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TO: Commanding General
3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDC-C-OP
APO US Forces 96355

1. (U) During the period covered by this report this organization participated in combat operations with the 1st and 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi, RVN; deployed the Battalion (-) from Cu Chi RVN to Pleiku RVN and participated in combat operations as part of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (U) At the beginning of the period the Battalion minus Company B was positioned at Cu Chi and employed under control of CG 25th Infantry Division. Company B, as part of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, was positioned at Pleiku.

3. (U) During the period 1 to 13 May 1966 the Battalion (-) was attached to the 1st Brigade for the defense of the Division base area perimeter. In addition, elements of the Battalion secured the Division Laterite Pit, and provided tank support for infantry battalion combat operations. Concurrently, the Battalion (-) prepared for deployment to Pleiku.

   a. The scout platoon and HHC tank section provided security for the Division Laterite Pit for 8 days during this period.

   b. Company A provided security for the Division Laterite Pit for 6 days, provided one tank platoon to the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry for a 2 day operation in the Filhol Plantation (XT676165), provided one tank platoon for perimeter defense to the 2d Battalion 14th Infantry for 13 days and provided 1 tank platoon for perimeter defense to the 4th Battalion 23d Infantry for 2 days.

   c. Company C was attached to the 2d Brigade for Operation Lihue from 2 to 10 May 1966. This operation consisted of securing the road from Cu Chi to Tay Nihn in support of the 1st Division Operation Birmingham.

   d. Company B secured Route 19 from Pleiku to Kontum for the period 1 to 7 May. On 10 May 1966 Team B (Company B minus 1 platoon plus 1 cavalry

4. (U) a. During the period 14 to 22 May 1966 the Battalion (-) deployed from Cu Chi to Pleiku. The Battalion (-) moved from Cu Chi to Saigon overland, loaded aboard LST's and moved to Qui Nhon. Upon off loading, units moved to a marshalling area outside of Qui Nhon to prepare for the movement over Route 19 to Pleiku. The schedule followed for this deployment was as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co C &amp; Bn CP</th>
<th>HHC (-)</th>
<th>Bn Tns</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LST #1</td>
<td>LST #2</td>
<td>LST #3</td>
<td>LST #4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depart Cu Chi</td>
<td>14 May 66</td>
<td>15 May 66</td>
<td>15 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Load LST</td>
<td>15 May 66</td>
<td>15 May 66</td>
<td>19 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depart Saigon</td>
<td>15 May 66</td>
<td>15 May 66</td>
<td>19 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrive Qui Nhon</td>
<td>17 May 66</td>
<td>17 May 66</td>
<td>21 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depart Qui Nhon</td>
<td>17 May 66</td>
<td>17 May 66</td>
<td>21 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depart Marshalling Area</td>
<td>19 May 66</td>
<td>19 May 66</td>
<td>22 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrive Base Camp</td>
<td>19 May 66</td>
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<td>Pleiku</td>
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b. While the Battalion was in transit from Cu Chi, Team B (Company B minus 1 tank platoon plus 1 cavalry platoon) continued to provide route security and convoy escorts until 18 May 1966. On 18 May Company B moved to LZ 27D (YA864134) to assist in security of 1st Battalion 14th Infantry Command Post.

5. (U) On 20 May 1966 Troop C 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry was attached to this Battalion by General Order 10, Headquarters 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, APO 96225, dated 1 June 1966.

