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OPERATION CROSSROADS: U.S.S. MUSTIN (DD413).

TEST BAKER [U].

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DIRECTOR OF SHIP MATER.

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GROUP 3
16 JAN 1965
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APPROVED:

F.X. Forest,
Captain, U.S.N.

USS MUSTIN (DD413)

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U.S.S. MUSTIN (DD413)

SHIP CHARACTERISTICS

Building Yard: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company.

Commissioned: 15 September 1939.

HULL

Length Overall: 348 feet 4 inches.
Length on Waterline: 341 feet 0 inches.
Beam (extreme): 36 feet 0 inches.
Depth (molded at side, to main deck, amidships): 19 feet 7 7/8 inches.
Drafts at time of test: Fwd. 11 feet 6 inches. Aft. 12 feet 6 inches.
Standard displacement: 1,570 tons.
Displacement at time of test: 2,110 tons.

MAIN PROPULSION PLANT

Main Engines: Two sets of Westinghouse turbines are installed, one set per shaft.
Reduction Gears: Two sets of De Laval (Westinghouse Mfg'd.) double reduction are installed, one per shaft.
Main Condensers: Two are installed in ship.
Boilers: Three Babcock and Wilcox boilers are installed in ship. 565 psi gauge. 715°F.
Propellers: Two are installed in ship.
Main Shafts: Two are installed in ship.
Ships Service Generators: Four sets are installed in ship. Two 150 KW.-A.C. and two 40 KW.-D.C. sets.
TECHNICAL INSPECTION REPORT

OVERALL SUMMARY

I. Target Condition After Test.

(a) Drafts after test; list; general areas of flooding, sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Forward</th>
<th>Aft</th>
<th>List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drafts before Test</td>
<td>11' 6''</td>
<td>12' 0''</td>
<td>0°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafts after Test (Two weeks)</td>
<td>13' 0''</td>
<td>12' 6''</td>
<td>0°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forward fireroom flooded to a depth of 8' 6" through a leak in a steam line to a sea chest. The line was already badly corroded. The forward engine room flooded to a depth of 7' 0" as the result of progressive flooding from the forward fireroom. The exact source of this leakage was not determined. The cause of flooding of the forward engine room was not completely determined. The following probably contributed to it:

(a) Failure of an already badly corroded blowing-out connection to a sea chest. The stop valve for this line leaked before Test B. Failure of the line allowed some water to enter the engine room, but not enough to account for all the flooding.

(b) Water backing up from the forward fireroom through interconnected piping, in which some leaks existed before Test B.

All of the flooding could have been easily controlled without impairing operation of the machinery if the crew had been aboard. The after engine room filled to a depth of 3' 0" as the result of leakage through the shaft gland in bulkhead 118.

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USS MUSTIN (DD413)

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(b) Structural damage.

HULL

None.

MACHINERY

The outer castings of the breeching between uptakes and stacks (above the main deck) are moderately dished. Seams failed in several places. A number of staybolts have pushed through the sheet. The stack is slightly dished near its base, but its strength is not impaired. All of the above damage occurred on the starboard side.

ELECTRICAL

Not observed.

(c) Other damage.

HULL

Not observed.

MACHINERY

Machinery in the forward fire room and forward engine room is damaged from flooding. Two small sections of piping, already badly corroded, ruptured. One is a blowing-out connection to a sea chest in the forward fire room, the other is a blowing-out connection to a sea chest in the after engine room. No other damage to machinery was found by a careful visual inspection.

ELECTRICAL

No electrical damage other than from flooding.
II. Forces Evidenced and Effects Noted.

(a) Heat.

HULL
None.

MACHINERY
No evidence.

ELECTRICAL
None.

(b) Fires and explosions.

HULL
None.

MACHINERY
No evidence.

ELECTRICAL
There were no fires or explosions.

(c) Shock.

HULL
None.

MACHINERY
The ship received a moderate underwater shock, which ruptured the piping mentioned in I (c) above.
ELECTRICAL

None observed.

(d) Pressure.

HULL

As the result of blast or of water pressure, the outer casing of the boiler uptakes is damaged, a weathertight door on the main deck is dished, and screens on exterior ventilation duct openings are damaged.

