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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
TO: Commanding General
3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDC-C-OP
APO San Francisco 96355

OPERATIONAL REPORT
Lessons Learned, (1-31 August 1966)

SECTION I
UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. General:

a. Mission: During the period the 1st Battalion 69th Armor
provided the Control Headquarters for the defense of the Brigade Forward
Base Area at Catocka. The Battalion also provided the 3d Brigade Task
Force with a mobile reserve/reaction force with the elements positioned
at Catocka. The Battalion forward CP moved to an Area of Operations
south of Duc Co to establish a screen, conduct zone reconnaissance and
search and destroy missions. In addition to the above missions this
Battalion also provided security for the Brigade Base Camp Pleiku, and
Special Forces Camps and artillery positions at Duc Co and Plei Me by
positioning tank platoons at these locations. Other missions accom-
plished include route security, convoy escort, RRU security, LLOC sur-
veillance patrols and support of infantry units conducting combat oper-
ations in their assigned areas of operation.

b. Task Organization:

(1) HHC 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-31 August 66.
(2) Co A 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-31 August 66.
(4) Co C 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-31, August 66.
(5) Troop C 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, 9-31 August 66.
(6) Co A 1st Battalion 14th Infantry, 30-31 August 66.
(7) Co C 1st Battalion 14th Infantry 27-30 August 66.
(8) Co B 1st Battalion 14th Infantry, 24-25 August 66.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

(10) Co C 1st Battalion 35th Infantry, 15-19 August 66.
(12) Co C 2nd Battalion 35th Infantry, 10-14 August 66.

2. Personnel:

a. Unit Strengths:

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b. Gains, Losses, and Balances:

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C. Battle and non-battle casualties:

(1) Battle Casualties - 3
(2) Battle Casualties Evacuated - 3
(3) Non-Battle Casualties - 21
(4) Non-Battle Casualties Evacuated - 14
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 25 August 1966)

d. Mail: Mail service during the period was good.

e. During this period the Battalion received the following R & R allocations:

   (1) Tokyo - 11
   (2) Bangkok - 10
   (3) Taipei - 7
   (4) Hong Kong - 6
   (5) Hawaii - 6
   (6) Singapore - 3
   (7) Kuala Lumpur - 3
   (8) Manila - 3
   (9) Penang - 3

f. Promotions: During the period the following promotions were received by this Battalion:

   (1) E7 - 1
   (2) E6 - 6
   (3) E5 - 5
   (4) E4 - 40

g. Awards and Decorations: During the period the Battalion submitted the following awards of which 3 air medals were approved.

   (1) Silver Star - 4
   (2) Bronze Star with V device - 6
   (3) Army Commendation Medals with V Device - 3
   (4) Bronze Star - 3
   (5) Air Medal - 3

h. Miscellaneous:

   (1) Religious services were conducted weekly at the Brigade Forward Base Area (Catecka) for Battalion personnel in that area.

   (2) During the reporting period the total PX sales were $189.70. The PX made several trips to service units in the field.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

(3) During the period one accidental shooting was reported.

3. Intelligence: The following enemy contact was made by elements of this Battalion during the period.

a. 8 August 66:

(1) Two tanks from Company C hit mines on the road to Plei Ho. The 1st incident at 1535 and coordinates ZA177100 and the 2nd at 1915 at coordinates ZA167080, both vehicles were damaged.

b. 9 August 66: 1st Platoon, attached to 9th Company 3d Battalion 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK) reported enemy probe at LZ 27V (YA822155) at 2315 hours. This probe was a full attack by the 5th Battalion 88th Regiment (NVA). Results of this attack were as follows:

(1) NVA casualties: 181 NVA KIA (BC), 150 NVA KIA (Poss), 6 NVA CIA.

(2) Equipment Captured: 5 - 60mm mort, 98 - 60mm rounds, 1 - 12.7 machine gun, 45 rifles - AK-47, 19 - SKS carbines, 12 - RPG-2 launchers, 357 RPG-2 rockets, 560 hand grenades, 7800 rounds loose small arms ammunition, 23 rounds 75mm RR, 50 drums LMG ammunition, 312 - AK-47 magazines, over 300 pounds of explosives, several miles of communication wire and large amounts of individual equipment.

c. 14 August 66: Co B platoon at LZ 27V reported trip flares set off at 2200, 1 man observed running from area. Taken under fire with negative results.

d. 16 August 66: Two tanks hit mines on Highway 19 west of Due Co. Both incidents occurred at coordinates YA799238, the first at 1800 and the second at 2150.

e. 17 August 66: B-1-69 reported contact while under operational control of TF 2-35 during relief of CIDG forces vicinity coordinates YA749235. Results 7 NVA KIA (BC); 1 SKS carbine and 1 7.62 LMG captured.

f. 19 August 66:

(1) Scout platoon received report from inhabitants of village at ZA196218 that 30 VC wearing khakis and fatigue uniform moved thru village at 2000 on 16 August, the VC moved northeast and were carrying 1 mortar of unknown caliber.

(2) Scout platoon found drawing of tank, APC's, AK-47, and MAT-49 in the dirt. The drawings were in sufficient detail that positive identification could be made.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 30 August 1966)

a. 20 August 66: B-1-69 was used to relieve a patrol of TF 2-35 which was pinned down by enemy fire vicinity coordinates YA735126. Results were 8 NVA KIA (BC), 1 AT mine was captured.

b. 26 August 66:
   (1) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located one company size assembly area vicinity YA791220, 306 weeks old.
   (2) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located squad size base area approximately 2 days old vicinity YA87197, there was a trail leading SSW.
   (3) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located trail running on azimuth of 280 degrees from YA785195. This trail was not recently used.

c. 27 August 66:
   (1) B-1-69 tank hit two mines, one left side and one right side vicinity YA821152.
   (2) B-1-69 reported fresh dug foxholes vicinity YA821152.
   (3) B-1-69 assigned mission of assisting 2-35 Infantry engaged in fire fight vicinity YA822140. Results of this engagement were 6 NVA KIA.

d. 29 August 66:
   (1) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry ambush site: Spotted 304 NVA (at 2330) fired claymore, unknown results.
   (2) At 0130 Troop C-3-4 Cavalry ambush site sighted 3 NVA and took under small arms fire, negative results.

e. 30 August 66: Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located overhead bunkers, 3-4 weeks old and destroyed them. Later determination after thorough search revealed the following: Bivouac area, 300' x 250', center of mass YA83172, area was well worn. A trail into area ran E-W. Also located 20 1-man foxholes, 2-155 artillery rounds laying side by side, 3 MG bunkers, and 3 AA emplacements (heavy MG) and 1 CP type bunker.

f. 31 August 66:
   (1) At 0915, Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located base area which contained 20 bunkers with overhead cover and 20 foxholes.
   (2) At 1515, Troop C-3-4 Cavalry reported an extension of base area found yesterday, estimate 100 - two man bunkers with overhead cover, all interconnected, 100 foxholes, estimate area not used in 30 days. Area is located vicinity YA815175.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

4. Operations: During the period this battalion provided the control headquarters for the defense of the Brigade Forward Base area (Catecka) and mobile reserve/reaction force for the 3d Brigade Task Force. The Battalion forward CP moved to an area of operations south of Duc Co to establish a screen, conduct zone reconnaissance and search and destroy missions. The Battalion was also responsible for LLOC security and convoy escorts. In addition the Battalion provided security for Pleiku, Plei Me and Duc Co, security for RRU units operating under Brigade control and provided armor support for infantry units.

a. On 1 August the Battalion moved the forward command post from Catecka to occupy blocking positions along Highway 19 from coordinates YA975270 to ZA076309. During this mission, Company A-1-69 (-1 platoon), Co B-1-69 (-1 platoon) and Company C-1-69 occupied blocking positions south of Highway 19. No enemy contact was made. Troop C-3-4 was OPCON TF 1-35.

b. From 2 August to 25 August the battalion remained at Catecka performing the assigned missions. During this period the battalion scout platoon secured the road from Catecka to check point #3 (AR774368) on six days, provided security for surveillance patrols on the land line of communication on 4 days and provide security for RRU on 11 days. On 23-25 August the scout platoon was engaged in cutting timber vicinity check point #12 (YA976291) to construct a permanent bridge at that location. During this period the battalion mortar platoon fired 1903 rounds in support of the Brigade H&I program. During the above period the attached infantry company conducted 9 dismounted patrols in the vicinity of the Brigade Forward Base area at Catecka, and provided security for the Brigade Civic Action Team on 3 days.

(1) Company A (-1 platoon) was positioned at Duc Co from 2-5 August 66. One platoon was positioned at LZ 27V (YA822155) under the operational control of the 9th Company, 3d Battalion 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK). On 5 August, Company A moved to Catecka with one platoon continuing to Pleiku to provide security for the Brigade Base Camp. During the period 6-25 August, Company A secured the road from check point #3 to check point #6 (ZA203343) on 16 days and from check point #6 to check point #8 (ZA123285) on 2 days.

