<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD385754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 1979, DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION GATLING I & GATLING II
1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS AND WARRIORS

D D C

RECEIVED

DEC 1. 4 1967

ACSFOR-RD File
67X028

CONFIDENTIAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVPDC
March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/ORE/13/67)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation GATLING I/GATLING II.

   GATLING II: 5 February - 15 February 1967.

3. (U) Location: GATLING I: LAM DONG Province
   GATLING II: BINH TUY and BINH THUAN Province.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General S. W. Matheson, 1st
   Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization: The task organization of the Brigade minus
   at the initiation of Operation GATLING I is shown below. Significant
   changes to this organization for the conduct of GATLING II were the
   loss of 200th of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group on 1 February and
   the addition of 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, minus, which came under the
   operational control of the Brigade from 5 February to 15 February 1967.

   1/327 Inf
   1 Engr Plat
   2/502 Inf
   1 Engr Plat
   2/300 Arty (-)
   B/30 Arty (-)
   Co B, 5th .50
   5 Co's, Mike Force
   2 Co's, CIDG

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
   a. 2/320 Arty (-): Employed in a direct support role.
   b. B/30 Arty (-): Provided general support reinforcing fires.
   c. 17th Avn Op: Provided four light airborne companies in general
      support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support, and resupply
      missions.
   d. 179th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company: Provided

CONFIDENTIAL

AO/298-C-67
CONFIDENTIAL

AIDOC

March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II

CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery batteries.

e. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for FAV War operations.

f. 7th Air Compagny: Flew 12 tactical air missions totaling 30 sorties. Seven of those missions were pre-planned and five were immediate. The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the average response time from the initiation of the requests until time-over target was 25 minutes. All targets were suspected VC base areas and airstrikes resulted in 85% ordnance on target, and 55% target area coverage. Twenty structures and two bunkers were destroyed and one secondary fire was reported. In addition the Air Force CL 102 pickups carried, and 7 reconnaissance missions in direct support of the Brigade. 80 sorties were flown by FACs in forward air control, artillery fire and visual reconnaissance missions.

g. 11th Air Det: Provided general support and maintained BAO LOC Airfield.

h. 54th Sig Bn: Provided general support.

1. 508th Mod Det (Airmobile): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Enclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, 1 Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct a raid type operation against a suspected high level political meeting of Headquarters Military Region VI; vic TAN Dinh, Y99055, to capture key personnel, documents and equipment, and to be prepared for subsequent offensive operations against the suspected location of Headquarters, Military Region VI vic T1201.03.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: GATLING I consisted of a raid by the Brigade minus one battalion, reinforced with five Mike Force and two CIDG companies, against the suspected meeting place of Headquarters Military Region VI vic TAN Dinh, Y99055. Following a B-52 strike against the objective area, the Mike Force and CIDG companies, under the control of 5 C, 5th Special Forces Group, blocked routes of egress to the north and west while the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to exploit the B-52 strike from the south and east. GATLING II consisted of a planned two battalion raid following B-52 strikes against the suspected location of Headquarters Military Region VI vic T1201.03, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault north and west of suspected enemy locations and 2d Army, 7th Cavalry (-) assaulted by helicopter and overland movement from the south and southeast. 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was kept on airstrip alert at BAO LOC to exploit the situation as it developed.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operations GATLING I and GATLING II were characterized by the large scale employment of helicopters to initially position maneuver elements so as to rapidly exploit B-52 strikes. Detailed search operations were conducted in and adjacent to B-52 strike areas and although contact throughout both operations was relatively light, several large caches and base area complexes were discovered and destroyed. The terrain in the Area of Operations was characterized by moderately thick hardwood forest and relatively light undergrowth.

b. On 30 and 31 July, only six days after the initiation of Operation...
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation CATINGO I and II

1. PARRAGHT, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry extracted from field locations in the PARRAGHT AO and began preparations in PHAN RANG for deployment on Operation CATINGO I. In an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the Brigade's true intentions, a cover plan was published indicating that the Brigade was to reinforce the BMD AO by deploying assault elements of two infantry battalions to PHAN THIET. To further enhance deception no advance preparation was made at BAO LOC to receive or supply the Brigade and all planning and coordination for operations in the CATINGO I AO was accomplished under a Top Secret security classification. Personal liaison was substituted whenever possible for written messages. On 31 January assault elements of 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry deployed by C-130 aircraft to PHAN THIET. This move served to position units of the Brigade for the raid and to enhance the credibility of the deception plan.

