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A STUDY OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY AND THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

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Degree of Master of Science in Operational Logistics and Supply Chain Management

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
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Abstract

Many organizations are finding it advantageous and often necessary to form collaborative alliances with strategic partners in order to solve collective problems and jointly work towards mutually desirable ends. This research examines a single case study of inter-agency coordination between the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and their involvement in humanitarian relief efforts. Pursuit of advancement through two collaboration models provided the framework of the research and contributed to the analysis of data. Resulting outcomes offer incentives for both organizations to develop stronger social networks assisting in a deeper understanding of the others organizational cultures and as well as urges operational collaboration across institutional lines.
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Jessica M. Thomas
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A STUDY OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY AND THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

I. Introduction

Background

Relatively all consumable items used by the branches of the U.S. military are provided by the Defense Logistics Agency, DLA. DLA either purchases or sources everything the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to operate, to include food, fuel, medical supplies, uniforms, construction and barrier equipment, vehicles, and tents. Additionally, DLA provides over 86 percent of the military’s spare parts for various transportation platforms, aircraft, and weapon systems (DLA Small Business, 2017). When perceived as being able to offer a unique capability in a humanitarian response effort, DLA can utilize their various depot locations, their capacity for expedient transportation, resources that are otherwise scarce or indented for specific purposes, or their contingency planning abilities to the benefit of those helping the victims of a natural disaster or complex emergency.

One of the divisions of DLA responsible for leading engagements in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts is known as the Whole of Government (WOG) Support Division. Their mission focuses on engaging in/with: Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), International Logistics and Security Assistance (IL/SA), various federal agencies, and associated state and local municipalities, to build partnerships, improve support, and gather information, enabling them to achieve desired customer outcomes (DLA J31 Roles and Missions, 2017).
In 2014, the director of DLA, Vice Admiral Mark Harnitchek, issued a Directive-Type Memorandum that made it DLA policy to establish agreements with Combatant Commands (CCMDs), military services, and Other Government Agencies (OGAs), in support of foreign humanitarian assistance activities (DLA, 2014). This policy states that DLA is obligated to shorten response times and, when authorized, send their most qualified personnel forward to integrate with strategic partners (DLA, 2014). Leveraging their resources to fill initial gaps in CCMD’s or an OGA’s ability to respond to crises is a capability DLA wants to afford to their partners and customers. Their numerous competences merged with their overarching emphasis to act with a sense of urgency in an effort to save lives, alleviate suffering, and reduce the impact of disasters, create a lot to offer other members of the humanitarian logistics enterprise (DLA, 2014).

When DLA’s capacities and capabilities are called upon to provide humanitarian aid, they are always in support of U.S. federal agencies which are leading the response effort on behalf of the U.S Government. Many of these relationships are with various federal agencies within the U.S. Department of State, (DoS). One partner that is independent of the DoS, but is an official component of U.S. foreign policy, is the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID. Their mission is focused on putting an end to extreme poverty and advancing the development of democratic societies that can sustain broad-based economic growth, respect and promote human rights, and strive to advance freedom, human dignity and development (USAID, 2017). The specific division within USAID responsible for managing humanitarian relief efforts for the U.S. Government overseas is called the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, or OFDA. They have five regional offices, over 20 field offices, approximately 430 staff members, along with OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors at six U.S. Air Force major commands.
Their mission focus mandates that they utilize their capabilities to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters worldwide (USAID, 2014). Their employees are comprised of regional experts, technical experts, logistics cell teams and exchange liaison officers, to name a few. With stockpiles of supplies and commodities located in Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Subang, Malaysia, they are prepared to respond to the average 70 HA/DR operations each year (USAID, 2014). Perhaps the initial thought when one hears the term “natural disaster” is the destruction that is caused by natural forces such as earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis. And while these types of disasters can be extremely devastating, USAID/OFDA is kept extremely active by additional disasters, with both a slow and rapid onset; such as influenza pandemics, famine, and refugee crises. All of these response operations come with a different set of requirements, civil objectives, political sensitivities, and methods to best meet the needs of affected victims.

When a disaster strikes a foreign country, there are several steps that must take place before it is determined necessary for the U.S. to get involved. The affected countries’ Chief of Mission authority officially declares a disaster when first, the local government and official responders are overwhelmed in their response efforts and effective assistance to its citizens cannot be accomplished organically. Second, the affected country must be willing to accept U.S. assistance as it is crucial that the U.S. does not impose its aid on another country, but rather, is welcomed and openly received.

Lastly, it must be in the best interest of the U.S. to conduct humanitarian relief in that country, in other words, there must be a political will to respond, and there are also versatile diplomatic and political sensitivities that are considered so as not to produce any negative second
or third order effects for either party. Once these criteria are met, and only then, would the U.S. Government respond to a foreign disaster.

Thus, out of these response efforts, rarer cases arise where DoS calls upon the DoD or DLA due to one or several unique capabilities they offer. To assist in providing a perspective on the frequency with which DoD or DLA becomes involved in foreign HA/DR efforts, consider that in one calendar year there are approximately 600 to 700 disasters that occur worldwide. Out of those 600 to 700 disasters, USAID/OFDA responds to approximately 10 percent as only 60 to 70 events rise to the level of the official disaster declaration and U.S. response criteria. Furthermore, out of the approximate 60 to 70 disasters where OFDA responds in some capacity, it is only about 10 percent of those where DoD or DLA is called upon to support OFDA’s HA/DR efforts. Therefore, it’s reasonable to suggest that neither the DoD nor DLA is inundated with multiple OFDA requests for support in HA/DR operations. However, a key point to consider is that despite the small percentage of operations where DLA and OFDA work together in HA/DR missions, when disasters of such magnitude strike, they tend to be highly scrutinized and immense in scope, severity, and impact.

