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<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
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<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
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<td>FROM:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<th><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>OACSFOR D/A ltr dtd 13 Sep 1973; OACSFOR D/A ltr dtd 13 Sep 1973</td>
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
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TO: See Annex L

1. (c) General.
   a. Purpose of the test:

   To test and evaluate the 23rd Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (Surveillance) (23d SWAD) under field combat conditions to determine the adequacy and suitability of organization, equipment, missions, doctrine, tactics, procedures, and techniques for conducting counter-insurgency operations.

   b. Test concept:

   (1) Field tests are being conducted in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to support actual operations as specified by COMUS-ACV. During the test period the test unit has supported the II ARVN (Army of Vietnam) Corps.

   (2) Deployment of the 23d SWAD through 14 February 1963 was:

   (a) One flight team (two aircraft and 16 personnel) at Qui Nhon in direct support of the 9th Division.

   (b) 23d SWAD (-) at Nha Trang. Missions were:

   1. Reinforcement of the flight team at Qui Nhon.
   2. Surveillance of the coastal railway in II Zone. On 21 January, railway surveillance was extended to include the railroad in Quang Ngai Province.

   (c) General support as directed by II ARVN Corps.

   (3) On 15 February, a flight team (two aircraft and 18 personnel) moved to Quang Ngai to provide direct support to the 25th Division. Team equipment included an AN/FPQ-7 photographic laboratory, giving the team a complete film processing capability.

   (4) Thus, on 15 February the 23d SWAD was disposed with the Detachment (-) (two aircraft) at Nha Trang, a flight team (two aircraft) 100 miles to the north at Qui Nhon, and a second flight team (two aircraft) at Quang Ngai, 200 miles north of Nha Trang.
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a. Significant events affecting the test:

On 5 February, two replacement Mohawks were ferried to Nha Trang from Cubi NAS, Philippine Islands, bringing the 2nd SAD to its authorized strength of six aircraft.

2. (C) Test progress.

a. The test is considered to be 80% complete.

b. A summary of significant statistical data follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>16 Oct</th>
<th>16 Nov</th>
<th>16 Dec</th>
<th>16 Jan</th>
<th>16 Feb</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nbour of combat support missions</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad reconnaissance</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night illumination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflet drop</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy observation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter observation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of photographic prints delivered</td>
<td>5700</td>
<td>3130</td>
<td>8130</td>
<td>7818</td>
<td>24,778</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times artillery adjusted</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of aircraft hit by ground fire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hits (total)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times hostile ground fire directed at aircraft observed by crew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ACTIV-Down

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16 Oct</th>
<th>15 Nov</th>
<th>15 Dec</th>
<th>15 Jan</th>
<th>15 Feb</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Fire on Aircraft Reported by Ground Units in Addition to Above</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Fire Delivered</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Lost (unknown cause)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Aircraft in Working Fleet (Assigned minus FDP &amp; Crash)</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Aircraft Available Daily</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Working Fleet Available</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Flight Hours</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Flight Hours by Unit</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per Aircraft in Working Fleet (monthly rate)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) Content and format of report.

a. Content: Much material published in Monthly Reports Numbers 1, 2, and 3 will not be repeated here. These monthly reports are intended to indicate progress and to provide for an orderly collection of data to be included in the final test report.

b. Format: Annexes A through G cover the seven test objectives. Annexes H through K contain back-up data. Distribution of the report is shown at Annex L.

4. (C) References.

a. USACV letter, 29 September 1962, subject: "Test Plan, AO-1 (Mohawk) Aircraft for Province/Section Surveillance in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations (C)."
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b. USMACV message, J3 4213 (1962), subject: "Operational Employment of the 23rd Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (Surveillance)"

c. DA letter, 6 November 1962, AGAM-P (M) 301 (31 Oct 62) DCSOPS, subject: "Army Troop Test Program in Vietnam (U)."

d. Test reports, Army Concept Team in Vietnam, subject: "Employment of OV-1 (Mohawk) Aircraft in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations (C)" —

(1) Monthly Test Report Number 1, 30 November 1962.

12 Incl
List on next page Major General, USA
Chief

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LIST OF ANNEXES

1. ANNEX A — Objective 1 (Area surveillance)
2. ANNEX B — Objective 2 (Suitability of Mohawk for surveillance)
3. ANNEX C — Objective 3 (Activities detected visually and by photographs)
4. ANNEX D — Objective 4 (Doctrine, procedures, tactics and techniques)
5. ANNEX E — Objective 5 (Adequacy of equipment and personnel)
6. ANNEX F — Objective 6 (Changes required in technical and training literature)
7. ANNEX G — Objective 7 (Logistical experience and problems)
8. ANNEX H — Railway security reports.
9. ANNEX I — Extracts from aviators' debriefing forms.
10. ANNEX J — Night illumination techniques and procedures.
11. ANNEX K — SOP for detached flight team.
12. ANNEX L — Distribution of report.
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SUBJECT: Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mohawk

ANNEX A — Objective 1 (Area surveillance)

1. (C) Objective.

"To determine the results obtained by providing continuous surveillance to a limited area; i.e., reduction in VC incidents, restrictions to VC movements, increase of RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) response and effectiveness."