6. (U) During the period 22 thru 30 May 1966 the Battalion (+) provided company sized units to operation Paul Revere, provided security for the Pleiku Base Area, conducted 2 company sized operations, and moved a forward CP element to the Oasis to assume the mission as control headquarters for the defense of the Brigade Forward base area and control of Brigade armor elements.

a. Company A secured the Battalion’s sector of the Pleiku base camp perimeter from 22 May thru 31 May and conducted two company size operations, Custer I, vicinity Pleiku, on 30 May 1966 and Custer II, vicinity Plei Me, on 31 May 1966.

b. Company B remained at LZ 27D until 25 May when the unit was ordered to Duc Co to provide security for the Special Forces Camp.
4 August 1966


b. Company C moved from Pleiku to the Oasis on 21 May to provide security for the Brigade forward base area. During this period Company C secured Route 19 from check point #3 to the Oasis on 8 days and escorted two convoys to Duc Co and 1 convoy to Plei Me.

d. Task Force Duffer (Troop C-3-4 minus 1 cavalry platoon, with 1 tank platoon of Company B-1-69, A Company 1st Battalion 35th Infantry, and one squad D Company 65th Engineer Battalion attached) conducted search and destroy missions east of Ia Tae River and west of Plei Me. Dismounted reconnaissance patrols were conducted west of Ia Tae River to the Chu Pong Mountain (YV8699). This mission was completed on 24 May and Task Force Duffer was dissolved. On 25 May C Troop 3-4 began its withdrawal from the area of operation to Highway 14. This extraction was completed on 28 May and the Troop (-) with an attached tank platoon moved to the Oasis. On 29 May Troop C escorted a convoy to Plei Me and returned to the Oasis. On 30 May Troop C (minus 1 cavalry platoon) was committed to assist TF 2-35 Infantry which was heavily engaged vicinity LZ 10A (YAT68374).

7. (U) During the period 1 to 7 June the Battalion supported operation Paul Revere and participated in the defense of the Pleiku Base Area. The Battalion CP moved from Pleiku on 3 June to join the Battalion Forward command element at the Oasis. The scout platoon and headquarters tank section provided the forward base area reaction force during the period 3 thru 7 June 1966. The scout platoon reinforced with one infantry platoon conducted one patrol south of the Oasis. The Battalion 4.2" mortar platoon fired 42 rounds in support of the Brigade H&I program.

a. Company A moved from the Pleiku Base Area to the Oasis on 1 June and provided security for the Brigade Forward Base Area. Company A secured the road from the Oasis to check point #3 on 4 days and escorted 2 convoys to Duc Co.

b. Company B moved to Pleiku on 1 June and provided security for the Pleiku base area until 7 June 1966. Company B also escorted 1 convoy to Plei Me. On 7 June Company B moved from Pleiku to ZA034310 to secure the area for a Battalion base of operations.

c. Company C remained at the Oasis to provide security for the Brigade base area during the period 1 to 7 June. During this period Company C opened the road from Oasis to check point #3 on 4 days.

d. Troop C-3-4 Cavalry (-) 1 platoon remained attached to 2d Battalion 35th Infantry operating vicinity LZ 11A (YAB65365), through 7 June. One platoon and the troop trains remained at the Oasis during this period and participated in the security of the Brigade Forward base area and supported Company A and C on road security and convoy escort missions.

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8. (U) On 8 June the Battalion Task Force (consisting of the 3 organic tank companies and Company B 1st Battalion 14th Infantry) moved from the Oasis to establish blocking positions along Highway 19 from ZA076309 to YA903269 and north along the Plei Dejereng road to YA896353. The Battalion CP was established at ZA034309. The concept of this operation was 3 infantry battalions sweeping south against the blocking positions established along Highway 19 (Incl 1). The Battalion Task Force was under the operational control of 2d Brigade 1st Air Cavalry until 2 June when the 3d Brigade Task Force assumed control. There was no enemy contact by the blocking force during this operation. The operation was completed with a link up between the sweeping forces and the blocking forces on 10 June. The Battalion was given the mission of positioning one company/troop each to the following locations; Brigade Forward base area, Pleiku base camp, Duc Co and Plei Me. The Battalion CP returned to the Brigade base area to assume the mission of control headquarters for the security of the Brigade forward base area.

a. Company A moved from the area of operation to the Oasis on 11 June to provide security for the Brigade forward base area.

b. Company B moved from the area of operations to Duc Co on 11 June and was placed under Operational Control of the 2d Battalion 35th Infantry.

c. Company C moved from the area of operation to Plei Me escorting a convoy from the Oasis on 10 June. The company remained under control of the battalion.

d. C Troop remained at Plei. a during this period to provide security for the Pleiku base camp.