One example of their joint efforts took place in 2014 during the mass Ebola outbreak in West Africa. USAID led the overall U.S. response effort and deployed Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Mali to coordinate the interagency actions, assess the situation, and identify gaps in response efforts. The DARTs were comprised of approximately 15 members from various U.S. Government agencies, including USAID/OFDA, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the DoD, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Forest Service (USAID, 2017). USAID also partnered closely with the United Nations’ World Food Program (WFP) and supported its work to build a system
of warehouses throughout the country and develop a supply chain of medical equipment to ensure Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) received ample resources to open their doors and sustain operations (USAID, 2017). With this supply chain in place, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and other medical supplies could now be transported by truck to logistics bases located in five strategic Liberian cities. Africa Command (AFRICOM) called upon DLA to assist with efforts in Liberia and through coordination with the U.S. Army, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), AFRICOM, U.S. Army Core of Engineers, and USAID, they had established three separate warehouses to deliver all classes of supply, except ammunition.

They also initiated the deployment of expeditionary teams to pre-position these materials, which helped establish 17 ETUs (Busch, 2016). DLA’s support effort in West Africa lasted several months, and per expectations, they transitioned operations to local authorities, federal agencies, and NGOs in early 2017. Today, USAID, among other agencies like the World Health Organization (WHO), are continuing to conduct critical training for health care workers in the effected countries which will help contain future outbreaks and instill the importance of health education.

**General Issue**

Saving lives and alleviating suffering brought on by all types of natural disasters and complex situations is too large and important of a responsibility for any single organization to undertake alone. Therefore, the relationships formed with partners who are willing to help shoulder that responsibility are pivotal to uphold and to continuously improve upon. With one of USAID/OFDA’s partners being DLA, cultivating better interagency coordination between each agency is considered a challenging, yet important goal to achieve.
Research Focus

Through examination of each agency’s internal governing mechanisms, HA/DR execution procedures, and potential collaboration barriers, this research seeks to evaluate DLA’s collaboration with USAID/OFDA in the conduct of HA/DR.

Research Objective

Using two collaboration models as the main framework, the primary research question to be addressed is:

**RQ:** How can DLA enhance its overall interagency coordination with USAID/OFDA so that it improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations?

Investigative Questions

Once a common language is established by providing several definitions regarding the overarching collaboration model, a better understanding of how to address subsequent investigative questions can be acquired. The research question can be addressed by collectively answering the following investigative questions:

**IQ1:** How can the current relationship between USAID/OFDA and DLA (in conducting HA/DR operations) be characterized?

**IQ2:** What are the current initiatives for USAID/OFDA and DLA to pursue progress from cooperation to coordination to collaboration?

**IQ3:** What are the barriers to collaboration between the two agencies?
**IQ4:** What future initiatives exist for each agency as motivation to overcome those collaborative barriers?

**IQ5:** How can DLA work with USAID/OFDA in order to formulate broad-based requirements to ensure the correct supplies are prepared and ready for transport before disasters occur?

The second chapter of the study will discuss some of the literature involved in each of the constructs that comprise the collaboration model. Chapter three will describe the methodology used to conduct the study with chapter four detailing the results and analysis of the data collected from both USAID/OFDA and DLA. Finally, chapter five will conclude with implications and recommendations for improving the DLA-USAID/OFDA relationship in the future.
II. Literature Review

Definition of Disaster

Humanitarian relief operations involve various logistic complexities many of which are different for each operation. The unfortunate circumstances or disasters that drive the need for humanitarian operations are also different and are defined diversely by various organizations. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) is the term that will be used to refer to the response operations that DLA and USAID, among other organizations, conduct in order to save lives and alleviate suffering of victims.

One organization known as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) defines a disaster as, “a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the communities’ or societies’ ability to cope using its own resources” (IFRC, 2009a). The IFRC goes on to make note of the fact that although many disasters are caused by natural forces and encompass events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes, and hurricanes, disasters can also include events that have human origins. Unfortunately, these types of events are intentional and include things such as terrorist attacks and acts of war, which encompass chemical, biological, and nuclear assaults (IFRC, 2009a).

Unintentional, man-made disasters are another type of disaster, and can occur as a result of human error: transportation catastrophes, oil spills, structural collapses of buildings, or controlled fires becoming unconstrained, are a few examples.

Additional categories of disasters, which are highlighted by the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), incorporate slow-onset disasters as well, such as famine, drought, or
growing pollution concentrations (WHO & CRED, 2010). They help their audience to understand the difference in impact that different disasters have on the affected communities. Using an earthquake as an example of a sudden disaster, they explain that an earthquake has an immediate, direct impact on its victims, with little to no warning signs, and health responses must also be immediate. Once the earthquake has passed, usually the indirect health effects must be attended to for approximately one to two weeks. Thus, for these types of disasters, the demand for external response efforts is high at the onset and then decreases fairly quickly after the disaster is over.

Contrarily, with a drought or famine, which is a slow-onset disaster, the demand for assistance can begin years before it is at its most severe state, and last even longer after the worst has passed. For these slow-onset disasters, there are usually clear and early warning signs, which should activate prevention and preparedness measures to be taken. However, these disasters still occur all over the globe and the health effects from their impact take much longer to recover from (WHO, 1999).

As one can imagine, most of these various types of disasters require different levels of responses and resources from outside agencies. Each type of disaster inflicts varying degrees of devastation and the uncertainty surrounding this devastation makes it difficult to prepare for the sudden disasters in particular. The logistic feats that many times have to take place in order to successfully alleviate suffering and save lives, are made extremely more difficult when destruction of infrastructure and loss of communication with the affected population occurs.

