<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD385845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (16 Nov 67) FOR OT

22 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding General
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Continental Army Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Chemical Corps School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School

(Continued on page 2)
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION: (Cont'd)
Commandants
US Army Signal School
US Army Transportation School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Civil Affairs School

Copies furnished:
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Security Officer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Office of the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering ODD (SEAM) ODDR&E
CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
AYTs: AVCA-GO-H
APO 96307

HEADQUARTERS
29TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP (US) 8
APO US Forces 96491

SUBJ: Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65).

TO: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
AYTs: AVCA-GO-H
APO 96307

This report contains information affecting the
interest of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and "it is
prohibited for the transmission or the revelation of its contents to any
person to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECTION I
SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. Personnel

1. A change of command took place 28 September 1966. Colonel
F. A. Hinrichs the new commander relieved K. S. Whitmore the departing
commander.

2. Since COSTAR implementation on 20 July 1966 the group has ex-
perienced a shortage of personnel in all its units. Since the last report
there has been but a slight increase on personnel fills. The fills have kept
only slightly ahead of the personnel rotating.

3. VIP Visits - With the continuing growth of the group and long
Binh area this headquarters has received many notable visitors. Commanders
have been favorable to the groups progress and performance of mission.

Some of the higher ranking officials were:

DDC
DEC 19 1967

B 003 650
4. Civic Actions:

(a) During the reporting period the units in the group were quite active in the civic action program and numerous projects were carried out. On 22 September 1966, a donation of approximately 10,000 piastres contributed by members of the 3rd Ordnance Battalion was presented to Father Nguyen-Duc-Nghi by LTC Eicher, Commanding Officer, 3rd Ordnance Battalion to assist the village of Tan Binh in completing their new church/school.

(b) The 3rd Ordnance Battalion delivered twenty-five care school kits and 300 refill kits to the Tan Binh school. Approximately 400 pounds of clothing and 2,500 bars of soap were distributed to the people of Tan Binh. The clothing was donated by the Roger Ludlowe High School in Fairfield, Connecticut. The 185th Maintenance Battalion distributed clothes, tooth brushes, tooth paste and cleaning supplies to the Da Minh Orphanage Home and the people of Bui Thuong village. English classes were held for the sisters at the orphanage.

(c) Units in the group supported their individual civic action projects with transportation of material and equipment to load and unload the
B. Operations

1. The 29th Group OPLAN 1-66 was issued on 29 July 1966, in the support of "Operation Bluejay" and "Operation Oahu". The group's mission was to establish a forward supply area at Tay Ninh for the purpose of providing all classes of supply and services including maintenance in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade during its staging operation.

2. The 29th Group OPLAN 2-66 was issued on 29 August 1966. This OPLAN was published in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade at Tay Ninh. The group's mission was to establish and operate an Engineer Class IV Supply Point at Tay Ninh (west) until further notice.

3. The 29th Group OPLAN 3-66 was issued on 30 August 1966. This OPLAN was published in support of "Operation Wren". The group's mission was to provide or arrange for all logistical support required by the Philippine Civic Action Group to stage into Tay Ninh.

4. The 29th Group OPLAN 4-66 was issued on 13 October 1966. This OPLAN was published in support of "Operation Shenandoah". The group's mission was to establish a forward supply for the purpose of providing logistical services and maintenance as requested in support of the 1st Infantry until termination of the operation.

5. The 29th Group OPLAN 5-66 was issued on 19 October 1966. This OPLAN was published in support of "Operation Albany" (Contingency Plan).
6. The 29th GS Gp OPORD 1-66 was published on 15 August 1966 stating the group's mission. Generally it is to provide supply, service and maintenance support to US Forces and Third Country Forces less Class III, Engineer Class IV, TC Aviation, and medical as directed by the CO, USASC, Saigon. In addition it assigns missions to attached battalions; covers the intelligence situation in the III Corps area; a troop list; a security plan; and a damage control plan.