9. (C) During the remainder of the month (12 thru 30 June) the battalion provided the control headquarters for the defense of the Brigade forward base area and a mobile reserve force for the 3d Brigade Task Force. On 21 June the Brigade forward base area displaced from Oasis (ZA1027) to Waikiki (ZA1128). On 29 and 30 July the Battalion (-) employed tanks in the Brigade H&I program. During this period the scout platoon and headquarters tank section participated in road security and convoy escort missions under control to the three organic tank companies. The battalion 4.2" mortar platoon fired 124 rounds in support of the Brigade H&I program.

a. (U) Company A provided security for the Brigade base area during this period and during the period 21 thru 30 June provided 1 platoon for security of the Plei Me Special Forces Camp. During the period Company A secured the road from the Oasis to check point #3 on 3 days, secured the road from Waikiki to check point #3 on 2 days, and provided convoy escort for 7 convoys. On 25 June 1 platoon conducted a reconnaissance sweep vicinity Plei Me with CIDG troops from the Plei Me Special Forces Camp.
CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C

4 August 1966


b. (U) Company B was positioned at Duc Co under the operational control of the 2d Battalion 35th Infantry during the period 12 to 18 June. On 19 June Company B moved from Duc Co to the Brigade forward base area. For the remainder of the period Company B was at the brigade forward base area to provide security for that installation. During the period 12 to 30 June Company B escorted 1 convoy from Waikiki to check point #3, and secured the road on 5 days.

c. (U) Company C was positioned at Plei Me for security of the Special Forces Camp during the period 12 thru 21 June. During this period Company C conducted extensive reconnaissance in the vicinity of Plei Me in conjunction with the CIDG personnel of the camp. On 14 June Company C encountered and cleared a log road block on Highway 14 vicinity coordinates AR795223, enemy contact was not made. Company C also escorted 2 convoys from Plei Me to check point #3. On 21 June Company C minus 1 platoon moved from Plei Me to Pleiku to provide security for the Pleiku Base Camp. They remained at that location for the remainder of the month.

d. (C) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry was positioned at Pleiku to provide security of the Base Camp from 12 thru 20 June. On 20 June Troop C moved from Pleiku to Duc Co and was placed under operational control of the 2d Battalion 35th Infantry. On 21 June Troop C was placed under Operational Control of the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry who relieved the 2d Battalion in that area of operations. The Troop (-) was positioned at Duc Co with 1 platoon at LZ 27D until 25 June when a second platoon was moved into the infantry area of operation. On 24 June the 2d platoon became heavily engaged by an estimated reinforced company of NVA while enroute to reinforce an engaged infantry company. The reinforcement was accomplished and the infantry company was extracted. The platoon suffered 3 KIA and 11 WIA during the encounter and was credited with 47 NVA KIA (BC). The Troop remained in the vicinity of Duc Co under operational control of 1st Battalion 35th Infantry for the remainder of the month.

10. (U) During the month of July the Battalion provided the 3d Brigade mobile reserve/reaction force and also acted as control headquarters for the defense of the Brigade Forward base area. On 5 July the Battalion CP displaced from Waikiki to Catecka (ZA213343), the Brigade forward base area. One company (Company C) was provided to the 1st Brigade 1st Air Cavalry Division for operation Henry Clay vicinity Ban Blech (BQ005985) during the period 10 thru 29 July. The Battalion continued with the missions of providing armored elements at Pleiku, Plei Me, Duc Co and the Brigade forward base area. The Battalion was also responsible for daily road security and convoy escort missions. The Battalion provided armored elements to infantry units for the security of remote landing zones. During the month the Battalion scout platoon assisted the tank companies on convoy escort missions and provided the forward base area defense reaction force. The 4.2" mortar platoon participated in the Brigade H&I program and fired 2099 rounds.
CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C