On behalf of the U.S. Government, USAID/OFDA is the main agency responsible for leading and managing all foreign disaster response efforts. As the primary manager of HA/DR operations, it is important to comprehend their definition of a disaster as it could potentially
initiate other agencies’ involvement. USAID’s Building Alliances Series on Emergencies, published in June 2009, states:

*Natural disasters are the consequences of a natural hazard and can affect populations in the forms of floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, volcanic eruptions, droughts, and famine. Additionally, disasters can be directly or indirectly caused by humans and can include events such as chemical spills, wild fires, crashes, and pandemics.* (USAID, 2009)

They also explain that complex emergencies are other instances where they may become involved in organizing a response effort, as their definition of complex emergencies is summarized to include populations threatened by acts of war, civil turmoil, international strife, terrorist exploits, and industrial catastrophes. These types of complex emergencies are often long-term situations that impact the livelihoods of surrounding populations in a devastating manner (USAID, 2009). Needless to say, USAID is an incredibly busy organization. If they are not actively responding to a natural disaster, they are proactively responding to other vulnerable communities around the globe in attempt to inform them on prevention and preparedness measures. Along with USAID/OFDA’s relief commodity stockpiles and 430 staff members worldwide, they normally combine their resources and have relationships with both U.S. federal agencies and many Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in order to carry out large HA/DR operations.

One agency they have relied upon in the past and will hopefully continue to seek assistance from is DLA. Due to the fact that they are a support agency during HA/DR operations, DLA can fill any gaps in the initial logistic channels and utilize their robust network to purchase
or source items not available through normal acquisition processes (Ryder, 2017). When needed, DLA can coordinate with TRANSCOM, the appropriate COCOM, and several others to help establish a supply chain in order to get commodities from origin to destination, in addition, sometimes the vendors with whom they establish contracts offer direct delivery to the area in need. With several of USAID’s core competencies in leading HA/DR operations, conducting assessments of needs, coordinating lines of communication, and gaining country access, they are a highly adept organization. And coupled with DLA’s capacity to supplement with targeted logistic capabilities, access to various forms of transportation, area-specific reconnaissance, aerial imagery, and a large number of responsive personnel, it is essential that each agency realize the other’s competencies to draw on, should they be needed in the future. As a result, the ultimate beneficiaries from DLA and USAID further synchronizing their HA/DR response efforts, would be disaster-affected victims. But putting this idea into action, however well-intentioned, introduces the concept of interagency coordination which can be particularly challenging.

**Interagency Coordination**

As a broad notion, interagency coordination has been studied by many sociologists, behavioral scientists, business managers, and political administrations, to name a few. One of the most foundational studies concentrates on the formation of collaborative alliances and establishes a more systematic understanding of the theories behind why they occur (Gray & Wood, 1991). Gray and Wood explain that a collaborative alliance occurs when organizations collectively attempt to resolve issues and problems that are too difficult and convoluted to be solved by only one organization alone. Additionally, two agencies that have related core
competencies and a similar objective can become a force multiplier if they collaborate. The term collaboration is defined by Gray as, “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.” (Gray, 1989). With collaboration referring to the process, and collaborative alliances referring to the forms, many organizations are finding it advantageous and often necessary to find partners with whom to work toward mutually desirable ends. The authors go on to say that the configuration of organizations are typically linked to a particular problem set and that each organization is faced with the added pressure of resource scarcity (Gray & Wood, 1991).

Another study conducted by Max Stephenson Jr., Co-Director for the Institute for Governance and Accountabilities at Virginia Tech University, explains certain factors that may facilitate or inhibit operational coordination between humanitarian agencies. One of these factors relates to organization’s internal operating structures, as they do not always encourage broad cross-talk or open cooperation among their internal sections, much less another external organization (Stephenson Jr, 2005). Reflecting back to DLA and USAID, this could definitely be an area worth navigating as DLA’s internal structure and language closely resembles that within the U.S. Department of Defense and USAID/OFDA’s structure and common language is rather independent and judicial in nature. Stephenson proposes that increased cooperation among humanitarian relief organizations operating in a given emergency setting be achieved by means of inter-organizational consensus building (Stephenson Jr, 2005). More specifically, these organizations might be encouraged to build individual cultures and finally, if possible, a shared culture of what has been dubbed ‘collective sense making’, (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), which may serve to ensure at least a method of operational cooperation across successive cases of
engagement (Stephenson Jr, 2005). But the capacity of two or more agencies to reach comprehensive sense making demands a degree of trust among its participants (Stephenson Jr, 2005).

It is this concept of trust that is a foundational building block upon which the structure of interagency coordination is built. While there are various interpretations of the characteristics of trust, Zaheer et al., (1998) offer their own three-part definition, “Trust is the expectation that an actor can (1) be relied on to fulfill obligations, (2) will behave in a predictable manner, and (3) will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present.” (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). It is also important to realize that individual participants must first be disposed to trust and thereafter, actually be willing to extend trust to another across organizational boundaries (Stephenson Jr, 2005).

The body of literature on interagency coordination was augmented by scholarly work on how the widespread use of information technology can change the ways people work together (Malone & Crowston, 1994). A brief definition of coordination is given as managing various dependencies amid activities (Malone & Crowston, 1994). They also stress the importance of interagency coordination due to the fact that in businesses today, global interdependencies are becoming more critical in order to adapt to an accelerating pace, a pace that ultimately crosses a threshold of new ways to organize successful human activities (Malone & Crowston, 1994). An emphasis is also placed on how communication is being conducted between agencies, particularly information exchange within producer-consumer relationships. By making this information actually ‘usable’ to both parties, they can establish a common language and develop standards for communication, which could then be designed into computer networks and other cooperative-work tools (Lee & Malone, 1990). Furthermore, a computer system in place that
already “speaks the language” of the users, is more likely to take root and actually aid in communication instead of hindering it.

**Historical Interaction Between USAID and DLA**

While the vast amount of research conducted on interagency coordination could be explored almost indefinitely, a shift in focus back to DLA and USAID is suitable for the purpose of examining past HA/DR operations that have contributed to the formation of their relationship. While each interaction between two agencies contributes in different ways, it’s important to understand the history of that interaction in order to constructively influence future operations.

As one of their first, joint efforts, USAID, DLA, the DoD, and many other organizations played an active role in coordinating one of the largest response efforts in HA/DR history for Operation Unified Response (OUR). On January 12th, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the capital of Haiti, about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, devastating the country with an estimated 230,000 deaths and 194,000 injured (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). In less than 24 hours USAID/OFDA dispatched their DART team consisting of 17 members to Port-au-Prince and immediately activated their Response Management Team (RMT) in Washington D.C. for their support. The DART assessed humanitarian needs and coordinated assistance with the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, the international community, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the U.S. DoD, and the Government of Haiti (GoH) (USAID, 2010).

