td>DASHLESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Artillery</td>
<td>DRUMFIRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 5th Artillery</td>
<td>DESTROYER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Battalion, 6th Artillery</td>
<td>DINAMITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 7th Artillery</td>
<td>DETONATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 33d Artillery</td>
<td>DUNGEON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Aviation Battalion</td>
<td>DANK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>DIEHARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Medical Battalion</td>
<td>DOCTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry</td>
<td>DRAGOON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Signal Battalion</td>
<td>DYNAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Military Police Company</td>
<td>DEPUTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>DURABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Supply and Transport Battalion</td>
<td>DELIVER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701st Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>DILIGENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Administrative Company</td>
<td>DEMON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Radio Research Unit</td>
<td>DECAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Development Task Force</td>
<td>HELPER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commander's Notes

1. The Division has had a number of experiences in fighting against VC fortified camps and positions in the jungle. With rare exception, the units involved have taken a high level of casualties. This is not surprising in that it is a law of infantry combat that a unit dug in on its own home ground, with prepared fields of fire often inflict heavy casualties on infantry units moving toward it and attacking it.

2. In an earlier Commander's Note I prescribed that units of the 1st Division would not attempt to withdraw while in contact. I am now modifying that directive in the case of heavily fortified positions.

3. The most effective weapons against VC fortified positions are napalm and large bombs, or 155 and 8" artillery with delayed fuzing. Among these weapons, the napalm and bombs are the more effective.

4. Therefore, when infantry units clearly identify a strongly fortified position and are not able by infantry fire and maneuver to destroy or force the enemy out, commanders of battalions and brigades may adjust their positions and issue necessary orders so that heavy ordnance may be employed. The success of this technique will depend upon the precise identification of the location of the fortified position by the infantry rifle company or companies in contact. An azimuth and distance from colored smoke will probably be the usual technique and all rifle elements should be prepared to direct air strikes in this manner.

5. If tanks are available and in the area, fortified positions may be reduced by tank fire. We have not yet fully and effectively employed tanks in this manner. The HEAT round may not always be as effective as armor piercing rounds, particularly in an area heavily bunkered.

6. Ideally, fortified positions would be discovered by squad size patrols or point elements so that large infantry forces will not close upon the positions and become engaged so closely that heavy ordnance can not be delivered. Thus, all squad sized security elements must be trained to identify and report heavily fortified positions and to remain in the area in order to assist in directing air strikes and the adjustment of artillery.

7. Nothing that is said above is to be construed as eliminating the necessity, eventually, to close with the position, destroy the remaining defenders and achieve the objective by infantry elements. This should be done after sufficient ordnance has been expended to soften the position and, ideally, to kill all or most of the defenders.
1. The Division has had recent experience in rice paddy warfare during which the bulk of a VC force escaped, even though three battalions were employed against an enemy force of about 300 men.

2. It is apparent that the first phase of such an operation must be to seal every avenue of escape. This can be done by platoon size units placed astride each canal, stream line, or wood line which constitutes an avenue of escape for the VC force. At each such point, foliage must be cleared from both banks of a stream to a width of 10-20 meters so that the VC can not exfiltrate in the water under the overhanging vegetation.

3. After the seal has been completed and preceded by heavy air and artillery strikes, infantry elements should work down both sides of the wooded streams or canals.

4. In order to kill the VC trying to escape through the waterways, it is essential to drop artillery rounds, 81mm mortar rounds or 250 lb fragmentation bombs into the water. Experience has shown that hand grenades are not effective in this role unless they explode within about five feet of the VC. An 81mm mortar round or 105 round has a lethal underwater radius of 10-15 meters and a 250 lb fragmentation bomb up to 100-150 meters. These underwater explosions both stun the VC and cause lethal internal injuries.
Commander Notes - 26 — Nighttime Fire Discipline

1. The VC are in the habit of probing defensive positions at night with light reconnaissance elements in order to cause the defenders to reveal their positions by opening fire.

2. Infantry elements must be sufficiently well disciplined so that they do not open fire with small arms or machine guns unless they are under close and heavy attack. Small reconnaissance and probing attacks should be met with hand grenades and mortar fire so that it is the VC who reveal their positions with small arms fire, rather than the infantry elements of the 1st Division.

3. The Australian Forces use a technique which seems to have high merit. Each of the listening posts has an alarm rope or wire back to the squad or platoon leader and a certain number of tugs on the wire or rope represent signals regarding the size and movement of the VC force. This is preferable to radio transmissions for obvious reasons when we are dealing with VC reconnaissance elements which may have moved to within a few feet or meters of the IPs.
Inclosure 7 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Oct 66
Commander's Notes - #7 — Defensive Positions

1. It will be an SOP in the 1st Division that hasty defensive positions will constitute a rectangular hole, a berm piled up in front, with corner firing ports so that the individual rifleman or machine gunner can continue to fire to the flanks even if under direct fire from the front.

2. It will also be SOP that each such position will be camouflaged with the local foliage and that fields of fire will be cut or trampled down.

3. After these hasty positions have been camouflaged, troops will begin to provide overhead cover and will continue to camouflage their work throughout.

4. These measures, plus fire discipline, will provide defensive positions which can not be penetrated by the VC.

5. It will also be SOP within the 1st Division that the soldiers in each position will discuss with the soldiers on their right and left their fields of fire and mutual plans and signals for supporting one another. This will produce teamwork and will assure the soldiers in each position of the support they can and will receive from both flanks. Squad leaders, platoon leaders, company commanders and battalion commanders will walk defensive positions prior to dark to assure that the positions are properly constructed, tied in, and that the necessary coordination has been effected all up and down the line.

6. All squad leaders, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and above, will know the precise location on the ground and the identifying number or letter for each mortar or artillery barrage and mortar and artillery concentration within his assigned sector. Artillery forward observers and artillery liaison officers will supervise and check to insure that this is done, as well as platoon leaders and company and battalion commanders.
Inclosure A Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Infantry Division, 31 October 66, Supply and Combat Service Support Activities

1. Supply: The average strength supported during the period was 22,380. The supply levels for the division as of 31 October 1966 were:

a. Class I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE RATION</th>
<th>DAYS OF SUPPLY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>ON HAND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) MEI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Forward battalions and separate companies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) DI AN battalions and separate companies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Brigade and division artillery</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 (avg)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Division reserve (S&amp;T Bn)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) &quot;B&quot; Rations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Brigades and division artillery</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.7 (avg)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) DI AN battalions and separate companies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Division reserve</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) &quot;A&quot; Rations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; ration supplements are on hand for issue with &quot;B&quot; rations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Class III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE FUEL/COMMODITY</th>
<th>DAYS OF SUPPLY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) At Base areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) JP-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) AVGAS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) MOGAS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) DIESEL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Division reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) JP-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) AVGAS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) MOGAS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) DIESEL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 8 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 7/4-12/66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(3) Package Lubes and Oils
   (a) Base areas  15 15
   (b) Division Reserve  15 15

c. Class II & IV (Less repair parts). The following items are in
   short supply at the close of the reporting period:
   (a) Batteries, BA 58, BA 261, BA 1389, BA 422, BA 386, BA 30.
   (b) Replacement of combat losses for the new family of radios.
   (c) Tentage and poles.
   (d) Underwear and socks.
   (e) Ruck sack.
   (f) Strap quick release.
   (g) Armor (aircrew).
   (h) Generators.
   (i) Flashlights.
   (j) Food containers, insulated.
   (k) Components of Demolition sets.
   (l) Compasses, M2.
   (m) Watches, non-maintainable.
   (n) Switchboard, SB/86P.
   (o) Office furniture.
   (p) Oxygen and acetylene (gas & bottle).
   (q) Trailer water.
   (r) Insignia, 1st Div patches, stripes, subdued insignia.
   (s) Aviator gloves and sun-glasses.
   (t) Petroleum handling equipment i.e. 50 GPM pump, light-
      weight pumps and 10,000 gallon tanks.
   (u) Typewriters.
   (v) Folding chairs.
   (w) Pump for water purification equipment 1,500 gallon.
   (x) 600 gallon water purification sets.
   (y) M-1937 fire units.
   (z) Dump truck, M51A2 x/wm.

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Inclosure 8 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 10/9-11/66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont')

(a) Tank M4A3 EWM,
(b) Hand tools,
(cc) Machine gun .50 Cal MG,
(dd) Sight H4 for 60mm mortar,
(ee) Quadrant gunners,
(ff) Machine gun 73,
(gg) Air dropable waterbags,
(hh) AML (launchers and bridges),
(ii) Night lighting devices for mortars (a) 60mm, (b) 4.2, (c) 80mm,
(jj) Aerial re-supply slings, nets,
(kk) Mess trays,
(ll) Plates (officers),
(mm) Steel wool,
(nn) Scouring powder,
(oo) Ice bags,

Note: The 1st S&T Battalion purchases no supplies on the local economy.

2. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES:

a. General:

(1) Assistance has been given to supporting units on Prescribed Load List procedures. Classes have been given by the Material Section 701st Maintenance Battalion upon request from supporting units. Actual checks of PLL's were made at unit supply rooms and motor pools.

(2) The importance of establishing and maintaining a PLL on all equipment in a unit was stressed to all concerned. Detailed instructions were given to personnel physically working with PLL. Correct reference covering PLL procedures was given to units. Section VI AR 735-35 and further defined in "The primer on PLL", printed and published by this battalion. It has been learned by these contacts that only recently the units are becoming aware of the importance of a properly kept PLL. Prior records indicate lack of command emphasis on this subject. Units and personnel contacted show good interest in bridging their PLL up to prescribed standards. It was further learned that personnel actually maintaining the PLL's will and want to do it correctly when given proper instructions and guidance.
Inclosure 8 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Oct 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont.)

b. Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft maintenance in the 1st Infantry Division during the month of October continued at a herculean pitch. This was necessary to keep up with the expanded number of flying hours used in support of ground operations. Aviation maintenance personnel met with the usual problems of parts supply and personnel shortages. It is reflected here, however, that although the number of hours flown by 1st Infantry Division aircraft has increased each month, the number of hours that aircraft were not flyable for supply shortages has steadily decreased the past year. Personnel shortages in the aviation maintenance field still exist; AG personnel are aware of the problem. Available manpower is being utilized to the maximum extent.

(2) The only significant problem that has occurred during this quarter is in maintenance scheduling. Several of the units have turned in over 75% of their aircraft to maintenance during a short period of time. This of course overloads the supporting organizational and field maintenance units. It also increases maintenance down time and leaves the aviation unit non-effective while their aircraft are out of action. This leads to the observation more personnel are required to maintain aircraft that are flying at an expanded amount of hours in support of ground operations. Secondly, all units concerned should program their aircraft into and out of the maintenance shops in order to keep a larger number operational.

c. Transportation:

(1) Tonnages received by the battalion by various means of transport were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class I</th>
<th>Class II and IV</th>
<th>Class III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>511.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rail</td>
<td></td>
<td>1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>1376.6</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>309.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Tonnages shipped from DI AN by various means of transport were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class I</th>
<th>Class II and IV</th>
<th>Class III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>873.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>1339.5</td>
<td>1115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>937.7</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inclusion A Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Oct 66
Supply and Coma Service Support Activities (Cont)

(3) Total tonnage handled during the quarter were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Class II and IV</th>
<th>Class III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shipped</td>
<td>7059.7</td>
<td>2860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received</td>
<td>4692.1</td>
<td>4133.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Total tonnage handled during the quarter for all classes of supplies:

Shipped: 18,640.3
Received: 11,740.8
Total: 30,381.1

(5) A total of sixteen supply trooj convoys were made during this period.

(6) During the period 1-19 October 1966, the battalion furnished twelve 2½ ton trucks in support of the 2d Brigade movement to DI AN. Six 2½ ton trucks have been supporting Operation SHENANDOAH and QUAN LOI since 15 October.

d. Medical evaluation: The following number of personnel were treated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>DISEASE</th>
<th>NON-BATTLE INJURY</th>
<th>IRHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admissions,</td>
<td>2339</td>
<td>1695</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition</td>
<td>1124</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by transfer</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNCLASSIFIED)
A statistical analysis of the 5029 battle casualties sustained as of 31 October 1966 by the 1st Infantry Division reveals the following:

- The 5029 battle casualties were comprised of:
  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq Co 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Admin Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq Co &amp; Rand Spt Cmd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st S &amp; T Bn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701st Maint Bn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Med Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Avn Bn</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st HP Co</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st M. I.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703d 4th Cav</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Engr Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde.</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 2d Inf</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266th Chem Plat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266th Chem Flt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The following is a breakout of battle casualties by hour:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUR</th>
<th>CASUALTIES</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The five most critical days for battle casualties were:
  
  1. 25 Aug 66 - 215
  2. 5 Dec 65 - 170
  3. 9 Jul 66 - 150
  4. 12 Nov 65 - 138
  5. 24 Feb 66 - 129

- The most prevalent location of wounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>1390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stomach</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>1230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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e. Source of wounds is broken out as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF CAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Mortar</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Mines</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Small Arms</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sniper</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Booby Trap</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Other</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Grade of wounds is broken out as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>% OF</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>% OF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>B-7</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>2805</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pd</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>E-3-1</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>2176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


g. The majority of the battle casualties were sustained by individuals possessing the following MOS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>% OF CAS</th>
<th>% OF CAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Infantry and Armor</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Combat Engineer</td>
<td>114%</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1252%</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>611%</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Breakout of the 5029 battle casualties by situation are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) S &amp; B</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>2977</td>
<td>3547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Defense</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Convoy</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Petrol</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Base Area</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) In Flight</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Occupy Ambush Site</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Admin Mvt</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Attack</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Other</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. The following is a breakout of non-battle casualties by month during the past six months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NBK</th>
<th>NEW</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 66</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 66</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 66</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 66</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Inlosure 9 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, (Cont'),

**j.** The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month during the past six months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 66</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 66</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 66</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 66</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 66</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**k.** The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month and by source of wound:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SMALL</th>
<th>BOOBY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 66</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 66</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 66</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 66</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**l.** The following is a breakout of battle casualties by situation and source of wound:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S &amp; D</th>
<th>MINE</th>
<th>ARMS</th>
<th>MORTAR</th>
<th>TRAP</th>
<th>SNIPR</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Area</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Flight</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Mvts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush Site</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**m.** The following is a breakout by identity of casualties for the current month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSING</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>Fk</th>
<th>AGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKB</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The following is a breakout of the 242 casualties, by months in country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>VHA</th>
<th>NBK</th>
<th>NEW</th>
<th>HTSD</th>
<th>ADC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 month</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 months</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 months</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 months</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 months</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 months</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a breakout of casualties for EM by US and RA categories:

- Total US in Division 6282
  - % of US casualties 36.9
- Total RA in Division 8714
  - % of RA casualties 63.1
The 717th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment was defeated on 30 June 1966, near the village of SHOK DOG in one of the classic engagements of the Vietnam conflict. In continuing their efforts to retake the 1st Infantry Division from the PLO PAO II area of operations, the VC attempted to ambush Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and Company C, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. As a consequence, the 717th Regiment suffered heavy losses and was soundly defeated.

