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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2.

C. W. EIFLER
Major General, USA
Commanding
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SECTION I  SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. (c) Significant events of the command for the period ending 31 October 1966.

a. The strength of the 1st Logistical Command has grown from 35,920 on 1 August 1966 to an assigned strength of 46,064 on 31 October 1966.

b. During the period the 1st Logistical Command effectively supported the following major tactical operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Unit</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUBOK</td>
<td>26 Mar-22 Sep</td>
<td>ATTLEBOROUGH</td>
<td>15 Sep-Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAUL REVERE</td>
<td>10 May-INDF</td>
<td>LAVIN</td>
<td>30 Sep-24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL PASO</td>
<td>2 Jun-3 Sep</td>
<td>SHERANDOAH</td>
<td>17 Oct-2 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN PAUL JONES</td>
<td>21 Jul-2 Sep</td>
<td>ADAMS</td>
<td>26 Oct-Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENARD</td>
<td>1 Sep-30 Oct</td>
<td>GERONIMO</td>
<td>31 Oct-Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAYER</td>
<td>13 Sep-1 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Debarking operations and movement of personnel and equipment to base camps was successfully completed by 1st Logistical Command units for the following major units arriving in Vietnam.

- Operation BLUE JAY 196th Infantry Brigade (Separate) and associated units.
- Operation MEADOW LARK 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and associated units.
- Operation STABLE 9th Infantry Division, Republic of Korea, and associated non-divisional units.
- Operation WÆEN Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam.

d. In Operation ROBIN, the debarkation of the 4th Infantry Division initiated on 20 July; arrival of personnel was completed in October. Movement of the equipment phase is scheduled to be completed in November.

e. Port operation and tonnage throughput increased during the period from 481,430 STON in July to a record high of 494,294 STON handled in October.

f. Increases as a result of recently completed facilities have helped offset the loss of tonnage handled as a result of the monsoon season at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon.
g. New facilities completed during the period or, developed sufficiently to allow partial use, included four barge sites allowing berthing and discharge of an additional ship at Newport, a barge discharge pier at Vung Ro, and a single berth on the Belong pier complex at Qui Nhon.

h. Permanent 2XL storage completed during the period included 40,000 bbls at Vung Tau; 9,000 bbls at Pleiku and an increase to 112,000 bbls at Qui Nhon, and 72,000 bbls at Nha Trang.

i. Distinguished visitors to the command during the period included:

- GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower (CIFC, USAAPAC)
- Honorable Robert S. McNamara (Secretary of Defense) 10-13 Oct
- Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp (Commander in Chief, Pacific) 10-13 Oct
- GEN Creighton W. Abrams (Vice Chief of Staff, DA) 14-20 Oct

A complete list of significant visitors is attached as Inclosure I.

j. The following personnel assignments and promotions were affected during the period:

(a) BG Shelto. E. Lollis, Deputy Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, temporarily assumed command of US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay on 6 September 1966 from BG Arthur L. Friedman who departed Vietnam on that date.

(b) BG Mahlon R. Gates, former Chief, Plans and Operation Division, Construction Division, H. IACV assumed command of US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay on 1 September 1966. General Gates was promoted to Brigadier General effective 27 October 1966.

(c) On 24 September 1966, Colonel James Gilman, Special Assistant for Material Readiness, was reassigned as Deputy Commander, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

(d) Colonel Aaron W. Walker replaced Colonel Gilman as Special Assistant for Material Readiness. Colonel Walker was assigned from the 25th Infantry Division on 19 September 1966.
g. New facilities completed during the period or, developed sufficiently to allow partial use, included four barge sites allowing berthing and discharge of an additional ship at Newport, a barge discharge pier at Vung Tau, and a single berth on the Delong pier complex at Qui Nhon.

h. Permanent fuel storage completed during the period included 40,000 bbls at Vung Tau; 9,000 bbls at Pleiku and an increase to 112,000 bbls at Qui Nhon, and 72,000 bbls at Nha Trang.

i. Distinguished visitors to the command during the period included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEN Dwight E. Beach</td>
<td>21-26 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIIC, US Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorable Robert S. Inbarmara</td>
<td>10-13 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral L.S. Grant Sharp</td>
<td>10-13 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Creighton W. Abrams</td>
<td>14-20 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff, DA</td>
<td></td>
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(c) On 24 September 1966, Colonel James Gilman, Special Assistant for Materiel Readiness, was reassigned as Deputy Commander, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.

(d) Colonel Aaron Z. Walker replaced Colonel Gilman as Special Assistant for Materiel Readiness. Colonel Walker was assigned from the 25th Infantry Division on 19 September 1966.
2. (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MATERIEL READINESS

   a. Presently staffed by four officers and three enlisted personnel, the Office of the Special Assistant for Materia Readiness has, during the past quarter, been involved in four major areas of activity:

   (1) Supervision of the Materiel Readiness Expeditees (MRE) program throughout the Command.

   (2) Monitoring follow-up actions taken on problems reported in Periodic Logistics Reports (PLR's).

   (3) Expediting the shipment of critical cargo throughout Vietnam.

   (4) Completion of special projects assigned by the Commanding General.

   b. The Materiel Readiness Expeditees (MRE) program has grown in size and scope during the last quarter and results achieved have been very satisfactory. LC Reg 740-1, recently published by this office standardizes policies and procedures governing MRE activities throughout the command. The regulation provides for a network of at least 20 MRE's who are appointed by and report directly to commanders of support commands and sub area commands. The purpose of the MRE is to provide the commander with a direct and continuous link with all customers of the supply and maintenance system be they combat, combat support, or logistics units. Their job is to unearth problems and expedite their solution while the problem is still in the formative stage. Frequent scheduled visits are conducted by MRE's to supported units to provide assistance. MRE's have been most valuable in locating critically needed repair parts for deadlined equipment. They have also been used effectively to locate shipments of cargo which have been misdirected or lost within the support command.

   c. Monitoring follow-up actions taken by support commands and staff directorates on problems reported by tactical units in their PLR's has been another major activity of this office. PLR's are now governed by USARV Reg 700-5 which was written by this office for Headquarters USARV. The 1st Logistical Command Regulation governing PLR procedures is currently being revised to provide for more efficient follow-up action on shortages reported. Determining the truly critical problems among the long lists of shortages submitted is the main problem encountered in follow-up action on PLR's. Some of the reporting units have been abusing the PLR by reporting as critical shortages items they desire for stockage or items which they desire in excess of authorization. This situation is being corrected by USARV Reg 700-5 which places heavy emphasis on the requirements to report only authorized combat essential items which are critically short in the unit. A program of increased communication with tactical units is also being pursued by this office to acquire information of the effect PLR shortages have on unit performance of mission, and to keep units up to date on the status of listed shortages requiring out of country action for solution.
The PLR, when properly used, is a valuable management tool providing consolidated theater-wide information on the needs of the tactical units and pointing the way for areas of emphasis in the supply and maintenance fields.

d. **Expediting the shipment of urgently needed cargo throughout Vietnam and retrograde cargo to CONUS is the job of the Air Traffic Coordinator assigned to this office.** Aided by an experienced transportation NGO, this officer chairs the biweekly Cargo Priorities Board. Here, representatives from staff directorates at this headquarters present their shipping problems to obtain priorities. Information obtained is taken to various area transportation agencies for coordination and expeditious movement of the cargo. Numerous requests for the movement of urgently needed cargo which is not critical enough for a combat essential lift have been handled in this manner during the last quarter. The Air Traffic Coordinator has also been a transportation trouble shooter for the command, searching for lost, strayed, or frustrated cargo. The experiences of this office have shown that when an urgent need arises, finding and fixing the item is a small task compared to that of getting it to the customer.
3. (U) AGofS, PERSONNEL.

a. The Special Services activities continue to expand in Vietnam and a request for 24 additional DAC spaces was submitted to US Army Vietnam in September. These spaces were predominantly for service club and craft personnel for the development of programs. Attempts are being made to hire personnel using nonappropriated funds pending approval of the spaces.

b. One hundred twenty-seven DAC spaces have been requested to augment the 14th Inventory Control Center. Department of the Army civilians with specialized logistical and supply management experience are considered essential since commodity management of Army supplies is accomplished by career civilians at the various depots and National Inventory Control Points in CONUS.

c. Nineteen additional military spaces were requested in September to effectively perform the personal effects mission assigned to the US Army Mortuary. Personal effects must be examined, reinventoried, and processed by the mortuary prior to shipment to the next of kin.

d. One hundred fourteen military spaces were requested in October to establish 500 gallon collapsible POL drum repair facilities in Saigon and Qui Nhon. The rate at which the drums are becoming unserviceable is mounting and the repair facility established in Qui Nhon from command resources is not able to handle the present and the anticipated workloads. Nonavailability of qualified personnel has seriously hampered efforts to relieve the backlog of unserviceable drums.

e. The accident and injury rates, both military and nonmilitary, declined steadily during the period of 1 August through 31 October 1966. Motor vehicle accidents and accidental discharge of weapons continue to be the primary contributors of injuries and property damage. The 4th Transportation Command recorded the highest rate in the command during August but reduced the rate sharply during the months of September and October. The command vehicle accident rate for this reporting period was as follows: August 0.9, September 0.8, October 0.9. The Support Commands at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay report the highest rates of injuries to military personnel. This can be attributed to increased 24 hour day, port and depot activities. Safety inspections and the use of protective clothing and equipment should isolate many of the accident prone areas at ports and depots. Supervision must constantly stress safety at ports and depots activities especially during hours of darkness. Continued emphasis is being placed on Army motor vehicle accidents in the following areas:

(1) Five minute safety talks for driver supervisors are being prepared by Support Command Safety Directors.

(2) Stand up type safety committee activity is being held at regular intervals.

(3) Continued emphasis is being placed on defensive driving.
f. Two civilian safety directors arrived during August for assignment to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, and Qui-Nhon Support Command. Increased effectiveness of the Command Safety Program is anticipated with the assignment of full time safety personnel.
4. (U) CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

Current Local National space allocations are 17,165 and the employment of Local Nationals throughout the command is steadily rising with some 13,000 direct hires reported at the end of the period. This is an increase of 4,000 since the previous reporting period. A Local National manpower ceiling is expected to be established in the near future. To that end, this headquarters reported to US Army Vietnam for the US Mission Budget Report, an estimated CY 67 Local National requirement of 26,000 direct hires for the command.
5. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

The operation of the Civil Affairs Branch of the 1st Logistical Command consisted of two major functions.

a. Distribution of relief supplies: The branch processed the requests for relief supplies, processed the supplies, prepared the shipments, and shipped 7,322,490 pounds of requested supplies to approved organizations throughout Vietnam during the period.

b. Supervision, coordination, and reporting of unit Civic Action projects: Continued surveillance of Civic Action projects within the command and coordination with existing supply sources in providing needed supplies for various Civic Action projects was accomplished. The branch also consolidated and forwarded reports from major subordinate commands concerning the status of Civic Action projects throughout the command.
6. (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL.

   a. On 1 September 1966 1st Logistical Command assumed responsibility for Army Personnel testing in Vietnam. A testing facility was established at each support command.

   b. Procedures were established to print, by means of ADP Equipment, the monthly officers roster for 1st Logistical Command units.

   c. Authority to compute and distribute enlisted appointment quotas for grades E1 through E6 was granted this headquarters by Headquarters, USA RV.

   d. On 1 August 1966 procedures were implemented that permits rotatees to proceed to the aerial port with a firm reservation for a specific flight.

   e. Command station list published on 20 October 1966 attached at Inclosure 2.

   f. Command strength during the period is at Inclosure 3.

   g. Reenlistment results are at Inclosure 4.

   h. Enlisted appointment quotas are at Inclosure 5.

   i. Statistics on casualties are at Inclosure 6.

   j. Major Paul L. Trina was assigned as Staff Postal Officer on 24 October 1966.

   k. Effective 19 August 1966, authority to award the Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Army Commendation Medal, and Purple Heart was delegated to the Commanding General, USA Support Command, Qui Nhơn, and the Commanding General, USA Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. Awards and decorations processed are at Inclosure 7.

   l. Personnel rotation and replacement statistics attached at Inclosure 8.

   m. Personnel spaces are not authorized for career counselors to support the command reenlistment program. In May 1966 career counselors were assigned from within our resources without authorization and a reenlistment program was initiated. Career counselors are now beginning to rotate, and there is no authorization upon which to base a requisition for replacements. Commanding General, USA RV, was requested by letter to authorize spaces for this program as authorized in AR 601-280. USA RV advises that DA has not yet furnished a decision on our request. Efforts are being made to obtain additional counselors from within this command. Individuals are reluctant to take this type of assignment since promotions are precluded by lack of an authorization.
7. (U) CHAPLAIN.

a. Personnel.

(1) As of 31 October 1966, 1st Logistical Command had a total authorization of 74 chaplains. 70 of these spaces are filled, 57 with Protestant Chaplains and 13 with Catholic Chaplains. There are no Jewish Chaplains assigned, coverage is being provided by Jewish Chaplains assigned to MACV and IFFORCEV and by authorized lay military personnel.

(2) As of 31 October 1966, 1st Logistical Command had a total authorization of 70 chaplain assistants with 89 assigned. The authorized number is less than actual requirements on the basis of one assistant for each chaplain plus administrative personnel.

b. Religious Coverage.

(1) Under the provisions of the self-help program, additional chapel facilities were constructed or programmed. The recapitulation of total chapel construction in Vietnam as of 31 October 1966 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistical Area</th>
<th>Constructed</th>
<th>Programmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, CRB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, QN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Chapel Attendance Percent of Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon-Vung Tau</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay-Nha Trang</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Average Number Services Weekly per Chaplain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon-Vung Tau</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay-Nha Trang</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Civil Affairs:

Chaplain civic action reports indicate a well rounded program to minister to the physical, spiritual, and educational needs of the Vietnamese people. Chaplains were responsible for the following contributions:
(1) Orphanages: VN$42,600, 825 lbs clothing
(2) Churches: VN$210,839
(3) Missions: VN$107,811, 10,000 bags of cement
(4) Refugees: VN$45,000, 5 tons of bulgar
140 gals of cooking oil
35 truck loads of lumber
15,000 school kits
7,405 bars of soap

d. Pastoral Coverage, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

In the month of August the Headquarters Chapel, 1st Logistical Command, was sufficiently completed for occupancy. Besides regular Sunday Service, a Daily Mass, Prayer Service and Sunday afternoon religious Dialogue were instituted, thus offering a complete religious program to the personnel of the command.
a. On 2 September 1966, the section published 1st Logistical Command Regulation 190-46 for the purpose of insuring timely and accurate reporting of statistical data pertaining to offense and incidents occurring within the 1st Logistical Command area of responsibility.

b. On 21 September 1966, the Provost Marshal section assumed responsibility within the command for the submission of initial reports of suspected criminal conduct, wrongdoing, or mismanagement which may result in damaging public confidence in the Army. These reports referred to by the symbol "BLUE BELL" were formerly prepared at the Headquarters, United States Army Pacific. Immediate action was taken to advise subordinate commands as to the requisite information needed to prepare initial reports.
9. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES.

a. The assigned strength of Special Services increased to 8 officers, 25 enlisted men, 8 DAC's and 96 Local Nationals as of 31 October 1966.

b. Miss Vera Vincent, DAC, GS-12, Staff Service Club Director, Korea arrived in Vietnam 19 October for 30 days TDY to review and make recommendations on the Service Club Program in Vietnam.

c. A revised 1st Logistical Command Regulation 28-1, Special Services Program, was published in October.

d. R&R Branch.

(1) Total quotas for out-of-country for 1st Logistical Command increased 15.2 percent, from 1508 spaces to 1781 spaces.

(2) In September 1966, the method of reflecting the percentage of fill was changed to reflect the actual spaces used by the command. The quarterly utilization using this method shows 74.3 percent utilization. In previous reports, the space turned back to USARV prior to the cut off date were credited.

(3) On 1 August 1966, the out-of-country R&R Processing Station moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Nha Trang on a temporary basis. A permanent site at Cam Ranh Bay is being planned and is expected to be ready during 2nd Quarter, FY 67.

(4) Hawaii was added as an out-of-country R&R site on an experimental basis in August 1966, and has now been established as a permanent addition to the R&R program. 1st Logistical Command received 144 spaces to Hawaii in the 1st Quarter FY 67.

e. Special Services Supply Depot.

(1) The current on hand dollar balance is $934,798.71.

(2) During the month of August, September and October, the depot received 123 1/2 tons of supplies and issued 114 1/2 tons.

(3) During this period the depot committed $1,178,689.08 in requisitions from appropriated funds and $1,101,588.87 in non-appropriated funds.

(4) The Special Services Supply Depot has 1639 line items in stock.

f. Library Branch.

(1) Two new Librarians, GS-11 and GS-9 were added to the Library Staff. The former has been assigned to Vung Tau as Area Librarian for Vung Tau and IV Corps. The latter has been assigned to the Library Service Center in Saigon.

(2) A 2,000 square foot library was opened at Qui Nhon in August.
Total library book stock for all libraries has been increased from 38,000 to 45,000 volumes.

A monthly distribution of magazines and paperback books are now made from the Saigon Field Distribution Center to 1734 units, giving each a pro-rated share of 56,250 military newspapers, 140,000 magazines, and 145,000 paperback books.

Da Clothbound Book Kits have been ordered on a reimbursable basis for the six month period January to June 1967 at a cost of $284,472.00.

$60,000.00 worth of library furniture has been placed on order to furnish programmed libraries.

An initial order for $38,000 from appropriated funds for hardbound books was initiated during the month of October.

Recreation and Plans Branch.

A new procedure to request and issue supplies and equipment was initiated in August. Supplies are requested monthly and issued monthly by the supply points. A list of available supplies and equipment is published monthly and sent to the field.

A revised appropriated fund budget for the remainder of FY 67 (1 Nov 66-30 Jun 67) for a total dollar value of $16,649,100.00 was submitted.

Monthly statistics showing the rate of participation in Special Services Activities reflected an average daily rate of 478 per 1,000 troops during the month of August, September, and October.

Entertainment Branch.

The Soldier Show Program began 1 October with the tour of the first Soldier Show within Vietnam. The "Black Patches" have performed in many isolated units and was highlighted by a performance before President Johnson in Cam Ranh Bay.

A basic supply of musical instruments have been distributed to units within Vietnam.

Seven civilian Entertainment Directors are now being recruited in CONUS to assist in the program.

USO and Professional Entertainment Touring Shows continue to be the mainstay of the entertainment program. During the month of August, September, and October, there were a total of 207 performances, with a total audience of 125,932. Two handshake tours, Arthur Godfrey and John Gavin, were made in Vietnam during this period.
(1) The reporting period was highlighted by the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Elections held on 11 September 1966. As the election date drew closer intelligence reports and captured documents revealed an organized Viet Cong (VC) campaign to step up terrorist attacks, intimidate voters and hamper the election machinery. The tense, pre-election atmosphere prompted the Security Division and the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (IID) to intensify their operation in order to maintain an optimum state of readiness and security posture throughout the command. Despite the VC reported determined intention to disrupt the election, over 80% of the registered voters (over four million persons) went to the polls. Undoubtedly the VC plans were thwarted by the effective and well coordinated security measures adopted by the ARVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces in Vietnam. However, on the eve of the election the VC launched an all out effort in a last attempt to achieve at least partially their goals. In the Saigon Metropolitan area alone there were 14 terrorist attacks, consisting mostly of grenade throwing incidents. There were a few injuries, mostly Vietnamese civilians, but no one was killed and there were no Americans involved. In general, VC initiated incidents during the election period fell far below what was expected. Other than the division of additional personnel to augment the security forces, the effect of the election period on the mission of this command was negligible.

(2) The major VC activity that had a direct impact on the 1st Logistical Command mission was the attack of the Equipment Incorporated (EI) Motor Pool on 14 September 1966. The firm was under contract to this command and operates a fleet of approximately 440 trucks hauling military supplies and equipment from the Saigon Port and Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base. The attack took place at approximately 0140 hours, 14 September and was launched by an estimated 32 VC troopers using automatic weapons and concussion grenades. A total of 52 trucks were destroyed or damaged, and one building and a house trailer blasted. Four Vietnamese nationals were killed. The motor pool was guarded by 20 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops armed with carbines and grenades and eight unarmed Chinese "Nung" guards. The ineffectiveness of the indigenous guard force prompted the Commanding General to assign the security mission of the installation to the US Army Support Command, Saigon. This action was a principal factor in achieving a successful defense of the motor pool against a second attack on 10 October 1966.
On this occasion the US guards repulsed what appeared to have been a well-coordinated VC attempt to penetrate the motor pool. This was accomplished by placing effective fire on the enemy and quickly summoning gunships to silence the VC machine gun and mortar positions. The engagement started at approximately 0100 hours on 10 October 1966 and lasted for about 45 minutes. Results were four VC killed, by body count, and an estimated nine VC killed or seriously injured and carried away. One US officer was injured and admitted to the hospital with shrapnel wounds in his groin and small of the back. One Vietnamese civilian employee of ISI was killed. No damage to equipment or structures was sustained.