(2) Company B was positioned at Catecka from 2-5 August 66. During this period the company reinforced with one platoon, Company C-1-69 and one platoon Troop C-3-4 escorted one convoy from Catecka to check point #12 and one convoy from check point #12 to Catecka. One platoon was positioned at Plei Me until 4 August 66. On 5 August the company moved from Catecka to Duc Co to relieve Company A. One platoon moved to LZ 27V and came under OPCON 3d Battalion 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK). On 9 August the 2d platoon was positioned at LZ 27V when that position came under attack by the 5th Battalion 88th Regiment (NVA). The attack was repulsed with heavy NVA losses (see para 3, and Inf 1). This support was provided for the ROK unit until 21 August 66. During the period 5-17 August, the company (-) remained at Duc Co to provide security for the artillery position and Special Forces Camp at that location. The company also escorted one
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convoy from check point #12 (YA976291) to Duc Co and emplaced and secured the attached AVLB at check point #12 (YA976291) on 3 days in support of Task Force Luat and 1-9 Cavalry operating along Highway 19. On 18 August the Company (-) was placed under OPCON TF 2-35 and operated in the LZ 27F (YA776227) until 22 August. On 22 August Company (-) returned to Duc Co with one platoon OFCON 2-35 vic LZ 27F.

(3) Company C (-platoon) was positioned at Catecka from 2-25 August for security of the Brigade Base Camp. On 4 August one platoon moved from Cateeka to Plei Me to replace a Company B platoon which provided security for the artillery positions and Special Forces Camp. On 5 August the platoon at Pleiku was replaced by a platoon from Company A and moved to Cateeka. On 9 August a second platoon returned to Cateeka on 12 August. For the remainder of the period the company (-) was at Cateeka with one platoon positioned at Plei Me. During the period 2-25 August the company elements at Cateeka secured Highway 19 from Cateeka to check point #3 on 3 days, secured the road from Cateeka to check point #8 on 6 days, escorted one convoy from Cateeka to check point #12 and two convoys from check point #12 to Cateeka.

(4) Troop C-3-4 (-) was OPCON to TF 1-35 Infantry from 1-5 August and to 1-9 Cavalry from 5-9 August. On 9 August Troop C returned to Cateeka and operational control of this battalion. One platoon remained under Battalion control during the period 2-9 August and was used to meet the Battalion LLOC security mission. From 9-12 August the Troop remained at Cateeka. On 13 August, one platoon moved to Duc Co and was placed under OPCON TF 1-35. On 16 August this platoon moved to LZ 27Y and was placed OPCON TF 1-14. On 19 July this platoon returned to Duc Co and was placed OPCON B-1-69 until 22 August when it returned to Cateeka. During the period 9-22 August the Cavalry Troop secured Highway 19 from Cateeka to check point #8 on 5 days, escorted one convoy from Cateeka to check point #12, one convoy from check point #12 to Cateeka and 3 convoys from Pleiku to Kontum to Pleiku. On 24 August Troop C moved from Cateeka to Duc Co and was placed under OPCON TF 2-35. On 25 August, Troop C was at Duc Co and reverted to control of 1-69 Armor.

c. On 25 August the Battalion moved the Forward Command Post from Cateeka to Duc Co and on 26 August started operations in an area south of Duc Co as Task Force MAC which was still in progress at the end of the period. The AO had boundaries of Highway 19 to the north, grid line YAI6 to the South, the Cambodian border on the West and grid line YA86 to the East. The task force consisted of the Battalion Forward Command Post (Battalion Command vehicles, Headquarters Tank Section, and a Scout Section from the Battalion Scout platoon), B-1-69, (-) until 30 August, C-1-69 (-) from 30 August when it replaced B-1-69, C-3-6 (-) from 27 August, one platoon from A-1-35 and one platoon from C-2-35 on 31 August. During this same period the Battalion Rear Command Post continued to fulfill the missions of security for the Brigade. The Battalion Mortar Platoon fired 932 rounds in the Brigade H&I program. The attached Infantry Company conducted 11 local patrols around the Brigade forward Base Area. The Battalion Scout Platoon (-)
secured Route 19 from Catecka to check point #3 on two days and secured the Brigade LLOC surveillance patrol at check point #3 on one day.

(1) Company A (-) was positioned at Catecka to provide security for the Brigade Forward Base area from 25-31 August. During this period Company A (-) secured the road from Catecka to check point #3 (AR774368) for three days. Until 31 August one platoon remained at Pleiku to perform maintenance and for security when it returned to Catecka. On 28 August one platoon moved from Catecka to Pleiku to provide security for the Special Forces Camp and artillery positions relieving a platoon from C-1-69.

(2) Company B on 25-26 August the Company (-) was positioned at Duc Co for security with one platoon OPCON 2-35 at LZ 18F (YA775281). On 22 August the Company (-) escorted a ROK convoy from Duc Co to check point #12 (YA975291). On 26 August the Company (-) conducted a mounted reconnaissance from LZ 18F and established base camp at YA821192. One platoon was released from OPCON 2-35 and moved to LZ 18F with the Company and one platoon remained at Duc Co for security. From 27-30 August the Company (-) conducted screening and search missions in the TF MAC AO and one tank hit two mines, one on each track at YA821192. On 27 August the platoon moved south of the AO to assist 2-35 in contact at YA822140. On 30 August the Company (-) moved from the Battalion AO to Catecka to provide security for the Brigade Forward Base area. On 31 August one platoon moved to Pleiku for security and maintenance.

(3) Company C from 25-30 August provided security for the Brigade Forward area. The platoon at Pleiku returned to Catecka on 28 August. The company opened and secured the road from Catecka to Oasis four times. On 30 August the company (-) moved from Catecka to Battalion AO in the vic of LZ 27T. One platoon was positioned at Duc Co to provide security for artillery and Special Forces Camp. On 31 August the Company (-) conducted a screening mission between grid line YA81 and 82 and moved north and south along a ridge line and returned to 27T with no contact.

(4) Troop C-3-4 conducted a mounted reconnaissance on 26 August from Duc Co to YA778183 to establish a Troop base. From 27 through 31 August the Troop conducted screening missions within the Battalion AO. On 27 August one platoon was assigned OPCON 2-35 and remained with that unit for the remainder of the period. On 30 August the Troop discovered a 300' by 250' deserted area believed to have been used by NVA troops, at YA813172. On 31 August a further search uncovered 100 unused bunkers at YA815715.

(5) Logistics:

a. The overall logistic support has improved during the reporting period. Requisitions are being handled expeditiously and a better flow of supplies and repair parts is being experienced. A major effort has been made to update property accountability records. There has been considerable problems in the preparation and processing of reports of surveys. The S4 of this battalion has established special routing, receipt and suspense files to eliminate delay or loss of these records.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

b. Supply:

(1) Class I: Approximately 85% of the rations consumed during the period were A rations with the balance being either C or B.

(2) Class II & IV (less repair parts): Even though there has been an improvement in the availability of supplies the following shortage items are considered critical:

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(3) Supply Transactions:

(a) Requisitions Submitted:
1 Non-expendable - 113
2 Expendable - 184
3 Repair parts - 233

(b) Follow up status cards (AF-1) - 21

(c) Turn in - 28
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(d) Abstracts of issue or turn in - 26

(e) Reports of survey, statement of charges, combat losses inventory adjustment reports - 19

c. Maintenance:

(1) Periodic maintenance services were completed for 1 tank company and selected headquarters vehicles during the period. Scheduled services are not being kept current due to the continued commitment of the Battalion elements.

(2) With the exception of suspension parts damaged by mines, the supply of repair parts is satisfactory.

(3) Four rebuilt tanks were issued during this period to replace vehicles which were continually experiencing mechanical failure. Two M-113's were also issued as maintenance floats for vehicles declared, by support maintenance, as not immediately repairable due to shortage of repair parts.

(4) 5 sets of tracks for M-113 were received during this period.

(5) Major assemblies used during the period were:
   (a) Tank engines - 5
   (b) Tank transmissions - 5
   (c) APC engines - 2
   (d) APC transmissions - 3

d. Equipment: Major equipment of requisition and considered critical are:

   (1) Xenon Searchlights
   (2) Special Sets A & B for each type vehicle authorized.

e. Construction: During the period several construction projects were completed.

   (1) One large latrine kit was completed.
   (2) Covered ammunition storage area was completed.
   (3) Conex containers were modified for use as arms rooms and for sensitive items storage.
   (4) One 12 man wash rack was completed.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

(5) Construction of perimeter bunkers was started. It is estimated that they should be completed by the end of September.

(6) One guard tower adjacent to MSR South was completed.

f. Ammunition Consumption:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODAC</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>G890-1305</td>
<td>Hand Grenade, Frag</td>
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</table>

6. Civic Action: This Battalion conducted no civic actions during the period. The attached infantry company secured the Brigade Civic Action Team for operations in 3 villages vicinity of Catecka.

SECTION II

Observations

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:


Item: During the attack at LZ 27V on 9 August observers experienced difficulty detecting NVA moving toward their position.

Discussion: The battlefield at LZ 25V was under almost continuous illumination and flare ships were used. Tank commanders reported that they could not detect NVA moving directly towards their position. They also reported that they could observe the NVA moving laterally or diagonally across their position.

Observation: When tanks are positioned in mutually supporting positions, the tank commander can easily detect NVA moving toward the adjacent tank and direct his fire against them.

b. Use of searchlights during night engagements.

Item: Searchlights have been used two times in night engagements by the Battalion.
Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

Discussion: The value of a searchlight is reduced when it only possesses a white light capability. Infra-red would increase its effectiveness by approximately 75% by allowing undetected observation of areas of responsibility. The operational life of a searchlight during a heavy engagement is approximately 30 minutes. This is sufficient time to allow employment of other means of illumination.