4 August 1966


a. Company A provided 1 platoon for the security of the Plei Me Special Forces Camp while the Company (-) participated in the security of the Brigade forward base area during the period 1 thru 7 July. On 8 July the Company moved from Plei Me to Duc Co to provide security for the Special Forces Camp for the remainder of the month. Concurrently with this mission Company A provided 1 tank platoon to the 3d Battalion 1st ROK Regiment for 21 days and one platoon to the 1st Battalion 14th Infantry for 5 days to secure remote landing zones south of Duc Co. On 16 July Company A (-) 2 tank platoons reinforced with 1 armored cavalry platoon, C Troop 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, was committed to reinforce a Special Forces outpost vicinity YA776223 which was under attack. Light contact was made by the company and resulted in 4 NVA KIA. During the month Company A provided convoy escort forces for 5 convoys.

b. Company B remained with the Battalion Headquarters at the Brigade Forward base area. During the month one platoon was positioned at Plei Me to provide security for the Special Forces Camp from 11 July until the end of the month. Company B participated in one joint US-ARVN operation on 7 July, enemy contact was not made. One platoon was provided to the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry for a search and destroy operation south of Oasis (ZA1027) on 14 July, enemy contact was not made. During the month Company B secured the road from check point #3 to the Brigade forward base area on 20 days and provided armored convoy escort for 12 convoy.

c. Company C remained at Pleiku base camp for security of that installation from 1 to 10 July. On 10 July Company C was attached to the 1st Brigade 1st Air Cavalry Division for operation Henry Clay. The company reverted to Battalion control on 29 July and was positioned at the Brigade forward base area for the remainder of the month. During the period 10 to 29 July Company C escorted 5 convoys from check point #3 to Ban Blech and participated on 14 combat operations in conjunction with air mobile forces. 1 VMC was captured by the company.

d. Troop C was attached to 1-35 Infantry and 1-14 Infantry Battalions in the area of operations south of Duc Co during the period 1 to 17 July. On 18 July the Troop moved to Pleiku to provide security for the base camp and remained there until 30 July when it moved to the Oasis and was placed under operational control of the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry. During the period of attachment in the area south of Duc Co the Troop was positioned in remote landing zones to provide security of the infantry battalion and company base areas. These elements were also used in search and destroy missions, reconnaissance, establishment of screens and ambushes. On 3 July the 2d platoon was committed to relieve a reinforced infantry platoon which was ambushed. This relief and extraction was accomplished with light casualties and the platoon was credited with 36 NVA KIA (possible). While the troop was positioned at Pleiku, 2 scout sections with 2 mortar squads attached, escorted a convoy of 299th Engineer Battalion to Dak To on 28 July and from Dak To to Pleiku on 29 July. Upon moving to the Oasis on 30 July the Troop escorted a 105 artillery battery from the Oasis to the Infantry Battalion.
CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C

7

4 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1966. (RCS GSGPO-28) (R1)

Base Area (ZA082216) and secured this base area.

11. (C) During the quarterly period this Battalion's units were involved
in 4 combat actions which resulted in contact with enemy forces. These contacts
resulted in friendly losses which totaled 3 KIA or DOW, 33 WIA, 1 tank, and 2
APC's were damaged by direct enemy action. Enemy losses during these contacts
were 51 KIA (BC), 36 KIA (possible), 3 CIA. In addition to active contact,
vehicles of this Battalion were involved in 27 mining incidents. These mines
caused 3 KIA, 4 WIA and damaged 19 tanks, 1 VTR, 9 APC's and 1 wheel vehicle
of this battalion. Of these vehicles damaged, 1 tank and 3 APC's were damaged
beyond repair and required replacement.
SECTION II

1. (U) Recommendations:
   a. Personnel: None
   
   b. Intelligence: It is recommended that an interpreter be furnished at company level to facilitate an immediate interrogation of prisoners upon their capture. This would enable intelligence of tactical value to arrive at each evaluating headquarters faster thus allowing more timely reaction by combat units.
   
   c. Operations:

   (1) Organization: The current TOE for this Battalion requires modification to permit the tank companies to conduct extended operations in this geographical area. There is a definite need to provide increased capability for vehicle recovery, ground medical evacuation, cross country logistic resupply, and reconnaissance and security operations. Specific recommendations and the required personnel and equipment will be made in a modified TOE request being prepared by this organization.