7. The 29th GS Gp OPORD 2-66 was published on 30 September 1966 establishing a supply point within the 196th Infantry Bde Base camp to support all US and free world forces located in the vicinity of Tay Ninh.

8. The 29th GS Gp OPORD 3-66 was published on 30 September 1966 establishing a supply point within the 11th ACR base camp area to support all US and free world forces located in the vicinity of Xuan Loc.

9. The 29th GS Gp OPORD 4-66 was published on 7 October 1966 establishing a supply point at Phu Loi to support all US and free world forces in the Phu Loi area.

10. Operation Toledo was supported by the 29th General Support Group. The 29th General Support Group provided logistical support for Classes I, II, IV, and V to the 173rd Airborne Brigade for Operation Toledo, from its commencement on 12 August 1966 until its termination on 6 September 1966.
11. Operation Shenandoah: From 10 October 1966 to 1 November 1966, the 29th General Support Group provided Class I, III, V, laundry, bath and Graves Registration to the 1st Infantry Division engaged in operation Shenandoah. Two Forward Supply Points, one at Lai Khe and one at Phu Loi were established for the duration of the operation.

12. Operation Meadowlark was the staging of the 11th ACR. The operation began on 6 September 1966 and ended on 2 October 1966. Troops from the 11th ACR debarked at Vung Tau and were flown by C-130 to Bien Hoa Air Base for bus transportation to the staging area in the vicinity of Ho Nai. Equipment was off-loaded at Saigon Port and conveyed to the staging area. The 29th General Support Group provided Class I, Class V, water, and maintenance support during this staging operation.

13. Operation Robin was the staging of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The Brigade personnel arrived at Vung Tau and was moved by vehicle convoy from that port to the staging area vicinity Long Thanh (Bear Cat). Unit vehicles and equipment were unloaded at Saigon Port and conveyed to the staging area. The 29th General Support Group established a logistical Command and Control Center and provided Class I, III and V supplies plus laundry and water to the Brigade.

14. Other operations supported by the 29th General Support Group were Kamuela, Decatur, North/South Carolina and Sioux City. Support in these operations were of Class only.
15. Base development plans for all group cantonment and operational areas in Long Binh were submitted to USARV on 3 October 1966. The group is now awaiting publication of the Long Binh base development plan.

16. During this period conferences were held, with personnel of the 1st Inf Div, for the purpose of acquiring 1,000,000 sq meters in Phu Loi to form a 1st Log Logistical complex.

17. Engineer effort continues during this period in the construction of area IV of the group Ammunition Supply Depot. On 18 October 1966 the 18th Engineer Brigade began an area improvement project to improve the 266th S&S Bn operational area in Long Binh. Construction of permanent facilities by the engineers has progressed slowly due to higher priority projects in the Long Binh area.

18. During this reporting period the group sponsored eight units of which four were assigned to the group and four to other 1st Log units in the Long Binh area. This duty involves receiving the advance party and main party, and providing rations, quarters and/or administration.

19. On 4 October 1966 the 228th Supply and Service Company relocated to Tay Binh for the purpose of operating a forward supply area in the support of that complex.

20. On 13 October 1966 the 548th relocated to Phu Loi for the purpose of forming a FSA. On 26 October 1966 the 551st relocated to Xuan Loc for the purpose of forming a FSA. These movements were made in accordance with a published plan "Concept of Operations", US Army Support Command, Saigon.
21. During this period the operations section assumed the functions of the AG classified files section to expedite routine handling of classified material.

22. The 29th General Support Group's J80-1 on Emergency Evacuation and Destruction of classified material was published.

23. MTOS's have been submitted by all Battalions where necessary to realign the personnel and equipment needs based on COSTAR configuration and the group's mission.

24. Mission changes during this period were the transferring of the Class I Depot mission on 16 August 1966 and the Long Binh Vehicle Park on 27 September 1966, from the group to the 506th Field Depot.

25. In support of combat operations during this period the group was required to supply personnel and equipment from its organic resources to supplement truck convoys. The personnel were used as shotguns and the vehicles were used to support the 48th Transportation Group convoy requirements. This added requirement made it necessary for the group to work on a 24 hour a day basis at times in order to fulfill its mission requirements.

