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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVED-C

28 September 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (MACV/RCS/3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
American Division
APO 96374

Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO 96502

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation BENTON


3. (U) Location: QUANG TIN Province.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation BENTON was as shown below:

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1-327 Inf</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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b. The task organization of the Brigade was changed three times during Operation BENTON. On 14 August 1967, A Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was placed under operational control of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The following day operational control of A Company was terminated and the company returned to its parent unit. On 15 August 1967, the Mike Force...
Company with the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was detached and attached to the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The two CIDG Companies in support of the Brigade were released on 19 August 1967, and the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was attached to the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 2-320 Artillery: Employed in a direct support role.
   b. C Battery, 3-16 Artillery (155 Towed): Reinforced the fires of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.
   c. 14th Aviation Battalion: Provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.
   (1) 176th Helicopter Assault Company: Employed in direct support of the Brigade and provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.
   (2) 161st Helicopter Assault Company: Provided helicopters on a mission support basis for troop lift, combat support and resupply missions.
   (3) 178th Aviation Company: Provided CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.
   d. 9th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for psychological operations.
   e. 244th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support of the Brigade.
   f. 7th US Air Force: Flew 210 tactical fighter missions totaling 372 sorties. One hundred and fifty of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of twenty-five minutes. In addition, sixty-four Combat Skyspot sorties, thirteen Flareships (AC-47) sorties, and 192 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. Forward Air Controllers flew 103 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.
   g. TIEN PHUOC CIDG Camp: Provided two CIDG Companies in support of Brigade operations.
   h. Company C, 5th Special Forces (PA NANG): Provided two Mike Force Companies to operate with two battalions of the Brigade.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Task Force OREGON directed the Brigade to conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 117.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: Operation BENTON commenced on 130730 August 1967 after completing Operation HOOD RIVER. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted airborne assaults northwest of CHU LAI into multiple landing zones (1216) west of GOHR Area of Operations (AO) and commenced search and destroy operations to the east. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated operations on the 181 AO (Operation HOOD RIVER) on 10 August, conducted airborne and overland displacement to CHU LAI Base Camp, and on 13 August 1967, assumed the mission of the Brigade Immediate Action Force with an on-order mission to conduct airborne assaults into the GOHR AO. On 15 August 1967, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus one company) conducted airborne assaults into the GOHR AO and commenced search and destroy operations within their assigned AO. Artillery and Air Force Tactical Air prepared all LZ's and then shifted to known or suspected enemy locations and routes of agress (Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics).
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11. Execution:

a. Operation BENTON was characterized by small unit actions with bat-
talions and companies maneuvering freely in reaction to intelligence received and
enemy movements. All contacts with large size enemy forces (platoon or larger) were made in the late afternoon or just prior to dark and normally lasted in-
to the night until the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Contacts with large
forces gradually declined as did the enemy's will to stand and fight and degener-
ated into contacts with squad size or smaller enemy forces. The search and
destroy tactics employed by the Brigade consisted of saturation patrolling, day
and night ambushes and small unit stay behind forces. Artillery fired harassing
and interdiction missions each night on known or suspected enemy locations. The
terrain over which operations were conducted included dense, jungle covered
mountains, rolling hills with tall elephant grass and flat, cultivated lowlands
with rice paddies.

b. Operation BENTON was initiated immediately upon the com-
pletion of Operation HOOD RIVER from selected pickup zones (PU's) within the VIEGHEL AO.
Elements of the Brigade Tactical Command Post displaced overland to CHU IAI to
coordinate and control the operation. A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th
Cavalry remained at CAREITAN Base Camp east of DUC PHO and secured the Brigade
base and conducted patrols outside the base perimeter. A Company, 326th Engineer
Battalion (Airborne) continued to improve the base camp in addition to providing
engineer teams to the infantry battalions.

c. Numerous small unit contacts were made throughout the operation as a
result of extensive saturation patrolling. These contacts are listed chronologically
in Inclosure 11 (Small Unit Actions). Significant enemy contacts during Operation
BENTON are as follows:

(1) 13 August 1967: At 1700 hours near BT210088 Company B, 2d
Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was engaged by an unknown size enemy force.
The enemy employed rockets, rifle grenades, machine guns and small arms fire.
Company B returned the fire and called for artillery. As the company attempted
to maneuver, it was met with intense enemy fire and the company consolidated their
position and requested Air Force C-47 aircraft with miniguns ("Spooky"). The
enemy continued to attack with small arms until 2350 hours. He then employed
60mm mortars, 81mm rocket launcher fire and rifle grenades and two companies attacked
the perimeter. Company B countered with small arms, machine guns, gunships and
"Spooky." The fire fight continued until 0155 hours, 14 August 1967, when the
enemy broke contact and withdrew. Sporadic sniper fire continued throughout the
night. Results of the contact were 35 enemy killed (confirmed); 3 AK-47ts, 2 RPD machine guns and several Chicom grenades captured; 5 US killed and 15
wounded.

(2) 13 August 1967: The tactical command post and fire base of the
2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry at BT173115 was subjected to a mortar
and grenade attack at 2100 hours. Elements at the command post included the bat-
talion staff, Reconnaissance Platoon of the Battalion and B Battery, 2d Battalion
(Airborne), 327th Infantry. The enemy followed the mortar attack with a probe of
the defensive positions employing automatic weapons. Friendly units countered
with small arms, grenades and "Spooky." The fire fight terminated at 2245 hours.
Movement around the perimeter continued throughout the night. Results of the
contact were 1 US killed and 13 wounded; enemy losses could not be assessed.

(3) 15 August 1967: Company B, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th In-
fantry made contact at 2000 hours with an estimated NVA squad at BT200053. The
company employed artillery, gunships and "Spooky" against the enemy force. Con-
tact was broken at 2145 hours. Results of the contact were 10 enemy killed
(confirmed) and 1 carbine captured. Friendly losses were 2 killed and 5 wounded.

(4) 16 August 1967: Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th
Infantry became engaged with an unknown size enemy force at 1300 hours near
BT161107. An air strike was called in on the enemy exposing a trench system and
bunkers. A second air strike was called in destroying the bunkers and exposing
an additional trench system. Results of the action were 10 enemy killed (confirmed)
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5) 18 August 1967: Company A, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry while maneuvering through a pass (BT160050) at 1200 hours was fired upon by enemy automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire. An air strike and artillery were employed and the enemy broke contact. The company pursued with light contact until 1640 hours. Again the company was fired upon by heavy automatic weapons fire from BT160055. Air strike and artillery were again employed as Company A maneuvered. Heavy fighting continued until 2215 hours when the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Enemy losses were 9 killed (confirmed). Friendly losses were 5 killed and 15 wounded.

6) 18 August 1967: Commencing at 1700 hours, one platoon of Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with a company size force near BT165037. The enemy opened fire with nine automatic weapons, simultaneously pinning down the platoon. Results of the initial contact were 2 US killed and 5 wounded. The company employed air strikes and artillery and maneuvered its remaining platoons against the enemy. Heavy fighting erupted at 1810 hours and continued until 2100 hours. Final results of the action were 6 US killed, 13 wounded and 1 enemy killed (confirmed).

7) 25 August 1967: At 0900 hours, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force near BT169107 that resulted in 1 US wounded, 1 enemy killed (confirmed) and 1 enemy individual weapon captured. A MEDEVAC helicopter approaching the area to evacuate the wounded man was hit by enemy small arms fire and forced down at 1020 hours. A Company secured the area, and in the process of doing so, killed 1 enemy near the helicopter. Sporadic action continued throughout the afternoon. Artillery and limited gunships supported the company while heavy rains precluded the use of air strikes. At 1715 hours, the company received 8-10 incoming 82mm mortar rounds and engaged an estimated 20-30 well dug in enemy. Contact was broken at 1730 hours. Total results for the day action were 9 enemy killed (confirmed), 5 individual weapons and 1 flare pistol captured. Friendly losses were 6 killed and 22 wounded.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 117.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operations: 303 killed (confirmed); 1 killed (probable); 13 VC captured; 2 NVA captured; 8 crew served weapons and 123 individual weapons captured; 31 tons of rice, 1.4 tons of salt and 4 tons of tea either extracted or destroyed; and 7 base camps destroyed.

c. Friendly losses resulting from combat operations were: 41 killed, 251 wounded (Medevac) and 36 wounded (minor); 5 UH-1D aircraft destroyed, 15 UH-1D and UH-1D aircraft damaged.