**BACKGROUND (V)**

Operation ZI PAO II commenced on 2 June 1966 when intelligence indicated that three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese regiments were poised to resume their "Monsoon Campaign" by attacking SVN and U.S. Special Forces compounds in DTUN THU, HON QUN, LOC MINH, and AUNG BE. Because of this threat, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, directed one infantry and one artillery battalion be deployed to LOC MINH to strengthen the defenses in this area. Subsequently, additional elements were deployed by 3d and 1st Div until by mid-June the majority of the division was operating throughout MINH LONG and MINH LONG Province. 1st Infantry Division troop dispositions as of 30 June 1966 are indicated on attached map 1. Two significant engagements had been fought with the VC prior to 30 June. On 6 June, Troop A (-), 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry had spoiled an ambush on Route 13, set by the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through TAUO, an area between TCHOMI and HON QUN. When the 4-hour engagement ended, the VC had lost 105 KIA (VC) with an additional 250 probably killed. The second significant engagement involved elements of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and CI Forces in the Battle of LOC MINH II on 11 June 1966. One battalion of the 273d Main Force Regiment was replaced in trenches and heavily fortified bunkers, but after massive artillery and mortar fire and air strikes, the positions were overrun. VC losses were 98 KIA (VC) and 140 KIA (Probable).

For about two weeks the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) had the mission of securing the division base at TCHOMI and the HON QUN airfield. On 8 June, the cavalry squadron had spotted an ambush on Route 13, set by the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through TAUO, an area between TCHOMI and HON QUN. When the 4-hour engagement ended, the VC had lost 105 KIA (VC) with an additional 250 probably killed. The second significant engagement involved elements of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and CI Forces in the Battle of LOC MINH II, on 11 June 1966. One battalion of the 273d Main Force Regiment was replaced in trenches and heavily fortified bunkers, but after massive artillery and mortar fire and air strikes, the positions were overrun. VC losses were 98 KIA (VC) and 140 KIA (Probable).

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Troop B would have one platoon of C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attached, while the remainder of C Company would move with C Troop. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry maintained one company on alert as the rapid reaction force. With final planning completed, the operation would begin on 30 June.

The vegetation in the area of the contact is wooded on both sides of the road. The open areas are rice paddies, some stream lines, and small lakes. Even here, there is adequate concealment due to the short-high grass. There are heavily forested areas as indicated on map 3 and the sketch maps, with the trees 150 - 200 feet high. Although movement in the grass is difficult to observe from the ground it can be observed from the air except where the terrain is heavily forested. The chest-high grass comes up to the shoulders of the road. The weather at the time of contact was clear and hot.

**THE BATTLE OF SROK DOM (U)**

On 30 June, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with attached 1st Platoon, C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and AVLB section departed the squadron perimeter at HON QUAN enroute to Check point GOLDEN RATS. The column was located at the bridge site by 0859 hours. Troop C was to depart HON QUAN at 0730 with C Company (-). However, this column was delayed until Troop C could reorganize after the search operation conducted until 2400 hours the previous night. At 0910, the column crossed GOLDEN RATS with B Troop leading and proceeded north on Route 13 to the operational areas specified in the order. Upon arrival at Check Point 1, the 3d Platoon with the 3d Platoon of infantry turned east and conducted a reconnaissance to the ford at Check Point 2. Due to the depth of the ford, the platoon retraced the route to Check Point 1, turned north on Route 13, passed through the 1st Platoon, and continued north. Order of march was now 3d Platoon with attached infantry, Troop Command Group, 2d Platoon, and 1st Platoon.

Troop C turned west at Check Point 1 and proceeded to the first stream. Three mortar carriers, ten infantrymen, and the 3d Platoon remained at Check Point 1 and established a perimeter. The mortars were laid west to support the troop. As C Troop moved west, they flanked the road on both sides. After crossing the stream, the infantry dismounted and deployed.

At about 0930 hours when the lead personnel carrier of B Troop, moving north on Route 13 toward LOC MINII, reached a point about midway across the rice paddy (sketch map 1), it began receiving mortar, small arms and recoilless rifle fire and appeared to be the only one engaged. 1st Lieutenant James P. Flores, B Troop Commander, could see the mortar rounds bursting from his position in the column about 800 meters to the rear of the lead vehicle. He immediately called Col Lowane, who was over the area in an OH-13 helicopter. The 3d Platoon then reported receiving heavy fire from the north and northwest. A unplanned airstrike was currently in progress vicinity XT 7499, which Col Lowane diverted to UX 721015 at Lt Flores’ request. Lt Flores then called the 2d Platoon forward and deployed them around the 3d Platoon. The 2d Platoon brought their two tanks and one from the 1st Platoon forward. By this time all but one tank and a personnel carrier of the 3d Platoon had returned to Check Point 1 with wounded and to replenish ammunition. All platoons were now in contact on both sides of the road, with the heaviest volume of fire coming from the west.
The Viet Cong had set up the ambush in the shape of an "I," with a heavy security element crossing the road along the trail north of the paddy. The logs piled at random to the east of Check Point 3 afforded good protection and some of the recoiless rifles were probably located here. Mortars were reported by a forward air controller in the woods to the north of the village. The ambush extended for about 2000 meters, but with the exception of a security element to the northeast of Check Point 1, the eastern side of the road was lightly defended. The VC appeared to be lined up all along the west side of the road with the heavy weapons about 150 meters from the road in the heaviest vegetation. The VC were wearing a variety of khaki, black, and green uniforms. One strong point had been established by the VC in vicinity XU 722007. The recoiless rifles caused the most trouble, and were also the most difficult to locate. During the first 30 minutes of the contact, the enemy concentrated on knocking out the tanks. All four B Troop tanks were disabled from hits on the tank commander's cupola and subsequent wounding of the crew.

The 1st Platoon of B Troop was carrying the wounded to GOLDEN GATE with an intermediate aid station set up at Check Point 1. They also helped with the establishment of a strong point at Check Point 1. Because the incoming fire at Check Point 1 was so intense, Dust Off aircraft could not land so the squadron set up the Dust Off X at GOLDEN GATE and wounded were collected at Check Point 1 and then moved south.

Troop D concentrated on laying down a heavy base of fire to the west. Airstrikes which had been continuous from the initial strike, were being placed to the north and west. Artillery was attacking targets on the east of Route 15 and armed UH-1B's and CH-47's were making firing passes north and south on the area immediately adjacent to the road. When the 1st Platoon reported receiving fire at Check Point 1, it appeared to Lt Flores that the VC were attempting to cut him off from Check Point 1. An airstrike was immediately called in and the fire slackened at this location. The remaining elements at the head of the column were still receiving heavy fire from all types of weapons and Lt Flores called requesting C Troop come up and help.

When the first contact was reported, Captain Stephen Slattery, C Troop Commander, ordered the infantry to mount up and prepare to move back to Check Point 1, establish a strong point, and be prepared to assist B Troop. The 3d Platoon had been receiving some light fire at Check Point 1, but when the other platoons arrived at this location, the fire became more intense. Several of the infantry riding on the personnel carriers were hit as mortar rounds started falling into the area. Capt Slattery ordered the platoons to deploy and push out the perimeter, primarily to the north. The 3d Platoon was operating northwest of the crossroads, 1st Platoon east, and 2d Platoon west and southwest. The mortars had been re-laid to fire to the north. Check Point 1 was becoming very jammed with C Troop maneuvering and vehicles returning with B Troop wounded. Check Point 1 continued to receive heavy small arms fire with most of it coming from west of the road. Mortar and recoiless fire was being answered with a heavy volume of 50 caliber fire from the personnel carriers at the road junction. Col Lowane called and ordered C Troop to push north and relieve the pressure on B Troop. The 3d Platoon was finally able to start moving north with the tank from 2d Platoon. About 200 meters from Check Point 1, the tank was hit in the turret and the commander, Sergeant Allison, and the loader were seriously wounded. They were pulled from the tank and evacuated. The tank continued north.
C Troop column consisted of the 2d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and Troop Command Group (sketch map 2). The 3d Platoon, C Company (+), and mortars remained at the crossroads. Intense fire was received all the way to B Troop's position, but a heavy base of fire was maintained by the personnel carriers and the tank. The brush was so thick and close on both sides of the road, grenades were just tossed over the sides of the vehicles. About 500 meters over the first hit, the tank was hit again, but the driver kept going even though the cutter, Sergeant Riddle was wounded and evacuated. When the Troop C column arrived at the tail of the B Troop position, Lt Flores said to go farther north and fire to the west. The 1st and 2d Platoons moved up and deployed as best as they could since they were confined to the area immediately left and right of the road. Fire was directed east and west with the heaviest volume to the west. Coi Lemon ordered C Troop to hold at this point until B Troop could be extracted and move south. The C Troop tank went almost to the 01 grid line before it turned around and came back. Three men from the 2d Platoon joined Sergeant Wilson in the tank and although power to the turret was gone, they succeeded in getting the gun bearing to the north and northwest. Sixty rounds were fired before the ammunition was exhausted. The tank was then moved along side a disabled B Troop tank and the ammunition transferred. VC could be seen jumping around but didn't appear to be withdrawing. Artillery was firing north and east and airstrikes were being concentrated on the west, but appeared to be too far west. Captain Slattery asked Col Lemon to move them in closer and the next strike came in south to north with CBU which landed very close to the road.

With the arrival of C Troop, Lt Flores pulled all the remaining elements of B Troop back to Check Point 1, to regroup, rearm, and establish a block along the road west from Check Point 1. When the first lift of B Company, 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was received, Lt Flores pulled back. Troop B remained at Check Point 1 for about 40 minutes to rearm and get the wounded and dead back to Check Point 1. The next 30 minutes were taken to move the 1st and 2d Platoons down the road to block. The 3d Platoon handled the evacuation of wounded (sketch map 3).

Lieutenant Charles D Cole with the 3d Platoon of C Troop had been handling casualties between the forward elements and GOLDEN GATE. He loaded C Company on the personnel carriers and moved to the head of the column. After the infantry were dropped, the 3d Platoon deployed west of the road while the 2d Platoon moved off to the east in an attempt to push the VC out onto the LZ (sketch map 4). Lt Cole's platoon hit a VC strong point. He was hit in the chest and several others were wounded before they could pull back. The mechanized flame thrower with Lieutenant John L Lyon's 1st Platoon assisted in the extraction of 3d Platoon. As the infantry began to land on LZ 2 and C Company began to deploy, the fire was chased. Fire from the personnel carriers was directed more to the west. The VC started withdrawing and many were killed as they jumped to run through the high grass.

After a delay of about 30 minutes caused by enemy fire received from both sides of the road, B Troop was occupying their blocking position. Initially, the he of the column halted just west of the stream until information was received that a reinforced platoon of B Troop would assist. The block was then extended to about the 70 N-S grid line. From the blocking position, VC could be seen withdrawing along the trail that parallels the road and were taken under fire.
Troop C established a perimeter along Route 15 until the infantry started making the sweep. By 1530 contact along the road had practically ceased and the personnel moved into the brush to search for dead and wounded VC and weapons. The 3d Platoon, B Troop returned to the blocking position with the Aero Rifle Platoon of D Troop. By 1700 movement had ceased and the two troops remained in position the remainder of the day.

REACTION (V)

For a week prior to 30 June 1966, B Company 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been maintained on a 30 minute alert as a rapid reaction force and was in this posture at the time B Troop made contact. Then it became obvious that both troops and the attached rifle company were heavily engaged, B Company was alerted for probable deployment. Two questions had to be answered first; how they would be employed and by what means of transportation. All helicopters were fully committed on other missions. Twelve 3/4 ton trucks were collected from the various units in the vicinity of the battalion command post at QUAN LOI, and B Company was prepared to move prior to their arrival.

At 1026 hours the helicopters supporting the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry in the SONG B"3 area were diverted to QUAN LOI, but by 1040 hours had not arrived. Company B departed by vehicle for the squadron command post at HON QUAN, and at 1105 passed to control of Col Lowane.

Between 1015 and 1020 hours, A Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was alerted, pulled off the perimeter, and instructed to be on the airfield in the event helicopters became available. Company A was assembled on the airfield by 1100 hours. General DePuy called Col McChrystal to the division command post about 1040 hours to be briefed on what had happened in his battalion. General DePuy made the decision to divert 12 helicopters from SONG B"3. All helicopters closed the QUAN LOI airfield at 1130 hours. Col Lowane was informed of the current status of Companies A and B and asked where and how he wished to deploy them. A command and control helicopter arrived for Col McChrystal and he and the battalion S-3 went forward for a recon...
before it was consumed by fire. Col McChryystal landed with H Company, and assumed command of Companies A and B. Col Lawrance was informed of this and that the battalion (-) was attacking in the direction he had specified.