2. In February, the Brigade minus 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced Operation CATINGO I in LAM DINH Province northwest of BAO LOC by conducting an airborne raid following a B-52 strike on a suspected high level enemy conference near TAM DIKHU, T9395665. B Company, 5th Special Forces Group became OPCOM to the Brigade at that time. At 0100H, Company B, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault from PHAN THIET into LZ MINAY (a distance of approximately 90 km) while the battalion minus closed BAO LOC via C-130 aircraft from PHAN RANG and conducted airmobile assault into LZ MAU Y. (see Inclosure 2, Tab A). All elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry closed into the AO by 011300H and had begun movement north on multiple axes to block routes of egress out of the objective area. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry initiated airmobile assaults from PHAN THIET at 010910H with a task force consisting of Company A, Company B and HHC (-). Company C and the remainder of HHC arriving by C-130, conducted an airmobile assault from BAO LOC and by 011300H the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had completed the block and had begun moving west on multiple axes. The Mike Force controlled by Company B, 5th Special Forces Group completed its airmobile assault from TAM DIKHU and blocked routes of egress to the north and west. The Brigade CP assumed control of the operation from BAO LOC at 011300H. The operation of the CP was complicated by the temporary loss of a C-130 load of personnel and equipment. One company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry became OPCOM to the Brigade at 011300H. It arrived in BAO LOC by C-130 aircraft and assumed the mission of the Immediate Action Force. To preclude compromise of the Brigade's plan, logistics build-up in the BAO LOC area was prohibited prior to initiation of the assault. All elements assaulted with sufficient Class I, III, and V supplies for a three day period. A complicating feature of the operation was the necessity of flying in helicopter fuel after the air assault phase had begun. C-130 aircraft landed with bladders of fuel at the old BAO LOC dirt strip while less than 2,000 meters away C-130s were bringing in troops and equipment and helicopters were being loaded for the assault. Despite stringent security measures imposed on the Brigade, engineer, airfield control, and logistics personnel at BAO LOC appeared generally well informed. The precise air move into the BAO LOC area was apparent from the amount of traffic broadcast in the clear on the Combat Center Flight Following net starting approximately 010730 Hrs. During the period 1-2 February 3/327 Infantry, 2/502d Infantry and attached units conducted a thorough search of the objective area with negative results. No evidence was found that would substantiate the presence of an enemy headquarters in the area. 1/327 Infantry began extraction from the CATINGO I AO 011300H Feb and by 011530H the battalion closed at new BAO LOC airstrip. On 2 Feb a Mike Force Company tripped a booby trapped artillery round resulting in L WP KIA (Artillery party), 2 CIDT KIA, and 10 CIDT WIA. US Special Forces and Mike Force elements incurred additional casualties when one of two snipers fired at helicopters taking off from LZ PEG. 2/502d Infantry extracted from the AO and closed new BAO LOC airstrip 011300H on 2 Feb. Mike Force and CIDT terminated operations and OPCOM station 014000H on 2 Feb.

J

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVRO-C: Combat Operations: After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MAG/RC/3/12/3) (9)

d. Operation GATLING II commenced in BINH TUY Province, NW of
PHAN THIET on 05/60/67 with 2/502 Inf and 2/7 Cav (-) following B-52
strikes on suspected locations of Headquarters, Military Region VI. 2/502
Inf conducted airborne assault from BAO LOC to selected LZ's in zone,
closing at 05060/67. 2/502 Inf and 2/7 Cav commenced search and destroy operations in zone.
2/7 Cav (-) became OPCON to 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div 05/60/67 and
conducted airborne assaults from BAO LOC and PHAN THIET to LZ LUCKY STRIKE
with two companies closing 05090/67. 2/502 Inf moved overhead from the 2285 AO to block enemy withdrawal to the east. On
6 Feb 67, 1/327 Infantry was committed into the AO and conducted airborne
assaults from BAO LOC to selected LZ's, closing at 05090/67. The Brigade
Main CP displaced from PHAN THIET to Phan Rang and assumed control of the
operation at 06000/67. During the period 5 Feb - 6 Feb all units conducted
search and destroy operations in zone. While contact in the AO was
light, several large rice caches, base camp areas, and communications equipment
and documents were discovered and destroyed, or evacuated for intelligence
exploitation. At 05070/67 the Brigade terminated offensive operations in
observance of the TET cease fire. All units assumed a defensive posture astride
known or suspected enemy lines of communications and conducted vigorous reconnoitering to
minimize VC/NIW military exploitation of the TET stand-down. During the TET stand-down period which lasted through 12070/67, 16 separate VC/NIW initiated contacts were made within the GATLING AO. One
such contact on 10 Feb resulted in the discovery of a PCN camp and the liberation
of 16 POW's. Aggressive search and destroy operations were resumed on 12 Feb
by all elements and continued through 15 Feb. On 15 Feb search and destroy
operations were terminated and all elements were extracted from the AO to
PHAN THIET. 2/7 Cav (-) was released from OPCON and effective 15070/67
Operation GATLING II was terminated.

12. (a) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission
of conducting raids on suspected high level meeting sites and locations of
Headquarters, Military Region VI.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the
operations:

(i) GATLING I: 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 SA captured and 1 ton of rice
destroyed.

(ii) GATLING II: 25 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC; 19 detainees; 17 SA, 4
tons rice captured; 392 tons rice destroyed.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows:

(i) GATLING I: 1 US KIA, 2 GVN KIA, 3 US WIA, 11 GVN WIA.

(ii) GATLING II: 1 US KIA, 18 US WIA.

NOTE: All friendly losses during GATLING I were sustained
by units OPCON to the Brigade.