Within two days of the disaster, the headquarters for Joint Task Force Haiti, JTF-Haiti, was established by U.S. Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) to begin conducting humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal agency, USAID (Institute, 2015). From the onset, JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked
alongside counterparts from USAID, MINUSTAH, and several NGOs. Together, they developed plans for protecting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in makeshift shelters who were at great risk of further disaster due to impending flooding and additional structural collapses (Institute, 2015). The locations for 16 food distributions sites throughout Port-au-Prince were mapped out, requirements determined, and concepts of operations written. These critical sites were then rapidly established and supported and more than two million Haitians received much needed food and water on a regular basis (Institute, 2015).

DLA’s role began when they partnered with SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM, and JTF-Haiti to provide post-earthquake humanitarian assistance. DLA provided food, water, medical supplies, and construction equipment to the relief effort and they also deployed a support team to JTF-Haiti. The DLA team assisted JTF-Haiti in field activities working around the clock to meet customer’s needs (DLA, 2010). The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti brought together tremendous capacity and willingness to help from hundreds of organizations (DLA, 2010). Various relief efforts continued well past the completion of OUR and one of the largest lessons stressed was the importance of building unity of effort among all participating organizations (Institute, 2015).

Although OUR was one of the first, major operations that USAID, DLA, and many other agencies jointly worked, the specific partnership between USAID/OFDA and DLA didn’t take root at that time. Several years later however, the main, formative interaction contributing to the relationship between both agencies began with the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort in 2015. The unfortunate circumstances leading up to the cause of this event began in March 2011, with pro-democracy demonstrations in Syria against President Bashar al-Assad. They were fueled in the southern city of Deraa after the arrest and torture of several teenagers who painted
revolutionary slogans on a school wall. The anti-government protests were initially peaceful, however violence quickly escalated after the Syrian government opened-fire on protestors, and armed opposition groups began fighting back. Over the next several years, the country descended into civil war as rebel brigades were formed to battle government forces for control of cities, towns and the countryside. By June 2013, the UN stated that 90,000 people had been killed in the conflict and by August 2015, that figure had climbed to 250,000 (Rodgers et al., 2016). As the attacks and civil turmoil intensified in Syria, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) reported over 4.7 million Syrian refugees attempting to escape to safety in neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (Grimley, 2015). With extremely long distances to travel on foot coupled with the harsh winter temperatures, many were struggling to survive the journey.

USAID/OFDA, the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) office, USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, multiple NGOs, the Government of Iraq, and others in the international humanitarian community, began responding with supplies needed for survival. Several camps were established to provide temporary shelters and vast amounts of food and water were being transported to those seeking refuge from violence. However, as the mass exodus from Syria continued, more and more refugees were left vulnerable and it continued to strain the resources of the surrounding regions, furthermore, many were still exposed to declining temperatures.

Therefore, in August 2015, the DoS submitted a letter requesting humanitarian support in the form of Non-Food Items (NFIs) to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in response to IDPs in Iraq. Another letter was sent from the DoS to OSD on 14 September, 2015 requesting NFI humanitarian support for the refugees currently in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. This began
the massive coordination effort that launched several agencies into action; DLA began working with USAID, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, DoS PRM, and many different vendors in attempt to meet the requirements for the NFIs requested.

Through extensive conversations with the beneficiaries and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), very specific characteristics of the commodities requested needed to be fulfilled in order to meet the cultural requirements of IDPs. Several types of commodities required were blankets, mattresses, towels, carpets, pillows, hygiene kits, and winter clothing. But it was imperative that the product specifications per item were met accurately, as any linkages or ability to trace its origins to the U.S. or U.S. military, (whether by product number, color, brandings, etc.) could cause the IDPs to be targeted by rebel forces and armed militant actors. Thus, adherence to the humanitarian principle of doing no harm to the benefactors was of prime importance.

One of the various unique aspects surrounding the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief efforts, was the mandate for DLA to use expiring Fiscal Year funds called Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. This meant that over $114.6 million had to be expended/obligated by 30 September, which significantly shortened DLA’s response time. Due to the mandate of using OHDACA funds, which is DoD money, USAID/OFDA was assigned to use DLA, which also came with the caveat of having to communicate all actions through CENTCOM; this made the process more complex, as it included more participants in decision making. When DLA received an itemized listing with the commodity requirements, USAID/OFDA had already identified approved vendors to provide some of the commodities but there were legislative barriers preventing DLA to contract with non-U.S. vendors, at least right away. The Berry Amendment is one that mandates DLA give procurement priority of certain
commodities to American made/manufactured materials, however, if appropriate justification can be made affirming that the types of material or commodity cannot be domestically sourced, then DLA can attempt to get a Domestic Non-Availability Determination (D-NAD) waiver signed. But this process can take absorbent amounts of time, which was a luxury DLA did not have. Another issue was the amount of money allocated was completely accounted for in the procurement of the items, however, funding for transportation of the commodities, distribution center set-up, labor costs, and customs/clearance taxation costs were not anticipated. The compounding variables of DLA having to procure non-standard items, from non-standard vendors, and deliver them via a non-standard delivery method, forced them to communicate with USAID/OFDA frequently and thoroughly to accomplish their objectives. Needless to say, the amount of challenging and procedural ‘pain’ that was endured by many parties involved created a sizeable and steep learning curve throughout the operation.

Both DLA and USAID/OFDA learned a great deal about the other’s roles, limitations, capabilities, and organizational cultural differences. Despite the countless trials, compressed timeline, and funding restraints, the Syrian/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort was deemed a success and ended with the final commodity delivery in March of 2016. In the end, over 3 million items were sourced from 50 different vendors and shipped to 10 different locations spread over 4 countries. This operation also impacted millions of lives.

