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**AD NUMBER**

| AD385641 |

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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**AUTHORITY**

- Group-4 DoDD 5200.10, 26 Jul 1962; OAG, D/A ltr., 29 Apr 1980

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Headquarters 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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101st Airborne Division (-)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)

Commanding Officers
5th Battalion, 46th Infantry
5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

TO: See Distribution

SECTION C (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL: During the reporting period, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, terminated Operation THAYER II, participated in Operation PERSHING and Operation LE JEUNE, and commenced Operation BAKER for a total of 90 consecutive days in combat. These operations were conducted in the following time phases:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>THAYER II</td>
<td>3 January 1967</td>
<td>120700H February 1967</td>
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<td>PERSHING</td>
<td>120700H February 1967</td>
<td>191200H April 1967</td>
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<td>LE JEUNE</td>
<td>191200H April 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKER</td>
<td>221200H April 1967</td>
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The 3d Brigade TF, has participated in 356 days of consecutive combat duty as of 30 April 1967.

a. Mission:

(1) The mission in Operation THAYER II was to conduct offensive operations in the THAYER II AO (center of mass BR8065) designed to locate and destroy elements of the 18th NVA Regiment.

(2) The mission in Operation PERSHING was to provide close security protection in general support of RD operations in the PHU MY Area by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance patrols and search and destroy operations in the SUCI CA Valley and its western approaches, the 506 Valley and in the PHU MY District in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 22d ARVN Division.

(3) The mission in Operation LE JEUNE was:

(a) Deploy to LE JEUNE AO by sea 17-19 April 1967
AVDC-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-OSFOR-65) (U)

and by air on 19 April 1967.

(b) Assume control of the 2/35 Infantry and relieve
2d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) of the I2 JEUNE AO responsibilities and
missions on 19 April 1967.

(4) Upon relief of 2d Brigade:

1. Conduct search and destroy operations in the
DUC PHO Area to provide security for base development and clear the DUC
PHO Area of enemy forces.

2. Provide security for construction of CIDG camps,
sea LOC Terminal and road leading thereto.

3. Provide security for non-divisional engineer
battalion to construct U-330 airfield and improve roads in the DUC PHO
Area.

4. Be prepared to provide reserve/reaction forces
for relief/reinforcement of RF, FF, CIDG Camps, and District Headquarters
in RA TO and DUC PHO Districts.

5. Be prepared to come under operational control
of TF OREGON on order.

(4) The mission in Operation BAKER was to assume respon-
sibility within the DUC PHO TACR for:

(a) Offensive and defensive operations designed to
locate and destroy NVA units, main force units, local force units, and
guerrilla and Viet Cong infrastructure.

(b) Support of Revolutionary Development.

(c) Counter infiltration operations in the coastal
areas within the TACR.

(d) Conduct of psychological operations in support
of tactical operations and Revolutionary Development.

(e) Conduct of offensive and reconnaissance oper-
ations within the TACR, coordinating as appropriate with CG, 2d ARVN
Division.

(f) Conduct of offensive operations outside of DUC
PHO TACR as directed or approved by CG, TF OREGON.
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(RCS-OPFOR-65) (u)

(g) Defend and/or participate in the defense of other US and GVN critical installations as directed by CO, TF OREGON.

(h) As directed by CO, TF OREGON, and in coordination with appropriate GVN provincial and district authorities, assist in the training of and render support to GVN regional and popular forces.

(i) Be prepared, on a quick reaction basis when directed by CO, TF OREGON, to relieve and/or reinforce CIDG Camps at BA TO (BS15027), GIA VUC (BS179270), TRA BONG (BS315882), HU THANH (BS389704), MINH LONG (BS511256), and KHAN DUC (ZC005060). 3d Brigade TF had primary responsibility for BA TO and GIA VUC; secondary responsibility for the latter four camps.

(j) Be prepared on 12 hour notice, to provide an reinforced infantry battalion for employment anywhere in South Vietnam. Be prepared on an additional 12 hours notice, to deploy the remainder of the 3d Brigade TF anywhere in South Vietnam.

b. Operational area (See Inclosure 4)

(1) The area designated for Operation THAYER II included the SUCI CA Valley (center of mass BR5055) and adjoining hillmasses to the east, west, and north. The area encompassed approximately 220 square miles.

(2) The area designated for Operation PERSHING included the THAYER II AO plus the 505 Valley (center of mass BR5930), the NUI MINU Area (center of mass CR0175), the GRESHENT Area (center of mass BR9582), the GAT GIEP Area (center of mass BR5572) and the PHU MY Valley (center of mass BR9055). The area encompassed approximately 520 square miles.

(3) The area designated for Operation LE JEUNE and Operation BAKER encompassed the majority of DUC PHO District, Quang Ngai Province, covering an area of approximately 155 square miles.

c. Control:

(1) The 3d Brigade Task Force was under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for Operations THAYER II, PERSHING and LE JEUNE during the period 1 February 1967 - 221200 April 1967. On 221200 April 1967 upon the initiation of operation BAKER the 3d Brigade TF was under the operational control of TF OREGON and continued in that status throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

d. Task Organizations: Throughout the reporting period many units were placed under temporary operational control of the 3d Brigade.
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AVOC-V-OP

10 May 1967

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(RCS-LOGCER-65) (U)

TF for varying periods of time, the principal units of the 3d Brigade
TF with commanders' names and dates of command and the major supporting
and operational control units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
Colonel James G. Sweeney

Lieutenant Colonel Rodney B. Gilbertson - Deputy Commander,
1 March - 30 April 1967.

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Miller

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kingston, 1 Feb - 8 Feb 67
Major James E. Moore, 8 Feb - 30 April 1967

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Clinton E. Granger, Jr.

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Captain John F. Irving, III

3d Support Battalion (Provisional)
Major Andrew H. House, 1 - 18 February 1967
Major Robert R. Rutledge, 18 February - 30 April 1967

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion
Captain Arthur J. Rumsey Jr.

10th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
First Lieutenant Robert W. Traumray

52d Aviation Battalion (GS), 1 Feb - 28 March 1967

11th Aviation Battalion (GS), 28 March - 30 April 1967

2/5 Cavalry (OPCON), 1 - 9 Feb 1967

2/5 Cavalry (OPCON), 6 - 9 Mar 1967

D 1/2 Cavalry (OPCON), 6 - 9 Mar 1967

D 1/5 Cavalry (OPCON), 4 - 7 April 1967

B 1/9 Cavalry (OPCON), 19 - 30 April 1967
AVD-0-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(Nos. OSFOR-65) (U)

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Principal staff:
S1
Major John D. Weil
S2
Major Edgar Egeland
S3
Major James E. Moore, Jr., 1 - 8 Feb 67
Major R. P. House, 8 Feb - 30 April 1967
S4
Major John A. Joyce
S5
Captain John Schmidt, III, 1 - 19 Feb 1967
Major John W. Schuecker, Jr., 19 Feb - 30 April 1967

e. Artillery Support:

(1) See inclosures 1, 2, and 3 for artillery support of the 3d Brigade Task Force during Operations THAYER II, PERSHING and IZ JEBUS.

(2) During Operation BAKER the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-) was in direct support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(a) Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(b) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, remained attached to the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, which was under the OPCON of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(c) Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(d) During Operation BAKER Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm-towed) was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Battery C had the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(e) Brigade base camp security: Throughout the period, the 3d Brigade TF maintained an adequate defensive posture to provide continuous security for its brigade base camp vicinity of MKIsU.
The forces and organization established in OPLAN WINDJAMMER continued to be implemented throughout the reporting period.

f. (U) Operation TINKER II, conducted during the reporting period 1 - 12 February 1967, is covered in the After Action Report, TINKER II, attached as inclosure 1.

g. (U) Operation PERSHING, conducted during the period 12 February - 19 April 1967, is covered in the After Action Report, PERSHING, attached as inclosure 2.

h. (U) Operation LE JEUNE conducted during the period 19 - 22 April 1967 is covered in the After Action Report, LE JEUNE, attached as inclosure 3.

2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. The 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division deployed in the DUC PHO Area of Operations by air and sea on 19 April 1967 and became part of Task Force Oregon on 22 April. Current intelligence indicated a strong enemy force which had remained unchallenged in DUC PHO and NO DUC Districts. A total of two well equipped NVA Regiments, one Sapper battalion, one well equipped local force battalion and three local force companies were known to be operating in DUC PHO, NO DUC, or the eastern mountains of RA TO District. The infrastructure was known to be strong in the villages and hamlets. Prior to the arrival of the 3d Brigade TF there was no record of only one local VC who had rallied to the government of South Vietnam. In the first few days of contact the enemy was observed crossing open fields with weapons during daylight hours. He soon learned that this tactic ended in disaster. Ground to air fire, sniping and mining incidents were commonplace. Strong evidence indicated that the enemy was resupplied with arms and ammunition by sea and with food from the rice, meat and fish of DUC PHO.

b. One major contact in a fortified village on 16 April by elements of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry in which over 43 enemy were killed gave some indication of the extent that the enemy forces had concentrated their efforts, recruited local forces, and prepared the battlefield in an attempt to keep DUC PHO District under communist control.

c. 22 - 30 April: During this initial period all available evidence indicated that the enemy had not expected friendly forces to deploy to Quang Ngai. In addition, the enemy was taken by surprise by the aggressive search and destroy operations of the 3d Brigade Task Force. On 22 April elements of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry established contact with enemy forces fighting from a fortified village at BS79030. The enemy utilized the tactics of fire discipline, maximum
use of prepared battle positions (to include communication trenches, air
raid tunnels, and fighting bunkers), and maneuver of small tactical ele-
ments, indicating a high level of training. Documents captured from the
33 enemy bodies (one enemy killed was assigned as a platoon leader) iden-
tified members of the 3d Company, 93d Battalion, 2d VC Regiment. Further
documentary evidence, agent reports and the nature of the weapons cap-
tured, indicated that cadre from this company were actively engaged in
training the local force guerrillas in political and military subjects.
Confirmation of this cadre work was made as a result of a similar con-
tact by elements of the 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry on 23 April at
BS764107. Apparently a platoon of the 3d Company, 97th Battalion, 2d
VC Regiment had been training a local force company in their village.
Twenty-one enemy were killed. On 24 April, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
again engaged a similar type force at BS742b27. The contact lasted well
into the night, and accounted for another 22 enemy killed. Documents
captured indicated that 2d Company, 97th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment,
200th Recon Company, 3d NVA Division, and 2d VC Regimental Headquar-
ters personnel had been killed. Most probably these were training and recon-
naisance cadres who had been sent to Pho Nghia Village to prepare the
battlefield, train the local guerrillas, recon the US Forces operating in the vicinity, establish resupply caches of ammunition, and procure the rice then being harvested. Despite active and continuous surveil-
lance coupled with immediate return fire, the enemy frequently engaged
friendly forces with an average of five ground to air firings daily,
four sniping incidents and four attempted mining incidents per day.