(3) During the months of September and October the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) received 37 personnel of the 50 authorized by the recent augmentation. As of the end of the reporting period, the 524th MID was at 80% of its authorized strength of 72. The new personnel were apportioned among the headquarters, field, and resident office elements in the II and III Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). A field office was established at Long Binh to support 1st Logistical Command units and installations in the Northern Capital Military District and Southern III CTZ.

(4) With the substantial number of newly assigned personnel, the 524th MID rapidly increased its operational capabilities. Through its expanded liaison activities, and increased coverage, the 1st Logistical Command achieved a more adequate counterintelligence coverage and responsiveness to the ever increasing requirements that resulted from the rapid buildup in South Vietnam. Noteworthy evidence of prompt reaction and reporting by the 524th MID, was the excellent manner in which its agents handled the investigation of the two attacks on the EI Motor Pool mentioned above. In both instances a complete report with numerous exhibits was prepared within 24 hours and the Commanding General and his staff presented with a detailed and accurate briefing of the incidents.

(5) The 524th MID was deployed in the following manner:

(a) Headquarters: 6 officers and 13 EM.
(b) Saigon Field Office: 3 officers and 7 EM.
(c) Long Binh Resident Office: 5 EM.
(d) Cam Ranh Bay Field Office: 1 officer, 3 EM.
(e) Nha Trang Field Office: 2 officers, 4 EM.
(f) Pleiku Resident Office: 3 EM.
(a) Qui Nhon Field Office: 2 officers, 4 EK.
(b) Vung Tau Field Office: 2 officers, 3 EK.

(6) Problems experienced by the 524th MID were in the areas of communications and vehicles. The shortage of vehicles will be alleviated when the augmentation equipment arrives from CONUS. Action is being taken to improve communications capability.

(7) During the reporting period, the following personnel and document security actions were completed:

(a) Number of clearances validated: 1292.
(b) Number of requests for MAC processed: 374.
(c) Number of requests for BI processed: 11.
(d) Number of clearances granted:
   1. TOP SECRET: None.
   2. Interim TOP SECRET: 94.
   3. SECRET: None.
   4. Interim Secret: 393.
   5. CONFIDENTIAL: 92.
   6. TOP SECRET CRYPTO: 5.
   7. SECRET CRYPTO: 4.
(e) Number of counterintelligence inspections: 50.
(f) Number of counterintelligence checks: 24.
(g) Number of lead sheets completed: 49.

(h) Another significant accomplishment was the completion of Sabotage Threat Surveys of 26 key installations of the command. This action completed the first phase of a program unique to this command and to the 524th MID. The surveys were used as a basis for adopting countermeasures to threats of sabotage. Because of the completeness of descriptive matter in the reports and photographs, they were also used as a reference in studies of other problem areas.
(8) Weather. The Southwest Monsoon continued in full force over all Southeast Asia during August. The weather followed a somewhat regular daily pattern with afternoon showers occurring over parts of the area almost every day. The Southwest Monsoon was in its third month in August and heavy flooding was expected in the delta and coastal regions; however, it was not until September that the overflowing and flooding conditions in the Mekong Delta in IV CTZ became of major concern to military operations and the GVN. During the first half of September, the Republic of Vietnam was still under the influence of the Southwest Monsoon; however, later in the month, traces of the Northeast Monsoon began to appear. Mean temperatures dropped considerably especially along the coastal areas. During the last half of October the autumn transition season was gradually replaced by the Northeast Monsoon except for the most southerly regions. The autumn transition is the period when the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) moves south and the warm, moist air of the Southwest Monsoon is replaced by the relatively cooler, drier air of the Northeast Monsoon. During the first half of October, precipitation was generally light. As the ITCZ passed through Thailand, Cambodia, and RVN, there were several days of scattered heavy precipitation, but monthly totals remained low at most locations. By mid-October, the Northeast Monsoon precipitation conditions prevailed and the coastal regions experienced an increase in precipitation. Temperatures were cooler than during September and humidity decreased throughout the country.

(9) Interim change to 1st Logistical Command Memorandum 220-3, Headquarters Exercise and Alert Procedures, was published on 14 September 1966. The responsibility for notification transferred from the Staff Duty Officer to the Operations Division, Security, Plans and Operations. A draft of the revised Memorandum 220-3 was forwarded for approval and staffing 31 October 1966.

(10) Operations Plan 40-66, Ground Defense Plans for 1st Logistical Command Headquarters Compound, dated 23 September, was published to establish operational procedures to be followed in the conduct of the defense of the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command complex against ground attack or acts of sabotage and terrorism.

(11) Arrangements were made with the advisory team to the Joint High Command (AUNH) to procure, on a daily basis, two copies of their Morning Information Report. This report covers AUNH operations throughout RVN and provides timely and significant road, bridge, and railroad data. The data is used in support of the Security Division's continuing effort to provide timely information on lines of communications to the Operations Division for use in logistical planning.

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(12) In August this headquarters received a draft copy of a proposed US Army Vietnam Area Damage Control Plan. Proposed plan tasks Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command as the Army Area Damage Controller (ADC) for all United States Army, Vietnam installations and facilities. This headquarters concurred in tasking of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command as the ADC and recommended minor changes to the proposed plan to G4, United States Army Vietnam on 29 August 1966.

(13) During the period liaison visits were made to United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang Sub-Area Command, Nha Trang Sub-Area Command and 1st Logistical Command elements at Long Binh Post. Tactical security and problem areas were discussed and recommendations were made for improving tactical security.

(14) At 2040 hours, 28 October 1966, Ordnance Storage Area Number 3, of the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Ammunition Supply Depot was brought under hostile fire by an unknown number of VC attackers, who employed small arms, automatic weapons and grenades. The attackers entered the Ordnance storage area in the vicinity of a four man US ambush site, which was forced to withdraw under fire. Members of the attacking force placed satchel charges on Ammunition Pad (AP) C4, which contained 8 inch high explosive ammunition, and on AP B3, which contained 105mm high explosive ammunition. One explosion resulted on AP C4 that caused a small fire on that pad. At approximately 2110 hours, a larger order explosion occurred on AP C4, destroying or rendering unserviceable 12,005 rounds of 8 inch ammunition, and leaving a crater 200 feet wide and 40 feet deep. As a result of this explosion, several fires and smaller explosions occurred on nearby ammunition pads, which destroyed or rendered unserviceable 4,196-175mm propellant charges and 2,657-105mm high explosive rounds. In addition, several small metal sheds were extensively damaged and one truck, loaded with 155mm ammunition was overturned. The value of the ammunition destroyed or damaged was approximately $1,000,000.00. Immediately prior to the explosion, the members of the ambush party attempted to return to their positions, and two of them, PFC Sidney L. Bryant, Jr, and PFC Allen Brooks, were killed by the explosion. Nine US personnel were wounded by the blast, including other guards coming to the area and the two remaining members of the ambush party.
b. Plans Branch,

(1) Cam ranh Bay Joint Ammunition Area: During June and July 1966, IACV conducted a series of meetings for the purpose of discussing responsibilities in establishing a joint ammunition area at Cam ranh Bay. As a result of these meetings, it was determined that a memorandum of understanding, to be signed by each participating headquarters, should be originated by the command having overall supervisory responsibility for the proposed installation. Appropriate guidance was drafted by IACV and turned over to USAV for action. In turn, this headquarters was tasked for the memorandum of understanding. All concerned concurred in the concept except the 7th Air Force who non-concurred in the security portion of the memorandum. As of 31 October 1966, the security problem had not been resolved, and consequently, responsibility for the proposed installation has not been established.

(2) Installation Support: In June 1966, USAV tasked this headquarters to evaluate specific installations where there was or will be a significant requirement for administrative installation support. An initial draft TD for each specific installation cited on the requirement was established, typed and submitted to each support command for comment. Upon receipt of these comments, a final proposed TD was drafted, approved and sent to USAV on 27 August 1966.

(3) Support of the 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt): The 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt) arrived at Vung Tau in August 1966 and was deployed to Tay Ninh. The brigade was placed under the OPCON of II FFV and attached to the 25th Infantry Division. Appropriate guidance for its support was disseminated to USASC Saigon and the 44th Medical Brigade in sufficient time for supporting plans to be prepared and implemented upon the arrival of the supported unit.

(4) 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 60-67 (Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan) (U): USAV OPLAN 60-67 (Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan) (U) was received by this headquarters on 26 October 1966. A plan for the evacuation and relocation of US and designated alien noncombatants in support of the USAV plan was drafted and is being staffed.

(5) Support of the 4th Infantry Division: The 4th Infantry Division arrived in three main increments: Division Main and the 2d Brigade arrived at the port of Qui Nhon on 25 September 1966 and were deployed to Pleiku; 1st Brigade arrived at the port of Nha Trang on 4 October 1966 and was deployed to Tay Hoi; and the 3rd Brigade arrived at the port of Vung Tau on 11 October 1966 and moved by road to Bear Cat. Supporting plans were developed by USASC.
Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon respectively based on guidance from this headquarters. Plans were implemented upon the arrival of the supported units concerned.

(6) Continuity of Supply: On 30 September 1966, OPLAN 34-66 (Continuity of Supply) was published. This plan provides for essential resupply in the event of damage or destruction to one or more of the command's main logistical complexes. Requirements for resupply of combat and support units were calculated based on the degree of possible damage to each installation. Operation of the plan is contingent on quick reporting, resupply of essential supplies to combat and logistical units, and reconstruction of the facilities damaged. Support commands were tasked to provide implementing plans. The plan was developed in coordination with USARV and USAVC.

(7) Piaster Study (Task Force Piaster): On 1 September 1966, a study titled "Reduction in Piaster Spending" was published. The study was made in conjunction with all other staff sections to determine whether it is possible to reduce piaster expenditures in areas of expenditure controlled by the 1st Logistical Command. The requirement was given to SP0O in July by the CG as a result of DWP interest in the subject. Areas considered were contracts in the 1st Logistical Command area of responsibility, and personal expenditures of the 1st Logistical Command personnel. The study concluded that:

(a) Reductions in piaster expenditures can be expected when programmed troop units are deployed to perform services now performed by contractors; when loss local purchasing is done in-country; and when more US and contractor personnel are moved into US cantonments.

(b) Limited reductions in piaster expenditures in FY 67 will result through application of appropriate controls and improved management practices at all levels.

(c) Areas in which potential reductions or termination of contracts are indicated should be reviewed by appropriate directors and staff office chiefs for final determination on action to be taken. The study was approved by the CG on 3 September 1966 and distributed to agencies concerned.

(8) Support of Philippine Civic Action Group in Vietnam (PHILCAGV): On 12 September 1966, OPLAN 41-66 (Support of PHILCAGV) was published, the result of fruitful coordination between 1st Logistical Command, USARV Saigon, USAVC G4, PHILCAGV, II FFV, and the 25th Infantry Division. The plan provided for logistical support.
of the Philippine Civic Action Group in Vietnam, which deployed its 2100 personnel to WVK between 13 August and 13 October 1966. The 25th Infantry Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade sponsored PHILAGV on its arrival, and 1st Logistic Command provided logistical support during its deployment to Tay Ninh. Continuing logistical support is provided by 1st Logistic Command in all classes of supply and services, complementing PHILAGV’s limited capability.

(9) Revised Republic of Korea Forces (RFK) Support:
On 1 September 1966, 1st Logistic Command assured logistical support of RFK in II, III & IV CTZ as directed by U.S. in accordance with OPLAN 25-66. Support was to be essentially the same as for US Forces, augmenting RFKV limited capability. BG Rhee, CG, 100th ROK Logistics Support Command, contacted Gen Eifler with requests for increased support. As a result, tentative revisions to OPLAN 25-66 were made, and Gen Lollis conducted a liaison visit to Gen Rhee’s HQ at Nha Trang on 11 October 1966. At that time, additional requirements were presented by Gen Rhee. On 25 October 1966, Gen Rhee visited 1st Logistic Command, and agreement was reached in accordance with guidance provided by Gen Eifler. As a result, RFK was to be provided more direct support by distribution to ROK logistical units. A revised OPLAN (25-66) was prepared and approved for publication on 31 October 1966.

c. Force Development Branch.

(1) Reorganization and Augmentation of the 1st Logistic Command: In view of Department of the Army’s concern over the long range logistical organization for Vietnam, a conference was conducted in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the period 14–18 August 1966. The conference was hosted by U.S. The purpose was to discuss details of reorganizing 1st Logistic Command. The conference recommended that the combat service support structure in RVN, identified generally as phase III, consisting of a Vietnam Support Command (VSC) with augmentation and three area support commands be approved. A subsequent DA message received on 27 October 1966 approved the concept with modifications. The command structure described as phase III was approved less the augmentation for the nucleus of a Field Army Support Command. It was further stated that the 1st Logistic Command would be redesignated as the US Army Vietnam Support Command and that the three support commands would become area commands.

(2) C5 67 USARPAC/COMPAC Capabilities Planning Conference:
The C5 67 USARPAC/COMPAC Capabilities Planning Conference was held in Hawaii during the period 25 September through 21 October 1966. The purpose of the conference was to assess the impact of MACV, F/X/THAI and other R.O. are unit phasing on support and logistical
capabilities, USAMVC participated as working level representatives and provided assistance and advice as well as observed aspects of the conference in which service interests were involved. 1st Logistical Command representatives participated as USAMVC team members. Prior to the conference fact sheets were prepared by Force Development section in coordination with staff agencies for each functional area of combat service support. Fact sheets included impact statements and recommendations. During the conference detailed study of the troop list was conducted to ensure accuracy and completeness. Impact statements in fact sheets were closely evaluated, to identify areas which may inhibit military planning operations. Logistical planning factors utilized in computing tonnages were reviewed for feasibility by each component on the basis of their recent experience. The logistical concept of support was reviewed and revised as necessary.

d. Operations.

(1) During the period 1 August through 31 October 1966, 163 1st Logistical Command units arrived in RVN. Twenty-three of these units arrived in August, seventy-four in September and sixty-six in October. The arrival of these units brings the total 1st Logistical Command units in RVN to over 500.

(2) Because of the urgent requirement for general support supply units for depot operations, 17 supply units were accelerated in September and began arriving during the latter part of September and early October. This permitted the release of direct support supply and service companies from depot operations to perform direct support missions at brigade and division base camps. Because of acceleration these units had to be accepted with severe equipment and personnel shortages.

(3) In addition to the accelerated units arriving with equipment and personnel shortages, a significant number of other units were unable to meet equipment and personnel readiness dates. Most of these units were offered for deployment on schedule with shortages or at a later date with full equipment and personnel. In all cases where such offer was made the decision was to deploy units on schedule where at least some percentage of their capability was available to the command.

(4) During the reporting period, the Long Binh Sub-Area became of sufficient size to organize a post headquarters. The post, camp and station activities had been controlled by the Long Binh Sub-Area Command which was under the direction of US Army Support Command, Saigon. These activities, along with personnel of the Long Binh Sub-Area Command engaged in other than 1st Logistical Command activities were transferred to the Long Binh Post, US Army (Provisional). The
post headquarters was organized by Ltr & W General Order number 5863
dated 30 Sep 66, with a total of 156 personnel (34 Off, 1 WO, 107
En, 12 Civ.

(5) Training.

(a) Five training directives were published by
the 1st Logistical Command in order to provide guidance for the
training of accelerated units, new items of equipment and MOS
training for critical MOS shortages. Subjects of these directives
are as follows:

1. Unit Training of Accelerated Units.
2. Operation and Organizational Maintenance
   of Truck, Forklift, 6,000 lb and 10,000 lb Capacity.
4. Light and Heavy Vehicle Truck Driver
   Training MOS 64A10 and 64B20.
5. Materials Handling Equipment Repairmen
   MOS 43A10.

(b) Faster and weekly training schedules of
accelerated units were requested from CCRUS and received. These
schedules assisted the support commands in determining training yet
to be completed. However, all accelerated units arriving during
this period accomplished their purpose, i.e., partial assumption
of unit missions while simultaneously completing their Basic Unit
Training.

(c) Courses of instructions were conducted on
the following items of equipment:

1. All/GC 74 radio, operational thru general
   support training.
2. All/GRC-106 radio, operational thru general
   thru general support maintenance.
3. L107 and L110 weapons, organizational
   maintenance training.

(d) Operation BLUE JAY, OPNAV 28-66 dated 27
July 1966 provided for reception, de-station and processing of
the 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) and associated units through seaports
of Vung Tau and Saigon, and aerial ports of Vung Tau and Tay Ninh.
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1st Logistical Command provided the necessary logistical support from ports of debarkation to area of operations. The operation commenced on 4 August 1966 and ended on 1 September 1966. USASC, Saigon, 4th Transportation Command and the 44th Medical Brigade participated in the operation.

(e) Operation J-lock. OPLAN 32-66 dated 26 July 1966 provided for reception, debarkation and processing of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and associated units through seaports of Vung Tau and Saigon, and aerial ports of Vung Tau and Bien Hoa. This unit was the first unit of its type to enter VN deploying with a significant amount of tonnage. 1st Logistical Command provided the necessary logistical support from ports of debarkation to area of operations. The operation commenced on 4 August 1966 and ended on 21 October 1966. USASC, Saigon, 4th Transportation Command and the 44th Medical Brigade participated in the operation.

(f) Operation J-lock. OPLAN 29-66 dated 29 July 1966 provided for reception, debarkation and processing of the 9th Infantry Division (A.K.) and associated non-divisional units through sea ports of Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay. 1st Logistical Command provided the necessary logistical support from ports of debarkation to area of operations. The operation commenced on 12 August 1966 and ended on 17 October 1966. USASC, Cam Ranh, 4th Transportation Command and the 44th Medical Brigade participated in the operation.

(g) Operation J-lock. OPLAN 38-66 dated 15 August 1966 provided for reception, debarkation and processing of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG), Vietnam through the aerial/surface port of Saigon to the designated deployment area in VN. 1st Logistical Command provided the necessary logistical support from the port to the designated base camp. The operation commenced 16 September 1966 and ended on 19 October 1966. USASC, Saigon, 4th Transportation Command and the 44th Medical Brigade participated in the operation.

(h) Operation J-lock. OPLAN 27-66 dated 23 July 1966, provided for reception, debarkation, and processing of the 4th Infantry Division through aerial/sea ports of Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Nha Trang; movement to staging areas then to tactical deployment areas. The operation started 20 July 1966 and troop movement was completed in October 1966. Cargo vessels are still being unloaded and completion is scheduled to end in November 1966. USASC, Nha Trang, USASC, Cam Ranh Bay, 4th Transportation Command and the 44th Medical Brigade are participating in the operation.
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(6) Airdrop.

(a) During the period 12 thru 18 August 1966, Operation PAUL REVERE II was partially supported by airdrop. After Action Reports of these airdrops are included as Inclosures 9 thru 12.

(b) The 109th Quartermaster Air Delivery Co (TOE 10-407E) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 12 August 1966. The 623d Quartermaster Company (Air Equipment Repair and Depot Company) (TOE 10-417D) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 7 September 1966. The units were required to construct their own facilities. Transfer of mission load of air items to the 109th Air Delivery Company commenced on 12 October 1966. Total transfer of air items to USASC, Cam Ranh Bay is expected to be completed 10 November 1966.

(7) During the report period, tactical Army units were introduced into I CTZ and 1st Logistical Command contingency support plans for this area were initiated. Logistical support was provided by 1st Logistical Command to the 4th Battalion 503d Infantry, 2d Battalion 94th Artillery, 1st Battalion 40th Artillery and C Battery 6th Battalion 27th Artillery operating in I CTZ.

(8) Support continued to be provided to US and FMAP's operating in II and III CTZ's. Tactical units supported by 1st Logistical Command in tactical operations in these area included elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (ARVN), the 1st Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 196th Infantry Brigade, the 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Australian Royal Forces, the Capital Republic of Korea Infantry Division, the 9th Republic of Korea Infantry Division, the Republic of Korea Marine Brigade and Philippine Civil Action Group.