2. (C) Discussion.

a. Test activities relevant to this objective have been conducted in the same manner and in the same test areas as described in Monthly Test Report number 2: Binh Dinh Province (Area A) and Trans-Vietnam Railway, II Zone (Area B).

b. The table below shows the number of incidents in Binh Dinh Province for a 12-month period. The priority effort of the 23 SWAD surveillance operations was in this province during November and December 1962 and January 1963.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commo Sabotage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atrocities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambushes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Totals</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The Binh Dinh Province incident rate has declined during the past two months. It may be assumed that 23d SWAD operations contributed to this decline, but the relative weight which may be given to aerial surveillance as compared with other contributing factors is not yet clear. A detailed analysis is being made of the time and place of incidents. These data will be correlated with the daily areas of Mohawk operations in an attempt to more clearly establish the incident/air surveillance relationship.

c. Railway incidents.

The table below compares railway incidents in the three RVN security zones from June 1962 through January 1963.

Page 1
ANNEX A

CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX A — Objective 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>II Zone</th>
<th>I Zone</th>
<th>III Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>9#</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>3#</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>8#</td>
<td>3#</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Full months of Mohawk reconnaissance.

# = Beginning 21 January, Mohawks conducted daily railway reconnaissance in Quang Ngai Province, I Zone.

Although the number of railway incidents in II Zone increased in January, it remained below the average for the last seven months of 1962. A detailed analysis is being made to determine the correlation between times and areas of surveillance and times, locations, severity and types of incidents. Results of the analysis will be included in the final report.

3. Findings.

   a. VC incidents in Binh Dinh Province have declined in the last two months, but the specific contribution of Mohawk surveillance to the decline is not clear.

   b. There were more railway incidents in II Zone in January (8) than in December (3), but less than the 1962 seven-month average (12).
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ANNEX B — Objective 2 (Suitability of Mohawk for surveillance)

1. (C) Objective.

"To determine the suitability and feasibility of OV-1 aircraft for tactical area surveillance."

2. (U) Discussion.

No new data pertaining to this objective are included in this report.

3. (U) Findings.

None.
ANNEX C — Objective 3 (Activities detected visually and by photographs)

1. (C) Objective.

"To determine the nature of insurgent activities which can be detected by visual and photographic means."

2. (C) Discussion.

a. Two photographs are attached.

(1) Photograph C-1, taken on 7 February in Quang Ngai Province, shows a VC emplacement for an automatic weapon. Although the emplacement was unoccupied at the time this photo was taken, an O-1 aircraft received fire from this position two days earlier. This position is located in an area which has been under insurgent control since World War II. This open, uncamouflaged emplacement is situated on a bare knoll with excellent observation of three valleys which radiate from it.

(2) Photograph C-2, taken on 16 January in an insurgent-controlled section of Kontum Province, shows a cable over a river. III Corps Intelligence personnel believe this cable is used to assist VC ferry operations.

b. Extracts from visitors' debriefing forms (Annex I) contain examples of visual detection of insurgent activity.

3. (U) Findings.

No change from Report Number 2.

4. (C) Attachments.

Photograph C-1
Photograph C-2
VIP Monthly Report Number A — Revised

Photo C-1, LINX C — VC automatic xenon commission.
ACTIVE MI
SUBJECT: Monthly Test Report Number 4 - 1972

Photo 6-2, ANNEX C - Cable over river.
SUBJECT: Monthly Test Report Number 4 -- Hawk

ANNEX D -- Objective 4 (Doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques)

1. (C) Objective.

"To determine the adequacy and validity of current US Army doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques for employment of OV-1 type aircraft in a tactical area surveillance role and to further develop doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques for counter-insurgency operations."

2. (C) Discussion.

a. Responsiveness.

(1) Monthly Reports 2 and 3 contained numerous references, by advisors to supported units, to the responsiveness of the 23d SIAD. In order to measure responsiveness, an analysis was made of all mission requests received by the Qui Nhon flight team from 23 November 1962 to 10 January 1963. A breakout of requests and action taken follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Requests</th>
<th>Requests canceled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests canceled</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of weather</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft not available because of higher priority missions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By requester</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions flown</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service flights</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-planned railway recons</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft lost</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aborted, camera malfunction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flown by aircraft from Nha Trang</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Records incomplete</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions flown for the 9th Div</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Approximately 10% of the missions requested were not flown because of weather conditions. The period analyzed was during
ANNEX D -- Objective 4 (Continued)

The northeast monsoon; clouds frequently obscured mountain peaks and
ridges in the area of the flight team's operations.

(b) In nine instances missions were flown but, due
to omissions in records or unreasonable discrepancies, accurate data
could not be obtained. These missions are accounted for as "records
incomplete" in the table above.

(2) The following table is a breakout of the 9th Division
mission requests by time interval between receipt of the request and the
time the mission was requested to be flown. Shown on the right side of
the table is the performance of the flight team in meeting the times
specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time in hours from receipt of mission request</th>
<th>Number of missions requested to be flown in each time bracket</th>
<th>Flown on or prior to time requested</th>
<th>Flown one hour later than requested</th>
<th>Flown more than one hour later than requested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>43 (37%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>29 (25%)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>10 (9%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-12</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-24</td>
<td>31 (26%)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 24</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>99 (85%)</td>
<td>9 (8%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Considering first the left hand (request) side of
the table above, the significant points are that in more than one third
of cases, the flight team was asked to fly the mission in one hour or less;
and in 62% of all missions, the reaction time requested was three hours or
less.