In addition to these initial reactions as part of their counter-
attack plan, the enemy developed the strategy of drawing friendly forces
to the north to spread our fighting strength and lure vulnerable elements
into a kill zone. An NVA Returnee who surrendered on 23 April reported
that his company, the 31st Company (75mm R) of the 300th Heavy Weapons
Battalion, 3d NVA Division, together with the 32d Company (82mm Mortar)
and the 33d Company (Signal) were to ambush US Forces in the vicinity of
BS7042. Local Forces, probably the 38th Local Force Battalion, were to
be pursued into the kill zone by US Forces and the US Forces would be
amniliated by the 300th Heavy Weapons Battalion attacking with the
2d VC Regiment. Friendly forces found fortified hamlets, several with
concrete bunkers, south along Highway 1 from BS764465 to the northern
bank of the Song Tra Ca River (BS764418) and west along the river to the
mountains. The defeat of the enemy forces in early contacts to-
gether with the thorough use of artillery and tactical air strikes and
one B-52 strike confused and dispersed the enemy and drove him from the
battlefield deeper into the jungle covered mountains. During this period
arms bearing Viet Cong began surrendering to friendly forces in increas-
ing numbers. Most of them were village guarrillas. All of them were
afraid. A typical comment of one of the Returnees was that he was afraid
and tired of living like and being hunted down like an animal. As this
initial period ended it became apparent that the enemy had established a
firm plan to maintain control of DQ PH0, but for his plan to have a
chance for success larger forces would have to be committed.

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SUMMARY OF ENEMY PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT LOSSES AS OF 30 APR 67

(Total 12 days)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

3. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES:

a. Plans:

(1) 3d Brigade TF prepared contingency plans for the relief and reinforcement of critical US/ARVN installations in THAYER II and PERSHING AO.

(2) During Operations LE JEUNE and BAKER, the 3d Brigade TF had contingency plans for the relief and reinforcement of CIDG camps at the following locations:

a. BA TO
   BS556327
b. GIA VUC
   BS377271
c. MINH DINH
   BS555510
d. TRA BONG
   BS545878
e. HA THANH
   BS32170

b. Operations:

(1) Operation THAYER II, 1 - 12 February (See Inclosure 1, After Action Report, THAYER II).

(2) Operation PERSHING, 12 February - 29 April (See Inclosure 2, After Action Report, PERSHING).

(3) Operation LE JEUNE, 19 - 22 April (See Inclosure 3, After Action Report, LE JEUNE).

(4) Period 22 - 30 April 1967.

a) General: Upon being placed under the operational control of Task Force Oregon effective 2200H April, Operation BAKER commenced with the 3d Brigade TF continuing offensive and defensive operations in the DUC PHO Area designed to locate and destroy NVA and VC main forces, VC local forces, guerrillas, and VC infrastructure in the DUC PHO Area with two Infantry Battalions (1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry), one Armored Cav Troop (D, 3/4 Cav), one Air Cav Troop (B, 1/9 Cav), and supporting elements. Three major contacts were made during the period, all by elements of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, while smaller contacts were made by other combat elements of the 3d Brigade TF. Operations in the DUC PHO Area were typified by frequent engagements not only against well entrenched enemy company size forces, but also by encounters with various types of booby traps and land mines, and numerous incidents of sniper fire and ground-to-air fire. By the end of the reporting period the 3d Brigade TF had taken a heavy toll on the enemy and forced him to take the defensive while suffering very few US casualties.

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(b) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the period the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the western portion of the DUO PRO Area, engaging in three major contacts in village areas along the Song Tra Cau River. (See Inclosure 5).

(c) 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the period the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in the eastern portion of the DUO PRO area and provided security for the Sea LOC Terminal at LZ GUADALCANAL, the Brigade CP area at LZ MONTEZUMA, the road leading from GUADALCANAL to MONTEZUMA, "Golden Fleece" operations in the DUO PRO Area, and the ARVN artillery base at LZ SEMPER. The battalion had no major contacts during this period.

(d) Troop C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry: During the period C, 3d/9 Cav was under the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. One platoon assisted in providing security for LZ GUADALCANAL and conducted daily search and destroy operations in the vicinity to the north and south with elements of B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. C Troop (-) assisted in providing security for LZ MONTEZUMA and the road between MONTEZUMA and GUADALCANAL and conducted periodic search and destroy operations in the vicinity of LZ MONTEZUMA in coordination with elements of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(e) Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry: B, 1/9 Cav was under the operational control of the 3d Brigade TF during the period. B Troop provided vital support to 3d Brigade TF operations by conducting daily air and ground reconnaissance throughout the TAOE.

(f) Training Activities: During the reporting period the 3d Brigade TF personnel graduated from the following schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th># GRADUATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Div NCO School</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Div Pre Recendo School</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV Recendo School</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chemical:

(1) Riot control agent (CS) and white phosphorous grenades were employed to the maximum extent throughout the reporting period to clear tunnels and bunkers.

(2) Riot control agent was extensively utilized during
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(ECS-CSFOR-65) (U)

the reporting period in clearing fortified areas on search and destroy operations.

(3) During Operation FRESHING and Operation DAKER, explosive fused drums of CS-I were dropped from C-130 aircraft to deny and channelize the enemy's use of specific terrain.

(4) On 4 March 1967 (Operation FRESHING) the following areas were sprayed with defoliants: BR726666 - BR746668, BR726664 - BR746662, BR725569 - BR735565, BR745564 - BR755569, BR736673a - BR736677, BR746673 - BR746676.

e. KYMIR:

(1) Payops appeals were directed at specific hamlets, villages, groups, and individuals. The KYMIR program supported the daily tactical situation by utilizing current intelligence information.

(2) Ground teams and aircraft were coordinated during the tactical operation. Tapes and ground presentations were synchronous. Leaflets were dropped to support the loudspeaker broadcasts.

(3) Personal contact with the population was utilized in distributing JUSPAO newspapers, GVN flags and KYMIR posters.

(4) Leaflet drops and loudspeaker tape appeals were accomplished utilizing U-10, UH-1D and H-23 aircraft.

(5) Tape appeals were made by village chiefs urging the people of their villages not to support the Viet Cong and to evacuate areas which were under Viet Cong control.

(6) Summary of KYMIR activities:

a. Leaflets dropped 11,323,970
b. Speaker time 104 hours
c. U-10 missions 58
d. Returnees 96
e. Weapons 4
f. Leaflets fabricated 9
g. Tapes made 21

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(S/NoF-25) (U)

Tactical air support statistics for the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BAC Missions/Combat Flights</th>
<th>Reg Flown</th>
<th>Reg Flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 1 - 28 Feb 67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 1 - 31 March 67</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 1 - 30 April 67</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) TOTAL</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- % Run 75% 31%

Aviation: The aviation element continued to function with the responsibility of broadcasting artillery advisories over FM radio and operating a traffic control center. During the quarterly period, the section flew 891 hours, 24/2 sorties, and carried 2101 passengers in organic helicopters. Airmobile support was provided to the 3d Brigade TF by the 52d Aviation Bn, from 1 February to 28 March 67, and by the 211th Aviation Battalion, 28 March - 30 April 1967. Troop lifts, landing zone preparations, command and control capability and resupply missions were provided.

b. Logistics:

- Supply: No major supply problems existed during the period. During TAIKER II (1-12 Feb) and PERSHING (12 Feb - 19 April) 3d Brigade TF was supported with all classes of supplies by the Forward Support Area TF HARTSEL. During LEBE JUENE (19-22 Apr) and BAKER (22-30 Apr) 3d Brigade TF was supported with all classes of supplies by the Forward Support Area TF GALLAHER.

b. Transportation:

- The truck squads continued to be utilized for line haul between a base of operation and the Forward Support Area.

- An Air Force C7A was utilized daily to transport replacements, RER, FMS, emergency leave, mail and critical supply items from base camp to the Area of Operation.

C7A Statistics were:

(a) Sorties: 592
(b) Passengers: 7,283
(c) Cargo: 386,512

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(3) On 15 Feb 3d Brigade TF moved from Bongom Beach, BS690522; by organic vehicles 30 km to LZ UPLIFT to begin Operation PRESSING.