13. (a) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 3, Personnel and
Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: See Inclosure 6, Civil Affairs.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/R/JS/G/2/32) (U)

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: Timely receipt of the B-52 strike "bombs complete" signal was delayed in Operation GATLING I. Due to the lack of adequate communications facilities at BAO LOC, during Operation GATLING I, adequate communication facilities were established at BAO LOC, PHAN THIET and PHAN RANG and all stations were in contact with a relay aircraft observing the B-52 strike. Utilizing this technique, the "bombs complete" signal was received and disseminated with minimum delay. Timely receipt of the "bombs complete" signal during GATLING II permitted successful employment of several close air support sorties immediately following the B-52 strike.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Exploitation of B-52 strikes should be made as soon as possible to seal the area and fix the enemy. Whenever possible, the area should be sealed prior to the air strike and a reaction force utilized to enter the target area immediately after receipt of "bombs complete".

(2) A low-level LZ reconnaissance should be accomplished by the mission commander prior to the arrival of the troop lift to determine the exact characteristics of the LZ. Should it be found that the helicopters cannot land and that troops must exit from a "hover" position, troops should be forewarned in order to preclude injury or unnecessary delays.

(3) Villages marked "destroyed" or "abandoned" on maps should be entered carefully and searched methodically. Many such villages still support habitation and several large caches were found adjacent to or in these villages during GATLING II.

(b) A continuing training program is essential to keep up with the turn-over in personnel as well as to train the veteran trooper. In particular, constant training emphasis must be placed on marksmanship and the techniques of identifying, avoiding, and destroying booby traps.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Stringent security requirements in the operations field are not being matched in the logistics and air traffic control field. Every effort must be made to preclude providing the enemy with evidence of our intentions.

(2) The role of the sniper in search and destroy operations must receive greater emphasis. Numerous reports are received of enemy sightings at ranges of 300-500 meters with negative results. A well-trained sniper with the proper equipment should consistently score kills at that range. Units should habitually employ snipers.

(3) A security classification of Top Secret on an operation of this type with a short time for planning, unduly restricts the unit and creates administrative problems. Secret NOFORN should be adequate classification for this type operation.

16. (C) Recommendations: That during the assault phase of operations requiring exploitation of B-52 strikes or when a tactical advantage can be gained by placing maximum troops on the ground as rapidly as possible, the Brigade's
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II

Normal aviation support of two light airborne companies be supplemented by
at least one additional light airborne company.

Inclosures:
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operation Schematics
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Communications
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Psy War
8 - Artillery

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT,
Dept of the Army, Washington, DC 20310

CG, USARPAC
CG, MACV
CG, USAV
1 - GO, I FORCEN
2 - GO, 101ST AIR DIV, FT CAMPBELL, KY

DISTRIBUTION: 10 = J3
3 - ALO
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling 1 & 11.

1. (C) Terrain:
   a. Gatling 1: Terrain was characterized by moderately thick hardwood forest with light undergrowth. Fields of fire were good to excellent in most areas. Key terrain was most of the high ground in the area which offered good observation over avenues of approach. Some cover and concealment were provided by thick undergrowth and trees in the forested areas. Obstacles in the AO were of no significance. In general, terrain favored the enemy troops in ground operations. It favored the enemy by providing limited aerial observation. Long range observation favored the enemy by giving him an early warning capability.


2. (U) Weather:
   a. Gatling 1: In general, weather favored both air and ground operations. Severe cold during the nights (temperatures in low 40's) hampered ground operations (both enemy and friendly) to some extent. US troops deployed under a cover plan for Phan Thiet and adequate protective clothing for mountainous terrain was not carried.

   b. Gatling 11: Weather in this AO generally favored both air and ground operations.

3. (C) Analysis:
   a. Gatling 1: A thorough search of the AO with no significant contact indicated that no VC/NAV units had operated in the area for a considerable length of time. This was further substantiated by the lack of campsites, trails, caches, or any other items reportable during VR flights. The few enemy contacts made indicate the presence of local VC guerrillas. Nothing indicated the presence of VCLF, VCNF, or NVA units operating in the AO.

   b. Photo Imagery:
      (1) Gatling 1 - In spite of the extremely short planning time, photography of the area of interest was available from the film library at IFFORCEV. The rapid reproduction response by D Detachment 51 MIBARS enabled the 181st MID to prepare a photo mosaic of the area for each battalion involved in the operation. The mosaics were annotated to detect the trails and defenses in the area.

      (2) Gatling 11 - Due to the rapid reaction time necessary and secrecy employed in this operation, no aerial photography was available however the area was well covered with pictorial maps which provided a partial substitute.

   c. Infra-Red:
      (1) Gatling 1 - Due to the limited success experienced with this sensor in the past, it was not employed during this operation since its use might have prematurely indicated our interest in the area.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling 1 & 11.

(2) Gatling 11 - Red Base was employed over the operational area with negative results.

   d. Visual Recon:

      (1) Gatling 1 - Visual Recon was conducted daily during the operation with negative results.