(9) Logistical summaries for operations Hawthorne, Beauregard, Nathan Hale, Henry Clay and Hayes are attached as Inclosures 13 thru 17.
a. Personnel. LTC Blandy C. Haynes was assigned principal duty of Deputy Comptroller effective 16 August 1966.

b. Budget and Fiscal Operations.

(1) Change in Funding Channel: For the first time, the 1st Logistical Command received its quarterly allocation of Operations and Maintenance Army (O&M) funds from a finance office located in Vietnam. Previously, funds had been received by means of an Advice of Obligation Authority from Headquarters USARV. Commencing 1 August 1966, the advice was received from the 7th Finance Section, APO 96243. Funds are made available to 7th Finance Section by allotment from Headquarters, USAFRAC. $118.5 million in purchase requests were processed against the $200 million available to 1st Logistical Command during the period ending 30 September 1966; an additional $29.3 million was processed during October.

(2) AIK Budget for MACV Advisors. 1st Logistical Command was tasked by MACV to prepare the Calendar Year 1967 Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) budget for support of advisory personnel outside the Saigon-Cholon area. Despite the fact that this command has no operational control over the advisory elements, MACV required impact statements for each categorization of funds requested. This problem was solved by requiring input from each of the senior corps advisors concerned. In addition to obtaining the needed information, this marked the first time that advisory elements were required to participate directly in estimating their budgetary needs. No significant problems were encountered in obtaining the needed data from the advisory elements.

(3) Operations and Maintenance Army (O&M) Budget. A major effort was under way on 31 October 1966 to revise the 1st Logistical Command FY 1967 O&M Operating Budget. The original budget estimate, submitted in June 1966, has been overtaken by events and is no longer representative of the needs of the command. The impact of piaster expenditure controls, increased out-of-country procurement responsiveness to the CONUS supply system, changed requirements, and assumption of funding responsibilities by other commands necessitated the revision. Input was requested from 1st Logistical Command staff sections and directorates, and will be compiled into the revised FY 67 O&M budget estimate. The revised estimate will be submitted to Headquarters, USAV during November 1966 as a part of the Budget Execution Review.

c. Staff Finance Operations.

(1) The 192nd Finance Section (teams AB & FG) arrived in-country during August 1966 and assumed the finance service mission at Pleiku vice the Pleiku Provisional Finance Unit.

(2) The 92d Finance Detachment (Team AF) arrived in-country during September 1966 and assumed the finance service mission at Cam Ranh Bay vice the 9th Finance Detachment.

(3) The 9th Finance Detachment (Team AD) moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Vung Tau during October 1966 and will assume the finance service mission at Vung Tau on or about 10 November 1966 vice the Class B Agent operation supported by the 10th Finance Section (USAHAC Unit).
The 91st Finance Detachment (Te.u1 AF) arrived in-country during October 1966 and will assume the finance mission at Long Binh on 1 November 1966 vice the 29th Finance Detachment.

The following additional finance detachments arrived in-country during this report period and were assigned to augment finance sections in the areas indicated:

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FINANCE SECTION</th>
<th>AREA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87th Fin Det (A)</td>
<td>192d</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Fin Det (F)</td>
<td>22d</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th Fin Det (F)</td>
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<td>9th</td>
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<td>24th Fin Det (G)</td>
<td>91st</td>
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<tr>
<td>126th Fin Det (F)</td>
<td>91st</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
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d. Management Activities.

(1) Congressional Visit. Members of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services visited this headquarters during period 18-30 October 1966. Purpose of their visit to SEA was to assess military capabilities in the Pacific Command. The visiting group was composed of four professional staff members and two military escorts.

(2) US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) Survey. The US Army Audit Agency arrived in-country on 20 September 1966 to conduct a preliminary survey and comprehensive audit of the supply support system in Vietnam. Preliminary survey was completed on 14 October. Detailed audit of the International Balance of Payments Program and procurement activities began on 17 October and will continue until early December. Audit of stock control procedures in the 506th Field Depot will commence on 17 October and continue indefinitely. LC Regulation 36-1 was published on 29 September outlining policies, responsibilities, and procedures in connection with USAAA visits to this command.

(3) US General Accounting Office (GAO) Survey. A formal command entrance conference was held with representatives of the GAO on 23 September at this headquarters. The purpose of their visit is to survey port operations in Vietnam with particular interest directed toward the Saigon Port in order to answer a number of questions posed by a Congressional Subcommittee. This survey will continue indefinitely. Mr. O. V. Stovall, Director of International Operations Division, GAO, toured Saigon Port on 24 October and generally indicated that conditions at the port were much more satisfactory than had been indicated in Washington, D.C. prior to his departure for RVN. LC reg 36-20 was published on 11 October outlining policies, responsibilities, and procedures in connection with GAO visits to this command.

(4) Commander's Monthly Review. The Commander's
Monthly Review was published and distributed to each director, staff office chief, and subordinate commander during August, September, and October. These publications highlight significant statistical trends which occurred during the reported month.

(5) Data Automation Requirements (DAR). Data Automation Requirements were submitted or re-submitted for the following business machine applications:

(a) Construction Materials Automated Logistics Management System.

(b) USARV Logistical Data Processing System. DAR for this system has been submitted with additional justification for a small scale tape computer.

(c) Automated Management Personnel System. DAR for this system has been resubmitted with additional justification for a small scale tape computer.

(6) Headquarters Organizational Chart. This office updated and distributed a new organizational chart for this headquarters on 7 September.

(7) Control of Piaster Expenditures. LC Reg 37-8 was published on 9 September outlining policies, procedures, and responsibilities in connection with control of Piaster Expenditures.
(1) Electrical Power. Continued increases in the requirements for 60KW and 100KW generators were noted during the period as the standards of construction and the number of new facilities increased. The electrical requirements of the accelerated program to build ice plants and cold storage depots, together with the construction of such facilities as hospitals, containment areas, and automatic data processing facilities exceeded the available assets. A total of 547 of the 606 Japanese procured generators have now arrived. In addition, the first shipment of six 1500KW Electromotive Units arrived during September to be installed in the central power plant at An Khe. Construction of the permanent power distribution system at Can Ranh Bay is nearing completion and will initially provide 10,000 kW electrical energy. The design of a central power plant and distribution system for other base camps is continuing under the direction of USAV, and initial construction is scheduled during the next quarter at the following locations: Long Binh, Iba Trang, Cu Chi, Dong Ba Thin, Di An, Vung Tau, Dai Nhon, ROK Valley, and Bien Hoa.

(2) Well Drilling:

(a) The United States Army, Vietnam, (USAV) well drilling program in this period produced 20 developed wells as follows:

Pope, Evans, Robbins, Limited.

Sub-contractor Peril Triumph Company — 12 wells

Moscow Lines Company — 7 wells

18th Engineer Brigade — 1 well

(b) The contract with Peril Triumph was modified from exploratory drilling to developed well drilling. The contract with Raymond, Torison, Austin, Brown, Root, and Jones (RTBR) was modified to allow Seabee teams to operate their rigs. This is to cut down on operating costs. These teams are programmed to arrive in country by the end of November.

(3) Ice Plants: During the reporting period 15 ton ice plants have been placed in operation at the following locations:

30
In addition sixteen 15 ton ice plants and thirteen 3.6 ton ice plants are presently under construction. These plants should all be completed by 31 January 1967.

b. Installations Branch Activities.

(1) Construction: Major construction projects completed or started during this period are the following:

(a) Saigon:

1. The first increment of Newport to include the barge wharf, the LCF/LCU ramp, the north and south LST crane wharves and the LST ramps were completed 22 October 1966.

2. The 7th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital facility at Cu Chi was completed and work started on conversion to an evacuation hospital. EDC is January 1967.

3. Quay number one in the Fishmarket area was completed 21 October 1966.

4. Construction of the Class IV storage area at Ho Nai in the Long Binh area was started in July 1966.

5. Construction for the first IUST hospital in Vietnam was begun in the vicinity of Tay Ninh in October 1966. Estimated date of completion was December 1966, but the hospital was completed and operational on 15 November 1966.

(b) Cam Ranh Bay:

1. Construction was begun on two of four refrigerated warehouses. EDC: February 1966.
2. Horizontal construction work for Tank Farm 2 was started in July and erection of tanks commenced in August. Tank Farm 2 will have a capacity of 200,000 barrels. EDC is February 1967.


4. DeLong Pier 2 was installed in September 1966.

5. The ammunition pier and causeway was installed during this period. Final dredging and road construction is expected to be completed in November 1966.

6. The Vinnell Corporation moved their power ships into place late in June 1966 and started installation of primary and secondary electrical distribution lines under a contract to furnish power to the Cam Ranh Bay installation.

7. Port Lane at Vung Ho with two LST ramps and Navy cube pier and one Tanker discharge was constructed. In addition a road from Vung Ho to Highway 1 and a beach hardstand was completed during this period.

(a) Qui Nhon:

1. A new Post Exchange buildings and warehouse complex was completed.

2. The Port Complex was started in this period. A port access road was built by Engineer Troops. One "A" unit of the DeLong Pier was installed. EDC of the Port is 25 November 1966.

2. One 4" submarine POL line was installed during this period. Two more 4" lines were prepared for installation and are expected to be completed in November 1966.

4. The Qui Nhon - An Khe pipeline was started and 34.6 miles of pipe emplaced. The two tank farms at Qui Nhon were completed in August 1966.

(d) Port Lane.

On 19 June 1966, this headquarters culminated several studies of the use of Vung Ho Bay as a port facility, by requesting that USAV design and construct a temporary port facility there to support planned combat operations in the area. During late
July, the 39th Engineer Battalion began work on beach facilities and a 1.5 mile access road from the beach to Highway 1. During September and October, two LST ramps, a Navy cube barge discharge pier, and a T-1 32L tanker submarine discharge facility were completed. On 25 September the access road was opened permitting throughput of supplies to the Tuy Hoa Area. This facility is presently being upgraded to a permanent port to include the installation of a Delong Pier.

c. Construction Materials Branch Activities...

(1) During the month of August, personnel contracted by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) were assigned to the Construction Materials Branch. Their mission was to assist in establishing an inventory control center for construction materials. Procedures were established to receive daily reports from all depots on selected items. Qui Nhon Depot began providing copies of their daily transaction registers and other supply areas are in the process of establishing this procedure. By the close of the reporting period, knowledge of stock balances, dues-out, dues-in and usage rates was readily available for use as a management tool.

(2) On 26 August 1966, Log Command Circular 415-1, Common Construction Material, was published. This circular outlined procedures for support of Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps units in the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. The program of supplying such units with common construction supplies commenced on 1 October 1966, and met with considerable success. Authorized Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps units are now being supplied construction materials in quantity and several work stoppages have been avoided due to implementation of this program.

(3) In August, a construction materials supply point was established at Pleiku to serve organizations located in their area. This was followed by establishment of similar supply points in Ta Ninh, Tuy Hoa and Kuan Loc. Authorized stockage lists were prepared for these areas, and a supply pipeline to these points began to receive a steady flow of materials. The concept of storing supplies nearer the ultimate consumers has been proven well-founded.

(4) During the period each subordinate support command established staff positions at support command level for the management of construction materials. Due to a shortage of qualified engineer officers in 1st Logistical Command, the persons initially assigned to occupy these positions were 20th from the 18th Engineer Brigade. By the end of the reporting period, each support command had a limited but functioning staff, engaged in the management of construction materials.
An authorized stockage list (ASL) for construction materials was designed during this period and provided to all depots and to all major customers. The ASL was edited to assure that no duplication of stockage would result and that all principal needs could be met. Customers were requested to utilize the ASL as much as possible, when requisitioning construction materials, to preclude the necessity of requisitioning non-stocked items, with a longer delivery lead-time. The ASL has proven to be a good standardization tool. Construction units are using it when designing projects and customers utilize it when requisitioning materials. Demands are being gathered in these areas with non-standard items being eliminated. Requisitioning objectives of 240 days of supply were established for each item at each depot and a timely flow of requisitions to C^NUS supply sources commenced. All national inventory control points and major C^NUS supply agencies were provided copies annotated with requisitioning objectives for their use as a management tool.

In-country and off-shore procurement actions for this period totaled 79 purchase requests categorized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>DOLLAR VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>$4,796,595.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,435,161.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIAK</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>178,637.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>$7,410,394.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

680,000 square feet of Steel Ground Fattening, to be used for heliports, handstands, and depot storage areas was purchased. This purchase was divided equally between manufacturers in Japan and Taiwan.

1st Logistical Command Regulation 415-2, Construction and Fortification Materials, Policies and Procedures, after coordination with the US Army, Vietnam (USAV) Engineer Office was published with an effective date of 11 November 1966. This regulation defines procedures for support commands to manage construction materials and outlines methods for customers to obtain materials.

In preparation for the ultimate mechanization of construction materials stock records, two automatic data system technicians were requested to provide assistance and guidance in this area. The request was approved and the technicians arrived in August. By the close of the period, they had designed a program whereby computers would automatically produce cards signalling issues, releases of dues-out, and re-orders as well as a number of
other detailed functions necessary to maintain up-to-date stock status on construction materials throughout Vietnam. The technicians departed near the close of the reporting period.

d. Central Real Estates Office Activities.

(1) The Central Real Estate Office implemented a Lease Standardization Program designed to produce complete documentation for all lease contract files on hand. Progress was carefully reviewed each month. The program will be completed by 31 December 1966.

(2) A major one-time report was prepared in October at the request of the American Embassy for submission to the Ministry of Finance, Government of Vietnam for tax collection purposes. The report consisted of a complete listing of all US Army leaseholdings in Vietnam.

e. Contracting Officer's representative (PA&ES).

(1) The Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., Contract DAB-1167-0001 for A&U support during fiscal year 1967 is in the amount of $42,500,000. Negotiations are now underway to modify the contract due to an increase in scope of work to include A&U support to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (MACV), and Special Forces sites, plus additional support to other US and Free World Forces. If the proposed modification is approved, contract costs for FY67 will exceed $100,000,000. The current contract includes operation of construction material depots at Saigon, Vung Tau and Nha Trang. PA&ES also performs field maintenance repair of engineer equipment in the Saigon Area. The Annual Work Plan is being prepared and the first Quarterly Review and Analysis is currently in the process of review.

(2) Contractor performance during this period continued to improve as his capacity increased with additional American and Third Country National personnel, plus a small increase in government furnished equipment.
13. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

c. Inspections: Annual General Inspections conducted during the months of August, September, and October 1966 by the Office of the Inspector General, Headquarters 1st Logistical Command.

UNIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th Preventive Medicine Unit (LB)</td>
<td>15 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st Medical Detachment (LA)</td>
<td>15 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD 8th Medical Group</td>
<td>29 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>13-15 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Field Hospital</td>
<td>21-22 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Field Hospital</td>
<td>28-29 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>3-4 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Supply and Service Company</td>
<td>5 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Surgical Hospital</td>
<td>14 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD 79th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>18-19 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD US Army Support Command, Saigon</td>
<td>25-27 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Medical Company (Amb)</td>
<td>31 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Complaints and Requests for Assistance: The following is a summary of complaints and requests for assistance received by 1st Logistical Command Inspectors General during the period August through October 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>JUST</th>
<th>UNJUST</th>
<th>REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Log Comd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, CRB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Trans Comd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36
14. (U) INFORMATION.

a. The Information Office submitted 7,673 hometown news releases, 156 general news releases, and 126 photo stories. Representatives of 49 news media visited the command during the period.

b. Special projects during the period include:

(1) Pictorial Progress Report of 1st Logistical Command activities throughout the II, III, and IV Corps areas.

(2) Feature stories on 90th Replacement Battalion; 1099th Transportation Company, recipient of National Defense Transportation Award; transportation corps activities for Army News Photo Features; 16th anniversary of activation of 1st Logistical Command; Eureka, California, adoption of Vung Tau as a Sister City with appropriate ceremonies; adoption of 93d Evacuation Hospital by Huntsville, Alabama, and capabilities of Saigon port facilities.

(3) Special emphasis on Army Home Town News Center news releases and radio interviews.
15. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

a. Legal support to USAF has improved because of the assignment to that agency of LTC Warren L. Casey as General Counsel and Judge Advocate. This, together with the reassignment of Maj John McCormick to that agency for duty on a full time basis, has increased the capability of USAF to accomplish their mission more effectively.

b. Legal support to US Army Support Commands, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay has been improved by the arrival of the 5th Transportation Command (Term A) on 29 September 1966 and the 124th Transportation Command (Term A) on 1 October 1966 at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay, respectively. The JA Section of each command is composed of two officers and five JMs. The placing of these two JA Sections under the technical supervision and control of this office permitted the return of two officers who formerly staffed these branch offices on a temporary duty basis.

c. Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown of courts-martial tried during the months indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Trans Comd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Log Comd (Aggregate)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Trans Comd</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Log Comd (Aggregate)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Trans Comd</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Log Comd (Aggregate)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. For comparative purposes court-martial rates per 1000 military personnel for 1st Logistical Command (1st quarter FY 67), USARV (1st quarter FY 67) and worldwide Army (4th quarter FY 66) are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Logistical Command</th>
<th>USARV</th>
<th>Army Wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GMC</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPGM</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. Clans. The following claims were paid to members of this command for personal property lost, destroyed, or damaged incident to service in accordance with AR 27-21 and AR 27-29:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Claims Paid:</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Claimed:</td>
<td>$3,955.26</td>
<td>$2,481.80</td>
<td>$2,131.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Paid:</td>
<td>$3,235.46</td>
<td>$2,258.73</td>
<td>$1,992.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Legal Assistance. The following is a breakdown of legal assistance rendered during the period 1 Aug-31 Oct 66:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Instruments Prepared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption &amp; Change of Name:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, Immigration &amp; Passports:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Relations &amp; Paternity:</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depositions:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Support:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notarizations:</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances, Debts, Insurance, Etc:</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Property, Automobiles, Etc:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers of Attorney:</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Prop, Sale, Lease, Etc:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation (All kinds):</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torts:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wills &amp; Estates:</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16, (FOUO) COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE.

a. Secure Teletypewriter Circuit.

(1) A 100 word per minute secure teletypewriter cir-
cuit was installed on 29 October 1966 between Headquarters, 1st
Logistical Command and the Phu Lam DCS Relay Station. This is the
second 100 word per minute circuit between these two points. The
additional circuit was required to handle traffic originating and
terminating in 1st Logistical Command Headquarters which has tripled
in volume between 1 June and 1 November 1966.

(2) Deactivation of the secure teletypewriter cir-
cuit between this headquarters and Headquarters, US Army Vietnam,
has been requested effective 15 November 1966. Traffic between
these two headquarters can be passed rapidly via motor courier.
A total of less than 100 messages per day are handled on this circuit.
Due to the low volume of traffic the circuit can no longer be justified.

b. Telephone Directory Distribution. The new telephone
directories have been received by the Communications Office and
are being distributed throughout the command. Directories are
being issued in accordance with the density of telephone instruments
in each office at a ratio of one directory for each two instruments.
Sufficient directories are being packed for shipment to the support
commands for local distribution by each Support Command Communica-
tions Office.
17. (U) DIRECTIVES OF PROCUREMENT.

a. During the week of 22 August, contracts number DA 23-195-420-0778(T), 0884(T), DA-31 13-67-C-0171, and 0208 awarded by USAMC, St. Louis, Missouri, were transferred on a successor contracting officer basis from Mr. L. P. Hall to Major Block of this agency. In accordance with the conditions under which the transfer was accepted, three contract specialists accompanied the contract and will remain with Procurement Agency Vietnam for a maximum of six months.

b. On 14 October, a team of auditors from the US Army Audit Agency arrived and began conducting preliminary activities. An entrance conference was held 2 November 1966 and the formal audit began. This audit is scheduled to be completed by 15 December 1966.

c. The McClellan Committee counsel for Senate Permanent Investigation Subcommittee arrived 19 October to investigate contract actions.

d. On 6 October a cost plus incentive fee trucking contract was negotiated with Jhilco Corporation Techrep Division that includes two performance incentive features, gate to gate and truck availability incentives. The gate to gate incentive is designed to encourage the contractor to strive to reduce the turn around time of trucks. The truck availability incentive is designed to encourage the contractor to closely monitor his trucks to ensure that the maximum number of trucks are available for use, less the ones under load. Both incentive features are related and are designed to encourage management to maintain a higher standard of performance at a lower operating cost.
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18. (C) DISTRIBUTION OF AMMUNITION.

a. Surveillance Activities:

(1) The six Department of Army civilian ammunition inspectors (Surveillance) allocated to this command have arrived. All six are assigned to the Director of Ammunition; Three are stationed in the Office of the Director, one is stationed in each Support Command.