(b) On 15 Apr 1967 3d Brigade TF began their move to the LE JEUNE Area of Operations, vicinity DDU PHO.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry moved by C130 from Qui Nhon to Chu Lai. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C130</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry moved from LZ UPLIFT to LZ MONTEZUMA on 15 and 16 Apr 1967. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C7A</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) The Brigade TF (-) moved from LZ UPLIFT to LZ MONTEZUMA on 17, 18, 19 and 20 Apr 1967. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C7A</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>73,800</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH47</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>629,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>258</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Equipment:

(1) 3d Brigade TF received M60E1 Rifles to replace the M1A1 Rifle and 90 percent turn-in of the M1A1 was completed by the end of the reporting period.

(2) 100 CAR15 SMGs were received and issued to units in the 3d Brigade TF for test and evaluation.

(3) The Alarm Set, Anti Intrusion, AN/GSS-9, was received during the quarter and issued on a limited basis as a test and evaluation item.

(4) The 3 gallon capacity rubber water containers (air droppable) have proven to be outstanding for water resupply.
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(RDS-OPFOR-85) (V)

d. Medical:

(1) Number of patients treated by 3d Brigade TF Clearing Station = 3,312.

(2) Number of disease cases = 2,869.

(3) Number of battle casualties = 161.

(4) Number of non-battle casualties = 282.

e. Statistics:

(1) Class I:

(a) A Rations = 796,870.

(b) C Rations = 205,000.

(2) Class III:

(a) Nogas = 275,480 gallons.

(b) Diesel = 207,500 gallons.

(c) JAF = 91,000

(3) Class V:

(a) 10 MM = 17,894 rounds.

(b) 81 HE = 24,300 rounds.

(c) 122 HE = 13,500 rounds.

(d) 105 HE = 53,100 rounds.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. General:

(1) Major emphasis was placed on short range, high impact civic action projects in the Area of 3d Brigade TF Operations. The 3d Brigade TF-85 Section worked with military intelligence personnel, HYSOR teams, MACV subsector personnel, National Police, OVN officials, and infantry units in support of tactical operations.

(2) OVN representatives accompanied the Civil Affairs
and PSYOPS teams whenever possible, in order to insure a more favorable reception by indigenous personnel. In many areas, this was the first exposure to the GVN for the people of the rural areas.

(3) Civil Affairs Areas of Operations were:

(a) TOWIE II and PERSHING: Dinh Dinh Province
   (Phu Cat and Phu My Districts).

(b) Summary:

   1. Total MEDCAP Operations:
      a. Sickcall  5472
      b. Dental Hygiene  8h
      c. Baths for Children  992
      d. A doctor accompanied the CA/PSYOPS team on 19 operations and a dentist on 12.

   2. Public work:
      a. Playground set at Dien Tieu refugee hamlet.
      b. Well at Dien Tieu refugee hamlet.
      c. Market place (3 buildings) at My Tho.
      d. Highway 506 from Hoi An to Jot Highway #1 was reconstructed by D/65th Engineers and opened to traffic.

   3. Commerce: During the reporting period 123 laborers were hired to fill sandbags. Wages paid were at the rate of 50 piasters per day per laborer. A total of 35,000 sandbags were filled during 25 days of employment.

   4. Public Welfare:
      a. 34 tons of captured rice was returned to district officials for redistribution.
      b. 120 lbs of captured salt was distributed.
      c. The new market place at My Tho hamlet in Phu My district was officially opened on 8 April 1967, giving the people of Eastern Phu My district a place to trade and improve their economy.
      d. Operation GOLDEN FLEECE: On 20 April, 3d
Brigade TF took over Operation GOLDEN FLEECE. This was a joint operation with PF and RF cadre to protect rice harvesters while they harvested rice from public lands in DUC THO district. In all there were 9 operations with a total of 115 tons of rice returned to SVN control. Of the 115 tons, 40 tons are stored at district headquarters.

2 Government and Education:

a Two village bulletin boards were erected at My Tho and Dien Tieu.

b SVN flags were presented to the village chiefs of My Tho and Dien Tieu.

6 Refugee Assistance:

a A total of 1177 refugees were relocated from areas controlled by VC and NVA to refugee centers in Phu My District.

b The following supplies and assistance were given to the refugees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>18,780 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>120 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>330 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>24 oz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy</td>
<td>725 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned Goods</td>
<td>114 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>1,069 loaves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c During Operation LE JEUNS and Operation DAKER, (19 thru 30 April) the following refugee assistance was provided:

(1) Roofing sheets 140
(2) Bags of cement 28

d At the end of the reporting period there were 69 family refugee units under construction in DUC THO. This was an increase of 14 units since 19 April.
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Remarks:

(1) Refugees in the Phu My District suffered from various diseases, principally pneumonia, tuberculosis, and glaucoma. Many children suffered from Excessa. HEDCAP missions were specifically arranged to help the newly located refugees.

(2) There was a considerable refugee problem in Phu My district with approximately 29,000 refugees in the centers by 19 April. Only 52% of the heads of families are gainfully employed. The camps themselves were generally overcrowded and lacked sanitary facilities. Efforts were made by the US, ARVN, and O&M agencies to alleviate the condition.

(3) There were approximately 11,500 refugees in Dac Pho district as of 30 April. Of these, 1,266 were registered in the refugee centers of the district. There were no overwhelming problems in controlling these people and adequate facilities were fully utilized with more, under construction or planned. The refugees had sufficient food and clothing and were supported by a continuous HEDCAP program for health and sanitation.

6. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. (U) General:

(1) The 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division was attached to the 4th Infantry Division for administration and logistics effective 13 February 1967. All administrative functions previously performed by the Personnel Services Division of the Brigade were transferred to the Division.

(2) Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division Engineer Battalion effective 12 March 1967.

(3) Company D, 725th Maintenance Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division 7th Maintenance Battalion effective 17 April 1967.

(4) Company B, 25th Medical Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division Medical Battalion effective 17 April 1967.

(5) Troop C, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was attached to the 4th Infantry Division 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry effective 17 April 1967.

(6) 40th Scout Dog Platoon was attached to the 4th Infantry Division 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery effective 17 April 1967.
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b. (C) Unit Strength:

(1) As of 30 April 1967, the strength of the units of the 3d Brigade Task Force were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>(OFF)</th>
<th>(WU)</th>
<th>(EM)</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>(OFF)</th>
<th>(WU)</th>
<th>(EM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The 3d Brigade TF strengths changed daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Mar</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mar</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Apr</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Apr</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(MCS-OSFOR-65) (1) (3) Replacements received:

FEBRUARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade / Date</th>
<th>E-2</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/24 Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/6 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 25th Med</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Eng</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

MARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade / Date</th>
<th>E-2</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1/24 Inf</td>
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<td>1/35 Inf</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2/35 Inf</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/6 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 25th Med</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Spt Bn</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Eng</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APRIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade / Date</th>
<th>E-2</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/24 Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/6 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 25th Med</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Spt Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Eng</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVLDC-OF

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-GSFOR-55) (U)

(1) The number of friendly casualties for February, March, and April are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organic units:</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>WIA DIED OF WOUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Number of emergency leaves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/34 Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Engr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 25th Med</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Sct Dog Flt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th PI Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 725th Maint</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Personnel who departed for separation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/34 Inf</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Spt Bn</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHC, 3d Tde</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Engr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 3/4 Cav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) The problem of strength accounting, although difficult due to the separation of units from the base camp, was assisted immeasurably by the use of periodic musters held simultaneously in all brigade areas. Musters are correlated to the morning reports promoting accurate strength accounting.

c. (C) Morale: Morale continues to be excellent within the command.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(1) Mail:

(a) Number of bags received: 4,751
(b) Number of bags dispatched: 3,156
(c) Total Money Orders sold: $995,449.44
(d) Total stamp value sold: $21,277.00
(e) Dates mail was not received:

- February: 1, 22, 24, and 25th
- March: 12th
- April: 10th and 13th

(2) R&R:

(a) Allocations were sufficient to satisfy the needs of the command. R&R continues to be an important morale factor.

(b) Monthly allocations were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14 Inf</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/9 Arty</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Spt Bn</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Engr</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 Cav</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>256</strong></td>
<td><strong>259</strong></td>
<td><strong>290</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Promotion allocations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td><strong>E-1</strong></td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td><strong>E-2</strong></td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14 Inf</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 725 Maint</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp D, 3/4 Cav</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Engr</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
<td>E-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>330</strong></td>
<td><strong>311</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1,82)

21

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MARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>E-1</th>
<th>E-2</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14 Inf</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Engr</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 725th Maint</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp C, 3/4 Cav</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APRIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>E-1</th>
<th>E-2</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14 Inf</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9 Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 725th Maint</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 65th Engr</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp C, 3/4 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Awards and decorations:

(1) After attachment to the 4th Infantry Division the awards section of the 3d Brigade IF was incorporated in the 4th Infantry Division Personnel Services Division.

(2) Awards presented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star Medal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVID.C.OP

SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

10 May 1967

(RED.-SFOR.65) (U)

f. Religion:

(1) Chaplains conducted religious services in the field under combat conditions with no apparent problems.

(2) Chaplains made numerous trips to visit hospitals where 3d Brigade TF personnel were located. Chaplains delivered mail and other personal belongings during these visits.

(3) Jewish personnel were given the opportunity to attend passover services in Nha Trang.

g. Reenlistment:

(1) The high reenlistment rate in the brigade is a positive indication of the high morale present in this unit.

(2) The 3d Brigade TF achieved 100% of RA Career and 1st term reenlistees during this period.

(3) Reenlistments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Prior Service</th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RA (career)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last Prior Service</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1st term)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last Prior Service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Artillery:

a. During the reporting period the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, participated in five major operations: SAM HOUSTON, THAYER II, FRESHING, LE JEUNE, and BAKER. The fires of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, accounted for the following losses: 5 VC KIA; 4 VC WIA; 13 bunkers destroyed; 22 huts destroyed; 1 house destroyed; and 4 secondary explosions.

b. Attachments for reporting period see para 1e.