      (2) Gatling 11 - Daily flights which were flown over the operational area partially compensated for the lack of aerial photography. Unlike other areas in which the Brigade has been employed, it was reported that the enemy had, with some success, actively engaged reconnaissance aircraft. One of these aircraft flying visual reconnaissance was lost during this period, the cause as yet has been undetermined.

   e. Gatling 11:

      (1) Although no significant enemy contact was made, numerous incidents of light contact with small enemy units and individuals indicate that VC district forces, local guerrillas, and possibly a VC headquarters was located in the AO. This headquarters may have been that of the VC-6.

      (2) Indications are that Hq VC-6 evaded US forces but it is believed that contact was made with small elements of that Hq and some of its security forces.

      (3) Enemy forces in the area had cached over 390 tons of rice. It is possible that this rice was stored to support a future buildup of enemy forces in the area or the area was a logistical base used to support units subordinate to VC-6.

      (4) A significant amount of communications equipment was captured during the operation. This added substance to the reports of VC-6 being in the area and further emphasized the fact that perhaps the enemy is increasing his radio communications capability and ability to intercept our radio nets.

   1. CCOMC: During Operation Gatling 1 & 11, 1325 radio transmissions were monitored with no violations.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

   Enemy units encountered in this area have a greater radio communications capability than previously encountered in other areas. This capability has allowed the enemy to monitor, intercept, and jam radio nets. In one case an airborne FAC was asked to repeat the coordinates of a target. When challenged, the unidentified station could not authenticate. It is essential that maximum security measures be practiced when using any type of communications.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and material losses during Operation Gatling 1 and 11:

   a. Gatling 1:
Enclosure 1 (intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling 1 / 11.

(a) Weapons captured:
1. Mosin Nagant, M1944 Carbine
2. M1919 B Mag
3. French machine gun
4. Lee Enfield rifle
5. 5.56mm
6. US Carbines
7. 9mm Pistol
8. Survival kit

(b) Weapons destroyed:
1. Two tons rice destroyed.

3. Other:
(a) Weapons captured:
   1. Mosin Nagant, M1944 Carbine
   2. M1919 B Mag
   3. French machine gun
   4. Lee Enfield rifle
   5. 5.56mm
   6. US Carbines
   7. 9mm Pistol
   8. Survival kit

3. Other:
   (a) Weapons captured:
      1. Mosin Nagant, M1944 Carbine
      2. M1919 B Mag
      3. French machine gun
      4. Lee Enfield rifle
      5. 5.56mm
      6. US Carbines
      7. 9mm Pistol
      8. Survival kit
   (b) Ammunition:
      400 rounds of small arms ammunition.
   (c) Other:
      1. Transmitter w/CW key (Type RT-3)
         1 Receiver (Type R-2)
         2. A power cord unit w/power cards (type RA-2)
            which is used with 3H-58 hand generator.
         1 Set of earphones
         2. Manual morse keys
         1 French transceiver FFV 1002n
         9. Transistor radios w/modifications
         1 AC/DC volt - ohms meter
         1 Hand generator (type unknown)
         1 Transistor radio w/speaker and CW key attached
         1 Type writer
         1 Signal PLL kit w/repair parts and instruments.
         1 US Radio receiver BC 1306
         2 Cases batteries
         1 Sewing machine
         1 M1919 9
         296 Tons of Rice
         270 lbs of salt
         1 5 tons of potatoes
Appendix A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling I & II.

1. (6) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle Operation on Gatling I

   a. Generally the Lam Dong Province Committee, with a cover number of 5-30C has an estimated strength of 95 personnel and was believed to be in the vicinity of ZT 098965. The committee is composed of many sections: Economics and Finance (Cover number D-113), Signal (Cover number C-22), Intelligence Engineer, logistics, Security, Propaganda and Medical. The Province of Lam Dong is under the operational control of the Lam Dong Provincial Committee. The Lam Dong Provincial Committee is subordinate to the inter-provincial committee (code number T-6), reported to have been in Lam Dong. T-6 is reported to have six companies in Lam Dong under the operational control of the Lam Dong Provincial Committee.

   b. The province has been divided into two districts, Bao Loc District and Dien Linh District. Bao Loc District Committee has an infantry company, strength 85, for use in the district. The district is subdivided into five inter-village committees, each committee having an infantry platoon, strength 15-20. Dien Linh District has one infantry company, strength 75. This district is divided into 8 inter-village committees, each having an infantry platoon. Total strength in the province is estimated from 1700-1800.

   c. VC activity in Lam Dong Province, consisting mostly of harassment of GVN troops and mortar fire against secure hamlets showed a marked increase during Dec and Jan.

   d. The following VC units are carried in Lam Dong Province:

      (Reference: Intelligence estimate for Lam Dong Province dtd 30 Jan 67)

      | UNIT       | STRENGTH | LOCATION     | UNIT COMMANDER   |
      |------------|----------|--------------|-----------------|
      | 1/45 Hvy Wps BN  | 130      | TU 5254 (2 Jan 66) | GPT Ngo Tam Tai |
      | 186 HF BN      | 330      | ZT 1476 (21 Jan 66) | Maj Cong Hai    |
      | 810th MP BN    | 300      | YU 3337 (25 May 66) | Bu Thi Tran Nhan |
      | C-3 Co         | 80       | TB 7662      | Chau            |
      | 105th Co       | 65       | ZT 0692      | Anh Ch          |
      | 106th Co       | 75       | ZT 0692      | Tri             |
      | C-410th Co     | 95       | ZT 1871      | Trong            |
      | 210th Co       | 60       | ZT 2291      | Tran Van Cong    |
      | C-220th Co     | 150      | LN 8592      | Duong           |

   e. There were no NVA units reported to be in Lam Dong Province.

   f. Order of Battle findings: During the period of 1 Feb to 5 Feb (Gatling 1) there were no significant contacts made. Activity consisted of small contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (40), 6 weapons captured (M-1) and two (2) tons of rice destroyed. No unit identifications were made.

2. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle Operation Gatling II. Intelligence reports indicated that military Region VI was located in Binh Tuy Province with security elements of possible battalion size. It was also feasible that VC units based in Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces might periodically operate in Binh Tuy Province. During the period of 16 Feb to 15 Mar 67 (Gatling II) there were 25 VC KIA (40), 6 VCC, 19 individual weapons and four (4) tons of rice captured. Captured documents indicated that 866 was located in Binh Tuy Province, but no definite location was obtained. There were no large contacts during the operation and no unit identification was made.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GAILING (1 Feb - 5 Feb 67) and GAILING II (5 Feb 67 - 15 Feb 67)

1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:
   a. Beginning of Operation GAILING:
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation GAILING were as follows:

      | Authorized Augmented (MTOE) | Assigned |
      |-----------------------------|----------|
      | 4490                        | LMM      |
      | Present for Duty            | 1777     |
      | Base Camp - Phan Rang       | 2025     |
      | F/RANG/HQ 40                | 382      |
      | Not Present for Duty        | 331      |

      (2) The assigned strength was 109% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 101% of the augmented authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength; 9 were hospitalized, 115 were in transit, 111 were on TDY/SD status, 72 on leave, 22 in confinement, and 2 AWOL.

   b. Conclusion of Operation GAILING:
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation GAILING were as follows:

      | Authorized Augmented (MTOE) | Assigned |
      |-----------------------------|----------|
      | 4490                        | LMM      |
      | Present for Duty            | 1776     |
      | Base Camp - Phan Thiet      | 2577     |
      | Base Camp - Phan Rang       | 1008     |
      | F/RANG/HQ 40                | 332      |
      | Not Present for Duty        | 333      |

      (2) The assigned strength was 106% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 101% of the augmented authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength; 28 were hospitalized, 101 were in transit, 105 were on TDY/SD status, 77 on leave, 11 in confinement, and 8 AWOL.

   c. Replacements received during the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

      | OFF | 25 |
      | 1/327 | 11 |
      | 2/327 | 2  |
      | 2/502 | 25 |

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I (1 Feb - 5 Feb 67) and GATLING II (5 Feb 67 - 15 Feb 67)

a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

(1) Phase I (1-5 Feb 67) Operation GATLING: No casualties were sustained during this period.

(2) Phase II (5-15 Feb 67) Operation GATLING:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Total casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>363</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to forward units during the operation.

b. Beer, soda and limited sensitive items were provided to the units in the forward area during the operation.

c. Beach facilities were provided in phase II (5-15 Feb 67) Operation GATLING for the units in the forward area of operation.

4. (C) PERSONNEL PLANNING: A recent directive by DA disallowing involuntary officer extensions caused our rotational "hump" in May and June to increase; however, by continued emphasis on voluntary extensions, the Brigade is attempting to alleviate this problem.

5. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The crash of a CH-47 helicopter at Ban Loc airfield on D-Day of Operation GATLING I appropriately underscores the importance of opening the Brigade Clearing Station in a new AO at the earliest possible time. The 38 casualties resulting from that crash required a medical facility of clearing station size.

b. Patients treated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) VIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Non Hostile Injury</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Disease</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Returned to Duty</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Evacuated to Hospital</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Remaining in Holding</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Total Patients Treated</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
c. Hospitalized personnel categorized by wounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdomen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Extremities</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Extremities</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdomen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Extremities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Extremities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Class II and IV supplies were required only in small amounts due to the relatively short duration of the operation. All such items were requested through the FSE and brought forward by air from Phan Rang base camp. A total of 9 short tons were required.

Class III. Units initially deployed with an absolute minimum of vehicles, since the tactical requirement was for a foot mobile force. Consequently, consumption of MIAAS and DUSEL was relatively low. JP-4 fuel for supporting aviation units was delivered almost exclusively in 500 gallon bladders. A total of 94.8 short tons of fuel was expended during the operation by organic and attached vehicles. This does not include expenditure by supporting aviation units.

Class IV. Expenditure of Class IV was relatively low due to the light contact experienced. No difficulty was encountered with expenditure of ASR items. The low ASR of some ammunition items had no adverse effect on combat operations. A total of 95.9 short tons of Class V was issued during the operation. This figure is deceptive since only a fraction of this amount was expended and units completed the operation with a major portion of this amount on hand.