(b) One of the purposes of this objective is to collect
data on the value of quick reaction and immediate response vis-a-vis the
recognized advantages of centralized employment of hokhaK type aircraft.
It is pertinent to note that only about 25% of the missions given to the
ANNEX D — Objective 4 (Continued)

Mohawk flight team were received in time to have been considered and allocated at an evening planning conference — if that procedure had been used for mission assignment. It is apparent that the response inherent in decentralized operation and direct support mission assignment is geared to the actual requirements of the supported unit. It is possible that some of the missions assigned to the flight team on short notice should have been planned and requested much earlier, particularly if they were not of an immediate or urgent nature. But the realities of the situation must be considered, i.e., the relative inexperience of many ADW officers in staff planning, and the propensity of ADW commanders to withhold planning guidance until the last possible moment to eliminate security leaks.

(c) The "performance" side of the table, above, indicates that the Mohawk flight team performed 85% of all missions at the hour requested. An additional 8% were performed one hour late, and the final 7% were flown two hours or more later than requested. From available records it is not possible to reconstruct the specific reasons for each tardy mission performance. General reasons for tardy performance include: weather delays; aircraft out on other missions; maintenance or refueling delays; and, no doubt, human error.

b. Techniques and procedures.

(1) Night illumination techniques and procedures used by the 23d S'MD are recorded at Annex J.

(2) The 23d SMAD SOP for the duties and responsibilities of the flight team leaders of detached flight teams is attached at Annex K.

3. (c) Findings.

a. 62% of the Mohawk missions flown in support of the 9th Division (23 Nov 62 – 10 Jan 63) were requested three hours or less in advance of the time the missions were to be flown; 37% of all missions were requested with one hour or less lead time.

b. The 23d SMAD flight team performed 65% of 9th Division missions at the time requested; 8% were flown one hour late; and 7% were flown two hours or more later than requested.
ANNEX E

CON F I D E N T I A L

ACTIV-VIN
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mohawk

ANNEX E — Objective 5 (Adequacy of equipment and personnel)

1. (C) Objective.

"To determine the adequacy of equipment and personnel to support tactical area surveillance operations."

2. (C) Discussion.

Previous reports have pointed out the need for an increased photographic processing capability in the 23d SQD. On 13 February an additional AN/FQ-7 photographic laboratory was issued to the unit. This facility is now with the flight team at Quang Duc.

3. (U) Findings.

None
ANNEX F — Objective 6 (Changes in TOC and technical and training literature)

1. (c) Objective.

"To recommend necessary changes to the TOE (Modified), training and technical literature released on the results of the operational evaluation."

2. (c) Discussion.

None

3. (d) Findings.

None
ACTIV-AM  
Monthly Test Report Number 4 -- Mohawk  

ANNEX G -- Objective 7 (Logistical problems)  

1. (C) Objective.  
   "To determine logistical problems."

2. (C) Discussion.  
   
a. During the past 30 days the average daily availability of the 23d SWAD aircraft has been 86% of the working fleet. No aircraft were  
   GDP during the period. Graphs of daily aircraft availability and flight hours are attached (Graphs G-1 and G-2).  

   b. Parts usage for the 1742.9 hours flown since the unit arrived in the RVN is shown in Report G-3 attached.  

3. (U) Findings.  
   No change from Monthly Test Report Number 2.  

4. (U) Attachments.  
   
   Graph G-1 -- Aircraft availability  
   Graph G-2 -- Daily flight hours  
   Graph G-3 -- Parts usage
ACTIVATION Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mahone

Graph G-2, ANNEX C — Daily flight hours (average per week).
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mohawk


1. Since the test unit arrived in the RW in September 1962, the six assigned JXV-1C aircraft have flown a total of 1742.9 hours.

2. Parts usage during that period is shown below. The list does not contain common hardware items or replacement parts for the aircraft crash-damaged on 19 November 1962.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P.O.N.A.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2935-772-5610</td>
<td>Oil cooler</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2620-772-6666</td>
<td>Tires, main</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2620-288-0247</td>
<td>Tires, Nose</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620-871-1102</td>
<td>Brake Assemblies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-821-9677</td>
<td>Brake Lining</td>
<td>765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560-796-7074</td>
<td>Tank, Oil</td>
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<td>2915-784-3472</td>
<td>Fuel Boost Pumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>1650-775-3835</td>
<td>Hydraulic Pumps</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650-772-0374</td>
<td>Main Landing Gear Cylinders</td>
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<tr>
<td>1620-777-8606</td>
<td>Park Brake Valve</td>
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<td>1620-776-1958</td>
<td>Speedbrake Selector Valve</td>
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<tr>
<td>2915-775-7814</td>
<td>Fuel Controls</td>
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<td>2840-712-0390</td>
<td>Engine</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN6235-1A</td>
<td>Fuel Control Filters</td>
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<td>2915-790-8907</td>
<td>Fuel Control Filter Kits</td>
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<td>A330-227-3274</td>
<td>Oil Filter</td>
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<td>6605-879-1744</td>
<td>JOT. Harness (Thermocouple)</td>
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<td>6605-779-3777</td>
<td>Transmitter, Hydraulic</td>
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<tr>
<td>6220-533-8892</td>
<td>Torquemeter, Generator</td>
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</table>
### PART 3