8. Other:

a. Engineer:

(1) General: During the quarter 1 February - 30 April 1967, Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion continued to support the 3d Brigade TF by providing both combat engineer support in the area of operations and construction support for the Brigade base camp.
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20 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(2) Operations:

(a) Engineer support in the area of operations consisted mainly of:


2. Destruction of enemy tunnels, caves, bunkers, and defensive positions.

3. Preparation and maintenance of two new Brigade forward CP areas.

4. Construction, maintenance, and improvement of defensive perimeters.

5. Mine clearing.

6. Airfield improvement.

7. Relipad construction and maintenance.

8. Construction of a one-lane, class 32, dry-weather road (Route 506) from BR517720 to ER029892.

9. Establishment and maintenance of a water point.

10. Assisting and in civil affairs construction projects such as well-digging.

(b) Engineer support at the base camp included:

1. Assisting in movement of 3d Brigade TF base camp to Dragon Mountain.

2. Hauling construction materials for development of the base camp.

(c) Personnel and Administration:

1. Paragraph 1 00 384: Department of the Army, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, APO 96252, attached Company D, 65th Engineers Battalion to the 4th Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, effective March 12, 1967. Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion remained in support of the 3d Brigade TF as an OPCON unit from 12 March 1967 throughout the duration of the reporting period.
2. An infusion program was carried out between Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion and the 4th Engineer Battalion in order to level off the 4th Engineer Battalion's July rotational humps. A total of 37 personnel in grades SP5 and below were exchanged by Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion for 37 persons from the 4th Engineer Battalion.

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Item: Critical Shortage of Non-Commissioned Officers, MOS 11B40.

   Discussion: There is a critical shortage of infantry non-commissioned officers, MOS 11B40, existing in this command. The following is a consolidation by infantry battalion of the shortages:

   (1) Staff Sergeant E-6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) Sergeant E-5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Observation: Although a liberal promotion policy is a possible solution, it is not a desirable substitute for experienced and mature non-commissioned officers.

b. Item: Third In Country Promotion:

   Discussion: Current regulations allow no more than two in country promotions for enlisted personnel.

   Observation: It is recommended that a third in country promotion policy be initiated and continued indefinitely. Such a program
would be an effective management tool for the commander, in that he
would be able to select individuals who have demonstrated exceptional
ability and promote them accordingly. It would be a good incentive for
recruitment and retention in country, and would help in correcting the
imbalance in grade existing in most units due to the lack of non-com-
missioned officer replacements.

2. Items: Under the provisions of USARV Reg 190-2, USARV; Forms
364 and 365 are the only authorized forms for reporting captured data,
status, and disposition of detainees.

Discussion: Since the publication of USARV Reg 190-2 ouit-
lining the use of Forms 364 and 365, these forms have been unobtainable.
Subordinate units to USARV cannot comply due to the shortage in the supply
system.

Observation: Recommend that USARV publish guidance to sub-
ordinate units permitting local duplication of the format of the forms
364 and 365 until the supply channels can handle the present load that
is required.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Items: Occupancy of Artillery Position:

Discussion: Major problems were encountered by an artillery
battery (105 T) upon occupation of a position on the beach. The major
difficulty was preventing the trails from creeping back when charge 3 or
above was fired.

Observation: These problems can be eliminated by building
a platform under the wheels to prevent them from sinking in the sand.
The howitzer can be further stabilized by use of the 105mm jungle pack
sack and filled with sand and braced by engineer stakes to minimize
creeping.

b. Items: Air-transportable artillery battery fire direction
center (FDC).

Discussion: In order to begin firing upon occupation of
an FDC, the FDC must become operational immediately upon arrival. By
cutting out one long side from each of two CONEX containers, and then
welding the two containers together, an excellent, lightweight, water-
proof, air-transportable FDC can be constructed.

Observation: With the FDC CONEX, an immediate FDC capa-
bility can be made available to any firing battery.
c. **Item: Stay behind ambushes:**

**Discussion:** The enemy in the PERSHING AO established a pattern of trailing US units on search and destroy operations. When this pattern was discovered, rifle companies began employing squad-sized stay behind ambushes. This tactic proved extremely successful. The ground commander must carefully select the area, paying close attention to available cover and concealment.

**Observation:** Unit commanders should encourage the use of stay behind ambushes, and on occasion consider reversing the direction of march and move back into an area already searched.

d. **Item: The problem of booby-trapped Landing Zones:**

**Discussion:** During the reporting period 3d Brigade TF encountered several booby-trapped landing zones resulting in friendly casualties during combat assaults. To minimize this hazard this unit has adopted several techniques:

1. If possible avoid using the same LZ's more than once.
2. If possible select the least obvious looking LZ's.
3. In areas where numerous booby-traps have been encountered all LZ's should have an artillery prep, even though they look innocent and are lacking in vegetation. It is recommended that an additional 5 minutes of artillery be fired, most of the prep with VT fuse.

**Observation:** Units should avoid using the same LZ's more than once. In addition an artillery preparation should be fired on all LZ's regardless of how safe they seem to appear. Commanders should consider adding several minutes of VT fuse fire to their preparation, which should impact directly on the intended LZ.

e. **Item: OH-23 Recovery**

**Discussion:** The damage sustained by an OH-23 during recovery far exceeded the initial damage. The excessive downwash of the CH-47 causes the OH-23 blades to be very vulnerable during recovery.

**Observation:** Damage to the rotor blades during recovery can cause extensive secondary damage. When the situation permits, removal of the main rotor blades of the OH-23 prior to recovery will reduce the risk of further damage intransit.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-GSPOR-65) (U)

10 May 1967

f. Item: There is a need for an M-79 marking round.

Discussion: In recent operations, gunships have been employed more frequently in support of ground troops than ever before by this unit. The standard procedure is to have the ground troops mark their position with smoke and then point out the target by using distance and direction or referring to terrain features. A marking round for the M-79 could be used to rapidly indicate the target; it would also take away the human error in referring to terrain features.

Observation: A standard M-79 marking round should be developed for issue to combat units.

g. Item: Need for a 40mm CS grenade which can be fired from the M-79 or MK148 grenade launchers.

Discussion: Many tactical situations are such that ground troops would be greatly assisted if they could accurately launch CS grenades to a range greater than 25 to 30 meters to force the enemy out of a cave, tunnel, bunker, or trench.

Observation: A standard 40mm CS grenade should be developed, adaptable for launching from the M-79 and MK148 launchers.

h. Item: Clearing of defoliated areas.

Discussion: During Operation PERSHING numerous attempts were made to burn a large dry-wooded defoliated area by utilizing air strikes (napalm), WP grenades, artillery (WP), and dropping 55 gallon drums of napalm from a CH-47 then trying to ignite it upon impact on the ground with tracer rounds and thermite grenades from gunships. All attempts occurred during 1400-1800 hrs, the hottest and driest period of the day; all attempts were unsuccessful.

Observation: A system/SOP should be developed so that guidance can be given to the successful accomplishment of clearing defoliated areas for tactical aerial and ground observation.

i. Item: There is a need for a standard survival mirror in each squad.

Discussion: Several personnel in the 3d Brigade TF have survival signal mirrors. These mirrors greatly conserve the use of smoke and they do not compromise the unit position as readily as smoke does when signalling aircraft. When used properly and on a sunny day they are actually easier to spot from an aircraft than smoke.
Observation: The standard survival signal mirror should be made available for issue to the rifle companies.

j. Item: Lightening the soldier's load.

Discussion: The average soldier carries a rucksack, two-days rations, a double basic load of ammunition, two canteens, and his weapon. This heavy load greatly reduces his foot mobility and in the dry season increases the possibility of heat exhaustion. One method that has been used by this unit is to pick up the individual packs in the morning with the empty 'ermite containers and return them with the re-supply in the late afternoon. Several problems have been encountered in this system:

1. Some packs were lost because they were improperly marked.

2. Additional personnel were required for loading and unloading the equipment at the resupply pad.

3. On one occasion a unit was unable to get its packs because of the weather and tactical situation.

4. Because of the scheduling and pick-up time involved, the units usually were not able to commence their days operation as early as desired.

Observation: If the aircraft are available, this procedure greatly enhances the foot mobility of the individual. There are times when due to the tactical situation, or weather, this is not a feasible practice.

k. Item: The use of Starlight Scopes.

Discussion: 3d Brigade TF has had excellent results with the starlight scope mounted on the M-11 rifle. On one occasion, one of the platoons was set up in a night ambush when they sighted 15 to 20 individuals walking toward their location. The platoon leader was about to give the command to open fire when one of the men with a starlight scope saw that they were women. As it turned out it was a group of women returning from the fish-market. During the battle of Binh My (2), 23-24 April, several VC were shot by use of the starlight scope when they tried to escape across a river. Maintenance appears to be a problem. They damage easily and once turned in for repair it takes a considerable length of time to get them back.

Observation: Emphasis should be placed on procuring additional starlight scopes for the units. In addition maintenance procedures should be improved.
AVDL-C-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(ROE-SFOR-65) (U)

1. Item: The use of railroad flares for marking friendly positions.

Discussion: This unit has experienced many problems in the past in trying to mark friendly positions at night so that close air support could be used. One battalion has begun the practice of carrying railroad flares for this purpose. They are ideal in that they burn for an extended period of time—5 to 10 minutes—and are easy to use. The only place these flares are available at this time is in the Highway Warning Kits.

Observation: An effort should be made to procure a sufficient amount of railroad flares so that they are readily available through normal supply channels.

2. Item: Operations in loose sand.

Discussion: Operating in sandy areas increases the rate of wear on aircraft parts and bearings. The frequency of unscheduled maintenance rises due to the reduced life on parts, and the overall maintenance requirement is greater.