13. (U) Administration Matters:


14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Satchel charges were employed against enemy bunkers when artillery and hand grenades failed to rout the enemy. During a heavy contact against enemy in well dug in bunkers with over and cover, a company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry employed their attached engineer team to destroy the enemy and bunkers. Under the cover of supporting machine gun fire, engineer teams emplaced satchel charges against the bunkers which resulted in four enemy killed, two weapons captured and the bunkers destroyed.
b. CS was effectively used to rout an enemy from bunkers when repeated air strikes and artillery failed. During a heavy contact with the enemy deployed in dug in bunkers with overhead cover which prevented the friendly force from advancing despite numerous air strikes and artillery, non-persistent CS was dropped from a helicopter and followed by additional air strikes and artillery. Once the air strikes were completed, smoke grenades were dropped from a helicopter to screen the movement of advancing troops from the enemy. The CS and smoke employed permitted the friendly troops to overrun the enemy positions. See Inclosure 5 (Chemical).

c. "Daisy Cutters", 1000 pound bombs with a three foot pipe welded to the fuze, were used extensively to cut landing zones in the jungle forward of advancing troops. In several instances, those landing zones were used for resupply and medical evacuation.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

   (1) Sufficient air to ground radio nets must be available to supply all maneuver elements (down to and including the rifle company) with a frequency that will net with the radio mounted in the forward air controller's airplane. Without sufficient frequencies to supply all companies, the battalion command net must then be used which unnecessarily ties up the battalion commander's net.

   (2) An immediate debriefing of all pilots (command and control helicopters, utility helicopters and "slick" helicopters) must be accomplished as soon as pilots return from the area of operations to determine and process information which may be valuable intelligence. In one instance, a helicopter pilot saw the muzzle flashes of a recoilless rifle firing and assumed it to be friendly. Later, in a casual comment, this sighting was mentioned and was determined to be the enemy firing at friendly forces.

   (3) Whenever possible, if a fire base is to be established on a grassy slope, the grass should be burned off using napalm or white phosphorous rockets prior to the fire base being established. In one instance, a fire was started by an unknown source down the grass slope of an artillery fire base and resulted in extensive damages to equipment and the accomplishment of an assigned mission. See Inclosure 10 (Artillery).

   (4) Monsoon weather greatly decreases the efficiency and range of communications equipment. Additional radio relay stations must be planned for and established during the operation to insure continuous communications.

   (5) Plans for and speedy evacuation of downed aircraft must be executed as rapidly as possible. Without prompt evacuation, a maneuver unit is required to secure the downed aircraft which, in turn, jeopardizes the accomplishment of the mission and allows time for the enemy to maneuver and attack.

   (6) The enemy's capability to employ indirect fire support should always be assumed. Whenever a unit's location is compromised by resupply or medevac helicopters, the unit should immediately move from the immediate area. Another effective method of guarding against a mortar attack is to displace a short distance (200-400 meters) after dark.

   (7) Defensive targets are a necessity when establishing a position for the night. At the same time if defensive targets are plotted in a pattern, the position can be compromised. Consideration should be given to occasionally firing in false defensive targets.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) The enemy encountered during Operation BENTON were well trained and equipped. He was aggressive and did not hesitate to maneuver against the
flanks or rear of advancing troops. He utilized the terrain to his advantage with expertise and dug in tenaciously. The Brigade maximized the use of tactical air, artillery and CS to dig him out of his defensive positions prior to assaulting. Without this fire support, it is likely that friendly casualties would have been greater.

(2) CIDG and Mike Force Companies worked with and supported the Brigade. Each company worked directly with a maneuver battalion, thereby enhancing the capability of the battalion to maneuver and search out an area of operation.

(3) A need exists to have a winch capability organic to each assault helicopter company. When operating in dense, jungle covered mountains where landing zones are difficult to find, resupply to units and evacuation of non-critically wounded personnel becomes a serious problem. Units must postpone their assigned mission to move to accomplish resupply or evacuation. A winch mounted on a utility helicopter would facilitate accomplishing both requirements in a minimum amount of time.

(4) Mines appeared in increasing numbers during Operation BENTON and resulted in some casualties. Several mines were booby trapped. Constant alertness, training and aggressive leadership are the key negating the enemy's use of booby traps.

S.H. MATHESON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

1. (C) TERRAIN: The area of operation has numerous hills and low mountains surrounded by valleys in the north and rugged mountains in the central and southern portion. The many trails and waterways afford access throughout the area. It was along the waterways that the majority of contacts were made and installations discovered. The main avenues of approach are the SONG BONG MIEWS (NW - SE), Route 531 (E - W) and Route 533 (E - W).

2. (U) WEATHER: Partly cloudy skies with daily afternoon and early evening rainshowers and/or thunderstorms was the dominate weather picture during Operation BENTON. Visibility was generally unrestricted with a minimum of a half mile in rainstorms. Winds were generally southeasterly, light and variable at night. The maximum temperature was 101 degrees and the minimum was 78 degrees (F). Relative humidity ranged from a high of 98 percent to a low of 43 percent. Weather hampered one full day of air operations (27 August 1967) but did not severely hamper the ground operations for this period.

3. (C) ANALYSIS:
   a. Intelligence Analysis

      (1) During Operation BENTON, elements of the 6th and 7th Companies, 22d Battalion, 21st VC Regiment were engaged as was proven by documents captured. The enemy initiated two mortar attacks on friendly units. Units were sniped at constantly. Most elements were broken down to squad size groups, were well trained and maneuvered well in response to our heavy fire. Utilizing their excellent knowledge of the terrain and cover, especially bunkers, they would initiate contact in order to draw the friendly into an area from which the VC could employ their bunker complexes. The bunkers were constructed with a thick overhead of logs, very narrow firing ports, well maintained camouflage and were mutually supporting. (Comment taken from reports by 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry).

      Conclusion: NVA units will initiate action employing heavy volumes of fire and adroit maneuvering. The enemy prefers to use his bunker complex so that he can inflict greater casualties at less expense, NVA units will vigorously defend and only retreat as a final resort to annihilation. Few prisoners can be expected after contact.

      (2) Discussion: Enemy contacted in areas adjacent to cache sites were armed with various type weapons but predominantly Chinese Communist manufacture. Training areas had small arms ranges with silhouette targets, mock ups of planes and armored vehicles, and dummy potato masher hand grenades. Forces which guarded these areas utilized all forms of guerrilla warfare i.e., booby traps, mines, etc., which were in good working order. (Taken from reports rendered by 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry). Cache sites were well camouflaged and items stored were in large quantities.

      Conclusion: The enemy continues to guard his base camp with local forces. Base Area 117 exists and holds stores for a multi-battalion size force. Local Force units in this area are well trained in and capable of executing all aspects of guerrilla warfare.

      (3) Discussion: Numerous gas masks in good condition and manufactured either by North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist were found on enemy dead.

      Conclusion: NVA units engaged contained newly infiltrated personnel and the enemy is more prepared to cope with chemical agents. (Comment: Gas masks do not seal properly around the nose and cheek). Two gas masks were delivered to Brigade Chemical Officer for Technical Intelligence Analysis.
Discussion: Weapons captured after contacts and in cache sites were mostly SKS, AK-47 and RPD's of the "new family," were new and in good condition. Mortar and recoilless rifle ammunition captured was now and, in most cases, still in their original containers.

Conclusion: The enemy in this area is well supplied with weapons and ammunition. He can be expected to deliver high volumes of fire.

b. Communication Security

(1) During Operation BENTON, a total of 11,708 FM radio transmissions and 1,550 telephone transmissions were monitored. A total of 1,224 man hours were spent in support of Operation BENTON by personnel assigned to the 406th Radio Research Detachment's Communication Security Section. One violation occurred (classified location in the clear) during Operation BENTON.

(2) Recommendations

(a) Planning a conversation before placing the call will considerably decrease the possibility of compromise. Forethought is a definite requirement in precluding violations. Make the conversation brief and to the point. Long drawn-out conversations are likely to lead to compromise. If the party whom one is talking to starts to reveal classified material, stop him as soon as possible to limit the amount of information revealed. Following these simple precautions can greatly decrease the amount of intelligence made available to possible enemy intercept.

(b) The radiotelephone is the most insecure means of communication in practical use. Only personnel trained in the use of the radiotelephone should be authorized to use it.

(c) Communications security is not just something that happens, rather it is a condition that is produced. The better trained an individual is the less he is likely to violate the principals of communications security. All personnel who use non-secure means of communication should be regularly briefed or in some way reminded of the methods of keeping classified information secure. When transmitting messages of a sensitive or classified nature, the secure net should be utilized. The benefits of a secure net can not be over emphasized nor can its need, as the primary net, for the passing of information between the Brigade and forward Battalions. All commanders should insure that the secure net be operative at all times as an added measure of communication security.

4. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

a. Red Haze: The effect of Red Haze was lessened because fields were still being burnt off in and around the operational area. The Red Haze coverage and response time to requests were not adequate. The lead time allows little leeway for changing to areas that need to be covered. The readouts are often delayed and tactical reaction is lessened. A system is needed to give complete and timely dissemination to the requestors. Also, adjustment of the area to be covered at this time can not be given at the last minute, this factor should be incorporated in the overhauling of the present system. One solution may be direct communication between the requestor and the mission commander, utilizing the requestor's operations and intelligence net.

b. Aerial Photography: Photographic coverage for Operation BENTON was unsatisfactory in that requests and readouts were not delivered by the dates needed. This precluded use by the tactical commander in the planning. Therefore old photography and outdated Combine Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) studies had to be used which supply them with outdated
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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U) cont'd

information. Often insufficient lead time is given prior to a move; therefore, the requirements stated for requesting coverage could not be met.

c. Visual Reconnaissance: Only eight visual reconnaissance missions were flown out of a possible sixteen (16) days by one aircraft. This was due to flight restrictions and maintenance requirements.

d. Interrogation of Prisoners of War

(1) During Operation BENTON, the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section, 181st Military Intelligence Detachment, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division operated two (2) Brigade Collection Points for detainees. One interrogation team operated at the Brigade base camp in Duc Pho for interrogation of detainees brought in by the Brigade Security Patrols, A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry and the United States Navy. The majority of the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section moved forward to Chu Lai with the Brigade. Utilizing Task Force OREGON facilities, the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section worked out of the Task Force OREGON compound. They interrogated all detainees brought to them by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. If a detainee was determined to be a Civil Defendent or a Prisoner of War, the prisoner and a copy of the interrogation report were turned over directly to Task Force OREGON authorities for disposition. In the meantime, the Brigade S2 was notified of the detainee's status and an interrogation report was submitted to the Brigade S2. A contingent of the 9th Army, Republic of Vietnam Military Intelligence Detachment accompanied the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section to Chu Lai and aided in the screening of captured documents.

(2) The Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section also furnished an interrogator to each of the three infantry battalions. Each interrogator had the mission of screening out detainees and interrogating prisoners for information of immediate tactical nature in order that the capturing unit could react on this exploited intelligence. They also had the responsibility of working closely with the Battalion S2 to screen captured documents. Also, the interrogator at battalion level submitted a brief interrogation progress report that accompanied the detainee back to the Brigade Collection Point at Chu Lai. The brief progress report was to give the interrogator at battalion level a starting point. In general, attachment of interrogation of prisoners of war personnel to each battalion seemed to be a compatible arrangement.

(3) A problem that again arose during Operation BENTON, as it had in other operations, is the failure on the part of the capturing units to completely fill out the capture tag. The ten instances of this occurrence were at a time when there was no Interrogation of Prisoner of War Section representative out with the unit to assure compliance with the directive. This information insures proper interrogation and is an essential element to effective intelligence collection.

(4) Another area of concern is documents handling. When and if possible, documents should accompany the individual from whom they were taken. This is not only to aid in the interrogation process but also to expedite return of personal papers if the detainee is determined to be an Innocent Civilian. All too often, if an individual's identity card, birth certificate, land deeds, etc., are separated from his person, he may never see them again.

c. Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon: LRRP's were utilized to maintain surveillance on avenues of egress on the periphery of the area of operations. Artillery was used to engage groups of one to two times. The use of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units as security and stay behind infiltration conveyance proved to be of little value. They are not disciplined well enough to be utilized as clandestine security or as infiltration nodes.
5. (U) ENEMY LOSSES: The following losses were sustained by the enemy during Operation BENTON:

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<td>tivil Depondent</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>3.5:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Weapons:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprinfelded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>AK-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-1 Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thompson SIG</td>
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<td>M-16 Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Chicom SIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxim Mgager</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>M-60 MG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shot Gun</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>M-79</td>
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<tr>
<td>45 Cal Pistol</td>
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<td>60mm Mortar</td>
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<td></td>
<td>57mm RR</td>
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<td>c. Ammunition:</td>
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<td>82mm Mortar</td>
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<td>57mm RR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7.62 LWS</td>
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<td>75mm RR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifles Grenade</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Grenades</td>
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<td>d. Food Stuff:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>31 tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>4 tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>e. Installations:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortified bunkers - hut complexes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Signal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Miscellaneous:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition B (Explosive)</td>
<td>2 cans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Sites</td>
<td>2 cans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Inclosure:
Tab -- Order of Battle
1. (C) VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE

a. NVA Units

(1) The largest known unit operating within the Tactical Areas of Responsibility was the 21st NVA Regiment of the 2d NVA Division. The headquarters and subordinate battalions were believed to be located in the vicinity of BT 1705.

(2) The GK 33 Battalion which provides artillery support for the 2d NVA Division was believed to be located in the vicinity of BT 1324.

b. VC Main Force Units

(1) The 70th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment which was previously carried in QUANG NAM Province was believed to be located in the vicinity of BT 2017, conducting operations as an independent Battalion, directly subordinate to the 2d NVA Division.

(2) The 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Battalion was believed to be operating independently in the vicinity of BT 2813.

c. VC Local Force Units

(1) The 72d Local Force Battalion was believed to be operating in the vicinity of BT 2227.

(2) There were seven Local Force Companies believed to be operating within the vicinity of the Tactical Area of Responsibility, or within reinforcing distance. Units and locations were as follows:

(a) 74th Local Force Company - BT 2807
(b) 706th Local Force Company - BT 3113
(c) K-51 Local Force Company - BT 1376
(d) K-52 Local Force Company - BT 2229
(e) K-53 Local Force Company - BT 1516
(f) K-54 Local Force Company - BT 1516
(g) K-55 Local Force Company - BT 2713

d. Base Areas: There was one base area reported within the area of operations. Base Area 117 in the vicinity of BT 2307 is considered a safe and secure area in which to train, rest and regroup for combat.

2. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE FINDINGS AND SUMMARY IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA

a. Units Not Contacted:

(1) Elements of the 11th and 33rd Battalions of the 21st Regiment, 2d NVA Division were not contacted during Operation BENTON, and are currently located in central QUANG TIN Province.

(2) Elements of the GK 33 Artillery Battalion, 2d NVA Division and the 70th Battalion, 2d NVA Division were not contacted during Operation BENTON, and are currently located in central QUANG TIN Province.
(1) Interrogation by the 2d Battalion (airborne), 327th Infantry of local civilians on 14 August 1967 indicated the presence of the 72d Local Force Battalion in the vicinity of BT 154104. Later contacts in the area tended to confirm the reports. On 16 August 1967 a prisoner of war stated that he was from the QUYET TAM Battalion, which was located in the vicinity of BT 200105. The QUYET TAM Battalion was carried by the enemy as the QUANG NAM Provincial Battalion. The enemy does not recognize QUANG TAM as a Province, so it is possible that the QUYET TAM Battalion was also known as the 72d Local Force Battalion, due to the fact that the 72d Battalion was carried as the QUANG NAM Provincial Battalion. The 72d Local Force Battalion is currently carried in central QUANG NAM Province.

(2) The 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Battalion was believed to have been operating within our Tactical Area of Responsibility. This conclusion is based on the numerous fortifications, to include trench systems, bunkers, tunnels, and anti-aircraft positions which were encountered during the operation. The 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Battalion is believed to be currently located in the vicinity of Base Area 117.

(3) Small resistance groups (normally 5 to 10 personnel) which are believed to be elements of the local force limits operating within the Tactical Area of Responsibility were contacted periodically with insignificant intelligence results.

c. Units Contacted: On 13 August 1967 Company B, 2d Battalion (airborne) 502d Infantry, received intense mortar fire and automatic weapons fire at the Tactical Command Post located at BT 210088. Friendly artillery and airstrikes were suspended and the results of the engagement identified the units as being the 6th and 7th Companies of the 22d Battalion of the 21st Regiment. Documents captured throughout the Operation placed the 22d Battalion in the area. The 22d Battalion is currently believed to be located in the vicinity of Base Area 117.

3. (C) The friendly operations initiated during Operation BENTON have reduced the enemy's combat effectiveness. The enemy base area has been penetrated by friendly forces resulting in the loss of men, material and supplies to the enemy. The enemy has been forced to split into small groups to avoid contact while attempting to regroup in safer areas to the west and southwest of their base area. It was reported that the 21st NVA Regiment was to be the spearhead for the 2d NVA Division's wet season campaign, as a result of the friendly operations in the area this capability may have been greatly reduced if not eliminated entirely for this year's monsoon season.

4. (C) ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ALSO KNOWN AS</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st NVA Regiment</td>
<td>Cong Truong 21</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Maj Minh</td>
<td>BT 1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d NVA Division</td>
<td>Work Site 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Battalion/21st</td>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>LA</td>
<td>BT 1729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Battalion/21st</td>
<td>72 Battalion</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>CPT Tiep</td>
<td>BT 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Battalion/21st</td>
<td>Workshop 33</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>CPT Lien</td>
<td>BT 1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Battalion/2d</td>
<td>Phi Da 2009</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Cong</td>
<td>Base Area 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>ALSO KNOWN AS</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>COMMANDER</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Company - 409th</td>
<td>X-70 Company</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Duoc</td>
<td>Base Area 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>7th Company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>706 VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>106th Company</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Khoa</td>
<td>BT 3113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>721 VC Local Force Battalion</td>
<td>X-72</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Cao</td>
<td>Base Area 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GK 33 Artillery Battalion/2d NVA Division</td>
<td>EQ 33</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Can</td>
<td>BT 1324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>X-74</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Thanh</td>
<td>BT 2807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-51 VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Khoa</td>
<td>BT 1536</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-52 VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>C-73</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Unk</td>
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<td>K-53 VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>C-14</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>BT 3013</td>
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<td>K-54 VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>C-73</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Hong</td>
<td>BT 1516</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-55 VC Local Force Company</td>
<td>Flying Tiger</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>BT 2718</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-21; Phi Po</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation RENTON (U) (cont'd)

21st Battalion/21st NVA Regiment

CONFIDENTIAL
22nd Battalion/21st Regiment

33rd Battalion/21st Battalion

CONFIDENTIAL
6K33 Artillery Battalion/ 2nd NVA Division

72nd Local Force Battalion
CONFIDENTIAL

ORDER (Intelligence) to Combat Operations

PERSONALITIES: CO-NGUYEN DUC CONG
XO-SR CPT THUA
PO-DUAN CONG THANG

DISPOSITION: The present probable location of the battalion is BT 2017.