While several other examples of DLA working with USAID/OFDA, among other agencies exist, there have not been any previous studies conducted that look exclusively at USAID/OFDA and DLA. There is always a broader stage with multiple actors who are also involved in HA/DR coordination efforts. Although multiple actors are required to fill essential roles for HA/DR operations, this study focuses on coordination between DLA and USAID.
Furthermore, out of the vast amount of studies that have been conducted on general interagency coordination as a concept, as well as between real agencies, none have been found that look solely at DLA and USAID/OFDA. But before analyzing the relationship between DLA and USAID/OFDA, a common understanding of the ways in which two agencies can operate in conjunction with one another must first be considered.

**Frameworks**

Two collaboration models contribute to establishing this understanding and also provide the framework through which their organizational relationship can be evaluated. This study will use both of these frameworks.

The first, depicted in Figure 1, comes from a collective study conducted by several researchers who stipulate three activities which take place in order to achieve a successful operation by two or more agencies.

![Collaboration Model](adapted from Saab et al. 2009)

*Figure 2 - Collaboration Model (adapted from Saab et al. 2009)*

Deemed a “collaboration model” by the researchers, the first of the fundamental actions is to Build Trust among agency members. According to the study, trust is established through two mechanisms: face-to-face meetings and collaborative projects (Saab, Tapia, Maitland, & Maldonado, 2009). Sharing information about oneself, one’s organization, and one’s social
network and resources is the first step in creating trust (Saab et al., 2009). The second activity consists of Collaborative Behaviors. Through interviews of members responsible for conducting field level HA/DR activities, the authors concluded that these members believed collective action would result in better collaboration on future projects as well as facilitate stronger relationships between members. Achieving consensus with respect to developing, funding, and implementing relevant projects employed collaborative behaviors. Saab et al. explained that the perceived benefits of collaborating on influential action items helped members to recognize the value in working together to achieve common goals. This introduces the third activity of Generating Value. When individuals are able to connect with others from a different agency, this can lead to the enhancement of skill sets. Individuals from each agency who take on the responsibility of mentoring one another according to their strengths recognize meaningful worth and value in doing so.

All three of these activities are connected in that collaboration serves to reinforce trust if the individuals involved in a particular project are able to derive some value from it. Saab et al. concluded that if the collaborative activities and behaviors are seen as having value, and are also seen as reinforcing trust among individuals, the operation is considered to be a success from an interagency perspective. Success is the fourth and final stage of the collaboration model.

The second framework can be viewed as a subset of the second activity, Collaborative Behaviors, indicated in the first model. Created by several of the same authors, this model first establishes three separate definitions of the terms cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, which are terms that will be utilized in assessing DLA’s and USAID’s relationship. The distinction of these terms is important as they reflect differing levels of commitment each agency has towards working together.
Cooperation between organizations usually manifests as a primarily verbal dialogue and takes place in informal settings. An organization can present a need that another organization could satisfy without a formal contract or agreement (Hord, 1986). Hence, there are no risks or loss of independence with this kind of interaction (Mattessich & Monsey, 1992).

Coordination takes place when organizations find that their individual goals are similar, so they work together on separate, yet compatible missions (Czajkowski, 2007). There are more risks associated with coordinated activities because organizations commit resources and the result of their efforts may be beneficial for only one of the parties (Mattessich & Monsey, 1992).

Collaboration takes place when organizations share authority and responsibility for planning and implementing an action to solve a problem. Stakeholders, “engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures to act or decide on issues related to that domain” (Gray & Wood, 1991).

The flow of the second model begins with two headquarter agencies, each managing their respective field-level offices. As the model shows progression from cooperation to coordination, then finally to collaboration, there are arrows pointing to different domains in which each headquarter/field-level office can reside. This model is particularly applicable as both DLA and USAID/OFDA manage regional and/or field-level offices and each have a separate headquarters location. The core concept of this model is describing the soft boundaries between cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, indicating that two organizations can transfer back and forth along this continuum. Moreover, it makes the distinction between the last two levels with collaboration as working together on a specific task while cooperation is working on independent tasks toward a common goal (Hvinden, 1994).
Both frameworks provide the primary tools needed to determine where each agency currently is on this continuum. Additionally, the frameworks help to determine the extent to which both agencies can collaborate if indeed possible. The activities and concepts explained in both models, when applied, are significant in that they have the potential to influence the strategic, tactical, and operational goals of both DLA’s and USAID’s HA/DR operations (Saab et al., 2009). Having thus presented the frameworks as a premise, determination of the methodology behind the research will be the next topic discussed in this study.
III. Methodology

Case Study Approach

This research was conducted as a single case study on the relationship between DLA and USAID/OFDA. A case study approach is a suitable method to examine the co-operation of both agencies as it can improve discernment about a misunderstood or unfamiliar situation (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). Additionally, the results derived from the case study can be used to intentionally modify each agency’s perception of the other, along with their interactions and communication methods. Using a case study method to address the research question is merited as it seeks to explain how two agencies can work in cohesion with one another towards a common end. Case studies are useful in determining how or why a phenomenon occurs (Yin, 2014). Whatever the topic domain or field of interest, the distinctive need for case study research arises out of the desire to understand complex social circumstances (Yin, 2014).

One of the first tasks necessary to begin any case study is to understand the dynamics present within the setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, understanding the dynamics currently at work within each agency was paramount. And although many case studies employ multiple levels of analysis; i.e.: a firm’s executive, mid-level, or field-level divisions, this study examined DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s interactions at the headquarters level (Eisenhardt, 1989). This way, depending on research results, any new levels of understanding, interaction alterations, or regulation modifications can be made at the top and ideally extend down to field or operational levels.

DLA and USAID/OFDA were the two agencies chosen for this study because the positive impact that would result from a stronger ability to interact, trust, and execute their
intertwined responsibilities, could be immensely beneficial to disaster victims. Furthermore, DLA has recently established a new division entitled the Whole of Government Support Division, whose mission is to, “lead engagements...with federal agencies and associated state and local municipality customers, to build partnerships which improve support, to gather information for agency planning, and to focus efforts on achieving desired customer outcomes.” (DLA J31 Roles and Missions, 2017). This new division provides opportune grounds for building stronger relationships with USAID/OFDA personnel.