MACHINERY

Blast pressure and/or the heavy mass of water thrown upon the vessel caused the structural damage mentioned in I (b) above. Canvas covers had been fitted over air intakes to prevent entry of radioactive particles. Those on the starboard side were damaged, which is additional evidence of blast pressure. The blast came from starboard.

ELECTRICAL

None observed.

(e) Effects peculiar to the atom bomb.

HULL

None.

MACHINERY

The magnitude of underwater shock, blast pressure, and wave action, sufficient to cause noticeable effects at this distance from an explosion, are apparently peculiar to the atom bomb.
ELECTRICAL

Persistent radioactivity was the only peculiar effect noted.

III. Results of Test on Target.

(a) Effect on machinery, electrical, and ship control.

HULL

The only effect on these items is that of slow flooding of the machinery spaces.

MACHINERY

Flooding of the forward fire room and forward engine-room left machinery in these spaces inoperable. This leaves the ship with only one operable boiler and one operable engine, a situation making steering more difficult as well as greatly reducing speed. No electric power is available except that furnished by the emergency diesel generator (the latter was inoperable before Test B but was not affected by it and would have been operable after the test if it had been so before). All of the flooding could have been controlled if the crew had been aboard, in which case it is not believed that the test would have had any appreciable effect on operation of machinery, except for possible effects of radioactivity. Damage to uptake breeching and piping is minor and would not affect operation.

NOTE: No machinery on this vessel was operated after Test B. Radioactivity was high when the ship was inspected, 15 days after the test.

ELECTRICAL

The only effect was from salt water flooding.
(b) Effect on gunnery and fire control.

**HULL**

Not observed.

**MACHINERY**

No comment.

**ELECTRICAL**

None.

(c) Effect on watertight integrity and stability.

**HULL**

The watertight integrity and stability of the ship are not appreciably affected.

**MACHINERY**

No comment.

**ELECTRICAL**

None.

(d) Effect on personnel and habitability.

**HULL**

The only effect on personnel and habitability would have been the result of radioactivity.

**MACHINERY**

Except for effects of flooding, which could have been prevented if the crew had been aboard, and for radioactivity, the test would have had no effect on personnel or habitability below decks.
ELECTRICAL

None electrically.

(e) Effect on fighting efficiency.

HULL

None.

MACHINERY

Fighting efficiency is greatly reduced by loss of steam and electric power, and reduction of maneuverability caused by having only one usable engine. If the crew had been aboard to control flooding, it is not believed that fighting efficiency would have been affected at all, as far as machinery is concerned, except for possible effects of radioactivity.

ELECTRICAL

None electrically.

IV. Summary of Observers' Impressions and Conclusions.

HULL

No comment.

MACHINERY

The MUSTIN was apparently near the limiting range of serious mechanical damage to vessels of her type during Test B.

ELECTRICAL

Had the ship been manned flooding would have been quickly controlled, thereby eliminating all damage found on inspection.
V. Preliminary Recommendations.

HULL

No comment.

MACHINERY

Uptake breechings, as installed on this vessel, are an obvious point of weakness against this form of attack. Design changes are indicated.

ELECTRICAL

No recommendations are made.
GENERAL SUMMARY OF HULL DAMAGE

I. Target Condition After Test.

(a) Drafts after test; list; general areas of flooding, sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drafts before test</th>
<th>Drafts after test</th>
<th>List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11' 6''</td>
<td>13' 0''</td>
<td>0°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12' 0''</td>
<td>12' 6''</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forward fireroom flooded to a depth of 8' 6'' through a leak in a steam line to a sea chest. The forward engine room flooded to a depth of 7' 0'' as the result of progressive flooding from the forward fireroom. The exact source of this leakage was not determined. The after engine room filled to a depth of 3' 0'' as the result of leakage through the shaft gland in bulkhead 118.

(b) Structural damage.

None.

(c) Other damage.

Not observed.

II. Forces Evidenced and Effects Noted.

(a) Heat.

None.

(b) Fires and explosions.

None.
(c) Shock.

None.

(d) Pressure.

As the result of blast or of water pressure, the outer casing of the boiler uptakes is damaged, a weathertight door on the main deck is dished, and screens on exterior ventilation duct openings are damaged.

(e) Effects peculiar to the atomic bomb.