26. Operational control of the 148th Ordnance Detachment at Vung Tau was transferred from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion and given to Vung Tau Area Command.
27. Construction has begun on 24 guard towers and 34 bunkers in the Ammunition Supply Depot to add to the ADS’s security measures. Work has been progressing slowly on these because of other high priority operational commitments.

28. Emergency operating plans have been written and distributed to all units within the group. Also during this quarter, Ground Defense Plans have been published.

29. All perimeters have been reviewed for barrier protection and defoliation. Barrier protection and defoliation improvements are in progress as a result of the review.

30. Shotguns have been issued to sentries posted on the interior perimeters. These short range weapons will minimize the danger to friendly troops in adjacent areas.

31. All battalion Physical Security Plans have been revised to meet current mission requirements and enemy situations.

32. Test exercises were conducted as a minimum of one a month by all units of the group to train and test our security plans.

C. Training and Organization:

1. Training
a. During this reporting period the 29th General Support Group continued to stress training; with special attention to On The Job Training, ammo handling, ammo renovation, M2E driving and maintenance, military occupational specialist training and unit mission type training. Formal training was conducted by all battalions. Subjects taught include: Security indoctrination, escape and evasion, Code of Conduct, familiarization of defense plans, driver education, M2E instructor and operator training, field sanitation, character guidance, military justice, troop information, radio procedure, firearms safety, tire inflation operating procedure, uniform violations, riding in unlicensed vehicles, the new service savings program (10%), monthly firearms orientation, crew served weapons familiarization, transporting personnel and cargo, accident prevention, day and night patrolling, radio telephoro procedures.

b. The 75th Heavy Materiel Supply Company is conducting unit training. It did not complete this phase of training while in CONUS.

2. Organization: The organization of the group at the end of the period is as follows:

   a. HHC, 29th General Support Group

   b. HHC, 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
      54th Ordnance Company (Ammo) (DS-GS)
      78th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Renov)
      550th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Support)
      551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Support)
      576th Ordnance Company (Ammo) (DS-GS)
      Det P, 212th Military Police Company (Sentry Dog)

   Confidential

   DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
   NONCLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
   LOD DIR 526.0.10

   Confidential
CONFIDENTIAL

c. Hq and Main Company, 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS)
   19th Light Maintenance Company (DS)
   94th Maintenance Company (DS) (DIV)
   116th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (GS)
   216th Collection, Classification & Salvage Company
   551st Light Maintenance Company (DS)
   548th Light Maintenance Company (DS)
   349th Signal Detachment (Radar Repair)

d. HHC, 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)
   228th Supply and Service Company (DS)
   506th Supply and Service Company (DS)
   624th Supply and Service Company (DS)
   75th Heavy Materiel Support Company

D. Intelligence:

1. Enemy Situation:

   The major Viet Cong units deployed in the III Corps Tactical Zone are the 5th Viet Cong Division with Division Headquarters at XS 7580 and the 9th Viet Cong Division with Division Headquarters at XT 5575. The Viet Cong have 12 Regiments, 50 battalions, 33 special companies and 27 special platoon size units in the III Corps area. Total enemy strength in III Corps is 28,597 (4,500 of which are North Vietnamese Army Troops).

   Viet Cong 274th Regiment and Viet Cong 272nd Regiment shifted toward Highway 15 in mid October. The US 1st Infantry Division made contact with one battalion from the 272nd Regiment on 28 October 1966. Resulting in 97 Viet Cong KIA (body count), 13 Viet Cong KIA (poss) and 2 Viet Cong captured.