**Data Sources and Methods**

The two sources of data for this case study stemmed from semi-structured phone interviews of both DLA and USAID/OFDA participants, as well as archival documents from both agencies. In preparation for the data collection phase of the study, and in attempt to follow several guidelines presented by Yin (2014), the researcher briefly conducted a self-assessment of skills and abilities to maintain the following efforts:

- Asking good questions – and interpreting the answers fairly
- Being a good listener – and not trapped by existing ideologies or preconceptions
- Staying adaptive – so that newly encountered situations are seen as opportunities, not threats
- Have a firm grasp of the issues being studied – even when in exploratory mode
- Avoiding biases – by being sensitive to contrary evidence and conducting research ethically (Yin, 2014).
A main tool that assisted in these efforts, as well as increased the validity of the study, was the construction and use of a case study protocol that can be found in Appendix A. This provided the guidelines as necessary, especially during interviews, to maintain focus on addressing the posed questions and hence the overarching research question. A reference to all interview questions, approved by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Institutional Review Board (IRB), is provided in Appendix C. The interview protocol contains one set of questions for DLA personnel and another set of the same questions for USAID/OFDA personnel with only minor terminology changes as they pertain to each agency being addressed.

The qualitative method of semi-structured interviews was chosen as a form of data collection for several reasons with the foremost being that an interview is a professional interaction that goes beyond a spontaneous conversation, but rather, if performed correctly, can be a construction site for acquiring thoroughly tested knowledge (Kvale, 2007). The qualitative interview is a key venue for exploring ways in which the interviewee experiences and understands their environment. It provides a unique access to the lived world of the subjects, who in their own words describe their activities, experiences, and opinions (Kvale, 2007).

Thirteen interviews in total were conducted with 10 of the interviewees being from DLA and three from USAID/OFDA. Three of the DLA participants hold leadership roles in the WOG Division and are responsible for building partnerships and improving support to over 40 federal agencies. They work with Foreign Disaster Relief, Foreign Military Sales, and Defense Support Civil Authorities as well to cultivate support policy and process mechanisms. Other DLA interviewees held leadership roles in the Operations Division, who are responsible for coordinating and integrating DLA’s logistic capabilities with Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and other defense agencies. This section also manages the Joint Logistics Operations
Center (JLOC), which helps link and synchronize DLA support functions as well as Command and Control functions during contingency operations. All DLA personnel were able to provide unique and valuable insight into the agency’s culture as well as portray their inclination to work with USAID/OFDA. Regarding the interview participants from USAID/OFDA, two participants reside in OFDA’s Operations Division, which house the Military Liaison Teams. These teams are the principal point of contact for OFDA to coordinate with the DoD on Foreign Disaster Response and humanitarian assistance operations. They are also responsible for conducting the JHOC training at their headquarters location as well as around the globe. The last of the USAID participants worked in OFDA’s Humanitarian Policy and Global Engagement (HPGE) division. This division is responsible for tracking trends and policy developments in humanitarian assistance efforts, as well as managing global programs, policy and outreach, strategic communication, and interagency training and engagements. The following table is provided to indicate the number and length of each interview performed:

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<th>Agency</th>
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<td>DLA Interview 6</td>
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Despite the heavy-sided DLA perspectives, achievement of a response saturation level with USAID/OFDA interview participants similar to that of DLA’s interview participants was attained. The term *saturation* indicates that after several interviews, the researcher gets to a point where the participants begin to respond with the same type of replies, and similar answers were given repeatedly.

The second type of data collected came from archival documents. As previously mentioned, it is extremely important to establish a firm understanding of how both agencies are currently conducting their HA/DR efforts and the regulatory processes binding each agencies’ actions. The archival documents containing this type of information provided much needed insight, as well as assisted in grasping the differences and/or similarities in each agency’s organizational cultures. They also provided a sense of acceptable conduct, social practices/norms, and internal and external motives among each agency’s members. The combination of interviews and archival documents certainly contributed to gathering a holistic account of the real-world settings for each agency, and allowed for triangulation of data sources.
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). Yin outlines several factors that facilitate triangulation including the collection of numerous viewpoints, detecting multiple elements pertaining to situations, and formulating the overall picture that surfaces as the analysis progresses. As it applies to this case study, the 13 interviews contributed 13 different viewpoints, and each provided various elements about their relationship that affected multiple HA/DR operations. Furthermore, both types of data provided the opportunity to align my understanding under the participant’s outlook on their own relationships with DLA and USAID/OFDA respectively. In attempt to follow Creswell’s instruction for qualitative research, significant effort was also made to sincerely grasp the meaning that the interviewees placed on particular problems or struggles, while intentionally leaving out my own interpretation of those same problems or struggles. The researcher intentionally adopted the mindset of each agencies’ participant throughout the data collection process. Acknowledgment and consideration of biases while filtering through each data file was also conducted. This greatly assisted in maintaining objectivity toward each member.

Data Analysis Process

Once all interview responses were recorded and archival documents initially collected, the data analysis phase of research began. Creswell offers a six-step process that guides the qualitative researcher in conducting a thorough data analysis, and this process was implemented upon completion of data collection. The first step is to prepare and organize the raw data, which includes the transcribing of all interview responses as well as sorting and arranging all notes taken during the interviews (Creswell, 2014). Gathering all archival documents and arranging them according to the applicable agency was also performed.
The second step is to read through all the data and see what patterns, ideas, general tones, and themes emerge through this initial exploration phase. This can be considered an examination of data which can help answer questions such as, “What general ideas are the participants conveying?” or “What is the impression of the overall depth, credibility, and use of the information?” (Creswell, pg. 197, 2014).

