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The Strategic Setting for Conflict in South Thailand (U)

By: Russell F. Rhyne

Operational Research Division
Research Memorandum
ORD-RM 4923-1

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April 1965

Operational Research Division
Research Memorandum
ORD-RM 4923-1

THE STRATEGIC SETTING
FOR CONFLICT IN SOUTH THAILAND (U)

By
RUSSELL F. RHYNE

Prepared for:
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

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PREFACE

This report presents the first major step in the work of the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Counterinsurgency Surveillance Analysis Project. It forms the basis for our model (i.e., detailed description) of insurgent stockpiling operations in south Thailand and therefore for our subsequent studies of the means of detecting such operations. It starts with descriptions of the main political and military conditions that tend to bound, or predetermine, the conflict process in south Thailand and proceeds to our estimates of the current situation. It concludes with outlines of three hypothetical conflict situations that might possibly emerge in the relatively near future and which seem to us to merit more detailed analysis. The material presented herein is intended to provide the basis from which, and the context within which, further and more detailed analyses will proceed.

While this study is relatively broad in scope, it was developed with an eye toward analysis of stockpiling operations, and the emphasis within it probably reflects that intent. It is hoped that it will serve as a useful point of departure for the study of insurgent operations other than stockpiling, and counterinsurgent activities other than surveillance, but such applications should be made in full appreciation of the purposes for which it was produced.

The author is responsible for the particular estimates and emphases offered here, but the preparatory work was a team effort to which the other main contributors were Messrs. T. Baxter, F. M. Osanka, and D. Seeley. Valuable assistance was provided by USOM, JUSMAG, and the U.S. Embassy in Thailand, and by many officers of the various branches of the Thai security forces in Bangkok. The most important assistance, however, came from the Thai Border Patrol Police of the 9th Area (with their headquarters in Songkhla) and from various sections of the Malaysian Police. In a sense, it might be said that the Communist Terrorists helped most of all since they provided most of the materials
underlying this appreciation of the situation, via the captured documents and the interrogation reports in the BPP and Malaysian files that were made available to us. It must be emphasized, however, that the broad conclusions and evaluations implicit in the descriptions included here do not reflect, except by coincidence, the official estimates of any agency mentioned above nor of the several others who might be interested in this problem.

(U) These materials are of course already being put to use within the SRI project. They are being published primarily in the hope that any errors of interpretation or emphasis or any outright mistakes will be made known to us by those who are knowledgeable in the field before such distortions are carried over into our further work. Criticism is therefore invited.
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I INTRODUCTION

(U) The phrase "strategic setting" suggests different things to different people, and it is therefore necessary to start with a description of what we mean by it. The strategic setting of a conflict, as we use the term, consists of those parts of the total environment--political, physical, military, etc.--which tend to induce some kinds of conflict and inhibit others. This corresponds with the general idea that strategy is made up of the plans and agreements that bound the local, immediate field within which a tactical commander has freedom of action. The parts of the environment that have the most distinctive effects on local conflict alternatives may be called determinants, since they constrain and channel both the unforced evolution of the conflict and the tactical decisions of local leaders and officers.

(U) The most evident among such determinants are the actual strategic plans of the powers concerned, but they generally are not available and are sometimes altered radically as a situation unfolds. The elements of power and practicality and national purpose from which such plans are born are more basic and less changeable. An attempt to describe completely such bounding conditions would be endless, however, and this analysis will attempt to fix attention on the more salient points. After this effort, which is intended to provide bases for selecting plausible lines of evolution of the existing situation and for predicting how component subversive operations may relate to each other, more detailed investigations will be made of the interactions between selected hypothetical operations and the constraining effects of each environmental facet.

(U) This study begins with a description of aspects of local geographic, ecological, and communal relations, followed by brief treatments of the internal conditions in Thailand and Malaysia (the two countries most immediately concerned with insurgency in south Thailand) and their present or potential involvement in wider Southeast Asian
conflicts. With these materials as a base, it is possible to describe the local conflict situation and to project three hypothetical lines of evolution whereby the present situation might become more serious.

(U) Those three conflict situations then will serve as the basis for much of the work of the SRI Counterinsurgency Surveillance Analysis Project during the next several months.

(U) The local conflict situation is the point of departure, although it cannot be treated in detail until there has been some description of the local setting. Briefly, a highly professional communist army of several hundred men and women is marking time and building strength in south Thailand just north of the Malaysian border. It is the residue of the force defeated in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960); they are widely referred to as the Communist Terrorists, or CT.* The mere presence of such a force would represent a serious breach in the sovereignty of any state. While their ability to subvert must not be disregarded, it seems unlikely that these forces could militarily threaten either the Thai or Malaysian states unless those states were in trouble for other reasons. Unfortunately, it is easy to visualize conditions in which either or both might be subjected to politico-military pressures that would seriously strain them. Under such conditions, with their attentions diverted and their forces committed elsewhere, the Communist organization in the south would find its potential for mischief amplified many fold.

* See Sec. III-A for a breakout of the organizations and echelons of authority covered by this designation.
II STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS

(U) The following description of the strategic setting for conflict in south Thailand must, therefore, attend especially to those factors which bear upon the status and potential of the CT. More particularly, since it has been determined that this research project will focus its attention initially on insurgent stockpiling operations, this investigation of strategic determinants must treat with factors affecting the availability of supplies from outside of south Thailand, with the conflict alternatives that might be opened to the CT if an abundance of such supplies were to be made available to them. At the same time, this description should serve as a point of departure for analysis of many insurgent operations other than stockpiling, so attention will not be limited to questions important to the immediate subject of study in this project.

A. Physical and Military Geography

(U) The southern border of Thailand is farther from Bangkok than is Saigon, Dien Bien Phu, or Rangoon. The strip of land, about 300 miles long by 100 miles wide between the Kra Isthmus (the narrowest part of the peninsula) and the Malaysian border (and separating the Gulf of Siam and the Andaman Sea) belongs to Thailand from coast to coast, but to the north the peninsula is shared with Burma. At one point, about 100 miles north of Kra, Thai territory necks down to a width of only about 10 miles. It would be virtually impossible for an invading army to penetrate to the heart of Thailand along this narrow route, and the military plans and preparations of the Thai have paid correspondingly little attention to the region, in comparison for instance with those areas in north and northeastern Thailand which could be reached so readily from Laos.

(U) Whether because of simple distance or because the military threat has been perceived to be slight, the region south of Kra has been something of a forgotten land. It stands last in the list of
nine areas into which Thailand has been divided for administrative purposes—a list on which the region around Bangkok has been placed first. It seems to hold a corresponding position on many priority lists.*

(U) Much of the area is covered by jungle, especially near the Malaysian border and along the western coast, and a large part of the jungle is mountainous as well. Much of the eastern coast is relatively easy to patrol, having few irregularities and not a great deal of cover. The western coast is a smuggler's paradise, however, with heavy forest right down to the water, many small off-shore islands, and navigable estuaries reaching back into the jungle.

(U) It is the strip of land just north of the border that is most important in the context of this analysis, however, since it is there that nearly all the CT reside and exercise extensive influence upon the local people. The border area is a remarkably favorable one in which to hide, with very heavy jungle (ranging from primary stands of 200-foot trees down to new, chaotic regrowth) covering rough, craggy hills. The area is laced by streams and a very few trails and is dotted with a small number of rice-producing valleys.

(U) It is worth noting that there seem to be no good maps of this area north of the border. The map-coordinate location of a fire fight or a discovered camp usually is doubtful, since the Thai security forces work with maps that often are only vaguely related to the ground on which they walk.

(U) The border itself twists for about 400 kilometers across the peninsula. There are three primary avenues of movement across it: a highway-rail combination in the west through the town of Sadao and the

*Since the beginning of 1965, when the writing of this report began, there has been a progressive increase in general attention to the border area.
wide valley around it, another road through Betong in the very rough central sector, and a multitude of trails and a few roads across the flatter (but still generally forested) eastern area. The forests in Thailand where the CT now operate most frequently cover perhaps 10,000 square kilometers. The geography just south of the border is very similar.

B. Ecology

(U) The terrain and vegetation favor the guerrilla, but the human subsistence pattern works on the side of the counterinsurgent forces. A very similar situation in Malaya dictated the winning strategy there: the Briggs Plan which said, in essence, "Starve them." The jungle is neutral only in the sense that it is an unbiased enemy of any individual who tries to live steadily within it. Game, fruit, and edible plants are not plentiful, and vitamins and minerals and high-energy foods seem to be especially scarce. Movement, except along stream beds or the occasional trail, can be measured in hundreds of meters per day, and the gathering of the little food that exists is correspondingly difficult. It rains very often.

(U) If the jungle lay adjacent to the rice fields and if the local villagers produced an excess of food, the guerrilla might live in the jungle most of the time and come out briefly and only a little way to get plenty of food, but even this option is denied in this border area. Many of the local people work in tin mines or rubber groves and use the money from such work to import food to supplement the locally insufficient crops. Furthermore, the rubber plantations form a buffer between the jungle and the villages in most areas, in that they offer a much easier environment for police patrolling than exists in the jungle.

(U) On the other hand, rubber cultivation places many tappers in isolated positions, and this is reflected in south Thailand by a pattern of life where huts are scattered by ones and twos and tens in and around much of the region where the CT base themselves. Such households are extremely vulnerable to terrorist extortion, being nearly impossible to protect. The CT, therefore, carried over from Malaya a
pattern which somewhat parallels that of the local people. They acquire money (by collecting "taxes") and use that money to buy supplies (forcing or otherwise inducing local people to serve as their intermediaries).