None.

III. Results of Test on Target.

(a) Effect on machinery, electrical, and ship control.

The only effect on these items is that of slow flooding of the machinery spaces.

(b) Effect on gunnery and fire control.

Not observed.

(c) Effect on watertight integrity and stability.

The watertight integrity and stability of the ship are not appreciably affected.

(d) Effect on personnel and habitability.

The only effect on personnel and habitability would have been the result of radioactivity.

(e) Effect on fighting efficiency.

None.
IV. Summary of Observers' Impressions and Conclusions.

No comment.

V. Preliminary Recommendations.

No comment.

VI. Instructions for loading the vessel specified the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>LOADING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil</td>
<td>Min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel oil</td>
<td>Min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potable and reserve feed water</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt water ballast</td>
<td>320 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details of the actual quantities of the various items aboard are included in Report 7, Stability Inspection Report, submitted by the ship's force in accordance with "Instructions to Target Vessels for Tests and Observations by Ship's Force" issued by the Director of Ships Material. This report is available for inspection in the Bureau of Ships Crossroads Files.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HULL DAMAGE

A. General Description of Hull Damage.

(a) Overall condition of vessel.

Damage in this ship is limited to slight dishing of one watertight door, relatively severe dishing and rupturing of the uptakes, and rupture of wire mesh screens over ventilation ducts opening onto weather decks. Damage is more evident on the starboard side than on the port side. Minor damage was caused by flying fragments from the LSM 60. The explosion bore approximately 083 degrees relative.

General views of the exterior after the test are shown on pages 40 to 47 inclusive.

(b) General areas of hull damage.

Damage is confined principally to exterior parts of the amidship deckhouse and to the uptake casing.

(c) Apparent causes of hull damage in each area.

The major portion of hull damage is considered to have been caused by air pressure and falling water.

(d) Principal areas of flooding, with sources.

Slow flooding through fittings and piping occurred in both engine rooms and in the forward fireroom. Two weeks after the test the depths of water in these spaces were as follows:

- Forward fireroom: 8' 6"
- Forward engine room: 7' 0"
- After engine room: 3' 0"

Sources of flooding, as far as could be determined by visual inspection, are given in detail under Item L, "Flooding".

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USS MUSTIN (DD413)

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Flooding in the forward fire room and forward engine room left the ship with one boiler and one engine operable, and reduced the vessel's main propulsion accordingly. No electrical current remained available for power or lighting except that furnished by the emergency diesel generator.

(e) Residual strength, buoyancy and effect of general condition of hull on operability.

There is no effect on the ship's strength, buoyancy, or operability. Secondary flooding reduced buoyancy, affected stability by reason of free surface in the machinery spaces, and impaired operability by reducing ship propulsion to one-third normal.

B. Superstructure.

(a) Description of damage.

The stack breeching on the starboard side is badly dished and failed at the seams in a number of places because of failure of spot-welded lap joints. It was ruptured in way of transverse tie bolts. (Photographs 2175-5, page 48, 1933-3, page 49, 1933-4, page 50, and 2186-7, page 45). Stack breeching on the port side is only slightly damaged.

A watertight door in the amidship deckhouse, frame 105, starboard, is dished approximately 1-inch. (Photographs 2175-7, page 51).

A number of wire mesh screens over ventilation in-takes opening onto the weather deck were dished or ruptured, principally on the starboard side of the ship. (Photographs 2175-7, page 51).

A number of wire mesh screens over ventilation in-takes opening onto the weather deck were dished or ruptured, principally on the starboard side of the ship. (Photographs 2175-7, page 51, 1933-8, page 52, and 2175-8, page 53).

(b) Causes of damage in each area.

Air blast and falling water are considered the causes of damage.
(c) Evidences of fire in superstructure.

There is no evidence of fire.

(d) Estimate of relative effectiveness of plating thicknesses.

Stack breeching and ventilation screens in this ship appear particularly vulnerable to blast pressure.

(e) Constructive criticism of superstructure design or construction.

Heavier material in stack breeching and ventilation screens is indicated.

C. Guns and Directors.

No damage to guns and directors is noted.

D. Torpedo Mounts, Depth Charge Gear.

This ship has no torpedo mounts. Depth charge gear is unaffected.