Observation: The amount of time aircraft are down for unscheduled maintenance can be reduced in some cases by early analysis of increased wear rates on critical components and advance ordering of the necessary parts. Dust and sand cannot be eliminated but can be controlled by preservative or other soil stabilizers. Such stabilization is temporary and must be accomplished on a regular basis to be effective.


Discussion: During Operation BAKER this unit encountered enemy well fortified positions with very limited means of extricating them from their position. Air strikes and artillery were not completely successful in penetrating the bunkers.

Observation: A CS round has been developed for mortars and artillery that would help commanders in the field to overcome enemy in fortified positions. A priority system should be established in INW to get new R & D items to units who have an immediate need for them.

4. Item: The problem of leaving usable material in areas for the enemy to pick up.

Discussion: The enemy supply system is at best poor, and he has many shortages. Therefore, he is a scavenger and is prone to police-up anything left behind by the US soldier. Just the opposite
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10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

is true of the US soldier who seldom wants for supplies. This unit has moved into areas vacated by other units and found claymores, 105 rounds, M-79 rounds and thousands of rounds of small arms ammo plus assorted types of other equipment.

This practice should not be tolerated. Only training, supervision and discipline will stop it. Anything that the enemy could use should be picked up or destroyed and this includes used batteries, C-ration cans, and ammo bags. The VC are short of metal and can use the ration tin for many purposes including the construction of booby traps.

Observation: Command emphasis should be placed on units leaving an area free from equipment that the VC can utilize. Harsh measures should be taken against commanders who violate this rule of the battlefield.


Discussion: This unit has had numerous encounters with booby-traps and punji pits. Of course the best method of combating these devices is by having well trained, thoroughly oriented soldiers. Two things which have on occasion proved useful are:

(1) A grappling hook with a light rope attached, used for throwing ahead of the advancing troops in suspected booby-trapped locations.

(2) A long pole carried by the lead man to probe for punji pits along trails etc. This means that the second man in formation has to be responsible for forward security.

Observation: The individual soldier should be thoroughly trained and indoctrinated in booby trap warfare. In addition, in certain areas of heavy booby-traps and punji pit density it might be advisable to use expedients such as grappling hooks and probes to assist in locating these devices.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Item: Shortage of interpreters within the units.

Discussion: The rifle companies habitually operate independently. There have been numerous times when an interpreter was needed immediately, i.e. to exploit tactical information or to persuade NVA/VC to surrender. There is a critical shortage of interpreters in this unit. In fact, infantry battalions in this unit operate without any interpreters approximately 40% of the time.
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10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-OSPFR-55) (U)

Observation: A determined effort should be made to make
available enough qualified interpreters so that one could be assigned
to each rifle company, one to each reconnaissance platoon and two to
each battalion headquarters.

1. Item: Classification of detainees:

Discussion: The classification of detainees is a responsi-
bility of the interrogations officer based upon result of the inter-
rogation. However, classification should also consider the circumstances
of capture and when possible the forward JPW Team interrogation results.

Observation: The classification system of detainees should be
scrutinized and improved. More consideration should be given to the
circumstances of capture.

2. Item: Military Intelligence (MI) Personnel:

Discussion: The MI Detachment which is attached to the 3d
Brigade TF is presently authorized four interrogation prisoner of war (IPW)
enlisted personnel, which is the TO&E authorization for a divisional bri-
gade under TOA 19-27C. In view of operational requirements caused as a
result of operating as a separate brigade, this authorization has been
totally inadequate for this unit.

Observation: The MI Detachment attached to this unit should
be authorized the following personnel:

(1) CIC - 1 officer
(2) IPW - 1 officer, 7 EM
(3) CI - 1 WO, 2 EM
(4) XI - 1 EM
(5) OB - 2 EM

4. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Item: Responsive Refugee relief

Discussion: During the course of tactical operations in
heavily populated areas there is a great influx of refugees into district
camps. Standby refugee control teams area necessary as certain steps
must be accomplished in refugee processing:

(1) Movement of refugees to forward screening points.
(2) Screening by GVN officials, National Police, MI per-
sonnel.
(3) Movement to refugee centers.
(4) Relief activities to include:
   (a) Food, clothing and shelter.
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20 May 1967

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(a) MRDCAP,
(b) Registration,
(c) Continuing relief,
(d) Continued screening.

Observation: Where the influx of refugees is great as a result of combat operations, refugee relief teams should be formed and composed of the following individuals:

(1) Village officials.
(2) District NGO (USAID) Representative.
(3) MRDCAP team of 1 doctor, 3 medics, 3 assistants.
(4) Security force.
(5) Screening team of MI, National Police and village Police Chief. This team should be on standby, ready for deployment within 2 hours of notification.

c. Item: County Fair Operations:

Discussion: County fair operations are a successful population control measure as well as a means of obtaining intelligence. County Fair Operations teams can be constituted at battalion level to accompany combat units in search and destroy operations.

Observation: Each combat battalion should form a county fair team of the following personnel:

(1) Village Chief.
(2) Village Police Chief.
(3) Medical team.
(4) National Police.

This team should be on call at battalion level in coordination with local officials. It may be augmented from brigade or higher headquarters with personnel or material.

d. Item: Control of hand-outs and gifts:

Discussion: In many cases the spontaneous giving of small
amounts of food, candy, clothing, and tobacco to the indigenous people in an area, has an adverse effect on the economy and morale of the people. In many cases the people become beggars for handouts.

**Observation:** Gifts should be given as a reward for a self-help project whenever possible.

**e. Item: Civil Affairs Projects**

**Discussion:** Projects should be chosen to meet the following criteria:

- (1) Time limitations.
- (2) Availability of materials.
- (3) Availability of personnel.
- (4) Local desires.
- (5) Need for item of usefulness after completion.

The principal problem is to motivate the people to perform self-help projects. In many cases US forces furnish not only advice and material assistance but labor as well. This devalues the project and fails to give the Vietnamese a chance to participate.

**Observation:** All projects selected should be self-help in nature and carefully chosen to meet the desires and needs of the people.

**f. Item: Coordination of speaker and leaflet missions**

**Discussion:** Psychological Operations which provide speaker and leaflet missions are most effective in areas of contact or imminent contact.

**Observation:** Planned speaker and leaflet missions should be coordinated closely with 22B in order to achieve maximum effect.

**g. Item: Exploitation of Hoi Chanh**

**Discussion:** Hoi Chanh can be used most effectively as intelligence sources and can be exploited in Psychological Operations if used immediately after returning to SVN control.

**Observation:** The Hoi Chanh should be processed in the following sequence:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-0SPOR-67) (U)

(1) Tactical exploitation using aerial or ground loudspeaker.

(2) Tactical intelligence exploitation by MI personnel.

(3) Exploitation by PSYOPS personnel.

(4) Follow up loudspeaker exploitation.

PART II: Recommendations

1. Personnel: That a third in country promotion through the grade of E-6 be authorized for rifle squad leaders and LRRP team leaders. It is recognized that there is authorization for 3d in country promotions for the months of May and June, however, it is recommended that authorization be continued indefinitely as stated in the preceding sentence.

2. Intelligence:

a. That qualified interpreters be provided to brigade sized units on the following basis:

(1) Brigade headquarters: MC
   (a) MI section: 5
   (b) S-5: 3
   (c) S-2: 1
   (d) Military Police: 1
(2) Infantry battalions: 5
   (a) Battalion headquarters: 2
   (b) Rifle companies: 1 each
(3) Artillery battalion: 1

b. That MI detachments at infantry brigade level be authorized the following personnel, and that qualified personnel be assigned accordingly to fill this authorization:

(1) OIC = 1 officer
(2) IPW = 1 officer, 7 EM
(3) CI = 1 WO, 2 EM
(4) II = 1 EM
(5) OS = 2 EM
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AWDC-C-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-GSFOR-65) (U)

3. Operations:

a. That a standard 40mm marking round be developed for standard
   issue to combat units.

b. That a standard 40mm CS round be developed for standard is-
   sue to combat units.

c. That an in country maintenance facility for starlight scopes
   be established in order to reduce time lost to units when scopes are
   turned in for maintenance at higher echelons.

JAMES G. BRANDON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
AVIO-C-OP

10 May 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-QS FOR-35) (U)

5 Inpl: Withdrawn at D.A. published Sep 66:

1: After Action Report, Waterfall, FOR OT RD 67X071
2: After Action Report, Hau Nghia, FOR OT RD 67X072
3: After Action Report, II Corps, FOR OT RD 67X073
4: 3d Brigade TF Areas of Operations - Hau Nghia at D.A.
5: 1st Bn, 35th Inf Operations 22-30 April 1967.

Distribution:

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GE, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) 1
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CC, 1/35 INF 1
CC, 2/35 INF 1
CC, 2/9 ARTY 1
CC, C 3/4 CAV 1
CC, H 65TH ENGR 1
CC, B 1/9 CAV 1
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CC, HHC 3/25 TF 1
CO 1
DCO 1
XO 1
S1 1
S2 1
S3 1
S4 1
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AVDF-GC (10 May 1967) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE OREGON (PROVISIONAL, APO San Francisco
96374, July 1967

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, ATTN, AVHGC-DH,
APO San Francisco 96375

1. Forwarded herewith is subject report of the 3d Brigade,
25th Infantry Division.

2. This headquarters concurs with the following recommendations:
   a. Assignment of qualified interpreters to brigades in the
      amounts recommended.
   b. Development of a standard marking round and standard
      CS round for the 40 mm Grenade Launcher.
   c. Establishment of an in-country maintenance facility
      for starlight scopes.