Water. Due to the fact that the operation was launched during the dry season, water resupply was a greater problem than is normally the case. Numerous streams were dried up, thus eliminating one of the readiest sources of water for tactically deployed personnel. As a result, more water had to be supplied from a central source. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a 1500 gallon per hour water purification unit near Bao Loc initially, and later at Phan Thiet. Water at Phan Thiet was drawn principally from the city reservoir and had a distinctively unpleasant odor and taste which some personnel found unpalatable. Water resupply to committed companies and platoons was effected with 5 gallon water cans and 3 gallon free drop plastic water bags.

b. Maintenance: No major maintenance problems evolved as a result of the operation.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: an average of 10 - 2 1/2 ton trucks were committed daily to support operations in the forward area.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) C-7 aircraft were primarily used for routine resupply of Class II & IV, spare parts and transport of relatively small number of personnel.

(b) C-130 aircraft were the primary means of transporting Brigade personnel and equipment from base camp to Bao Loc and from there to Phan Thiet. Additionally, they were utilized almost exclusively during the initial phase of the logistical buildup at Bao Loc.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration Services were provided by the Phan Thiet FSA with personnel and equipment drawn from USSC, Cam Ranh Bay.

(2) Bath and Laundry facilities were provided by the Phan Thiet FSA.

3. Summary: The only major logistical difficulty was encountered during the phase of the operation near Bao Loc. The tactical requirements for secrecy eliminated any possibility of an early logistical buildup. This required an intensive effort during the first three days of the operation to obtain stockage levels. The recovery of empty 500 gallon bladders
CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 4. (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I & II

1. (c) Organization of Support

a. General. Due to tactical demands for secrecy, it was impossible to initiate a logistical buildup in the Bao Loc area until after ground operations had begun. Consequently, units were instructed to deploy with sufficient Class I, III, V and water to forego resupply for three days. Supporting army aviation units consumed over 18,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel daily. As a result, intense efforts were required to resupply sufficient JP-4 by C-130 aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay. The subsequent retrieval and return of empty bladders also caused considerable difficulty. The Brigade's supporting combat aviation battalion remained at Bao Loc only for five days. Tactical considerations caused all Brigade personnel to depart that area for Phan Thiet on 6 February. As a result large numbers of empty fuel bladders were left behind in the vicinity of Bao Loc airfield to await recovery after the Brigade's departure. Since there were no American logistical units or personnel in the area, the empty bladders were not secured sufficiently to prevent damage by indigenous personnel. Consequently, a large number were damaged or destroyed by natives who cut them open attempting to extract the small fuel residue in each container. It is recommended that sufficient personnel of the 1st Logistical Command be dispatched in future operations of this nature for the purpose of securing and recovering empty bladders during and immediately after the operation. This is necessary because the unit is unable to leave security personnel without detracting from its tactical mission. This points the problems inherent in delaying the logistical buildup until tactical units are committed.

b. Support Battalion. Support Battalion established a Forward Support Element (FSE) in the forward area to provide flexible and responsive Combat Service Support to combat elements. Initially the FSE located adjacent to Bao Loc airfield, but a change in tactical mission necessitated a change in location of the FSE which subsequently moved to the vicinity of Phan Thiet airfield. Major components of the FSE included a medical clearing company, a maintenance section, an ammunition section, an operations section, and an AG section.

c. Supporting Forces:

(1) USAEC, Cam Ranh Bay provided overall logistical support and control of assets.

(2) Phan Thiet FSA acted as executive agent for USAEC Cam Ranh Bay and provided Class I, III, IIIA, and V supplies, as well as barrier material.

(3) 10th Combat Aviation Battalion helicopter provided logistical as well as tactical support.

(4) USAF C-7 aircraft carried the bulk of Class II and IV supplies and repair parts from Phan Rang base camp to Phan Thiet.

(5) 179th and 180th Aviation Companies provided CH-47 helicopter support.

2. (c) Materiel and Services.

a. Supply.

(1) Class I supplies were provided initially by the FSE during the short period of operation at Bao Loc. While at Phan Thiet, Class I support was provided by the Phan Thiet FSA. Two 7 1/2 ton reefer vans provided adequate portions of fresh meat, fruit, vegetables, ice cream, and ice. A total of 70,3 short tons of supplies were issued. These included 26 meals of "A" rations, 15,120 "B" rations, 9,304 "C" rations and 124 LRP rations.
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I & II

presented another problem. The failure to evacuate this equipment promptly or to plan for its security resulted in damage to many bladders by indigenous personnel. Operation GATLING placed no other exceptional demands upon the logistical system and the system remained fully capable of supporting tactical requirements.