(2) During the period 55 unit basic loads were inspected in USASC, Saigon, 73 in USASC, Can Kanh Base; 28 in USASC, Qui Nhon; Quarterly inspections of Depots and A/BPs were conducted at Qui Nhon, An Lhe, Pleiku, Long Binh, Vung Tau, Tan Son Nhat, Phan Rang and Tuy Hoa.

(3) The inspectors conducted surveys of ammunition discharge operations at Qui Nhon, Can Ranh Bay, Cogido and Vung Tau. Results of surveys were furnished Director of Transportation of the appropriate support command for necessary corrective action, including submission of waiver requests. Inspectors provided assistance in preparing waiver requests for Qui Nhon port and Can Ranh Bay port activities.

(4) Waiver request on Long Binh Depot ammunition storage was reviewed in detail and submitted to higher headquarters.

(5) During the period 18 malfunction reports were received and processed. Necessary suspension notices and preliminary malfunction report were forwarded. Four (4) on site investigations of malfunctions were conducted.

(6) During the past ten months, nine malfunctions of 105mm HE ammunition, fused with the 1,51A5 series 7D fuzes have occurred. This number seems high and the Commanding General expressed concern. A technical evaluation must be made to determine if the high number of malfunctions is a result of a greater expenditure rate or is a function of deteriorating fuzes resulting in a higher failure rate. On 22 October, a letter to Commanding General, US Army Ammunition Command, set forth the computed failure rates in Vietnam, asking if our high number of failures versus issue rate is abnormal when compared to world-wide experience.

b. Renovation Activities.

(1) Refusing of 81mm HE (M43A1 round with 7D Fuzes K52Al) continued during period with production of 119,000 rounds; total production since program initiation is 395,909. Approximately 151,00 rounds remain to be refused; estimated completion date is January 1967. Of the 151,000 rounds remaining to be refused, approximately 25,000-30,000 rounds also require replacement of
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ignition systems. These operations will, beginning in December 1966, be performed concurrently.

At the request of DCG, 1st Logistical Command, 1st Lloyd Cunningham, GS-12, of the Maintenance Management Directorate, Headquarters US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (AASA) arrived in Vietnam for 90 days TDY. Purpose of his visit is to make a detailed study of existing conditions which will affect the degree of maintenance and renovation which will eventually be required in Vietnam. He will prepare a complete plan for an overall renovation program including equipment requirements, building requirements, and a proposed permanent DOD organization with skills and grade structure appropriate for accomplishing the program. The plan will be completed by 25 November.

There is no change in previously reported plans to modify (refuse) 81mm HE and 60mm HE ammunition upon completion of the current 81mm HE program.

c. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Activities:

(1) During this reporting period, the nine 30D activities responded to 1,927 incidents throughout Republic of Vietnam. 30D presented 63 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance courses, training 3,814 personnel in the recognition, identification and associated hazards of various munitions.

(2) The 30D units' capabilities were greatly increased by the receipt of AN/VIC-46 radios. To date, five of the nine units have received these radios. Through the use of these radios, the units maintain better control over the "on-site" teams supporting combat operations.

(3) On 28 October 1966, 30D personnel were called to assist in clearance operations after the Long Binh Ammunition Depot explosion. With the assistance of Navy, Air Force and Vietnamese 20D, army 30D located and removed 1,024 8" projectiles and 503 105mm cartridges during the initial three days following the explosion.

(4) The 533d Ordnance Detachment (EDT), received and distributed an Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Handbook which was composed by 533d Ordnance Detachment and published by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. This 52 page book briefly discusses the various munitions being used in Vietnam, data on emergency destruction of ammunition and demolition procedures.

(5) The 191st Ordnance Battalion arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 1 October 1966 with its organic 30D section consisting of one officer and eight EN. Since their arrival, two additional men have been assigned to bring the 30D section to T/O strength.
d. Ammunition Supply Activities:

(1) During the quarterly APEA liaison visit to Vietnam, CG, USA-V and CG, 1st Logistical Command were advised that certain items of Class V munitions were either in world-wide short supply at the time, or would be in the near future. The Directorate of Ammunition immediately began an intensive and comprehensive analysis of the current and projected supply status of the 29 items so indicated. This analysis was forwarded to Headquarters USA-V where it was reviewed and available Supply Rates (ASRs) were established. Prior to this analysis, ASRs had been established on five items; this analysis resulted in ASRs on an additional 13 Class V items.

(2) The supply was hand-carried to Headquarters USA-PAC by representatives of Headquarters USA-V and Headquarters 1st Logistical Command where briefing were held for C.MCUSA-PAC staff. Subsequently, the briefings were presented to the DA staff. In addition to establishment of ASRs, the 1st Logistical Command analysis had a bearing on:

(a) Establishment of a DA Ammunition Allocations Committee.

(b) Establishment of a series of systematic replenishment-drawdown charts to assist in 1st Logistical Command management of the 29 items.

(c) Collection of data to update USA-V semi-monthly on issues to using units, thus enabling USA-V to get an indication of the effectiveness of ASRs established.

e. Effective 24 October, Support CM and Class V stock control activities began reporting recipients of daily issues. On a monthly basis, reporting depots will forward to 102d Stock Control Detachment copies of all DA Forms 581 which have been filled for Free World Forces. These Forms 581 will serve as back-up for a new quarterly report of issues to Free World Forces.

f. On 28 October at approximately 2030 hours, Long Binh Ammunition Depot came under attack from VC small arms and mortar fire. Additional VC elements were able to place satchel charges on two pads of ammunition (1 pad of 8" HE projectiles and 1 pad of 105mm Ht). At approximately 2110 hours, the pad of 8" HE projectiles exploded, scattering 8" projectiles over a wide area, and starting fires on adjacent pads of 105 HE and unserviceable 175mm propelling charges. Fires on all pads had been extinguished about 45 minutes after ignition. At first light on 29 October, 1CD personnel found an additional satchel charge on a pad adjacent to the 8" HE projectile pad. This second charge did not function and was removed by 1CD personnel. Ammunition losses were:
None of these losses were significant in relation to our overall stock position and the known input of these items for November. Detailed after action report attached at Inclosure 18.
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19. (c) ILLUSTRATE OF MAINTENANCE.

   a. The 500 Gallon Collapsible Drum repair facility became operational at Qui Nhon on 25 June 1966. The repair facility had been relocated from Cam Ranh Bay in May 1966. Production rate of the plant has shown considerable improvement in the past few months.

   b. Initial shipments of standard rough terrain forklifts, both 6,000 and 10,000 pound capacity, began to arrive in RV. Two each 6,000 pound and 2 ea 10,000 lb lifts arrived at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon to be used initially as training vehicles. Training was conducted in the Saigon area by the New Equipment Training Team during the period covered by this report.

   c. The standard full tracked tractor, the Caterpillar D7E, arrived in country in significant quantities. Standardization has been partially implemented in the Saigon area for 1st Engineer Brigade and divisional units. Issue of these new tractors has resulted in a significant decrease in deadlines.

   d. Construction of maintenance facilities by the Vinnell Corporation at Cam Ranh Bay continued. The Vinnell Corporation, of Alhambra, California, has a contract to provide for the establishment and operation of fully equipped direct and general support maintenance shops for the repair of engineer and other selected equipment in the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

   e. Maintenance training on the AN/GC-106 Radio Set, at the GS level has been conducted in the Saigon, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay areas by Lt. George Flansburg, General Dynamics Corporation Technical Representative. Maintenance instruction is planned to include all US Army DS/GS activities in RVN supporting this equipment. The training cycle is programmed through December 1966.

   f. A cyclic overhaul program has been established with USAREC for AN/GD-1 Radar Sets and AN/PPS-4 and AN/TPS-33 ground surveillance radar sets. Sets meeting overhaul criteria, outlined in SB 11-464, will be evacuated to CONUS upon receipt of replacement sets. In conjunction with the cyclic overhaul program, all assets of AN/PPS-4 radar Sets will be converted to the AN/PPS-4 A model. This program is scheduled as follows:

      (1)  AN/GD-1 Radar Set, Initial shipment from CONUS, of three sets in November 1966 and one set per month thereafter until replacement of all in-country assets has been accomplished.

      (2)  AN/PPS-4 Radar Set, Initial shipment of ten sets per month, starting in November 1966, and ten sets per month thereafter until replacement of all in-country assets requiring cyclic overhaul or conversion to the "A" model has been completed.
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(3) AN/PPS-33 Radar Set. Initial shipment of five sets per month, starting in October 1966, and five sets per month thereafter until all in-country assets meeting cyclic overhaul criteria have been completed.

g. Receipt of three each AN/MPR-4, counter mortar radar sets by 1st Logistical Command units under the cyclic overhaul program has been confirmed by this headquarters. Replaced sets will be evacuated to CONUS for overhaul.

h. Data has been received from several sources that has permitted the computation of gross maintenance requirements and capabilities. The most significant data was furnished by the Combat Development Command Maintenance Agency, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md, which stated the capability of 503R units in terms of maintenance equivalents and assigned maintenance equivalents to major items of equipment. This, coupled with the AN 711-5 report of AN 711-140 items, permitted calculation of gross requirements and capabilities.

i. The program for rebuild of equipment for FY 67, 68 and 69 was completed in August in a joint effort with HQ, USARV. The program was presented to CASPAC on 20-28 Aug and was then presented to DA as part of the rebuild program for 503R, in St Louis 1-3 Sep '66. The study showed that USARV could accomplish 10% of its general support in FY 67, 50% in FY 68, and 90% in FY 69. In country general support units are currently programming the rebuild requirements.

j. A composite team from the supply and maintenance directorates studied the performance of the Red Ball Express system at the user level. The study provided data as to the time required for the requisitioner to get the requisition to the Saigon Red Ball Control Office, the time required to get the items in CONUS after it was forwarded to CONUS, and the accommodation of Red Ball at the user level. The Red Ball performance study was presented to the Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee, Senate Committee on Armed Services on 28 October 1966.

k. On 21 October 1966, a Supply and Maintenance Conference was held at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. Attending were key personnel from the supply and maintenance organizations within RVN. Problems of mutual interest and concern were discussed.

l. Replacement studies for 100 selected major end items have been completed. In addition, studies were conducted for 5 ton trucks, 2½ ton trucks, personnel carriers and medium tanks.
m. As a result of the anticipated deployment of additional general support units in Dec 66 and Jan 67, each of the three support commands was directed to establish at least one GS unit to perform its intended general support mission. This will reduce the requirements for evacuation of equipment to off-shore maintenance facilities and will expedite the return of a limited amount of equipment to the supply system.

n. lst Logistical Command regulations 750-15 and 750-16, establishing procedures for management of PLL's and ASL's have been published. These regulations should assist subordinate units in review and purification of PLL and ASL's. A theater wide program for review and analysis of all PLL/ASL by assistance teams has been developed at the request of CSSNV.

o. The program for retrograde of reparables has been fully implemented. A total of 2557 tons were evacuated in August and September 1966.

p. Army Audit Agency (AAA) conducted an audit of the Headquarters during September - October 1966. Fact sheets and charts were prepared showing the supply accommodation of the lst Logistical Command maintenance effort.

q. The first replacement weapons for the M107/M110 Gun Howitzer replacement program are awaiting off loading at Qui Nhon. To further reduce maintenance difficulties with the M107/M110 vehicle, maintenance training teams from Ft Sill, Oklahoma, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Id, are visiting each unit equipped with M107/M110 weapons.

r. Due to continuing difficulties with the 105mm Howitzer M108 and 155mm Howitzer M109, two maintenance assistance teams from Weapons Command are currently in country visiting units equipped with M108 and M109 Howitzers.

s. Maintenance responsibility for the Administrative Use Vehicle Fleet within lst Logistical Command was assumed by the Director of Maintenance during the month of August. Regulations concerning maintenance standards and repair parts support have been published.

t. Continued abnormal failure rate of the 5 ton multifuel engine has been the primary factor for this command's high deadline. An experiment was conducted converting the 2½ ton multifuel engine to properly perform in lieu of the 5 ton multifuel engine. This has proven to be a very satisfactory substitute and as such had a very favorable effect in reducing the deadline rate. New production design 5 ton multifuel engines are beginning to arrive in this command. It is hoped that with the new improvements a longer life expectancy will be experienced.
International Harvester Truck Tractors began arriving during this reporting period. To date 108 have been received with 172 still due to arrive.
a. Primary difficulty in bulk petroleum distribution continues to be shortage of shore tankage and adequate tanker discharge facilities. During the past three months, the tank farm at Nha Trang (72,000 bbls) has been completed, as has the initial 112,000 bbl farm at Qui Nhon. 40,000 bbls of storage have been completed at Vung Tau, and testing has started on tank farm 2 at Cam Ranh Bay (204,000 bbls) with service tankage. The initial increment of 9,000 bbls of bolted steel tankage at Pleiku is now operational, and the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline construction is 50% completed. Tanker discharge rates at Qui Nhon and Vung Tau continue to be severely restricted due to lack of adequate discharge facilities.

b. Acceleration by USAF of deployment of tactical fighter squadrons to Tuy Hoa without concurrent early completion of bulk fuel facilities there has placed strain upon US Army distribution system and forced the expansion of a temporary, combat support system into a semi-permanent facility. Additional pipeline is now being installed to enable product to be furnished directly to USAF facilities.

c. Increased staffing of the petroleum directorates at support command level has improved control over petroleum distribution.

d. A problem new to most US Army petroleum personnel, the supply of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG), has become of vital concern to the petroleum directorate, as requirements for this commodity are outstripping commercial petroleum firms ability to meet ever-growing demands. Use of LPG had originally been limited to certain Special Forces and Advisory Teams and PAVN forces in the Saigon Area. Outfitting of new troop messes with LPG burning equipment and expanded use in the field have skyrocketed the LPG demand. An LPG tanker vessel has been chartered to assist in meeting the requirements, and special LPG storage facilities to augment available commercial storage, are on order.

e. The aerial delivery of bulk fuels by "Flying Tankers", C-130 and C-123 aircraft outfitted with palletized internal tanks and pumping systems, has been re-instated with the receipt of improved equipment by USAF. Current equipment allows delivery of 5,000 gallons bulk fuel (by C-130) with an average total aircraft ground time of 12 minutes, while the C-123 version delivers 1,500 gallons in about the same time.

f. As the useable road net in W AREA expands, use of ground fuels continues to increase. While it has not yet reached the levels, in terms of gallons/man/day, that have been experienced in previous conventional warfare operations, if current trends continue, it will
likely equal or exceed these rates. The most interesting factor is that tactical units remain low in their consumption of ground fuels, apparently due to heavy reliance upon air mobility, while combat support and combat service support units are very high in ground fuel consumption. The heavy use of water craft also increases diesel fuel consumption.

Bulk fuels consumption in thousands of barrels consumed by US Forces in II, III and IV CTs, RVN, for this reporting period is as shown below:

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>JP-4</th>
<th>Avgas</th>
<th>Avgas</th>
<th>Avgas</th>
<th>Avgas</th>
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<tr>
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<td>42.0</td>
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<td>51.8</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>32.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
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<th>OCTOBER</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>89.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>326.6</td>
<td>331.9</td>
<td>322.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>377.9</td>
<td>376.9</td>
<td>455.0</td>
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a. During the period 1 August 1966 - 31 October 1966, Quartermaster field bakeries produced 4,647,852 pounds of fresh bread, Quartermaster laundries processed 2,863,313 pounds of laundry, and mobile bath facilities gave 542,646 baths.

b. The arrival of the 573d Supply and Service Company did not raise the laundry capability in-country because the unit did not have its TOE laundry equipment. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 532d Supply and Service Battalion, arrived without its bakery equipment, which is on board ship bound for SVN; however, the 532d bakery personnel are now operating a bakery previously operated by the 226th Supply and Service Company at Tuy Hoa.

c. Eight bath units were located in the Saigon Field Depot and distributed to the following units: 226th Supply and Service Battalion, four each; 185th Maintenance Battalion, two each (for maintenance float); 96th Supply and Service Battalion, one each; and 15th Support Service Company, one each.

d. Arrangements were made to air ship four dryers and two washers to the 88th Supply and Service Battalion to be used by the 573d Supply and Service Company.

e. Fifty engines needed for the engine-generators on the laundry drying tumblers arrived in-country. These engines will be a very large factor in cutting down the amount of deadlined equipment.

f. US Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAEC) has taken action to effect shipment of 24 new Eidel laundry units to Vietnam. Ten will go to Saigon Support Command, four to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, and ten to Qui Nhon Support Command. Distribution is based on combat support missions.

g. On 1 September 1966 the Personal Effects Depot of the US Army Mortuary, Vietnam, became operational. Since 1 September, 431 cases have been received, and 172 cases have been shipped to next of kin as of 25 October 1966. Summary Courts' reports completed as of 25 October 1966 are 170.

h. There were 1,505 remains processed through the US Army Mortuary during the period.
On 10 September 1966 the Supply Directorate was re-organized on functional lines as per the diagram below:

![Diagram of the Supply Directorate structure]

b. A Supply Management Branch was organized in order to devote a full time effort to the pure management aspects of general supply activities, including the preparation and revision of Log Command Supply Bulletins, and detailed studies on requirements and objectives.

c. During the week of 6-12 October 1966, a storage liaison visit was made from office of AC of S, G-4, USARV. The visit included a tour of the 506th Field Depot, Can Khan Bay Depot, and the Can Khan Depot. The visit concentrated on the Storage Management Program and space utilization and reporting policies and procedures. The USARVAC representatives provided the latest information on USARV policy and has sent helpful storage management check-lists and regulations to this command.

d. The first complete shipment of apples and oranges from CONUS arrived to institute a policy of one piece of hard fruit for everyone in SVN each day. Apples and pears will be procured from western pacific sources until such time as the CONUS supply line is full.

e. The temporary shortage of Sundries Packs has been overcome by the receipt of 7000 packs at Can Khan from Okinawa; 3000 at Can Khan Bay Depot from CONUS, and the assembling of 10,000 at the 506th Field Depot, Saigon.
During the reporting period a distribution of 3,493 Tent General Purpose Medium and 574 Tent General Purpose Large was affected.

The 506th Field Depot is now designated as the central repository for all awards and decorations. Units throughout RVN submit their requirements to USARV for approval which are forwarded through 1st Logistical Command to the 506th Field Depot for issue. USARV computes monthly a 90 day requirement for awards based on experience factors and the 506th Field Depot uses this computation as requisitioning objectives and requisitions direct to GOIUS. Awards and decorations are airlifted to RVN monthly.

Department of Army Civilian Depot Assistance Teams continue to arrive and rotate every 90 days. Currently we have 43 DACTs divided between the Depots in Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. A Packaging Team arrived from the US Army Natick Laboratories for on site determination of packaging requirements best suited for shipment to Vietnam. A team of eight supply management specialists from the Army Material Command arrived in Vietnam to provide assistance in reviewing depot requisitioning objectives. The team is in the process of working in each depot and assists in reviewing stockage objectives, requisitioning objectives and procedures used for determining criteria and computations. The team chief is Lt Col Raymond Cantaral from US Army, Army Material Command.

Nine ice plants are operational to provide potable ice to troops where it is not locally available. A total of 50 ice plants of 15 ton capacity will be constructed.
a. Rail. Tonnages moved by rail have increased considerably over the previous reporting period. It is anticipated that during the next reporting period backhauls, i.e., Dalat to Nha Trang, will increase.

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<th>FROM</th>
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<th>OCT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>3066.7</td>
<td>2334.2</td>
<td>3041.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>714.8</td>
<td>889.4</td>
<td>2136.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>2329.0</td>
<td>570.7</td>
<td>996.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

b. Port.

(1) Port operations and throughput increased in the period August through October. In October, a record volume of tonnage handled and discharged has been achieved by 1st Logistical Command ports. During the reporting period, new one month highs were recorded by Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. Port operations at Vung Ro, which began in September, reached 12,309 STON discharged in October. Inclosure 19 gives port operation statistics for 1st Logistical Command ports and Inclosure 20 reflects ships status.

(2) Western Area MINTS has instituted a program whereby every hatch on a ship has a key pallet marked, or a set of cargo slings attached for easy identification of the first pallet to be discharged. The above information has been disseminated to the ports in Vietnam.

(3) A query has been received as to the feasibility of employing more Sea Train type vessels. All ports have received these vessels with enthusiasm as they discharge quickly and can be backloaded with up to 21,000 MTOK. They are excellent carriers of unit equipment and large amounts of wheeled or tracked vehicles.