E. Weather Deck.

The weather decks are undamaged except for numerous dents caused by falling fragments from LSM 60. Pieces found varied from an inch or so in diameter to over three feet in length.

On the forecastle deck at frame 14, port, a windlass control handwheel is bent by contact with a flying fragment, and the deck is dented. (Photograph 2175-9, page 54).

F. Exterior Hull (above w.l.).

Undamaged.
G. Interior Compartments (above w.l.).

Undamaged.

H. Armor Decks.

Not applicable.

I. Interior Compartments (below w.l.).

No damage. Flooding is discussed in Item L.

J. Underwater Hull.

No damage is known to have occurred to the underwater hull, shafts, propellers, struts, or rudder.

K. Tanks.

No damage. All tanks and voids were sounded before and after test B and no undue increase was noted.

L. Flooding.

The forward fireroom was flooded to about 3 1/2 feet above the lower floor plates (approximately the 8'6" waterline). Flooding was caused by a leak in the blowing-out steam line to the sea chest of the sea suction for the fire and bilge pumps. (Photograph 1933-11, page 55).

The forward engine room was flooded to about 3 1/2 feet above the lower level floor plates (approximately the 7' 0" waterline). Causes of this flooding could not be determined. Possible sources of flooding of the forward engine room are:

(1) By salt water backing through the funnels of the low pressure drain line from the forward fireroom to the fresh water drain tank, venting into the bilges of the forward engine room.
(1) The main drain bulkhead stop valves and the bilge suction valves being left open in flooded spaces would have allowed the salt water from the forward fireroom to drain back to the forward engine room.

(3) The air vent on the salt water side of the #1 main condenser leaking into the bilges.

The after engine room was flooded to approximately the 3' 0' water line. The source of flooding was a leaking starboard shaft gland in bulkhead 118.

All flooding in the ship could have been controlled if the crew had been aboard.

M. Ventilation.

The only damage is the dishing and tearing of topside ventilation screens.

N. Ship Control.

Unaffected.

O. Fire Control.

Unaffected.

P. Ammunition Behavior.

Unaffected.

Q. Ammunition Handling.

Unaffected.

R. Strength.

There is no evidence of permanent hog or sag, shear strains in shell plating, or local failures in way of structural discontinuities.

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U.S.S. MUSTIN (DD413)

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Panel deflection under blast is evidence by dishing of a watertight door at frame 105, starboard, and by damaged stack breeching and ventilation screens.

S. Miscellaneous.

No comment.
TECHNICAL INSPECTION REPORT

SECTION II - MACHINERY

GENERAL SUMMARY OF MACHINERY DAMAGE

I. Target Condition After Test.

(a) Drafts after test; list; general areas of flooding, sources.

The forward fire room and forward engine room were flooded to a depth of about 3 1/2 feet above the lower level floor plates. Flooding of the forward fire room was caused by failure of a blowing-out connection to a sea chest. The line was already badly corroded.

The cause of flooding of the forward engine room was not completely determined. The following probably contributed to it:

(a) Failure of an already badly corroded blowing-out connection to a sea chest. The stop valve for this line leaked before Test B. Failure of the line allowed some water to enter the engine room, but not enough to account for all the flooding.

(b) Water backing up from the forward fireroom through interconnected piping, in which some leaks existed before Test B.

All of the flooding could have been easily controlled without impairing operation of the machinery if the crew had been aboard.

(b) Structural damage.

The outer casings of the breeching between uptakes and stacks (above the main deck) are moderately dished. Seams failed in several places. A number of staybolts have pushed through the sheet.
The stack is slightly dished near its base, but its strength is not impaired. All of the above damage occurred on the starboard side.

(c) Other damage.

Machinery in the forward fire room and forward engine room is damaged from flooding. Two small sections of piping, already badly corroded, ruptured. One is a blowing-out connection to a sea chest in the forward fire room, the other is a blowing-out connection to a sea chest in the after engine room. No other damage to machinery was found by a careful visual inspection.

II. Forces Evidenced and Effects Noted.

(a) Heat.

No evidence.

(b) Fires and explosions.

No evidence.

(c) Shock.

The ship received a moderate underwater shock, which ruptured the piping mentioned in I (c) above.