4. (U) Conclusions. A logistical buildup initiated on a crash basis as units are tactically deployed is an expensive effort that necessitates very careful planning. Logistics planning must include plans for phasing out supplies and equipment and for securing those left behind during rapid operational shifts.
Inclosure 5 (Signal) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and GATLING II

1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 1st FASCP, 501st Signal, had the joint mission of supporting Operation FARRAGUT by maintaining installed systems at Phan Rang, establishing and maintaining a Tactical CP at Bao Loc during GATLING I and displacing to Phan Thiet for GATLING II. During GATLING II the Brigade CP closed at Phan Rang and joined the Tactical CP at Phan Thiet, reestablishing all Brigade systems at that location for the completion of GATLING II and the continuation of FARRAGUT.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section was not committed during this operation.

b. Communications Center Section terminated secure teletype circuits at Bao Loc utilizing 56th Signal Battalion equipment during GATLING I. During GATLING II the system was reestablished at Phan Thiet releasing 56th Signal Battalion equipment.

c. Switchboard/Wire Section established the TAC CP at Bao Loc terminating 25 circuits and laying 10 miles of wire. At Phan Thiet 68 circuits were terminated and approximately 20 miles of wire were laid.

d. FM Radio Section provided FM Radio stations at Phan Rang, Bao Loc and Phan Thiet. Automatic retransmission and relay stations were employed at LZ's Lucky Strike and Fall Mall.

e. AM Radio Section operated secure teletype circuits between Bao Loc and Phan Rang during GATLING I and from Phan Thiet to Phan Rang during GATLING II.

f. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade HHC and attachments.

g. Field Forces Signal Support - 56th Signal continued to provide circuits into the in-country system, secure teletype between IFFORC, Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear and a single sideband phone patch net paralleling the radio teletype net.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation GATLING, Phase I and II.

1. Phase I.

a. Due to the short duration of the first phase of Operation Gatling (5 days) a civil affairs team of three personnel accompanied the brigade rather than the entire section. The team consisting of an officer, a medic and an interpreter was primarily concerned with civil affairs activities and conducted no civic action during the period. Cooperation received from the Province officials and US military representatives in Long Dong was excellent. This Province had one of the best refugee resettlement programs encountered thus far by the brigade.

b. Civil Affairs activities during Phase I of Operation Gatling consisted of the following activities:

1) Seven Montagnard refugees freed from VC control were resettled in a secure area.

2) The home of an ARVN noncommissioned officer that had been damaged by a crashing helicopter was repaired and items destroyed within the house were replaced. Repair was accomplished with materials provided by USAID and the labor was performed by members of the brigade.

3) The cutting down of several trees on a local tea plantation caused the plantation owner to lodge a complaint. The situation became aggravated when the owner was ignored. On learning of the incident an S5 representative visited the owner, apologized and explained the necessity for felling the trees. This and a later visit by the Commanding General placated the plantation owner.

4) Four tons of captured rice were extracted through US/VN efforts and turned over to Province officials.

5) Although daily hire laborers were not readily available in the Local area, the brigade managed to hire approximately 30 laborers per day for a four day period.

c. Lessons Learned:

1) Regardless of the duration of an operation or the size of the S5 element employed, it is imperative that organic transportation accompany S5 personnel on an operation. During Phase I of Operation Gatling the civil affairs team was directed to deploy without a vehicle. This situation seriously hampered the S5 mission and forced the team to rely on other staff sect. ns for transportation.

2) In order to effect the necessary action in an expeditious manner, organic units as well as those attached and in direct support must notify the S5 immediately when an incident involving the civilian population occurs.

2. Phase II.

a. During Phase II of Operation Gatling the Brigade relocated in Binh Thuan Province basing in the Phan Thiet area. As the move was classified and sudden in nature, contacts with the local GVN officials, their counterparts and the S5 officers in the area were not made until after the brigade's arrival. Upon closing liaison was immediately effected to secure labor and to obtain an official price list. A meeting was arranged by the Province CCO representative with local labor officials, a fair wage was agreed upon and a source of labor provided. As there was an abundant supply of labor in the area, the brigade decided to draw its labor force from a refugee village and the local Chieu Hoi center thereby providing jobs to people with the greatest need for income. In cooperation with local businesses the Province Chief provided an official price list for the area which was distributed.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation GATLING, Phase I and II.

throughout the brigade and posted in local business establishments. The cooperation given by the Province Chief, his staff and the US military and civilian representatives in the area was outstanding and greatly assisted the brigade in getting settled in its new location.

b. Civic Action during Phase II of Operation Gatling was nil as the period of the operation coincided with the Tet holiday period and most official activities in the Province came to a standstill. Liaison was made however and projects were lined up for action after the holiday period. A total of 54 Montagnard refugees who had been liberated from VC dominated areas were resettled during the period. As requested by the refugees they were taken to Phu Loc in Lam Dong Province to be resettled among other Montagnards.

On the occasion of Tet, 86 families in a refugee village near Phan Rang were presented with food, clothing, soap and toys for the children.

c. Lessons learned:

(1) When units operating in VC controlled areas encounter refugees who desire to escape from VC domination it is imperative that the exact location where refugees were picked up be reported. Very often there are many more people in the immediate vicinity also desiring to escape VC domination, however they have fled the battle area and are in hiding. By knowing the location of refugee pick up it is possible to go back, locate and extract additional refugees.

(2) Plans to erect emergency facilities to accommodate large numbers of refugees must be kept current as it is often necessary to hold refugees at brigade before they can be moved to resettlement areas.