As the companies started pushing south, B was west of Route 13 and A to their right (sketch map 5). Company A met resistance about 200 meters south of the LZ while B Company was mopping up the remaining elements of the enemy just to the west of Route 13. About 300 meters south of the LZ, B Company uncovered C Troop and C Company (-). At this time, Col McChryystal assumed command of these elements. Company C was ordered to reorganize and search the immediate area, while C Troop was to reorganize, recover disabled tanks and personnel carriers, and support from Route 13 as Company B continued sweeping south and A Company southwest. Company B ceased to meet resistance by the time they had progressed about 600 meters from the LZ. However, A Company met stiff resistance along the creek, vicinity CU 715005 (sketch map 6). The Viet Cong had established a strong combat outpost line east and west of the creek. Company A sustained a few wounded. Since no headway was being made, C Company was committed on the right flank of A Company. The link-up was made by 1315 and the strength of the two companies forced the VC out of their positions. Dust Off was completed and the sweep continued south to the blocking positions held by C Troop and the ARVN forces.

At 1500, Col Berry, 1st Brigade Commander, landed and directed the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry to assemble at LZ 2 and become the brigade reserve. The units returned to an assembly area just south of the LZ in the order B, A, and C Company, where the battalion remained overnight. The reconnaissance platoon, and mortar platoon of the battalion were flown in at 1700. Three ambush sites were established on the south, southwest, and the west, but no enemy activity was experienced during the night.

During the time the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was preparing for deployment, the 1st Brigade Commander was alerted at 1005 to move one infantry battalion and the brigade TAG forward to QUAN LOI. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced the move at 1234 hours using C-123 and CV-2 aircraft. The brigade closed the airfield at QUAN LOI at 1300. At 1630, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced an airmobile assault into LZ MRA, (map 2) and by about 1715 had closed into the area and began sweeping eastward.

Shortly after the contact was reported, the MNHQ I N PROV province chief offered units immediately available to him for support of the 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Troop, 1st Cavalry, ARVN, with 20 APCs reinforced with the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, ARVN, were attached to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. At 1100 hours the U.S. Advisor reported to the 1st Infantry Division C3 for a mission. He was directed to immediately proceed north on Route 13 to link up with VC elements at Check Point 1. This was accomplished and the blocking position established at approximately 1500 hours (sketch map 5). The 9th Regiment had one other company immediately available for operations which moved to secure the bridge at Check Point 0600 30 GATE. The Regional Force companies were securing the road between the bridge and HOB. One company of the 9th Regiment was called back from an operation south of QUAN LOI as a possible escort for the move of an artillery battery north on Route 13.

At about 1100 hours, two CIDG companies were sent from LOC MNHQ and assumed blocking positions north of the battle area.
The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was ordered at 1020 hours to move from SONG B. to QUAN LOI. The battalion closed at 1120 to LOI at 1450 and A Battery, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery moved by CH-47 from SONG B. to LOI at 1545. This battery was moved to LZ BLVS (map 2) at 1155 hours, 1 July.

At 1420 hours, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to terminate its operation, return to LAI KHE and prepare for movement on order. At 1430 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to move one company from the 2d Brigade Base Camp to PHUOC VINH and the battalion (-) to LAI KHE. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry closed into LAI KHE at 1715 and the last of C Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was on the way to PHUOC VINH in fixed wing aircraft by 1815.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced moving from LAI JIG at 1600 hours utilizing C-123 and OV-2 aircraft. All elements of this battalion had closed into QUAN LOI at 1710.

On 1 July, follow up action continued against remnants of the 271st VC Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry secured LZ BLUS as Battery A, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery was lifted by CH-47 to support future operations. Company C remained to secure the LZ while the remainder of the battalion moved to seize the bridge at XT 69999; link up with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-); and with B Troop proceeded to Objective 1 (XU 696027). Troop C joined Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry at LZ BLUS.

The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GREN (XT 616995) at 1000 hours. The battalion moved to secure Objective G SMALL (XT 623995); left one company in blocking positions; and proceeded to vicinity of XU 721021 to conduct a search of the battle area of the previous day. Light contact was made with small groups of VC.

The 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry continued to search the battle area and uncovered numerous shallow graves and additional VC bodies. At 1600 hours, the battalion conducted an airmobile assault on LZ PINK (XU 592023) and occupied positions for the night as shown on Overlay 1. Company B made contact with the VC and Company C and Recon Platoon were sent to reinforce. Mortar and small arms fire was received until contact was broken at 2030 hours. At 0545 hours 2 July, the overnight positions of A Company, C Company, and Recon Platoon, were under fire by VC automatic weapons and mortars. The VC then launched a series of five assaults from all directions, but the attack was countered by fire support from artillery, gun ships, and fighter bombers. A total of 69 sorties were flown by USAF fighter bombers and included close air support by three flights using SKY SPOT (radar bombing) techniques. Company B was moved at 0730 hours to reinforce Companies A and C and contact was broken at 0900 hours. A body count of VC dead revealed that the attacking 3d Battalion, 273d VC Main Force Regiment suffered the loss of 78 killed.

At 0710 hours, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry moved from overnight positions to support the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry. Link-up was made at 0930 hours and both battalions searched the area around the defensive perimeter. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry then continued north toward LZ BOSB (XU 5904) but made no contact.
The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus C Company at the artillery base, assembled on Route 13 and was helilifted into LZ 14B (U 657050), closing at 1330 hours. This LZ and adjacent LZ LUMPS (U 657037) were secured by Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and attached ARVN ATC troop and rifle company.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was helilifted into LZ PTKK and relieved the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry which returned to control of 1st Infantry Division at 1530. During the night the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry came under mortar attack which appeared to have been a cover for the withdrawal of the VC to the southwest and northwest. A sweep of the area was made with only minor contact.

**FIRE SUPPORT**

At the time B Troop made contact, a preplanned air strike was in progress vicinity XT 7499. The aircraft had commenced dropping CBU at the time Col Lewane notified the forward air controller (FAC) that the armored column was in contact. The pilot pulled out of his southeast to northwest direction of flight and brought his aircraft down the west side of Route 13, expending the remainder of his CBU, Napalm, and 20mm. A large group of VC were seen running east along the trail north of the rice paddy. The next flight concentrated on the low at Check Point 3 and the trail. A second FAC arrived about 1030 and started working along the trail. Col Lewane requested the area along Route 13 about 300 meters from the road be hit, however, the troop commanders requested it be moved closer to the road. During the dash of Lt Cole's 3d Platoon forward with the infantry, a napalm strike was placed along side the west of the road consisting his movement. Col Lewane called for a preparation on LZ 2, but delayed the actual landing when he was notified that aircraft were on station with CBU. This strike was placed from the 00 grid line to the LZ. After the LZ preparation, air strikes were directed to the west to cover trails on which VC were withdrawing in groups of from 5 to 15. Napalm strikes were placed ahead of the advancing 2d Battalion, 13th Infantry.

From the initial preplanned strike, air support was continuous and unlimited. A total of 96 sorties were flown as follows:

- A4 = 24
- F100 = 40
- A1 = 10 (VHAP)
- P5 = 6
- P4 = 8

Ordinance expended included:

- High Explosive = 41.3 tons
- Napalm = 48 tons
- CBU = 11.5 tons
- Rockets = 160

There was a minimum of one PAC on station at all times. These PACs were in constant communication with either the squadron commander, S-3, or troop commanders.

Artillery direct support was provided by Battery B (155mm) and Battery D (8") 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery located at HON (UAN (XT 76291)). Battery B fired 248 rounds and Battery D fired 277 from the time contact was made until about 1900 hours.
Defensive concentrations had been plotted along the route which facilitated ground observers with the column to call for fire. However, most of the missions were adjusted by air observers. Within minutes after contact began, an air observer was over the battle area. Fire was most intense from the northeast and northwest and artillery was fired on the trail north of the rice paddy. These fires were shifted to the wooded area north of SHOK DONG. Col Lewane then directed that C4I would fire to the east of Route 13. This was continued until such time as he directed that artillery be placed as a block along the streamline to the west. Artillery was also used in the preparation of LZ 2 and shifted prior to the landing to the woods on the north. Artillery continued to block along the streamline to the west after the infantry deployed. Groups of VC were seen to walk into the fire, lying down or getting in holes between volleys. By 1700, resistance had ended, but air and artillery continued to interdict likely assembly areas and routes of withdrawal. Interdiction continued throughout the night.

In addition to air and artillery, helicopter gunships supported the engaged units. At 0945 hours an armed CH-47, GO-60 154, received an ambush reaction mission in support of the armored column. Contact was made with Col Lewane at 1000 hours. The pilot was briefed on the situation and made an immediate attack on the enemy forces 100 meters west of Route 13. The first attack was made at 1008 hours using 20mm and 50 caliber guns and 40mm grenades. After the first pass, Col Lewane requested that fire be moved to within 25 to 50 meters from the road and the second attack was made using the same weapons. A third pass was made using M-18 (7.62 Miniguns) and 50 caliber side and rear guns. The Miniguns appeared to have little suppressive affect and the aircraft received several hits. Transmission warning lights, oil pressure, and temperature gauges indicated heavy damage and an immediate landing was made in the rice paddy east of Route 13. A check indicated the aircraft was safe to fly and the aircraft returned to QUAN 100 to ascertain the extent of damage. At 1130 hours, UH-1G was contacted for a replacement aircraft which arrived at 1200 and continued attacks on enemy troops, evacuation routes, assembly areas, and close support of elements occupying blocking positions.

Operations with armed Chinooks ended at 2015 hours. Numerous sorties were flown by armed UH-1B's both as cover for the armed Chinooks and against targets selected by Col Lewane.

RESULTS (U)

Enemy losses included:

- 770 KIA (Body Count)
- 200 KIA (Cable)
- 7 WIA
- 40 Small Arms
- 23 Crew Served Weapons
- 1633 Rounds of Ammunition

Friendly losses are as follows:

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry

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<th>Troop</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
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<td>Hq</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1 (1 WIA)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1 (2 WIA)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
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2d Battalion, 10th Infantry

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Company</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Company</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Company</td>
<td>5 (1 D0)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
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Seven armored personnel carriers and four tanks were destroyed. One personnel carrier and one UH-1D were destroyed.

CONCLUSION (U)

As the reaction forces continued to search the battle area, conclusive evidence was found that the 271st Regiment had been decisively defeated and again failed in its assigned mission to destroy U.S. armored forces along Route 13. The rout of 271st Regiment can be attributed to several significant factors:

From the first indication of contact until the VC withdrew in defeat, Lt Col Lewane was in complete command of the situation. At the time of contact, the squadron was under OPCON 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry. Because he had complete control of the situation, subordinate elements of the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry were placed under his control when committed to the battle. Except for short periods of time when he returned to refuel, he was over the battle area. During his absence, he had his S-3 replace him to control the action and coordinate the fire support. Col Lewane was in constant communication with his troop commanders, artillery observers, forward air controllers, and gunships. He coordinated all the fires to insure that the maximum amount of uninterrupted firepower could be brought to bear on the enemy forces.

Lt Col McChystal’s plans for deployment of the rapid reaction force saved many valuable minutes, preventing a larger number of VC from withdrawing.

The decision of General DePuy to divert helicopters for the lift of 120th Infantry, coupled with the movement of B Company by vehicle to the pickup zone cut to a minimum, the time between landing of the two companies.

Preplanned airstrikes were available for diversion to the area of contact and subsequent close air support was continuous. There was unlimited support with varying quantities and types of ordnance.

Medium and heavy caliber artillery was available within range of the battle area. It rapidly responded to requests for fire by Col Lewane.

Troop C was not initially engaged and was available for immediate reinforcement on Col Lewane’s order.

The tremendous base of fire laid down by the tanks and personnel carriers, coupled with the tenacity with which personnel fought and the outstanding leadership given the men, were instrumental in overcoming the numerically superior VC force. As squad and platoon leaders were wounded or killed, assistants immediately assumed command so that at no time were the troops lacking direction.
The time contact was made is particularly significant. The battle started at 0958 leaving ten hours of daylight for the battle to develop, a reaction force to be committed, and a search of the battle area to be conducted after contact was broken. This denied the enemy the capability to police the area.

Weather conditions did not limit the ability of the forward air controllers or artillery observers to place effective fire on the enemy.

Incl -- MAP 1 - 1st Inf Div Troop Dispositions
MAP 2 - Area of Operation 1:50,000
MAP 3 - PICTOMAP Area of Operation 1:25,000
Sketch Maps 1 - 6
Overlay - Battle of HO KRIGNOU
RESUME OF BATTLE OF LOC NINH RUBBER PLANTATION

The Battle of the LOC NINH Rubber Plantation was conducted under the canopy of the gently rolling LOC NINH Rubber Plantation two kilometers west and northwest of LOC NINH, coord XU 737097. Vegetation under the 60 foot rubber trees was negligible. Weather for the operation was fair with the exception of heavy ground fog in the early morning. The fog delayed the heliborne portion of the operation from 0620H until 0815H when the fog dissipated sufficiently to allow the HU-1D helicopters to make their lift of one CIDG platoon and one platoon from A Company into the LZ via coord XU 702112. Touchdown was 110835H Jun 66 following a five minute gunship preparation in the area.

The ground blocking elements, two platoons from A Company, 2/23th Inf departed the LOC NINH area at 0715H along Route RED and Route BLUE, respectively. At 0735H these elements reported receiving SA fire from approximately one platoon of VC via coord XU 715093. A Company's 81mm mortars were fired into the area with unknown results. In the same vic, at 081OH, the blocking elements had three wounded by SA fire from the VC positions at the top of Hill 150. The 81mm mortars from A Company were again called on the hilltop. Following the mortar barrage the two blocking platoons moved into positions to the south and east of the VC locations on Hill 150, vic coord XU 715095.

The heliborne elements after their initial landing, headed south toward their original objective of the Village Nr. 10 complex, centered at XU 710100. At 0849H the blocking elements reported receiving MG fire from a bunker at vic coord XU 717095. Upon receiving this information the CIDG/A Company elements altered their mission and moved south to assist against what was now estimated to be at least one VC platoon entrenched on top of Hill 150. A Company's platoon moved to the north of the VC positions, using the two blocking forces on the east and south, thus forming a U-shaped ring open to the W.