Observation: Infra-red capability would increase the probability of early detection of enemy forces and prolong the combat life of the light by allowing it to be used undetected.

c. Trip Flares:

Item: Use of trip flares as a supplementary means for battlefield illumination.

Discussion: Trip flares are a valuable supplement for battlefield illumination because they can be fired to silhouette targets between the defensive position and the flare, particularly, if set for either trip or command initiation.

Observation: Trip flares should be set for either trip or command initiation for use as an illumination supplement.

d. Movement Planning.

Item: Movement during rainy periods is hindered.

Discussion: Mud slows tracked and wheeled columns to nearly \( \frac{1}{2} \) of their dry season speeds. Movement with tanks in the Duc Co area during monsoons should be made primarily along ridge lines. Trail-stream crossings as shown on maps are insufficient to support tanks 90% of the time. Movement planning must consider the route with fewest stream crossings on the best.

Observation: Planning time for movement with tanks on good, dry roads (unimproved) must be approximately quadrupled when planning movement during and after heavy monsoon rains.

e. Tanks as a Relief Force.

Item: The battalion was called upon to provide a relief force for the infantry three times during Operation Paul Revere.

Discussion: Supporting fires were maintained directly on enemy positions and friendly positions were poorly delineated.

Observation: When tanks are employed as a relief force to elements under attack, supporting fires should be planned and coordinated to prohibit the enemy from withdrawing when the tanks arrive and change the balance of firepower, thus giving the tanks an opportunity to close with the enemy. Friendly positions must be pinpointed to avoid masking tank fires.
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26 September 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

3. Organization and Training: None

4. Intelligence: VC/NVA Mining Activities.
   
   Item: During Operation Paul Revere, which started on 10 May 66, the Battalion encountered 51 enemy mines.
   
   Discussion: Most of these mines were placed on Route 19 west of the Oasis (ZA839249). These mines caused suspension damage to both tanks and armored personnel carriers. The road distance on which mines have been encountered is approximately 31 km, this distance makes the habitual use of mine detectors impractical.
   
   Observation: The VC/NVA are capable of interdicting any route in the area of operations by use of mines.

5. Logistics:
   
   a. Land Line of Communication:
      
      Item: The unpaved land routes have been damaged by extensive use during the monsoon season.
      
      Discussion: The extensive use of the unpaved routes by heavy vehicles, both logistical and tactical have resulted in heavy damage to these routes. The heavy logistical vehicles such as the 5000 gallon tanker and 5-ton artillery ammunition trucks cause the most damage. Tactical vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers do not cause extensive damage except where they cross routes or where the road bed is poorly prepared.
      
      Observation: The use of a LLOC along an unpaved road is not feasible during the monsoon season.

   b. Requirement for cross-country capable cargo transported.
      
      Item: The VC/NVA mining efforts are concentrated on established routes in the area of operation.
      
      Discussion: The VC/NVA are capable of effectively interdicting and given route through a concentrated mining effort. To combat this capability resupply columns should be capable of moving cross country except where terrain obstacles channelize columns on the road. These relatively short stretches of road could be swept by mine detector teams. In order to employ this concept a full track cargo transporter or GOER family vehicle is needed for resupply of isolated positions by ground means.
      
      Observation: This concept would limit effectiveness of the VC/NVA mining activities.

   c. Tow Hooks and Tow Cables.

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Item: Carrying tow hooks and cables in the "ready" position.

Discussion: This unit has lost many tow hooks and tow cables by carrying them in the ready position. While in the ready position it has been found that there is a greatly increased probability of loss due to brush and trees and the amount of time saved has been marginal.

Observation: Tow hooks and cables should be carried in the stowed position to reduce loss.

d. DX of Uniforms and Equipment.

Item: The present system of DX for uniforms and equipment is poor.

Discussion: Due to the necessity of laundering the items being DXed, much of the effect of the system is lost. There is usually a 4 to 7 day wait for return of material sent to the laundry.

Observation: Items should be accepted for DX by the S4 and then laundered on-mass by him.

e. Class "A" Rations.

Item: Cold storage facilities for perishable rations.

Discussion: Because it is impossible to establish a fixed schedule for delivery of rations to forward units some perishables have remained packed and in the open for long enough periods that upon receipt large portions of them were found to be spoiled.

Observation: There is a need for some type of cold storage facility at Catecka in which perishable rations could be stored until time for delivery.

f. Maintenance.

Item: Scheduled maintenances (Q service) is essential in keeping down the deadline rate.

Discussion: After a complete Q service in August A Company average deadline rate dropped approximately 50%. A similar trend has been observed in the other companies.

Observation: Regular quarterly maintenance is an absolute requirement in order to maintain combat effectiveness.

g. Radio Repair.

Item: Radios are not being adequately inspected or tested during repair.
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Discussion: This unit has sent numerous radios in for repair which have been returned as repaired and been found to have the same or a similar defect. Specifically C-14, C-6, and B-6.

Observation: Radio inspection procedures at the repair echelons should be tightened.

SECTION III
Recommendations

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:
   a. When this battalion is assigned a tactical mission in an area of operations, it should be relieved of the mission of control headquarters for the defense and security of the Brigade Forward Base area. A battalion Headquarters is not capable of operating two functional operation centers for extended periods.
   b. A permanent bridge should be emplaced at YA974291 to facilitate use of Highway 19 to Duc Co.

3. Organization and Training: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:
   a. Route 19 west to Duc Co must be repaired if it is to be used as a land line of communications during next year's monsoon season. This repair will require extensive engineer effort and should be programmed during the upcoming dry season.
   b. This battalion has had Xenon searchlights on requisition for over one year. This unit should be given the highest priority for issue and installation of these lights and associated fire control instruments. This item is required to improve the night operational capability of this battalion.

FOR THE COMMANDER
/s/ Robert L. Saathoff

1 Incl

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HEADQUARTERS
1st BATTALION 69TH ARMOR
3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355

TLARM-C 8 September 66

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TO: Commanding General
3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDC-C-OP
APO San Francisco 96355

1. The 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK) came under the operational control (OPCON) of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division on 9 July 1966 and immediately occupied defensive positions vicinity the Cambodian border. On 10 July 1966 the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 69th Armor, at the direction of the Commanding General, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, placed one tank platoon under the OPCON of the 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK). This platoon was positioned in the 9th Company perimeter on the south. This platoon was rotated with other platoons from the 1st Battalion 69th Armor Approximately every seven days. No significant contact was made by the 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK) during the period 9 July 1966 to 9 August 1966.

2. On 5 August 1966 the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion 69th Armor replaced a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion 69th Armor in the 9th Company area on the normal rotation described above. A detailed sketch of the 9th Company defensive position is at Inclosure.

3. During a liaison visit to the 9th Company position on 7 August 1966 Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Fairfield Jr., the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 69th Armor, recommended to Captain Lee, the Commanding Officer of the 9th Company, that he reposition the tanks to the 1st Platoon. This recommendation was based on Colonel Fairfield's analysis of the 9th Company position, and the avenues of approach into this position. The close proximity of the heavy jungle to the south and southeast and the concealment offered by the elephant grass to the southwest appeared to offer the best avenues of approach into the 9th Company position. Captain Lee considered this analysis and recommendation but decided against repositioning the 1st Platoon tanks.

4. Since there had been no significant contact in the area since 9 July, there is no doubt that a degree of complacency had developed, although further discussion of the action by the 9th Company and the 1st Platoon will indicate that what complacency did exist, had no significant effect on the outcome of the engagement that was about to take place. As the sun set on the night of 9 August 1966, the usual 50% alert among personnel in the 9th Company perimeter went into effect; all trip flares around the perimeter had been inspected, the single strand of Concertina wire outside the perimeter was checked for breaks and the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion 69th Armor, under the command of 2d Lt Charles E. Markham checked the lay of their tank guns for the final time before darkness set in. The two members of each of the five tank crews that were not alert went to bed in tents immediately behind each tank position.
5. Commencing at 2010 hours, 9 August, the normal artillery harassing and interdiction (H & I) fires commenced to the west of the 9th Company position toward the Cambodian Border. These fires consisted of 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars, 4.2 inch mortars, 105mm howitzers, 155mm howitzers, 8 inch howitzers and 175mm guns all in support of a planned H & I program.

6. At 2315 hours, 9 August 1966, Lt Lim Bog Man of the 9th Company climbed upon tank B-15 and told the tank commander, SSG Wallace T. Ferneyhough, that he thought he heard digging to the southwest. SSG Ferneyhough illuminated the area with his tank mounted, 18 inch, searchlight, and conducted reconnaissance by fire with his 7.62mm coaxially mounted M73 machinegun. This firing immediately alerted the entire position and all personnel who were not on alert began moving to their positions. Within seconds, the entire treeline to the SE erupted with heavy automatic weapons fire. As a result of this firing Lt Markham, the platoon leader and tank commander of B-11, and PFC Robert Merrick, the loader of B-14 were slightly wounded but still managed to get aboard their respective tanks and engage in their assigned duties.

7. Illumination in the battle area was initially provided by tank mounted searchlights on B-15 and B-13 and by 60mm mortars firing from within the 9th Company position. Subsequently, existing illumination was augmented by US and ROK artillery and a USAF AC-47 flareship which arrived over the area at approximately 092330. Discussion with personnel involved in this action revealed that the battle area was under almost continuous illumination from approximately 092330 until daylight on the 10th of August with only a few brief periods of from 10 - 15 seconds between flares. (The tank mounted searchlights on B-13 and B-15 were both knocked out by enemy fire by 0145 hours).