   (2) Tactics:

   (a) The movement of armored units at night is entirely feasible. This will hamper the VC/NVA mining activities on the routes traveled and retard enemy resupply efforts by limiting his freedom of movement. Enemy ambushes of an armored element at night gives the armored element a distinct advantage as enemy AT weapons will be less accurate and muzzle flash pinpoints enemy positions for accurate return fire.

   (b) During tactical operations in areas of VC/NVA activity commanders must have freedom to conduct reconnaissance by fire at potential ambush sites.

   (c) The use of night vision devices such as infrared, searchlights and starlight devices in conjunction with the tank fire control system increases the night effectiveness of armor and increases the ability of an armored unit to conduct night offensive operations.

   (d) Current air mobile/armor operational concept is to engage the enemy with the air landed infantry and reinforce with armor. An equally effective concept would be to engage with the armor and use the air mobile infantry to land in the rear of the enemy force.

   (e) The pilots of command and control helicopters must be thoroughly briefed before take off. This briefing should contain the concept of the tactical operation and the commanders concept of control.
4 August 1966


CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C

d. Logistics:

(1) A minimum of one chain saw for each company sized unit is an absolute must. These items have proven invaluable in recovery operations.

(2) Several authorized items which have not yet been issued and considered essential for operations are: Xenon searchlights, Special set A & B for each type armor vehicle authorized and the impact wrench which is OEM to the VTR.

(3) The shortage of replacement track vehicle two cables (1 1/8 inches diameter by 10 feet long) is also becoming critical.

e. Communications: Continuous command emphasis is required to insure that proper radio telephone procedures are used.

2. (C) Lesson Learned:

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (U) Intelligence:

(1) Item: Commanders and staffs must make a detailed map reconnaissance supplemented with an aerial reconnaissance before planning a ground tactical operation for armored vehicles.

Discussion: Maps of this area, as an example, will show an intermittent stream which will vary, depending upon season, from dry wash to full running streams. Likewise streams exist on the ground where none are shown on the map. Trails indicated on the map may be a road 15 feet wide or paths 2 feet wide.

Observation: After selecting several possible avenues of approach from a detailed map reconnaissance, these avenues are checked by aerial reconnaissance before a final selection is made. The executing commander should be present on this reconnaissance if possible.

(2) Item: Trafficability maps which correlate topography, vegetation, and seasonal impact, must be compiled by armor units.

Discussion: This facilitates maintaining an up-to-date area of operation overlay indicating new trails, conditions of old ones, possible fords, areas of good and/or poor trafficability, and any other pertinent information the commander discovers in his area of operation.

Observation: With accurate, up-to-date information of the area of operations, tactical decisions can be made with more exactness than could be possible by map reconnaissance.

(3) Item: Units should make use of the Special Forces Intelligence network in their area of operation.

Discussion: A guerilla war at best is an extensively fluid situation with action in many areas being conducted simultaneously. Timely intelligence from as many sources as possible, aids in the evaluation of enemy intelligence. With Special Forces units operating extensively in the central highlands, coordination should be effected with these units to utilize their intelligence network and intimate knowledge of the area.

Observation: A great deal of timely information concerning the enemy and terrain has been obtained from the Special Forces Camps at Duc Co and Plei Me.

c. (U) Operations:

(1) (U) Item: Sniper suppressive fire.