2. Major incidents in Long Binh and surrounding areas that are of interest to this command.
CONFIDENTIAL

a. On 25 September 1966, 1/4 ton truck of 375th Radio Research Unit and a 2 1/2 ton truck from 121st Signal Company (1st Infantry Division) were hit by command detonated claymore mine(s) at YT 069030; 1 US KIA, 2 ARVN KIA, 6 US WIA.

b. On 10 October 1966, the Equipment Incorporated Motor Pool located at X3 94992 (Tu Duc) was attacked by an estimated 40 to 60 Viet Cong, using small arms, 60mm, hand grenades and bangalore torpedoes. An element of 3rd Ordnance Battalion security platoon repulsed the attack. 3 US WIA, 1 Vietnamese National KIA, 4 Viet Cong KIA, 1 Viet Cong WIA (poss).

c. On 12 October 1966, the 11th ACR compound at YT 070110 received small arms fire from unknown number of Viet Cong. 1 US KIA, Viet Cong losses unknown.

d. On 18 October 1966, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Base Camp at YT C09142 was attacked by unknown number of Viet Cong using small arms, grenades and claymore mines; 2 US KIA, 12 US WIA, 2 helicopters destroyed and one 2 1/2 ton truck damaged.

e. On 28 October 1966, the ammunition area of the 3rd Ordnance Battalion was attacked by unknown number of Viet Cong using small arms, mortars and satchel charges. Pad 4, Area III exploded destroying approximately 12,000 rounds of 8 inch ammunition, 2,633 rounds of 105 ammunition and 4,195 propellant charges. Two US personnel were killed in action and nine US personnel wounded in action. Viet Cong losses unknown.

3. The group suffered 3 KIA and 36 WIA during this period.

E. Logistics:

1. Ammunition:

a. As of 31 October 1966, the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh ASD has a total of 51,500 short tons of Class V stored.
b. A program is underway at the Long Binh ASD to barricade 19 class 7 storage pads.

c. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Activities:

   (1) The 3rd Ordnance Battalion's EOD Detachment, completed 132 incidents during the period.

   (2) Several Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance classes were given.

   (3) A total of 52 liaison visits to supported units were made during the reporting period.

   (4) EOD personnel test fired 120 rounds of renovated 81mm mortar ammunition during the period.

   (5) The EOD Detachment destroyed 339,600 rounds of unserviceable small arms, and 17,871 other items of unserviceable ammunition during the reporting period.

   (6) Recapitulation: At the end of the reporting period, 152,000 rounds of 81mm High Explosive ammunition had been modified by 3rd Ordnance Battalion personnel.

2. Maintenance:

a. The 29th General Support Group organized an organizational maintenance inspection team to inspect 1st Logistical Command units in the Long Binh Post and II Field Force units on a quarterly basis. In conjunction with the OHI Team, 29th Group Regulation 750-26 has been published prescribing maintenance objectives, and procedures for 29th General Support Group units.
b. During this period the 29th General Support Group assisted the US Army Weapons Command in the investigation of the numerous malfunctions of the Rifle, US, 5.56mm, M16E1 expressed by the 1st Infantry Division.

c. A team has been organized specifically for the repair of damage to idler arm spindles and hull separations on M113 APC's. It is anticipated that this program will result in a reduction of the number of M113 APC's evacuated for repair.

d. Maintenance support planning during the quarter has centered on advanced planning for support of divisional and nondivisional units scheduled into the command and the relocation of maintenance units to forward areas.

e. It was noted during the quarter that many units were experiencing problems with organizational maintenance, which resulted in an increased workload at field maintenance facilities. To assist these units in locating their maintenance problems, contact technical assistance teams were organized. Each unit is visited by the contact team on a scheduled basis, and additionally the team is available on call to its customer units. Since the establishment of the contact technical assistance teams the organizational and field maintenance backlogs have been declining.