STRENGTH: Personnel: 350

Weapons: 60, 81, or 82mm Mort's
57 or 75mm Rr's
HMG's
Indiv Wpns

X-70 CO
7th CO
70th CO (139th Bn)

PERSONALITIES: CO - NGUYEN DUOC
XO - WO LE TA
PO - NGUYEN MAI

DISPOSITION: Personnel: str 90

Weapons:

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After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U) (cont'd)

PERSONALITIES: CO - TH. NH
XO - TR. NH TIEN
PO - PHUANG

STRENGTH:
Personnel: str 50
Weapons: 60mm Mort K-50 Indiv wpns
Light MG K-44 Grenades
BAR's M-16
AK-47 B-40

UNIT HISTORY: Bivouac area of camp loc BT 323110, alternate loc of camp when in danger is BT 285078. The 72nd BN status company is a sapper company. Def stated a platoon from the V-24 Company was used to organize the 74th Company (sapper company) the company operates LY TIN, TAM KY, TIEN PHUOC Districts.

K-51
107th Unit
F-14
A-10
D-21
F113
F15
A-10
$-15
$-15

Thanh Binh
Thanh Binh

PERSONALITIES: CO - KHO.
XO - NGUYEN THU N
PO - ANH VIU

STRENGTH:
Personnel: str 65
Weapons: 81mm Mort .30 Cal MG AR
60mm Mort BAR's SMD
57mm RR Heavy MG M-19
B-40 K-79 Carbines 30 Cal

TRAINING AND TACTICS: Low level agent reports stated that the mission of this unit is to destroy bridges, escort VC laborers who carry rice, to attack Rd teams in their operational area, to attack refugee camp (Thanh). Composition of the company as follows: The company has 3 inf platoons. Each platoon has 2 squads of 12 man each. The weapons platoon is a recon squad that has binoculars.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
2. After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U') (cont'd)

D-22
A.13
V.13 Co
10th Unit
Tien Phouc
Dai Van
Tal LY

STRENGTH:
Personnel: str 150
Weapons: 60mm Mort B-3's 57mm
M-60 MG M-1's Indiv Wns
.30 Cal MG K-50
M79 Gren L K-44

TRAINING AND TACTICS: Low level agent reports indicate the following missions for the unit: attack RD Teams, to attack refugee camp, to shell CHOI SUNG outpost, to attack bunkers in their area.
The unit was composed as follows: It contained three (3) inf platoons and each platoon had two squads composed of 12 men each. One of these squads was a recon squad equipped with binoculars, the weapons platoon was composed of three squads and each squad was composed of 10-22 men each.

A.14
V.14
A.19
14th Co
21st Village Guard
C.-73
C.-16
D-23
T&W KY
Unit 113
Tal LY
PRK 53
V53
V309
K309
LBN: 2001

STRENGTH:
Personnel: str 90
Weapons: 81mm Mort B-3's
60mm Mort Indiv Wns
57mm RSA Explosives
.30 Cal MG
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U) (cont'd)

C-73
16 CO
V-12
III Unit
Daily
North Tam KY
16/4 Co

LEN: 2002
PERSONNEL: STR: 130
WEAPONS: 81mm Mort 30 Cal MG 2K
60mm Mort B.R.S. AK
57mm RR Indiv Wpns SMG
40mm RKT Launcher AR.* M-14

TACTICS: Low level agent reports list the following as
missions of this unit: atk RD teams in the area, mine roads atk PF units,
shell out posts in their area, to atk refugee camp, to maintain security in
VC controlled areas.

K-55 CO

A-21
A-21
C-75
Flying Tiger A-21
PHI PO
A-21 CO (? Intel Est #5-67
75th

STRENGTH: PERSONNEL: STR: 100

CONFIDENTIAL

20
After Action Report, Operation BETON U (cont'd)

106th Co
76th Co
V-75 Co
V-76th Co
GI Bo Nauh

STRENGTH:
Personnel: 80

Weapons: 60mm Mort 30 Cal MG Grenade Launchers
81mm Mort Baht's Indiv Spns
57mm R.A. No-24's
14.5mm AR's

TRAINING AND TACTICS: Unit is supposed to harass allied units in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL
UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation BENTON:

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation BENTON were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</th>
<th>4,368</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4,714</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airhead - DUC PHO</td>
<td>3,935</td>
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<tr>
<td>Base Camp - PHAN RANG</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>321</td>
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</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 116% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 109% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 54 were intransit, 110 were on TDY/SD status, 145 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing and 3 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation BENTON:

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation BENTON were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTOE)</th>
<th>4,368</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - DUC PHO</td>
<td>3,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - PHAN RANG</td>
<td>903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 113% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 105% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 19 were intransit, 141 were on TDY/SD status, 190 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing, and 11 AWOL.

c. Replacements received during Operation BENTON were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>BW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>1 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>2 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>0 15</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-320</td>
<td>0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep Co</td>
<td>0 11</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for Operation BENTON were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC IRRP</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326 Engr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Inf (Scout Dog)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 41 251
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

b. Total casualties for Operation BENTON were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

c. Total casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>514</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to the forward units during the operation.

b. A forward Red Cross representative remained an integral part of the Brigade forward echelon during Operation BENTON.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING:

a. A records check was conducted by AC.

b. During the time of Operation BENTON, the brigade rotated approximately 140 personnel to CONUS and received 45 replacements.
Inclousure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENEDICT (U)

1. (C) Organization for Support

a. General: Brigade maneuver elements were supported by a forward supply point established at CHU LAI by the Forward Support Element. Brigade elements located at CARENTAN base continued to be supported by the Forward Supply Element at CARENTAN base.

b. Support Battalion:

(1) The Forward Supply Element provided all classes of supply and services to Brigade elements located CARENTAN base. The Forward Supply Element consisted of D Company, 326th Medical Battalion; E Company, 801st Maintenance Battalion; and C Company, 501st Supply and Transportation Battalion.

(2) The forward supply point provided all classes of supply, laundry, and bath, maintenance and transportation services for Brigade elements at CHU LAI. The forward supply point consisted of D Company, 326th Medical Battalion (-), the Maintenance Section, 801st Maintenance Company; and a Supply Section, 801st Supply and Transportation Company. Elements of these sections collocated with the next higher supporting units to facilitate passing of requisitions, job orders and DA 581s.

c. Supporting Forces:

(1) Units Supporting the Forward Supply Element were:

(a) Task Force McDonald

(b) Support Battalion (PHAN RANG)

(2) Units Supporting the Forward Supply Point were:

(a) 94th Supply and Service Battalion

(1) 221st Supply and Service Company

(2) 163rd Transportation Company

(b) 80th General Support Group with the 205th Ammunition Platoon

(c) 188th Maintenance Battalion

2. (C) Material and Services

a. Supply

(1) Class I: "Meal, Combat, Individual" formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. No problem areas were encountered other than a shortage of ice due to a mechanical failure of ice making equipment in the Class I yard. Air shipments of ice from DUC PHO helped alleviate the problem until the ice producing equipment was returned to an operational status. A total of 84,05 short tons of Class I was consumed by the Brigade to include 29.25 short tons of "A" rations and 54.80 short tons of "C" rations.

(2) Class II and IV: The bulk of Class II and IV items used by the Brigade was drawn through the 94th Supply and Service Battalion, Task Force GREGN Support Command. Problems developed due to insufficient stockage at the 94th Supply and Service Battalion to meet the Brigade's demands. A critical shortage of fatigues in small sizes became evident during the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry's material readiness operations. Medium sizes were available but due to the fact that 90% of airborne troops require small and extra small sizes, this was an unsatisfactory solution.
Air shipments of fatigues from the Brigades's resources at DUC PRO and PHAN RANG helped to supply the unit. However, many troops returned to the field without the proper sized fatigues. Total Class II and IV issued to the Brigade was 22,97 short tons.

(3) Class III: The 221st Supply and Service Company provided all types of Class III in sufficient quantities to support logistical and tactical operations. The Brigade drew a total of 4.06 short tons and no problems were encountered.

(4) Class V: The 205th Ammunition Platoon supplied the Brigade with all Class V items. No problems were encountered on Class V resupply at Brigade level. However, on two occasions units did experience delay on emergency resupply in drawing ammunition from the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) and in movement to the helipad. It is recommended that units stockpile a small emergency resupply in the vicinity of the resupply pad to facilitate movement to the requesting unit.