3. This headquarters does not concur in the assignment of
   military intelligence personnel to brigades in the amounts recom-
   mended.

   a. Brigades operating as part of a division are normally
      provided counterintelligence and interrogation support by the
      division military intelligence detachment. Order of battle and
      imagery interpretation support are provided from the division head-
      quarters.

   b. Separate brigades are normally authorized a Military
      Intelligence Detachment, Separate Infantry Brigade, TOE 30-14G,
      31 August 1966. This detachment has an authorized strength of 32
      and can provide counterintelligence, interrogation, order of battle
      and imagery interpretation support to the brigade.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S/ Russell A Powell Cpt
f O. A. GEANER JR
CPT, AGC

5 Incl
nc

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS GSFR-65) (U)

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-CT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division (UIO WAL2AA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning lack of noncommissioned officers, section 2, part I, paragraph 1a, page 25: Concur. The shortage of noncommissioned officers in MOS 1LB40 is arm-wide. In an effort to alleviate the shortage, this headquarters recommended to DA that USARV be placed under the same promotional policy as other commands. Per DA Msg 826311, 4 Aug 67, this recommendation was approved. While a liberal promotion system cannot compensate for experienced personnel, it does allow a commander to promote outstanding personnel who possess the potential for leadership.

   b. Reference item concerning third in-country promotions, section 2, part I, paragraph 1b, page 25: Concur. DA Mag 826311, 4 Aug 67, automatically provides for subsequent in-country promotions—providing DA criteria are met.

   c. Reference item concerning forms, 364 and 365 section 2, part I, paragraph 1c, page 26: Nonconcur. A file check of records as far back as 12 Apr 67, indicates that the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division has not requisitioned these forms. At the present time, the stock level of these forms is: 68,000 (364); and 75,000 (365). The unit is being advised to recheck its requisitioning procedures. There has not been a shortage of these forms at this headquarters.

   d. Reference item concerning shortage of interpreters, section 2, part I, paragraph 3a, page 31: Command emphasis should be placed upon maximum utilization of available ARVN interpreters during tactical operations. USMACV is cognizant of the need for Vietnamese and Montagnard interpreters to a total of 69 for attachment to each U. S. division beginning in FY 68. In addition, USMACV is in the process of simplifying procedures for U. S. tactical units to obtain ARVN interpreters. Increased availability of interpreters and simplified procedures for obtaining them will facilitate
their employment down to company level if the tactical situation dictates the need.

e. Reference item concerning classification of detainees, section 2, part I, paragraph 3b, page 32. In the Commander's Analysis portion (paragraph 15a(3)) of the Thayer II Combat Operations After Action Report, it was pointed out that there were many instances when POW's and suspects arrived at the battalion command post area and the circumstances of their capture were sketchy. The brigade solved the problem by inauguring a policy whereby platoon leaders carry captured document tags. "They merely need to check out the word document and write in the word prisoner, then fill out the card and attach it to the individual. When the POW arrives at the battalion command post area, the circumstances of his capture are readily available to the S2." This procedure could also be used to handle detainees. Based upon the fact that the item "classification of detainees" appeared in only one of three operations reported during the period, and the problem was apparently successfully resolved, recommend that no further action be taken since the problem was one of training and implementation rather than the need for any revision of the detainees classification system.

f. Reference item concerning need for N-79 marking round, section 1, part I, paragraph 2f, page 28. Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment (ENSURE) No 3 is a requirement for a 40mm smoke marking round compatible with the N-79 and M148 launcher. Item is being fabricated in test quantities and due to arrive in RVN for evaluation in Sep 67.

g. Reference item concerning 40mm CS round, section 1, part I, paragraph 2g, page 28. DA ENSURE No 87.3 is a requirement for a 40mm CS grenade for the N-79 Grenade Launcher. This round has an external configuration almost identical to the conventional HE round. The projectile is filled with a CS pyrotechnic mixture which emits CS smoke for approximately 30 seconds. Effective range is from 30-200 meters. Cartridge can only be fired from the N-79 grenade launcher. It cannot be fired from the M148 adapter for the M-16 rifle. Present status, 3,888 have arrived in RVN. Another 17,000 are due by 1 Nov 67. The round will be evaluated by combat units in RVN.

h. Reference item concerning survival mirror, section 1, part I, paragraph 2i, page 28. DA ENSURE No 68 is the requirement for a lightweight individual survival kit. The BOI for this kit is one per aircraft. Each
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Kit is equipped with a mirror. Based on the above no consideration has been given to development of a separate standard mirror for each squad.

i. Reference item concerning starlight scopes, paragraph 2k, page 29: Concur. It is recognized that maintenance is presently a problem. Under the present system DSU's evacuate starlight scopes to Sacramento Army Depot for repair and return. Turn around times average 21 days. By end 1967 repair parts (which are presently in production) and float items should be in country in quantity. At that time repair will be accomplished in country and turn around time will be considerably reduced. A mission support plan has been furnished by the project manager, night vision, for preparation of support packages. He advises that USARV requirements for Night Vision Devices will be filled by late in the second quarter FY 1968.

j. Reference item concerning railroad flares, paragraph 1, page 30: Sufficient quantities of this item are presently on hand, available for issue, in 1st Logistical Command Depots. The highest issue of these, in the last six months, has been 1700. None were requested in June or July and there has been no shortage of the item.

k. Reference item concerning new R&D chemical items, paragraph 1n, page 30. Concur. These items are presently programmed into Vietnam under the ENSURE program, and have been allocated to units which have expressed a desire to test them.

3. Unit will be notified of recommendations and actions by routine endorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. L. KENNEDY
CPT AGC
Asst AG

5 Incls
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ, 25th Infantry Division (3d Brigade Task Force)
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

X. F. OSBOURN
Maj, AG
Asst AG

5 Incl
nc
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for the period 22 through 30 April 1967

1. 22 Apr 67 - Unit loc: Bn CP, A 2/9, 4.2 Mort plat, A Co, LZ OD (BS780367); B Co at LZ MONTICELLO; C Co at LZ OD; Recon at BS796410. At 0755 hrs Recon began moving and left plat, A Company moved out on a patrol. C Company reported 9 VCs ready to be picked up at 0756 hrs. The VCs had been detained the day before. After the VCs were picked up C Company moved out on their sweep and at 0915 hrs they began to receive sniper fire. Gunships were requested. Medevac was called for 2 WIA in 2nd plat, C Company at BS786126. At 0938 hrs the units around the plat in contact were: 3d plat, B Company at BS796425, and Recon plat at BS810117. The fight increased in intensity and at 1018 hrs C Company 2nd plat, had suffered 1 WIA. Recon plat began receiving AW fire at 1055 hrs vicinity BS 611412 and quickly requested MED. While Recon was receiving fire, A Company 2/35 just west of LZ SHOY (BS822403) was getting AW fire. At 1045 hrs Recon began receiving AW and small arms fire from their left flank. The 1st plat C Company made contact at 1105 hrs vicinity BS776425. The GRC made an extraction at BS776425 of 1 KIA and 1 WIA at 1115 hrs for C Company. Ground to air fire was received by the gunship flying over BS 775460 at 1125 hrs.

The Blue Team, B 1/9 was located at BS826847 when 2/35 notified the Recon plat that 8 VC were hiding in the bunker at BS812403, and they would mark the location with WP. The Blue Team, B 1/9 Cav, moved in on a suspected VC CP location at BS826416. Artillery and ARA was called in on a group of 20 males with weapons. 20 were KIA and 10 WIA. The Blue Team suffered 3 KIA and 1 WIA. The Recon plat was located at BS814406 when the Bn CO notified 2/35 that the Recon plat would be moving to BS815402. 2/35 was notified at 1212 hrs. C Company was still receiving small arms fire at 1323 hrs when the gunships reported people fleeing the village to the west. More gunships were requested at 1328 hrs and they arrived at 1340 hrs. 1st plat A Company prepared an LZ for the IERP and the IERP was inserted at 1352 hrs vicinity BS791243. Two air strikes were conducted, one at BS791243 and the second at BS796378.

The IERP found a grenade at BS791242 and then at 1405 hrs they found an anti-personnel mine at the same location. The Bn CO directed Recon to assemble in a PZ immediately for pick up, and told them they would be inserted at BS798426; at the time Recon was holding 3 VCs at BS817401. The IERP had moved to BS793400 by 1530 hrs. C Company, still in contact, requested an immediate air strike on the village at BS776428. A second air strike was brought in on the village at 1630 hrs by C Company's FFO. The strike was made by 5 jet air craft. A Company's 1st plat closed LZ OD at 1700 hrs. The VC fighting C Company in the village found the going getting rough, and after the second air strike 12 VC decided to make an escape. They began to run out of the village just as a "SHARK" gunship,
17th Aviation Company, flew by. The alert "SHARK" saw them and quickly made a 180° turn to enable his gunship to come in behind the VC. Running with their backs to the closing gunship, they were easy prey for the "SHARK" miniguns. The gunships pass was so low over the rice paddies, the spraying water and mud from the bullet strikes covered the windshield and the gunship had to return to LZ MONTZUMA to wash the windshield. C Company contact continued and the entrenched VC held their fortified position with great tenacity. At 1716 hrs C Company passed on the report that they had 5 VC KIA vicinity BS 775225, and 3 AK-47, 1 paratrooper MK-50, 1 RP-4 type rocket launcher with 1 rocket. The O&C went in with the Bn S-3 to pick up a Recon WIA at 1823 hours. At 1828 hours the VC in the My Thuan village began firing M-79 rounds at C Company, and Recon suffered one KIA at 1835 hrs.