**NUMBER**

### AMOUNT

- 2860-779-2276
- 2860-770-6908
- 1560-445-6252
- 2860-739-6906
- 1690-772-3424
- 1560-770-6012
- 1560-774-3027
- 2860-790-3648
- 1610-671-1092
- 1690-807-9183
- 2915-795-9852
- 1005-300-5541
- 1640-792-9299
- 2840-475-6965
- 2840-475-6966
- 2840-475-6967
- 5330-248-3855
- 5330-265-1091
- 5330-265-1088
- 1630-797-8606

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Nut, External Wrenching</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engine Inspection Kit</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear View Mirror</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction Gear Kit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nose Gear Door Actuator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass, Windshield R/H</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass, Windshield L/H</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gear Box</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop Control Assy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canopy Actuator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pump, Rotary Power Driven</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gun, Charger, NSO-2S P/N 871134</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harness Assembly P/N 200-54185</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop Dose Seal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil Filter Seal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel Control Filter Seals</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel Control Filter Seals</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brake Disc</td>
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<td>Release bench rack, AMM 78-1 DAC # 60A12208</td>
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<td>P/N</td>
<td>NOMENCLATURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
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<td>5841-543-1328</td>
<td>Combination rack, Bomb &amp; rocket—AERO 15C, DAD #58415AR</td>
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<td>6720-892-4272</td>
<td>Combination Rack, Bomb AERO 65/6</td>
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<td>6615-486-8072</td>
<td>Control Amplifier — APF-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>5831-682-2703</td>
<td>Photo System Unit</td>
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<td>6605-090-2703</td>
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<td>5895-681-9868</td>
<td>Lens Cone LA130A</td>
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<td>5955-777-7784</td>
<td>Lens Cone LA131A</td>
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<td>6125-548-5821</td>
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<td>6720-899-7911</td>
<td>Crystal</td>
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<td>5895-677-1882</td>
<td>Dynamotor DY 107/AR</td>
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<td>6605-604-5662</td>
<td>Control Panel (Camera)</td>
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<td>5826-505-0645</td>
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<td>Amplifier Compass (N-1)</td>
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<td>5821-543-1890</td>
<td>CV-265/ANH-30A</td>
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<td>5821-503-2586</td>
<td>B-1021/ANH-30D</td>
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## CONFIDENTIAL

**ACTIV-AN**  
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Nahnek  

**ANNEX H** — Railway security reports.

### ATTACHMENT

|------------|------------|------------|------------|
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ACTIV-AN
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mahack

Report H-1, ANNEX H — Excerpts from rail adviser’s monthly report.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>RAIL SEC ADV</th>
<th>RAIL SEC ADV</th>
<th>9 FEB 63</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STUDIES &amp; ANALYSIS BR</td>
<td>IX ZONE</td>
<td>MA TRANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;T DIV, USAEC, MAAG</td>
<td>SAIGON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (K) Number of incidents in zone:
   a. Rails removed or separated 5*
   b. Mining of train 1**
   c. Telegraph line cut 2***
   d. Train derailment 4*
   e. Attack on trainwalker 1

* Three rail removals or separations resulted in train derailments. Incident of 16 Jan 63 is reflected in these figures (See attached report of Khan Ham intelligence adviser and incident report by this adviser).

** One train derailment was result of VC mine.

*** One telegraph line removal was in conjunction with train derailment.

For the month of January 1963, a total of 8 incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAMAGE</th>
<th>VEH OR EQUIP</th>
<th>PLETS</th>
<th>HURST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>172 Meters of rail</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6 firecrackers</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Locomotives</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 red flags</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Rail cars</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 RR Horn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Railroad car load freight</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 lug wrench</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AM
Monthly Test Report Number 6 — Mehrek

Report N-1, ANNEX H — Transcripts from rail advisor’s monthly report (continued)

KIA: Unknown WIA: Unknown

KIA: 14° WIA: 22°

*All KIA result of train derailment and all civilians.
*All KIA result of train derailment, 2 military, and 20 civilians.

2. 

3. (K) Accomplishments during month:

Rail reconnaissance by 336 SW Arm Det initiated in Quang Ngai province on a daily basis as of 21 January 1963.

4. 

5. (K) Recommendations:

6. 

EDITORIAL NOTE: The symbol "(K)" stands for "KIA," a Vietnamese security classification equivalent to CONFIDENTIAL.
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PRIORITY

FROM: RAIL SEC ADV, I I ZONE, NHA TRANG

TO: RAIL SEC ADV

STUDIES & ANALYSIS BR

CMA DIV, USA SEC, HAUQ

STIONS

INFO: SR ADV II CORPS

ATTN: G-2, ADVISOR

PLEIKU

Train No. 2334, unescorted, north-bound, passenger and freight, derailed by mine action at 1050 hours, 21 Jan 63 at KN 1058 (RM 883/905). No info on injuries, dead, or VC attack available.