The CIDG platoon attempted to penetrate the VC positions from the W1, but were repulsed by heavy SA and AK fire coming from the well entrenched enemy. The CIDG elements then displaced, tying in with A Company's blocking elements on the south. 81mm mortars were immediately called in to the north, sealing off any VC route of withdrawal.

Due to the intensity of the fighting C Company was alerted at 0910H to be prepared to move on foot to assist A Company. At 0949H C Company was ordered to move in support of the elements around Hill 150. By 1030H A and C Companies had linked up, C Company moving around toward coord XU 713098. As C Company moved to effect tie in, A Company indicated that VC were moving to the NE toward Hill 177, vic coord XU 721111. C Company was then ordered by the battalion commander to move north to intercept and attack the VC in that vicinity.

Upon approaching coord XU 720104, C Company ran into intense ground fire from at least one VC company firmly entrenched in bunkers with overhead cover off the vic of Hill 177. Artillery and 4.2" mortar fire was called on the VC positions and to the north to prevent the VC from escaping. At 1200H C Company requested ammunition resupply and further assistance to maneuver against the enemy force. In less than 15 minutes two helicopter loads of ammunition were airdropped on C Company's front lines. The Recon Platoon was immediately dispatched on foot from LOC NINH with still additional ammunition and a mission of aiding the C Company attacking elements south of Hill 177.

ANNEX B Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation Narrative
ANNEX B Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation Narrative (Cont')

The Recon element moved to A Company’s CP location, vic coord XU 720092 and then proceeded north to assist C Company, killing three VC snipers along the way. At 1330H Recon and C Company linked up with Recon being placed on C Company left flank vic coord XU 717104. In preparation for an assault, more artillery was fired on the VC positions around Hill 177. The attack commenced at 1425H with C Company on line east to west where the Recon Platoon pitching in on VC trench line from the west along a ridgeline running north vic coord XU 715113.

At this point the VC concentrated their fire on Recon and C Company platoon on the left, hurling grenades and firing SA from the trees. Simultaneously, the VC began hitting the Recon Platoon’s left flank with intensified SA and AT fire. The Recon in turn attempted to fall back to prevent the VC enveloping movement. While in the process of accomplishing this maneuver, the VC moved a machinegun into a trench occupied by the remaining Recon elements, resulting in the VC overrunning the positions. C Company immediately countered with its reserve platoon, eliminating the VC resistance, pushing the enemy off Hill 177 into the artillery volleys to the north and northwest, terminating this portion of the battle at around 111615H Jun 66.

Meanwhile, in the A Company area to the south, consecutive assaults from the north, south, and west failed to dislodge the VC from their entrenched positions. A CIDG company moving west on patrol was diverted into a blocking position vic coord XU 700090. A Company’s 81mm mortars continued to pound the VC positions, but to no apparent avail. The battalion commander then decided to commit his final reserve, B Company, at 1430H, at the same time moving the CIDG company east to XU 713090 into a more advantageous blocking and maneuvering location.

When B Company linked up with A Company at 1500H the A Company elements were repositioned to allow the artillery to fire a preparation all along Hill 150 prior to an assault by B Company. In the meantime the CIDG platoon attached to A Company and positioned vic coord XU 714093 retreated to the south after their interpreter had been killed by the VC, thus creating a gap in the A Company lines on the south. The SF Advisor then joined A Company until the battle ended.

Following a sixteen volley artillery bombardment B Company assaulted Hill 150 at 1630H, completely overrunning the VC positions. The VC fled to the south and ran into a heavy volume of fire from the CIDG blocking force, causing the VC to scatter SW in complete disorganization.

After the final assault, consolidations were made in the battalion zone of action. Casualties were then evacuated, ammunition resupply was effected, and the battlefield was policed of VC bodies and equipment with a thorough search of the entire area. The battalion then moved on foot back to base camp location around the LOC NINH airstrip, final elements closing at 112100H Jun 66.

1. Casualty Figures:
   US       VC
   KIA - 33  KIA - 98 (VC)
   WIA - 33  WIA - 1 (Captured)
ANNEX B Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation Narrative (Con't)

The enemy force was estimated to be from two to three main force VC companies. Because of the nature of resistance this estimation was never apparent until approximately 1200H.

2. Enemy Equipment Captured:
   a. 60mm mortar ——— 1 each complete with ammunition.
   b. SKS Russian Carbine — 1 each.
   c. Panzerfaust ——— 1 each with ammunition.
   d. MG-42 machinegun —— 1 each.
   e. VC webgear.
   f. VC medical supply.
   g. Numerous grenades, mines and small arms ammunition.

3. Ammunition Expended:
   a. 81mm mortars — 400 HE, 14 Ill.
   b. 4.2" mortars — 95 HE, 5 WP.
   c. 105mm Arty —— 1143 HE.
   d. Small arms —— two basic loads.

4. Air Sorties Flown: Air was used to block VC route of escape to the west side of the battle area. Sixteen sorties were flown by F-100's, F-4C's, and Navy A1H aircraft. Ordnance expended as follows: CBU, Napalm, 250 pound fragmentation bombs, 20mm cannon.
ANNEX B Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation Narrative (Con't)

2nd Bn, 28th Inf, 1st Inf Div
Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (XU 7308)
101600H Jun 66
KM

FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

REFERENCE: MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM: 1:50,000 LOC NINH 6346 IV; LOC THIEN 6346 III.

1. MISSION: A Co w/1 platoon CIDG conducts search of Village Nr. 10, Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation, vic coord XU 7209, to clear area of local VC.

2. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of operation: A Co (-) w/CIDG platoon attached, at 110600H commences move by foot and HU1D helicopter to surround Village Nr. 10 and clear it of VC and VC sympathizers.

b. A Co: At 0600H two platoons follow Route Red and Route Blue to blocking positions east and south of Village Nr. 10. At 0630H one platoon from A Co w/one platoon of CIDG helilifted to LZ XU 701112, move south, conduct search and clear of VC in Village Nr. 10.

c. B Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 20 min. alert.

d. C Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 5 min. alert.

e. Heavy Mortar: GS, priority to A Co.

f. Recon: Reinforce on call.

g. AT: Demo support on call.

h. Coord. Instructions:

(1) A Co send one man to maintain constant coordination with CIDG.

(2) Overhead prep of LZ five minutes prior to landing.

(3) VC and VCS evacuated to Loc Minh on foot.

(4) Evacuate casualties to rear on foot if possible. Dustoff on call. Dustoff freq: 45.7

(5) FAC freq: 43.6
ANNEX B Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation Narrative (Con't)

ACKNOWLEDGE:

BOWIE
Lt Col

ANNEX: A

DISTRIBUTION: B

OFFICIAL:

/s/Fish

for /t/RABDAU
S3

Regraded to FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
upon execution. DECLASSIFIED
upon Completion.
ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY) to FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

GUNSHIP FREE FIRE AREA

LZ S

ARTY CONCENTRATIONS

ANTITANK CONCENTRATIONS

ARTY FREE FIRE AREA

BLUE

RED

CP #3

CP #2

CP #1

CP #4

68

15

OFFICIAL:
/s/Fish
Lt Col
RESUME OVERLAY to FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

NOT EXACT SCALE: APPROX 1:20,000 LOC NIH--XU7308

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for/L/BAESAU
S3
ANNEX C Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of MINH THANH Road Narrative

THE BATTLE OF MINH THANH ROAD

The 272d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment is considered the elite regiment of the 9th VC Division. However, during the Battle of MINH THANH Road on 9 July 1966, this regiment suffered its second defeat by the 1st Infantry Division and supporting forces. On 8 June 1966, two battalions of the 272d Regiment had attacked an armored cavalry column and were severely decimated during the three and a half hour attack. The Battle of MINH THANH Road is another example of the departure from conventional tactics the 1st Infantry Division has experienced during its first year in the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Battle of MINH THANH Road was one of five major actions in which Viet Cong Main Force Regiments were engaged and defeated by men of the Big Red One during Operation EL PASO, June - July 1966. The battle is classic in two respects. First was the planning and execution. Second, this was not an instance of where the VC alone planned the attack and launched it at a time and place of their choosing, withdrawing before adequate resources were deployed in reaction.

Based on the previous successes of ROADRUNNER operations conducted by armored cavalry forces, the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, gave the 1st Brigade Commander the mission of developing a plan to lure the Viet Cong into attacking US forces. Colonel Sidney B Berry Jr. received the mission, gave his staff the concept of operation, and issued the order for Operation OLYMPIA/EL PASO (OPCRD 23-66), 8 July. The 1st Brigade mission was: "to position forces and conduct reconnaissance in force to lure VC forces to ambush/attack the column, enabling the 1st Brigade to destroy VC forces by offensive action." Operation OLYMPIA was a multi-phase plan in concept, easily modified to insure response to attacks on either the MINH THANH Road or National Route 13 south of AN LOC. In response to additional guidance from General DePuy, the 1st Brigade included a feint against SROC CON TRANG. On 8 July, a simulated airmobile assault would be conducted into an LZ vicinity SROC CON TRANG following air and artillery preparations causing the VC to be drawn into the killing zone of a B-52 strike. Subsequent to receipt of the mission, extensive planning, reconnaissance and wargaming was conducted. All commanders participated in the plan and knew exactly what the philosophy was and what the other commanders felt. This facilitated the carrying out of modifications with a minimum of radio transmissions once contact was made. On 9 July, Phase II of the concept of operations would commence with Task Force DRAGOON, consisting of Troops B and C 1/4 Cavalry and B Company 1/2 Infantry, conducting a reconnaissance in force along Route KNIFE (map 1) to MINH THANH. TF DRAGOON would receive engineer equipment at MINH THANH and return to AN LOC. In the event TF DRAGOON was ambushed or attacked enroute, forces previously positioned would respond immediately as the situation developed. Commitment of initial battalions would be against the VC flanks. Remaining battalions would be committed to the immediate battle area or to blocking positions. Landing zones and tentative blocking positions along likely VC routes of withdrawal were selected (map 1) to be occupied on order. To further insure the VC were lured into contact, the movement of bulldozers and resupply trucks from MINH THANH to AN LOC escorted with a small amount of armored cavalry was leaked. Information was also leaked that a convoy would be moving down Route 13 in the near future in hopes that should the VC not be lured into attacking the MINH THANH convoy, they would attack the one on Route 13. The latter convoy would be covered by Artillery Base II. The attack on the MINH THANH Road was preferred.
because of landing zones. The plan was wargamed from the VC standpoint and although five possible sites were selected for the attack, the final position selected was the same location the actual attack took place. The intelligence estimate indicated a minimum of one battalion and possibly a regiment could be expected to attack. Intelligence had shown the 272d Regiment to be operating in the area in regimental strength.

On 7 July, the 1st Brigade began positioning its forces and completed care and maintenance for future operations. Headquarters, B, and D Batteries, 8/6th Artillery and A Battery 1/5th Artillery moved to Artillery Base I. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced infiltration to MINH THANH, using Uh-1D and CV-2 aircraft. The move was completed on 8 July. Forces at MINH THANH then included 2/2d and 1/7th Infantry and Battery C, 2/3d Artillery. The simulated airmobile assault was conducted on 8 July by elements of 1/28th Infantry, followed by the B-52 strike at 1100 hours. Air strikes were also employed against suspected VC bases in the SROU CON TRANG area. Headquarters Battery, 1/5th Artillery and C Battery 1/7th Artillery moved to Artillery Base II. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Haldane’s 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry occupied positions around the abandoned airstrip 2500 meters east of Artillery Base I and secured the artillery with one company. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rufus G. Lassell, moved from LOC NH to QUAN LOI, 5500 meters northeast on AN LOG, and came under control of 1st Brigade. Company C, 1/2 Infantry and an ARVN APC troop provided security for Artillery Base II. The 1/18 Infantry maintained one company at position S5 and the battalion (-) at the MINH THANH airfield. The 2/2 Infantry occupied overnight positions in vicinity of S11.

The 1/18 Infantry (-) began moving to S5 at 0605 on 9 July, followed by the movement of 2/2 Infantry to S11 at 0656. Company B, 1/28 Infantry, assisting in the security of Artillery Base I, returned to control of the parent organization.

At 0700 hours 9 July, Task Force DRAGOON crossed the start point at the AN LOC airfield with C Troop, commanded by Captain Stephen Slattery, leading. Troop B, commanded by Captain David Kelly followed at 0710. The artillery began firing preparation along Route KNIFE at 0720 hours. Due to the low overcast and its interference with close air support, the column halted at 0755 in the vicinity of Check Point HANK. A 30 minute delay was anticipated, but it was 0900 before the column resumed movement. LTC Lewane, overflying the column, gave the order to move and Troop C continued to lead. The tactical formation consisted of two platoons flanking the road with a command group and a third platoon following on the roadway. However, as the column proceeded beyond the rubber plantation, the thickness of the underbrush and secondary jungle growth forced those elements on the flanks to return to the roadway. Tanks were interspersed with the platoons and a mechanized flame thrower was integrated into the tactical formation of each troop. Personnel of B Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry were integrated into the elements of the squadron (-) with the majority with C Troop, giving each personnel carrier six fighting troops. After the column had proceeded approximately 2100 meters, the terrain on the flanks of the road opened sufficiently for assumption of the flanking wedge formation. The flanking platoons employed reconnaissance by fire, but no fire was returned and no enemy activity was observed. Artillery continued to fire on pre-planned concentrations approximately 200 to 300 meters ahead of the column and about 100 meters off the road. Fire teams (armed Uh-1B’s) and an
ANNEX C Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of MINH THANH Road Narrative (Cont.)

armed CH-47 were also conducting reconnaissance by fire on both sides of
the road. The aerial scouts from D Troop flew ahead and to the flanks
of the column to detect any VC movement.