3. Services:

a. The 266th Supply and Service Battalion operated laundry facilities at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, Phouc Vinh, Lai Khe, Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Xuan Loc, Decret and Long Binh. A total of 307,587 bundles of laundry were processed during the reporting period.
CONFIDENTIAL

b. Bath units were operated at Dì-An, Quán Loi, Tay Minh, Lai Khe, Phu Loi, Xuan Loc, and Long Binh during this period. These units administered 202,214 showers during the reporting period.

c. The bakery at Long Binh baked 229,828 pounds of bread during the reporting period. A second bakery is being erected at Cu Chi, but is not operational at the present.

d. The 266th Supply and Service Battalion operates a central graves registration collection point at Long Binh. An additional collection point is located at Tay Minh. Three graves registration teams are located at Quan Loi, Lai Khe and Xuan Loc respectively. A fourth team is stationed with the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

e. Two 15 ton capacity ice plants are now in operation. Plant #1 began operation 1 October 1966 and is now producing 14 tons per day and plant #2 became operational 18 October 1966 and now produces 6 to 9 tons per day.

4. General Supply:

a. Class I:

(1) Total strength supported at the Long Binh Class I Supply Point increased during the last quarter from 21,500, with 41 unit breaks to 35,000 for non-perishables with 90 unit breaks.

(2) Additional Class I Supply Points have been established at Tay Minh and Xuan Loc.

b. Class II and IV:
(1) The Long Binh Class II and IV supply point is undergoing renovation to alleviate problems of poor drainage and excessive damage to supplies.

(2) The Self Service Supply Center has relocated in a permanent warehouse.

(3) The transfer of quartermaster repair and textile and shoe repair capability has been transferred from the 266th Supply and Service Battalion to the 12th Maintenance Battalion, as a result of a change to COSTAR on 20 July 1966.

(4) The 125th Maintenance Battalion Technical Supply, reported 7,593 line items on its ASL. The present rate of effectiveness for ASL items is 83.2%.

(5) As a result of receipts of 1600 cubic foot reefers, the gross reefers capacity at the Class I Supply Point at Long Binh rose from 11,200 cubic feet to 15,600 at the end of the reporting period.

(6) A Class II and IV construction material storage and issue yard was added to the Tay Ninh Forward Supply Area.

(7) Presently 80,000 troops are being supported thru 190 "AT or YT" accounts in the Class II and IV supplies. Approximately 2/3 of our II and IV supplies have been relocated to provide for engineer effort to improve site conditions.
OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. Personnel - None
B. Operations - None
C. Training and Organization - None
D. Intelligence:
   1. Item: Security Forces
      DISCUSSION: That the present security forces at the LBAD is too small to provide adequate security to that installation.
      OBSERVATION: It is estimated that two companies of Infantry are required to properly secure that installation. Information from US Army Support Command, Saigon indicates that one company of Infantry should be available to the 3rd Ordnance Battalion on or about 1 December 1966 for the purpose of providing security to the Long Binh Ammunition Depot.
   2. Item: Reporting of Army Casualties
      DISCUSSION: There was a delay in submitting the casualty reports on members of the 1st Logistical Command Security Platoon killed and injured as a result of the incident at the Long Binh Ammunition Depot on 28 October 1966. The 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), who was responsible for initiating these casualty reports, was aware of the time limitations given on these actions.
In that the 1st Logistical Command Security Platoon personnel were on TDY for the purpose of guarding the Long Binh Ammunition Depot, their records were located in Saigon this fact precluded the 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Amno) from making verified entries on the casualty forms in an expeditious manner. Additionally, there was a conflict as to which form, MACV or USARV was required for the report.

**Observation:** Since this incident occurred the following corrective actions have been initiated:

a. Personnel records of the 1st Logistical Command Security Platoon TDY to the 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Amno) have been transferred to the custodian of records for that battalion located in Long Binh.

b. **ITEM:** Coordination of Major Units and Emergency Services

**Discussion:** A centralized priority system of communications netted to all emergency services, i.e., fire department, Military Police, area reactionary forces and the area commander is vital during an emergency situation.

**Observation:** During the preliminary attack and subsequent explosions and fire at the Long Binh Ammunition Depot on 28 October 1966, telephone communications through the Long Binh switch became so active that it impaired the efforts of the 29th Group to expeditiously notify the required emergency services and inform its subordinate and higher commands. Recommend the area commander take immediate steps to establish an emergency communications net.
E. Logistics:

1. ITEM: Excessive Backhaul

DISCUSSION: On previous combat support operations, large quantities of supplies have been stock-piled requiring back haul following the termination of the operation. The back haul requirement places an unnecessary burden on transportation assets.