Information received here around 1500, advisor notified 1605, Mahasek over train at 1707, unable to establish contact with ground troops in area.

Aerial photos viewed at 1915 reveal a stack of what appears to be seven cars immediately to rear of locomotive. Pile consist of three small freight cars and four large ones, one large freight car is laying on its side. Entire train appears to have been derailed. Locomotive is on wheels but is off tracks.

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ACTIV-IM
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mohawk


PRIORITY

FR:  RAIL SEC ADV, II ZONE, NHA TRANG

TO:  RAIL SEC ADV
      STUDIES & ANALYSIS BR
      COM DIOS, USA SEC, NAGR
      5/3/63

INFO:  SR ADV, II CORPS
      ATTN:  G-2, ADV
      PLEIKU

(U) Freight, escorted, southbound, train No. 2935/Mixed at KM 1096.2
    (KM 883/885), 1600 hours, 10 Feb 63. Seven cars derailed, four on their
    sides, one twisted across roadbed, two with one set of wheels each off
    tracks. No VC attack. No weapons, or equipment lost. Five injured by
derailment.

(C) Mohawk arrived over train at 1445 on routine rail reconnaissance,
    MBSS escort identified location of six VC and requested aircraft to take
    them under fire. Request made three times. Escort informed Mohawk that
    VC were not firing on aircraft. Under existing rules of engagement aircraft
    could not deliver air strike.
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PRIORITI
FR: RAIL SEC ADV, II ZONE, MRSS

TO: RAIL SEC ADV
STUDIES & ANALYSIS BR
OCT DIV, USAEC, MACD
SAIGON

INFO: G-2, ADV

(U) Train No 27, passenger, escorted, southbound, mined at HK 1134.7 (BQ 66/954). 132200 Feb 63. No VQ attack. Security flatcar, two wheels off tracks, chief train car, two wheels off tracks, two rails twisted, seven crossties damaged. Original info received Maha Trung by TR-30 relay; stated only that train had been mined and derailed.

(U) Maha Trung requested 2230, off 2330, over area 0005.

(X) Remarks: Low level air reconnaissance of area BQ 954/797 to BR 960/062, morning 14 Feb 63, revealed five foot patrols in area plus what appeared to be two platoon size units operating on or near rail right-of-way. Train No 2242 had air cover this area afternoon 14 Feb 63. Routine Maha Trung rail reconnaissance II Zone tracks, 14 Feb 63.

Above area had static air surveillance (L-39), morning & afternoon of 15 Feb 63, during the time important trains passed, plus routine Maha Trung reconnaissance mission.

Nature of incident indicates mine hastily placed; pressure activated instead of electrically. First pressure mine this MRSS Sub-Zone since 6 Nov 62.
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ACTIV-AM

Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Mohawk

ANNEX I — Extracts from aviators' debriefing forms.

The following comments were extracted from aviators' debriefing forms prepared by US pilots upon completion of each mission. A variety of Mohawk missions are described. In some cases the comments have been edited slightly for clarity.

1. Mission Nr: Q3-1-32 Time: 191110 - 191300 Jan 63

Mission: Proceed to area of operations of 30th Artillery and perform observation as requested by that unit.

Proceeded to target area at 1110 hours and contacted 30th Arty, was directed by radio to proceed to AH-2B Infantry unit near vicinity of BR 589738. On passing the ridge I was informed by FM radio that a VC machine gun had fired on us from the vicinity of some small huts. The description of the machine gun location was obtained and a pass was made over the area during which the sources of the ground fire was located by the observer and confirmed as VC. We were fired on again during this pass. We then made four runs with machine guns. An American came on the radio, identified himself, and reported the last two runs were right on target. He then identified his location as in the valley at the base of the ridge I had just fired on. After expending all ammo, returned to Qal Khon, landing at 1300.

2. Mission Nr: Q3-1-35 Time: 201405 - 201635 Jan 63

Mission: Lay photography of Target area Q3-1-32

Observed and photographed target fired on in Mission Nr Q3-1-32. Photographed suspected VC village at 580738. PIW to cover for Mohawk 09. No targets detected. Reported to FSB on return.


Mission: Day Visual and photo reconnaissance of suspected VC emplacements. Observed five personnel in the open at coordinates 1A 1A0660. Anti-helicopter ditches and stakes discovered at the same coordinates. Believe personnel to be VC work party preparing anti-helicopter defenses. Photos taken. Located possible VC buildings and activities.


Mission: Visual observation of area NE of Dong Son.

Saw numerous roads and foxholes in area B-2 at coordinates BR 930962 (unknown); BR 930960 (roads). Observed numerous people on road 20 km South of Dong Son. Reported suspected VC company at BR 785055 to FSB.
ANNEX I — Extracts from debriefing forms (continued).

5. Mission No: Q3-1-59A Time: 290900 - 291110 Jan 63

Mission: Observation of quadrilateral area in Phu Cat Province.

Observed numerous new structures vicinity of BR 645346. Several
new buildings being built under trees. Observed hogs, cattle, and chickens
but no human life. Approximately 100 new structures in area, all well
covered. Observed one building alone. It appeared to be larger than
the average house. Suspected storage house of some sort.


Mission: Photography reconnaissance initially; mission changed
in the air to railroad reconnaissance.