(4) Port improvement has progressed significantly with the opening of four barge sites at Newport near Saigon, Vung Ro Bay near Tuy Hoa, and the opening of a new channel and a berth of the Do Long Pier at Qui Nhon on 17 October 1966. The ammunition pier at Cam Ranh Bay was finished by the end of October, however a small amount of dredging must be accomplished before the first vessel can move into a berth.

(5) UIC cargo (TO&E equipment) started to arrive in noticeable amounts at ports during August 1966, and at present represents a major portion of the cargo handled in this theater. A Cargo Disposition Instruction (CDI) is prepared for each vessel with UIC aboard, and sent to the port of discharge with appropriate identifying and shipping instructions, to prevent delay in discharge and forwarding to destination.
Late arrival of ocean manifests are reported bi-weekly to W&KBITS via FANS telcon for ocean vessels which have an ETA of two weeks or less at ports in Vietnam.

A projected tonnage report has been developed to inform the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, and to assist port commanders by providing advance information for discharge operations. This report previews by two weeks all vessels due at ports in Vietnam, and includes a breakout of cargo by major commodity with tonnage figures.


On 10 September 1966, United States Army Vietnam approved the allocation of vehicles to support commands rather than to individual transportation motor pools. Each support command now has one Transportation Motor Pool with all others designated as sub-pools. Responsibilities, maintenance, and spare parts re-supply are not affected by this change. Support command allocations permit changing of administrative vehicle assets within the commands without approval of United States Army, Vietnam.

In October 1966, Philco-Ford Corporation was awarded a contract for the operation, maintenance and management of 200 commercial design stake and platform trucks in the Saigon area. Scheduled date for commencement of operations is 1 January 1967. This contract is the first to award compensation on an incentive compensation basis. Areas of incentive compensation to the contractor are costs of contract operation, portal to portal travel time, and vehicle availability.

Administrative Vehicle status is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL VEHICLES</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Can Kanh Bay</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>268*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>199*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 23 vehicles accepted for transshipment from Saigon to Qui Nhon, and 30 vehicles accepted for trans-shipment from Saigon to Can Kanh Bay.

d. Air. On 15 October 1966, the CV-2 aircraft allocated to the 1st Logistical Command was transferred to the Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, in order to support intensified operations in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones.

e. Coordination of Civilian Contracts. Contracts as reported for last reporting period continue in effect. Only sizeable new contract, Philco, is explained in paragraph e(2) above.
f. Movements. Unit advance parties arriving at Tan Son Nhut were experiencing difficulty in obtaining prompt in-country air transportation to final destination. Coordination was accomplished with 8th Aerial Port and advance parties now move under emergency TDY priority.
24. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MEDICAL SERVICES.

a. Major Patricia Accountious, MD, transferred from the 3d Field Hospital to Headquarters Detachment, 44th Medical Brigade, and serving as a member of this directorate, was designated as Staff Dietitian, 44th Medical Brigade, and Dietary Consultant to the US Army Vietnam Surgeon's office.

b. A detailed medical troo study of the medical requirements for Vietnam, not previously accomplished, was conducted and approved by 1st Logistical Command and the Surgeon's Office, US Army Vietnam. This well documented study was used by 186th Army Vietnam at the September CINC/PAC/USARPAC Conference.

c. In the interest of economy of personnel, and for more efficient operations, the official office of the Directorate of Medical Service was relocated from the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters to the 44th Medical Brigade area. A liaison office, staffed by 44th Medical Brigade personnel, will remain located within the headquarters area.
a. Captain Richard E. Sander assumed command of the detachment on 26 September 1966, replacing Captain Donald C. Fayette.

b. Three prefabricated billets under construction are expected to be completed in early November and a detachment day room and enlisted men's club will be completed in the very near future.
1. (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MATERIAL READINESS.

   a. Item: Cargo delayed due to lack of cleaning.

      Discussion: All cargo offered for shipment must be as clean as possible. The Air Force has rejected cargo as hazardous on numerous occasions because it was dirty, greasy, or leaking oil. Retrograde cargo to CONUS or Okinawa has been quarantined by Department of Agriculture officials because of clods of dirt or vegetation sticking to it.

      Observation: It is essential that all cargo be as clean as possible before being offered for shipment.

   b. Item: Cargo lost or missent because of improper markings.

      Discussion: Proper shipping documentation must be neatly and securely placed on crates and containers. It is essential that all old markings be obliterated. An Army shipper once used an Air Force shipping crate with the USAID handclasp markings still on it. Cargo handlers merely glanced at the USAID marking, which should have been obliterated, and put the crate in Air Force channels. Only after a thorough search was the cargo located in an Air Force depot.

      Observation: Shipping documentation is as important as the address on a letter. Care must be taken to display it carefully on shipping containers.

   c. Item: Cargo delayed because of improper use of Transportation Control Movement Document (TCMD).

      Discussion: A common mistake has been to send air cargo destined for Pleiku to Qui Nhon with a supplemental address of Pleiku. This causes delays because the cargo, naturally, goes to Qui Nhon first, then awaits an aircraft to Pleiku. Critical cargo has also been lost because the shipper neglected to put the name and phone number of a contact man in the remarks column of the TCMD.

      Observation: Addresses on TCMD's should be filled out in terms of direct channel shipment. The remarks column of the TCMD should contain sufficient information to enable cargo handlers at the other end to identify the addressee.

   d. Item: Abuse of Priorities System.

      Discussion: The unrealistic use of 01 and 02 shipping priorities has caused unnecessary backlogs at air heads. If traffic on the air channels is relatively heavy, it does no good to assign a high shipping priority to a shipment, then drop it off at the air head, because it only goes to the end of the line behind other 01 and 02 shipments. It is often much faster to ship cargo by LST or other surface means rather than push 01 and 02 shipments into the existing buildup.

      Observation: Care must be taken when assigning shipping priorities. Abuse of the system is self-defeating.
Item: Chaplain Assistants. The number of assistants assigned and their distribution is adequate for the needs of the command. However, 21 of these assignments are excessive to current authorization tables.

Discussion: Adjustments to the authorization tables for chaplain assistant spaces have not kept pace with the rapid growth of the command. TDs for both 501 Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay support commands omit all assistant spaces, accounting for 9 out of the 21 excesses. Activation of COSTAR units account for an additional six assistants in DS type units where adequate coverage dictates the continuing need for both chaplains and assistants. The remainder are double slotted to cover known losses.

Observation: During the writing of adjusted TDs, particularly in the support commands, the requirements for chaplain assistants must be taken into consideration.
3. (C) Provost Marshal.


Discussion: The lack of security guards is a problem that continues to be inherent throughout the 1st Logistical Command.

Observation: Requirements for security guard companies have been validated, however deployment into this theater has been delayed. Until the security companies are operational in-country the problem will remain critical.


Discussion: Physical security surveys conducted of facilities within the com and continually reveal deficiencies of inadequate barriers and lighting. Since the construction effort, which utilizes available resources to the maximum, is directed mainly toward combat operations, lower construction priorities have been established for logistical support activities. Construction projects have not included the completion of security measures prior to beneficial occupancy. Power sources are not adequate to meet light requirements, however, the introduction of power ships may alleviate some of the problem.

Observation: The construction requirements have been established. However, until these are completed, many facilities will remain vulnerable due to their susceptibility to damage or loss by various hazards.
4. (C) ACofS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

a. **Item:** TOE for the Quartermaster Air Delivery Company (TOE 10-407E) and the Quartermaster Air Equipment Repair and Depot Company (TOE 417D) are inadequate.

**Discussion:** TOE's for the referenced organizations do not provide for location in undeveloped areas. The units are designed to operate from fixed locations; therefore, no provision is made in the TOE for operation in locations such as Vietnam.

**Observation:** TOE 10-407E and TOE 10-417D should have sufficient tentage and flooring included as XAXTOC items to enable them to operate from field locations.

b. **Item:** Diversion of Incoming units.

**Discussion:** During the period 1 August 1966 to 31 October 1966 a significant number of incoming units of the 1st Logistic Command were diverted from original destinations due to the changing tactical and logistical situation. Some of these diversions were caused by a change in destination of large tactical units such as the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, which was diverted from Ban Me Thout to Bear Cat. This necessitated a reevaluation of support requirements which resulted in the diversion of some logistical units.

**Observation:** Difficulties were experienced in obtaining approval for some diversions since a lead time of 45 days is required. This lead time could not always be met due to last minute changes. This resulted in equipment having to be unloaded at original port of debarkation and transshipped to the new destination.
5. **(U) ACoFS CO: Problem.**

**Item:** Ordering of Finance Detachments.

**Discussion:** The practice of ordering Finance Detachments causes innumerable administrative problems inherent with the inability of these Finance Detachments to operate independently.

**Observations:** Task 14-500E is a cellular TOE used for the purpose of creating a Finance Section of sufficient size to meet the requirements for finance service in a given area. A Finance Section is normally comprised of a Headquarters (A-Team) Disbursing/Examination (F-Team) and either a Commercial Accounts (G-Team) or Funding (I-Team). The Finance Detachments presently in country, and programmed, result in four to five detachments operating within one office, but still retaining unit identity until a modified TOE can be processed.
Item: FACV Advisory site construction.

**Discussion:** Continued inflationary pressures in Vietnam resulted in bills for construction by local contractors, far in excess of government cost estimates despite the use of government furnished materials.

**Observation:** A proposed modification to the FACV contract is presently under study to establish FACV activities at the larger FACV elements, with mobile teams to accomplish maintenance, repair, and some minor construction at all FACV sites, eliminating the need for local contractors.

b. Item: The construction of an ice plant requires specialized technical knowledge not available in most engineer units.

**Discussion:** Pacific Architects and Engineers, the FACV Contractor has erected most of the ice plants in Vietnam and has become proficient in the techniques of erection.

**Observation:** That contract personnel can be utilized to provide technical assistance to the military in future ice plants constructed.

c. Item: POL Construction materials.

**Discussion:** During this period, POL facilities construction emerged as a major item of concern. Originally, specific POL construction projects had been requisitioned using a color-code system. For instance, the orange system identified a 100,000 barrel tank farm at Cam Ranh Bay. The materials for each project did not arrive in-country at the same time however, and to construct a facility required "borrowing" from another project's assets. Due to sporadic and unplanned arrival in Vietnam, POL construction materials contained in Project Code YT3 lost all relationship to specific projects that might have existed originally. The concept of maintaining project integrity for POL construction materials was deemed no longer practical or desirable. To rectify this situation, an inventory of all POL construction facilities was conducted and completed by 1 October 1966. Based on this inventory, trans-shipment of components required to assemble complete project stocks was directed, and requisitions for missing components were submitted.

**Observation:** The management of POL construction materials is best accomplished on a line item basis, rather than thru use of a code system. Under previous procedures an unworkable method existed.
whereby the 1st Logistical Command Director of POL, the USA&V Engineer Section and the 18th Engineer Brigade were attempting to jointly manage POL construction materials. Currently management is accomplished under one agency, the Construction Materials Branch of the Engineer Office, 1st Logistical Command.

d. **Item**: Prefabricated Buildings.

**Discussion**: During this period it became increasingly apparent that a comprehensive compilation of all data pertinent to the requisition, shipment, receipt and issue of prefabricated buildings was necessary. Such buildings had been requisitioned by a myriad of agencies such as:

- 1st Logistical Command
- US Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Officer In Charge of Construction (OICC)
- US Army, Vietnam (USARV)
- Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E)
- US Army Pacific (USARPAC)
- US Army Mobility Equipment Center (USAMEC)
- US Army-Air Force Exchange Service

No single office or person possessed the total status of prefabricated buildings destined for Vietnam. Due to the quickening pace of the construction effort in Vietnam, command interest in this problem area increased considerably during this period. The Construction Materials Branch prepared a compilation of all pertinent information, in order to provide information by which higher headquarters could determine allocation and priorities for issue. Compilation was done in booklet form and contains information on size, quantity, location or destination, source of procurement and other available information, and has proved to be a most effective management tool.

**Observation**: Whenever feasible, the 1st Logistical Command should requisition all prefabricated buildings so as to properly receive, store and issue these items. When this cannot be done, this command should be thoroughly informed of actions taken by other agencies, to insure that monitoring of the overall status of prefabricated buildings may be accomplished.
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e. Item: Depot Operations.

Discussion: By the establishment of construction materials supply points at Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, Tay Ninh and Xuan Loc, the customer contacts at the principal depots at Saigon, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay have been reduced considerably. Supplies reach the consumer more rapidly and vehicular transportation requirements are reduced.

Observation: Establishment of forward area construction material supply points has proven its merit. Alertness to the desirability of creating similar supply points elsewhere is required. Lack of storage space and personnel dictates that these supply points must temporarily be limited to high tonnage and basic construction items.

f. Item: Construction Materials Supplied to Non-US Army Forces.

Discussion: During this period, support provided to other than US Army units increased considerably. The common construction materials program was implemented during this period, requiring support of Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps activities in the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. The Republic of Korea Forces increased their troop strength; the Australian Forces began a large-scale construction effort, and the Philippines Contingent arrived during this period. Substantial support was rendered the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) and Inter-Service Support Agreements required supplying such agencies as USAID, the Combined Studies Division and the 5th Special Forces Group. Under emergency conditions, material was provided to Republic of Vietnam military units. In addition, many contracts were negotiated for construction projects which required government furnished materials.

Observation: The 1st Logistical Command was not provided advance notice of agreements made, contracts signed or projects planned on many occasions. The drain on available resources from these unforeseen requirements has been substantial and the items which are generally required for these unplanned requirements are normally items already in short supply.
7. (U) DIRECTIVES OF PROCUREMENT.

a. Item: Unauthorized use of imprest fund.

Discussion: During the recent months, there has been a noted increase in the number of unauthorized purchases made from the imprest fund. The following action is taken upon receipt of information disclosing a possible unauthorized item purchase:

1. The unit ordering officer is immediately informed.

2. The comptroller is notified of the unauthorized purchase. All unit ordering officers are briefed by the small purchase contracting officer of US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam prior to issuance of appointing orders.

Observation: It is imperative that ordering officers closely examine all purchase requests prior to initiating purchase actions to ensure that only items essential for mission accomplishment are purchased.

b. Item: Non-availability of equipment through supply channels.

Discussion: The property administrator of the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) Contract has been experiencing difficulty in obtaining government furnished property through supply channels for contract performance. Frequent meetings between PA&E and the 50th Field Depot have been held to confirm the fact that valid requisitions are in existence. A command letter with a machine listing of critical items of equipment has been sent to the Commanding General, Army Material Command, requesting that the National Inventory Control Points provide 1st Logistic Command a listing of all items of equipment that can be obtained through supply channels by 31 December 1966. If equipment cannot be obtained through normal supply channels prior to 31 December 1966, PA&E will be granted procurement authority to obtain critical items of equipment.

Observation: Experience has shown that the supply system cannot provide equipment in the time frames required.
8. (C) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION. 

a. Surveillance Activities:

Item: 105mm Malfunctions.

Discussion: During the past ten months, nine malfunctions of 105mm HE ammunition, fused with the L51A5 series PD fuzes have occurred. This number seems high and the Commanding General expressed concern. A technical evaluation must be made to determine if the high number of malfunctions is a result of a greater expenditure rate or is a function of deteriorating fuzes resulting in a higher failure rate.

Observation: On 20 October, a letter signed by Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command to Commanding General, US Army Munitions Command, set forth the computed failure rates in Vietnam, asking if our high number of failures versus issue rate is abnormal when compared to world-wide experience.

Item: Quarterly Inspection of Ammunition Depots and Supply Points.

Discussion: The quarterly inspection of each storage activity is conducted by the Support Command resident DAC Ammunition Inspector (Surveillance). Items checked include suspension and release system, surveillance program, quantity/distance violations vs. waiver requests, storage compatibility, housekeeping, renovation operations, and surveillance records.

Observation: The numerous deficiencies noted indicate the urgent need for establishment of a surveillance organization at each storage activity adequately staffed with military personnel. Training and frequent monitoring of the program by DAC Ammunition Inspectors is essential. The Surveillance Branch, Directorate of Ammunition, Headquarters 1st Logistical Command, is presently working on development of an extensive, coordinated surveillance program.

b. Supply Activities:

Item: Exceeding ASIs.

Discussion: In view of projected shortage of certain items of Class V ammunition it was necessary to establish Available Supply Rates (ASIs) for 23 items. The ASIs were communicated to
using units through L343V command channels and to supply points through 1st. Logistical Com and ammunition channels. The ASRs were honored more in the breach than in compliance.

Observation: Both customer and supplier must be aware of ASRs established, and adhere to them. Commanders of ammunition supply activities were granted, through support command channels, authority to make partial issues when, in the judgment of the ASP commander, a request was excessive, with instructions to pass the problem immediately to this headquarters for resolution.
9. (C) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE.


Discussion: On 4 June 1966 the responsibility for operation of the 500 gallon collapsible fuel drum repair facility was transferred from the Car. Hanh Bay Support Command to the Qui Nhon Support Command. The facility itself was moved to Qui Nhon and it became operational on 25 June 1966. Production of the Qui Nhon facility has gradually increased to an end-of-quarter rate of 20 repaired drums per day. Although current production is almost double that of the previous quarter, a backlog of unserviceable drums still existed. Additional vulcanizers were received at the repair facility during the week of 24 October, and this added equipment should enable the facility to increase production even more.

Observation: The receipt of the additional vulcanizers should allow the repair facility to reduce this backlog to a zero level.

b. Item: Standardization of Rough Terrain Forklifts.

Discussion: Initial shipments of standard rough terrain forklifts, including the training vehicles, have arrived. Fourteen each 6,000 pound lifts have been received and are being distributed to Saigon and Cam ranh Bay. No significant deadline improvement was noted during the last quarter as new lifts were not yet in the hands of the users.

Observation: Advantages of having standard models of forklifts include a reduction in the variety of repair parts required for stockage and increased maintenance effectiveness resulting from specialization and rapid identification of problem areas and trends.

c. Item: Standardization of Full Tracked Tractors.

Discussion: Initial shipments of D7E tractors have been issued against 18th Engineer Brigade and divisional TOE authorizations in the Saigon area. The 19 tractors, aboard the Baton Rouge Victory when the vessel was damaged by a mine on 22 August 1966, are still under water. The tractors, however, are to be replaced by USAI3C so that TOE standardization for the Saigon area can be completed. During last quarter, 79 tractors were received in Saigon and 75 have been issued.

Observation: Standardization of full tracked tractors will significantly reduce the high downtime rate of this commodity which has been experienced in the past.
Item: Contract Maintenance.

Discussion: Vinnell Corporation at Cam Ranh Bay began limited maintenance operations during the past quarter. Although shops have not been completed, Vinnell maintenance personnel were dispatched to the Cam Ranh Bay shops for duty.

Observation: Contract maintenance in RVN has proved highly beneficial to the maintenance effort in those areas where there is a shortfall in military maintenance capability.

e. Item: Maintenance Planning.

Discussion: In-country assets of teletypewriter sets TT-4, TT-98, and TT-76, in troop units, because of age, use, and environmental operating conditions, are deteriorating to the extent that rebuild of these items will be required in the foreseeable future. Nonavailability of replacement sets from 1st Logistical Command or CONUS depot assets preclude an overhaul type program, as outlined in SB 11-464. Additionally, there is no present in-country capability for rebuild of these items. Okinawa, on the other hand, is set up to handle approximately fifty teletypewriter sets per month from Vietnam on a repair and return basis, to include rebuild if required. Present out-flow of teletypewriters from USA and 1st Logistical Command units to Okinawa on a repair and return basis is negligible.

Observation: Lack of assets prevents a direct exchange type overhaul program. To accomplish necessary repair to efficiently sustain current RVN tactical and administrative operations, it will be necessary to evacuate subject equipment off-shore for rebuild and/or overhaul.

f. Item: Maintenance Support.

Discussion: Deployment of units to RVN with low-density equipment has resulted in considerable difficulty in supporting this equipment because of the non-availability or excessive delay in procurement and delivery of essential repair parts.

Observation: Issue of low-density army inventory or obsolescent equipment to US Army units in RVN should be avoided unless sufficient repair parts are readily available in the supply system to support the equipment during its intended use span.

g. Item: Troop Planning.

Discussion: Previously maintenance troop planning has been based on units or troops to be supported. This technique assumes support of a theoretical organization and is appropriate for preliminary planning only as equipment to be supported often deviates

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from this theoretical model. At the operating level, maintenance planning must be based on unit capabilities to support specific types and quantities of equipment. Based upon equipment densities from the AR 711-5 report, the requirement for maintenance by 1st Logistical Command has been determined. Using the capabilities of COSTAR units provided by GCC Maintenance Agency, a comparison of requirements versus capabilities has been made. This data shows shortfall in most all areas of maintenance. A result of this shortfall is that general support units have been employed in DS missions thus eliminating USAF general support capability. This problem will continue until all maintenance units deploy. Data are now available for planning deployment of maintenance.