(d) Pressure.

Blast pressure and/or the heavy mass of water thrown upon the vessel caused the structural damage mentioned in I (b) above. Canvas covers had been fitted over air intakes to prevent entry of radioactive particles. Those on the starboard side were damaged, which is additional evidence of blast pressure. The blast came from starboard.
(e) Effects apparently peculiar to the atom bomb.

The high magnitude of underwater shock, blast pressure, and wave action, sufficient to cause noticeable effects at this distance from an explosion, are apparently peculiar to the atom bomb.

III. Effects of Damage.

(a) Flooding of the forward fire room and forward engine-room left machinery in these spaces inoperable. This leaves the ship with only one operable boiler and one operable engine, a situation making steering more difficult as well as greatly reducing speed. No electric power is available except that furnished by the emergency diesel generator (the latter was inoperable before Test B but was not affected by it and would have been operable after the test if it had been so before). All of the flooding could have been controlled if the crew had been aboard, in which case it is not believed that the test would have had any appreciable effect on operation of machinery, except for possible effects of radioactivity. Damage to uptake breaching and piping is minor and would not affect operation.

NOTE: No machinery on this vessel was operated after Test B. Radioactivity was high when the ship was inspected, 15 days after the test.

(b) Effect on gunnery and fire control.

No comment.

(c) Effect on water-tight integrity and stability.

No comment.

(d) Effect on personnel and habitability.

Except for effects of flooding, which could have been prevented if the crew had been aboard, and for radioactivity, the test would have had no effect on personnel or habitability below decks.
(e) Total effect on fighting efficiency.

Fighting efficiency is greatly reduced by loss of steam and electric power, and reduction of maneuverability caused by having only one usable engine. If the crew had been aboard to control flooding, it is not believed that fighting efficiency would have been affected at all, as far as machinery is concerned, except for possible effects of radioactivity.

IV. General Summary.

The MUSTIN was apparently near the limiting range of serious mechanical damage to vessels of her type during Test B.

V. Preliminary Recommendations.

Uptake breechings, as installed on this vessel, are an obvious point of weakness against this form of attack. Design changes are indicated.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MACHINERY DAMAGE

A. General Description of Machinery Damage.

(a) Overall condition.

The forward fireroom and forward engineroom were flooded to approximately 3 1/2 feet above the lower level floor plates. The flooding could have been controlled if the crew had been aboard. Actually however, boilers 1 and 2 and the forward engineroom (which contains both ship's service generators) are inoperable. There is some damage to the breechings between uptakes and stack, above main deck, but not enough to impair operation. Two small nonessential sections of piping, already badly corroded, ruptured. These failures are primarily responsible for the flooding. Otherwise, there is no change in the overall condition of the machinery, as far as can be determined by visual inspection.

(b) Areas of major damage.

Forward fireroom and forward engineroom.

(c) Primary causes of damage.

Flooding. Blast pressure caused minor damages to uptakes breeching.

(d) Effect of target test on overall operation of machinery plant.

The flooding of the forward fireroom and forward engine room reduces steam power to 1/3 normal and makes ship control more difficult, as only one engine can be used. No electric current is available for power or light except that furnished by the emergency diesel generator.
If the crew had been aboard the flooding could have been controlled. In this case the test would have had no effect on overall operation of the machinery plant, as far as can be determined by visual inspection.

NOTE: No machinery on this vessel was operated after Test B.

B. Boilers.

1. Boilers 1 and 2 are inoperable because of flooding. This could have been controlled if the crew had been aboard. There is no other damage to boilers, as far as can be determined by visual inspection. Fittings and foundations are intact. Pressure parts (both hydrostatic and air pressure) appear to be undamaged.

2. The outer casings of the breeching between uptakes and stack (above the main deck) are moderately dished. Seams have failed in several places. A number of staybolts have pushed through the sheet. This damage was apparently caused by air blast and/or the heavy mass of water thrown upon the vessel. It would not affect operation or materially reduce structural strength. Operation could be continued indefinitely without repairs.

The stack is not appreciably damaged. It is slightly dished on the starboard side near the base.