Proceeded north on photo recon. After taking two photos, we
were diverted by Hawk Scout on an immediate mission to inspect a suspected
railroad derailment north of Hue. Hawk 09 and 02 proceeded down the
railroad and found the trouble. A rail had been bent outward. There was
a train stopped on the south side. They had seen the rail and stopped.
We contacted the crew on the ground and they were starting the repair.
We orbited the area while they repaired the tracks and remained over the
area until the first train passed safely.

7. Mission No: Q3-3-96 Time: 090755 - 071005 Feb 63

Mission: Day visual and photographic reconnaissance of suspected
VC troop concentrations.

Observed numerous well-used paths leading to lone building at
coordinates EQ 280610. Made photographs and delivered for target analysis.

8. Mission No: Q3-3-96 Time: 070815 - 070935 Feb 63

Mission: Day visual reconnaissance of suspected VC hiding place.

Sighted approximately 10 suspected VC at coordinates EQ 9070.
All suspected insurgents ran for cover as the aircraft approached. No
known fire received. Reported concentration to FSG at end of mission.

9. Mission No: Q3-3-129 Time: 131330 - 131530 Feb 63

Mission: Day visual reconnaissance of suspected VC hiding area.

At 1315 observed smoke from suspected cooking fires at coordinates
BR 954556 and BR 955545. No personnel sighted.
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ACTIV-AM
Kushalvi Test Report Number 4 — Kharkh

ANNEX I — Extracts from debriefing forms (continued).

5. Mission No: Q3-1-594 Time: 290900 - 291110 Jan 63

Mission: Observation of quadrilateral area in Phu Ten Province.

Observed numerous new structures vicinity of BR 44534D. Several
new buildings being built under trees. Observed hogs, cattle, and chickens
but no human life. Approximately 100 new structures in area; all well
concealed. Observed one building alone. It appeared to be larger than
the average house. Suspected storage hogs of some sort.

6. Mission No: Q3-3-66 Time: 01000 - 011145 Jan 63,

Mission: Photography reconnaissance initially; mission changed
in the air to railroad reconnaissance.

Proceeded north on photo recon. After taking two photos, we
were diverted by Hawk Scout on an immediate mission to inspect a suspected
railroad derailment north of Toy Hoa. Hawk 09 and 02 proceeded down the
railroad and found the trouble; a rail had been bent outward. There was
a train stopped on the north side. They had seen the rail and stopped.
We contacted the crew on the ground and they were starting the repair.
We orbited the area while they repaired the tracks and remained over the
area until the first train passed safely.

7. Mission No: Q3-3-96 Time: 070735 - 071005 Feb 63

Mission: Day visual and photographic reconnaissance of suspected
VC troop concentrations.

Observed numerous well-used paths leading to lone building at
coordinates EQ 2806510. Made photographs and delivered for target analysis.

8. Mission No: Q3-3-96 Time: 070845 - 070935 Feb 63

Mission: Day visual reconnaissance of suspected VC hiding places.

Sighted approximately 10 suspected VC at coordinates EQ 2970611.
All suspected insurgents ran for cover as the aircraft approached. No
enemy fire received. Reported concentration to FDC at end of mission.


Mission: Day visual reconnaissance of suspected VC hiding area.

At 1345 observed snipers from suspected sniping fires at coordinates
BR 9659546 and BR 955565. No personnel sighted.
ANNEX I — Extracts from debriefing forms (continued).

10. Mission No: Q3-2-135  Time: 151900 - 151930  Feb 63

Mission: Night visual and photo reconnaissance.

Arrived target area at 1915 hours. Dropped four flares. Observed automatic weapons fire directed at aircraft from Vic CR 075110. No hits on aircraft. Reported activity to FSCC for possible air strike.
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ACTIV-6N
Monthly Test Report Number 6 — Mohawk

ANNEX J — Techniques and procedures for night illumination

1. (G) General.

This annex records the standard procedures and techniques for night illumination used by the 23d SAM to support counter-insurgency operations in the RW.

2. (U) Description of the flare and mounting system.

a. The Mark VI, Model 6 aircraft parachute flare is the only illumination pyrotechnic which has been used by the 23d SAM. The flare weighs 30 pounds, is 36 inches long and 5 3/4 inches in diameter. It produces 1,000,000 candle power for a duration of three minutes while descending by parachute at 450 feet per minute.

b. The flare is equipped with a delay fuse which must be preset for an ignition delay between 300 and 12,000 feet after release from the aircraft. When released from the aircraft the fuse is activated by a nylon cord lanyard. At the completion of the set delay the ignition charge of blank powder is ignited by the fuse; the expanding gases produced by this charge force the auxiliary parachute from the flare case and also ignite the 17.6 pounds of illuminant (pyrotechnic candle). The auxiliary parachute opening shock separates the parachute tube and the pyrotechnic candle from the flare case. The weight of the candle then pulls the parachute from the case and it opens, allowing the case to fall free and suspending the ignited flare. The free-falling parachute case presents a minor hazard if employed over friendly troops. The best illumination is provided with the flare 3000 feet to 1500 feet above the ground. Therefore, release altitude is normally established at 3000 feet plus the fuse setting. Example: If the fuse is set at 300 feet, the release should be made at 3300 feet above the target for best results. This also assures burn-out of the flare before ground contact; this is necessary to prevent the burning flare from starting a ground fire.

c. The flare is mounted on the bomb racks by means of two metal support bands which are shipped with the flare. There are also two metal steadying bands against which the main braces of the bomb racks rest. Final modification of the standard Mohawk main braces is necessary for proper security. This may be accomplished by manufacture of smaller main braces or by placing a small strip of wood between the main braces and the flare. One flare may be mounted on each of the four AERO 130 bomb racks and one on each of the two AERO 654-1 racks. Flares are mounted with the fuse end of the container toward the front of the aircraft.