Observation: Receipt of timely and accurate AR 711-5 data and projected KIDA data for RVN is essential for troop planning.

b. Item: Maintenance Rebuild Program.

Discussion: As additional equipment arrives in RVN and as that which arrived in country during the initial build-up in 1965 gets older, the requirement for rebuild increases. In late CY 67 deployment of maintenance units will be sufficient for most all general support units to assume a true GS mission. To prepare for this mission, a study was conducted to determine the predicted rebuild requirements for FY 67, 68, and 69.

Observation: Deployment of many maintenance units six to ten months after the deployment of the equipment they are to support has resulted in USAF inability to perform the required general support maintenance to any significant degree until after July 1967 and has required evacuation of large quantities of material for off-shore overhaul. Sufficient maintenance units should be time phased to provide DS/JS support during all phases of a build-up.

i. Item: PLL and ASL Evaluation.

Discussion: A contributing factor to the high deadline rate in RVN is the inability of PLLs and ASLs to satisfy and accommodate the demands placed against them. Review of a small sample of PLL/ASLs revealed that the stock record cards were not properly maintained and that demands were not being recorded. To assist units in maintaining proper ASL/PLLs instructions were issued in 1st Logistical Command Regulations 750-16 and 750-15 respectively. A program has also been established to provide assistance teams to all units in RVN for review of their ASL/PLLs.

Observation: Proper ASL/PLLs are a must for adequate supply support for the maintenance effort. In RVN a major cause of high deadline rates is the shortage of repair parts. A contributing factor to this supply shortage is inadequate PLL/ASL records. Review of these records must be constant and a matter of primary interest to commands at all levels.
j. Item: XM16E1 Rifle.

Discussion: During the past six weeks, there have been several reports of malfunctioning of the XM16E1 Rifle, particularly in the 1st Infantry Division. Investigation revealed that most of the malfunctions were caused by "failure to extract" and that these malfunctions were eliminated by thoroughly cleaning the weapon. The investigation also revealed that poor maintenance and need for repairs were important factors in the reported malfunctions. A technical assistance team from US Army Weapons Command is currently in-country conducting training at all levels and furnishing technical assistance during the inspection and repair of weapons.

Observation: The XM16E1 Rifle is a reliable weapon when properly maintained. Continuous emphasis must be placed on first echelon maintenance.
10. (U)  DIRECTIVES OF PETROLEUM.

Item: Water in fuels.

Discussion: The high humidity and frequent rains make it almost impossible to prevent free water in bulk fuels.

Observations: Extreme caution must be used in all petroleum handling operations to minimize chance of introduction of water. Water must be drained from storage tanks as it accumulates, and all issues must be through a filter separator to insure that water free fuel reaches the consumer.
11. (F000) DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES:

a. Laundry:

(1) Item: Difficulty is being experienced in supporting the growing number of combat missions because of the lack of adequate amounts of field laundry equipment.

Discussion: Increasing combat support missions and support of incoming combat units have severely taxed our laundry support capability. Incoming service units are arriving in-country without laundry equipment. To meet this increasing combat support requirement, a series of twelve small nonstandard fixed laundries will be constructed in the base camps. Plans for the buildings are being drawn up, equipment has been ordered, and TO 10-500 fixed laundry teams have been requested.

Observation: Construction of nonstandard fixed laundries will free more field laundry units for "in-field" laundry support.

(2) Item: Complaints on Contract Laundry Service.

Discussion: Numerous units have complained of poor contract laundry service. Complaints covered the return of dirty sheets, delay in processing laundry, and lost articles.

Observation: Complaints by units were general in nature and were never accompanied by documentation. In some instances, where units complained of dirty sheets, it was discovered that units had turned in linen that was nothing but rags and expected the laundry contractor to return them snowy white.

(3) Item: Laundry equipment maintenance.

Discussion: Trips to the field laundry sites have indicated that units are lax in operator and organizational maintenance. Units do not have aggressive maintenance programs for laundry equipment.

Observation: The laxity in operator and organization maintenance coupled with the lack of an aggressive maintenance program within the units have only aggravated the increasing deadline rate in laundry equipment. Support commands have been directed to correct these deficiencies.

(4) Item: Deployment of laundry units in support of tactical operations.
Discussion: Laundry units, when moved forward of base camps, are not fully utilized. When used to support small tactical operations, the capability of the units is also lost.

Observation: The practicality of leaving laundry units in base camps is based on the following.

(a) Base camps provide water and maintenance facilities not always available on tactical operations.

(b) Troops on tactical operations of short duration do not fully utilize laundry facilities set up in forward support areas.

(c) The capability of laundry equipment is decreased due to movement time and tactical considerations. In base camps the laundry can be run on a 20-hour basis, increasing laundry service for the whole base camp.

(5) Item: Starch in jungle fatigues.

Discussion: Starch in jungle fatigues prevents air flow through the material and causes excessive wear.

Observation: Unstarched jungle fatigues will provide better ventilation for the individual and will be longer wearing.

b. Graves registration:

(1) Item: Wrapping deceased hands for shipment to US Army Mortuary.

Discussion: The US Army Mortuary has expanded its facilities to include an identification section. All necessary identification to include fingerprinting is accomplished in this section. Several remains have been received at the mortuary with the hands wrapped or bandaged. Due to moisture accumulating in the bandage, the fingers become wilted and clear fingerprints cannot be obtained before rigor mortis sets in.

Observation: Letters were sent to all support commands to insure that the practice of wrapping hands of deceased is discontinued. Since this practice has been discontinued, remains are arriving in much better condition for fingerprinting and further identification.

(2) Item: Personal effects depot.

Discussion: Before 1 September 1966, personal effects of deceased left in the unit area were disposed of by summary
court officers appointed at unit level. On 1 September 1966, the Personal Effects Depot of the US Army Mortuary, Vietnam became operational. All personal effects of deceased personnel are shipped through graves registration channels to the Personal Effects Depot where final disposition is made.

Observation: With the establishment of the Personal Effects Depot, all personal effects of deceased personnel are channeled into one central system. This greatly decreases the chances for mistakes and expedites the disposition of effects to the next-of-kin. Summary Court Officers at unit level are no longer needed.

(3) Item: Disposable transfer case.

Discussion: A new disposable transfer case for embalmed remains was received at the US Army Mortuary, Vietnam. Before using disposable cases, a test run was made to Dover Air Force Base, Delaware to test the case durability. Eight cases were sent filled with dry cement. Upon arrival at Dover AFB, a check revealed that the cases were in excellent condition. The experiment with the disposable case is not finished because all evaluation tests have not been completed.

Observation: The use of the disposable transfer case saves costs and reduces cargo requirements for shipments to Vietnam. However, these factors must be weighed against the positive assurance of a good study and seal-tight case for maximum protection of remains shipped to CONUS. Evaluation continues.
Item: Tonnages moved by rail have continued to increase in all areas where rail is utilized by 1st Logistical Command shippers.

Discussion: The increased utilization of the Vietnamese National Railway will continue. It is anticipated that retrograde shipments will increase as shippers become more familiar with the advantages of rail transportation.

Observation: Increased retrograde cargo movements by rail will result in better utilization of existing rail schedules and facilities.

b. Item: The management of deep draft ships has improved at both receiving ports and ports of origin.

Discussion: As management experience is gained at originating ports and at 1st Logistical Command ports the efficiency of operations has steadily improved. The use of the twice-weekly telecon between USARV and WALTTS has improved the rapport between the "port managers" at both ends of the shipping pipeline.

Observation: As personnel at both ends of the shipping pipeline gain operating experience the shipping system is improved. Many officer personnel with experience in 1st Logistical Command Ports are now being assigned to WALTTS, Hq USARV, and CINCPAC in recognition of the need for experienced port operations personnel at these headquarters.

c. Item: The Port Construction Program is progressing rapidly and greatly increases efficiency of operations.

Discussion: As new port facilities, i.e., piers, barge sites are made available to the port operator, tonnages continue to reflect the gains in operational efficiency afforded by these facilities. These gains occur despite adverse climatic conditions.

Observation: The Port Construction Program which will be nearly complete by the end of the 3d Quarter of CY 67 will be the major contributing factor to the success of the logistical support mission in Vietnam.
SECTION II PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) ACoS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

   Destination of all units scheduled to arrive in country should be reconsidered 60 days prior to arrival of unit and a final decision made to determine if their destination is still valid.
2. (U) ACoFS, CONTROLLER

That all future requirements for finance service be met by requesting complete finance sections (Composed of cellular teams appropriate to the mission) rather than the numerous detachments that have been requested and deployed in the past.
3. (U) ENGINEER.

a. That except when specifically directed by higher headquarters, all materials for JK facilities or projects be requisitioned, received, stored and issued on a line item basis.

b. To preclude unforeseen drain of construction material resources by non-US Army Forces it is recommended that:

   (1) Allied Free World Forces provide bills of materials for planned projects and regular forecasts of recurring requirements.

   (2) OICC directives to JK requiring materials to be furnished be coordinated with this command prior to commitment.

   (3) Future interservice support agreements contain sections concerning specific construction material support required.

   (4) That this command be furnished advance notice when possible and automatic distribution on all interservice support agreements and contracts negotiated with civilian concern requiring government furnished materials.

c. That the requisitioning, receipt, storage and issue of all prefabricated buildings be the responsibility of this command, and that this command be informed of any actions taken in this area by other agencies in Vietnam. The management of prefabricated structures should be given special attention to insure proper programming of these buildings.
4. (U) Directorate of Maintenance

1. That arrival in RVN of new equipment training teams be coordinated so that teams do not arrive in advance of equipment arrival.

2. That low density army inventory or obsolescent equipment not be introduced into RVN until stocks of prepositioned repair parts are on hand, in-country, to adequately support this equipment for an extended period of time.
AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, A. San Francisco 96307 23 FEB 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:
   
a. Reference Paragraph 3a, Part I, Section II, Page 62:
      
      (1) The observation that additional security guard forces are required is considered valid.
      
      (2) Subsequent to submission of this Report, four Infantry Security Companies which arrived in-country in November—December have been committed to security support missions for protection of 1st Logistical Command activities and facilities.
      
      (3) Three additional Military Police Companies (Physical Security) were also programmed for deployment and to be utilized for protection of 1st Logistical installations. However, these units were deferred by DOD in December 1966. No other resources will become available until they are reinstated or until arrival of one additional sentry dog company in December 1967.
      
      (4) Efforts will be resumed to program additional physical security resources on removal of current troop strength ceilings or receipt of space allocations.

b. Reference Paragraph 4a, Part I, Section II, Page 63:
   
   While it is true that the Quartermaster Air Delivery Company and the Quartermaster Air Equipment Repair and Depot Company are designed to operate from fixed locations, this fact does not preclude employment of these units in undeveloped areas such as Vietnam. Sufficient WABTOC tentage and flooring is authorized units currently assigned to this command to permit effective operations at present locations.
c. Reference Paragraph 6c, Part I, Section II, Pages 65 and 66: Concur in observation on management of POL construction materials.

d. Reference Paragraph 6d, Part I, Section II, Page 66: Concur with controls established on construction materials for pre-fabricated buildings. While not stated in the observation, the US Army Engineer Command (Provisional) retains allocation authority on these materials in accordance with construction priorities and criteria that have been established for the Military Construction - Army program.

e. Reference Paragraph 6f, Part I, Section II, Page 67: The observation on construction materials supplied to non-US Army forces appears valid and efforts are being made to improve coordination and provide earlier forecasts for such requirements.

f. Reference Paragraph 7b, Part I, Section II, Page 68: The basic problem being experienced with the non-availability of equipment through supply channels is that of short lead time between requisition and required dates. To alleviate this problem, the 1st Logistical Command has been authorized to issue statements of non-availability on items that cannot be supplied in order that these might be procured from other sources by Pacific Architects and Engineers.

g. Reference Paragraph 3a, b, and c, Part II, Section II, Page 82: The recommendations, with comments on these items appearing in paragraph 2c, d, and e above, are concurred in.

h. Reference Paragraph 1, Part II, Section II, Page 80: Concur with 1st Logistical Command's recommendation to reconsider destination of all units scheduled to arrive in-country 60 days prior to arrival and to make a final decision to determine if destination is still valid. Although such a review is standard practice within USARV, it is recognised that in certain cases it may still be necessary to change destination subsequent to this 60 day period. In such instances trans-shipment of equipment may be unavoidable.
AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

1. Reference Paragraph 5, Part I, Section II, Page 64 and Paragraph 2, Part II, Section II, Page 81: Concur. A recommendation to deploy complete Finance Sections was forwarded to DA several months ago and this headquarters received information from the Office of the Chief of Finance in July 1966 that the recommendation would be followed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

M. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
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GPOP-OT(31 Oct 66)  2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 1st Log Comd

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  17 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, ASC
Asst AG

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INCL.
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission No 3)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Effective until 25 August 1967 unless sooner superseded or rescinded

1. PURPOSE. To summarize conduct of the mission and problem areas encountered.

2. GENERAL.

a. At 2300 hours, 11 August 1966, a request was relayed from COC-MACV for airdrop of 118,926 lbs of Class V to the 1st Cavalry Division via Pleiku (IV 9U8898). The load consisted of the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908 Rds</td>
<td>105mm HE</td>
<td>113,526 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 Rds</td>
<td>105mm WP</td>
<td>5,400 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Rds</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>118,926 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Mission was allocated to the 1st Logistical Command Provisional Air Delivery Company.

c. Airlift was approved for the mission by COC.

d. Seventeen (17) C-123 aircraft were allocated to the mission. The following is a breakout of the aircraft:

(1) Personnel Jump (CCT & Parachute Recovery Team) - 1
(2) Mission - 12
(3) Reserve - 4

e. A Combat Control Team and Recovery Team jumped ahead of the cargo aircraft.

f. Army UH-1 helicopters were parked on or adjacent to the drop zone. Red smoke (no drop signal) was given the first three A/C; however, the second and third pilots did not see it and dropped their loads. One UH-1 was completely destroyed and one damaged. Remaining pilots saw the smoke and orbited the DZ until it was clear.
AVCA GO-0
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission No 3)

3. DROP DATA.
   a. Type Aircraft: C-123.
   c. Number of Bundles: 56 ea A-22 containers.
   e. Drop Altitude: 650 ft.
   f. Drop Speed: 130 knots.
   g. Accuracy (Expressed in clock system with 12 being line of flight. Distance expressed in yards):
      (1) Six A/C loads: 12 at 150.
      (2) Three A/C loads: IP.
      (3) One A/C load: 12 at 75.
      (4) One A/C load: 3 at 175.
      (5) One A/C load: 3 at 185.
   h. Load Survivability: 100%.
   i. Malfunctions: One load separation.

4. PROBLEM AREAS.
   a. Communications:
      (1) The message requesting airdrop was released from the 1st Cav at 1115:30H Aug 66. The time of filing at the 1st Cav Comm Center was 1115:40H Aug 66. The message arrived at 1st Logistical Command HQ at 1216:15H Aug 66.
      (2) The common user telephone to the Air Delivery Company has been out of order for 10 weeks. Repeated efforts have been made to correct this situation. USARV Signal, Telephone Management Agency, and
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission No 3)

1st Logistical Command Signal have been contacted; however, no results have been obtained. The nonavailability of this telephone seriously hampered the flow of information to this unit.

b. Equipment and Personnel on the Drop Zone: Many helicopters, artillery pieces, and personnel were on the DZ. Many of these items were not moved even after efforts by the CCT Commander. This caused a dangerous condition on the DZ.

c. Loading Aircraft: The take-off order of A/C was not known; therefore, the aircraft were loaded in a piece meal fashion.

d. Transportation: The Provisional Air Delivery Company is dependent on USASC, Saigon for transportation support. This support was nonresponsive when requested in the middle of the night. The SDO of USASC, Saigon did not have firm instructions on actions to take when emergency airdrop situations arose. Priorities on the transportation assets were higher on other projects.

e. The 1st Logistical Command Air Delivery Officer bypassed USASC, Saigon and coordinated directly with the Air Delivery Company leaving the Support Commander uninformed of the Air Delivery Company's actions.

f. Some parachutes did not completely inflate when dropped from 650 ft.

5. LESSONS LEARNED.

a. More emphasis should be placed on requesting airdrop by telephone.

b. Requesting units should insure that personnel and equipment are off the DZ at least 30 minutes prior to the drop.

c. The mission commander should inform the supporting aerial port squadron of take-off order of aircraft to enable the aerial port to plan the loading of the A/C.

d. Clear instructions to duty personnel on actions required in the emergency airdrop situation should be written. Transportation should be available to the unit when required.

e. Intermediate commanders should be informed of actions taken if the emergency situation requires direct contact with their units.
AVCA GO-0

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission No 3)

f. Maj Komm, 19th ACS Standardization and Evaluation Officer, stated that the drop altitude on G-12D drops should be 750 ft.

FOR THE COMMANDERS:

C. C. Rice

Major, AGC
Adjutant General

TEL: Lynx 782/930

DISTRIBUTION:
Special
1-MACV, ATTN: JI
1-MACV, ATTN: COC
1-USARV, ATTN: GH
1-USARV, ATTN: AOC
1-7th Air Force
2-1st FORCEV
2-1st Cav Div
2-USASC, SGN
2-USASC, CRB
2-USADep, CRB
2-309th QM Air Delivery Co
2-Dir, Abn Dept USAQMS, Ft Lee Va (23801)
1-315th ACW
2-GG, 1st Log Comd
2-AVCA GA
8-Historian
1-SR&O, ATTN: AVCA GO-0
AVCA GO-0

22 August 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop mission No. 6)

TO: See Distribution

1. PURPOSE: To summarize conduct of the mission on 16 August 1966 and problem area encountered.

2. GENERAL:
   a. At 1300 hours, 15 August 1966, Lb Col Erridge, G-4 section I FFV, requested airdrop of 119,100 lbs of Class V to the 1st Cav Div vic Pleiku (TV948888). Requested delivery time was 161500H Aug 66. The load consisted of the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800 Rds 105mm HE</td>
<td>107,100 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 Rds 105mm Illum</td>
<td>12,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Rds 105mm</td>
<td>119,100 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Mission was allocated to the 1st Log Comd Provisional Air Delivery Co and the 315th Air Commando Wing.

   c. Airlift was approved by COG.

   d. Eight C-123 aircraft were allocated to the mission. Thirteen sorties were flown.

   c. A recovery team and a CCT were in the area.

3. DROP DATA:
   a. Type Aircraft: C-123

   b. Drop Technique: A-22 bundle with G-12D parachute

   c. Number of bundles: 56

   d. Drop Times:

   (1) Flight 1 (8A/C) - 161500H Aug 66.
   (2) Flight 2 (5A/C) - 161700H Aug 66.
AVCA GO-0

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission No. 6)

e. Drop Altitude: 750 ft
f. Drop Speed: 130 knota

g. Accuracy (Expressed in clock system with direction of flight 1200. Distance in yards):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLIGHT NUMBER</th>
<th>DIRECTION</th>
<th>DISTANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>IF</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Malfunctions: 1 Total, 5 Partial

i. Load Survivability: Damage to load described as negligible.

4. I FFORCEV G-4 representative stated that this was the best drop so far.

5. PROFILE: AREAS:

a. Communications: See previous reports.

b. Personnel: The Provisional Company is presently short many riggers. The lack of these men makes shift scheduling difficult. Some men have worked 36 hours without sleep.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LYNX 782

C. C. RICE
Major, AGC
Adjutant General
AVCA GO-0

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission No. 6)

DISTRIBUTION:

External:
1-MACV, ATT: J-4
1-MACV, ATT: COC
1-USARV, ATT: G-4
1-USARV, ATT: AOC
1-7TH AIR FORCE
2-1 FFORCV
2-1ST CAV DIV
2-USAF, SGN
2-USARC, CAN LAURN BAY
2-USADP, CAN LAURN BAY
2-109TH QM DELIVERY AG
2-Dir, ABU DEPT USAAC, FT LEE VA (23801)
4-315th ACW

Internal:
2-COJIND GROUP
2-DIR OF AM
8-HISTORIAN
4-SPRO, ATT: AVCA GO-0
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission Numbers A and 7)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Effective until 25 August 1967 unless sooner superseded or rescinded

1. PURPOSE: To summarize conduct of the mission and problem areas encountered.

2. GENERAL.

   a. On 12 August 1966, a request was received from the 1st Cavalry Division for airdrop of 172,600 lbs of Class V. The airdrop was requested to take place on 17 August 1966 and was assigned mission number 4. Drop was to Pelime DZ.

   b. On 16 August 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division requested an additional 96,262 lbs of Class V to be dropped on 17 Aug 66. Drop was to be to CAT DZ, and was assigned airdrop mission number 7.

   c. Loads consisted of the following items:

   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>300 Rds</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 in HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 Rds</td>
<td></td>
<td>175mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 Rds</td>
<td></td>
<td>155mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Rds</td>
<td></td>
<td>155mm WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>525 Rds</td>
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<td>Fuse FD</td>
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<tr>
<td>300 Ea</td>
<td></td>
<td>Charge, Prop GB</td>
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<tr>
<td>200 Ea</td>
<td></td>
<td>Charge, Prop WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   d. Mission was allocated to the 1st Logistical Command Provisional Air Delivery Company and the 315th Air Commando Wing.

   e. Ten (10) aircraft were allocated to the mission. All aircraft were mission aircraft. Twenty-two (22) sorties were flown.