Troop C assumed a box formation approximately 200 meters before
reaching Check Point DICK with the Troop Headquarters closing the box
in the rear and maintaining contact with the trail troop. An artillery
preparation, followed by airstrikes, softened up the bridge area.
Napalm was particularly effective in burning out dense undergrowth
adjacent to the bridge. Following the airstrikes, the lead platoon,
with two engineer mine sweeper/demolition teams attached and supported by
overwatching tank fire, moved rapidly to the bridge site. Dismounted
personnel secured both sides of the bridge and after a check revealed
no demolitions were installed on the bridge, several M113s crossed to
add force to the far side. Extensive scouting, mine sweeping, and checks
found no evidence of enemy activity and the bridge was determined to be
in good enough condition to support heavy armor. After the bridge was
secured, the 1st and 2d Platoons moved rapidly across and established
blocking positions on both sides of the road. LTC Lewane called at this
time and instructed the column to speed up the operation. Because of the
combination of the time factor and the thick jungle growth adjacent to
the road, the column formation was resumed as the squadron continued
movement toward Check Point TOM.

A forward air controller (FAC), flying over Route KNIFE spotted an
estimated squad of VC at 0945 in vicinity of Check Point TOM headed
north. An airstrike was immediately called in on the enemy. However,
the column continued without incident until 1145. At a point midway
between Check Points DICK and TOM, Lieutenant Jack Lyons, 1st Platoon
leader of C Troop, reported an estimated five VC crossing the road from
north to south. A second group of about ten VC were observed crossing the
same direction and were taken under fire by the main tank gun. This was
followed by incoming small arms fire then automatic weapons fire. The
lead elements rapidly deployed and were engaged by enemy mortar and
anti-tank fire. By 1145 the entire column was receiving heavy automatic
weapons, recoilless rifle, mortars, and small arms fire (sketch map).

LTC Lewane requested a determination be made as to the direction of
the main attack and on which side of the road the major concentrations
were located. This was extremely difficult to determine because of the
tremendous volume of fire from the deployed tanks and M113s and the
confusion that existed as personnel became disoriented as the vehicles
maneuvered up and down the column. Reports were received that the VC
were attempting to cross the road ahead of the column from right to left
and that enemy fire received from the rear was coming from the left side
of the road. Based on these events, initial determination was made that
the main force was on the left (south) side of the road. Soon after
this, as accurate casualty counts and concise reports from the personnel
on the ground and aerial observers were received, it was then determined
that the main VC force was concentrated on the right side or northwest
of the contact point. Artillery fire was concentrated in this area.
The delay in making an early and accurate determination was probably
the most critical time of the battle because of its influence on springing
the reaction forces. The actual ambush site was approximately 1000 meters
long. Foxholes with overhead cover were prepared in the ditch along the
road, but did not appear to be fully occupied until shortly before the
firing started. The bulk of the forces were from 100 to 400 meters from
the road and moved up to fighting positions as the column moved into the
contact area. Drainage ditches, dug at a 45 degree angle into the contact area, were used as fire lanes by the VC although apparently were not dug for this purpose.

As soon as the attack started, the squadron assumed a compressed formation. The lead troop compressed and the trail troop closed on the lead troop and also compressed. The gunships and aerial scouts immediately moved out of the way of the airstrikes and artillery to a distance of five kilometers and began looking for withdrawal routes. The ACH-47 was hit at 1129 and forced on the road approximately 600 meters southwest of DICK. It was later extracted by a "Flying Crane". This area was also designated as the initial Dust Off pickup zone and forward logistics site.

COL Berry alerted Major John C Bard at 1105 to be prepared to move the 1/18 Infantry to position N9 and Lieutenant Colonel Jack L Conn to be prepared to move the 2/2 Infantry on order. At 1117 the 1/18 Infantry was ordered to move on the trail from position 35 as the Battlefield Assault Force and minutes later the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was alerted for possible movement to position NC or ND. The order was given at 1130 for the 1/28 Infantry to move to ND, then to the west and occupy a position southwest of NC from where it was planned to attack the enemy column to the southwest. The 2/2 Infantry was ordered to move to position SK, on foot, report their location, and prepare to attack due north. As the 1/18 Infantry started moving to N9, they found moving in the heavy jungle undergrowth very difficult. General DePuy directed division artillery to put more observers over the contact area. The 1/18 Infantry became tangled up in bunkers and foxholes and requested more close air support.

COL Berry radioed his present plans summary to the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC) at 1134: "The 1/18 Infantry is moving north parallel to the road to relieve pressure on the cavalry and to hit the VC flank. The 1/28 Infantry will land on LZ ND and move west to occupy positions southwest of ND and await orders. The 1/28 Infantry is planning to attack along the enemy column to the southwest. The 2/2 Infantry will move by foot to blocking position SK, report upon arrival and then prepare to move north to relieve the pressure on TF DRAGOON. The 1/16 Infantry has been alerted for possible movement at 1200 hours into the forward area." This plan was later modified by moving 2/2 Infantry to ND by helicopter. During the time the brigade commander was relaying his plans, the VC were hitting the column with mortars and recoilless rifle fire. Artillery was hitting the enemy force with such a heavy volume of fire, only the personnel on the ground could observe its devastating effect. Air strikes were continuous and at one time five flights of fighter bombers were stacked up waiting their turn to go in. LTC Lomax's estimate of the size of the enemy force was possibly two battalions or a regiment.

The first lift of the 1/28 Infantry was off the ground at 1210 hours and touched down on LZ ND at 1215. By 1230 the entire battalion had closed ND. The 1/28 Infantry controlled its own fires on the LZ, but came under Operational Control (OPCON) of Commanding Officer 1/4 Cavalry (-) at 1250 by direction of COL Berry. At this time B and C Troop had compressed 1400 meters southwest of DICK and casualties were being evacuated to the Dust Off area vicinity of the downed ACH-47. COL Berry gave the order at 1326 to Commanding Officer 1/16 Infantry to commence his heliborne assault on NC and be prepared to move to N5 or N6 (LZ NA was
considered but not selected because it was too obvious and would probably be ambushed. This left NC as the only usable LZ from which the infantry battalions could be moved to blocking positions on the northwest.)

The VC appeared to have broken contact about 1330 and aerial observers reported large groups of VC moving to the northwest. Troops B and C pulled back to DICK for ammunition resupply. The 1/28 Infantry was located approximately 700 meters from DICK moving southwest, parallel to the road. When the battalion reached the initial contact point it also made contact with an unknown size force. The 1/16 Infantry was given a new direction of attack; east with the right flank on the road and left flank 500 meters into the woods. By 1405, 1/16 Infantry had the fires lift enroute to NC and the 2/2 Infantry was preparing for lift to the same LZ. The 1/18 Infantry was deploying to attack parallel to the road in vicinity of TOM, converging on DICK. The first and second lifts of the 1/16 Infantry landed on NC at 1415 and 1430 respectively. An APC troop from the 5th ARVN Division linked up with the 1/4 Cavalry (-) at 1505 and was given instructions to retrieve 90mm ammunition that had been dropped along the road between DICK and TOM. The 1/18 Infantry received a change in direction of attack at 1435; new direction of attack north and block south of N5. An enemy blocking position was encountered approximately 800 meters north of TOM and air strikes were called in. The zero rifle platoon from D Troop reinforced C Troop at 1500 because more casualties had been sustained among the infantry than with B Troop. The VC broke contact with the 1/28 Infantry about 1540.

At 1545, COL Berry recommended to General DePuy that the 1/4 Cavalry (-) and ARVN APC troop block from TOM to DICK. The 1/28 Infantry would attack southwest along the north side of the road and then sweep back along the south side. The 1/16 Infantry was move from NC to N5, leaving an element to secure the LZ for arrival of the 2/2 Infantry. After the 2/2 Infantry arrived, the battalion would move to N5 and in conjunction with 1/16 Infantry occupy blocking positions. At 1700, the first lift of the 2/2 Infantry was off S4 enroute to NC. The 1/18 was still in light contact and clearing a bunker complex. VC in the area were wearing a leather belt with a copper buckle and a star superimposed on the buckle. The 1/28 Infantry was moving between the 1/18 Infantry and the road. The last lift of the 2/2 Infantry landed on NC at 1755. The 1/16 Infantry found the movement to N5 to be very difficult. Although contact was made with small groups of VC fleeing toward the SAIGON River, the greatest difficulty was caused by the heavy jungle undergrowth. This hurt the attempt to close the ring around the VC force. One small flight developed during which LTC Lazell was wounded. COL Berry assumed temporary command of the battalion until LTC George K. Wallace III could be flown in to the forward area. The 1/16 and 2/2 Infantry established blocking positions vicinity of N5 and NC respectively. Troop B occupied a blocking position at TOM while 1/18 Infantry established overnight positions northwest of TOM. The 1/28 Infantry swept west through the VC positions on the north side of the road and then returned the south side. There was very little evidence that any considerable VC forces had been south of the road, further substantiating the determination that the main attack had come from the northwest. The 1/28 Infantry remained overnight north of TOM. Troop C remained overnight at DICK and the ARVN APC troop midway between TOM and DICK. An inventory of vehicles revealed that four M113’s and one M48A3 tank had been destroyed and three additional M113’s had been damaged.

On 10 July, the 1st Brigade forces conducted search and destroy operations to locate and destroy the remnants of the 272d VC Regiment.
block routes of withdrawal, and deny the VC safe havens west of the battlefield. With the exception of contact with a platoon size force and one of unknown size, contact was limited to skirmishes with small groups of VC attempting to flee across the SAIGON River. The 272d VC Main Force Regiment had sustained the loss of 239 KIA (Body Count), 304 KIA (Probable), eight captives, 13 crew served weapons, and 41 small arms. An extensive bunker complex was discovered 1500 meters west of TOM and a battalion size base camp was located approximately 1500 meters north of TOM. The 2/2 Infantry swept from NC to DICK. Mortar positions were discovered and evidence indicated the VC had conducted a hasty withdrawal on 9 July. The 1/4 Cavalry (-) conducted a search of the area between DICK and TOM and moved to MINH THANH at 1630. The remaining battalions were extracted from the battle area on 11 July.

Operation OLYMPIA achieved the results for which it was generated; the 272d VC Main Force Regiment was lured into attacking the 1st Infantry Division and suffered losses that probably reduced the regiment to 50% strength. The success of US forces during the Battle of MINH THANH Road can be attributed to several significant facts.

Intelligence proved to be excellent because one of the assumptions made in the intelligence estimate was that the 272d regiment was operating in the area in regimental strength.

The value of thorough and deliberate prior planning and wargaming cannot be over emphasized. All commanders participated in development of the plan and each commander knew what the other would do. It was a plan of the whole group with each having a vested interest. As the plan was modified, it was easily executed because every commander knew the philosophy and how other commanders felt.

The decision to delay the move until the fog and overcast dissipated had a profound effect on the final outcome. This coupled with the fact that the attack came early in the day offered a sufficient period of daylight to fight the battle and sweep the area before the VC had the opportunity to return under cover of darkness and remove the dead, wounded, and weapons.

The artillery and close air support were effective as the principle killer. Over half of the enemy were probably killed by this combined firepower. The road provided an easily defined FSCL. With friendly forces fighting from the road, FAC's and airborne observers had no question as to where to place the fire. The positions selected for the artillery and the philosophy of bringing the artillery north of the FSCL and the air south placed the preponderance of both in these areas. The massed 155mm and 8" fires were instrumental in the quick breakup of the VC attack and subsequent withdrawal. Ninety-six fighter bomber sorties were expended in support of the engaged forces.

The support provided by the airlift mission commander had a tremendous effect on the successful outcome of the operation. Most important, he was present during the entire planning phase. He was also present with the unit to be lifted and sent his representative with the next unit to go.

Conversely, there were factors that had a detrimental effect on the outcome.
ANNEX C Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Battle of MINH THANH Road Narrative (Con't)

Most critical was the difficulty in determining the direction of the main attack and its influence on the initial movement of the reaction forces.

Difficulty in moving through the jungle prevented the 1/16th Infantry from closing the ring and closing off VC escape routes. This was compounded by the lack of adequate landing zones to the rear of the VC force.

Viet Cong camouflage and fire discipline was significant. The preplanned air and artillery fires, reconnaissance by fire, and continuous surveillance by airborne observers were ineffective in causing the VC to disclose his presence.

Certain readily apparent truths emerged from the Battle of MINH THANH Road in the form of lessons learned. While the basic fundamentals of tactical operations remain unchanged, changes in techniques are required as a result of lessons learned from different environmental conditions. The following lessons learned are included for the benefit of the units engaged in the battle, other units of the 1st Infantry Division, and other agencies interested in preparation of units or individuals for combat under similar conditions.

The direction of the main attack and the major concentration of VC forces must be determined immediately. This is important for two primary reasons. First, it is necessary in order to bring in the maximum amount of artillery and air to overcome any existing numerical superiority and break up the attack during the most critical time, the first 30 minutes. Second, reaction forces must be rapidly deployed to flank the VC positions and block routes of withdrawal. Due to the confusion that can result as personnel become disoriented, a recommended method of pointing out the direction of attack is through the use of flares. Supporting fires should have been put in as soon as the first VC were spotted. Doubling the amount would not have been too much. Fires should have been placed farther from the road since the VC were initially back from the road from 100 - 400 meters and then moved up. Reconnaissance by fire farther back would have gotten the bulk of the weapons and troops before they moved up to fighting positions along the ditches.

The main attack was expected from the direction of where the jungle was most dense. It did come from that direction where there were few or no landing zones and thus prevented attacks on the flanks and to the rear.

The Compressed and Compressed "L" Formations were developed to win the firepower battle. In these formations, the lead troop precedes the trail or following troops by 100 to 300 meters. When contact is made the troops compress and the trail or following troops close on the lead troop. The Compressed "L" Formation utilizes dismounted infantry to form the "L". As the infantry move forward, the vehicles that are masked weave their way to the lead of the column. Air and artillery are placed in the pocket ahead of the infantry. During the Battle of MINH THANH Road, the Compressed "L" Formation was not used because the bulk of the infantry were riding on the personnel carriers of the lead troop.

This was the first time infantry were used as cavalry, placed in personnel carriers to fight from the carriers. This amounted to about eight or nine men per carrier including the crew. This was a mistake,
resulting in too many personnel on one carrier to fight effectively. The optimum number of troops to fight from an ACAV is five. More than this hinder the action rather than assist it.