The Bn CO requested the Air Force C-l7 (Spooky) with its miniguns to be sent to the C Company location at 1910 hrs. The situation at 1947 hrs was: C Company in heavy contact in the village with the VC bottled up in one corner. Recon was providing a blocking force on the west, running from BS77419 to the northeast. B Company was providing a block to the south along the trams: BS77419 to BS77420 to BS775224. C Company was on the line from BS774128 to BS776424.

Darkness was approaching and the Bn CO decided to: (1) leave the battlefield situation in the above posture for the night, (2) bomb the village with the Air Force C-l7’s 21,000 rounds, use artillery (B&T and illumination) throughout the night, and, (3) have C Company sweep the village after a 0630 hrs air strike the following morning.

At 2000 hrs the total enemy KIA by body count was 18, and C Company lost another man, KIA at 2013 hrs, making the total casualties for the day 3 KIA and 9 WIA.

The anxious eyes of C Company, B Company and Recon watched the village throughout the night for signs of a breakout of an attempt to drag off the bodies of the dead VC. Illumination was provided throughout the night by A 2/5 Artillery.

2. 23 Apr. 67 - The requested air strike was made at 0630 hrs. C Company platoons began to move into the village as soon as the dust and smoke cleared. The Bn CO and S-3 flew to the village and began to orbit at 0700 hrs. C Company found no resistance and easily swept through the village, getting to the opposite side at 0755 hrs. A sweep back through the village began at 0758 hrs to get a body count. Seven WGS were picked up on the initial sweep. B Company picked up one WGS at 0800 hrs. Medevac was called by the Bn CO for the 3 wounded Vietnamese from the village at BS775226. The Medevac also extracted 1 US WIA and 1 KIA. The second
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Sweep yielded 2 VC KIA and 36 VOS. Weapons found were: 2 SKS, 2 SMO, 1 Rocket Launcher, grenades (US and Chicom), 2 M-79, 3 M-16, a knife and assorted canteens, belts and packs. Ammo recovered: 3,43 rounds 7.62mm, 190 rounds 8mm, 24 rounds M-1, 1 X 60mm round in container, also 20 sets of black pajamas were captured. Total enemy KIA at Theip Son (2) was 33.

At 1125 hrs, the B Company CO and 1st Sgt were wounded by a grenade. The VC had jumped out of a large bunker in the village at B9 766416 and tossed the grenade.

B Company requested an EOD team to assist in the destruction of some large bunkers at B9 766416. The 3d and 4th platoon of B Company moved out at 1315 hrs. Recon was given the mission of checking out the village (B9 766423) at 1355 hrs by the Bn S-3. The air strikes were planned - one at B9 766426 (TNT 15:15 hrs) and one at B9 766453 (TNT 17:00 hrs). B Company destroyed 22 bunkers with overhead cover (3 to 5 feet thick) at B9 766416. A Chinook was sent to C Company to pick up 80 refugees. The 2d platoon, B Company began receiving 1W fire at 1550 hrs vicinity B9 766411L. Gunships were requested immediately, C Company found 550 lbs of rice at B9 766425. The enemy was in a heavily fortified position with bunkers and 1W weapons.

2d platoon, B Company had just crossed the railroad when the VC opened fire. The Bn CO called for an immediate air strike on the village of Binh My (1). At 1724 hrs the Bn CO reported the VC were pinned down on the SW, the NW sector was still receiving heavy fire, and there were several US WIA at B9 766411 near the railroad bridge. Three men from B Company were on the ground in an exposed position in front of the enemy bunkers. One of the gunship pilots, Lt Wood, 174th Aviation Company, distinguished himself by hovering directly over the wounded at an altitude of 20-30 feet, and directly in front of the enemy bunkers. With his guns blazing, he resembled an irate, protective, mother eagle shielding her young. With the valiant support of the gunships, and the courageous effort of the B Company FO, Lt Keith, who crawled out to rescue the wounded, the area was cleared for the air strike. All positions were marked with smoke and the F-100's began to pound the enemy. At 1810 hrs, the air strike was finished and the 2d platoon, B Company with the Recon platoon began to close in on the village of Binh My (1). The next flight of F-100's began to strike Binh My (2) just SE of B9 766407. A white team was used to scoot the SE side of the village of Binh My (1). At 1810 hrs, 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA were extracted. The Air Force Q-47 was requested and at 1930 hrs B Company reported 1 VC KIA who was armed with an M-16.

At 1950 hrs the Cacti Green forces around the VC were located at: D Company B9 766411, Recon platoon B9 766410, C Company (-) moving to a blocking pen at B9 766411L. The total US casualties for the day were: 2 KIA and 5 WIA.

Again, the night was spent watching for VC attempts to escape.
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The most likely escape route was the river, and B Company placed riflemen with starlite scopes on the bridge at BS724H41 to watch the river. Illumination was provided by the artillery and H&I fires were shot into the village. Air strikes were scheduled for the next morning, 24 April 1967, for 0630 hrs and 0645 hrs.

3. 24 Apr 67 - At 0640 hrs the first air strike was underway with 3 F-101's delivering their ordnance on the village. A White Team was sent in to screen and observe reported movement in the village in the vicinity BS803H40. The second air strike was completed at 0750 hrs. At 0735 hrs, B Company shot one VC who was attempting to swim the river. The Recon plat and 2nd plat, B Company swept through the village at 0750 hrs meeting no resistance. C Company was instructed to move NW and check out the area at BS734L26, then to BS747H39 because those areas were covered with trenches and foxholes. An engineer team with demolitions was requested to destroy the bunkers.

At 1013 hrs A Company's 3d plat departed LZ OD on a local patrol. The LRRP reported seeing 5 people in black pajamas at 1110 hrs near BS796-355. When C Company approached the village at BS756L28, the pagoda bells began to ring and the Vietnamese people began evacuating the village. At 1145 hrs 1st plat, C Company was notified to get into a LZ at BS756L30 for extraction and delivery to BS782H26. The 1st plat, C Company completed the lift at 1538 hours. C Company (-) continued to sweep through the village at BS735L32. At 1530 the body count from the village was 20 VC KIA. The last two were killed in the air strike. Statistics for the day were: 20 VC KIA in the village at BS651L27.

4. 25 Apr 67 - At 0755 hrs the resupply Chinook received ground-to-air fire and the gunships were called to C Company's location. The Blue Team, B 1/9 Cav was inserted at BS783L24, and requested a ready reaction force from 1/35. A Company was designated by the BN CO to provide a plat for the RRF. C Company received word from the Red Team (gunships) working over their area that the village of Tan Phong (BS735L43) had numerous freshly dug trenches and tunnels which could accommodate a company-size unit. C Company (-) was located on a line from BS733L34 to BS746L31 and the 3d plat, C Company was located near BS746L30 at 0905 hrs, at 1105 hrs C Company (-) was sweeping Tan Phong (BS736L37) with the 2nd plat at BS746L30, and the weapons plat at BS737L31. Resistance was not met; however, many freshly dug trenches and several bunkers were found.

The gunships of the Red Team, B 1/9, were on station overhead and at BS745L27, the lead gunship fired on a man wearing a grey uniform, web gear, and helmet. Another individual was taken under fire and killed at BS745L24. 2nd plat, A Company, on a local patrol out from LZ OD, found a small cave containing some documents at BS760L37. The BN S-3 instructed 2nd plat, B Company to search to the SW vicinity BS623J2. The 3rd plat,
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C Company was moving to the location where the gunship had fired on the pajama clad person at BS742424 when they received AW fire on their left flank and sniper fire from their right front. The 3d plat, began to flank the enemy and called for the gunships who, fortunately, had just refueled and were on their way to the C Company area. At 1237 hrs 3d plat, C Company had 3 men pinned down in front of the enemy bunkers, one of them WIA. Their location was BS742428. At 1241 hrs the gunships were on station, and the lead ship immediately spotted 2 men with packs and weapons entering a building. The fire fight grew in intensity and at 1315 hrs 3 plat, C Company had 3 WIA and needed a Medevac. The 3d plat pulled back to provide the gunships working room on the bunkers. The wounded were pulled back to safety under very heavy fire.

An air strike was being made at BS742423 and was being controlled by the Bn Comm Officer from LZ OD when the Bn S-3, above 3d plat, C Company in the C&C, called the 1/35 TOC to have an immediate air strike laid on. The Bn Comm officer notified the FAC of the S-3's need and the jets were diverted north to the C Company area where the FAC contacted the Bn OD and S-3. The F-100's had expended their HE and napalm on the target at BS742423; but they were able to offer 20mm and the FAC called for more jets while the 3d plat, C Company wounded were being pulled back to safety. The Red Team gunships laid down heavy fire on the entrenched enemy while the Medevac ships entered. After the friendly positions were identified, the Air Force began to pound the enemy positions. The air strike at BS742423 was completed at 1411 hrs. At 1415 hrs the Bn OD directed B Company to move to the NW of C Company's contact area. A second air strike for C Company was approved at 1415 hrs. As the C&C flew to drop smoke grenades to the units on the ground with the Bn OD and S-3 it received 40 rounds of AW fire, losing altitude and power rapidly. The aircraft made its way to LZ MONTEZUMA air strip on a final glide and crash landed. No one was hit by gunfire or hurt in the landing. The ship caught fire during the glide into the air strip. A replacement C&C was immediately provided, and the OD and S-3 returned to the contact area. At 1431 hrs the Recon plat was at BS754352, and 2d plat, A Company had picked up a VCS when he tired to run at BS775370. The 2d plat, B Company had bagged a hook load of rice by 1505 hrs and also had 2 VCS at BS754359. The 2d plat, A Company returned to LZ OD at 1515 hrs. Recon plat was now at BS762416 and was moving to a blocking position for the C Company contact. Their block was to be set at BS754358. B Company (-) was at BS752416 at 1535 hrs. The 3d plat, C Company had one WIA at 1603 hrs and requested Medevac. The second air strike was completed at 1620 hrs on BS742423. By 1625 hrs Recon had reached BS754356, and by 1705 hrs they were located at BS744357. The 3d plat, B Company was located at BS754359. The 3d air strike of the day went in at BS742423 at 1725 hrs. The Artillery was controlling the air strike in the C Company area and was wounded on the left forearm from the bomb shrapnel. At 1840 hours C Company reported their
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Casualties since the contact began. 2d plat had 3 WIA and 1 KIA, 3d plat had 1 WIA and the Arty FO's RTO was KIA. Again, for the third day in succession the S-4 made a resupply run to the embattled area to deliver ammo and C rations. At 2000 hrs the Bn CO directed C Company elements to pull back so the village could be shelled throughout the night. The platoons pulled back and Medevac ships began making extractions. The Air Force C-17 (SPOOKY) was called and was controlled by C Company. The final friendly casualty report was: B Company - 1 KIA, 3 WIA; C Company - 1 KIA, 9 WIA; 2/9 Arty - 1 WIA (1/35 LMO) and 1 KIA (C Company FO's RTO). The action in the C Company area resulted in 15 VC KIA, found on the NW side of Tan Phong, 2 SMG's captured, 1 M-16, and an estimated 10 rounds of rocket fire from the village was received.