(5) Water: Potable water was available from two water points on CHU LAI post. Although the water points produced sufficient water, the length of time units had to wait in line made resupply of units in the field extremely difficult. This problem was rectified by Company C, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) establishing a water point in the vicinity of the forward supply point.

b. Maintenance: Maintenance support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion. No problems were encountered. The following job orders were completed:

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<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Signal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: Vehicular support was furnished by the 163d Transportation Company by allocating the Brigade ten 2½ ton trucks per day. However, due to vehicle deadline, the Brigade seldom received all of its allocated vehicles. At the termination of the operation, Brigade headquarters elements and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 326th Artillery headquarters elements motor marched from CHU LAI to DUC PRO utilizing 37 non-organic 2½ ton trucks.

(2) Air: United States Air Force C123, C130, C7A, and Army CH-47 and UH-1D aircraft provided airlift support for the entire operation. A daily C123 shuttle between CHU LAI and DUC PRO was scheduled in direct support of the Brigade. Two airlifts were conducted at the close of the operation on 28 and 29 August 1967 by moving three infantry battalions and three artillery batteries.

(3) Sea: No sea transportation was used during the operation.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration Service was available through the 94th Supply and Service Battalion.

(2) Quartermaster laundry and shower service was available at CHU LAI.
3. (C) Medical:

   a. Hospitalization and Evacuation:

      (1) Hospitalization: All patients requiring Army level medical care were admitted to the 2nd Surgical Hospital. A holding facility collocated with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade dispensary was maintained to treat minor wounds and medical problems.

      (2) Evacuation: Evacuation of patients from the Brigade area of operations was carried out in an effective manner through the support provided by the 498th Air Ambulance Company. All field pickups initially went to the 2d Surgical Hospital for sorting. Those patients not admitted were provided ambulance transportation to the Brigade's holding facility.

   b. Medical Statistics:

      (1) Killed Hostile Action: 11
      (2) Wounded Hostile Action: 251
      (3) Non Battle Injury: 30
      (4) Significant Diseases:

         (a) Gastroenteritis 0
         (b) Upper Respiratory Infection 4
         (c) Neuropsychiatric 3
         (d) Hepatitis 3
         (e) Heat Injury 4
         (f) Dysentery (Amobic) 5
         (g) Malaria 50
         (h) Fever of Unknown Origin 13
         (i) Foot Problems 2
         (j) Dermatitis 1

   c. Logistics: Initial deployment with a twenty day level of supply proved inadequate when fire destroyed the medical supplies of two battalion forward aid stations. Supply was accomplished to the forward supply point from the dispensary located in the Brigade tactical command post area. In further operations, the span of control will be made more efficient by the employment of battalion rear aid station elements.

4. (C) Conclusions:

   a. The present concept of logistical support is valid.

   b. A small emergency resupply of ammunition should be stockpiled in the immediate vicinity of the resupply helipad.

   c. Closer supervision of sized TA50-901 items is required for units to be properly prepared for stand-down periods.
1. (U) Mission: To conduct chemical and ground air assault operations against WC/NVA forces operating in the area of operations and to employ riot control agents to harass and demoralize civilians under VC/NVA influence in conjunction with psychological operations.

2. (C) Operations:

   a. General: Chemical operations conducted during Operation BENTON were smoke operations, M7A3 CS grenade attack, employment of fougasses, and tunnel flushing/denial operations. All operations were conducted by the 20th Chemical Detachment under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer. Details pertinent to each operation are discussed in the following paragraphs.

   b. Smoke Operations/M7A3 Grenade Attack: Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry on 20 August 1967 requested a combined CS and smoke attack be conducted against an estimated reinforced NVA platoon in bunkers and 2-3 man fighting holes with overhead cover vicinity BT185123. The purpose of this strike was to cause the enemy to evacuate their bunkers making them vulnerable to tactical air and artillery and/or decrease their ability to place effective fire on Company B as it maneuvered to engage. Five-hundred and four CS and 378 smoke grenades were utilized. A total of seven passes (4 CS and 3 smoke) were made over the target area in the following manner: Tactical air, then three CS strikes immediately followed by artillery and tactical air again, then three smoke strikes to build a heavy cloud over the objective area, and then a final CS strike followed by Company B assaulting.

   c. Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered an extensive tunnel complex on 27 August 1967 vicinity BT163214. The 20th Chemical Detachment was requested to flush any VC/NVA personnel out of the tunnel and seed the tunnel complex with persistent CS. This was accomplished using 240 pounds of bulk CS.

   d. On 13 August 1967, three fougasse emplacements were employed on the defensive perimeter of the Tactical Command Post, lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

3. (C) Results: CS grenades formed a heavy concentration of Riot Control Agent in the target area. Smoke grenades created a dense cloud throughout the target area. Troops of the supported infantry company reported the enemy fled from his fortified positions from which he had brought heavy machine gun fire on them for two days despite constant air and artillery strikes. The fougasse was not employed against the enemy.

4. (C) Lessons Learned: No new lessons were learned relevant to chemical combat operations; however, the practicality and effectiveness of employing CS against enemy troops in bunkers and camouflaged positions with overhead cover, causing them to flee and thereby exposing themselves to artillery and tactical air, was again proven.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

1. (C) Mission: The Civil Affairs mission was to control and coordinate:
   a. Refugee Movement
   b. Food Extraction
   c. Medical Assistance
   d. Return of Innocent Civilians

2. (C) Concept of Operations: No mass refugee movement was planned for Operation BENTON. The QUANG BIN Province Chief requested that only refugees who volunteered to leave the tactical area of operations be evacuated. Each District headquarters was prepared to accept up to one hundred refugees, with the exception of HAU Duc District. HAU Duc does not have an American advisor, as a result refugees from this District were evacuated to Province headquarters at TAM KY. If large numbers of volunteer refugees were encountered, they would be evacuated directly to Province headquarters. Food caches discovered during the operation were to be evacuated to Province headquarters. Province officials would provide laborers to assist in extraction operations. The area of operations was not considered secure enough to execute MEDCAP operations; however, medical treatment in the field was planned. Innocent civilians would be returned to their respective District headquarters.

3. (C) Execution: The civil affairs mission was executed in four areas:
   a. Refugee Movement

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<th>NUMBER</th>
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</table>

SUB-TOTAL 420 TLN TIN 7 - CH-47

431 TAM KY 2 - CH-47

TOTAL 701

b. Food Extraction: No food caches were extracted during Operation BENTON due to inaccessible extraction sites coupled with heavy ground fighting.

c. Medical Assistance: Medical treatment was given to twenty-two refugees in the area of operations during Operation BENTON. Nine animals received veterinary treatment.

d. Innocent Civilians:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
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</table>

TOTAL 42

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BETTON (U)

4. (C) Total Operation BETTON Statistics:
   a. Refugees Relocated: 701
   b. Food Extracted: None
   c. Persons Medically Treated: 22
   d. Domestic Animals Treated: 9
   e. Innocent Civilians Returned: 43

5. (C) Civil Affairs Analysis: It was observed that population movement and control presents a major problem to QUANG TIN Province. Existing facilities for receiving and caring for refugees need expansion. It was further noted that more government security forces are needed. This would allow Province to capitalize on the impact of tactical operations and begin effective pacification measures over a larger area.
Inclosure 7 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EOCO (U)

1. (U) Mission: The 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communications Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had the joint mission of providing signal support for the Brigade.

2. (C) Operations:
   a. General: The 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communications Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided signal support during Operation EOCO.
   b. FM Radio Section established FM radio communications at CHU LAI for Operation EOCO. Operations consisted of the following Brigade nets:
      (1) Brigade Command
      (2) Operations and Intelligence/Secure
      (3) Administration/Logistics
      (4) Aviation
      (5) General Purpose
      (6) Artillery
      (7) Radio Wire Integration

In addition, the Brigade entered the Task Force OREGON Command Net plus monitoring Battalion Command Nets on order. Communications between the Area of Operations and TAC were initially by AN/PRC-25 at Battalion Tactical Command Posts boosted by one Brigade automatic retransmission relay site. Later, communications were directed between TAC and Battalion Tactical Command Posts utilizing the AN/VRC-46. All nets operated by Brigade were operational 24 hours daily. At CARENTAN Base the Base Security Net and Brigade Command Net were operational 24 hours daily.

   c. VHF Section. Organic VHF equipment was not used. VHF carrier support was provided by 36th Signal Battalion, Task Force OREGON. Twelve VHF circuits were provided to TAC. Of the twelve, four were common user and eight were sole user/teletype circuits. In addition, 36th Signal Battalion provided spiral-four cables from VHF carrier to TAC Forward Supply Point linking communications of TAC and TAC Forward Supply Point with Task Force OREGON circuits on a 24 hour basis.

   d. Switchboard/Wire Section remained operational at CARENTAN Base, with one wire team and one switchboard team dispatched to CHU LAI. A stacked SB-86 switchboard provided 42 circuits at CHU LAI. Fourteen miles of field wire C-1 were installed. All wire was installed underground or overhead.

   e. Communications Center remained operational at CARENTAN Base. One team was sent to install and operate a Communications Center at CHU LAI. It provided 24 hour secure teletype service to Task Force OREGON.

   f. AM Radio Section remained operational at CARENTAN Base. One VSO-2 was operational 24 hours daily vicinity TAC Forward Supply Point. The net consisted of stations located at TAC Forward Supply Point, Forward Supply Point, and Rear Supply Point.

   g. Maintenance Section remained operational at CARENTAN Base. One maintenance team was sent to CHU LAI to provide maintenance support for the Brigade.
1. (U) Missions: To assist the ground commander in the accomplishment of his tactical mission by issuing instructions to the population and by decreasing the combat effectiveness of VC and NVA units by exploiting the psychological vulnerabilities of the VC and NVA.