As progress was made through this second step, multiple themes emerged from the transcriptions and archival documents to include cultural differences and attempts to acquire information from USAID/OFDA. As a second, more deliberate pass was made through all data, the researcher transitioned into the third step of the analysis process of coding. For this study, five provisional codes were used initially (Miles et al., 2014) and pulled from the two framework models discussed in the previous chapter. These codes are examples which Creswell defines as expected codes, or codes that the reader would suspect to be found in a particular case study. The provisional codes are Trust Building, Generating Value, Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration.

As coding each portion of data under its proper concept continued, the researcher came across segments of data that did not exactly fit into the pre-determined constructs. Thus, by maintaining an open mindset and attempting to be sensitive to the fact that certain segments of data may indicate a potential new theme has emerged and should be further investigated or analyzed, several new codes were defined and incorporated into the entire data analysis process. Some of these new codes can be categorized as unanticipated codes and one actually falls under the category of an in-vivo code, which means it carries a term or phrase that was coined by the participant, using his or her language (Creswell, 2014). With one of the unanticipated codes being; DLA Giving USAID/OFDA the Credit, this was unexpected in that one would not
automatically assume an agency such as DLA, which can be comprised of a lot of type-A personalities, retired military, and active duty military, would acknowledge that they may not always be the best choice for support. For example, one DLA representative stated:

*USAID knows whatever country that’s been affected by the disaster. They are the experts on site, we are there to support them, and we recognize that. They also source almost everything locally, so they have insight into which vendors are best to establish contracts with.*

The code categorized as an in-vivo code is; DLA Trying to Get USAID/OFDA’s Playbook, with the word ‘playbook’ being termed by DLA personnel. For example, the researcher frequently came across statements such as:

*In a perfect world, I would already have that playbook, that list of all the items, quantities, colors, dimensions, etc., and vendors for every single thing they could possibly want, whether or not it’s on contract. And whether or not they ever execute and spend one penny on us, that’s fine, but at least we’re a lead time closer to supporting and saving lives.*

The request for such a playbook was even found in one of the After Action Report items as a lesson learned, and was termed, “*Request a Humanitarian Assistance Standard Operating Procedure Playbook that can serve as a single reference document baselining common planning*
and execution procedures.” Therefore, due to the frequency and prevalent viewpoints on this playbook, various data segments were framed with this in-vivo code.

The fourth step is to use all of the now coded data to explain and describe the setting of the analysis. According to Creswell, the descriptions encompass information on the people involved, background on the locations, and explanation of the conditions in the applicable environment. Doing this can provide overarching and comprehensive themes that can serve as headers when discussing the findings of the data analysis process (Creswell, 2014).

Step five encompasses using the method of triangulation with the data to build coherent justification for the themes. As certain data sources or participant’s responses converged or supported other perspectives, those connections were documented in analytic memos. As the process of triangulation continued, experiences from each interviewee began to align with others who had similar experiences, or justifications for a particular business practice. In some instances, one agency’s business practice was found to be the stem of the other agency’s frustrations. There were many causal connections made throughout the triangulation phase of data analysis. Triangulation not only added to the validity of the study, but also assisted in conveying the descriptive themes that emerged, that were not originally derived from the two frameworks, allowing the researcher to fully comprehend the accurate outlooks held by each participant from each agency (Creswell, 2014).

The sixth and final step involves interpreting the findings of the data analysis and deriving a conclusion from the results. Discussion of findings is provided in the following chapter by addressing each investigative question. Each question may warrant discussion between both agencies on how to incorporate any positive practices moving forward. As Creswell mentions, in qualitative research, where frameworks or models are used as a lens
through which the data analysis takes place, the researcher can form conclusions that call for action agendas towards progressive reform and change (Creswell, 2014). This research is concluded with applicable recommendations to each agency on how to progress toward a more collaborative relationship.
IV. Analysis and Results

Results of Coding Analysis

Once all data was collected, transcribed, organized, and reviewed at the surface level, the first deductive examinations began. The application used for data organization and coding was the Dedoose Data Management software system, where dimensions of qualitative themes are generated, explored, and integrated with other types of data. The Dedoose software served as a platform that allowed for meticulous interpretation of each data type, whether they were archival documents, interview transcripts, or notes taken throughout the study. As previously mentioned, the researcher initially intended on using the following five provisional codes acquired from both collaboration models: Building Trust, Generating Value, Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration. These five provisional codes however, did not completely encompass the intent and perspectives expressed in interviews and archival documents. Therefore, following the initial deductive analysis of data, and remaining receptive to new codes arising, a more thorough and inductive review of the data took place.

As analysis progressed, repetitious behaviors and circumstances were developing in each data segment which ultimately manifested as ten additional codes. These new codes were: Cultural Differences; DLA Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value; DLA Attempts to Acquire USAID’s “Playbook”; the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); Legislative Barriers; Funding Limitations; DLA Giving USAID Credit; USAID Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value; USAID Restricting Amount of Information Shared; and USAID Managing Funds. Each code was defined by the behaviors or characteristics continually exuded in the data. For detailed definitions of each code, please reference Appendix A.
Moreover, as the coding process was conducted, the researcher was simultaneously interpreting pieces of data with the creation of memos that the Dedoose software enables its users to create. These memos assisted in capturing the essence of statements, responses to situations, images, attitudes, as well as their accompanying implications. Memos were utilized to capture anything that was indicative of DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s relationship, whether positive or negative, or anything that offered an explanation as to why things are done a certain way at both agencies. Maintaining the perspective of the subjects and intent of the archival documents was of paramount importance and a continuous endeavor throughout the analysis.

Upon completion of the coding process, the analysis tool within the Dedoose software was utilized to expose patterns and build visualizations of the code applications. The findings not only indicated the frequencies with which all codes were used per data input, but they also revealed different aspects of the complex relationships between certain codes. The first table compiled as a result of the analysis is titled, Table - 2 Code Application.
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<td>Totals</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table - 2 Code Application
This table serves as a visualization of the frequency with which a particular code applied to each data file. The number in each cell indicates the number of times that particular code was used while coding that specific data file. Several findings were significant upon analysis of the table, with the first being the totals located at the bottom of the table, particularly the ones in a bold, thick border.