3. DROP DATA.

   a. Type Aircraft: C-123.
AVCA Go.0
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission Number 4 and 7)

b. Drop Technique: A-22 containers w/G-12D parachute.

c. Number of Containers: 92.


e. Drop Altitude: 750 ft.

f. Drop Speed: 130 kn.

g. Accuracy: All loads impacted onto the drop zones.

h. Malfunctions:

   (1) PAPA MIKE DZ: One parachute failed to deploy.

   (2) CAT DZ: 1.

i. Damage:

   (1) PAPA MIKE: 12 rdz unusable.

   (2) CAT DZ: 9 rdz unusable.

4. PROBLEM AREAS.

   a. The 8 inch projectiles and 175mm projectiles make a very unstable load. When placed on honeycomb the load has a tendency to wobble and shift.

   b. Due to the use of multiple Drop Zones, some loads were delivered to the wrong DZ.

   c. Propellant charges for the 175mm gun were requested; however, these items were drop tested and found unsuitable for airdrop.

5. LESSONS LEARNED.

   a. Load spreaders and straps must be used to maintain the load configuration on 8 inch projectiles and 175mm projectiles.

   b. A system must be devised to identify a load with a specific Drop Zone. Color coding a DZ and then tagging the loads with a like colored tag will identify the loads with the correct DZ.
AVCA GO-0
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Airdrop Mission Number 4 and 7)

c. A method of rigging 175mm prop charges should be developed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Lynx 737933

C. C. RICE
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Special
1-MACV, ATTN: J4
1-MACV, ATTN: COC
1-USARV, ATTN: G4
1-USARV, ATTN: ACC
1-7th Air Force
2-IX FFORCEN
2-1st Cav Div
2-USASC, SGN
2-USASC, CRB
2-USADep, CRB
2-109th QM Air Delivery Co
2-Dir, Abn Dept USAQMS, Ft Lee Va (23801)
4-315th ACW
2-CG 1st Log Comd
2-AVCA GA
3-Historian
4-SP&O, ATTN: AVCA GO-0
LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 11-66 (OPERATION HAWTHORNE) (U)

1. (C) Operation HAWTHORNE was conducted in northern Kontum Province in the vicinity of Dak To during period 2-20 June 1966, by forces of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div reinforced by elements of the 1st Cav Div.

2. (C) The operation commenced on 2 June with 2 Bns participating. This force was increased on 8 June by the addition of one Inf Co and again on 10 June by the addition of one (1) Bn plus one (1) Co of the 1st Cav Div.

3. (C) Tactical contact was heavy on two (2) days, moderate on three (3) days and light to negative the remainder of the time.

4. (C) Support Operations:

   a. The 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) was co-located with the forward support element of the committed force in the vicinity of Dak To I airfield (23 0222). There was no displacement of the FSA during the operation.

   b. Resupply to the FSA was by air LOC from Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay until 13 June 1966 when route 14 from Pleiku was opened. From this date on resupply was by land LOC from Pleiku supplemented by the air LOC from Qui Nhon.

   c. A buildup of stocks at the FSA began on 30 May and reached a 3 day stockage level in all classes of supply provided prior to the commencement of the operation on 2 June 1966. Support personnel and supplies were air-lifted into the area concurrently with the tactical units. An average of 1.0-1.30 sorties of support personnel and equipment for every 5 tactical sorties was provided.
d. The approval on 9 June to fire an additional 7000 rds of 105mm How Ammo for the operation, the increase in troop strength on 10 June, the planned introduction of 8" How (2) and 175mm guns (2) on 15 June, and the difficulty of getting sufficient numbers of aircraft into Dak To airfield made it necessary to open route 14 from Pleiku on 13 June. Bridge limitations on route 14 restricted convoys to 2½ ton trucks and half loaded 5000 gal tankers. However, by mounting large convoys and making daily runs augmented by air, ample supplies were provided to maintain desired stockage objectives throughout the operation.

e. Services rendered to supported units:

   (1) Showers: A daily average of 410 showers were provided.

   (2) Laundry: An average of 1,072 pieces of laundry were processed daily.

   (3) A total of 205 work orders were processed.

f. Lessons Learned:

   (1) Plans must include provisions for an alternate LOC in the event the primary LOC fails to provide necessary tonnages or the forces supported increase rapidly.

   (2) Buildup of supply point stocks, equipment and personnel can be adequate to meet requirements provided a sufficient number of air sorties are allocated for this purpose during initial unit moves to the area. Normally one logistical sortie is required for every five tactical unit sorties.
5. (v) Personnel: The following personnel were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation HAWTHORNE:

a. 2 Officers
b. 1 Warrant Officer
c. 95 Enlisted Men

Annex: A-Logistical Support Data Operation HAWTHORNE (v)

Distribution:
2-OG, AMC
2-OG, CDC
2-DSLOG, DA
2-MACV JOC
2-NCOV 33
2-MCOS 34
2-MACV ATTN: TMA
1-OG, USARV
2-OG, USARV G3
2-OG, USARV G4
2-OG, II FFORGEV
3-OG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
3-OG, 173d Abn Bde
2-OG, 7th AF ATTN: CINC-A
3-OG, 1st Inf Div
3-OG, 1st Air Cav Div
3-OG, 25th Inf Div
1-OG, CONARC, Ft Monroe, Va
3-OG, US STRICOM, MacDill AFB, Fla
3-OG, TARPS, APO 96558
5-OG, USASOC, Qui Nhon
5-OG, USASOC, CHB, Nha Trang
5-20, 4th TC (Mrl A)
2-OG, 68th Med Gp
2-OG, 43d Med Gp
2-OG, 55th Med Gp
2-Dir of Armys
1-Dir of Med Svc
1-Dir of Sup
3-40CFS, SDAO
10-AVLC GO-0
1-Dir of Svc
1-Dir of Trans
1-OG, 14th IOC
1-Shoe, 1st LOGOMD
0-Historian
AVCA GO-0
SUBJECT: LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 11-66 (OPERATION HAWTHORNE) (U)

Distribution (Cont'f)

1-CO, 44th Med Bde
1-Cmdt, C&GS Soh, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66048
1-Cmdt, TUSA Armor Soh, Ft Knox, Ky 40121
1-Cmdt, TUSA Infantry Soh, Ft Benning Ga 31905
1-Cmdt, TUSA Artillery Soh, Ft Sill, Okla 73540
1-Cmdt, TUSA Quartermaster Soh, Ft Lee, Va 22060
1-Cmdt, TUSA Ordnance Soh, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005
1-Cmdt, TUSA Transportation Soh, Ft Rucker, Ala 36362
3-CG, USACBC CSSG, Ft Lee, Va 22060
1-HQ, USARPAC (USACBC LNO) APO 96558

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
### CONFIDENTIAL

**ANNEX A-1: LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 11-66 (OPERATION ELKMONT) (c) FOR UNIT: 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div PERIOD COVERED FROM 3 Jun to 9 Jun 66**

**TASK ORGANIZATION:** Eq Co, 2 Abn Inf Bn, Arty Bn (18 - 105 tubes), Arty Btry (6 - 155 tubes), 2 Armored Cgos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>INTAKE</th>
<th>STORAGE</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>DAY OF</td>
<td>OBJETIVE</td>
<td>B-20M PRD</td>
<td>RESUPPLY</td>
<td>CONSUMPTION</td>
<td>CONSUMPTION</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<td>6,964</td>
<td>25,356</td>
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<td>16,454</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>71</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>449</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>473</td>
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<td>705</td>
<td>643</td>
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<td>SUPPLY</td>
<td>STOCKAGE</td>
<td>SUPPLY O/H</td>
<td>EXP OF PD</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>CONSUMPTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>681</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>3,326</td>
<td>2,848</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
LOGISTICAL CRITIQUE 12-66 (OPERATION BEAUREGARD) (U)

1. (U) Operation BEAUREGARD was conducted in northern Kontum province in the vicinity of Dak To from 24 Jun until 15 Jul 66, by forces of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The purpose of the operation was to conduct surveillance of the Laotian-Cambodian-RVN border in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces.

2. (U) The operation commenced on 24 Jun 66, with 2 Abn Bns participating. There was no change in the force structure during the operation.

3. (U) Tactical contact was light to negative throughout the operation.

4. (C) Support Operations:

a. The 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) was co-located with the Forward Support Element (FSE) of the committed force in the vicinity of Dak To I airfield (ZB0222). There was no displacement of the FSA during the operation.

b. Resupply to the FSA was by air LOC from Qui Nhon.

c. No build-up of stocks was required since adequate stocks remained in the FSA after termination of operation HUWHORNE on 20 Jun 66. A four to ten day level of Class I, Class III and Class V was on hand at that time.

d. The lack of significant contact throughout the operation coupled with poor flying weather on several days caused consumption to be far below the estimated requirements, especially in Class V. Consequently, in spite of greatly reduced resupply shipments, the stocks on hand at the end of the operation were considerably higher than desired.

e. Services rendered to supported units:

(1) Showers: A daily average of 410 showers was provided.

(2) Laundry: An average of 1,072 pieces of laundry was processed daily.

(3) Graves registration: A total of 5 bodies were processed by graves registration.

f. Lessons Learned: When contact and activity is light efforts must be made to quickly reduce resupply in order to maintain stocks within 20% of the objective.

5. (U) Personnel: The following personnel were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation BEAUREGARD:

a. 2 Officers

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DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: LOGISTICAL CRITI. US 12-66 (OPERATION BRAUBERG) (O)

b. 1 Warrant Officer
c. 65 Enlisted men

Annex: A-Logistical Support Data Operation BRAUBERG (O)

Distribution:
2-CG, JMC
2-CG, CDC
2-MLOG, el
2-MLOG CHC
2-MLOG J3
2-MLOG J4
2-MLOG JTN; TM
1-OG, U/SR
2-DLRY 03
2-DLRY 07
3-CG, I FORMCE
3-CG, II FORCEN
3-CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
3-CG, 173rd Bde
2-CG 7th AF JTN: CDICO-L
3-CG, 1st Inf Div
3-CG, 25th Inf Div
1-CG, OCCUSC, Ft Monroe, Va
1-CG, US STRATCOM, MacDill AFB, Fla
1-CG, USRRC, APO 96555
5-CG, USLSC, Qui Nhơn
5-CG, USLSC, GSB, Nha Trang
5-CG, USLSC, Saigon
1-CG, 1st LOGCOMD
1-CG, 4th PC (Tan ...
2-CG, 68th Med Grp
2-CG, 43rd Med Grp
2-CG, 55th Med Grp
2-DIR of Amm
1-DIR of Med Svc
1-DIR of Sup
3-COFS, SPM
10-0FG, GO-O
1-Mr of Amm
1-DIR of Trans
1-CG, 14th ICC
1-Engr, 1st LOGCOMD
8-Historian
1-CG, 44th Med Grp
1-Cmdt, C&GS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66504
1-Cmdt, T&L, Air School, Ft. Rucker, Ala 35462
1-Cmdt, T&L, Artillery Sch, Ft. Sill, Okla 73504
1-Cmdt, T&L, Quartermaster Sch, Ft. Lee, Va 23540
1-Cmdt, T&L, Ordnance Sch, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005
1-Cmdt, TUSC, Transportation Sch, Ft. Benjamin, Ga 31524
1-Cmdt, TUSC, Aviation Sch, Ft. Rucker, Ala 35462
3-CG, USRRC CSSO, Ft. Lee, Va
1-RG, USRRC (USRRC LNO) APO 96555

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**ANNEX A to LOGISTICAL CRITICAL 12-65**

**OPERATION REPAKJARD**

**PARENT UNIT:** 1st Bde 101st Abn Div

**PERIOD COVERED:** FROM 24 June TO 15 Jul

**TASK ORGANIZATION:** 1 Bde Eq, 2 Abn Inf En, 1 Arty Btry 105mm how.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>EST DAY OF SUPPLY</th>
<th>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H END OF PD</th>
<th>TOTAL RESUPPLY</th>
<th>TOTAL CONSUMPTION</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY RESUPPLY</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLASS I (RATIONS)</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>31,484</td>
<td>16,842</td>
<td>62,434</td>
<td>77,676</td>
<td>2,973</td>
<td>3,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP4 (GALLONS)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>57,400</td>
<td>173,500</td>
<td>216,100</td>
<td>8,262</td>
<td>16,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS (GALLONS)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>20,900</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGAS (GALLONS)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>50,400</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL (GALLONS)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS V (8/T)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TONNAGE</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS)_

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

_DOD DIR 5200.10_
Logistical Critique 13-66 (Operation NATHAN HALE)(U)

1. (U) Operation NATHAN HALE was conducted in the central portion of Phu Yen Province and eastern portion of Phu Bon Province from 19 June 1966 to 1 July 1966 by elements of the 1st Cav Div (AK). This operation was the execution of a contingency plan to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Dong Tre (SG 070).

2. (U) The operation commenced on 19 June with one Inf Bn (AK) participating. The force was increased daily until 24 June when a total of 4 Inf Bns (AK) and 1 Abn Inf Bn were participating. One additional increase in the force occurred on 26 June with the introduction of one Inf Bn (AK). NATHAN HALE terminated on 1 July 1966 with 5 Inf Bns (AK) and 1 Abn Inf Bn participating.

3. (U) The tactical contact was light to moderate throughout the operation.

4. (C) Support Operations:

a. The 1st Log Cmd Forward Support Area (FSA) was located at Tuy Hoa south (CQ 1914) throughout the operation. Initially the Forward Support Element (FSE) of the committed force was co-located with the FSA at Tuy Hoa, however, during the operation it was relocated to an area via Tuy An (CQ 0654).

b. Resupply to the FSA was by sea line of communication (LOC) from stocks located at Cam Ranh Bay. The sea LOC was backed up by an air LOC also from Cam Ranh Bay.

c. No build-up of stocks was required since Tuy Hoa was an operational supply point at the time the operation commenced.

d. During the operation the input of more Air Mobile units caused consumption of JP-4 to increase very rapidly. This made it necessary to provide considerably more product than the normal Tuy Hoa resupply system was able to provide, even with air augmentation. Therefore it was necessary to station a tanker ship off-shore at Tuy Hoa to insure sufficient quantities of JP-4 were available. Initially the product was discharged from the tanker ship into collapsible tanks on an LCH. The LCH moved the product to shore where it was discharged into collapsible tanks on the beach. Later, a submarine line was used to replace the LCH.

e. The operation began with 144,000 gallons of JP-4 in 55 gallon drums. Since the demand for JP-4 was large, it was not possible to discharge rapidly enough for Air Mobile type units. To offset this difficulty, it was necessary to augment the drum method of storage with 500 gallon seal bins, and later with 10,000 gallon bladders filled from a tanker ship.

f. The rapid build-up of Air Cavalry units proved the value of POL pre-cons. In connection with this, the precons could not be fully exploited because of shortcomings in discharge capability when attempting to meet the heavy demand for JP-4 imposed by the Air Cavalry units.

g. During the operation, Tuy Hoa was established as a sub-area, therefore, no effort was made to draw down stock. The stocks remaining at the termination of the operation were included in sub-area assets.
SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 13-66 (Operation NATHAN HALE)(U)

h. Lessons Learned:
(1) When a sea LOC is available, heavy drawdowns of POL products can be off-set by using tanker ships to provide over the beach discharge directly from the ships.

(2) POL prestocks can be a valuable asset for supporting airmobile operations. However, the method of storage must lend itself to fast discharge in order to meet heavy drawdown requirements.

Annexes:
A - Phase I
B - Phase II
C - Issue & Receipts (Phase I)
D - Issue & Receipts (Phase II)

DISTRIBUTION:
2-GO, AMC
2-GO, ODC
2-GSO, DA
2-DSLOSG, NA
2-MAC, JCS
2-'MCV J3
2-MACV Jh
2-MACV, ATTN: TMA
1-GO, USARV
2-USARV 03
2-USARV GH
3-GO, I FFORCEN
3-GO, II FFORCE
3-GO, 1ST AGR, 101ST ARM DIV
3-GO, 173D AGR ADE
3-GO, 7TH TR FORCEN, ATTN: CDICO-A
3-GO, 1ST ITR L V
3-GO, 1ST ITR C V DIV
3-GO, 25TH ITR DIV
3-GO, 196TH ITR ADE
3-GO, 11TH ITR DIV
1-GONARC, FT MURROE, VA
3-CIC, USSTRICOM, MCCLAFF, FLA ATTN: J4
1-CIC, USRRC, PO 96558
5-GO, USAFO, Q
5-GO, USASOC, ORM
5-GO, JIASSC, SG
1-COMA 2 GROFP, 1ST LOG GROUP
1-GO, LTNG (TML A)
2-GO, 68TH MED OP
2-GO, 18TH MED OP
2-GO, 55TH MED OP
2-DIR OP MFG
1-DIR OP WMP NYC

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Logistical Critique 13-66 (Operation NATHAN.HAILE)(U)

DISTRIBUTION:
1-Dir of Trans
1-Dir of Sup
3-Acfs, SP60
10-AYCA GO-O
1-Dir of Svc
1- CO, 14th IOC
1-Engr, 1st Log Cond
8-Historian
1-HQ, USARPAC (USACDC INO) APO 9658
1-CO, 44th Med Bde
1-Cmdt, C&GS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 66048
1-Cmdt, TUSA Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky 40121
1-Cmdt, TUSA Infantry Sch, Ft Benning, Ga
1-Cmdt, TUSA Artillery Sch, Ft Sill, Okla 73540
1-Cmdt, TUSA QM Sch, Ft Lee, Va 28060
1-Cmdt, TUSA Ord Sch, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005
1-Cmdt, TUSA Trans Sch, Ft Dupis, Va 26304
1-Cmdt, TUSA Aviation Sch, Ft Ruckner, Ala 36362
3-CG, USACDC CSSG, Ft Lee, Va

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
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**Annex A to Logistical Critique 13-66**

**OPERATION:** NATHAN HALE

**TASK ORGANIZATION:** 1 Bde, HQ, 3 Inf Bn (AM), 1 Inf Bn (Abn), 4 Btrgs 105mm How PARENT UNIT: 1st Air Cav Div PERIOD COVERED: 19-22 Jun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Est Day of Supply</th>
<th>Storage Objective</th>
<th>Supply O/H Begin PD</th>
<th>Supply O/H End of PD</th>
<th>Total Loss Supply</th>
<th>Total Consumption</th>
<th>Av Daily Supply</th>
<th>Av Daily Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>1 (rtns)</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>106,500</td>
<td>89,256</td>
<td>77,845</td>
<td>20,881</td>
<td>32,292</td>
<td>5,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>(gallons)</td>
<td>9,750</td>
<td>146,250</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>37,600</td>
<td>131,600</td>
<td>9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>(gallons)</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>41,250</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>(gallons)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>4,025</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>(gallons)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>(L/T)</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>462.5</td>
<td>769.4</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>253.7</td>
<td>205.1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tons GE</td>
<td>179.6</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS**

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Annex B to Logistical Critique 13-66

**Operation:** NATHAN HALE

**Task Organization:** 2 Bde Hq, 1 Abn Inf Bn, 5 Inf Bn (AH), 7 Arty Btry 105mm  
Parent Unit: 1st Air Cav Div  
Period Covered: 23 Jun 1 Jul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>EST DAY OF SUPPLY</th>
<th>STORAGE OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H END OF PD</th>
<th>TOTAL 1O-SUPPLY</th>
<th>TOTAL CONSUMPTION</th>
<th>AV DAILY SUPPLY</th>
<th>AV DAILY CONSUMPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I (Rations)</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>73,200</td>
<td>77,845</td>
<td>179,037</td>
<td>234,666</td>
<td>132,874</td>
<td>29,258</td>
<td>16,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4 (gallons)</td>
<td>53,500</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>130,700</td>
<td>747,500</td>
<td>666,800</td>
<td>93,438</td>
<td>83,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS (gallons)</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>33,100</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>4,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS (gallons)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>34,600</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>35,400</td>
<td>7,125</td>
<td>4,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUKW (gallons)</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>29,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V (S/T)</td>
<td>169.0</td>
<td>1,014.0</td>
<td>818.0</td>
<td>1,138.1</td>
<td>1,190.0</td>
<td>865.8</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tonnage</td>
<td>431.5</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>2,501.0</td>
<td>4,930.0</td>
<td>3,985.6</td>
<td>616.3</td>
<td>498.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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OWGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10
# ANNEX 1

**ISSUES and RECEIPTS**  
**NATHAN HALE**  
**June 20 - 23**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>20 June</th>
<th>21 June</th>
<th>22 June</th>
<th>23 June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RECEI</td>
<td>ISSUED</td>
<td>RECEI</td>
<td>ISSUED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>5,788</td>
<td>11,207</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOGAS</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
* DOD DIR 5200.10

**CONFIDENTIAL AL**
### ANNEX D  ISSUES AND RECEIPTS  NATHAN HALLS  June 24 - July 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>24 June</th>
<th>25 June</th>
<th>26 June</th>
<th>27 June</th>
<th>28 June</th>
<th>29 June</th>
<th>30 June</th>
<th>1 July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RECEI</td>
<td>ISSUED</td>
<td>RECEI</td>
<td>ISSUED</td>
<td>RECEI</td>
<td>ISSUED</td>
<td>RECEI</td>
<td>ISSUED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>43,960</td>
<td>21,789</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>14,173</td>
<td>5,144</td>
<td>11,308</td>
<td>43,318</td>
<td>14,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>64,300</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>128,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCO GAS</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>191.3</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>119.1</td>
<td>179.9</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Downgraded at 3 year intervals**  
**Declassified after 12 years**

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Logistical Critique 14-66 Operation HENRY CLAY (U)

1. (U) Operation HENRY CLAY was conducted in Phu Bon, Phu Yen and Daklac provinces from 2 July 1966 to 30 July 1966 by elements of the 1st Cav Div (A). This operation was characterized by a pursuit and reconnaissance in force westward from Tuy Hoa to vic Ban Blech.