(U) This is indeed a potential point of vulnerability for the CT, making the study of their supply and stockpiling operations an especially appropriate starting point for counterinsurgency analysis in this case, but it is only a potential. One major difference between the earlier situation in Malaya and the one now in south Thailand, while not really ecological, must be discussed here to show that the solution proved in the former case may not be copied blindly for application in the latter. This has to do with the level of administrative development in the two places. The situation in Malaya just after the surrender of the Japanese was chaotic, but there was a past history of rather intimate governmental contact with almost all of the populated areas. A system of indirect rule had been evolved such that different groups were governed by individuals of their own culture, and while there often was not an identity of interest between the governing and the governed, there was at least reasonably good communication.

(U) In south Thailand, in contrast, some villages (and these are positioned in such a way as to be especially important in the CT supply chain) have almost their sole contact with the Thai Government through occasional visits by the Border Patrol Police (BPP). A large part of the population in the critical eastern sector is racially Malay, follows the Muslim religion, and speaks a Malay dialect. The Government's administrative and security personnel, by contrast, speak Thai and are Buddhists. Control of the food supplies needed by a guerrilla force of a few hundred men requires the most intimate control, going down almost to ounces of rice and single packets of vitamin tablets. It calls for a smooth-functioning, pervasive local administration system of a kind that has never existed in south Thailand and which could not be created quickly or easily. This structural characteristic of the civil administration, then, is an important strategic modifier of the opportunities presented by the local ecology.
The foregoing has treated only one way in which the subsistence pattern may affect the options open to the CT and their opponents. Poverty does not correlate at all well with the incidence of revolution, whatever the dreams of economic determinists may suggest, but neither is it irrelevant. Any relative economic disability offers some leverage to skillful subversives of the sort to be found in any well-integrated communist organization. This is especially so when the disadvantaged individuals tend to fall within the membership of a group defined by less changeable characteristics such as race or culture and when the disadvantage in question may plausibly be blamed on governmental policy rather than on simple bad luck. South Thailand is not a hardship area in comparison with other parts of Asia, but it does show some of these particular vulnerabilities.

Thailand is not a land of hungry people in general, and a resounding number of its farmers own their land. The classic line of appeal by Mao, against landlordism, sure to be worked by Asian Communists whenever possible, is therefore inapplicable in most sections. South Thailand's income from tin and rubber has given it the reputation of being relatively well off in comparison with the rest of the country, but the tin is owned by a few and it is reported that about 90 percent of the rubber is harvested on a share-crop basis from land owned by others. The "landlord" line may therefore have some appeal there. As an indication, the fractional share accorded to the tapper is one of the items of attention in current CT propaganda issued in the area. Later consideration of communal relations will bring out the possible significance of the fact that most tappers are of the Malay race in the critical eastern sector of the border.

* A figure of 83 percent was quoted from the 1953 census in the U.S. Army Area Handbook for Thailand, SORO, p. 424 (June 1963).
(C) While we do not intend to argue that the economic potentials for revolution are very serious in south Thailand, one further item is worth mentioning. A recent study* has pointed out that while poverty has been only occasionally followed by revolution, most revolutions have been preceded by a long period of gradual economic improvement followed by an abrupt set-back shortly before the revolution broke. Rubber has been a major money crop in south Thailand for decades; it has become a way of life for very many villagers. The price on the open market has dropped in the space of a few years to a small fraction of what it was before, and at least some businessmen in the area think that the associated depression could be mitigated if Thailand did not follow the U.S. lead in refusing to trade with rubber-hungry Red China. None of the captured CT documents consulted in this study so far, however, have commented on this relationship.

(U) In summary, as regards the local means of subsistence, the villager often does not grow all his own food. Many villagers work for wages or as share-cropping rubber tappers to get the money with which they support their families. The jungle itself will not support anything like the number of CT who live in it, and much that they need cannot be obtained even from nearby villages. This offers a possible means of both detecting and combattng the CT in the jungles, since they must regularly get food from some place and (considering the uncertainties that bear upon a hunted body of men) must store emergency supplies in each of the several places to which they might be forced to move on short notice. On the other hand, this ecological pattern provides something like a rural proletariat as grist for the Communist mill.

C. Communal Relations

(U) Our language has no colloquially current word to designate the separate cultural or racial groups within a multicultural state. A group sharing a language, moral precepts and patterns of living, and enough physical similarities to be assigned to one race or another has often been called a nation (e.g., the Navajo Nation). It has become customary, however, to talk of any state as a nation, no matter how many "nations," in the foregoing sense, may coexist within it. The word "culture," on the other hand, omits the matter of racial stock even in its broad anthropological meaning, and its more common meaning identifies it with superficial aspects of existence to such an extent that it is an inappropriate descriptor. In default of other terms more commonly used, the name "communal group" has been used for the kind of social entity described at the beginning of this paragraph.

(U) In south Thailand there are three such communal groups. One is the Chinese; a second is of Malay racial stock and culture and follows the Muslim religion; the third is racially Thai and its religion is Buddhism. The groups are not sharply distinct, of course. There are Chinese Muslims and a number of Chinese Buddhists, while some members of the Thai race in the area are Muslim, but these individuals adhere to one or another of the three, without forming into distinctive subgroups. There also is an invitation to misunderstanding in the fact that the two states most intimately involved—Malaysia and Thailand—have names that parallel those of two of the groups in question. Furthermore, the Thai Government lists all its citizens as Thai. Since most of the Chinese and Muslims are Thai citizens, they show up as Thai in most census reports and similar documents.

(U) In this section, discussion will be limited to communal groups in the country of Thailand unless there is explicit indication to the contrary. The Chinese group (in which religion seems to be a criterion definitely subordinate to racial and cultural membership) will be referred to as "Chinese." The group whose members generally speak Malay and adhere to the Muslim creed will be called "Muslim," to avoid
some of the ambiguity connected with the name, Malaysia. The Thai/Buddhist group will be called "Buddhist."

1. **Chinese**

(U) The Chinese dominate several regions along the border, including the two around the towns of Sadao and Betong in the western and central sectors, respectively. They provide not only the shopkeepers and businessmen in these towns--roles held by Chinese in many parts of Southeast Asia--but also a high proportion of the rubber tappers and tin-mine laborers in the two areas. They often labor under the same kind of political ostracism that has frustrated the "overseas" Chinese communities for decades. Each government in Southeast Asia, whether colonialist or not, has had to reckon with the fact that Chinese generally work harder, count better, and somehow make out better than other groups. Given an equal chance at political power, it seems that their energy and skill could have brought them to control the government in a number of countries. In most parts of Southeast Asia, however, the rulers have perceived this potential and have carefully blocked off the roads the Chinese might follow to reach political dominance. The Chinese in Betong may own the place, but the local police and all administrative officials, from the all-important district officer--Nai Amphur--upward, are likely to be Buddhist.

(C) Such frustrations seem to bear most heavily upon the more vigorous young people. These frustrations were considered important among the motivations that drove young Chinese into the CT organization during the Malayan Emergency, and they probably have some similar effect now in the Chinese enclaves near Betong and Sadao. In Betong, for instance, there appears to be a measure of voluntary support based on the energies and naturally radical inclinations of the young people; the overtly communist Malayan Communist Youth League in the area has been estimated to contain about 250 members. The older people, however, and most of the people in the countryside who provide supplies to the CT are probably held in line by fear more than by enthusiasm.
(C) The proportion of Chinese among new recruits appears to be far lower now, however, than it was a decade ago in Malaya. This must be partly due to the recruitment strategy of the CT, which penalizes the Chinese in order to support a beneficient image in Muslim communities. It may also suggest that fewer Chinese in Thailand feel interested in actually joining anything that calls itself a Malayan Races Liberation Army.

(C) Whatever the supply of recruits from the Chinese community or the degree of willing support offered by it to the CT, there seems to be no difference of opinion concerning the tangible support that it provides them. The CT collect taxes (referred to by them as subscriptions or donations) in money from those who have some and in labor from poorer people, and utilize the Min Yuen (the CT supply and intelligence support organization)* in a well-developed system of contacts to buy and move food, medicine, and other things needed by the jungle army. The Chinese communities near Betong and Sadao are known to provide at least significant funds for use in gaining support in the Muslim group in addition to those needed to support the CT in their own areas. Such funds are used, for instance, to buy medicines to be given to Muslim villagers.

2. Muslims

(U) The Muslim community in south Thailand covers most of the border areas except those of the Chinese enclaves mentioned above. The regions just north and south of the present border were once part of a single country, the kingdom of Pattani, and some feelings of solidarity still link the people within them. For one thing, some traits of the old Malay culture are better preserved there than in any other part of Malaysia. In Kuala Lumpur, for instance, it is hard to find the puppets

* Described in detail in Sec. III-A.

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used in the Wajang shadow plays except in museums; in south Thailand and in Kota Bharu (in northeastern Malaysia) they are part of a living, popular theater. This type of similarity is matched by religious and (to at least some extent) political ones. The religious tie is strongest, manifesting itself in a sort of fundamentalist attachment to Islam. Hundreds of local people go each year on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and strict adherence to the Islamic moral and social codes is common. Religious schools (with instruction given chiefly in the Malay language) offer almost the only education beyond the fourth grade in south Thailand, and the Hadji in each village tend to be the respected leaders.