8. Tanks B-12, B-13 and B-14 concentrated their firing on the woodline to the southeast while Lt Markham in B-11 and SSG Ferneyhough in B-15 directed the majority of their fire to the south and southwest. At no time were more than eight enemy personnel spotted in any one group. All available types of tank ammunition were fired except high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) with 90mm canister and 7.62mm coaxial machine gun being the two types preferred by the tank commanders.

9. Although there was a heavy volume of SA and AW fire directed at the position throughout the night, there never appeared to be a large scale direct assault or coordinated attack. The initial attack lasted until 0130 hours, followed by a lull until approximately 0200 hours when the enemy firing again picked up. By 0430 hours all firing by the enemy had ceased. Although it is merely conjecture at this point the alertness of Lieutenant Lim and subsequent illumination and firing by SSG Ferneyhough in B-15 appears to have disrupted the coordinated attack that was planned. Enemy documents retrieved after the battle and prisoner of war interrogation reports conclusively indicate that a coordinated attack was planned against the 9th Company position.

10. The combined effects of the tank armament, 9th Company automatic weapons and supporting artillery and mortars had a devastating effect upon the enemy. Inclosure 2 is a tabulation of all ammunition expended in this action. The 197 enemy dead that literally covered the battle field as the sun came up on the morning of 10 August was a clear testimony to the fruits of a well-organized defensive position.
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11. Lieutenant Han Kwang Kuk, the Korean artillery forward observer attached to the 9th Company had 20 tubes of artillery available that could fire in support of this engagement. These ranged from 105mm through 175mm. During the night of 9 - 10 August, all of these artillery units were utilized by Lt Han. At 2320 hours, after analyzing the enemy situations, Lt Han requested his first artillery fire. At 2324 hours, the first artillery began landing among the enemy - this initial fire was provided by C. Battery, 61st Artillery (ROK). Within ten minutes, the additional US and ROK artillery, 61st Artillery Duc Co and the US 105mm Battery at LZ 27Y with the 1035th Infantry were firing in support of the 9th Company. At times, the 105mm artillery was landing within 30 meters of the 9th Company perimeter. The heavier artillery was utilized to seal off the enemy's routes of withdrawal to the southeast, south and southwest. As indicated by the data at Inclosure 2 the artillery was also utilized to augment the illumination provided by the USAR AC-47 flare ship.

12. This engagement was the first taste of combat by the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion 69th Armor and they stood the test in an outstanding fashion. In the words of Captain Lee, the 9th Company Commander "the men of Lieutenant Markham's platoon are all brave men." An example of the type bravery that Captain Lee is talking about can be found by following the actions of SP4 Donald R. Krug. Specialist Krug was an extra man in Lieutenant Markham's platoon and from the outset of the engagement was observed all over the perimeter by the American and Koreans, assisting the medical personnel, firing a Korean BAR and even at times firing his 45 caliber pistol at the enemy when they approached the perimeter.

13. Coordination of fire between two or more tanks was in continuous evidence throughout the engagement. The main avenue of approach into the 9th Company position appeared to be from the southwest approximately between the two trees 125 meters southwest of the perimeter (Inclosure 1). The small (approx 3' high) finger that runs northeast - southwest along this axis of attack provided cover from direct fire from B-15 and B-11 depending on which side of the finger the enemy chose to go. If SSG Ferneyhough in B-15 observed the enemy approaching on the north side of the finger they would jump over the finger to the south side when he took them under fire. SSG Ferneyhough would then call Lt Markham in B-11 and tell him to fire down along the south side of the finger. This tactic also worked in reverse and was utilized many times during the engagement. The searchlight mounted on SSG Ferneyhough's tank drew heavy automatic weapons fire each time it was turned on. During those periods when no enemy were observed SSG Ferneyhough would turn on his searchlight to draw fire and Lt Markham would return the fire. This tactic only lasted until approximately 2400 hours when the enemy finally succeeded in knocking out SSG Ferneyhough's searchlight.

14. At approximately 0230 hours, Lt Markham received a radio call from 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK) asking him to move his platoon out from the 9th Company perimeter in a counterattack. Lt Markham wisely decided not to counterattack since there was no positive enemy position to attach and his platoon would become much less effective and a great deal more vulnerable moving around among the enemy in the dark. The propriety of the decision was further justified during a sweep of the enemy area at approximately 0700 hours the morning of the 10th of August when 7 satchel charges and over 350 RPG-2 anti-tank rockets were found littering the area.
15. The engagement finally ended at 0430 hours the morning of 10 August although there were brief periods of 5 - 10 minutes throughout the night when the engagement stopped. It was impossible of course to determine the amount of enemy personnel individually killed by the 9th Company, the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion 69th Armor and the supporting US and Korean artillery. It is obvious however that without any one of these elements, the number of enemy dead would have been far less than the total of 197 a have already been counted on the battle field. The most significant aspect is that the enemy chose knowingly to attack a defensive position reinforced by US Armor. The firepower and armor protection of the M48A3 tank proved more than a match for his determination to overrun the 9th Company position and succeeded in providing "Operation Paul Revere II" with one of the most successful small unit engagements of the war.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
1. Detailed Sketch of the 9th Company Positions
2. Ammunition Expenditures

DON A McKNIGHT
Major, Armor
Executive Officer
## Artillery, Mortars

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## Tanks, 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion 69th Armor

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 30 September 1966)

TO: Commanding General
3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDC-C-OP
APO San Francisco 96355

SECTION I
UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. General:
   a. The 1st Battalion 69th Armor provided the perimeter defense control headquarters for the brigade forward base area. It also provided the 3d Brigade Task Force with a mobile reserve/reaction force positioned at Catecko. Additional missions were: LLOC surveillance, route security, convoy escort, RRU security, support of infantry unit combat operations, and the security of artillery positions and Special Forces Camps at Duc Co and Plei No. The battalion also assisted in securing the Brigade Base Camp at Pleiku by positioning elements there. Task Force 1-69 conducted search operations in AO 27 from 1-7 September and the battalion forward command post returned to Catecko from Duc Co on 9 September 1966.

   b. Task Organization:
      (1) HHC 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-30 September 1966.
      (5) Trp C-3-4 Cavalry 1-7, 28-30 September 1966.
      (7) Co C-2-8 Infantry, 2-7 September 1966.
      (10) Co C-1-14 Infantry, 12-17 September 1966.
2. Personnel:

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</table>

c. Battle and non-battle casualties:

(1) Battle Casualties - 0
(2) Battle Casualties Evacuated - 0
(3) Non-Battle Casualties - 17
(4) Non-Battle Casualties Evacuated - 7
(5) Non-Battle Death - 1

d. Mail: Mail service during the period was good.

e. During this period the battalion received the following R & R allocations:

(1) Tokyo - 11
(2) Hong Kong - 9
(3) Singapore - 2
(4)
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(4) Taipei - 7
(5) Bangkok - 8
(6) Kuala Lumpur - 4
(7) Penang - 2
(8) Manila - 2
(9) Hawaii - 4

f. Promotions: During the period the battalion received the following:

(1) E6 - 2
(2) E5 - 4
(3) Ek - 40

g. Awards and Decorations: During the period the battalion submitted the following awards.

(1) Silver Star - 5
(2) Bronze Star - 1
(3) Army Commendation Medal - 17
(4) Air Medal - 2
(5) Legion of Merit - 1
(6) USARV Certificate of Achievement - 2

h. Miscellaneous:

(1) Religious services were conducted weekly at the brigade forward base area (Catcoa) for battalion personnel in that area.

(2) During the reporting period the total PX sales was $24,000 (Sensitive Items).

3. Intelligence: The following enemy contact was made by elements of this battalion during the period.

a. 1 September 1966:

(1) C-1-69 patrol found enemy bivouac area and 30 foxholes at YAB5217.

(2) HNC 1-69 patrol found abandoned medical clearing station 21.
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which contained an NVA poncho and bandages.

b. 4 September 1966: Troop C-3-4 Cavalry patrol heard noises coming from an apparent enemy command post or anti-aircraft location; fired organic mortars and called for artillery fire, results unknown.

c. 5 September 1966:

(1) C-1-69 patrol located a fresh trail made within 24 hours vicinity YA827156.

(2) C-1-69 patrol located 1 unidentified man who was taken under fire and fled vicinity YA824148.

(3) C-1-69 patrol made enemy contact with an estimated reinforced squad or platoon vicinity YA823148. They observed one man dressed in khakis and barefoot.

(4) C-3-4 Cavalry located a squad size bunker which overlooks a trail running northeast to southwest vicinity YA753189.

(5) C-1-69 had an infantry platoon attached who made contact with unknown size force vicinity YA805202.

(6) C-1-69 had an infantry platoon attached who made contact with an unknown size force vicinity YA824147.

(7) A scout platoon APC hit mine vicinity YA964289. The damage was as follows: 1 track blown off, 1 set road wheels.

(8) A scout platoon APC hit mine vicinity YA955288. The damage was as follows: 1 track blown off, 1 set road wheels and 2 casualties (minor injuries were evacuated).

d. 7 September 1966:

(1) A tank from C-1-69 hit mine at YA932283.

(2) A tank from C-1-69 hit mine at YA940287.