Discussion: On operation Circle Pines the Battalion CP was plagued by snipers firing from woodlines approximately 300 meters away. This was combated by firing suppressive fire using 90mm tank guns and 7.62 machine guns at various intervals during the day and night.

Observation: After initiating this suppressive fire the Battalion was not bothered by sniper fire.

(2) (C) Item: The use of a command and control helicopter greatly assists the battalion commander in the control of his elements on road marches and during combat operations.

Discussion: The company commander is required to be on the ground where he can best influence the tactical action. During escort missions the aircraft can provide the ground commanders with timely information on route and traffic conditions and convoy discipline. During combat operations in dense vegetation or jungle, ground commanders have experienced difficulty in maintaining proper orientation and direction of movement. The command and control helicopter is used to keep the ground elements moving in the proper direction and assist in the selection of the best route of advance. During both type operations the helicopter can be used to detect and give the ground commanders warning of enemy ambush positions.

Observation: This organization has experienced considerable success in directing ground commanders from the air. To facilitate air identification of vehicles unit designation symbols have been painted on the vehicle tops or rear decks. The use of colored smoke grenades has proven helpful for locating elements by air observer in extremely dense areas.

(3) (C) Item: NVA AT weapons, RPG-2, 37mm RR and 75mm RR will penetrate the turret and hull of the M48A3 tank.
CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C 4 August 1966

Discussion: The use of field expedients such as sand bags will decrease the effectiveness of the enemy HEAT weapons as well as absorb metal fragments with these weapons.

Observation: A tank which had sand bags carried on the front slope was hit by an RPG-2 round but caused no damage to the vehicle or crew.

(4) (U) Item: Armor units have proven effective in bolstering the defense of small outlying positions.

Discussion: Tank platoons and companies have been used to provide security for artillery positions, Special Forces Camps and infantry battalions. The presence of tanks reduces vulnerability to an attack. A ground attack against a well prepared defensive position, reinforced by tanks, would be costly to the enemy.

Observation: The NVA/VC have shown a reluctance to engage tanks where they can be avoided.

(5) (U) Item: Ambush patrols must remain in constant radio contact with control stations.

Discussion: In operations where units of more than one major command or nation are operating concurrently in a joint area of operation, coordination can not always be effected on a timely basis. When information is received that a unit's patrol and that of another unit are operating in the same area, there must be a positive means of communicating this information immediately to the patrol.

Observation: The use of the tracked vehicle head and chest set with the PRC-25 radio allows continuous communication to be maintained with patrols without disclosing their location by speaker noise.

(6) (U) Item: The majority of casualties from the scout vehicle crews are observers.

Discussion: The scout vehicle commander is protected by a prefabricated gun shield while the observer has no protection.

Observation: The gun shield for the track commander is effective in protecting him from enemy fire. The use of sand bags has reduced the casualty rate among the observer personnel.

(7) (U) Item: Armor is an absolute necessity if an overland line of communication is to be used to support combat operations in areas subject to interdiction by the NVA/VC.
4 August 1966

CONFIDENTIAL


Discussion: This battalion has been used extensively in convoy escort and route security missions. Escort missions are accomplished by interspersing the escorted column with tactical vehicles so that several can engage any ambush position. Helicopters greatly enhance security of the column. The route security mission is accomplished by establishing outposts of one or more combat vehicles along the route so that effective fire can be brought to bear on any ambush position. In addition mounted patrols are conducted between these outposts to prevent any ambush force from getting into position.

Observation: There have been no attempts to ambush any escorted convoys or convoy moving along a route secured by this battalion.

(8) (U) Item: Armor units can be used effectively to reinforce engaged units or to counterattack the enemy force.

Discussion: When infantry units become engaged, armor units can move to the scene of action. This can be accomplished in areas normally considered unsuitable for mass armor employment but requires a thorough knowledge of trafficability within the area of operations (see Section II paragraph 2 b (2) to facilitate timely action. In areas where the tanks can not close with the enemy the long range direct fire capability can be used to influence the outcome of the engagement.