(C) Across the border in the Malaysian states of Kelantan and Trengganu (both parts of the old kingdom of Pattani), the Alliance Party, which controls the national government, lost out initially to the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). Since then, the Alliance Party has won in Trengganu, and the PMIP is in power only in Kelantan. The PMIP has adhered to the idea of a union of all Malay peoples, or "Indonesia Raya" as it is called. It is sternly religious, with easy access to the religious schools which are attended by most of the students in Kelantan. It has clear lines of affinity with and support from Indonesia. It may have links with the Nationalist Party of South Thailand, which holds very similar political positions and which is at least penetrated and probably controlled by the CT, but no clear lines of association have as yet been uncovered.

(U) Whether or not there are direct ties between the PMIP and the Muslim parties of south Thailand, the PMIP position in the regions just south of the border is important. For one thing, many well-to-do Muslims in south Thailand send their children to be educated in Kelantan. The direct effect of exposure to pan-Islamic ideas there surely stiffens to some extent their feeling of cultural separateness from the Buddhists in Thailand. The significance of exposure to Indonesian influences will be made clear in a later section.
(U) This intense religious and cultural feeling has fostered irredentist movements against the present Thai government and the Sultanates through which the British exercised control prior to Malayan independence. CT propaganda now makes a play to this residual sense of nationalism.

(U) The Muslim communal group in south Thailand is an especially hard one for the Thai state to digest. It is a sophisticated society with traditions comparable in their elaboration and age to those of the Thai, and its sense of identity with either the world community of Muslims or with the old state of Pattani is probably as close as that with Thailand. Furthermore, both the present Thai state and that to which most Muslims aspire are theocratic to a great extent. Buddhism is theoretically more permissive in this respect, offering a better base for equal political involvement of people and groups of several religions, but the interweaving of secular and religious duties is so close in Thailand that it is hard to visualize the emergence of a non-Buddhist national leader. The administrative carry-over from the days of absolute monarchy is sufficient so that ideas of regional autonomy of a sort that might permit local government of Muslims by Muslims are alien to the whole system.

(C) One additional bit of history makes this Muslim group (which is almost entirely of the Malay race) especially important in relation to the CT. There has been great emphasis by communist leadership in Southeast Asia upon the penetration of the indigenous communities, especially the Malay, going back to Commintern instructions of the 1920s. This effort generally was fruitless in Malaya itself, and it seems likely that this difference between what was described as necessary and what was actually accomplished must have looked to the CT leaders like one explanation for their failure there. This is partly substantiated by the self-criticisms of the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) after the first few disastrous years of the Emergency, in which they described the early emphasis on the armed struggle (as opposed to political, non-violent actions designed to gain public support) as a
"leftist deviation." Since the CT have come to think that their failure to tie to a pervasive mass movement of Malays was a major cause of their failure in the past, the current success in that direction among the Malay/Muslim communities north and south of the border finds special emphasis in their plans and hopes. It will be argued later that there has been a large measure of such success, putting the Muslim communal group in south Thailand in a pivotal position.

3. Buddhist

(U) Little will be said here about the Buddhist community in the south of Thailand. A rather small proportion of residents in rural areas near the border belong to this group, with a larger one to be found in the towns. A disproportionate share of them are associated with the military, police, and civil administration. Reliable data on income distributions are not available, but given the prevalent association in Thailand between income and governmental power, it seems fair to guess that this group also contains a disproportionate share of property owners. (Indeed, since this last also probably applies to the Chinese, the Muslims seem likely to be economically as well as culturally disadvantaged.)

(U) As one gets north of about the seventh parallel, however, the Buddhists make up most of the population, except in isolated enclaves.

(U) The most important segments of this community, in the present context, probably are the security forces and other government agencies engaged in civil administration and economic development. The counterinsurgent forces that are most important in the area are the Border Patrol Police and the Army. There are two other branches of the police, the Provincial Police and the Water Police, but neither are possessed of a combat capability such as to seriously bother the forces already commanded by the Communists in the region. All of these agencies of government have a few non-Thai members, but very few. This is due less to direct exclusion of Malays than to entrance requirements that
call for fluency in the Thai language, to which many of the Muslim group are exposed only during their brief four years of public schooling.

D. Regional International Relations

1. Malaysia

(U) Although the area under consideration is in Thailand, Malaysia seems to be the country that is most seriously threatened. The CT escaped from Malaya after defeat there, and they claim that their only purpose as a continuing force in the field is to return one day for another attempt. They now avoid contact with the security forces in order, as they say, to show that they are only in Thailand for a breathing spell. This is a matter of decision, however, rather than capability, since they probably could function well on the offense.

(U) The defeat had been a gradual one. The Communist army, composed mostly of fighters who had served in the anti-Japanese underground forces during WW II, began the fight in June 1948 under the name Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army, with a vast supply of arms and ammunition and from 5,000 to 12,000 men. It once was estimated that about 6,000 weapons were available to them in 1946 (furnished during the war by the Allies or obtained from the Japanese). After a little more than a year of action, in October 1949, they were already getting very short on ammunition, the Malayan Security Forces having recovered in combat or through the discovery of caches the remarkable quantity of 565,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. In that year some CT (by then calling themselves the Malayan Races Liberation Army) units had already begun the long trek from the south to the greater safety of the jungle-covered mountains in the parts of the country farther north. The Central Committee of the MCP, which had retained effective control over the CT from the start, moved north to the geographic center of the country in 1950, worked back further into the hills in succeeding years and in 1953 made its "long march" to the Sadao area. (The parallel with the Chinese Communist experiences under Mao is emphasized by the CT in this case as in a number of other cases.)
(U) After the first few years of fighting, the leaders had recognized their error in emphasizing violence and sabotage, including such things as slashing rubber trees and other actions that hurt the economy but also hurt the rubber tappers whose support they wanted. By then, however, the Briggs Plan of resettlement and protection of outlying villages, rigid food control, and deep patrolling by security forces had reduced the strength of the CT and their access to the population. They did threaten a comeback of a sort through clandestine control of front organizations in the mid-1950s (which was detected in time and contained), but by and large theirs was a losing battle of isolation, frustration, starvation, and continual movement from perhaps 1953 until the Emergency was declared finished in 1960.

(U) Organized bodies of men had begun to move into Thailand as early as 1953. One among the documents tells how a unit of 24 members (including the defector who gave the Malayan Police the information) was ordered in 1957 by its District Committee Secretary to dig up weapons previously buried in a particular area and then go to south Thailand. The journey took 45 days. By 1960 there were 500 to 600 CT in Thailand and only a few left in Malaya.

(U) The British had granted independence, within the British Commonwealth, to Malaya in 1957, giving responsibility for internal security to the new state. The CT were by then incapable of interfering appreciably with the elections that followed the granting of independence.

(U) The 12-year Emergency forced on Malaya (and the British) by the CT was extremely expensive, of course, in money and men and hardship, but it had one effect that the CT could hardly have foreseen and which they surely do not like. It built the best administrative machine in Southeast Asia, extending past ordinary legal and security

*Recorded in MCP position papers issued in 1951.
problems to the most minute details of village economics. Because of the smooth transition of power during the Emergency (and because of the wisdom of a few men), that machine never fell into disuse but was instead put to work in the task of making a nation, socially and economically.

(U) The foregoing accounts for many of the pertinent relations between Malaya and the CT now in Thailand. The other major event that must be understood is the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, in which the states making up Malaya were united with two previously British states in northern Borneo—Sarawak and Sabah—and Singapore.

(U) The attitude of Indonesia toward Malaysia is critically important in any assessment of the plausible lines of development of conflict in south Thailand. Briefly, this is so because Indonesia has launched a "crush Malaysia" policy which may bring either direct or incidental aid to the CT in Thailand. This policy will be considered further below, but some of its roots may lie in the character and actions of Malaysia and, before its formation, Malaya. These will be treated here.

(U) The revolt in Sumatra (and some of the other non-Javanese islands) against Sukarno's government in the middle and late 1950s was not unwelcome to many anti-communist nations. Malaya, then in the terminal but still serious phases of its Emergency, must have noted that opposition to communism was a fundamental theme of the revolutionists in Medan. While never going so far as to recognize the revolutionary regime, Malaya still did not make severe efforts to close down the supporting trade with Sumatra across the narrow Straits of Malacca. Even if Sukarno were not inclined to carry a grudge over this tacit approval of his enemies, he must now understand the quality of support that a newly viable Malaysia, no longer actively engaged in its Emergency, might now offer to a new Sumatran revolt.

(U) And he must further realize that the union with the states of North Borneo shows the way in which a Federation can accept
new applicants for membership. Malaya itself was merely an area to which Indonesia could not expect to extend its empire. Malaysia, with its ability to accept new members, is a possible competitor. Java forced centralized authority in place of the original Indonesian Federation to which the Dutch transferred sovereignty. It is not impossible that some of the outer islands (including Sumatra) might one day look to association within the Malaysian Federation in order to gain the kind of regional autonomy they lost to the Javanese so soon after gaining independence from the Netherlands. When Indonesia says that it is threatened by Malaysia, the statement is not an empty one, even if the latter has no expansionist or aggressive designs whatever. The seductiveness of Malaysia is a threat all by itself.