(3) A tank from HEC 1-69 hit mine at YA984294.

e. 10 September 1966: A-1-69 found 1 VNCS at AR760264 and returned to higher headquarters for interrogation.

f. 13 September 1966: Trp C-3-4 Cavalry APC hit mine suffering 3 WIA.

g. 23 September 1966:

(1) B-1-69 captured 4 VNCS, 2 at ZA230276 and 2 at ZA222376.

(2) C-1-69 picked up 7 VNCS carrying Chieu Hoi passes.
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1. 24 September 1966: B-1-59 picked up 4 VMCS, 2 at AR789229 and the other 2 at AR790219.

2. 25 September 1966: B-1-59 picked up 2 VMCS at ZA087217.

4. Operations:
   a. 1-8 September 1966: The battalion (-) continued to conduct screening, zone reconnaissance and search and destroy operations in the assigned area of operations. This AO was bounded by the Cambodian Border on the west, Route 19 on the north, the YA86N-S grid line on the east and the YA16E-W grid line on the south. The battalion rear command post remained at Cateka to provide the control headquarters for the defense of the brigade forward area and the mobile reserve/reaction force. It also coordinated the LIDO security operations within the brigade area of operations. On 7 September the battalion forward command post moved from the AO closing at Cateka on 9 September 1966. One headquarters tank hit a mine on 7 September enroute to Cateka.

   (1) Company A (-) one platoon was positioned at Cateka from 1-8 September 1966 for the defense of the brigade forward base area. One platoon was positioned at Plei Me for security of the Special Forces Camp and the artillery in the area. During this period the elements at Cateka opened the road from check point #6 to check point #3 three times, escorted AVIN to check point #12 two times and made one zone recon with a military intelligence team.

   (2) Company B-1-69 Armor (-) was positioned at Cateka for security of the brigade forward zone of operations. One platoon was positioned at Pleiku for security of the brigade base camp. During this period the elements at Cateka opened the road from check point #6 to check point #3 five times.

   (3) Company C (-) one platoon supported Task Force MAC in the 1-69 (-) assigned area of operations. One platoon remained at Duc Co for security of the artillery positions and the Special Forces Camp. From 7-9 September 1966 one platoon escorted Task Force MAC command post from coordinates YA975291 to Cateka and remained at Cateka.

   (4) C Troop 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry (-) supported Task Force MAC in assigned area of operation and conducted one search with negative results. One platoon was positioned at Duc Co for security of the artillery position and the Special Forces Camp and one platoon was OPCON to Task Force 2-35. From 2-6 September the Troop (-) supported Task Force MAC and conducted patrols and reconnaissance in the assigned AO with negative enemy contact. One platoon was positioned at Duc Co for security of the artillery position and Special Forces Camp. On 7 September the troop was released OPCON 1-69 Armor and was placed OPCON Task Force 2-35.

b. 8-30 September 1966: The battalion remained at Cateka performing assigned missions. The battalion mortar platoon fired 4045 rounds in support of the brigade MI program during the period 1-30 September 1966 and the attached infantry company conducted 5 village search operations.
dismounted patrols and 8 ambush patrols with negative significant contact. The scout platoon secured the RRU on 22 days, performed 11 escort missions which included 5 village searches, and worked on the bridge at check point 12 two days during the period. Two APO's hit mines.

(1) Company A (-) one platoon was positioned at Catecka from 6-25 September for the defense of the brigade forward base camp. During this period one platoon was positioned at Plei Me for the security of the Special Forces Camp and the artillery in the area. During this period the elements at Catecka secured Highway 19 from check point 6 to check point 3 two times, escorted 2 convoys from check point 6 to check point 12 and one convoy from check point 12 to check point 6, and secured an engineer work party working on Highway 60 for one day. On 10 September Company (-) conducted a zone recon south of check point 3 and one VMCS was detained. On 17 September one platoon was placed OPCON TF 1-14 Infantry for operations along Highway 19 vicinity Plei Rongol. On 26 September Company A (-) moved from Catecka to Plei Me to provide security for the artillery position. One platoon remained OPCON TF 1-14 for operations along Route 19. On 27 September Company A (-) escorted one convoy from check point 5 to Plei Me and back to check point 7. On 29 September, the platoon OPCON TF 1-14 returned to battalion control and was positioned at Catecka. Company (-) conducted route recon along Highway 60 from Plei Me to Plei Me (1) and returned to Plei Me.

(2) B-1-69 (-) was positioned at Catecka for security of the brigade forward base camp from 8-30 September. One platoon was positioned at Pleiku for security of the brigade forward base camp from 8-25 September. From 11-22 September 1966 one platoon assisted in security of B-3-6 Artillery at coordinates 2A560813 and from 23-30 September 1966 at Thua An District Headquarters. The company (-) secured Highway 19 from check point 6 to check point 3 on 10 days and from check point 6 to check point 8 on 7 days. The company (-) conducted search and clear operations at Plei Gae Thong (1) (2A230375) and Plei Gae Thong (2) (2A223375) on 23 September, Plei Dal (AR782128), Plei Peng (AR786228) on 24 September and Plei Hueng Ya Tong (2A05225), and Plei Ya Ha (2A057220) on 26 September. During these operations 8 VMCS were detained. An element from the company secured the engineer work party on Highway 60 on two days, escorted one convoy from check point 6 to Plei Rongol, 2 convoys from check point 3 to check point 5, and two convoys from check point 3 to Plei Me.

(3) Company C (-) remained at Duc Co for security of the artillery positions and the Special Forces Camp during the period 8-25 September. One platoon escorted the battalion forward command post to Catecka and remained there, under battalion control to provide security for the brigade forward base area and assist in LOC security missions. During this move two tanks hit mines causing light damage. On 16 September one platoon escorted Battery A, 3d Battalion 6th Artillery (SP) (-) from Duc Co to IZ 27U (Tri811921) and returned to Duc Co. On 17 September one platoon escorted the Battery A train to IZ 27U and returned to Duc Co. On 23 September one platoon moved from Duc Co to check point 12 (TA976291) to pick up engineer convoy. Seven VMCS surrendered to this platoon at check point 12 under the Chiou Hli program. These returnees were given medical treatment, food and transported to the the brigade POW compound for interrogation. On 23, 24 and 26 September 1966 the platoon at Catecka was attached to the scout platoon (-) to secure an engineer work
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party making road repairs on Route 60 at AR774-368. This element returned to Oates each night. On 24 September the platoon at Oates escorted the AV-139 to check point #12 (Y976221) picked up the trains element of Company C and Troop C 3d Squadron 1st Cavalry and escorted them to Oates.

On September 30th the platoon at Oates moved to Than An District Headquarters to receive a platoon of Battery B 3d Battalion 6th Artillery, (AF).

On 28 September 1966 the Troop was relieved at Oates and moved to Duo Co. On 29 September the Troop moved from Duo Co to Pleiku for maintenance and to assist in security of the brigade base camp.

5. Logistics:

a. General: Logistical support during the last period has continued to improve. Percentage of fill and the time lapses on all requisitions and follow up status replies have reflected rapid handling. The primary areas in which expedients handling has been noted are in some "Red Ball" repair parts, minor expendable supply issues and mess hall cleaning material. The direct exchange of clothing and field equipment has proven to be satisfactory.

b. Supply:

(1) NON-EXPEENDABLE

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<th>REQ. HD./RED.</th>
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(2) Expendables

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(3) Supply Transactions:

(a) Non expendables: 153 each
(b) Expendable: 82 each
(c) Supply Division Repair Parts: 30 each
(d) Follow-up status cards (AP-1's): 33 each
(e) Turn-ins: 70 each
(f) Report of Survey, Statement of Charges, Combat Losses,
    I.A.I.R.'s: 21 each
(g) Abstract issues and turn-ins: 5 each

(c) Maintenance:

(1) Scheduled services for the months were accomplished except
    for Company C. The scheduled services will be accomplished for this unit as
    soon as operational commitments permit.

(2) The supply of repair parts remain a critical problem area.
The battalion is using repair parts faster than they can be supplied. Some items which result in deadline vehicles are alternator pulleys for the M-113 personnel carrier and suspension components for M-48A3 tanks.

(3) Major components used during the reporting period.
   (a) Tank engines - 5
   (b) Tank transmissions - 7
   (c) Tank final drives - 1
   (d) APC engines - 9
   (e) APC transmissions - 2
   (f) APC final drive - 1
   (g) APC transfer cases - 3

d. Equipment: Equipment of this unit averaged over 90% availability.

e. Construction:
   (1) Completed 7 bunkers and 2 towers.
   (2) Repaired and replaced the majority of perimeter wire.
   (3) Removed the old tank bunkers.
   (4) Constructed 1 GP small tent kit, 1 GP medium tent kit and a new shower for HQ.
   (5) Reconstructed A&B companies latrines to provide larger seating capacity.

f. Statistical Data:

(1) Ammunition Expended:

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<td>Hard Grenade Fragmentation</td>
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(2) Rations: The battalion task force consumed 77,267 meals during the period. Of these approximately 60% were Class A with the remaining 40% B or C type rations.