Photographs: 2175-5; Page Center breeching leg.
48
-6; Page 56 Forward breeching leg.
1933-4; Page #2 uptake, starboard side,
50 showing tie bar bolts.
-5; Page 57 #2 uptake, starboard side,
-6; Page 58 #3 uptake, starboard side
1933-7; Page #2 Fire room, starboard
59 air intake
-8; Page Forward engine room vent
duct, port side.

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C. Blowers.

No apparent damage.

D. Fuel Oil Equipment.

No apparent damage.

E. Boiler Feedwater Equipment.

No apparent damage.

F. Main Turbines.

Apparently undamaged.

G. Reduction Gears.

The starboard reduction gear is flooded over the main thrust and bull gear bearings. Apparently the lube oil pump tank and the lower half of the bull gear are contaminated with salt water. This is secondary damage caused by the flooding of #1 engine room, which could have been prevented if the crew had been aboard. No mechanical damage is apparent.

H. Shafting and Bearings.

Apparently undamaged.

I. Lubricating System.

1. Apparently undamaged.

2. Due to the flooding in #1 engine room, the lubrication system in this space has been contaminated with salt water. This could have been prevented if the crew had been aboard.
J. Condensers and Air Ejectors.

1. Apparently undamaged.

2. The main and dynamo condensers in the forward engine room had their injection and overboard valves left open for Test B. Inspection of these condensers after the engine room had been pumped out indicated that no damage had occurred.

K. Pumps.

1. Apparently undamaged mechanically.

2. The pumps in #1 engine room and #1 fireroom are damaged from salt water. This is secondary damage caused by flooding of #1 fireroom and #1 engine room, and could have been prevented if the crew had been aboard. Pumps affected are:

(a) Feed Pumps:
   1. #1 main feed pump.
   2. #1 cruising feed pump.

(b) Circulating Pumps:
   1. Emergency Diesel cooling water pump (electric driven).

(c) Condensate Pumps:
   1. Dynamo condensate and booster (electric driven).
   2. #1 main condensate and booster pumps.
   3. #1 cruising condensate and booster pumps (electric driven).
(d) Fire Pumps:
1. Fire and flushing. Flushing (electric driven)

(e) Lube Oil Pumps:
1. #1 main lube oil.
2. #1 cruising lube oil (electric driven).

(f) Fuel Oil Pumps.
1. #1 fuel oil service pump.
2. Fuel oil tank drain pump (electric driven).

L. Auxiliary Generators.

Apparently undamaged mechanically. They are inoperable because of flooding, which could have been prevented if the crew had been aboard.

M. Propellers.

Not inspected. There is no reason to believe they were damaged.

N. Distilling Plant.

Apparently undamaged.

O. Refrigerating Plant.

Apparently undamaged.

P. Winches, Windlasses and Capstans.

Apparently undamaged.

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USS MUSTIN (DD413)

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Q. Steering Engine.
   Apparently undamaged.

R. Elevators, Ammunition Hoists, etc.
   Apparently undamaged.

S. Ventilation (Machinery).
   Apparently undamaged.

T. Air Compressors.
   Apparently undamaged.

U. Diesels (Generators and Boats).
   No apparent damage incident to Test B. The generator was inoperable before the test.

V. Piping.
   1. All piping was inspected and appears to be undamaged except as follows:

      (a) Auxiliary Steam:

         1. The blowing out steam line to the sea suction of the fire and bilge pumps in #1 fire room (located to starboard of #2 boiler) ruptured and flooding of this space resulted. This line had been severely corroded and was in a poor condition before Test B. Failure to close the open funnel drain main valves resulted in flooding of the forward engine room, through the drain main from the flooded forward fire room.

         2. A similar line in #2 engine room also failed. This line is connected inboard of the sea suction valve.
Already existing leakage of the sea suction valve allowed water to enter the engine room through the break in this line.

W. Miscellaneous.

The messing, laundry and machine shop equipment shows no apparent damage.
GENERAL SUMMARY OF ELECTRICAL DAMAGE

I. Target Condition After Test.
   (a) Drafts after test; list; general areas of flooding, sources.

   Drafts not observed. The following spaces were flooded. Forward engine room; forward fire room, and after engine room.

   (b) Structural damage.

   Not observed.

   (c) Damage:

   No electrical damage other than from flooding.

II. Forces Evidenced and Effects Noted.
   (a) Heat.

   None.