2. (U) The operation began 2 July with two (2) Bdes, consisting of six (6) Inf Bns (A) and one Abn Inf Bn. On 17 July it was reduced to one (1) Bde, consisting of four (4) Inf Bns (A).

3. (U) There was no significant tactical contact throughout the operation.

4. (C) Support Operations:
   a. The 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) was initially located at Tuy Hoa with sub-area assets utilized for initial stockage. Unit distribution to the Ede Forward Support Element located vic Cung Son (BC 84/2) was provided during this phase of the operation.
   b. As the units in the operation moved to the West, an additional FSA at Ban Blech (BQ 0161) and an interim FSA at Cheo Reo (BO 24/2) were established. All commodities had to be prestocked at Ban Blech, however, only Class I and V had to be prestocked at Cheo Reo since this location was already being maintained as a Class III prestock point. The primary purpose of the FSA at Cheo Reo was to provide an intermediate supply point for forces phasing between Cung Son and Ban Blech. This was necessary due to the large area in which the units were operating during that phase causing some of the units to be too far from either Cung Son or Ban Blech to receive support from either of those locations.
   c. Resupply Lines of Communications (LOC) to the FSAs were as follows:
      (1) Tuy Hoa was supplied by a sea LOC from Cam Ranh Bay with an air LOC as back-up.
      (2) Primary LOC for resupply of Ban Blech was by road from Qui Nhon thru Pleiku, with an air LOC from Qui Nhon as back-up.
AVCA GO-0

SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 14-66 Operation HENRY CLAY (U)

(3) Cheo Reo was supplied by land LOC from Qui Nhon thru Pleiku with an air LOC from Qui Nhon as back-up.

d. 1st Logistical Command convoys were used to resupply Ban Blech and Cheo Reo by road from Qui Nhon thru Pleiku in conjunction with one of the missions of Operation HENRY CLAY i.e., a show of force. The motor convoys during this operation were executed without enemy initiated incidents.

e. While supporting the operation by unit distribution from Tuy Hoa to Cung Son, the road deteriorated badly, making it necessary to use 2½ ton cargo trucks for most of the resupply. Since there were insufficient numbers of 2½ ton cargo trucks in Tuy Hoa at that time, it was necessary to move some from Gia Ranh Fey by sea. This resulted in a delay in substituting 2½ ton trucks for 12 ton Stake and Platforms.

f. Lessons Learned:

(1) When the condition of the roads being used is uncertain, a back-up capability of 2½ ton trucks must be planned for and readily available in the event it becomes necessary to reduce heavy truck traffic on the roads.

(2) When an airmobile operation covers a large area, it may be necessary to establish prestock points at intermediate locations until bulk of units move within support range of preplanned FSAs.

Anexes: A - Logistical Support Data (Cung Son) Operation HENRY CLAY
E - Logistical Support Data (Ban Blech) Operation HENRY CLAY
C - Logistical Support Data (Cheo Reo) Operation HENRY CLAY
D - Logistical Support Data (Combined) Operation HENRY CLAY

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CG, HHC
2-CG, CJC
2-DSLOG, DA
2-MACV J10C
2-MACV J3
2-MACV J4

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SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 14-66 Operation HARRY CLAY (U)

DISTRIBUTION:

2-MACV, ATTN: T&A
1-CG, USARV
2-USARV, G3
2-USARV, G4
3-CG, I FFORCEN
3-CG, II FFORCEN
3-CG, 1st Dde, 101st Abn Div
3-CG, 173rd Abn Dde
2-CG, 7th Air Force, ATTN: CDICO-A
3-CG, 1st Inf Div
3-CG, 1st Air Cav Div
3-CG, 25th Inf Div
1-CG, CONARC, Ft Monroe, Va
3-CIC, US STRICOM, MacDill AFB, Fla, ATTN: J4
1-CIC, USARPAC, APO 96558
1-CG, USAASC, Qui Nhon
5-CG, USAASC, Cà Mânh Bay
5-CO, USAASC, Saigon
1-Command Group, 1st Log Cond
1-CO, 1st TC (Tml A)
2-CO, 68th Medical Group
2-CO, 43d Medical Group
2-CO, 55th Medical Group
2-Dir of Ammo
1-Dir of Med Svcs
1-Dir of Sup
3-ACofS, SP&O
10-AVCA GO-O
1-Dir of Svcs
1-Dir of Trans
1-CO, 14th ICC
1-Engr, 1st Log Cond
8-Historian
1-CO, 14th Medical Brigade
1-Hq, USARPAC (USACDC LOG) APO 96558
1-Cmdt, CGGS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66048
1-Cmdt, TUSA Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky 40121
1-Cmdt, TUSA Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga
1-Cmdt, TUSA Artillery Sch, Ft Sill, Okla 73540
1-Cmdt, TUSA Quartermaster Sch, Ft Lee, Va 22060
1-Cmdt, TUSA Ordnance Sch, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005
1-Cmdt, TUSA Transportation Sch, Ft Justis, Va 23604
1-Cmdt, TUSA Aviation Sch, Ft Rucker, Ala 36362
3-CG, USACDC CSG, Ft Lee, Va
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Annex A to Logistical Critique 14-66

OPERATION HENRY CLAY (Oung Son) PARENT UNIT: 1st Cav Div (AM)  
PELIOD COVERED FROM 2 TO 13 JULY 1966

TASK ORGANIZATION:  2 Bde H3, 6 Inf Drs (AM); 1 Abn Inf 'Bn, 2 Arty Bns

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>EST DAY OF SUPPLY</th>
<th>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD</th>
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AVLC Form 262 (13 Jun 66)

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
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NOTE: Insert construction in Class I due to incursions of Chao Ho Drainage Scheme. Chao Ho was initially established...

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TASK ORGANIZATION: 1st Jun (A) 4th July (B)
OPERATION: HARD(GA) PADDLE UNIT: "Jet Carp Unit" (AN)
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<tr>
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**Notes:**
- Class A: 7/5/95
- Class B: 1/3/95
- Class C: 2/1/95
- Class D: 3/1/95
- Class E: 7/5/95

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Logistical Critique 15-66 (Operation HAYES) (U)

1. (U) Operation HAYES was conducted in Central Kontum Province via Dak To (2B 0222) from 18 July 1966 until 1 August 1966 by tactical elements of the 1st Cav Div Air Mobile (AM). The purpose of the operation was border surveillance and blocking of avenues of approach from Cambodia through Kontum Province.

2. (U) The operation commenced on 24 June with 1 Inf Bn (AL) reinforced with one Inf Co (AL) participating. The operation was suspended on 1 Aug 66 when the one Inf Bn (AL) and one Inf Co (.M) were withdrawn suddenly from the area to participate in Operation PHIL HAYNES II.

3. (U) There was no significant contact during the operation.

4. (C) Support Operations:
   a. The 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area (FSA) was located at Dak To I airfield (2B 0222). There was no displacement of the FSA during the operation.
   b. Primary resupply was by air LOC from An Nhon, backed up by land LOC from Pleiku.
   c. No build-up of supplies was required since sufficient stocks remained from Operation BAURGOE which terminated on 15 June 66. Five to eighteen days of Class I, III, and V were available for support of Opn HAYES at that time.
   d. Lack of significant contact during the operation and the tactical unit's premature extraction resulted in low consumption and large quantities of stocks on hand at the termination of the operation.
   e. Services rendered to supported units:
      (1) Showers: a daily average of 197 showers was provided.
      (2) Laundry: an average of 360 pieces of laundry were processed daily.
      (3) Graves Registration: a total of 5 bodies were processed by graves registration.
   f. Lessons Learned:
      (1) Close coordination with tactical unit supported is required on possible changes in force structures and contemplated rapid extraction from an area of operations.
      (2) When contact is not significant and the area of operations is inaccessible except by air, it is extremely important to evaluate the estimated days and change accordingly. Also, it is necessary to ship by consumption once an average daily issue trend is established and the stockage objective is reached.

5. (U) Personnel: The following personnel were provided by the 1st Logistical Command in support of Operation HAYES:

   Personnel
   121

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SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 15-66 (Operation HAYES) (U)

2 Officers

1 Warrant Officer

86 Enlisted Men

J ohn J. Sanders

Colonel, GS

ACOF, SpcO

Annex A — Logistical Support Data Operation HAYES

DISTRIBUTION:

2-MCNY, ATTN: TMA
1-CO, USARV
2-USARV, G3
2-USARV, G4
3-CO, I FORCENV
3-CO, II FORCENV
3-CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
3-CO, 173d Abn Bde
2-CO, 7th Air Force, ATTN: CDICO-A
3-CO, 1st Inf Div
3-CO, 1st Air Cav Div
3-CO, 25th Inf Div
1-CO, CONARC, Ft. Monroe, Va
3-CIC, US STRICOM, MacDill AFB, Fla
3-CIC, USARPAC, APO 96558
5-CO, USASC, QN
5-CO, USASC, CNS
5-CO, USASC, CSH
1-Command Group, 1st Log Cond
1-CO, 4th TO (Tnl A)
2-CO, 68th Medical Group
2-CO, 55th Medical Group
2-Dir of Arms
1-Dir of Med Svs
1-Dir of Sup
3-ACOFS, GRO
10-AVCA GO-0
1-Dir of Svs
1-Dir of Trans
1-CO, 14th IOC
1-Engr, 1st Log Cond
1-Historian

1-Command Group

1-CO, 14th Medical Brigade
1-No, USARPAC (USACDC LAD) APO 96558
1-Cmdt, GSG Sch, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66043
1-Cmdt, TUSA Armor Sch, Ft. Knox, Ky 40121
1-Cmdt, TUSA Inf Sch, Ft. Benning, Ga
1-Cmdt, TUSA Artillery Sch, Ft. Sill, Okla 73542
1-Cmdt, TUSA Quartermaster Sch, Ft. Lee, Va 23560
1-Cmdt, TUSA Ordnance Sch, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md 21005
1-Cmdt, TUSA Transportation Sch, Ft. RUSTIS, Va 23604
1-Cmdt, TUSA Aviation Sch, Ft. Ruckner, Ala 36362
3-CO, USACDC CSSO, Ft. Lee, Va

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED
## Logistical Critique

**Operation:** HAYES  
**Parent Unit:** 1st Cav Div (AM)  
**Period Covered:** 18 Jul - 1 Aug 66  
**Task Organization:** 1 Inf Bn (AM), 1 Inf 80th (AM)

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<th>Supply in To/Day</th>
<th>Total RSUPPLY</th>
<th>AVERAGE Daily Consumption</th>
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AVLC Form 262 (13 Jun 66)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTIC COMMAND
APO 96307

AVCH-50-S

7 November 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Lessons Learned - Long Binh (U)

TO: SEC DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) During the night of 28 October 1966, at approximately 2110 hours, area III of the Ammunition Supply Depot at Long Binh was attacked by a hostile force which employed small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and/or mortars. This force succeeded in entering the area and placed satchel charges with time fuse devices on two ammunition pads. The attack resulted in the loss of two US lives, nine US wounded and the destruction of thousands of rounds of ammunition.

2. (U) At the time of the incident, security for area III was provided by a four (4) man ambush patrol and two (2) roving jeep patrols with two (2) men each. A 45 man reaction force, capable of deploying within twenty minutes, was available to assist the security forces during an attack. The ambush patrol was occupying a previously prepared position at the time of attack.

3. (C) Based on a study of the incident, the following "lessons learned" have been derived and are to serve as guides to help prevent or minimize the effects of future incidents of this nature:

   a. (U) Immediate Intelligence.

      (1) Discussion. Approximately two hours prior to the attack, at least one indigenous kitchen employee reported to a US soldier the possibility of enemy activity. The information reported was not relayed to supervisory personnel, and therefore not acted upon.

      (2) Observation. It must be repeatedly emphasized at all levels of command that any person having knowledge, no matter how trivial, that indicates hostile activity of any type should immediately report the information to his supervisor. Supervisory personnel must notify the unit intelligence officer or commander in order to get the information into intelligence channels for exploitation.
b. (U) Counterintelligence assistance.

(1) Discussion. Counterintelligence (CI) personnel can assist in assessing hostile threats to installations. Once the assessment has been made and reports rendered, prompt action on recommendations must be initiated.

(2) Observation. Know and utilize the intelligence assets available.

c. (U) Avoiding pattern.

(1) Discussion. The friendly ambush patrol varied its location on a random basis but frequently operated from previously prepared positions. The reaction force was well rehearsed and the reaction time well established. The hostile tactics used indicated that the enemy might have had knowledge of the reaction time of the reaction forces (paragraph 2e, below).

(2) Observation. Avoid operational patterns and emphasize, in ambush and patrol training, noise discipline, alertness and use of alarm systems. Ambush sites should not be previously prepared positions and precautions must be taken to prevent disclosure of ambush positions.

d. (U) Reaction to activity.

(1) Discussion. When the ambush site received the initial indirect and small arms fire, personnel immediately returned the fire even though they had not identified the targets. In addition, personnel started evacuating the ambush site. This action could have divulged the location of the site had the enemy been firing only to test the defense of the area.

(2) Observation. Security forces must be trained in fire discipline and defense techniques.

e. (U) Employment of reaction forces.

(1) Discussion. A study of the incident indicated that the hostile plan was to emplace time controlled satchel charges, evacuate the area, engage the ambush site in a fire fight at the preplanned time causing a reaction force to deploy to the area and thereby inflict more casualties when the detonation occurred. By investigating the reported hostile activity with a small team prior to deploying the full reaction force, as was done in this case, it is possible that the potential number of casualties was reduced. This was a change from what had normally been done before.
(2) Observation. Plans for the employment of a reaction force should take into consideration the likelihood that one of the targets of the hostile force might be the reaction force itself.

f. (U) Communications.

(1) Discussion. A vehicle with radio was dispatched to the ambush site to assess the threat and determine courses of action. Initially, radio contact could not be established with the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which necessitated the dispatch of another vehicle to warn the TOC. When radio communication was established, the message received in the TOC was garbled which further delayed initiation of the reaction capability.

(2) Observation. The primary means of communication must be checked frequently to insure rapid reporting and effective control. In addition a secondary means of communicating must be provided, i.e., land lines or other devices.

g. (U) Physical Security.

(1) Discussion. A physical security survey dated 10 July 1966 pointed out the need for establishment of clear zones, construction of better fencing and access roads, and protective lighting at the Long Binh A30. Work orders for fence construction, removal of dense vegetation, and for perimeter lighting had been submitted and a request made for an all weather perimeter road. At the time of the incident the projects had not been completed.

(2) Observation. Appropriate construction priorities for security must be provided at the earliest possible phase of planning and construction of critical installations/facilities. Physical security measures must be included in the initial funding and constructed simultaneously to or before the installation/facility. When the installation is in existence and recommendations are made to improve physical security, corrective action must be taken immediately, if within the capability of the installation facility.

h. (U) Fencing.

(1) Discussion. Planks were found laid over the concertine barrier in the vicinity of a small stream bed. It is possible this was the means of access and/or egress. The barrier was obscured by brush and vegetation.
(2) Observation. When fencing of desired specifications is not available, every effort must be made to maintain and improve available fences. Clear zones on each side of the barrier must be maintained to enable observation and coverage of the barrier. If the fence is not covered by lighting, the use of trip flares should be considered. Probable avenues of approach into the area must be analyzed and guarded against.

i. (O) Sentry Dogs

(1) Discussion. Sentry dog teams at the ASD were not in operation because areas and pads were being worked on the night of the attack. The decision not to use the dogs was based on the belief that friendly activity in the area would constantly alert the dogs. Consequently, any possible early warning or psychological benefit of dog teams was lost. A post incident evaluation of the area showed that dog teams probably will not lose effectiveness when the area is being worked. Dog teams are now being used full time to test this concept.

(2) Observation. Feasibility studies should be made for each potential guard post to determine the effect that working parties would have upon the employment of sentry dogs in the same area.

j. (C) Fire Protection and Safety

(1) Discussion. The explosive material involved in this incident was "Fire Symbol 4 which includes quantity distance classes 4 through 7, especially hazardous". The provisions of paragraph 3d of Th 9-1300-206 direct that no attempt to fight fires involving symbol 4 material shall be made. However, the fires in pallets and dunnage were fought and blazes were extinguished which could have caused more extensive damage.

(2) Observation. Conditions peculiar to this theatre of operations, i.e., critical supply posture of numerous class V items, makes it essential that the local commander be permitted to take an on-the-spot decision of whether a fire should be fought.

k. (O) Quantity, Distance and Dispersion

(1) Discussion. The main explosion did not cause sympathetic detonation to adjacent stacks of ammunition. Dispersion of stacks of like type of ammunition within the depot excluded the loss of the entire quantity of type munition.
AVCA-GO-5
SUBJECT: Combat Lessons Learned - Long Binh (U)

(2) Observation. The minimum separation distances specified in Table II of paragraph 15, Pl-1300-206 will ensure against propagation of sympathetic detonation to adjacent stacks of ammunition. Adherence to these distances will also limit the quantity of ammunition that may be lost in any one explosion. The insistence upon adequate pads and pad spacing prevented what would probably have been a disastrous and critical loss of an entire ammunition depot.

1. (U) Control of investigations.

(1) Discussion. Immediately following the incident, requests for available details were made by adjacent commanders and all higher headquarters from US Army Support Command, Saigon, to LVC. Further, intelligence investigators and press representatives, acting within their assigned functions sought details by interviewing witnesses and knowledgeable sources before those responsible for the command investigation could do so. Initial reports were a mixture of facts, rumor, and hearsay.

(2) Observation. A standing Operating Procedure should exist to provide for the establishment of a Control Center having the responsibility of directing the command investigation of an incident, compiling information for release to the press, coordinating investigation of officially designated agencies such as intelligence, JSOC, and US Teams, disseminating factual reports to higher headquarters, and restricting entry to the incident area to only those personnel essential for military operations.

It is always simpler to look back and determine what could have been done to preclude a specific action. This in no way reflects upon the outstanding overall security plan and actions taken by the command and organization in this instance. The purpose is to review your own plan for similar weaknesses and to strengthen them for better security.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

T/L: Lynx 784

GLENN A. DOYLE
Capt., AGC
Asst., AG

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