OBSERVATION: Close coordination between the supported and supporting organizations during a combat operation will give the logistical support complex sufficient planning data to effectively dry up forward supply areas in a timely manner.

2. ITEM: Scarcity of MHE

DISCUSSION: During the initial unloading, incoming units have had little or no capability to off-load cargo in the staging area. The sponsoring units have provided some MHE for this off-loading at the expense of hampering their normal mission requirement.

OBSERVATION: The present availability of MHE is such that provision of this equipment to incoming units places a burden on sponsoring units.

3. ITEM: Employment of Fork Lifts

DISCUSSION: To a large degree terrain and weather conditions encountered in this area preclude the use of commercial fork lifts. Additionally, the high usage factor on rough terrain fork lifts has resulted in a high deadline rate of this equipment.

OBSERVATION: Commercial fork lifts are of limited value for field operations, particularly during the rainy season.
4. ITEM: Paletization of Ammunition

DISCUSSION: The 8th Aerial Port Squadron, Bien Hoa Airbase, has refused to ship unitized packs of 105mm and 4.2 inch ammunition aboard Air Force C-123 Aircraft. These packs are so constructed that they are not compatible with the rollers on C-123 aircraft and cannot be safely loaded.

OBSERVATION: Resulting requirement to repalletize ammunition prior to air shipment results in a slowing of the rate at which ammunition can be loaded.

5. ITEM: Engineer Support

DISCUSSION: A prodigious amount of engineer construction work remains to be done in the Long Binh Area. Priority of available Engineer efforts have been assigned to the completion of barricades around Class 7 pads in the ASD and improvement of roads and working areas in Supply and Maintenance complexes throughout the Group.

OBSERVATION: Extensive engineer effort is still required for the completion of facilities at Long Binh.

6. ITEM: Rifle, US, 5.56mm XM16E1

DISCUSSION: An investigation of excessive malfunctions of the XM16E1 rifle within the 1st Infantry Division disclosed that many of the rifles reported as having a record of excessive malfunctions performed flawlessly when properly cleaned and lubricated. Those weapons which continued to malfunction (primarily failure to extract) after cleaning and lubrication were found to have worn or weak parts. Proper cleaning material was not available such as bore brushes or bore cleaning compound in sufficient quantities to provide one for each rifleman.
CONFIDENTIAL

OBSERVATION: Training and continued supervision of bore, cleaning and lubrication, particularly at the company, platoon and squad, is needed to keep weapons in firing condition. Armorers need to learn how to recognize weak and worn parts which will affect the proper functioning of the rifle.

7. ITEM: Water Shortage

DISCUSSION: Experience indicates that it is often difficult to locate laundry and bath facilities near adequate water sources.

OBSERVATION: Water tankers are required for the transportation of water to laundry and bath sites in the field.

8. ITEM: Missing Equipment

DISCUSSION: Both washer and dryer units are being received without the generators necessary to operate them. This causes the equipment to be completely unusable until a generator can be procured.

OBSERVATION: Lack of complete equipment results in unnecessary loss of production.

9. ITEM: Class I Storage Area - Tay Ninh

DISCUSSION: Generally Class I subsistence supply points in the III Corps Tactical Zone are unsuitable. Soft ground, poor drainage, and heavy traffic, particularly during the rainy season, are the primary problems.

OBSERVATION: A lack of completed engineer effort to provide area drainage projects, hard surfaced storage pads and roadways prior to establishing Class I subsistence storage and issue areas has resulted in a high loss of rations, due to spoilage.
10. ITEM: Unidentified Shipment

DISCUSSION: The amount of material received, without documentation by the 266th Supply and Service Battalion Class II and IV supply point is decreasing but remains a problem. Unidentified material must be stored until identified causing an unnecessary build up of stocks.

OBSERVATION: The need to reestablish identity of supply including documentation hampers the efficient operation of the Class II and IV supply point.