Observation: On three occasions during this period C Troop 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, or one of its platoons has successfully been employed in this role, (see Section I paragraph 6d, 9d and 10d).

(9) (U) Item: The M48 AVLB is used to extend the mobility of armor units.

Discussion: The AVLB has been used on numerous occasions to permit rapid crossing of obstacles. It extended the use of Route 19 to Duc Co for a period of a month after the ford at YA975291 became unusable. During Operation Circle Pines the ABLB was used to allow the battalion entry and exit of the area of operations, (paragraph 7, Combat After Actions Report (RCS/J3/32) this headquarters dated 7 April 1966). The M48 version of the AVLB is obsolete, too heavy and subject to mechanical failure but the system is an absolute requirement for armor units. This vehicle should be replaced by a lighter, more maneuverable, and more maintainable item.

Observation: The AVLB has proven to be one of this battalions more valuable assets.

(10) Item: Logistic elements that are being escorted must be thoroughly briefed prior to the convoy's departure.

CONFIDENTIAL
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TLARM-C

4 August 1966


Discussion: This Battalion's SOP for convoy escort places the escort commander in charge of all personnel. His briefing includes but is not limited to the following subjects: Rate of march, distance, frequency and call signs, action in event of contact and route information. The convoy is assembled in a secure area where this briefing is conducted and the convoy organized.

Observation: The briefing has improved the control of logistic elements during marches and insures proper reaction in event of enemy ambush.

d. (U) Logistics:

(1) Item: Feeding of A Rations in remote areas.

Discussion: When units are deployed in remote areas for extended periods A Rations should be fed at least once a day. This has proven to be a definite factor in maintaining high morale. This requires that kitchens either be deployed with the unit or the food moved by use of mermite cans (insulated container).

Observations: The practice of feeding at least one A Rations per day to units deployed in remote areas should be continued when tactical situation permits.

(2) Item: Armor units deployed in remote areas must be re-supplied with fuel by other than TOE means.

Discussion: The resupply of an armored unit fuel requirements in remote areas, can best be accomplished by use of the 500 gallon collapsible containers. Replacement couplings, hoses and valves must be available since these items are inclined to be damaged during transport and delivery. A battalion sized unit will require approximately 20 of these containers. These containers can be transported by either armored personnel carriers or by air. Units should also have the necessary sling apparatus to permit air delivery.

Observation: Since this organization has procured the collapsible container, the resupply of fuel has presented no problems.

e. Maintenance:

(1) Item: Enemy mines have caused suspension damage to many tracked vehicles. These vehicles, particularly tanks have not always been immediately repairable due to shortage of suspension parts.
CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C


4 August 1966

Discussion: The normal enemy mine will cause damage that will require replacement of six road wheels, three road wheel hubs with bearings, 2 road wheel housings, one road wheel arm, and eight track blocks to effect repairs. The repaired vehicle will experience future problems with the suspension system and track life will be out to approximately one half that normally expected. This problem area was forecast in November 1965 to Division G4.

Observation: Armor units deploying to RVN should have suspension parts stockage based on the demand experience of this Battalion.

(2) Item: The 4.2 KW generator authorized as a component of the Track Command Post M-577 is used extensively during combat operations in Vietnam.

Discussion: The repair parts for the 4.2 KW generator are based on demand data generated on state side use. For the past 5 months these generators on the operations and intelligence vehicles have operated an average of 8 hours a day. Repair parts, particularly replacement engines are not available in the supply system at this time.

Observation: Support agencies must stock repair parts for this piece of equipment based on demand data generated by like units in-country and stock these parts before entering RVN.

f. (U) Communications:

(1) Item: Excessive down time for communication equipment.

Discussion: Although the new series radio is far superior to the old, excessive down time caused by inadequate stockage of required items is causing a strain on effective combat communications. Within the command the shortages of repair parts, modules, transistors, cables, test equipment and float radios has created a high deadline rate and a down time of three weeks or more for vehicular mounted radios. The lack of availability of land line communications equipment i.e., telephones and line packs for switchboards is reducing current equipment capabilities and causing base area communication requirements not to be satisfactorily fulfilled.