(3) Mileage:

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<th>TYPE VEHICLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>M-18A3 (Tank)</td>
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<td>M-113 (Carrier Personnel)</td>
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<td>M-106mm (Carrier Mortar)</td>
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<td>M-577 (Carrier Command Post)</td>
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<td>M-28A2 (AVIB)</td>
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<td>M-66 (VTR)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

6. Civic Action: Civic action programs were carried out in the following villages by attached CA personnel during roundup operations:

   a. Plei Dal - AR781218
   b. Plei Pong - AR789228
   c. Plei Gae Thong (1) - ZA230375
   d. Plei Gae Thong (2) - ZA223375
   e. Plei Ya Ho - ZA087220
   f. Plei Kaug Ya Tong - ZA084205

SECTION II

1. Observations:

   a. Personnel: None
   b. Operations:

      (1) Item: Roundup Operations: See Incl 1
      (2) Item: Tracked vehicle ford conditions.

      Discussion: Approaches to tracked vehicle fords are the key to their suitability. During the monsoon rains the approaches may have been damaged by high water.

      Observations: Tracked vehicle fords should all be checked as soon as practical to determine trafficability.

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Subject: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 30 September 1956)

- Organization and Training: None
- Intelligence: None
- Logistics: None
- Other: Radio Communications

Item: During the monsoon season condensation collects in the MT 1029/VRC and bases of the VRC series radio.

Discussion: Condensation causes short circuits and reduces operational range of the VRC series radio.

Observation: During the monsoon season inspection of these components should be made by organizational maintenance personnel and dried out as required.

Recommendations: None

1. Roundup Operation Conducted on 21 & 26 September 1956

C. O. CLARK
LTC, Armor
Commanding
SUBJECT: Roundup Operation (U) Conducted on 24 and 26 September 1966

THRU: Commanding General
3d Brigade Task Force
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96210


2. Operation on 21 September 1966:

a. Purpose of operations: To search villages suspected of being hostile and at the same time provide security for civic action teams working in the villages.

b. Scheme of maneuvers: Two Platoons of B-1-11 Infantry were airlifted into blocking positions south of the villages of Plei Feng (AR789228) and Plei Del (AR781218). The lift commenced at 2415 September 1966 and was completed at 2430 September 1966. Upon touchdown the infantry moved out toward the village assuming a shallow V with the open side toward the village. Company B (--) two Platoons, 1st Battalion 69th Armor (--) one scout section moved from Cateoka (ZA15109) at 2450 September 1966 and arrived at Plei Feng at 2500 September 1966 and Plei Del at 2515 September 1966. At approximately 500 meters from the villages, the armored elements changed formation from a march column to double column with APC's trailing and paralleled the villages on both sides. Contact with the infantry by armor completed the surrounding of the villages with the APC's forming the link between the parallel armored columns. Arrival in the objective areas by infantry and armor was as near simultaneous as possible.

c. Fire support peculiar to the operation: The operation was beyond the range of all friendly artillery except two 175mm guns at Plei Ms (ZA35188). Fire support was supplied by 90mm tank guns of B-1-69 Armor.

d. Success of the operation: 4 VMCS were apprehended and returned to Cateoka for further interrogation. One village confirmed hostile, Plei Del (AR781218).
TIAN-0

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7 October 1966

SUBJECT: Roundup Operation (u) Conducted on 24 and 26 September 1966

1. Type forces involved: Infantry, two platoons reinforced, armor, company (-) two platoons, and a scout section.

2. Operation on 26 September 1966:

a. Purpose of operation: See paragraph 2a.

b. Scheme of maneuver: Company B (-) two platoons, 1st Battalion 69th Armor (+) scout platoon (-) (+) B-1 LCP Infantry (-) and Military Intelligence Team and Civic Action Team departed outside at 26:515 September 1966 for Plai Ye 30 (ZA682229) and Plai Keng Tong (ZA682237). The infantry was mounted in APCs of scout platoon (-). At 26:509 September 1966 the team reached a point 3, approximately 600 meters north of Plai Keng Tong. The formation was changed from a single column to parallel columns and these in turn moved down the east and west sides of the village meeting at the south end. The north side of the village was secured by the trail elements of the column. The encirclement was completed at 26:526 September 1966, and infantry were dismounted. At first light, the infantry moved in to search the village accompanied by military intelligence personnel. After dismounting infantry, the scout platoon (-) moved to Plai Ye 30 and surrounded the village by a similar maneuver. This was accomplished shortly after first light and no one was allowed to leave the village. Upon completion of search in Plai Keng Tong (ZA682229) infantry moved to Plai Ye 30 (ZA682237) and began search. The civic action team continued to work in Plai Keng Tong. At 26:509 September 1966 psychological war aircraft made a loudspeaker pass over both villages.

c. Fire support peculiar to operations: Normal fire support coordination was made. One section of 5P 4.2" mortars was attached to B-1 LCP.

d. Success of operations: 2 VMES detained for further interrogation.

e. Type forces involved: Infantry, two platoons reinforced, armor, company (-) two platoons (+) scout platoon (-) and military intelligence team, civil affairs team and psychological operations team.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. Item: Friendly forces must arrive prior to or at first light.

Discussion: VC forces will enter the village at or after dark and leave at or shortly after first light.

Observation: By timing their arrival to first light friendly forces will arrive while a maximum of VC forces are still in the village.

b. Item: Upon arrival of armor, the VC will attempt to flee the village on the opposite side.

Discussion: Small VC element will attempt to avoid contact with armored elements and also to infiltrate the village being surrounded.
SUBJECT: Roundup Operation (U) Conducted on 24 and 26 September 1966

Observation: Simultaneous arrival of air landed infantry and armored elements or simultaneous approach from multiple directions will prevent VC escape.

a. Items: Roundup operations lend themselves well to conduct of psychological operations.

Discussion: Psychological operations conducted while the audience is surrounded by visible power is more effective than random missions over areas where they can be readily countered by VC present in the area.

Observation: Psychological operations aircraft should make their passes immediately after the village has been surrounded and the people assembled to exploit the confusion and fear created.

C. O. : CLARK
LTC, Armor
Commanding
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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 69TH ARMOR
APO San Francisco 96255

7 November 1966

SPECIAL: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 October 1966)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDH-GC
APO San Francisco 96262

SECTION I
UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. General:

a. Mission: During the month the 1st Battalion 69th Armor provided the control headquarters for the defense of the 3d Brigade Task Force forward base area, provided a control headquarters for a mobile reserve/reaction force for the 3d Brigade Task Force and 1st Infantry Division. Elements of this battalion were positioned at Plei Me, Dug Co, Pleiku, 4th Division forward OP at LZ 36 (YA865456) to provide security for Special Forces Camps, artillery units and command elements. The battalion conducted extensive LOC security missions within the 3d Brigade Task Force and 1st Infantry Division AO. Other missions accomplished by elements of the battalion were security for RRU, village search and clear, and support of infantry units conducting combat operations.

b. Task Organizations:

(1) HHH, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 1-31 October 66.

(2) Co A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 1-12, 30-31 October 66.


(4) Co C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 1-6, 14-31 October 66.

(5) Troop C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1-17, 30-31 October 66.

(6) Co A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 1-5 October 66.

(7) Co C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, 6-14 October 66.

(8) Platoon, Co D, 65th Engineer Battalion, 24 October 66.

(9) Co B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 15-17 October 66.

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2. Personnel:

a. Unit Strengths:

(1) Beginning Period Strengths:

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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>34</td>
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</table>

(2) Gains and Losses by Grade:

(a) Gains:

1. 2d Lt - 1
2. Lt - 1
3. 3d Lt - 1

(b) Losses:

1. 1st Lt - 3
2. Lt - 1
3. 2d Lt - 9
4. Lt - 10
5. Lt - 25
6. 3d Lt - 18

(3) Battle Losses - 0

(4) Non-Battle Losses - 1

(5) Ending Period Strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>ASG</th>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>534</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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TOARM-O 7 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 October 1966)

b. Morale: Morale was good during the reporting period.
   (1) Mail Service: Mail service was good for the reporting period.
   (2) R&R: During this period the battalion received the following R&R allocations:
       (a) Tokyo - 7
       (b) Hong Kong - 7
       (c) Singapore - 1
       (d) Taipei - 6
       (e) Bangkok - 6
       (f) Kuala Lumpur - 1
       (g) Penang - 3
       (h) Manila - 2
       (i) Hawaii - 3
   (3) Promotions: 40 EM were promoted during the reporting period.
   (4) Awards and Decorations: During the period the battalion submitted the following awards:
       (a) 1 Legion of Merit
       (b) 39 Bronze Stars (26 approved)
       (c) 52 Army Commendation Medals (8 approved)
       (d) 2 Air Medals
   (5) Enlistments: Three EM enlisted during the reporting period.

3. Intelligence: The following enemy contact was made by elements of this battalion during the reporting period.

a. Enemy Activity:
   (1) 1 October 66: Scout Platoon, 1-69 picked up 1 VNCS at ZA165342.
   (2) 2 October 66: A-1-69 tank hit a mine at ZA176122 with 38
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negative injuries.

(3) 7 October 66: A-1-69 reported finding 3 antipersonnel mines at ZA199649.

(4) 16 October 66: Scout Platoon, 1-69 picked up 2 VMES at ZA131411. Found drawings of weapon (MAS 36) on ground.

(5) 15 October 66: Scout Platoon, 1-69 located one booby trapped trip flare. The flare body had 30 caliber carbine ammo wrapped to it.

(6) 27 October 66:

(a) HQ tank hit a mine at ZA215230 with negative casualties.

(b) Scout Platoon, 1-69 reported locating one antitank mine and destroyed the mine with caliber .50 fire at ZA210230.