   (b) Fires and explosions.

   There were no fires or explosions.

   (c) Shock.

   None observed.

   (d) Pressure.

   None observed.
(e) Any Effects apparently peculiar to the atom bomb.

Persistant radioactivity was the only peculiar effect noted.

III. Results of Test on Target.

(a) Effect on propulsion and ship control.

The only effect was from salt water flooding.

(b) Effect on gunnery and fire control.

None.

(c) Effect on watertight integrity and stability.

None.

(d) Effect on personnel and habitability.

None electrically.

(e) Total effect on fighting efficiency.

None electrically.

IV. General Summary of Observers Impressions and Conclusions.

Had the ship been manned flooding would have been quickly controlled, thereby eliminating all damage found on inspection.

V. Any Preliminary General or Specific Recommendations of The Inspection Group.

No recommendations are made.
SECTION III
PART C - INSPECTION REPORT

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ELECTRICAL DAMAGE

A. General Description of Electrical Damage.
(a) Overall Condition.

The electric generating plant was disabled by flooding. Only the emergency generator was operable.

(b) Areas of major damage.

All damage to electrical equipment was in forward engine room, after engine room and forward fire room.

(c) Primary causes of damage in each area of major damage.

Salt water flooding was the only cause of damage.

(d) Operability of electrical plant.

1. Ship's service generator plant - generators were not affected. However, generator plant auxiliaries were flooded.

2. Engine and boiler auxiliaries - all auxiliaries in the lower level of both engine rooms and the forward fire room were flooded.

3. Electric propulsion - this item does not apply.

4. Communications - the only effect was due to the loss of ship's service power.

5. Fire control circuits - no damage.

6. Ventilation - the loss of ship's service power re-
duced ventilation to zero.

(e) Types of equipment most affected.

Equipment most affected were: motors, motor controllers, wiring, wireways, and transformers.

B. Electric Propulsion Rotating Equipment (S41).

This item does not apply.

C. Electric propulsion Control Equipment (S41).

This item does not apply.

D. Ship's Service Generators (S61).

No damage.

E. Emergency Generator (S61).

No damage. The machine did not operate for the test as an engine bearing burned out just before abandon ship (C.O. report #5).

F. Switchboards and Distribution Panels (S62).

No damage to switchboards. Distribution panel in lower level of engine rooms flooded.

G. Wiring, Wiring Equipment and Wireways (S62).

All equipment in the lower level of both engine rooms and forward fire room was flooded.

H. Transformers (S62).

Transformers in the forward engine room were flooded.

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I. Submarine Propelling Batteries (S62).
   This item does not apply.

J. Portable Batteries (S62).
   No damage.

K. Motors, Motor Generator Sets and Motor Controllers (S63).
   All motors and motor controllers located in the lower level of the forward engine room were flooded.

L. Lighting Equipment (S64).
   The only damaged lighting was in flooded areas.

M. Searchlights (S66).
   No damage.

N. Degaussing Equipment (S64).
   No damage.

O. Gyro Compass Equipment (S64).
   No damage.

P. Sound Powered Telephones (S65).
   No damage other than flooding.

Q. Ship's Service Telephones (S65).
   This item does not apply.

R. Announcing Systems (S65).
   No damage.
S. Telegraphs (S65).
    No damage.

T. Indicating Systems (S65).
    No damage.

U. I.C. and A.C.O. Switchboards (S65).
    No damage.

V. F.C. Switchboards (S71).
    No damage.
AB-CR-175-2186-2. View from off port bow after Test B.
AB-CR-175-2186-4. Close-up off port quarter after Test B.
AB-CR-175-2186-3. Port side view, frames 86 to stern after Test B.

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8859
AB-CR-79-2966-10. View from off port quarter after Test B.
AB-CR-175-2186-9. View from off starboard bow after Test B.
AB-CR-175-2186-7. Starboard side close-up, bow to stack after Test B.
AB-CR-75-2186-6. Starboard side close-up, stack to stern.
AB-CR-175-2186-6. Starboard side close-up, bow to frame 169.
Damage to starboard side of stack central breeching. Note retraction of plating in way of tie-bolts.
AB-CR-76-1933-3. Damage to starboard side of stack forward breeching.
AB-CR-76-1933-4. Damage to starboard side of stack after breeching. Note retraction of plating in way of transverse tie-bar bolts.
AB-CR-76-1933-8. Damage to screen over forward engine room air intake, main deck, port, frame 104.