During the action, the M-14 Rifle proved superior to the M-16 Rifle. The infantry complained that dust collected during the road march caused the M-16's to jam. There were no reports of similar M-14 malfunctions.

The Starlight Scope proved effective during the night and periods of rain. Enemy movement and lights were observed up to 100 meters. Activity was observed around two disabled M-113's on the north side of the road.

The type of action in which the column was engaged revealed the need for a representative from the squadron command group on the ground to establish a command post area to: (1) evacuate wounded, (2) resupply forward troops, and (3) exert additional command and control over the forward troops.

The reconnaissance by fire by the ground elements was unsatisfactory because it was done at a 90 degree angle to the column. The lead vehicles should direct their fire into the ditches where the camouflaged foxholes were located. A better possibility of causing the VC to disclose their position exists.

Tanks should have led the column. Tanks can take more punishment and put out a greater volume of fire than the ACAV. The canister round is effective at close ranges and on 9 July kept the VC from overrunning the column.

An armored unit can sustain itself during the critical period of the first two hours. Trucks with infantry cannot be expected to sustain itself for more than a 30 to 60 minute period primarily because of the difference in the amount of firepower and ammunition available.
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ANNEX G Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Operation Overlay - TAY NINH AO

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ANEXE H Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Raid Target 21 - 27 June 1966

1. Background: A returnee, NGUYEN MING NHUT, rallied on 4 April 1966. He reported a storage area containing 3,000,000 plasters worth of supplies vic XT 445540. The camp was reported to be guarded by 80 men. On 1 May, 20 sampans were seen in the area and on 12 May, two sampans were sunk there. On 13 May a bridge capable of carrying truck traffic was destroyed by air and wooden crates on a landing dock nearby produced secondary explosions when hit by artillery fire. On 14 and 15 May approximately 200 tons of rice were uncovered by an airstrike in the area.

2. Raid: On the morning of 21 June the 2/16 Inf made a heliborne assault into a landing zone in the vicinity of the storage area with the intent of destroying the base. At 0925H, six VC were encountered near a hut vic XT 461512. One VC was killed (BC), two VC KIA (Prob), and one VC. One German Mauser rifle, two 105mm rounds, and ten rounds SA ammo were also captured. The VC stated he was from C-65 local unit. Their mission is tribute collection and formation of guerrilla teams in the BEN GUI area. Rallier NGUYEN MING NHUT stated the 80 man force guarding the storage area was B-65. At 1125H, vic XT 458525, the 2/16 Inf was engaged by another small group of VC resulting in one VC KIA (BC). The VC was carrying medicine and may have been a medic. Destroyed were a classroom, five huts, and one hospital consisting of an operating table, oxygen mask, and medical supplies. Other supplies captured or destroyed during the day were one French M-35 SMG, two sampans, 16 rounds of SA ammo, seven grenades, two 155mm rounds, torches, 55 gal gas, gunpowder, a water pump, 30 tons of rice, one base camp and 300 sheets of tin. The unit had not reached the base camp area by nightfall so they dug in and prepared to go on the following day.

3. On 22 June, the 2/2 Inf was committed to raid area. As the units penetrated into the supply area it became apparent that it was quite extensive. VC losses during the day were 47 tons of rice, two sampans, 100 sheets of tin, four grenades, 16 rounds SA ammo, eight huts and one building.

4. On 23 June the search of the area continued with numerous small contacts throughout the day resulting in eight VC KIA (Prob). VC losses during the day were four base camps, 1350 lbs of flour, 30 gal of tobacco, 30 gal M16 20mm, 2.25 tons of rice, two truck tires, four tractor tires, one 3/4 ton trailer, 75 gallons of fuel, two oxcarts, two bicycles and 1000 tons of rice.

5. On 24 June small groups of VC were again contacted resulting in one VC KIA (BC), and one k50/PPSH41 CHICOM SMG captured. VC losses during the day were one boat building facility, two boats, 300 lbs of tea, 15 tons dried fish, 3.85 tons of rice, 55 gallons of fuel, 25 tons of salt, 1000 cans of sardines, 15 thermos jugs, 20 kerosene stoves, 100 gallons of kerosene, 8000 aluminum pans, 900 soup ladles, and 350 gallons of oil. Documents captured by the 2/2 Inf vic XT 416537 indicated that the 273d Regiment and 243 Artillery Battalion were in the area as recently as 20 June and that the 271st Regiment was probably still in the BINH LONG - TAY NINH Province area. The losses suffered by 273d Regiment on 17 May and 11 June vic LOC NHIN probably resulted in their withdrawal to this area for replacements and resupply.

6. On 25 June the number of contacts decreased, however, the 2/16 Inf killed one VC (BC), 11 VC KIA (Prob), and captured one CHICOM AK assault rifle. VC losses during the day were two - seven HP boat motors, two base camps, four sampans, 2.35 tons dried fish, 24.65 tons of rice, and five gallons of tar.

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7. On 26 June the 2/2 Inf killed two VC (RC) and captured one rifle and one German Mauser. An armed CH-47 helicopter killed five VC (RC) and destroyed one .50 cal MG in the area. VC losses were ten tons of rice, one grenade, 500 lbs of wax, 320 sheets of tin, five spools of bailing wire, 12 bicycles, and one bag of toothpaste and tooth brushes, one bicycle repair shop, and one base camp.

8. The units spent 27 June destroying VC supplies and extracting on the 28th. Evidence indicated that more supplies will be found along the SAIGON River north towards Cambodia. Total losses during the raid are listed in Appendix 1. VC losses during the operation in cost of supplies is in excess of 23,000,000 plasters.
# Appendix 1 (VC Losses on the Raid) to ANNEX H (Raid Target)

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1. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols were utilized to search suspected areas, via LOG NINH for VC and installations. The results of their missions are listed below:

   a. Team #4 infiltrated at 031900H June via XT 6185 and exfiltrated at 041717H via XT 6288. One VC was sighted at 040846H via XT 8556'. Contact was made with four VC at 0416.5H and a fight developed. The patrol took evasive action and requested exfiltration. During exfiltration the helicopters were fired on by an estimated VC platoon. Fire teams engaged the VC with unknown results.

   b. Team #2 infiltrated 031855 June via XT 5994. At 041500H via XT 592399 one VC platoon was seen moving southwest. The VC had one 81mm mortar, one LMG, and individual weapons. An airstrike was placed in the area with unknown results. At 051115H the team was extracted via XT 6090 and received fire from the village via XT 675915 and airstrikes were placed on the target.

   c. On 101857 June Team #5 infiltrated via XT 5883. From 1915H to 2130H small groups totaling 100 men were seen moving west via XT 582827. At 110925 the team was exfiltrated via XT 585835.

   d. On 101859H June Team #3 infiltrated via XT 5786 and exfiltrated at 111358H via XT 57998C. No significant sightings.

2. By this time it was apparent the VC were withdrawing in small groups to the west towards Cambodia and there would be little chance of engaging a sizable force in this jungle area. Operations were shifted to the MINH THANH area in an attempt to locate elements of the 272d Regiment located in the area. Attempts to infiltrate in the late afternoon of 12 June were hampered by poor visibility so the teams were infiltrated early on 13 June.

   a. At 130658H June Team #1 was infiltrated via XT 7155. There was a considerable amount of VC activity in the area. At 0920H the team was surrounded by an estimated 30 VC and requested exfiltration. Air strikes were called in on the VC and the teams extracted at 131000H via XT 709949.

   b. Team #6 infiltrated at 130650H June via XT 6656. There was evidence of considerable VC activity. The team was engaged by an unknown number of VC, one team member was killed and four VC were killed (BC). The team requested extraction and was extracted, minus the KIA, at 130915H via XT 709249. An air strike was placed on the VC positions.

   c. The areas in a and b above were unsuitable for LRRP operations. Cover and concealment are sparse and the terrain is open in many places. Two infantry battalions were committed into the area. Several base camps, including one of regimental size, were found in the area, however, only small groups of VC were encountered as they chose to abandon their camps. The aerial rifle platoon was also committed where the patrol member was killed and his body was recovered.

3. The extent of VC losses as a result of LRRP findings cannot be accurately assessed. Canopies prevented BDA from air strikes and the VC chose to flee from US ground forces committed. Any VC casualties from air were carried off so they would not be found.

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## ANNEX K Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
### Close Air Support Sorties

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## Annex K: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III

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## Close Air Support Sorties (Cont.)

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ANNEX K Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
Clos Air Support Sorties (Con't)

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<td>3955</td>
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Total Tonnage (CAS) Operation EL PASO II/III

- HE ——— 1581 Tons
- NAP ——— 827 Tons
- CBU ——— 171 Tons
- Rockets ——— 1322
ANNEX L-1 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III
VHF Circuit Diagram EL PASO II

AN LOC 79 → QUAN LOI 77 54

MINH THANH 76

LAI KHE 73

PHU LOI 55

DI AN 50

BEAR CAT 72

50-73
55-73
50-71
50-55
50-72
54-71
55-71
50-73
79-77
77-76
ANNEX M Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EL PASO II/III

List of Commanders

1st Infantry Division
MD William E. DiPuy

Division Artillery
COL Marlin W. Camp

1st Brigade
1st Inf Bn
COL Sidney B. Jerry

2d Brigade
2d Inf Bn
COL Dewitt C. Smith Jr. (4 Jul - 14 Jul)

2d Brd
LTC Herbert McChrystal (14 Jul - 24 Jul)

1st Bde
LTC Sam S. Walker

3d Brigade
COL William D. Brodie

Support Command
COL Freddie W. Gramling

1st Bn, 2d Inf
LTC Richard Prillaman

2d Bn, 2d Inf
LTC Jack L. Conn

1st Bn, 16th Inf
LTC Lee S. Henry (2 Jun - 20 Jun)

LTC Rufus G. Lassell (20 Jun - 9 Jul)

LTC George H. Wallace III

1st Bn, 18th Inf
MAJ John C. Bard (2 Jun - 14 Jul)

LTC Warner S. Goodwin

2d Bn, 18th Inf
LTC Herbert McChrystal (2 Jun - 20 Jul)

LTC Lewis R. Baumann

1st Bn, 28th Inf
LTC Robert Haldane (2 Jun - 20 Jul)

LTC Jack G. Whitted

2d Bn, 28th Inf
LTC Kyle W. Bois (2 Jun - 14 Jul)

LTC Thomas H. Jones (14 Jul - 11 Aug)

LTC Elmer D. Pendleton Jr.

1st Sqdn, 4th Cav
LTC Leonold L. Lewane

1st Engr Bn
LTC Howard L. Sargent (2 Jun - 16 Jul)

1st Avn Bn
LTC Joseph H. Kierman Jr.

121st Sig Bn
LTC Harold G. Keebaugh (2 Jun - 14 Jun)

LTC Elmer H. Birdseye (2 Jun - 2 Jul)

LTC Carroll S. Meek

1st Bn, 5th Arty
LTC John R. McGiffert

1st Bn, 7th Arty
LTC Frank R. Tims (2 Jun - 15 Jul)

8th Bn, 6th Arty
LTC James R. Koenig (15 Jul - 1 Aug)

2d Bn, 33d Arty
LTC Charles D. Daniel

2d Bn, 13th Arty
LTC Gerald E. Robinson

11th Combat Avn Bn
LTC Joseph B. Starker
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (McV/AS/13/32)

THRU: Command Channels

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) Operation EL PASO II/III - security, search and destroy.

2. (U) 2 June 1966 - 3 Sep 1966.

3. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
   a. Artillery Support

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<td>2/13 Arty (-)</td>
<td>(9 June-28 June)</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Gerald E. Robinson</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS 1st Bde</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/2/13 Arty atchd (--7)</td>
<td>(9 June-28 June)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/1/5 Arty atchd (-)</td>
<td>(13 June-27 June)</td>
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<td>B/8/6 Arty atchd (-)</td>
<td>(10 June-18 June)</td>
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<td>2/33 Arty (-)</td>
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<td>Lt. Col. Frank H. Tims (2 June-15 July)</td>
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<td>DS 3d Bde (2 June-16 July)</td>
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<td>C/1/7 Arty atchd (6 June-27 June)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/6 Arty (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Col. John H. McElfrith</td>
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<tr>
<td>GS (18 June-27 June) (6 July-17 July)</td>
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<td>DS 2/18 Inf (27 June-6 July)</td>
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<td>A/2/33 Arty atchd (30 June-4 July)</td>
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<td>1/LHA (17 July-21 Aug)</td>
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<td>B/8/6 Arty atchd (9 June-3 Sep)</td>
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<td>B/1/5 Arty (-)</td>
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<td>Lt. Col. David C. Rogers</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS 1st Bde (6 July-16 July)</td>
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<td>A/1/5 Arty atchd (6 July-11 July)</td>
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<td>A/2/33 Arty atchd (6 July-11 July)</td>
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<td>C/1/7 Arty atchd (6 July-12 July)</td>
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<td>B/1/5 Arty atchd (13 July-16 July)</td>
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AVDB-RA3


Lt. Col. Carroll J. Reck

1/7 Arty (-)
BS 2d Bde (17 July - 16 Aug) with
A/1/7 Arty attd (17 July - 20 Aug)
A/1/5 Arty attd (17 July - 16 Aug)
B/2/33 Arty attd (17 July - 1 Aug)

b. Deployment: Artillery support was provided by assigning 105mm howitzers in direct support of the Brigades. These artillery battalions varied in size from two to four batteries. For certain special operations a battalion (-) or one battery was attached to a single infantry battalion. The deployment and fires of the direct support artillery units were controlled by the supported unit (for details see appropriate Brigade reports). General support and reinforcing artillery was provided by 155mm and 8 inch howitzers from the 8/6 Arty. The GS and GSJ artillery batteries were positioned at various times in the ALOC - QUAN LOI - QUAN TANH base camp areas, or, for special one or two day operations, moved to forward field positions to provide support; such as from 7-11 July when the 8/6 Arty was located at "Artillery position 1" and fired in support of 1st Bde convoy ambushed on 9 July. The GS artillery fires were controlled by the forward element of Division Artillery. For some special operations the 8/6 Arty was assigned a direct support mission.

c. Fire Support Coordination: Boundaries between AO's were established as fire coordination lines. The Div Arty Fire Support element moved forward and was co-located with the Division TOC.

d. Army Aviation Support: Division Artillery Aviation Section, augmented with one OH-13 aircraft from the 74th Aviation Company, provided aerial observation over convoys and Brigade areas of operation during daylight hours. Radio relay, artillery adjustment, recon and command liaison were performed as required. The aircraft were maintained and operated from Division Artillery field locations. Aircraft requiring major repair or intermediate maintenance and inspection were replaced with aircraft available at the PHU LOI base camp. Total hours flown on operation LL PAÜ II/III are as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Hours</th>
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<tr>
<td>OH-13's</td>
<td>1008 hrs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-1P</td>
<td>151 hrs</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>1159 hrs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

e. Artillery Warning to Aircraft: Artillery/aircraft advisory was provided by each Brigade in their respective areas of operation. Each direct support battalion provided information to the Brigade advisory center. Advisory information for the QUAN LOI and AH LOC area was provided by the air traffic controllers from the 1st Avn Bn. This headquarters controlled all artillery in the QUAN LOI/AH LOC area and forwarded the advisory information to the air traffic controller. The system was considered to be adequate.

f. Artillery LMO's and FO's: Direct support artillery battalions provided LMO's and FO's to the supported unit. 8/6th Arty and Div Arty provided LMO's to ARVN.

g. Div Arty Base Organization and Security: CO Hq Div Arty was responsible for organization of the Div Arty base and coordination of security with the 2d Bn, 18th Infantry while in the forward base areas.