2. Indonesia

(U) The foregoing could only be true if Indonesia were experiencing economic and administrative difficulties, which seems to be the case. For many reasons, the transition to independence there was more abrupt than in Malaya, and the need for gradualness was greater because of the smaller proportion of practiced administrators left after the Dutch were ousted by UN pressure. And the economic and cultural problems were greater, with Java nearly sinking under its weight of people. The outer islands were inclined to translate their cultural differences with Java into economic ones. So Java formed an empire, chiefly by force of arms. Lacking the trained administrators needed to handle the more complex forms of a government based on consent and empirical adjustments, she moved quickly into what is effectively a dictatorship.

(U) The flamboyant characteristics of Sukarno are interestingly similar to those of Ardjoena, the brilliant "long-chancer" among the princes of the Mahabarata Epic, who has been adopted by Javanese as their cultural ideal. The moderate leaders and the steady, centrist Muslim party (the Masjumi Party), and the Indonesian Socialists, who balanced Sukarno at the start, have been all but silenced. Nasution, the military leader, who has been elevated in rank past the point where
he has any troops to command, has been regarded for several years as the final balancer.

(U) As the democratically inclined parties and leaders have been eclipsed, the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) has moved closer to Sukarno, and with that evolution Indonesia has moved very close to Red China.

(U) At the same time, the policy of favoring flair before caution has driven the Indonesian economy nearly to a state of chaos. The fact that it has not collapsed seems to be evidence of the sort of levitation that is possible for a while when a people believe that all of its leaders' drafts will somehow be cashed. As so often happens, however, it has become necessary to maintain a kind of national hysteria. First it was West Irian. A show of bombast and near-conflict caused enough UN pressure against the Dutch to win what force of arms apparently could not, just as had been the case a decade before on the independence issue. The bombastic approach to empire building was confirmed.

(U) Shortly before the West Irian accession had been arranged, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia was informed by the British that Malaysia was about to be formed. He replied that that was a subject of interest to the component states involved but not to Indonesia. The PKI at once saw it differently and so did Sukarno shortly thereafter. In any case, with the PKI leading it toward ever more militant measures, the Indonesian government soon launched itself on the course which Sukarno called his "crush Malaysia" campaign.

(U) This resulted in a great increase in the number of men under arms, even more remarkable when one realizes that Indonesia has 100 million inhabitants as against Malaysia's 10 million, unqualified technical superiority in the air, and an army many times larger and more heavily armed. It also was translated into the policy of "Confrontation," which was described as the policy that was used to wrest West Irian from the Netherlands, except for military activity. Soon, however, uniformed
irregulars were filtering across the central Borneo divide into Sarawak. That invasion has been opposed by Malaysian security forces, Gurkhas, and other Commonwealth forces.

(U) More recently, the incursions in Borneo have been accompanied by increasingly frequent air drops and sea landings of irregulars on the Malayan Peninsula itself. So far each penetration has been destroyed, with nominal losses to the defenders; at the present trickling rate such receptive defense could probably continue far longer than the invaders' enthusiasm.

(U) The main force driving Indonesia toward heavier involvement seems to be thePKI, which is here in an enviable position. A recent Party cleavage, between those favoring precipitant action to point out the failures of Sukarno's economic policies and others who wanted quiet infestation of the government's administrative organs, was settled in favor of the latter. Deep involvement in Malaysia, which is competent in its own right and has Commonwealth backing, could be disastrous for what is left of the Indonesian economy. By inducing the Indonesian government to over-commit itself now, the PKI may be laying the foundation for later attacks upon the incompetence of that same government. Whether Malaysia (a recent foe and present block to communist ambitions in Southeast Asia) or Indonesia (a plum almost chaotic enough for the picking) were to collapse first, the PKI could call itself a winner.

(U) The PKI policy of pushing "Confrontation," therefore, seems to be a clever one. As part of this, it would seem reasonable for the PKI to support the small but very able Communist Terrorist Organization in Thailand. Such support might be realized either through PKI influence in the Indonesian government or by calling on Chinese or Viet Cong resources; in either case the needed organizational and physical resources are available.

(U) It is essential to recognize, however, that a comfortable association between Indonesia and the CT (who still are predominantly Chinese) has serious hurdles in its way. The Indonesian
policy is founded on a racial and religious base, and has had its anti-Chinese overtones in the very recent past. The more thoroughly indoctrinated members of a Communist Chinese group may be expected to cooperate with a movement that is anti-Chinese if such action seems tactically desirable, but less firmly attached supporters—merchants, for instance, or the young men who see a future for themselves in the post-revolutionary state—are not likely to be so malleable. Only the most cynical of people can avoid some belief in their own propaganda, and it would be difficult for the Indonesians and CT to conduct a campaign of inciting strife between Muslims and Chinese in Malaysia without having a backlash within their own camp. It is assumed, therefore, that the two may act in concert but that their cooperation will be competitive and latently antagonistic.

(U) The foregoing may have overemphasized the importance of PKI desires and interests. Indonesian initiatives affecting insurgency in south Thailand may be driven less by the theories and interests of communism than by those of the Indonesian revolution itself. Indonesia still is controlled by men like Sukarno, who, after all, live for their country. What do they see in "Confrontation?" They have said that they see in it a means of further welding together their country, which may be another way of saying that they hope that an external enemy may help keep people from inspecting too carefully the state of affairs within. The most widely publicized reason is based on the contention that Malaysia is "neo-colonialist." Although the rest of the argument is not spelled out, this apparently is meant to indicate that the Malaysian government is unlegitimate and, therefore, that its destruction is an appropriate and even obligatory act. This may sound to some of us like simple invective, but at the very least it is not simple and it may be a dominating consideration in the minds of some leaders and many followers. They may hope finally for an easy win—to huff and puff once more and see another imperialist house come down—but they also may accept high risks along the way.
And while Malaysia and West Irian may look very different to us, it is unfortunately not obvious that Sukarno is mistaken. After all, the Labor Party, traditionally anti-imperialist, has just come to power in Britain; the British economy might be hard driven to support another Malayan Emergency; U.S. resolution in South Vietnam is questioned daily in the U.S. press; and the U.S. terms for military aid to Malaysia which recently were rejected in Kuala Lumpur were far less generous than those under which various kinds of U.S. aid had been provided to Indonesia in recent years.

But suppose that bombast has no effect this time, and that Malaysian forces simply go on killing or imprisoning the guerrillas sent to invade. Indonesia might then try a more massive attack, especially if Malaysia grows tired of such receptive defense and starts to carry the fight to Indonesian territory. Amphibious operations in the delivery and support of regular forces pose extremely complex administrative problems, more demanding than those in the realm of government which seem to have been too difficult for the Indonesians, so it seems unlikely that a heavier Indonesian attack would take that form. A mere increase in the frequency of commando-type penetrations, however, could be serious, especially if such landings were associated with action from the north by the CT now in Thailand.

To give some measure of this, there was one time in 1964 when Malaysian security forces had to deal with three simultaneous landings, a situation that seems to have engaged nearly all the security forces then available in the Peninsula. One of the three groups of guerrillas had to be left unattended for about three days, and in that time its members, some of them selected because of their previous residence in a local village, had set up a supply relationship in the locality. It took ten days for a much superior force to dig them out. If there were ten groups rather than three, four or five of them might go for weeks before their local supply relations could be put under stress. Raise the total to about 300 landings (to give about 10,000 invaders, or something like the numbers in one of Sukarno's divisions),
and the situation could be comparable to the worst periods of the Emergency.

(U) Fortunately for Malaysia, it is easier to say such things than to do them, and easier to land such separate groups than to supply and integrate them thereafter, but it is the kind of high-risk, quick-gain strategy that might appeal to Sukarno, especially with the PKI exerting its steady pressure toward deeper involvement. Even if such an attack were to fizzle after a few months, it would offer the CT of Thailand a chance to make their return to Malaya.

(U) If bombast fails, however, there is another possible branch along which Indonesian policy might move. Rather than further damage the economy and risk the reputation of the army by a deep military involvement, the anti-communist elements in Indonesia might call a halt to the whole business, including the PKI role in Djakarta.

(U) It seems, then, that a much intensified attack by Indonesian irregulars in the Malay Peninsula and probably in Borneo as well is a possibility, although internal forces in Indonesia might halt such action soon after its beginning. The CT may plan to capitalize on the attack, but their plans also must take into account the chance of a fizzle.

3. Laos

(U) There is another, almost separate web of conflict in Southeast Asia which may affect the course of events in south Thailand. If severe pressure were to be brought to bear on Thailand from Laos, the CT would be presented with an opportunity something like that which would be offered by Indonesian assault on Malaysia, but in this case the opportunity would lie to the north rather than to the south.

(U) There is no need to try to summarize a war so widely reported as that now going on in South Vietnam. It is enough to point out that the Viet Cong have already had to secure a considerable part of northern and eastern Laos to facilitate their logistic support of the war on South Vietnam. It is very easy to visualize possible outcomes of
the present war that would free large North Vietnamese forces for further operation in Laos, and from there, Thailand. Chinese forces could also be introduced, and if Red possession of Laos permitted stockpiling on the Thai side of the mountains such forces could be large. The existence of the capability for attack, of course, gives no proof that the attack itself will occur, but the chance will exist.