3. (U) Arming and disarming the flare.

d. After the flare is mounted on the rack, the metal cover at the fuse end is removed. The fuse is given the desired setting by rotating the thumbcrew indicator to the desired delay, indicated as 30 (300 feet), 26 (2000 feet), etc. The thumbcrew is then tightened so that the pointer penetrates the flare case enough to stay firmly in the set position. The
nylon lanyard and is equipped with a small piece of metal called an "arming plate". This arming plate is inserted between the nose arming clips in the forward portion of the bomb rack. The safety screw located in the center of the fuse section is removed just prior to flight. Caution should be used to insure that the nose-tail arming switch in the cockpit is in the safe position so that if the flare should be inadvertently dropped, it would fall safe.

b. To employ the flare the following actions are taken in sequence:
On the control panel in the cockpit set the stepping switch to the desired station; select either nose, or nose and tail arming; on the bomb-rocket switch, select bombs; insure armament circuit breakers are "on"; turn master arm switch "on". Upon completion of these steps the flare is ready to be released. Flare release is accomplished by depressing the stores release button on the pilot's control stick.

e. Electrical stepping has been disconnected on all 23d SW 00 aircraft. Therefore, for each drop the stepping switch must be rotated manually to the desired external stores station. By selecting the proper setting the flares may be released singly, in pairs, or all at once.

4. (C) Pre-mission preparations.

a. On pre-planned missions, detailed briefings are conducted. However, pre-planned flare missions have been the exception rather than the rule. Most missions are received on an "as required" basis, allowing minimum time for preparation. Minimum essential briefing information to allow accomplishment of the mission must include:

  (1) target description and location;
  (2) results desired; and
  (3) weather.

b. At least one aircraft is pre-flighted and mounted with flares for standby each night. A duty crew is on alert in the operations hut. Because of these preparations, sorties can be airborne within 15 minutes of receipt of request from a supported unit, and can be over any target within a 100 N.N. radius within 45 minutes.

5. (C) Navigation to the target.

a. In underdeveloped areas of the R.W., ground lights are very scarce at night and piloting is extremely difficult except on clear nights with a bright moon.

b. One of the best methods of navigation has proven to be dead reckoning (time-distance) combined with some sort of friendly signal from the target area (signal flares, fires, or voice radio signal).
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MONTHLY TEST REPORT NUMBER 4 — Mohawk

ANNEX J — Night Illumination (continued)

The FM ranging capability of the Mohawk has been used effectively to provide navigational guidance to the target area. This is an excellent method but may not be usable if other radars are transmitting on the same frequency.

When available, radar vectors are without doubt the most effective means of target location. The 23rd SMAD has no organic radar. GCI sites located in the area have been used on those missions in which the target was within radar range of the sites. In many instances, however, radar is masked by mountains between the GCI site and the target area.

Electronic navigation aids (WOR and NDB) in the II Corps area are completely unsatisfactory because of unreliability and insufficient accuracy for this type mission.

6. (C) Technique for providing continuous illumination.

a. Single aircraft: Experience has shown that the best flight pattern to a figure eight with the target at the center. Ninety-second legs are flown with standard rate 225° turns. Each time the target is crossed, approximately 2-3/4 minutes will have elapsed between flares, giving at least 15 seconds overlap of illumination by each succeeding flare. Pattern will look like this:

![Diagram of a figure eight pattern](image)

(1) The altitude (3000 feet absolute above the fuse setting) must be decided upon and the fuse set prior to the flight. Factors considered in determining flight altitude are terrain elevation, cloud cover, hazards to flight, and requirements for visual observation of the illuminated area by the aircraft crew.

(2) Release point and pattern must be adjusted to allow for wind drift.

(3) A Mohawk carrying six flares can provide continuous illumination for approximately 15 minutes.

b. Two aircraft: When two aircraft are employed to provide illumina-
ANNEX J — Night Illumination (continued)

When illumination over the same point, a rectangular pattern is used with 30-second legs and a standard rate 180° turn at each end to complete the pattern. The pattern is located with the target at the midpoint of either leg, and the aircraft are spaced on opposite sides of the pattern to provide a flare release approximately every 2½ minutes. By this method, approximately 30 minutes of continuous illumination can be provided.

![Diagram of illumination pattern]

- If illumination for longer than 30 minutes is required, additional aircraft should be designated to relieve aircraft on station when their flares are expended. Because of the difficulty of maintaining relative stations at night, this method is preferred over the use of three or more aircraft in a single pattern.
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ANNEX K — 23d SWAD SOP for detached flight team leaders.