F. Administration - None
PART 2
RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Personnel - None
B. Operations - None
C. Training and Organization - None
D. Intelligence - None
E. Logistics: 

1. That stockage levels at Forward Supply Area be revised on a weekly basis to more closely parallel unit issues over the preceding period. This will reduce the amount of stocks to a level that is acceptable to the supported unit and will materially reduce back-haul requirements.

2. That measures be taken to assure that a supply of water is available to laundry and bath facilities prior to their moving into the field. A 5,000 gallon tanker is the best means of providing water until a fixed water supply can be established at the laundry and bath facility.

3. That Class I ration break-down facilities be located on a high, well drained area.

4. That all necessary cleaning equipment be on hand prior to issue of Rifle US, 5.56mm XM16E1 to combat units.
5. That adequate training in the care and cleaning of the XM16E1 rifle be given to all personnel armed with that weapon. Additionally, ensure that serviceability of the XM16E1 rifle inspections be emphasized and made the subject of frequent Command Inspections.

6. That every effort be exerted at all levels to insure that proper documentation is attached to incoming supplies. A simple solution is to attach a copy of a DA Form 1348-1 for each item to the TCM.

F. Administration - None

F. A. Hinrichs
Col, OrdC
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

1st Log
SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFG-65) (29th GS Group)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY CONTACT FD, CAMBODIA, APO San Francisco 96307 1 (PRI 1966)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96307
Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army (ACSFOR, DA) Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded in accordance with paragraph 9, AR 1-19, dated May 1966.

2. Reference Section II, Part 1, D6. This command is implementing a
1st Logistical Command wide technical assistance program for the M16a1
rifle in the III and IV Corps areas. Teams will visit each US Army unit
having this rifle to provide repair, replacement and evacuation support as
required; training in repair, care, cleaning and lubrication of the rifle,
magazine and ammunition; assistance in revising unit PLL and ASL as required,
and assistance in obtaining sufficient quantities of cleaning and lubricating
equipment and materials.

3. Reference Section II, Part 2, B2. Instructions have been given
that a physical reconnaissance will be made of the proposed sites of both
bath and laundry operations to determine adequacy of water and security. In
some instances an auxiliary pump and additional hose will be required.
In some instances a 5,000 gallon tanker may be utilized. S&S Battalions
do not have this equipment authorized to them nor do they have the capability
to haul water. Bath support may also be through utilization of Decontaminat-
ing Trucks if they have not been previously used for defoliation.

GILBERT F. LEVY
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding

Dowgraded at 5 year Intervals:
Declasified after 12 years
DOD DR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGO-DH, APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by the 29th General Support Group for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) Reference Section I, paragraph 15: It is estimated that the Long Binh Base Development Plan will be published 25 December 1966.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 1: This headquarters is cognizant of the need for additional personnel for security of the logistical command supply complexes. On 20 September 1966 this headquarters approved 394 spaces for the 29th General Support Group to hire IN personnel for security guard duties. As security personnel become available, they are assigned security missions as appropriate.

4. (U) Reference paragraph D2G, Section II, Part I: Long Binh Post, a USAFV unit, has planned an emergency FM radio net for major units in the Long Binh area. Necessary equipment requests (USARV FORM 47) have been submitted by Long Binh Post and this net will be established when the equipment is issued.

5. (C) Reference paragraphs E1, Section II, Part I, and E1, Section II, Part II:
   a. This headquarters concurs with the observations indicated in paragraph E1, section II, Part I. Foreseeing this requirement, it has been the policy of this headquarters to state in all tactical OPLANS that direct coordination with supported units is authorized and directed. If a conflict exists whereby subordinate organizations cannot obtain necessary information vital for logistical support from a tactical organization or command this headquarters is prepared to take command action upon notification and request.
   b. This headquarters does not concur with paragraph E1, Section II, Part 2. The initial estimated day indicated for each tactical operation in this headquarters OPLANS is computed based on two factors.
      (1) Supplies necessary to sustain the tactical force structure under conditions of heavy combat.
      (2) Experience gained in supporting similar tactical force structures in previous combat operations in RVN.
(3) The estimated day initially is a guide established by this headquarters to insure that at the beginning of a tactical operation sufficient supplies are available to support the operation. This headquarters encourages changing estimated days and consequently stockage objectives based on the specific needs of the force being supported. These changes, however, should be based on average daily issues for a large statistical sample; then a previous week. When the average daily issue is a significantly larger or smaller figure than the estimated day, a subsequent alteration of the estimated day should be initiated by the supporting organization. The estimated day should be equal to or greater than the average day issue.