(U) Furthermore, if such an attack were to take place, it would be a communist one, nearly devoid of the nationalist overtones that have pervaded (and may have been dominant over) events in Vietnam. One should expect in such a case that the various elements of strength available to world communism would be coordinated. Without trying further to guess the character of an attack from the northeast, we shall assume that a logical concomitant to it would be a diversionary operation from the south by CT who have been reinforced or at least supplied from outside of south Thailand.
III THE CURRENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN SOUTH THAILAND, DECEMBER 1964

(U) The foregoing description of the strategic context of conflict in south Thailand provides a basis for a more detailed treatment of the situation there than was possible in the brief introductory description. This section will consider events during about the last four years. We intend to imply, by the above designation of month as well as year, that things could change radically at any time.

(U) The strength and characteristic operations of the CT will be described first, followed by similar treatment of the counterinsurgency forces in the area.

A. The Communist Terrorists

(U) The organized remnant of the communist army against which the forces of the British Commonwealth fought so desperate and costly a campaign between 1948 and 1960 in Malaya now occupies the area just north of the Thai/Malaysian border. Their strength was whittled from somewhere between 12,000 and 5,000 down to about five or six hundred during that time, but it took about a quarter of a million security forces to accomplish it. The leaders of those communist forces and, presumably, a disproportionate number of the better jungle fighters were among those who retreated over the border into Thailand. These insurgent forces, the CT, were called "Jawn Jin" (Chinese bandits) by local Thai people, "Ma Gung" (Malayan Communists) in Mandarin, and "Penjahat Kommunist" (Communist Bandits) by the Malay-speaking group. We shall refer to them here individually as CT, and collectively as the CTO (Communist Terrorist Organization).

(U) The CTO (see Table I) is made up of two basic elements: the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan Races* Liberation Army (MRLA). The two organizations parallel each other down to the level of

*This is the most common translation of the Chinese root word, but in this connotation it implies nationalism rather than racial integration.
Table I

THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN SOUTH THAILAND

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP)  The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)

Political Matters  Military Matters

Central Committee  General Headquarters

Joint-State/Border Committee  Regimental Headquarters

District Committee  Independent Platoons

Armed Work Force

Branch Committee  Sections

Armed Work Cells

Supporters and Sympathizers  Communist Front Organizations  Communist Satellite Organizations  Village Unions
the Armed Work Force and Cell, where they combine to form operational units. Not all of the personnel of the MRLA are party members, but most of the MCP have some position of authority in the MRLA. Hence, some overlap exists between the two organizations at all levels. The MCP controls all the activities of the CTO. At the apex of the MCP is the Secretary General and the Central Committee consisting of up to 12 top ranking MCP executives. This Committee rarely meets and the day-to-day policy direction for the CTO is carried on by the Politburo. The Politburo is one of three major functional departments of the MCP. The other two are Propaganda and Racial Work. The Central Committee (or Politburo) is also thought to play the role of the military high command of the MRLA, and probably provides policy direction to various CTO sponsored organizations, such as the Malayan Races Liberation League (MRLL) and the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL).

(U) At the next level are the Joint State or Border Committees of the MCP** and the regimental headquarters of the MRLA. At the present time there are two such combined units. The 8th Regiment of the MRLA, operating in the area of Sadao, is associated with and controlled by the Kedah-Penang Joint Committee of the MCP. The 12th Regiment of the MRLA operates in the Betong Salient and northward to the region just south of Yala. Associated with it is the Perak-Kelantan Border Committee. A third major segment of the CTO called the Central Department of Malay Works (CDMW) operates in the region south of Narathiwat to the Kelantan border.

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*The MRLL and MCYL are examples of organizations sponsored by the CTO which are truly communist in orientation. The Malaysian literature refers to these as "satellite" organizations. They differ from the communist-front organizations in that their members generally are knowing and spontaneous supporters of the CT, while those of the fronts usually are duped into acting as the communists would prefer.

**During the Malayan Emergency, several other echelons of command called Regional and State Committees existed between the Central Committee and its operating units. The reduction in force since then has made these levels superfluous and they have been consolidated into Joint or Border Committees.
This unit's function is primarily political and it answers directly to the Politburo. Since it is formed of the remnants of the old 10th Regiment (Malay), it is sometimes referred to as such. Although the use of armed presence in the latter area seems to be de-emphasized by the CTO, it is known that armed units of the CDMW exist.

(U) The MRLA "regiments" are simply levels of command, which, while they have their own security force, do not function as integrated military units. They do, however, maintain reserve units at this level, which can be called upon to support any subordinate element that may be in difficulty.

(C) Under the Joint or Border Committees and the MRLA Regiments are District Committees. The number of these varies between areas. Associated with the District Committees is an independent (floating) platoon of 30 to 40 well-armed and trained MLRA troops, consisting of three sections or squads with two to four automatic weapons per section. When one of these platoons is combined with elements of the MCP, it is called an Armed Work Force. There are two such platoons known to exist, one each in the Sadao and Betong areas, with a possible third operating in the CDMW region south of Narathiwat. They move frequently from one district to another and are used to display evidence of CT military competence and control before larger audiences, such as at mass meetings. The MCP elements accompanying these units preach propaganda through the medium of lectures, movies (16 mm sound), and tape recordings.

(C) The fundamental operating units of the CTO, however, are found at the Branch Committee level and below. This is referred to by

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*This material is derived from conversations with members of the Malaysian Police and the Thai BPP and from translated documents that have been found in south Thailand. It is believed to apply to the present situation, although the translations contain certain words (such as "Politbureau") which are infrequently used these days.
the CT as the "Min Yuen" (Peoples Movement). Two to four Branches are formed under each District Committee. Each Branch, in turn, consists of upwards of 20 Armed Work Cells. The latter constitute the primary contact with the masses. A typical Armed Work Cell contains three armed members of the MRLA, and one or two party members representing the MCP. The MCP element of the Armed Work Cell conducts virtually all of the business of the CTO with the masses. These personnel are either derived from the local area or have become so familiar with it that they can move about with relative ease. They speak the local dialect, be it Thai, Muslim or Chinese, and are extremely well versed in every local problem and attitude. They are responsible for setting up local cells of communist satellite and front organizations. They also set up local intelligence gathering systems, levy taxes, and acquire and transport supplies. These latter functions are largely performed through so-called masses executives, who may also be influential members of satellite or front organizations existing in their locals.

(C) The number of CT in south Thailand is variously estimated. The Thai BPP, which is the primary agency of the Thai Government now actively engaged against the CT, carry about 200 enemy soldiers on their situation map. This number reflects a count of highly reliable sightings and does not appear to include MCP or other non-uniformed CT. If this estimate is in error at all, it might be expected to be low. The Malaysian Police (who maintain as close a watch as they can on these forces) estimate the total to be at least 500 and maybe 1000. An isolated CT claim (drawn from a reported lecture given to about 60 villagers in the central border zone near the town of Betong in 1963) asserted that 26 platoons were then available for action in northern Malaya, which would indicate a force of perhaps 700 to 1000, over and above the residue that would have to be left behind in Thailand to preserve the safe haven there. There are evident, propagandistic reasons why the CT might wish to exaggerate their strength, and this last estimate may be correspondingly higher than the truth.
(C) For the purposes of analysis, we shall assume that the CT have at their disposal a force of guerrilla fighters numbering 500 or more. They are organized in three units, the 8th Regiment (in the Sadao area), the 12th Regiment (in the Betong salient), and the Department of Malay Works (in the eastern, mainly Muslim, sector). The last is often referred to in Malaysian documents as the 10th Regiment, which was the single Muslim, non-Chinese regiment during the Emergency and whose officers and men seem now to constitute the core of the Department of Malay Works.

(C) There is less variation in the estimates of the quality of these forces. All sources agree that these men (and some women) are well trained, well disciplined irregulars who are jungle-wise and schooled in the concurrent exercise of violence and persuasion. They often go in uniform, the same one used by many of them in a decade of war in Malaya, and they are scrupulously correct toward the local population. Their present policy calls for them to avoid conflict with Thai security forces, in order to present a "seemingly peaceful situation," but they fight promptly and well whenever the Thai BPP are able to make contact with them. The siting and defensive preparations of their jungle camps are excellent.

(C) One aspect of their capability seems surprising. Both captured documents and the weapons that have been taken from the CT indicate that their guns are old (though excellently maintained) and of such a variety that the provision of ammunition would be troublesome even at very modest levels of activity. The CT seem well supplied with money, and the purchase of arms would not appear to be hard to arrange. They are now avoiding combat, it is true, but they are attentive to the forms of military status (as is shown by their use of uniforms in spite of the fact that their lives are endangered thereby), and a soldier's weapon is a prime symbol. Some few CT platoons are heavily armed, with as many as five automatic weapons for 19 men, but even such groups seem to use guns of WW II vintage. It would seem that a force such as the CT would outfit itself in a manner such as to impress others and to fight
efficiently whenever the opportunity for a return to Malaysia might present itself. A reissue of arms might of course take place before the present phase of quiescence is passed. On the other hand, the sample on which data are available may be non-representative.

(U) The insurgent counterpoint to combat capacity lies in the ability to manipulate individual and group feelings among the people, and here again the present-day CT appear to be very competent. They have established in the Chinese communities of the Betong and Sadao areas at least the minimum essentials of material support without which a locally based guerrilla must fail at once. They collect taxes, both in money and labor, and they have enough supporters to buy for them (using their tax revenues) the supplies they need and to move those supplies to the edge of the jungle where the CT themselves may pick them up. This system seems to be the same as the one utilized in the Malayan Emergency, with effective use of threats and (rarely) violence and an appeal to the dammed-up energies of Chinese youth, but without a tap root into any pervasive local movements.