2. (U) General: During Operation BENTON 3,510,000 leaflets were distributed and seventeen hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made. The themes utilized were:
   a. Population control
   b. VC/NVA Demoralization
   c. Chieu Hoi
   d. National Safe Conduct Passes

3. (U) Special Projects: During the course of Operation BENTON, the Brigade TC CP conducted an overland displacement from CHU LAI to DUC PHO. During the conduct of the road movement, a prerecorded tape was played explaining the benefits which accrue to the Vietnamese people by virtue of the GVN having reopened Highway 1.

4. (C) Results: During the month of August 1967, 54 Hoi Chanh turned themselves over to government control in QU'NG TIN Province as opposed to no Hoi Chanh's for the month of July.

5. (C) Conclusions: The results achieved in Operation BENTON indicate that Brigade combat operations have a marked effect on the number of Hoi Chanh rallying to GVN agencies.
1. (U) Missions: To provide direct and general combat engineer support to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Concept of Operations: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) placed one platoon in direct support of all maneuver battalions. The remainder of the company provided general engineer support and water supply to elements of the Brigade located at CHU LAI and at DUC PHO. Landing zone clearing/demolition teams also supported each Mike Force Company in support of the Brigade.

3. (C) Execution:

a. The platoon in direct support of the maneuver battalions cleared twelve helicopter landing zones, destroyed 394 large caliber rounds and 242 chicom hand grenades, cleared and destroyed thirteen mines, built four bunkers, destroyed one tunnel complex and acted as infantry when required.

b. A water point was operated at CHU LAI and at DUC PHO. Other elements of the company swept roads for mines and accomplished explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) missions around CARENTAN Base at DUC PHO.

4. (U) Lessons Learned: None
1. **Mission:** The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery C, 3rd Battalion (Towed), 16th Artillery was placed under operational control (CPCON) of 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery and provided reinforcing fires.

2. **Summary of Operations:**
   
a. In the conduct of Operation BENTON, the same techniques of artillery employment that have proven successful in the past were employed. Although the radar was not employed in the area of operations, it was moved from DUC PHOBAC to CHULAI base on 16 August 1967 and was placed OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 82nd Artillery for a period of seven days. The radar section also furnished a team of three personnel to assist the 3d Battalion, 82nd Artillery section and to instruct them in registration, survey and detection techniques employed by the 1st Brigade Countermortar Radar Section.

b. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery was placed OPCON to the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery by Task Force OREGON on 11 August 1967. This battery was given the mission of reinforcing the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery. When Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery became non-operational because of damaged equipment resulting from a fire on 13 August 1967, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, assumed the mission of Battery B until reconstitution was complete on 16 August 1967.

c. An additional forward observer requirement was imposed on the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, with the attachment of two Mike Force companies to the Brigade. This requirement exceeded the organic capability of the battalion; however, additional forward observer parties were formed and provided to the two companies by using personnel from organic sections and battalion headquarters. Moreover, an additional liaison section was formed and collocated with Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. The section's mission was to coordinate aircraft control and artillery fire at the TIEN PHUOC airfield and also to affect coordination with the adjacent Special Forces camp and the Marine Artillery (105mm Howitzer Battery) located within the compound. During the first three days of the operation an ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery was located at the camp and the liaison section was responsible for the coordination of all fires affecting the air traffic control pattern at TIEN PHUOC.

d. During the initial phase of the operation, communication problems were encountered because of the distances between battalion operations at CHULAI and the fire direction centers of Battery A and Battery B. This problem was solved by collocating an automatic retransmission station with Battery C.

e. On the afternoon of 13 August 1967 a grass fire ignited by an unknown source burned over the firing position of Battery B and the tactical command post of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Exploding ammunition forced evacuation of the position and precluded movement of howitzers and equipment. The unit was under enemy mortar and small arms fire throughout the night. On the afternoon of 14 August 1967 all personnel
and howitzers were extracted by CH-47 and taken to CHU LAI. Although there were no major casualties as a result of the fire, nine personnel were evacuated for wounds received from enemy fire. Emergency requisitions were submitted for essential items of equipment and on 15 August 1967 four operational howitzers, less section equipment, were issued to the unit. Fire direction equipment, tentage and section equipment were provided from battalion resources, and minimum essential communications equipment was obtained by the Brigade Signal Officer. Two howitzers reclaimed from the fire were test fired and found to be serviceable. The battery with six operational howitzers was inserted into the operational area on 16 August 1967. Excellent cooperation and rapid action on the part of all personnel in the supply chain resulted in the minimum downtime for this unit.

3. (C) Execution:

a. A/2-320 displacements:

   (1) On 150730 Aug, A Btry displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 175078. Unit closed 1500 hours. Priority of fires to 1-327 Infantry.

   (2) On 290830 Aug, A Btry displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 552055. Unit closed 1100 hours. Further displaced by air (C-130) to CAF.UTAN Base Camp vicinity BS 84063715. Unit closed 1600 hours and started preparation for future operation.

b. B/2-320 displacements:

   (1) On 130730 Aug, B Btry displaced by air to BT 173114. Unit closed 1200 hours. Priority of fires to 2-327 Infantry.

   (2) On 141330 Aug, B Btry was extracted due to fire at the battery position. Unit closed CHU LAI Base Camp area at 1600 hours.

   (3) On 161000 Aug, B Btry displaced by air to BT 125109. Unit closed 1445 hours. Priority of fires to 2-327 Infantry.

   (4) On 280800 Aug, B Btry displaced by air to BT 552055. Unit closed 1430 hours. Further displaced by air to CAF.UTAN Base Camp vicinity BT 84063700. Unit closed 1835 hours. Unit started preparation for future operation.

c. C/2-320 displacements:

   (1) On 131230 Aug, C Btry displaced by air to BT 23851409. Unit closed 1700 hours. Priority of fires to 2-502 Infantry.

   (2) On 291000 Aug, C Btry displaced by air to BT 552055. Unit closed 1400 hours. Further displaced by air to CAF.UTAN Base Camp vicinity BS 84063715. Unit closed 1720 hours. Started preparation for future operations.

d. TAC 2-320 displacements:

   (1) On 100930 Aug, TAC displaced overland to CHU LAI Base Camp vicinity 575028. Unit closed 1130 hours. Mission to support Operation EUPHON.

   (2) On 291300 Aug, TAC commenced displacing overland to DUC PHQ. Unable to make river crossing at BS 695636, it returned to QUANG NGAI Airfield vicinity BS 604721. Closed 1820 hours.

   (3) On 301000 Aug, TAC displaced overland to CAF.UTAN Base Camp at BS 84063711. Unit closed 1530 hours.
a. Radar Section 2-320 displacements:

(1) On 160800 Aug, Radar displaced by air to BT 515041. Unit closed 0915 hours. Became OPCON to 3-82 Artillery, with the mission of providing countermortar defense to the CHU LAI Airbase complex during the period that the 3-82 radar was inoperational.

(2) On 220900 Aug, Radar terminated OPCON to 3-82 Artillery. Displaced by air to BS 870331. Unit closed and operational 221030 hours. Mission defense of CARENTAN Base Camp.

4. (U) Results:

a. 4 VC KBA (C)
b. 2 VC KBA (P)

5. (U) Recap of Missions Fired:

a. Number of missions fired:
   (1) 105: 559
   (2) 155: 376

b. Total rounds expended:
   (1) 105: 8792
   (2) 155: 4819

6. (U) Administrative Matters: N/A

7. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques: The M18 Field Artillery Data Computer was issued to the battalion, basis of issue being one per firing unit and one to battalion FDC. Issue was made at the completion of a five day course conducted by a New Equipment Training Team. The computers were programmed by the battalion technician and will be issued prior to the next operation. Each unit has two trained operator personnel and two personnel in the battalion communications section were qualified as maintenance technicians.