(7) 31 October 66: 3-1-69 tank hit a mine with negative casualties at ZA196200.

b. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain: The terrain trafficability has improved for armor, wheel vehicles and foot troops during this period.

(2) Weather: From 1-31 October the weather was generally clear with unlimited visibility, exceptions: early morning ground fog in area of operations, which dissipated early, and intermittent rain showers. The average visibility for this period was 10 KM and the average ceiling was 3-5000 broken.

4. Operations:

a. 1-17 October 66: During this period the battalion continued to provide the perimeter defense control headquarters for the brigade forward base area and continued to provide the brigade with a mobile reserve/reaction force positioned at Catecka. The battalion provided security for the brigade base camp, at Pleiku and Special Forces Camps and artillery positions at Duc Co and Plei Me. Additional missions were route security, convoy escort, village search and clear, RBU security, LLOC surveillance and support of infantry units conducting combat operations in their assigned areas of operation. The battalion scout platoon secured the road from CP #6 ZA122267 to CP 3 AR773336 three times and from CP 6 ZA199348 to check point #3 once, provided security for RBU seven times, searched and cleared two villages in the vicinity of ZA185340 and ZA186402 on the 2d and 10th of October, detaining two suspects. Also it escorted convoys on four days and assisted in escorts three times. On 1 October the platoon (-) continued to work on constructing a bridge at cooed YA975297a. The battalion mortar platoon continued to fire in support of the 3d Brigade HAM program. The attached infantry company conducted 23 dismounted patrols and 10 night ambushes in the vicinity of the brigade forward base area at Catecka and participated in one village search mission.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learnt (1-31 October 1966)

(1) Company A (- 1 platoon) was positioned at Plei Me from 1-12 October to provide security for the artillery located near the Special Forces Camp. One platoon was at Cateoka for security of the 3rd Brigade Forward Base area from 1-7 October, at Duo Co for security of artillery and the Special Forces Camp from 7-10 October and under OPOCON TF 2-35 Infantry for operations along Route 19 from 10-14 October. On 10 October 1 platoon from Plei Me moved to Waikiki (ZA18112) and was OPOCON TF 1-35 until 12 October when the company headquarters and remaining platoon were placed OPOCON TF 1-35 and moved to Waikiki. The company (-) remained OPOCON TF 1-35 until 14 October when the entire company moved to Pleiku to prepare for attachment to the 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry for LOC security operations between Pleiku and Ann Khe. This attachment was affected on 15 October and remained in effect for the remainder of this period. On 1 October one platoon secured an engineer work party along Route 60. On 3 October one platoon escorted a convoy from OP #3 (AR774368) to Plei Me and back to OP #3. On 7 October, the company (-) moved with the CIDG from Plei Me USSF Camp south of Coa Co Mountain to investigate a report of mines. Two antipersonnel mines were located at ZA165337 and removed.

(2) Company B remained at the brigade forward base area at Cateoka for the entire period. It opened the road between OP #8 (ZA122257) and OP 3 AR77336 (eleven times, and once between OP #8 ZA122257 and OP #6 ZA199360. Two convoys were escorted to Plei Me and three to Duc Co. An engineer work party was secured on the 2d, 4th, 5th, 10th, 12th and 19th of October. On the 17th one platoon escorted Company C, 2-8 Infantry to a village at YA968285, secured it while it was searched and then returned to Cateoka.

(3) Company C (- 1 platoon) was positioned at Duk Co for security of artillery and the USSF Camp from 1-6 October. On 7 October the company (-) moved from Duc Co to 12 TF (TA828172) and was OPOCON TF 2-8 Infantry until 13 October. The company (-) moved on 13 October to Pleiku Base Camp for maintenance services. One platoon performed escort missions from 1-6 October and moved to Duc Co to provide security for the artillery and USSF Camp until 17 October. During this period Company C elements escorted 13 convoys to Duc Co, 2 from Duc Co to Cateoka, and one from OP #3 AR773367 to check point #12 (YA755251), and back to check point #3. Elements also provided security for 1 engineer work party and one CIDG mission during the period.

(4) Troop C-3-4 was positioned at Pleiku Base Camp for maintenance from 1-10 October 1966. On 10 October Troop C-3-4 was detached from 1-69 Armor and placed OPOCON 1-69 Armor. On 10 October one platoon moved from Pleiku was placed OPOCON TF 2-35 for LOC security missions on Route 19 east of Pleiku. This platoon remained on this mission for this period however OPOCON passed from 2-35th Infantry to 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry on 15 October. On 13 October one platoon moved to Cateoka to assist in security of the brigade forward base area. On 14 October the Troop (-) moved to Cateoka under OPOCON 1-69 Armor. On 16 October the Troop (- 1 platoon) moved from Cateoka to escort an artillery unit to Plei Pjereng and had progressed to YA303215 by the night of 17 October.

b. 16-31 October 66: On 18 October the battalion (-) moved from 40

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 October 1966)

Cateoka to the Pleiku Base Camp. On 20 October the 1st Battalion 69th Armor was released OPOON 3d Brigade Task Force and attached to the 6th Infantry Division. On 22 October the battalion was alerted as a reaction force for the relief of USSF Camps at Plei Me and Due Co. This mission continued until 30 October when the battalion forward command post moved from the Pleiku Base Camp to 2A0571A5. From this forward location the battalion conducted LLOC security mission along Route 19 from 2A077309, north along connecting road to Route 509 and along Route 509 from Pleiku to Plei Djereng. During the period 20-31 October the battalion conducted road runner operations along Routes 19 and 509, escorted LLOC resupply convoys and secured engineer work party on Routes 19, 19 and 509.

(1) Company A was attached to 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry for LLOC security operations along Route 19 from Pleiku to An Nhie from 18-29 October 1966. On 30 October the company reverted to battalion control and moved to LZ 3G (2A0661A5) and assumed LLOC security missions along Route 509 from 2A0971A4 to 2A0857A0.

(2) Company B conducted extensive LLOC security operations along Route 509 between Pleiku and Plei Djereng. The company also provided a platoon to secure the artillery and USSF Camp at Due Co from 22-31 October 1966. On 26 October the company (-) moved from Pleiku base camp to a field location vicinity coordinates 2A0551A5, on 28 October the company moved to 2A1021A5 and on 30 October moved to 2A0851A5 to provide security for the battalion forward OP and C Battery 5th Battalion 16th Artillery. During this period the company escorted 28 resupply convoys west along Route 509 and 13 convoys of empty trucks back to Pleiku.

(3) Company C remained at Pleiku Base Camp until 30 October 1966 for maintenance services. Concurrently the company provided security for engineer work party and performed convoy escort operations. On 30 October the company moved to Plei Rongol to conduct LLOC security operations along Route 19 from 2A093270. During this period Company C secured an engineer work party on Route 19 and on Route 509. The company also escorted 3 east bound and 1 west bound convoy along Route 509. At 302040 October Company C was placed OPOON 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry for reinforcement of Plei Me USSF Camp. The company made a night tactical march from Plei Rongol to 2A205215 closing at 310200 October.

(4) Troop C-3-4 was placed OPOON 1st Battalion 69th Armor on 30 October 1966. The troop was positioned at LZ 3G (2A8561A5) and assumed LLOC security operations along unnumbered route running from Route 19 to Route 509 from 2A096270 to 2A091A46.

5. Logistics:

a. Logistics support during the first half of the month continued to show improvement as the demand data accumulated by this unit during the last five months has increased the PLL authorizations. The time lapse and percentage of fill have continued to improve. The transfer of responsibility for logistic support to the 6th Infantry Division has caused several problems but these should be resolved as the battalion becomes familiar with the 4th
Division supply procedures.

b. Resupply missions to forward units, both at the GP location and at forward combat locations remained adequate for the period 1-20 October. During the remainder of the month proper coordination was not made on several occasions.

c. Maintenance:

(1) Maintenance services were conducted for nine tanks and 27 personnel carriers in the cavalry troop and 17 tanks in C Company. Scheduled services were brought to date considering the time element; however considering the 750 mile quarterly services, the vehicles should be serviced approximately each 30 to 45 days.

(2) Replacement repair parts were critical in the area of tank suspension items. One other item was critical for a period in October - the tank generator control box.

(3) Major assemblies used during this period are:

- (a) Tank engines - 4
- (b) Tank transmissions - 7
- (c) APC engines - 11
- (d) APC transmissions - 4
- (e) APC transmission cases - 3
- (f) APC control differential - 2
- (g) VTR engine - 1
- (h) VTR transmission - 1

d. Construction during the month was limited in the forward area but when the battalion returned to base camp on the 18th of the month several projects were begun and completed.

- (1) Finished the sandbagging of all perimeter bunkers.

- (2) Constructed 5 G.P. medium tent kits including one (1) to be used as an officers mess.

- (3) Constructed 2 G.P. small tent kits.

- (4) Started construction of 3 ammunition bunkers.

e. Statistical Data: 42
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7 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 October 1966)

(1) Fuel
   (a) Diesel: 41,500 gallons
   (b) NGAS: 36,600 gallons

(2) Ammunition
   (a) Cal .50: 3,100
   (b) Cal .50: 2,000
   (c) Cal 5.56mm: 7,500
   (d) Cal 7.62mm: 15,000 (M14)
   (e) 90mm HE: 75
   (f) 90mm Cunister: 40
   (g) 90mm WP: 25
   (h) L.50 HE: 3,400
   (i) L.50 WP: 22
   (j) L.50 Illumination: 2
   (k) 40mm: 75

(3) Rations:
   (a) Breakfast: 20,450
   (b) Dinner: 20,850
   (c) Supper: 20,900

   (d) Breakdown of the above consumed rations are:
      55% A's, 25% B's, 20% C's.