(C) In the eastern sector, however, there are disturbing indications that the CT are managing to establish a broader base among the Malay racial groups. Malaysian authorities responsible for continuously monitoring the activities of the CT both north and south of the border have indicated their conviction that race, religion, language, economic divisions, and local Muslim nationalism are being woven together in a CT-led movement. Resources drawn from Betong and Sadao are diverted, at least in part, to buy medicines for distribution among the Malay villagers. Individual CT adopt (or pretend to adopt) the Muslim religion and utilize the prestige of the religious teacher as a base from which to preach local irredentist nationalism. Captured documents show little direct criticism by the CT of the Thai government, but they do indicate unrelenting efforts to persuade villagers by both actions and words that the CT army is stronger and more orderly than the Thai security forces and that CT civic services are better tuned to local needs than are those of the Thai authorities.
(C) The CT dispense medicines, dig graves, plow farms, act as judges in the settlement of local quarrels, and introduce rudimentary civic organizations at the village level. As a part of such organizations they sometimes (the data available to us do not show the proportion of the villages in which this is undertaken) also create village unions or "anti-robbery" leagues, as they are sometimes called. Arms are also issued to villagers on some occasions. The arms seem to be taken back again after a short time, but in each case a few young men (well chosen, we may be sure) have had the pride of bearing arms, have known that they owed that pride to the CT, and have been given the minimum instruction necessary if they were to be called up as a reserve force to augment the CT army.

(C) A better source of recruits and of an armable reserve probably is to be found in the satellite organizations, notably the MCYL and the Youth Executives they have organized. It is not at all clear from the fragmentary data available to us how many individuals have been drawn into either the satellite or front groups nor how widely distributed such groups may be.

(C) In any case, from the tone of the captured documents bearing on the question, it would seem that there are quite a number of them. It has been estimated, for instance, that the MCYL has 200 to 250 members in the Betong area, and that supporters in the villages of that region may number 1500. As another indication, one account discusses a conflict that arose between the Youth Executives and the older Executives organized in one village. There is no hint that the village in question might have been one of a few. The central authority decided in this case, by the way, that the youth group should be given authority over the others.

(C) Another possible source of supply and reinforcements is to be found in Indonesia. The CT successes in the Muslim community have been associated with appeals to local nationalism and to the non-Muslim character of the present Thai and Malaysian governments, the latter being explicitly multi-cultural even though it favors the Malay group in some
ways. There is an evident affinity between such a movement and the anti-colonialist, pro-Malay position of Sukarno. There are in fact reports (of undetermined validity) that Indonesian soldiers have landed in south Thailand and have been seen with the CT. One report told of a landing of 32 Indonesians along the coast east of Songkhla. It was followed by another telling of 50 CT and 30 Indonesian soldiers in a camp some 60 kilometers north of the border. The last mentioned the kind of uniforms and arms used by the Indonesians and included the comment that the Indonesians had some 20 extra weapons to give to villagers whom they hoped to recruit for action against Kelantan. Whether or not these reports are true, it is clear that the interests of the CT and of the Indonesians are compatible in many ways. Both want to see the Malaysian government toppled or at least embarrassed. The Indonesians are relatively short on skilled guerrillas who know the border region, but they have plenty of modern arms; the CT find themselves in the reverse, complementary condition.

(C) The CT now appear to live almost entirely in the jungle. More than 200 of their camps have been found in south Thailand during the last four years or so, but only a few of those camps were notable enough to merit description in the reports of the Thai BPP. The ones that were described were the ones in which a fire fight was necessary to take them or were the unusually large ones. These particular camps are described in a document recently issued by this project.* An example will suffice here. The camp in question (see Fig. 1) was found by the BPP during a time when the author of that document was on patrol with them. Several other camps discovered previously were visited during the week's patrol in the jungle, but this particular camp had not been found before. It was on a spur of high ground jutting out into a bend in a stream, which seems to be the case with many of the larger camps. It

NOTE: CT camp on hilltop near river. Surrounded by two concentric rows of subterranean trenches, invisible, as they were roofed over and covered with earth. Sleeping platforms spaced at intervals around inner ring of trenches. Large, heavy barricade, about height of a man, constructed across rear of camp. Ring of foxholes encircled camp at its outer perimeter, outside double row of trenches. Evidence of wire or rope telegraph used to alert camp in emergencies. Camp contained one large rattan and palm hut about 10 x 30 feet, believed to be women's quarters. Hut contained 8 bunks along walls and small table in center. Outside, a trench at one end and fireplace at the other. No sun in camp. Jungle very thick. Trees about 75-80 feet. Brush cleared out under trees. Many metal containers found. Also empty cans for Gerber's orange juice, 3-gallon cooking-oil cans, tins of Thai dried fish, and American whiskey and gin bottles. (BPP states such supplies are brought to CT by Min Yuen, the CT service organization that provides not only supplies, but also intelligence and contacts with local villagers.) Camp had held between 50 and 60 CTs. Believed to be CT combat training camp or combat camp.

Camp had been abandoned by CTs about six months before discovery by 917th BPP Platoon.

FIG. 1 ABANDONED CT CAMP
was well fortified, as is indicated in the sketch of its defenses and general layout, reproduced here from Technical Note 1. Many of the trenches that surrounded and criss-crossed it were covered over so as to be hard to see even from the ground. The dense cover probably makes the camp invisible from the air, but that has not yet been checked with care. The size and general layout of the camp caused members of the Special Branch of the Malaysian Police at Kuala Lumpur, to whom it was described, to declare at once that it must have been the headquarters camp of the CT 8th Regiment. It had been abandoned, according to the estimate of the BPP, in about mid-1964, and it probably had held about 60 CT.

(C) This same camp was ringed by litter of empty tin cans and monkey skulls, which reflects two interesting aspects of CT supply. As was mentioned in the comments concerning the ecological context, the CT must import food from outside the immediate region of their camps, and the fact that they are steadily hunted requires that they provide hidden stores in many places. Rice and dried fish can be stored, and many captured documents and caches attest to the fact that the CT do store them (usually in sealed cans or drums underground), but they don't really store very well or keep very long. Besides, they fail to provide for many of the dietary needs of men living active lives wholly within the jungle. There has been, therefore, a tendency for the CT to rely heavily upon canned foods, and the evidence of that dependence is found around most discovered camps, in many caches, and in captured documents. A detailed list of the material utilized by the CT has been prepared in Technical Note 2 on this project.*

(C) Such use of iron containers may distort the local magnetic field, and the monkey skulls show another way in which CT supply operations disturb the surroundings and thereby become subject to detection.

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(C) CT supplies are obtained under a system similar to that which was utilized by them before in Malaya, whereby Min Yuen liaison personnel arrange with supporters in the villages for the purchase and transport of material to the edge of the jungle where the CT themselves can pick it up. Larger shipments are reported to originate in good-sized towns, such as Yala, from which they are shipped in routine ways (often by boat along the rivers) to distribution points nearer the CT areas. From there they sometimes go by jeep or elephant to the jungle edge, but there is also an extensive use of human porters. One document, for instance, gives an account of the cargo carried by each of a dozen or two villagers over a period of a month, with the days of activity and the weights and distances given for each man. Such cargo duties appear to be assigned in lieu of taxes to villagers whose poverty would make a money tax unreasonable.

(U) As was mentioned above, the CT are especially careful to maintain what is described in one document as an "apparently peaceful situation" so that the Thai government may elect not to pursue too vigorous campaign against them. Accordingly, they never seek contact with Thai security forces. They fight and fight well when it becomes impossible to avoid combat, and they usually break off contact as soon as possible. They recently evacuated a large jungle camp (with facilities to sleep 200 to 300) in the face of a BPP force which they may have outnumbered more than three to one. The BPP who first entered this camp found warm ashes and a sign on the school blackboard which asked them please not to wreck the camp since the "CT, like the BPP, were only doing their job" and since the CT had no quarrel with Thailand.

(C) This is the continuing refrain of the CT: that they are in the area only to gain strength and perfect their organization so that they may return to the fight in Malaysia. At the same time, however, the CT must preempt three of the fundamental evidences of sovereign control in order merely to prepare for later operations to the south—namely, the effective exercise of coercive power, taxation, and the provision of some civic government. Such action puts them and the Thai
government in basic competition, whether or not either of the parties wants the conflict between them.

(C) Furthermore, the CT seem to be hedging their bet by expanding their operation toward the north. One captured document mentions the dispatch of agents for fund raising and organizations to the "north," and others comment on the increased emphasis on the Thai language in current training activities. Even without an attempt to organize Thai supporters, there are enclaves of Chinese and some Muslim groups scattered all the way up to Kra. To cap the story, the document from which the quoted reference to the "seemingly peaceful situation" was drawn also said that the maintenance of such an appearance was associated particularly with just the present phase of activity and that a "major enemy is of course the reactionary Thai government."

(U) The CT represent a significant weapon, small as armies go, but excellent. That weapon seems now to be trained on Malaya, but it is possible that it might be directed also or instead at Thailand.

B. The Thai Security Forces

(U) The main counterinsurgent force now operating against the CT in south Thailand is the BPP force of about 1100 men. Its headquarters is in Songkhla (Hq 9th Area BPP) and perhaps a third or a half of that number are in the jungle hunting CT at any given time. It is an excellent force, well trained and highly motivated. Its numbers probably are too few to cope effectively with the CT if the latter were to go over abruptly to the offensive, falling far short of the 10- or 20-to-1 ratio that seems necessary against skillful guerrillas in rough country. The units of the Royal Thai Army that would be called on to take over from the BPP (or support and supplement them as the case might be) have had far less contact with the jungle and with the theory or practice of irregular war than have the BPP. The learning period might be costly.