5. 26 April 67 - 30 April 67 - At 0020 hrs the C Company FO reported secondary explosions coming from the village at BS742423. At 0650 hrs an air strike was made on the village (Binh Chieu (2)) and was completed at 0715 hrs. By 0730 hrs the Bn CO and S-3 were airborne in the C&C over the C Company area. The Bn CO instructed B Company and C Company to move back through the two villages and conduct a thorough search. Also at 0815 hrs, the Bn CO requested an EOD team from Brigade to go into the contact area to destroy the dud artillery rounds.

B Company and C Company had swept the two villages at 0827 hrs and had not met with resistance. At 0830 hrs B Company began a sweep of the eastern village and C Company started on the western village in a search for equipment and bodies. The 1st plat, A Company departed LZ OD on a local patrol at 0852 hrs. Recon plat received sniper fire from the village at BS745416 and called in artillery fire. The Blue Plat, B 1/9 Cav was inserted at 0933 hrs near BS784332. The sweep completed, C Company reported at 1025 hrs that they had found 22 VC KIA and signs that 5 bodies had been removed. From blood trails and bloody bandages an estimated 8 VC were wounded. Equipment policed up included: 4 AK-50 SMG, 3 M-16 Rifles, 1 M-2 carbine, 1 SKS, 1 Chicom BN, and ammo in the following varieties: 300 rounds 8mm, 71 rounds .30 cal, 494 rounds of .30 cal long, 352 rounds .62mm short (wide rim type) and 50 rounds of 5.56mm. At 1245 hrs an air strike was made at BS742423 and was controlled by the Arty LMO.

At 1100 hrs the unit locations were: 1st plat, A Company BS784332; B Company (-) BS740419; 2d plat and 3d plat BS 750425; C Company BS740420; LRRP (Team #1) BS754321 and LRRP (Team #2) BS790340. At 1435 hrs C Company picked up 1 VCS with two fresh wounds. Another air strike was made on BS740378 at 1520 hrs. When the jets screamed in delivering their bombs they received ground-to-air fire. A second air strike was put in on the same location at 1630 hrs. In the period between 1530 hrs and 1630 hrs the 4.2" mortars fired on BS740378 and a secondary explosion was observed. At 1615 hrs the unit locations were: C Company BS740419, B Company (-) BS740313, 2d and 3d plate BS772419, Recon plat BS762401 and LRRP BS790340.
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The IRRP spotted 9 persons in black pajamas moving equipment vicinity BS780368. A White Team was called for the IRRP and A 2/9 fired into the location. The IRRP reported 6 VC KIA, 1 was carrying a MI. Later, at 2036 hrs, the IRRP spotted flashing lights at BS790340, and called in artillery.

27 Apr 67 - At 0805 hrs C Company received sniper fire vicinity BS740407, and observation aircraft were summoned. The 2d plat, A Company departed LZ OD on a local patrol. The flight leader for the B Company (-) lift was briefed at 0900 hrs. The first element of B Company touched down at 0955 hrs vicinity BS706422. Recon plat made a combat assault at BS706429 with an artillery preparation of the IZ. At 1000 hrs C Company was located at BS731410 and had picked up 11 VCS. The IRRP, at 1105 hrs, was told to link up with 2d plat, A Company and return to LZ OD. Also at 1105 hrs the Recon plat closed at BS703428. The IRRP started to move down off the mountain but due to the density of booby traps had to move back to be extracted by air. At 1221 hrs C Company was receiving sniper fire at BS721410. A gunship team was requested. 2d plat, B Company killed a VC at BS699428 who was carrying a Chicom grenade. The IRRP on the mountain was extracted at 1500 hrs while two false insertions were simultaneously made in adjacent areas, and the IRRP (Team #2) was inserted at BS810330. 2d plat, B Company reported 2 VC KIA vicinity BS709428 at 1332 hrs. Both wore carrying Chicom grenades, canteens and pistol belts. The 2d plat, A Company spotted 2 persons in black pajamas who fled. The fleeing VC were fired on and one was killed. Also at BS 773416 2d plat, A Company found 4 spider holes with 2 US grenades, 1 US poncho, 50 lbs of rice, 3 canteens and some clothing. C Company was ready for extraction at 1550 hrs vicinity BS735412, so A Company was lifted from LZ OD to the C Company PZ and C Company was returned to LZ OD. B Company (-) was at BS705421, 1st plat at BS706429, 3d plat at BS706425, Recon plat at BS706429, and the IRRP at BS803324. B Company (-) discovered a 250 lb bomb at BS705421 and blew it in place at 1826 hrs. A 2/35 was extracted from the 1/35 AG at 1827 hrs.

28 April 67 - At 0725 hrs A Company reported a large rice cache at BS734407. B Company requested EOD assistance to blow 2 750 lb bombs at BS716421. Also B Company's FO was notified he would control the air strike at BS715396 at 0900 hrs. Recon made a GA BS765351, touching down at 0631 hrs. 1st plat, A Company picked up 2 VCS at 0650 hrs. B Company found 3 more 250 lb bombs at BS716423 at 0955 hrs. Two of the bombs had been cut open and had the explosives removed. 1st plat, B Company found 500 lbs of rice at BS18416 which they destroyed. At 1100 hrs B Company reported on their bomb demolition project. They had destroyed: 2 X 750 lb bombs, 1 X 250 lb bomb and 3 X 250 lb bombs which had been opened.

Recon captured 1 ton of rice in a hut at BS755366 and one woman.
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They also took under fire a woman with a pack and weapon. She was wounded and died later. Her pack contained medical supplies, documents including propaganda literature, schematic drawings of fortified villages and a schematic drawing of the District Hq in Duc Pho. Also she was carrying a photo of herself and friends, and in the picture she was holding a Thompson SMG. The 30 year-old female was definitely a hard-core communist. The 3d plat, A Company found and destroyed 400 lbs of block salt at BS725384. Recon killed 1 VC at BS755366 and wounded a second. The 1st plat, A Company spotted 1 NVA at 1312 hrs and began receiving AW fire from 2 locations vicinity BS729380. The platoon swept through the area with negative contact and found only some empty cartridges. The LRRP found a booby trap at BS804324 and marked its location. B Company found 1 ton of rice at BS712406 and asked for personnel to bag the rice. The rice bagged and ready for pickup at 1430 hrs.

The 1st plat, A Company at BS732381, found a hut containing 6 X 60mm mortar illumination rounds, 1 pack, 5 PAVN shovels and 13 tons of polished rice (estimated 250 cu. meters). Later, at 1649 hrs, another 15 tons of rice was found by 1st plat, A Company near BS732382 along with 3 M9A1 gas masks. Coordination was made with the District Hq at Duc Pho and arrangements were made for PF personnel to go to 1st Plat, A Company's location to bag and extract the large rice cache. The rice removal was scheduled for 29 April 1967.

29 Apr 67 - At 0750 hours the 3d plat, C Company departed LZ OD on a local patrol to meet a Popular Force platoon and provincial Recon unit at the pagoda vicinity BS809350. The joint operation was then to proceed south into the valley, BS800330, to find a 250 lb bomb (booby trap) found on an earlier mission by the same PF unit. A second task assigned was the job of destroying a bamboo and barbed-wire fence constructed by the VC. A contingent of PF rice baggers were lifted to A Company's location to sack the 13 tons of rice found in a cache by A Company. The rice was stored at BS733381. A Company's 1st plat stayed at BS733381 to see that the rice cache was extracted while A Company (-) moved on to the south. Meanwhile, 3d plat, C Company and the PF unit had reached the area where the PF's had reported the bomb on 23 April. The PF's told the 3d plat leader they could not remember where the bomb was located although they had given coordinates in their initial report on 23 April to the PF advisor at Duc Pho District Hq. The bomb was not found; but the bamboo fence (75 meters long) was torn down by the PF troops. Two air strikes were made - one at 1300 hrs on BS743321 and one at 1400 hrs on BS697379, which was controlled by B Company. At 1500 hrs a third air strike was delivered on BS771323. The 3d plat, C Company closed LZ OD at 1700 hrs, and Recon reported 1 VC KIA at BS747366. The 3d plat, A Company found 2 M-1 barrels, 2 hand flares, 1 bag of M-1 ammo, 1 home-made rocket launcher, and 1 carbine at 1702 hrs near BS732370. Closing the days activity, A

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Remainder of report not received at Hq, Department of the Army.