The Standing Operating Procedure reproduced below was published by the 23d SWAD to govern the operation of detached flight teams. It outlines command, control, and administrative procedures employed by detached teams.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

Duties and Responsibilities of Flight Team Leader of TDY Flight Team

When a flight team is TDY to and in direct support of a unit, many of the normal administrative and operational functions of mission receipt, planning, and data-recording become a direct responsibility of the flight team leader.

The flight team leader acts as the Liaison Officer with the supported unit and is responsible for the employment of his flight team at the request of the supported unit commander. Consideration must always be given to service to the supported unit, maximum utilization of capabilities and aircraft, and safety throughout all operations.

The flight team will normally work in conjunction with the G3 or G3 Advisory Group of the supported unit and receive all mission requests through them. This affords channelization of requests from all unit sources and allows establishment of priorities by one source when the requirement exists. This central contact will assure continuity of operations and maximum utilization in support of the using unit.

All missions will be receipted for and recorded on the unit mission request form attached as Enclosure 1. Type missions not noted on the form should be recorded on the back of the form. All documents connected with mission request (i.e., request in Vietnamese, translations, overlays, maps, etc.) will be attached to above stated request form.

All missions received will be logged out and in on the daily mission log. This log sheet will be a continuing running log utilizing a block of mission numbers assigned to the flight team. The flight time column will be the actual flight time as logged by the pilot in the form 12. The pilot’s name assigned the mission will be recorded in an additional column at the end of the remarks section. (Enclosure 2).

Every mission flown will have an aviator’s debriefing form (Enc. 3) completed immediately upon termination of the mission. Every effort will be made to record all observations and actions in minute detail. Pilots and/or observers debriefing by intelligence or operations personnel will be noted on the debriefing form.

Data entered on the mission request form, daily mission log, and debriefing form will be accurate and complete. Briefly is secondary to completeness.

In addition to the above requirements, the flight team leader will prepare daily a narrative summary of the daily operations of the flight team.

ANNEX X
This should include a detailed description of any significant mission, incident, or happening. Other suggested points to cover would be any maintenance problems pertaining to aircraft, cameras, vehicles, radios, weapons, or personnel problems.

Any significant happenings or observations, especially railway incidents and/or accidents will be reported immediately to Operations, Nha Trang. Reports of this type will be made at the discretion of the flight team leader and always in the best interest of operations and security. Aircraft hits, defensive fires delivered, missing, wounded or dead will be reported immediately.

Daily, by 0800 hours, the flight team leader will call the following report of the preceding day's activities to unit operations (Goldfinch 908):

- Total aircraft assigned
- Total aircraft flyable
- Total crew assigned
- Total crew flyable
- Total missions flown
  - missions by type
- Total number of sorties
- Total flight time by A/C

The above forms and reports are necessary due to the test status of this unit and the requirement to have an accurate record of the unit's activities. These reports and figures are included in reports to II Corps, MACV and USASOC and are used in test reports on this unit by ACTIV (Army Concept Team in Vietnam). The value derived from flight team reports is directly proportional to the thoroughness and accuracy with which they are completed.

In some cases, in the past, it has been difficult to refer to photo missions by mission number because the camera data plate did not reflect the proper mission number when photos were taken. To preclude this, the camera data plates will be filled out for all missions where cameras are carried, whether it is a photographic mission or not. These data plates will be filled out as follows:

- 23d Avn Dt.
- A/C Number
- Mission Number
Personal delivering film from photo missions to Nha Trang for processing will have correct mission number assigned for reporting to operations. This will afford proper documentation of film for filing and future reference.

The flight team leader is responsible for all phases of the operation while the flight team is detached. Major maintenance difficulties should be referred to the unit as soon as possible. Requirements for parts or resupply of usage items and ordnance should be programmed in advance of actual need and the requirement made known to operations so delivery can be made to coincide with the need.

The flight team will maintain one officer at the operations desk during all operational periods. Periods during which this is not practical should be reported to unit operations.

Air-ground communications will be maintained in so far as possible with all unit aircraft in the operational area. FM frequency will be 42.0 primary and 43.0 secondary. UHF frequency will be 339.6 MC primary and 242.6 MC secondary. These frequencies will be monitored by aircraft from this unit unless operational missions dictate other frequencies for accomplishment of mission.

Utilization of this unit's aircraft will be for operational missions and training in conjunction with operational missions. Shipment of items to the unit will be by cargo aircraft except in operational emergencies. If delivery by cargo aircraft is not possible, deliveries should be scheduled in conjunction with operational missions. Priority or urgency of requirement will dictate any deviation from this policy.

Nothing written in this SOP should prevail over good common sense and a sound decision based on the facts available.

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Inclusions:

1 - Mission Request Form
2 - Daily Mission Log
3 - Airman's Debriefing Form

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ACTIVATION
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — Kohsak

ANNEX K — 23d SWAD SOP (continued)

EDITORIAL NOTE:

Inclosures 1 and 2 are not included here. A sample Mission Request Form was included with Monthly Report Number 3 as Inclosure 1, Annex O; a sample Aviator's Debriefing Form was Inclosure 6 to that Annex.
ACTIV-4N
Monthly Test Report Number 4 — NoOA

ANNEX L — Distribution of report.

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