8. (U) Commander's Analysis: Attempts to fight the fire which ravaged the B Battery firing position on 13 August 1967 were severely hampered by the extremely tall (8-10 feet) vegetation on the landing zone. Therefore, the practice was later initiated during Operation BENTON, of intentionally starting fires during the artillery and air preparations with white phosphorus and/or napalm, particularly when the landing zone was covered with tall grass. This practice has considerably reduced the hazards associated with fire during subsequent operations. Additionally, this procedure assists in detonating any booby trapped ordinance placed on the landing zone by the enemy.
Inclosure II (Small Unit Actions) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

The following is a chronological list of all small unit actions and intelligence reported during Operation BENTON. The list does not include significant small unit contacts described in the basic Combat Operations After Action Report.

1. 13 August 1967:
   a. 131000 Aug 67: Command and Control helicopter of the Brigade Commander was hit two times by enemy small arms fire near BT132074 resulting in 1 WIA (minor).
   b. 131400 Aug 67: Command and Control helicopter of the Brigade Commander near BT173115 was hit two times by enemy small arms fire resulting in minor damage to the helicopter.

2. 14 August 1967:
   a. 140815 Aug 67: TAC CP/2-327 Inf vicinity BT173115 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA (medevac).
   b. 140900 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT231133 engaged snipers in a hut resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 3 detainees.
   c. 140925 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT221137 engaged 2 enemy (1 with weapon) resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   d. 141015 Aug 67: Command and Control helicopter/2-502 Inf vicinity BT212113 engaged 1 enemy wearing a khaki uniform resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   e. 141100 Aug 67: Command and Control helicopter of the Brigade Deputy Commanding Officer was hit by one small arm round resulting in 1 WHA (medevac) and minor damage to the helicopter.
   f. 141104 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT201120 engaged 2 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 AK-47 and 1 carbine captured.
   g. 141140 Aug 67: Rec/2-327 Inf vicinity BT174114 found 2 NV resulting in 2 NV KIA (C) and 1 mosin-nagant rifle captured.
   h. 141320 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT135113 engaged an estimated enemy squad resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured.
   i. 141330 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT208090 found 1 VC killed by artillery.
   j. 141330 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT201117 engaged 1 enemy carrying a weapon resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 carbine captured.
   k. 141634 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT221139 received automatic weapon fire resulting in 1 WIA (medevac).
   l. 141835 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT220133 engaged 4 enemy with rucksacks resulting in 4 VC KIA (C).

3. 15 August 1967:
   a. 150909 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT204111 received sniper and automatic weapons fire resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA (medevac).
   b. 151200 Aug 67: E/1-327 Inf vicinity BT205147 apprehended 33 detainees.
   c. 151500 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT216137 received sniper fire from several different directions resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
Inclosure 11 (Small Unit Actions) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

d. 151635 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT207111 received automatic weapons fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 150 home made grenades captured. A search of 2 huts found material to make 100 more grenades and 10 rucksacks.

e. 151002 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT165077 found and extracted 3 tons of rice.

f. 151802 Aug 67: Rcn/l-327 Inf vicinity BT165076 found 4 tons of tea and 1 ton of rice. The rice was destroyed and the tea extracted.

g. 151830 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT219136 engaged 2 enemy with rucksacks resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 Chicom grenade captured.

4. 16 August 1967:

a. 160730 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT206110 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.

b. 160740 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT154104 engaged an estimated 15 VC in fortified positions. The company employed air strikes, artillery and gunships resulting in 1 WIA (medevac), 5 VC KIA (C) and 1 shotgun, 1 mauser and 1 Chicom grenade captured.

c. 160830 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT18130 found and destroyed 1 ton of rice.

d. 160840 Aug 67: Rcn/l-327 Inf vicinity BT166073 apprehended 2 detainees.

4. 161000 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT194140 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WIA (medevac).

f. 161135 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT228123 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 grenade captured.

g. 161225 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT192142 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WIA (medevac).

h. 161323 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT230117 found and destroyed 700 pounds of rice.

i. 161425 Aug 67: Rcn/l-327 Inf vicinity BT170072 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 SKS captured.

j. 161430 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT233121 engaged sniper resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

k. 161505 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT183144 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

l. 161323 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT230117 found and destroyed 700 pounds of rice.

m. 161325 Aug 67: 176th Aviation gunship vicinity BT164103 received fire resulting in 1 WIA (medevac).

n. 161350 Aug 67: A/2-327 Cav vicinity BS857358 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 grenade captured.

o. 161600 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT166103 engaged an estimated squad size enemy force resulting in 7 VC KIA (C) and 1 small arm weapon captured.

p. 161645 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT230120 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WIA (medevac).
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q. 161700 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT195047 engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

r. 161730 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT206111 found a weapons cache in a hut and cave containing 59 small arms weapons, 5 crew-served weapons, 2 82mm mortar sights, 3 82mm mortar rounds and assorted small arms ammunition. All were extracted.

s. 161932 Aug 67: Mike Force/1-327 Inf vicinity BT133068 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA (minor).

t. 162030 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT171071 apprehended 1 male of military age resulting in 1 detainee.

u. 162040 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT229125 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 clip of M-1 ammunition captured.

v. 162250 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT192144 received 6 incoming 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 KHA and 9 WHA (6 medevac and 3 minor).

5. 17 August 1967:

a. 170001 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT150106 observed 12 82mm mortars rounds being fired on old defensive positions the company had occupied the previous night.

b. 170145 Aug 67: A/2-17 Cav vicinity BT871362 apprehended 7 detainees unloading a junk. A swift boat took the junk in tow.

c. 170340 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT170072 apprehended 2 detainees.

d. 170900 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT196097 found a hospital complex, 10 tons of rice and 1 ton of salt. All were destroyed.

e. 170930 Aug 67: Rcn/1-327 Inf vicinity BT170088 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

f. 170950 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT165065 engaged an unknown size VC force resulting in 1 US KHA, 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 SKS captured.

g. 171000 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT231120 engaged 2 snipers with TAC Air resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

h. 171150 Aug 67: Rcn/1-327 Inf vicinity BT178068 engaged 2 enemy wearing khaki uniforms resulting in 2 NVA KIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.

i. 171215 Aug 67: Utility aircraft (176th Avn Co)/2-327 Inf vicinity BT192145 received 2 small arms hits resulting in 1 US KHA (medevac) and minor damage to the aircraft.

j. 171230 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT231120 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

k. 171340 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT202101 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.

l. 171400 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT202101 found and destroyed an ammunition cache consisting of 100 82mm mortar rounds, 24 60mm mortar rounds, 3 81mm mortar rounds, 47 76mm recoilless rifle rounds, 3 unidentified chicom rocket rounds, and large amounts of miscellaneous small arms ammunition. One M-1, 1 mosin-nagant and 3 SKS were captured.

m. 171435 Aug 67: Rcn/2-327 Inf vicinity PT26116 had 3 US WHA (medevac) when 1 individual stepped on a landmine.

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n. 171500 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT202101 found a medical supply cache consisting of 9 bundles of gauze, 500 bottles of penicillin, 2 bundles of syringes and numerous scissors, tweezers and other instruments. All items were extracted.

o. 171526 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT176114 engaged 2 enemy resulting 1 US WHA (minor) and 1 VC KIA (C).

p. 171535 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT161109 engaged 1 enemy resulting 1 detainee.

q. 171609 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT164103 engaged 2 enemy resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

r. 171650 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT157104 found 1 enemy body approximately 1 day old.

s. 171800 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT196066 found a weapons cache in a hut consisting of 2 MAT 49 submachine guns, 1 BAR, 1 carbine, 19 82mm mortar rounds, 2 chicom rocket rounds, 2 home made bombs, 2 cans of Composition "B" and small arms ammunition.

t. 171910 Aug 67: Rcn/l-327 Inf vicinity BT157074 apprehended 9 detainees.

u. 171945 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT164203 apprehended 1 VC who attempted to escape resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

v. 172100 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT221119 apprehended 1 detainee.

6. 18 August 1967:

a. 180730 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT164056 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

b. 180815 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT248123 engaged an estimated enemy squad resulting in 1 WHA (medevac).

c. 180845 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT164098 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

d. 181120 Aug 67: TAC CP/2-502 Inf vicinity BT238145 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

e. 181130 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT164094 engaged 1 VC in tunnel resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

f. 181150 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT255123 found 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 .45 caliber pistol captured.

g. 181205 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT193095 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

h. 181215 Aug 67: Utility Aircraft (176 Avn Co)2-327 Inf vicinity BT178138 received fire resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

i. 181230 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT150058 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US WHA, 1 WHA (medevac) and 4 VC KIA (C).

j. 181235 Aug 67: F/1-327 Inf vicinity BT195067 contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 WHA (medevac).

k. 181245 Aug 67: F/1-327 Inf vicinity BT195067 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
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1. 181303 Aug 67: Recon/2-502 Inf vicinity BT299151 engaged 2 snipers resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

2. 181505 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT234116 engaged 1 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

3. 181625 Aug 67: B/2-327 Inf vicinity BT144123 had 1 US WHA (medevac) when individual stepped on a landmine.