(3) Despite written directions to the contrary, troops continue to give out candy and other items to children while in town. In one instance a soldier threw a handful of candy bars from a moving truck. The candy fell into the road and children dove to retrieve it. A following truck, also US, barely missed running over several of the children. In another instance, a Vietnamese girl was struck in the breast by an apple thrown by a US soldier. Although the motives of the soldiers involved were probably well meaning, the results were harmful as evidenced by these two examples. Commanders must continue to emphasize the brigade policy of not giving handouts to children. The unit S-1's are more than willing to see that anything the troops want to give away gets distributed properly.
Includes 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report Operation GATLING I & II

1. (U) Psychological Objective: To induce as many VC personnel in the area of operations to avail themselves of the OVN Chieu Hoi Program.

2. (C) Leaflets: 2 missions covering 5 target areas were flown delivering 116,000 leaflets into the Brigade Area of Operations.

3. (C) Loudspeakers: 2 missions (aerial) against 5 target areas broadcasting a standard Chieu Hoi appeal were flown for a total of 26 hours broadcast time.

4. (U) Due to the short time frame from receipt of the message ordering this operation to the time ground combat operations were launched and the fact that this operation was highly classified during the planning phase, advance Psychological Operations planning could not be accomplished. As a result, planning was accomplished after arrival in the objective area decreasing the amount of time available to physically conduct Psychological Operations in the AO.
CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure 6 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING

1. (c) Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery direct support of 1st. Inf., 101st, 101st Airborne Division. Platoon 2/320th Artillery and one platoon 1/30th Artillery remained in PHAN THIET AO to support maneuver elements operating in that AO. The battalion headquarters element remained at PHAN THIET base camp. Battalion Headquarters (-) displaced to BA LOC on D-Day.

2. (c) Execution:

a. GATLING I:

(1) At 010730 February, A/2/320th Artillery and 5/1/30th (-) Artillery were located C-130 from PHAN THIET base camp to provide support for maneuver elements in the GATLING AO. B/2/320th Artillery and one platoon 1/30th Artillery remained in PHAN THIET AO to support maneuver elements operating in that AO. The battalion headquarters element remained at PHAN THIET base camp. Battalion Headquarters (-) displaced to BA LOC on D-Day.

(2) Additional liaison and forward observer requirements were imposed when a provisional CIDO battalion (-) was placed under operational control of the Brigade. Organic personnel were employed in normal support association roles. The added requirements exceeded the organic liaison and forward observation capabilities of the battalion were fulfilled by using personnel with associated training and experience. A significant degree of cross-training was achieved however, battalion resources were strained.

b. GATLING II:

(1) HHH/2/320th displaced by air (C-130) to PHAN THIET. Organic and attached artillery continued to provide support as outlined in subparagraph a above. The mission of B(-)/2/320th Artillery was changed to reinforcing B/1/21st Artillery.

c. During both phases of the GATLING operation, the same techniques of fire support coordination and artillery employment which have proven successful on previous operations were employed. No new techniques were developed. The maneuver concept dictated independent operations by the batteries.

3. (c) Execution:

a. GATLING III:

(1) At 010700 February, A/2/320th displaced to ZT015520. Unit closed at 1420 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(2) At 010700 February, C/2/320th Displaced to ZT065590. Unit closed at 1745 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry.

(3) At 010700 February, Platoon B/1/30th displaced to ZT054926. Unit closed at 1740 hours. Reinforcing the fires of 2/2/320th.

b. GATLING IV:

(1) At 050630 February, A/2/320th displaced to ZT053777. Unit closed at 1215 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(2) At 050900 February, C/2/320th displaced to ZT043437. Unit closed at 1425 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry.

(3) At 050930 February, Platoon E/1/30th displaced to PHAN THIET AN070707. Unit closed at 1500 hours and reinforced the fires of 1/21st Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division.

(4) At 050930 February, A/2/320th displaced one platoon to AN070757. Unit closed at 1830 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation GATLING

(5) At 130730 February, A/2/320th (-), displaced to join platoon at 133335/H. Unit closed at 1700 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(6) At 120700 February, C/2/320th displaced to ZT1556S1. Unit closed at 1415 hours. Direct support of 2/502 Infantry.

3. (G) Results: 1 VC (KIA) Phase II.

5. (U) Administration Matters: N/A

6. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques: N/A

7. (U) Commanders Analysis: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, and tactical air continue to provide adequate fire support. The 150th Aviation Company (CH-47) initiated the policy of providing this battalion with a liaison officer. This officer added immensely to the smooth and rapid displacements made by the batteries. During one displacement, forty-one members of 0 Battery loaded onto a CH-47. Even though the pilot knew this number was on board he attempted to take off resulting in the loss of his aircraft and the injury of twenty-nine persons. The battalion, as policy, now stations a responsible individual at the rear of the aircraft to insure that no more than the correct number of personnel load the aircraft.

8. (U) Recommendations: That six (6) CH-47's be provided this Brigade at all times and that the aviation company assigned the support continue to provide a liaison officer.