Observation: The current assigned supply priority of this battalion does not adequately levy the supply system to ensure timely delivery of required repair parts and equipment. Also the direct support agencies stockage of repair parts and float equipment does not appear to be adequate to support combat operations.

/s/ R. J. Fairfield, Jr.

R. J. FAIRFIELD
Lt Col, Armor
Commanding

4 Incl
1. Sketch Map of Blocking Pos on Rte 19
2. MONEVAL Report May (Limited Distr)
3. MONEVAL Report June (Limited Distr)
4. MONEVAL Report July (Limited Distr)
CONFIDENTIAL

TLARM-C

4 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1966. (RCS GSGPO-28) (R1)

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AVDC-C-OP (4 Aug 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS GGSP-28) (R1)

Headquarters, 3d Bde TF, 25th Inf Div, APO US Forces 96355, 20 Oct 1966

THRU: Channels

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240

1. Forwarded herewith is Operational Report of Lessons Learned for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, submitted by the 1st Battalion, 69th
Armor.

2. The inclusion of additional lessons learned delayed submission
of this report.

3. The report and recommendations appear adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R.F. LEVERGOOD
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
AVDDH-GC


HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO US Forces 96262, 22 Oct 66

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350


2. Forwarded is the Operational Report On Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 for the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.

3. The reported unit was attached to the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966. Any assets available within the division will be applied to alleviate materiel deficiencies noted above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Ronal B Stephens

4 Incl
nc

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DIR 5/20/88
AVFA-GC-O&T
3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS C5FP065 (U)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

Concur with comments and recommendations in basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT A. DICKOVER
CPT, AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Regraded Unclassified when separated from classified enclosure.
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor as incorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. Reference Paragraph 1b, Section II, Page 7: Enclosure 3 to Letter, Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, subject: Administration and Control of Non-Commissioned Officer Interpreters, 4 November 1965, authorizes one Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) interpreter per tank company and also one interpreter per rifle company. Due to the non-availability of qualified ARVN personnel, all authorized positions cannot be filled at this time. There is a critical shortage of qualified US Army interpreters in Viet Nam.

   b. Reference Paragraph d(1) and (2), Section II, Pages 7 and 8: The items referred to should be included in MTUS that is being prepared by the unit.

   c. Reference Paragraph d(3), Section II, Page 8: Tow cables for tracked vehicles are short throughout the command. Current status is none on hand, 1,920 on requisition, and 511 due out.

   d. Reference Paragraph 2e(1), Section II, Page 12: Concur that suspension parts stockage for tracked vehicles in this theater of operation should be based on Viet Nam requirements. There is a shortage of suspension system components in Viet Nam at this time.

   e. Reference Paragraph 2e(2), Section II, Page 12: Increased stockage of repair parts for the 4.2 KW generator is being accomplished as parts become available in supply channels.

   f. Reference Paragraph f(1), Section II, Pages 12 and 13: Communications capabilities as well as signal maintenance capabilities have vastly improved since the submission of this report. Prescribed Load Lists and maintenance float equipment has been increased to reflect theater experience in those areas where justified.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. L. CONNER
Cpt, AGC
Asst. Adjutant General

4 Incl
nc
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed with
the following additional comments:

a. Reference Section II, Paragraph 1d (3), Page 8: Requirements for tow cables are currently being investigated by this headquarters. If required, CONUS NICP will be requested to expedite delivery of this item.

b. Reference Section II, Paragraph 2e (1), Page 12: Parts in support of combat vehicle suspension systems are being shipped to USARV to meet current demands. Redistribution of suspension components excess to Eighth Army has been initiated.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. L. Chappell
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

MEGADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE(S)
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (13 Feb 67) FOR OT RD
15 February 1967


TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
a/s

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