(4) The following miles were travelled during the periods:

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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>6,109</td>
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<td>M106 (Mortar Carrier)</td>
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<td>M8A2 (AVIB)</td>
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<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M88 (VTR)</td>
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   TOTAL MILES 59,037

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November 1966

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6. Aviation:
   a. A OH-2 ship was used on 27 days.
   b. Resupply sorties flown during the period totaled approximately 150. These sorties were primarily flown on UH-1 type ships although CH-47's were used for water and heavy maintenance parts (70%-30%).

7. Civic Action/Psychological Warfare: Civic Action programs were carried out in the following villages by attached CA personnel during this period:
   a. Plei Kbang Ya Tong - ZA084205
   b. Plei Poo Xoi - ZA186402, with 2 suspects captured.

8. Engineer Support: None

SECTION II

1. Observations:
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Operations:
      (1) Tracked vehicle ford conditions:
         Item: The present conditions of vehicle fords is unknown.
         Discussion: Approaches to tracked vehicle fords are the key to their suitability. During the monsoon rains the approaches may have been damaged by high water.
         Observation: Tracked vehicle fords should all be checked as soon as practical to determine trafficability.

      (2) Convoy Organization:
         Item: Standard doctrine is for the slowest or most cumbersome vehicle to be placed in the front of the convoy.
         Discussion: This practice slows convoys and at times blocks the route entirely. It has been found advisable to place these vehicles at the rear of the convoy. If they encounter difficulty they are near the recovery vehicle and can be secured by elements of the route security force.
         Observation: Slow and cumbersome vehicles such as 5000 gallon tankers should be placed near the rear of the column.

      (3) Two way traffic on secondary roads:
         Item: It is desirable to use secondary roads for two way...
CONVOY TRAFFIC.

Discussion: During convoy operations along Route 509 it has been found that convoy traffic in both directions can be conducted if strict control is maintained. There must be established by passes and convoy traffic controlled so that one halts while the other passes as they meet in areas where 2 way traffic is possible.

Observation: It is recommended that two way convoy traffic be planned for all roads including secondary as it greatly speeds up resupply and provides more security due to increased traffic.

c. Organization and Training: None

d. Intelligence: Mining of LOC

Item: Mining of major lines of communication during period of non use.

Discussion: When major routes of communications are not travelled for a long period of time heavy mining of the route can be expected due to the lack of surveillance along the route during this period.

Observation: When travel is resumed along a route which has not been used for a period of time (1-2 weeks) maximum use must be made of mine sweeping techniques, rigid convoy discipline, and route security procedures.

e. Logistics:

(1) Resupply Failures:

Item: Resupply placed aboard aircraft did not reach the unit intended.

Discussion: On several occasions supplies put on various aircraft would not reach the required unit even though location and call signs were given the pilots.

Observation: In order to remedy the above problem it is recommended that a courier of some sort accompany each resupply load to ensure that the proper unit or individual receives the designated supplies.

(2) Engineer Support for LOC:

Item: Roads develop trouble spots when subjected to large amounts of heavy resupply traffic.

Discussion: The escort element will be able to identify trouble spots. The engineers responsible for maintenance of the route should be responsive to the escort unit so that repairs can be made before the route becomes unusable.
TIARN-O
7 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 October 1966)

Observation: It is recommended that an engineer liaison team be assigned to the escort unit.

(3) Reduction of turn around time.

Items: Turn around time is extended greatly due to excessive unload time at destination.

Discussion: Logistics elements must make arrangements to facilitate rapid unloading of supplies at the destination. There have been many instances of unload time in excess of four hours which precluded the return of empty trucks or escort vehicles as planned.

Observation: It is recommended that adequate material handling equipment be provided at the forward logistical base to expedite unloading.

f. Other: Radio Communications:

Items: During the monsoon season condensation collects in the MT 1029/VRC and bases of the VRC series radio.

Discussion: Condensation causes short circuits and reduces operational range of the VRC series radio.

Observation: During the monsoon season inspection of these components should be made by organizational maintenance personnel and dried out as required.

2. Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: It is recommended that convoys that must be escorted by combat units be limited to 30 vehicles. This will permit the employment of one tank platoon which can provide adequate security and is small enough for positive control.


d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: None

C. O. CLARK
LTC, Armor
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVVH-EC (28 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 August - 31 October 1966) (RSG OSGOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 4th Infantry Division, APO US Forces 96262

TO: Commanding General, I Force V, ATTN: AVFA-EC-OAT, APO US Forces 96350

1. (U) Forwarded is the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966, submitted by the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.

2. (U) The reported unit was attached to the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966.

3. (U) The report is considered adequate and has been reviewed by this headquarters. Specific comments follow:

a. Paragraph 2a, Section III, Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 August 1966) recommended that the battalion should be relieved of the mission as a control headquarters for defense and security of the brigade forward base area when assigned a tactical mission in an area of operations. Terrain limitations in the area of operations have dictated the primary use of armor as route security. The positioning of the battalion headquarters in the forward base area is necessary for the control of route security missions. The additional mission of control headquarters for base security relieves the brigade staff to devote more time to the tactical operations. When an area of operations is available for armor to be used in its primary role as a maneuver element it will be so utilized.

b. Paragraph 2b, Section III, Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 August 1966) recommended a permanent bridge be emplaced on Route 19 at coordinates YA 974231. The 20th Engineer Battalion has this mission and work is almost complete.

c. Paragraph 5a, Section III, Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 August 1966) recommends that Route 19 to Do Co be repaired in anticipation of next year's monsoon. The 937th Engineer Group and 20th Engineer Battalion are presently upgrading this road to class 50.

d. Paragraph 5b, Section III, Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 August 1966) recommends priority of issue of Xenon searchlights for the battalion. Xenon searchlights are presently being issued to the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.

e. Paragraph 1b(1), Section II, Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 October 1966) recommends tracked vehicle fords in the area of operations be checked to determine trafficability. All known tracked
车辆在该区域的通过能力已被检查，以确定交通能力，并采取必要的维修措施。

- 第1段，第二部分，操作报告：从8月1日至10月31日期间，吸取教训，建议在前送后勤基地配备足够的物料搬运设备，以加速卸货，从而缩短周转时间。目前，叉车和/or起重机等物料搬运设备已定位在前送后勤基地。

- 第2段，第二部分，操作报告：从8月1日至10月31日期间，吸取教训，建议在必要时将运量限制在30辆。这允许一个坦克排对移动中的运量进行等效的控制。目前，采用不同的方法来确保地形和建立路线上的坚固点，以允许大运量的自由行驶。

F. THE COMMANDER:

DENNIS E. BURKE
LT, AGC
Adj AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 August - 31 October 1966) RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

Headquarters, T Field Force Vietnam, APO US Force 96350 15 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Force 96307

(C) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarter 4 Period Ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded with the following comments:

a. Section I, Paragraph 5 (Logistics): Attachment of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor to the 11th Infantry Division occurred during the period that the 70th Maintenance Battalion (-) was engaged in establishing shop facilities, inventorying repair parts shipped from CONUS, and establishing a consolidated technical supply for customer support. The Authorized Stockage List of the 70th Maintenance Battalion (-) was developed to support only 13 M60A3 tanks since Company B (Forward Support), attached to 3d Platoon, 4th Infantry Division (MCSM to IT FORSRV) carried the Authorized Stockage List for the division's tank battalion. The 70th Maintenance Battalion has completed action to adjust stock levels to compensate for the added density of equipment created by attachment of the 1st battalion, 69th Armor.

b. Section II, Paragraph 4 (VC/NVA fighting techniques): Artillery interdiction fires on or adjacent to remote, infrequently used roads have proved effective in disrupting enemy mining activities. The use of time and proximity fused High Explosive or Shell, A/PERS-7, 105mm, XM 516 is preferred over point detonation fuses since no damage will be inflicted on the road bed. Remote areas, such as those described in the basic report, which have little or no civilian traffic, are appropriate for artillery interdiction. Where appropriate, interdiction fires should be planned on lane locations susceptible to extensive mining.

c. Paragraph 3d of 1st Support, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division: Xenon Searchlight kits issued to 1st battalion, 66th Armor were received less required 180 Infrared Binocular Equipment. 4th Infantry Division has requested the 1st Logistical Command to expedite delivery of 20 binoculars to permit exploitation of the infrared capability provided by Xenon Searchlight Kits.

FOR THE COMMANDER

WILLIAM J. FISHER
Colonel, G3
Adjutant General

3 Troop
DC

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHOC-DN (6 Nov 66)  2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RGCS GPFOR-66)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96507  F 4 NOV 67

TO:  Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-OT
     APO 96556

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor as instructed.

2. Reference Paragraph 5b, Section III, Page 15; Paragraph 3d, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement: These searchlights are presently being installed on all NAAAJ combat tanks in RVN as prescribed in DODMO 9-2350-22K-301. Failure to include the M18 Binocular in MNO kits received has been reported to the COMUS Project Manager for Tanks. Corrective action is anticipated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. R. AUTREY
Cpt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

3 Incl

50

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GFOR-OP (3 Nov 66) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS GFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. L. MacMillan
CPT, AG
Asst AG

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