(U) The BPP now seek contact and combat with the CT whenever possible, and since the CT often wear a distinctive uniform, and since so few non-CT live in the jungle areas in question, a meeting between CT and BPP generally results in an immediate exchange of fire.
There had been an arrangement with Malaya, which was allowed to lapse in late 1963, whereunder Malayan Police Field Forces worked together with the Thai BPP and Army against the CT. The CT generally sought (as at present) to avoid contact, and their documents tell of month-long, arduous treks from one location to another as they were redepolyed to safer areas. During this time, the Thai government initiated some constraints on the movement of local people and especially on those of newcomers to the border regions. Such constraints were far less severe than the ones utilized in the Malayan Emergency, but they probably facilitated to some extent the detection and destruction of the CT and their all-important Min Yuen links with the villages. Nevertheless, only one CT was killed and the Thai evidently felt that the situation was not sufficiently threatening nor the results of the operation encouraging enough to justify the expense and dislocation of the continuing effort.

There have been discussions recently between the Thai and Malaysian governments looking toward the institution of a new period of cooperation, but the character of such an agreement and the date at which it might be expected are alike uncertain. At present, while the agreement for the utilization of mixed patrols and the presence of Malaysian security forces has not been reactivated, the Thai BPP still get as much help as the Malaysians are allowed to provide, and it is valuable. When the BPP obtain CT documents and propaganda, usually written in Chinese or Malay, they are generally sent to Malaysia for

*Under that arrangement, security forces of the two countries engaged in mixed patrol action, and it was permissible for the forces from each of the two countries to make shallow penetrations into the other when the tactical situation called for it. A major sweep through south Thailand was undertaken in 1963, but was relatively ineffective. Just after that sweep, Thai authorities indicated that the situation seemed less serious than they had previously believed and that further intensive joint operations against the CT were probably unnecessary at that time. The formal agreement for joint operations has apparently never been cancelled, but in the light of these official Thai opinions, it has fallen into disuse.
translation and comment, to which the Malaysians bring their vast reservoir of experience and documentary data on the CT.

(C) As regards back-up for the counterinsurgent forces, the U.S. aids the Thai security forces with supplies and training, and Malaysia (as part of the British Commonwealth) has Australians and others on active patrol along the southern side of the border. However, a large part of the security forces in Malaysia, including the Commonwealth forces and the Malaysian Police Field Forces, are now engaged in meeting the Indonesian invasion in Borneo and in combating the air and sea landings in Malaya itself.

(U) In addition to the existing BPP and Army units maintained in the south by Thailand, another counterinsurgency arm has been introduced. The Thai government instituted several years ago a type of civic action unit called a Mobile Development Unit (MDU). Two MDUs have been in operation in south Thailand south of the town of Yala for more than a year. These units engage in several kinds of civic action, utilizing both civilian and military resources to further local development. The BPP also maintain a civic action program in south Thailand that is actually larger than that under the MDUs, but it is limited mostly to the provision of rural schools and lacks the breadth of the more localized MDUs. The effects of such efforts have not yet been fully assessed, but they are almost certainly salutary.*

*"Mobile Development Units," by Dr. Lee Huff, December 1964 (Military Research and Development Unit, Bangkok, Thailand).
IV STRATEGIC PROJECTIONS--THREE ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

(U) The immediate reason for undertaking this summary description of the factors that may be expected to channel the conflict alternatives in south Thailand has been to provide a basis for selecting a few plausible cases within which the role of surveillance may be studied. This section outlines three such conflict situations. It is believed that they are among the more plausible ones, but that was not the only basis for picking them; they also were chosen to represent relatively distinctive patterns of operations and, especially, of materiel support.

(U) The normal or perhaps standard strategy for a force like the CT in an attempted return to the attack on the present government in Malaya would be one of gradual penetration combined with establishment of the Min Yuen system in local villages. This particular strategy is only partly open to the CT, however, because of the competency of the Malaysian Police and because the social and economic environment being achieved in Malaya under independence is relatively favorable. Because of the former, efforts at quiet infiltration are likely to be detected, and the latter makes it difficult to attract voluntary, widely based support for CT-led opposition to the government. The intensely Muslim areas of Kelantan and Trenggana may offer an exception to the latter point, however. CT hopes for a seizure of power probably must hinge on some collateral disruption or deterioration in the socio-political environment in Malaysia.

(U) Correspondingly, the Thai state is sufficiently well organized and commands enough allegiance from most of its people (again, the Muslim groups near the Malaysian border are a question mark) so that a force such as that of the CT could seriously endanger it only if other events had already placed it under severe stress.

(U) The CT, then, might be compared to a colony of bacteria in a healthy body. As long as the body retains its health, they can be safely contained, but let that body experience a temporary weakness and
the bacteria may kill it. These Communist Terrorists occupy a very important strategic spot in that they can steadily threaten two of the staunchest, most independent nations of Southeast Asia. If either nation were to come under attack from another quarter, which unfortunately is possible, the CT might convert a serious situation into a desperate one.

(U) The three alternative situations described below are chosen to bracket this problem. The first describes a case in which the CT have the initiative stolen from them by counterinsurgent pressures that force them to fight or be liquidated. The second and third are cases in which Malaysia and Thailand, respectively, are attacked by other forces, providing in each case a chance for the CT to move to an offensive posture under circumstances favorable to their local objectives and to those of world communism.

A. Case I

(U) This case is intended as a base condition. In it we assume that the present, seemingly peaceful posture of the CT is abandoned, not because of the emergence of a situation favorable to them but because Thai and Malaysian counterinsurgent forces take the initiative and force the CT to choose between combat and surrender. It represents, we hope, a plausible sequence of events in a situation that might evolve quickly from the present one. For the immediate purposes of surveillance analysis, it represents only another set of circumstances in which detection and identification might be accomplished. In the broader field of counterinsurgency analysis, however, it may serve as a basis for estimating the "costs" (i.e., the accumulated material and non-material penalties) of taking the initiative against the CT in the near future.

(C) We assume, then, that the current situation is modified only as follows: First, an agreement is reached with Malaysia permitting operations somewhat similar to those in 1963, with organized units of the Thai and Malaysian security forces operating under a joint command with shared intelligence and moving into each other's country as the tactical situation might dictate. In addition, units of the Thai Special Forces
and of BPP from other Areas are brought into the 9th Area both to augment the 9th Area BPP and to provide combat training to selected officers and men from regions that might have similar troubles later. Under these assumptions, the counterinsurgent forces already trained in irregular warfare and immediately available near the border in Thailand might number approximately 2000 men, backed of course by the existing regular forces (especially RTA) in the south. It would not be appropriate, however, to assume that the command-control system needed for full coordination of these forces with each other would exist prior to a reasonable shake-down period under actual combat. Still less would it be appropriate to assume a smoothly working association of the security forces on the one hand and the intimately associated civic regulatory and development agencies on the other.

(C) As regards the insurgents, we assume that they number approximately 1000 fighters, with half that number made up of veterans with a decade or more of combat behind them and the remainder (trained but not "blooded") hastily called up. We assume further that they would shift to active guerrilla warfare—destruction of communications, ambushing, raids on arms depots anywhere in Thailand, and the minimum amount of local terrorism consonant with the maintenance of supply relations in the villages—early enough so that their combat forces would have been only slightly depleted by prior counterinsurgent operations against them. This is equivalent to the assumption that the CT estimate well in advance that the forces being arrayed against them could make their continued passivity untenable, and that all that is needed to force them into action would be evidence of the intent to use such capabilities against them. Such a reading of the evidence should be possible before losses to a competent anti-guerrilla force would become significant.

(C) On another point, however, it seems fair to assume that the CT might not have such forethought. This has to do with their Min Yuen system, especially in the central and western sectors (Betong and Sadao) where there is less popular, voluntary support for the CT. In such areas, a prompt occupation and continued presence by security
forces might seriously disrupt the CT supply system before they would decide to counterattack. In the eastern sector, where the CT have roots in a more pervasive political movement, their lines are less vulnerable and would presumably not be interdicted before active hostilities were begun; the extent to which they might be breached later should be analyzed rather than assumed.

B. Case II

(C) In Case II, it is assumed that the CT receive external support from either Red China or Indonesia and that the disturbance within Malaysia on which they hope to capitalize would be caused by armed Indonesian incursions. In this connection, it should be noted that when the Indonesians pressed the Malaysian security forces with three simultaneous air drops, they forced the engagement of most of the forces then available. If, therefore, there had been six or ten or 300 such air drops or water-borne landings, all in the same few weeks, it seems fair to suppose that a large number of them would be established in relatively secure ways. If such were the case, there might be a real disruption of social and economic life in the areas involved, and the available Malaysian Security Forces would be completely occupied in coping with the situation. The CT could, therefore, during the period of such disturbance, penetrate almost at will, and could then have a rather free hand in extending their own support relationship.