4. 181630 Aug 67: B/2-327 Inf vicinity BT124116 engaged 1 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

5. 181730 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT185138 engaged 1 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

6. 182400 Aug 67: C/I.-327 Inf vicinity BT166040 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

7. 19 August 1967:
   a. 190750 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT232113 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   b. 190835 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT186093 found 1 VC body in a grave.
   c. 190930 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT167037 engaged 2 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.
   d. 191040 Aug 67: Utility Aircraft (176 Avn Co)/2-502 Inf received several small arms hits requiring moderate maintenance.
   e. 191212 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT160011 received ground fire while approaching an LZ resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).
   f. 191225 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT120011 engaged 3 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.
   g. 191257 Aug 67: B/2-327 Inf vicinity BT161013 apprehended 2 detainees.
   h. 191320 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT169014 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   i. 191345 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT166052 found and extracted 12 tons of rice.
   j. 191400 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT202104 engaged 1 enemy wearing khaki uniform resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   k. 191400 Aug 67: B/2-327 Inf vicinity BT163014 engaged 1 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   l. 191510 Aug 67: Recon/2-327 Inf vicinity BT116112 engaged 4 enemy resulting in 4 detainees.
   m. 191520 Aug 67: Command and Control Helicopter/2-327 Inf vicinity BT135009 engaged 1 enemy with door gunners resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
   n. 191520 Aug 67: Recon/2-327 Inf vicinity BT141008 had 1 US KIA when individual stepped on a landmine.
   o. 191547 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT164044 engaged 1 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).
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p. 191550 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT165043 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

q. 191615 Aug 67: E/1-327 Inf vicinity BT195065 found 1 SKS in the vicinity of the previous day's contact.

r. 191620 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT160016 apprehended 2 detainees.

s. 191650 Aug 67: Recon/2-502 Inf vicinity BT35159 received automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

t. 191700 Aug 67: Command and Control Helicopter/2-502 Inf vicinity BT190098 received ground fire resulting in minor damage to the helicopter.

8. 20 August 1967:

a. 200920 Aug 67: Mike Force/2-502 Inf vicinity BT204138 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 4 grenades captured.

b. 201230 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT182102 engaged an estimated enemy platoon in fortified bunkers resulting in 5 US WHA (medevac).

c. 201240 Aug 67: Recon/1-327 Inf vicinity BT182038 engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (C), 1 M-1 and 1 French rifle captured.

d. 201410 Aug 67: P/2-502 Inf vicinity BT190098 found 9 bodies in an area of the previous day's contact.

e. 201700 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT173049 found an enemy base camp consisting of tunnels, bunkers and 23 barracks. Three enemy were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA (C), 1 AK-50 and 1 SKS captured.

9. 21 August 1967:

a. 210725 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT226103 triggered a mine resulting in 2 US WHA (medevac).

b. 210800 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT172049 found 1 NVA in a grave.

c. 211015 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT200105 apprehended 1 detainee and captured 1 AK-47.

d. 211030 Aug 67: Recon/1-327 Inf vicinity BT34683 found 1 VC in a grave and apprehended 1 detainee.

e. 211035 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT172049 found 1 VC in a grave.

f. 211210 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT214103 engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 3 mosin-nagent carbines captured.

g. 211220 Aug 67: P/1-327 Inf vicinity BT195059 engaged 2 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.

h. 211230 Aug 67: Recon/1-327 Inf vicinity BT176082 killed 1 detainee who attempted to escape.

i. 211330 Aug 67: P/1-327 Inf vicinity BT200055 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

j. 211330 Aug 67: Recon/2-502 Inf vicinity BT250147 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.

k. 211500 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT171052 found a grave with 2 VC.
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1. 211545 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT191106 received fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 US WHA (medevac).

m. 211600 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT187077 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

n. 211630 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT185108 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 WHA (medevac), and 9 VC KIA (C).

o. 211700 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT173047 found 5 graves with 5 VC.

p. 211735 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT202055 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

q. 211755 Aug 67: A/2-3 & Inf vicinity BT181015 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

r. 211801 Aug 67: Command and Control Helicopter/1-327 Inf vicinity BT182079 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C).

e. 211930 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT223093 engaged 1 VC in a cave resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

10. 22 August 1967:

a. 220930 Aug 67: LRSP/2-502 Inf vicinity BT156134 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

b. 220940 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT177099 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 US KHA, 3 NVA (medevac), and 7 VC captured.

c. 221115 Aug 67: Command and Control Helicopter/1-327 Inf vicinity BT160103 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 UH-1D destroyed.

d. 221215 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT200057 apprehended 4 detainees.

e. 221220 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT170072 found 3 enemy bodies and apprehended 5 detainees of military age all of whom had been wounded by artillery.

f. 221440 Aug 67: A/2-17 Cav vicinity BS577358 apprehended 1 detainee.

g. 221550 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT165089 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

h. 221648 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT21095 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

i. 221752 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT183026 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 SKS captured.

j. 221755 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT21106 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

k. 221756 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT228156 engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 mauser with scope captured.

l. 221820 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT186107 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

m. 221915 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT158035 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

n. 222010 Aug 67: A/2-3 & Inf vicinity BT182100 ambushed 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).
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11. 23 August 1967:

a. 230805 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT178101 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WHA (medevac).

b. 230840 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT183022 engaged an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 4 US WHA (medevac), 3 NVA KIA (C), and 1 SKS and 1 RPG machinegun captured.

c. 230855 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT183107 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 US WHA (minor), 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 mosin-nagant captured.

d. 230915 Aug 67: A/2-17 Cav vicinity BS869354 apprehended 1 detainee.

e. 230930 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT159038 found and destroyed 1 ton of rice.

f. 231145 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT162032 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

g. 231220 Aug 67: FAC/2-327 Inf vicinity BT183055 observed 1 body in an airstrike area resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

h. 231258 - 231945 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT190054 engaged snipers and an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA, 4 WHA (medevac), 12 VC KIA (C) and 2 SKS and 4 AK-47 captured.

i. 231410 Aug 67: C/1-327 Inf vicinity BT172029 found and destroyed a base camp consisting of 30 buildings and numerous defensive positions.

j. 231416 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT185054 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 WHA (medevac).

k. 231445 Aug 67: FAC/1-327 Inf vicinity BT162074 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

l. 231715 Aug 67: Mike Force/2-502 Inf vicinity BT177068 found and destroyed 1 ton of rice.

m. 231730 Aug 67: Mike Force/1-327 Inf vicinity BT177059 found and destroyed 1 ton of rice and 400 pounds of salt.

n. 231830 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT177088 found and destroyed a VC killed by mine.

o. 232035 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT181105 had their perimeter probed with grenades and small arms resulting in 4 US WHA (medevac).

p. 232045 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT190030 engaged 20-25 VC resulting in 1 US KIA.

q. 232214 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT11075 apprehended 2 detainees.

12. 24 August 1967:

a. 240810 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT190030 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

b. 240830 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT190054 found 4 VC bodies killed in the previous day's contact.

c. 240831 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT190041 found 1 VC killed by a claymore mine.

d. 241023 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT190054 found 2 VC killed in the previous day's contact and captured 1 CaRe15.

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e. 241255 Aug 67: Mike Force/2-502 Inf vicinity BT93123 found and destroyed 1 ton of rice.

f. 241310 Aug 67: Mike Force/1-327 Inf vicinity BT181063 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 SF WIA (minor), 1 VC KIA (C), and 1 AK-47 captured.

g. 241320 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT191044 found 1 WIA in a grave.

h. 241355 Aug 67: TAC CP/1-327 Inf vicinity BT71077 apprehended 1 detainee.

i. 241440 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT70954 found 1 dead VC killed by an airstrike and 1 SKS.

j. 241545 Aug 67: Recon/2-327 Inf vicinity BT75089 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.

k. 241730 Aug 67: TAC B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT238142 received 3-5 rounds sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA (medevac).

l. 25 August 1967:

a. 250912 Aug 67: G/1-327 Inf vicinity BT92035 found 1 WIA in a grave.

b. 251125 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT86116 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

c. 251230 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT83103 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA (medevac).

d. 251325 Aug 67: B/2-502 Inf vicinity BT83103 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA.

e. 251400 Aug 67: Recon/1-327 Inf vicinity BT185078 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.

f. 251420 Aug 67: A/2-327 Inf vicinity BT320003 was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 WIA (medevac).

g. 251630 Aug 67: A/2-17 Cav vicinity 381354 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.

h. 251740 Aug 67: Utility Helicopter/2-502 Inf vicinity BT201099 received ground fire and was forced down resulting in 1 US WIA (medevac) from the 176th avn Co.

l. 26 August 1967:

a. 260929 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT69107 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 SKS captured.

b. 260950 Aug 67: Recon/1-327 Inf vicinity BT85072 apprehended 2 detainees.

c. 261008 Aug 67: A/1-327 Inf vicinity BT83065 found graves containing 5 VC.

d. 261350 Aug 67: Recon/2-502 Inf vicinity BT239160 engaged an estimated 30 enemy in mixed uniforms resulting in 1 VC WIA (medevac).

e. 261559 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf vicinity BT83104 found 2 dead VC in a tunnel and 2 SKS.