c. This headquarters is presently writing a regulation on the establishment and operation of FSAs to be published on or about the 5th of January 1967. This regulation will give subordinate organizations additional guidance in maintaining stockage levels.

5. (C) Reference: Paragraph E4, Section II, Part I, page 4:

a. The requirement to repalletize 105mm and 4.2 inch ammunition for shipment aboard the C-123 aircraft has slowed the loading rate by approximately two thirds. During the periods when the intensity of tactical operations is high, this loss of efficiency could seriously affect the adequacy of Class V support.

b. The Directorate of Ammunition, this headquarters, is currently studying this problem. Specific safety requirements and possible techniques for loading of this ammunition without repalletizing are being explored with the Directorate of Safety, 7th US Air Force.

7. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E5: The amount of engineer effort required in the Long Binh area is recognized by USAV and was the reason for relocation of an Engineer Battalion to support the construction. This added engineer effort should assist in the early completion of facilities.

8. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E6 and Section II, Part II, paragraphs E4 and E5: Support commands have been instructed to form M16 rifle assistance teams which were trained by a group of specialists from USAVECO. These teams are visiting all organizations armed with the M16 rifle to provide equipment training and assure that adequate NRLs and ASLS are on hand. The teams are also assuring that sufficient cleaning equipment and materials are on hand. Shortages of cleaning equipment and materials have been overcome. Weekly progress reports are being
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA 00-0
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

submitted on this project by support commands to this headquarters.

9. (U) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph E7 and Section II, Part II, paragraph E2:

a. Sixty-two deep wells are currently programmed in the USARV well drilling program for the Saigon Support Command area. Twenty-seven wells are under construction at the present time. Water distribution systems are programmed in the 67S MCA Program.

b. The Director of Services, Saigon Support Command, has been directed to utilize a POL tank truck for hauling water to support field laundry and bath operations when an adequate water source is not available.

c. Six 1,200 gallon and nine 5,000 gallon tank trucks are organic to a supply and service company.

10. (U) Reference paragraph E8, Section II, Part I: Action has been taken by this headquarters to requisition and install generators for field laundry equipment. Twenty-one generators are presently being installed in field laundry units throughout the command. Saigon Support Command received five generators to remove laundry equipment from deadline.

11. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph E9 and Section II, Part 2, paragraph E3: The lack of engineer effort at Tay Ninh was recognized and this headquarters requested engineer support on 9 November 1966 as an operational requirement in support of operations. This operational support was provided to include preparation of hardstand for Class I storage areas. The Class I area was located in accordance with a base development plan. The area was filled with laterite, compacted and drainage provided.

12. (U) Reference paragraph E6, Section II, Part II: The recommendation is valid when only one line item is shipped. When multipacks of 50 to 200 line items are shipped in one box, it is not practical. Proper documentation will provide sufficient copies of 1348-I to accompany the shipment within the box (usually attached to the item) and a packet taped or wired to the exterior of the box.

13. (U) The 29th General Support Group engaged in combat support operations for 92 days during this reporting period.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFCR-65) (U)

14. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by the comments contained in the preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. W. Marks, Jr.
1st Lt., AGC
Assist Adjutant General

TEL: Lynx 782/430
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96307 24 JAN 1967

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group as indorsed.

2. Concur with the basic report as modified by the previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-OT(15 Nov 66) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 29th Gen Spt Gp

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 16 FEB 1957

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

ROBERT L. BURCH
Lt Col, AGC
Asst AG