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h. METRO: Electronic met messages were received from the Div Arty met section at PHU LOI (until it became inoperable) and from FAC LOC VINH and CU CHI. A visual flight team was available in the JURU LOI area. This team corrected the electronic met messages with actual wind data at JURU LOI. This correction was not always accomplished due to the weather limitations on visual met observations. However, in most cases, the electronic met proved very satisfactory.

i. Control and Clearances of Fires: Div Arty and each direct support Bn cleared fires with the ARVN headquarters nearest their locations for their responsible units. Bde and BN AD's were cleared as free fire areas prior to conduct of an operation.

j. Artillery Preparation Fires on LZ's: Preparations were planned and executed by direct support battalions and reinforced on-call by general support artillery. Units conducted registrations or fired check rounds in the vicinity of LZ's prior to firing preparations.

4. (U) EXECUTION: For narrative summary of operations see appropriate Brigade reports.

5. (U) Breakout of ammunition expenditures and artillery missions are included in Brigade reports. The 8/6th Arty while in a GS role fired 14,250 rounds 155mm, 344 rounds 105mm and 285 rounds 81mm of 155mm and 9,449 rounds of 8 inch during 4,282 missions. (87 registrations, 3,080 H&I, 371 anti-personnel, 270 anti-equipment and 174 others).

6. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Participating Strength:

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<th>End of Operation</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
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<tr>
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<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 WIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/6th Arty (-)</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>264</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/5th Arty (-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/7th Arty (-)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>214</td>
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b. Awards and Decorations: Div Arty personnel received 177 awards and decorations for actions during EL PASO II/III.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE/CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Intelligence and Civil Affairs: 1st Infantry Division G2 and Brigade G2's provided the intelligence support before and during the operation. A great deal of low level intelligence information was received from the Special Forces camps at AN LOC, LOC NU, and SONG 3E and also some ARVN authorities at sector and village level.

b. Surveillance: Electronic surveillance equipment was not employed by Div Arty. Red Haze and SLAR flights provided targets which were fired on by artillery. Surveillance of target areas and suspect locations was accomplished by aerial observers during times of good visibility.

8. (C) LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY:

a. General: Logistical support of the artillery elements during the operation (particularly during EL PASO II) was complicated by frequent cross-attachment of batteries, both divisional and non-divisional, from their parent battalion to other battalions and by attachment to infantry elements. The frequent movement and change in assignment resulted in delays and misrouting of some supplies. This adverse condition was partially compensated for by having all artillery trains elements operate from LAI KHE and coordinate closely and directly on logistical support. The Div Arty Su section acted as a clearing house and radio relay station in an effort to keep parts and supplies moving to the proper battery.

b. Ammunition was supplied by a combination of means. The basic requirement was fulfilled by Air Force C-123 or C-130 lift from BIEN HOA to the airstrip closest to each battery position. The ammunition was then shuttled to the battery by vehicle or helicopter. This system was supplemented by a large initial overland movement of ammunition from LONG BINH to CHON THANH when the GS battalion was committed. On two occasions ammunition was lifted from base stocks at LAI KHE directly to battery positions. This base stock was subsequently replaced by Air Force lift from BIEN HOA. Movement of ammunition to and from the LZ's by helicopter became more effective and less time consuming as A 22 containers and slings became available. At the close of EL PASO II, the Div Arty Su could move 1000 rounds of prepackaged ammunition to any position within one hour.

c. Other supplies: The operation of a single logistical base and the responsiveness of the SET element there resulted in excellent support of the forward elements. The only problem concerning these supplies was caused by the frequent movement and cross attachment as discussed above.

d. Maintenance: Company C, 701st Maintenance Battalion provided outstanding direct support maintenance and back-up organizational maintenance for the forward elements.

e. Medical: Medical support of artillery units was provided by organic medical sections. Medical evacuation was to the nearest clearing location or to a specific medical facility in special cases. Non-emergency cases were evacuated routinely by resupply aircraft.

f. Transportation: Sufficient ground transportation means were introduced into the operational area to satisfy artillery requirements and, to a large extent, fulfill the short haul requirements of various infantry and support elements. Aerial resupply worked well despite bad weather and soft airstrips.

g. Summary: Logistical support of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery in this rapidly moving operation was adequate.

9. (C) COMMUNICATIONS: The HC-292 antenna was elevated an additional 24 feet by using a mast kit (AB 235/C) and stakes (GP-2). This helped overcome the effect of heavy vegetation and dampness and provided a good readable signal to about 50 miles. A system of mounting radios in the CP tent without the use of remotes was employed and proved very effective.
a. Outpatient: During the operation of the Div Arty medical aid section in the forward area from 9 June to 26 July a total of 22 patients were treated as follows:

1. UHI 57
2. Skin disease 34
3. Gastrointestinal 14
4. VD 5
5. Possible malaria 1
6. Insect bite 3
7. Injuries 67
8. Other 20
9. Vietnamese Nationals 7

Of the injuries, there were only five that were injured from hostile actions.

b. Field Sanitation: Sanitation and mess facilities were generally adequate but required constant attention.

11. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusion: Artillery adequately and continuously supported the operation.

b. Lessons Learned:

1. Combined artillery-air operations can be conducted simultaneously in the same area. Detailed pre-planning to include the establishment of safe air corridors allowed the continuation of artillery preparations during airmobile operations. The establishment of fire coordination lines with artillery employed on one side and air on the other enhanced the continuous fire support capability.

2. Infantry and armored cavalry platoon sergeants and platoon leaders must be thoroughly trained in artillery adjustment and observer procedure. This is essential so that they can call for artillery fires when their assigned artillery forward observer is wounded or out of action.

3. Use of airborne artillery observers proved effective. They were able to rapidly report ground activity not detectable by personnel or the ground and provided accurate and timely observed artillery support to the ground gaining arms.
CONJFlOeMTIAL

AVD9-RA3  23 September 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (23/09/66/03/32)

(4) Habitual association of units should be maintained in the interest of unity of effort and timely response to orders. Only in cases of tactical necessity should batteries be attached to other than their parent unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Thomas M. Bowes
/THOMAS M. BOWES
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
1st Inf Div (G) - 25
23d Arty Op - 6
1/5 Arty - 5
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1/7 Arty - 5
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"A TRUE COPY"

WILLIAM L. PONDER JR.
Major, Artillery

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THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96336

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO J321
APO US Forces 96231

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation "DAHBORT", search and destroy

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 150830 September 1966 to 211715 September 1966

3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division ORED 27-56 (Operation ATLANTIC CITY) dated 111200 September 1966. Name of operation changed by 1st Infantry Division to "Danbury" on 161758 September 1966. Operation conducted in Binh Duong Province with center of mass vic X6536. The plan was to conduct battalion, company and platoon size search and destroy operations in the area employing the cloverleaf technique.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel Sidney H. Marks

b. Task Organizations:
   - Headquarters 3d Brigade, Colonel Sidney M. Marks, CO
   - 1/2 Infantry, Lt Colonel Richard L. Fritiman, CO
   - 1/3 Infantry, Lt Colonel, William M. Wallace II, CO
   - 2/16 Infantry, Lt Colonel, William S. Hathway, CO
   - 2/28 Infantry, Lt Colonel, Elmer D. Pendleton, CO
   - 2/33 Artillery, Lt Colonel, Charles D. Daniels, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Unknown VC units had been reported east of the Dau Tieng area (X165370) by Red Haze, SAR, VR, and O-2. The activities of these units extended into the western portion of the 3d Brigade TAOR. Aircraft had been fired on in the Long Nguyen area in the western portions of the TAOR. Numerous supply installations, base camps, and fortified positions had been previously located in the area. It was expected that more installations than those discovered existed in the area.

b. The area of operations was discovered to be a confirmed VC logistical base area. As friendly troops proceeded through the area, the VC withdrew as rapidly as possible. Most of the base camp areas had been recently occupied by VC. It was obvious that the VC were either unprepared or unwilling to defend. Friendly troops encountered isolated snipers throughout the operation, but this was not part of a coordinated defense plan, just a token resistance offered by rear area caretaker personnel. In addition to the sniper fire, many booby traps were discovered covering the entire area. Civilians questioned during the operation stated that the VC would not allow them to enter certain jungle areas due to the presence of mines and booby traps. Numerous captured documents promise the possibility of establishing the presence of previously identified VC units through letter box numbers. All indications point to the presence of only VC logistical units.

Descarcified After 12 Years

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The only obstacle in the area was the Rach Tinh stream which generally bound
the operational area on the east. The dense jungle afforded excellent cover
and concealment for most of the installations and supplies that were found. In
areas where rubber trees were located, however, the defoliation conducted approx-
nately one month before had left the area completely devoid of all vegetation
and at least one cache was found from the air as a direct result of this weather
during the operation was typical of the monsoon season with hot, humid days, cool
nights, and at least one heavy rainshow every day, usually in the afternoon.

Quite a few man bunkers were found throughout the area. They were
approximately 4 to 5 feet below the ground with 1 to 2 feet above the ground well
camouflaged with dirt and grass. The entrances were either open doors leading
right into the bunker or small tunnels that led into the bunker. There were
also several small tunnels that would hold 3 to 4 people. Most of the fortifi-
cations were strictly for protection and few of them could be considered as
fighting positions. The Division "Tunnel Rats" were called to explore one group
of bunkers and tunnels but found only one small man bunker and 6 small tunnels
about 6 feet long. They were destroyed by an engineer demolitions team with
overhead charges.

Civilians found in the area of operation were women, children and
old men. This indicated no active hostility toward the US troops and gave no
major resistance to be relocated to the refugee village at Ben Cat. Very little
information was received from them except that the VC would not let them go in
certain parts of the woods.

3d Brigade conducts search and destroy operations in assigned
areas of operation to kill VC and destroy VC installations and supplies,

The concept of operations was to airlift 144
Companies of 1/16 1st + 2/28 1st Inf, 1 1/2 Ayry
who were airlifted to vic XT72235 on 15 September 1966 to play a direct support
role in the operation. On 16 September 1966 1 1/4 Inf with 3 demolitions teams
from "D" Ist Ayry and 2 Inf with 2 demolitions teams from "F" 1st Rcr were to
conduct airmobile assaults into the area of operations, establish battalion bases
and conduct company size patrols around the area. On 18, 19, and 20 September
1966 the battalions were to continue the same but slowly moving to the southeast.

On 16 September 1966 an artillery and air preparation was begun at 1030 hours on LZG vic XT663382. At 1056 hours the 2/28 Inf began an airmobile assault on LZ vic XT663382. The 2/28 closed the LZ at 1102 hours. 0 2/28 Inf started 24/hr.
operations to the west toward objective "F" vic XT652366 and the 2/28 (-) moved to
attack objective "E" vic XT653382. At 1200 hrs an artillery and air preparation was begun on LZD vic XT662369. At 1228 hrs the 1/16 Inf began an
table assault on the LZD vic XT662369 closing at 1310 hrs. Upon closing LZD, the 1/16 Inf began 36/hr. operations to the east. At 1300 hrs the 2/28 Inf located
and destroyed 2 I05mm howitzer rounds, 5000 lbs. salt, gasoline, clothing, bike-
cycles, and several bunkers vic XT653382. At 1330 hrs the 2/28 Inf received 3
rounds of sniper fire from XT652381 with 0 casualties. The fire was returned
by 1 1/16 Inf located and destroyed a old base camp at XT652380 consisting of several foxholes, bunkers, and some bicycles. At 1345 hrs the 1/16 Inf received
1 more round of sniper fire vic XT673381 resulting in 2 US WIA. Fire was returned again with unknown results. At 1355 hrs the 2/28 Inf located
and destroyed 3 rounds of sniper fire vic XT673386 with 0 casualties. Artillery
was called in with unknown results. At 1500 hrs the 1/16 Inf located
and destroyed vic XT653388 5000 lb cement, 3 cubic yards of gravel, 1/4 steel pickets, and 7 pull type. They also destroyed all remaining cache at XT5593995. At 1530 hrs the 2/28 Inf located and destroyed vic XT653386 5000 lb cement, 3 cubic yards of gravel, 1/4 steel pickets, and 7 pull type. They also destroyed all remaining cache at XT5593995. Preparations were started to extract this rice on 17 September 1966. The 1/16 Inf closed into the ROK position vic XT663389 at 1600 hrs.
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and the 2/28 closed its RN position via XT655381 at 1615 hrs. At 1620 hrs C 1/16 Inf located several bicycles and a bag of documents via XT653930. The bicycles were destroyed and the documents evasuated. At 1700 hrs C 1/16 Inf received several rounds of small arms fire via XT653839. Fire was returned with artillery and 60mm mortar. One of the mortar rounds fell short resulting in one US WIA. At 1726 hrs the name of the operation was changed to "NAMHUR". On 17 September 1966 at 0730 hrs C 1/16 Inf began movement toward objective "X" via XT651930. At 0800 hrs a platoon from D 1/16 Eng received several rounds of small arms fire via XT653839. Fire was returned with one (1) VC KIA (BO). Evacuation of the VC body resulted in the capture of 2 Chinese claymore mines and 50PDR L2 submachine guns which were destroyed. At 0910 hrs C 1/16 Inf (-) joined C 1/16 Inf at XT653930. At 1300 hrs A 1/16 Inf moved toward XT653939 and B 1/16 Inf began OP operations to the northeast. At 1607 hrs 0 1/16 Inf located a cache of rice via XT653939 and 13 women and children. The women and children were evacuated and plans were made to extract the rice on 19 September 1966.