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AB-CR-76-1933-11. Temporary leak-stopper on suction side of No. 2 fire and bilge pump in after engine room, frame 124, starboard.
AB-CR-76-1933-5. No. 2 uptake, starboard side.
AB-CH-76-1933-6. No. 3 uptake, starboard side.
AB-CR-76-1933-7. No. 2 fire room, starboard air intake.
Since the submission of reference (a) all flooded engineering spaces in the USN MUSTIN (DD413) have been pumped. There still remains between three and five inches of water in the bottom bilge of the Forward Fire Room, and after engine room.

While no further major damage has been found, other than damage to electrical pumps and installations caused by fourteen days submersion in sea water, the supplementary report is submitted to give the causes for leakage found and the present material status of the MUSTIN.

Flooding in the forward fire room (Compt. B-1-1) was caused by a one half inch hole in the blowing out line to the sea suction side of the No. 1 Fire and Bilge Pump. A soft patch has been applied to this line. The boiler foundations and brickwork appear to be undamaged.

The After Fire Room (Compt. B-2-1) was not flooded. No major damage was found.

The cause of the leakage in the Forward Engine Room (Compt. B-3-1) has not yet been found. A thorough inspection has been made by ship’s force. No increase in flooding has been noted over a period of 48 hours. All electrical pumps and transformers in this space are grounded.

A small leak in the discharge side of the No. 2 Fire and Bilge Pump (After Engine Room - Compt. B-4-1) was found on 13 August. There is no disc on the discharge side. However, this leak was not found when the ship was first reboarded on 9 August. At the time of first reboarding the After Engine Room was apparently being flooded by leakage through the packing around the starboard shaft from the Forward Engine Room. It is the opinion of the commanding officer that the leakage in the Fire and Bilge Pump developed between 9 and 13 August.
Ten minutes prior to evacuation of last minute personnel for BAKER Day the diesel generator wiped the No. 1 and No. 2 main bearings and the No. 3 and No. 4 connecting rod bearings.

In general no structural damage to machinery foundations nor any distortions of the shell plating has been found. All tanks and voids were sounded before and after test BAKER and no undue increase was noted.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER
ATTENTION: OMI/Mr. William Bush (Security)

SUBJECT: Declassification of Reports

The Defense Special Weapons Agency has declassified the following reports:

- AD-366588
- AD-366589
- AD-366590
- AD-366591
- AD-366586
- AD-367487
- AD-367516
- AD-367493
- AD-801410
- AD-376831
- AD-366759
- AD-376830
- AD-376828
- AD-367464
- AD-801404
- AD-367459

XRD-203-Section 12
XRD-200-Section 9
XRD-204-Section 13
XRD-183
XRD-201-Section 10
XRD-131-Volume 2
XRD-143
XRD-142
XRD-138
XRD-83
XRD-80
XRD-79
XRD-76
XRD-106
XRD-105-Volume 1
XRD-100
Subject: Declassification of Reports

✓ AD-367491 X RD-134-Volume 2
✓ AD-367479 X RD-123
✓ AD-367478 X RD-122
✓ AD-367481 X RD-125
AD-367500 X RD-159-Volume 2
✓ AD-367499 X RD-160-Volume 3
✓ AD-367498 X RD-161-Volume 4
AD-367512 X RD-147
AD-367511 X RD-148
AD-367465 X RD-107
AD-366733 X RD-43
AD-367477 X RD-121
AD-367476 X RD-120
AD-367467 X RD-109-Volume 1
AD-367475 X RD-119
AD-367474 X RD-118
AD-367473 X RD-117
AD-367472 X RD-116
AD-367471 X RD-115
AD-367466 X RD-108
AD-801405L X RD-113
AD-367470 X RD-112
AD-367469 X RD-111
Subject: Declassification of Reports

AD-801406L ✓ XRD-114.

In addition, all of the cited reports are now approved for public release; distribution statement "A" now applies.

ARDITH JARRETT
Chief, Technical Resource Center