(C) In order to capitalize to the fullest on such an opportunity, the CT probably should have forces greater than 500 and preferably should possess good weapons of kinds sufficiently similar so that the supply of ammunition would not be too complicated. Their numbers may already be close to 1000. The present policy of developing satellite organizations in south Thai villages can provide something resembling a trained reserve to the CT. The recently discovered CT training camp had facilities for advanced ideological instruction for about 500 students per year, and the camp had been used for about three years. Arms could presumably be supplied from outside by either Indonesia or Red China. For this case, therefore, we shall assume 1000 jungle-wise troops and 1000 more who would be trained but not experienced in combat.
(C) It should be assumed, however, that there would not be open and complete cooperation between the CT and the Indonesian invaders. Their immediate objective might be identical in that both groups would hope to see the present government of Malaysia torn down. A further correspondence between their objectives might be expected because of the predominance of communists in the CT and the major role that the PKI has played in the Indonesian policy and actions against Malaysia.

(C) These people are still human, however, and the CT have advertised themselves for 20 years as the Communist Party of Malaya, and they fought one desperate, costly war under that banner. They have maintained their military integrity in the jungles in south Thailand for a number of years with that identification as their rallying symbol. They could hardly, therefore, be pleased if another organization (the Indonesian state or the PKI) were to appear and conquer Malaysia or parts of it in their place.

(C) We shall assume for this strategic alternative, therefore, that the CT would attempt a pre-emptive occupation of territory in Malaya if an Indonesian invasion looked as though it might be successful. Some considerable degree of competition should be expected between even the two Communist Parties (the Malayan and Indonesian) following the historical model in both China and North Vietnam, in which the local revolutionaries sought independence of the "senior" parties of Russia and China, respectively. If the invasion did not look successful, the CT probably could either refrain from action altogether or limit their strategic objectives to the border areas in which their prior political foothold might be extended to give effective control in northern Perak and Kelantan.

(C) If their strategy, however, is based on pre-emptive (though spotty) occupation of territory, they must plan to move so rapidly that political development and persuasion could not keep up with their progress toward the south. This would mean that they would have to pass flying squads of commandos through those regions along the border in which they earlier might have established a more popular kind
of support, with the basic missions of destroying Malaysian police and other evidences of authority. Such commando squads would range deeply into the Malay Peninsula, presumably on missions of demolition, interdiction, and assassination. They would necessarily have to depend to a relatively great extent on terrorism to obtain supplies, since they would have so far outrun their system of village supporters. Their village support would, of course, be based to some extent on terrorism anyway, but in a slow-growing system, persuasion and unexercized threats can go a long ways; if revolutionists are forced to hurry, then overt terror and actual violence must partially replace the quieter forms of persuasion.

(C) Supply by either sea or land would be a possibility, but it will be assumed that the CT are unable to arrange caches of either food or arms farther south than perhaps 25 km from the border. An attempt to prepare food caches in more southerly areas would risk betrayal of the entire plan, especially since the present Malaysian authorities are in intimate contact with at least some villagers in most areas. It is true, nevertheless, that many village sympathizers were never identified during the Emergency in Malaya, and Min Yuen organizers were liquidated in many places without designating the individuals in the villages who had been sympathetic to them. These sympathizers might still be tapped by the CT, but we assume that they would not rely on them in advance of the CT occupation of the immediate area (when terrorism could be brought to bear upon them) and that advance supply dumps would therefore not be prepared by such sympathizers.

(U) As regards the caching of new arms,* these same arguments apply.

*We consider only actual weapons here, for two reasons. First, the continuing shortage of ammunition during eleven of the twelve years of the Emergency would suggest that known sources were probably being tapped in many cases. Second, ammunition is perishable stuff, and much of that which might have been left behind as recently as, for instance, 1957, would not be trustworthy.
There may well be old caches still in existence in the region, but it seems probable that the locations of only a few such caches are known to the CT at this point in time. The CT were so security conscious, during the Emergency at least, that only a few of them ever were allowed to know where each particular cache was located. With total CT casualties having exceeded 10,000 (as compared with about 1,000 or less who were neither captured nor killed), the compound probability that the few who know the location of caches would also be among the few who survived would be very low. Statements by surrended enemy personnel during the later stages of the Emergency seem to bear this out, according to Malaysian authorities, since many told of caches that were thought to exist in a given area but had been lost because the only ones who knew their exact location had been killed. We assume, therefore, that the CT cannot count upon using any guns or ammunition that may have been left in caches after the Emergency.

In summary for this case, it is assumed that the CT would make advance preparations insofar as they might be able to do so in the region just south of the Thai border and especially in northern Kelantan, developing village support and establishing supply dumps in that area. If Indonesian attacks in other parts of Malaysia promised to saturate the Security Forces in Malaysia, the CT might call up their reserve in Thailand, utilizing weapons already supplied to them from external sources, and move to the south. They would occupy their previously prepared border areas and from that support base launch deep-penetration attacks by commando-type patrols into as much of the rest of Malaya as possible. During such operations they would not rely on pre-stocked materials south of the border region and would be forced to utilize violence as their principal means of gaining food supplies and human labor from the villages. Their military mission would be the demolition of the communications and productive facilities in Malaya and the destruction of Security Forces insofar as that might be possible.
C. Case III

(C) Case III resembles Case II in that it is assumed that external supplies are available to the CT. The difference, however, is that the strategic objective is assumed to be Thailand rather than Malaysia. In this case, we presume that the necessary precursor disturbances in Malaya never occur, at least in an intensity such as to make invasion attractive to the CT. It is assumed, on the contrary, that disturbances in Thailand make that country appear to be a relatively easy mark. The present stability of the Thai state and the effectiveness of its armed forces make it seem doubtful that such an opportunity would exist during peaceful times. It is assumed for this case, therefore, that the CT operations against Thailand from the south would be triggered by severe pressure against Thailand from the north, presumably from Laos. We assume for this case, further, that the CT would not move against the Thai under such a contingency unless they had made some preparatory plans and preparations in that direction. There are faint indications that such preparations are being made, notably the increased instruction in the Thai language among CTs. Also, some statements in some captured documents indicate that CT agents are being dispatched toward the "north." For this case, therefore, we assume a gradual, preparatory extension of administrative and political effort in the regions south of the Kra Isthmus, with perhaps a corresponding pre-stockage of materiel.

(C) While this case must be regarded as one plausible strategy for the CT, it should be noted that this would be something of a political about-face for them. The doctrinaire core of their movement should be expected to accept such a change in line without batting an eye, but the front groups and even the satellites would be much less easy to manipulate. Warfare 200 miles to the north would not be likely to command the same enthusiasm from Muslim front groups near the border as might be expected in Cases I or II. The historical path of the Communist Party in the West is littered with front groups that collapsed when the "line" changed abruptly, and the same might well happen in the case hypothesized here.
Furthermore, while the "old timers" could be expected to go along with any change in line of this kind, the pressures necessary to have the line changed would probably be significant because of the long-term identification between the CT, the Malayan Communist Party, and the aspirations of both groups in the Malayan Peninsula. If the movement were to be redirected toward the south, it should be presumed that there would be some quid pro quo. For this case, therefore, it is assumed that the CT operation in the south would be a deliberate diversionary action, in relatively close coordination with a communist penetration in the north. The price for such diversion would presumably be two-fold, involving, first, the provision of arms, and second, the promise of political authority in the southern region after the victory was won. The price might well extend further to include a promise of support for subsequent operations against Malaysia.

The operation in Case III might be slower in its development than the one considered in Case II, since Indonesian attack across the seas would probably have to be rather abrupt to be successful, while communist pressure across the Mekong could be applied more gradually. Correspondingly, a diversionary attack in the south might be a slow-growing application of violence. This is visualized, however, as a campaign in support of the concurrent and heavier attacks in the northeast. It should be vigorous enough to hold in the south those security forces already assigned there.

We assume for this case, then, that a period of clan-destine subversion and Min Yuen development would be followed by an extension, in a matter of weeks, in which violent incidents would be perpetrated all the way from the border to the Kra Isthmus.
V APPLICABILITY TO FURTHER ANALYSIS

(U) The foregoing provides general grounds for assessing the plausibility of alternative courses of action by the various countries that might become involved in conflict in south Thailand. Some of those alternatives have already been considered in the design of the three hypothetical conflicts, but others are sure to arise as we get further into the elaboration of those and other situations.

(U) More immediately, the three projected conflict situations will be used as the basis for scenarios, like outline war plans, each reflecting specific activities in specific places. They will include descriptions of the logistic support needed in each case, by zone and type. Only after such rather quantitative descriptions are available will it be possible to estimate the impact of each stockpiling and supply operation upon its surroundings. For instance, when the number of soldiers to be supported in a given valley is projected, it will be possible to guess such things as the change in the import or export of rice, the number of porters who would have to be drafted locally, the arms to be transported or stored, or the number and size of camps to be looked for. Each of these and many others might serve as an appropriate indicator of the presence and character of the supply operation; the enumeration and examination of such indicators is one of the main purposes of this research program.

(U) Correspondingly, the description of the conflict processes will provide a basis for estimating the significance of particular kinds of detection. For instance, if part of the enemy operation must proceed in only one way, detection at that point may be especially valuable since no alternative mode of operation is open to the opponent. Or the time of duration of a particular "target" may be such that only a few kinds of possible detections are even worth thinking about. It would generally be useless to photograph a target, for instance, that must be struck in ten minutes or not at all.
(U) This report, then, presents three possible insurgency situations and the context within which each would be found if it were to occur. The next step is to see how the activities in question would "rub" against the world around them, and from that rubbing to see how they might be detected and how important such detection might be.
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