At 1235 hrs the platoon of engineers moved to XT650381 to extract the rice found by 0 1/16 Inf at 161500 September 1966. At 1520 hrs the recon platoon of the 2/28 Inf (-) returned to Ben Cat. At 1715 hrs with 172 100 lb bags of rice taken to Ben Cat. At 0927 hrs A 2/28 Inf (-) located and destroyed a hut with several ponchos, gas cans and rice bags. At 1515 hrs an aircraft flying over the AO received fire and an airstrike was called in via XT653930. The results of the airstrike were 3 VC KIA (BO) and 1 VC WIA (BO). At 1515 hrs B 1/16 Inf destroyed 400 lbs of salt via XT653930. At 1515 hrs A 1/16 Inf (-) received several rounds of sniper fire via XT650381 resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1607 hrs C 1/16 Inf (-) moved toward XT653939 and plans were made to extract the rice to Ben Cat. At 1615 hrs extraction began on the rice found by A 1/16 Inf. A total of 317 100 lb bags of rice were extracted by 0 1/16 Inf. At 1135 hrs A 1/16 Inf discovered another smallfield running from XT653839 to XT653939. This minefield was also bypassed. At 1410 hrs C 1/16 Inf located and destroyed a hut with several ponchos, gas cans and rice bags. At 1515 hrs an aircraft flying over the AO received fire and an airstrike was called in via XT653930. The results of the airstrike were 3 VC KIA (BO) and 1 VC WIA (BO). At 1515 hrs B 1/16 Inf destroyed 400 lbs of salt via XT653930. At 1515 hrs A 1/16 Inf (-) received several rounds of sniper fire via XT650381 resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1607 hrs C 1/16 Inf (-) moved toward XT653939 and plans were made to extract the rice found by A 2/28 Inf at 171509 September 1966. At 1715 hrs B 1/16 Inf (-) moved toward XT653939 and C 1/16 Inf (-) joined C 1/16 Inf at XT653930. At 1300 hrs A 1/16 Inf (-) received several rounds of sniper fire via XT650381 resulting in 1 US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results.
At 2200 hours, the 2/28 Inf closed into its RON position via XT661380, resulting in one (1) US KIA from A 1/16 Inf and three (3) US WIA from 3 1/16 Inf.

On 19 September 1966, at 0730 hours, both battalions sent patrols out from their RON positions. A 1/16 Inf went west and B 1/16 went northwest while A 2/28 Inf maintained the battalions perimeter via XT660393. B 2/28 Inf went south and C 2/28 went west while A 2/28 maintained the battalion perimeter and discovered and destroyed a hut with tunnels, various pieces of clothing, a booby trapped CBU bomb, and some miscellaneous equipment at XT660393. At 1000 hours, A 1/16 Inf destroyed 1000 lbs of rice via XT665314. At 1005 hours, B 2/28 Inf destroyed a hut with 200 lbs of rice, 12 rice bags, 3 ponchos, and some cookware via XT657314. At 1045 hours, 3 1/16 Inf was hit with two (2) claymore mines via XT661395 resulting in one (1) US KIA and 6 US WIA. At 1110 hours, a platoon from 3 company 1st Engr began extraction of rice cache via XT653397 caused by 2/28 Inf at 1816Z Sep 66. By 1110 hours, 239 100lb bags had been extracted to Ben Cat and Lat De, and an additional five (5) tons of loose rice was scattered. At 1300 hours, the 3d Brigade CO issued orders to the 1A6 Inf to conduct an immediate assault via XT661377 with artillery and demolitions. At 1145 hours, artillery preparation of LT2 via XT683137 was started. The 1/16 Inf began movement to the LT2 via XT661377 at 1150 hours. Touching down at 1300 hours and closing at 1350 hours. At 1557 hours, C 2/28 Inf destroyed 180 bags of rice via XT661354. At 1600 hours 1/16 Inf began movement to east of LT2 via XT661338, toward their RON position via XT665134 closing at 1600 hours. At 1610 hours, 90 1/6 Inf found a claymore mine via XT661353 and evacuated it. At 1700 hours the 2/28 Inf closed into its RON position via XT663395. At 2120 hours, C 1/16 Inf received one (1) incoming rifle grenade via XT661338. Fire was returned with unknown results.

On 20 September 1966, at 0600 hours, a 1/16 Inf conducted S&D operations to the east of the RON position via XT663395, and 1/16 Inf moved west. Also, the 2/28 Inf started S&D operations to the south of their RON via XT665350. At 0955 hours, A 1/16 Inf destroyed 2000 lbs of wheat and 500 lbs of rice via XT659314. At 1000 hours, C 2/28 Inf destroyed 126 bags of rice via XT669353. At 1058 2/28 Inf destroyed 60 bags of rice via XT664351. By 1100H 1/16 Inf had apprehended a total of 71 old men, women, and children from XT 659314 to XT 703314. They were all evacuated to Ben Cat. At 1112H C 2/28 Inf discovered and destroyed a hut with 8 sets of clothes and 5 booby trapped CGBs via XT667314. At 1207H C 2/28 Inf received 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA from one of the booby trapped CGBs via XT673139. At 1230H an aircraft received fire via XT669386. An airstrike in the area resulted in 1 VC KIA (3C) and 1 VC KIA (Pose). At 1315H, 1 1/16 Inf started movement toward their RON position via XT669387 closing at 1330H. At 1337H 2/28 Inf discovered a heavily booby trapped base camp via XT672338. 10 US were WIA there from a booby trapped hand grenade. At 1357H 3 2/28 located a base camp via XT667314 and destroyed 8000 lbs of rice via XT667314. At 1358H 2/28 Inf received several rounds of sniper fire via XT667314 resulting in 1 US WIA. When taking cover, 3 men were WIA by a booby trapped grenade. Fire was returned with unknown results. The 2/28 Inf closed their RON post via XT656235 at 1930H. At 2030H, a claymore mine was detonated on the perimeter of the artillery base via XT722335 but it was aimed too high and there were no US casualties. At 1324H an ambush patrol from 1/16 Inf engaged 3 VC via XT722335 resulting in 2 VC KIA (3C) and 1 VC KIA (Pose). Equipment found on the dead VC indicated that they were the ones who detonated the claymore mine.

On 21 September 1966 the 2/33 Arty (-) began extraction to Lai Khe at 0610H. The 2/28 Inf began extraction at 0900H and closed Lai Khe at 2028H. The 3/28 Inf began extraction at 0900H and closed Lai Khe at 1028H. At 1500H 3 1/5 Arty began extraction to Phuc Vinh and the artillery extraction was complete at 1700H. The operation was terminated at 1745H when A 2/16 Inf closed Lai Khe.

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ported with 155mm (SF from Lai Khe. The artillery was used throughout the operation for 12 preparations, H&I fires, and for specific targets. Throughout the operation, the artillery fire was accurate and violent. B 5/3 ARy also supported from Lai Khe.

The effects of having three (3) firing batteries operating with the advanced battalion fire direction center (FDC) was observed repeatedly. This tactical arrangement permitted each of the two (2) maneuver battalions to have a battery available to answer calls for fire. The third battery reinforced fires as required, or answered calls from the two (2) artillery air G's, one of which backed up the maneuvering battalions.

During the operation, the artillery expended 11,261 rounds of 105mm ammunition and 2011 rounds of 155mm ammunition. The enemy losses attributed to the 2d Battalion 3d Artillery and attached batteries during the operation: three (3) VC KIA (DC), ten (10) VC KIA (P)K (Pan), three (3) VC WIA (P), one (1) VC WIA (captured), one (1) sam pan destroyed.

b. AIR FORCES: The Air Force contributed significantly to the high degree of success of "Operation DANGURY," by flying 115 preplanned close air support sorties and two (2) immediate sorties. 32 of the preplanned close air support sorties were used in direct support of the ground troops to suppress enemy ground fire, as were the two (2) immediate sorties. The results of the air support were: three (3) VC KIA (DC) five (5) VC KIA (P), one (1) VC KIA (Pan), they destroyed a large building, 33 bunkers, one (1) machinegun, and eight (8) houses. The fighter sorties were flown as listed below:

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a. ARMY AIR SUPPORT: The 3d Brigade Aviations Section flew a total of 179 support sorties for a total of 77 hours during "Operation DANGURY." The section scheduled three (3) ORL's daily in support of the operation, one with each of the maneuver battalions and one to support the 3d Brigade Headquarters. The ORL contributed greatly to the control of the operation by the battalion commanders.

b. SUPPLIES:

- US: 111 evacuated to Don Cat

b. EQUIPMENT:

1. US Losses: (1) M-16 destroyed, Serial Number 156214

2. VC Losses:
   a. Rice = 957 - 100 lb bags
   b. Rice Mills: 2 each
   c. Tins: 40 sheets
   d. Boots (US made): 1 pair
   e. Bicycle: 7 each
   f. Clothing: Numerous pieces of miscellaneous clothing

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(g) Documents: Numerous pieces of paper, some of which contained valuable intelligence information.

(b) Ammunition: Three hundred (300) rounds of miscellaneous small arms.

(i) Weapons: One (1) type 50 PPSH submachine gun, three claymore mines.

b. Destroyed:

- Rice: fifty-nine (59) tons
- Sampans: One (1) each
- Buildings: One (1) each
- Bunkers: 57 each
- Gun emplacements: 1 each
- Houses: 13 each
- Cement: 3160 lbs
- Salt: 6 tons
- Peanuts: 100 lbs
- Base Corps: 20 each
- Partition: 110 each
- Fish: 25 gal
- Gasoline: 180 gal
- Gravel: 3 cu yd
- Steel pickets: 185 each
- Bicycles: 22 each
- Bicycle tires: 1 each
- Tools: 12 each (garden)
- Barbed wire: 50 ft
- Co. Wayns: 1 each
- Tubers: 100 lbs
- Rubber pressing machine: 1 each
- Rice wine distillery: 1 each
- WC Classrooms: 2 each
- Wheat: 2300 lbs
- Chickens: 8 each
- Ducks: 19 each
- Hogs: 26 each
- Water buffalos: 45 each
- M1 Rifle Stocks: 5 each
- Hand Grenades: 56 each

(6) CONFIDENTIAL
Claymore Mines: 2 each
105mm Rounds: 2 each
155mm Rounds: 1 each
175mm Rounds: 1 each
8 Inch Rounds: 1 each
60mm Mortar Rounds: 1 each
81mm Mortar Rounds: 1 each
CBUs: 9 each
Small Arms Rounds: 3 each

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Administrative plans for the operation were completely adequate.

(1) Supply. Resupply of the battalions was done completely by helicopter. There were no major problems encountered during either resupply or extraction of the rice and refugees.

(2) Maintenance. There were no problems with the maintenance. First echelon maintenance was conducted continuously by the troops on weapons and equipment.

(3) Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization. Initially, WIA's were given necessary first-aid by the platoon and company medics. The battalions used both the "Stokes litter" and the "Forest penetrator" devices in evacuating the wounded. Platoon and Company medics evaluated WIA's for medical evacuation.

(b) Transportation. All transportation was conducted either on foot or by helicopters. No significant observations were made.

(5) Communication. As the operation progressed, the moisture hampered the operational capabilities of the radio more and more. Continual first echelon maintenance was required to maintain communication. It was found that antennas wrapped in tape at the joints helped to minimize the breakage rate.

b. Only a minimum of personnel remained behind at base camp for security.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. It was found that the claymore mine is very effective in destroying bunkers. It can be placed on top of the bunker, facing down slightly buried, and will completely collapse most of the bunkers.

b. The "Stokes litter" and "Forest penetrator" are very effective in extracting wounded from the jungle. The "Forest penetrator" requires only a 2 to 3 foot hole in the canopy, whereas the "Stokes litter" requires 15 feet due to its tendency to swing.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

The overall outcome of the operation was extremely successful. The objective was to destroy VC material in an area which was believed to be a large supply base. From the results it can be concluded that it was, in fact, a large supply base and it should take a long time to build up that many supplies again. The plan of operation, as conceived, was to be flexible and changes were made continuously depending on the situation as it developed. The results of these changes were the discovery of many facilities which would have been missed had a rigid plan been followed. It was noted again that there is an urgent need for a method to destroy large quantities of rice. Although the flame thrower was used with some success, it is not the answer.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: Operation DAKRURY was extremely successful, and has hampered the VC cause in the area of operation.

b. Lessons Learned: (1) The VC used the CBU as an excellent booby trap in a new way. The CBU is buried in the ground, with one (1) fin bent now to act as a firing pin release. A coupling is tied to the bent fin, and when disturbed it releases the fin detonating the CBU. (2) The use of the battalion and company base concept provides for distribution of individual loads and temporary grounding of heavy equipment (such as claymores, etc) in the base camp area while platoon search and destroy. (3) VC storage methods in this area relied almost completely on concealment rather than any other means. Most items were reasonably accessible to open areas and had only caretaker guard forces.

S.M. MARKS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
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