One can see that the two highest code counts are Cultural Differences with 54 instances of application throughout the whole data set, along with Generating Value as the second highest with 39 instances of application. This result certainly correlated with the responses received from the majority of interviewees who agreed that the business practices, the expectations, the social norms, and principles that guide each agency are vastly different from each other and have been different for the history of both agencies’ operation. This translates into immeasurable differences which manifest into two separate ways of thinking, two separate ways of approaching problems, and two different organizational cultures.

However, attention can also be drawn to the application of Generating Value, at 39 counts. Instances of data segments that were categorized as such expressed the views of one agency seeing value in the other. One example being that both DLA and USAID/OFDA see value in the training opportunities each agency offers the other. Each see worth in the investment of time and resources into cross-training that allows others to understand how they ‘do business’ and why they approach things the way they do. It has the potential to open new lines of communication as well as help agency members see the strengths and core competencies that the other agency has to offer. Another finding was that the least-used code, Cooperation, only amounted to a total of four applications. One way this result can be interpreted is that the agencies do not spend much time at the cooperation level, but this will be discussed further in
Investigative Question One’s analysis. The last pattern that the Code Application table exposes is the commonality in responses from USAID personnel reflected in Table – 3 Code Application USAID Only, indicated below:

Table – 3 Code Application USAID Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Building Trust</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Cultural Differences</th>
<th>DLA Attempts to Improve C&amp;G Build Trust, and Gen Value</th>
<th>DLA Trying to Get USAID’s “Pay Back”</th>
<th>DLA Giving USAID the Credit</th>
<th>Generating Value</th>
<th>Legislative Barriers</th>
<th>Funding Limitations</th>
<th>POA</th>
<th>USAID Attempts to Improve C&amp;G Build Trust, and Gen Value</th>
<th>USAID Restricting Amount of Info Shared</th>
<th>USAID/ODA Managing Funds</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID Interview 1 docx</td>
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<td>USAID Interview 2 docx</td>
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After examining a cut-out from Table 2 – Code Application of only the USAID interviewee data files, one can see the similar pattern across the rows which indicate parallel coding applications for their responses. A number of implications can be drawn from all three USAID members answering the majority of the interview questions similarly, one of them being that USAID’s training of their members is standardized and thorough. An alternate inference could be that USAID personnel recall similar events and experiences which shape their views and allow them to see through the ‘same lens’, providing for similar responses. DLA’s responses also illustrate analogous results in code application but perhaps DLA’s experiences differ across a more diverse audience, as the interviewees from DLA were from several different departments. Again, part of the reason why the pattern is intriguing is that multiple conclusions can be inferred from it.
The next table produced after analysis is called the Code Co-occurrence Table, labeled as Table -4 Code Co-occurrence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building Trust</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Cultural Differences</th>
<th>DLA Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust &amp; Gen Value</th>
<th>DLA trying to get USAID’s &quot;Play Book&quot;</th>
<th>DLA Giving the Credit</th>
<th>Generating Value</th>
<th>Legislative Barriers</th>
<th>Funding Limitations</th>
<th>MOA</th>
<th>USAID Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust &amp; Gen Value</th>
<th>USAID Restricting Amount of Info Shared</th>
<th>USAID/OFDA Managing Funds</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<td>Building Trust</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>Cultural Differences</td>
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<td>DLA Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust &amp; Gen Value</td>
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<td>DLA trying to get USAID’s &quot;Play Book&quot;</td>
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<td>Funding Limitations</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
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<td>USAID Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust &amp; Gen Value</td>
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<td>USAID/OFDA Managing Funds</td>
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</table>
As one can see above, the table indicates how many times a pair of codes was utilized to capture various data segments. Many of the scenarios described by both USAID and DLA personnel, whether it entailed a past HA/DR operation, a training event, or an AAR meeting, had two or more codes that applied to each example. The strongest correlation between codes was found between Generating Value and Building Trust, indicated by two of the red boxes on Table-3 Code Co-occurrence each containing the number 18 inside. This means that it counted 18 instances where these two codes occurred together and collectively described those particular data segments. One example where this pair of codes applies is the discussion of DLA orchestrating a tour of one of their warehouses to be given to several members of USAID. An exploration of one of the warehouses run by DLA Troop Support in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which houses several classes of supply, will help in generating value in the capabilities that DLA could offer USAID/OFDA, should they be needed. It also gives the opportunity for USAID/OFDA to trust in DLA’s capacities as a future contributor and establish the habitual linkages with suppliers of core requirements for HA/DR operations.

**Investigative Questions Answered**

As the analysis portion of the study intends to address all Investigative Questions, subsequently answering the main Research Question, the Collaboration model construct and the findings within all tables will assist in answering IQ1:

**IQ1: How can the current relationship between USAID/OFDA and DLA (in conducting HA/DR operations) be characterized?**
Referring back to the Collaboration model discussed in the literature review, there is a continuum that can help characterize and place DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s current relationship. Recall that Saab, et al. (2009) describes the cooperation level as two agencies working on independent tasks but toward a similar objective. The type of communication involved at this level of a relationship can be considered brief and transactional in nature, without having to invest in shared resources. The coordination level is one step further, where two agencies are working on separate tasks, yet each agencies’ end state is more conjoined. It can be characterized by behaviors such as collective planning, invested time and shared resources, and consensus building. Lastly, the collaboration level is the synchronized end-state where each agency is working on the same task to achieve the same objective. Usually preceded with substantial investments of resources, sharing a collective authority, and synchronizing each organization’s efforts, collaboration is that level many agencies strive to reach in their relationships with their strategic partners.

With this construct in mind, and based on the findings quantified in Table – 1 Code Application, the code counts for Cooperation applications throughout the data set amount to four. This is the least applied code out of the 15 available. Referring to Table-3 Code Co-occurrence, Cooperation was only used once in combination with Coordination and twice in combination with Generating Value, for a total of three applications throughout the data set. These results also align with the information shared throughout the data collection phase as most past interactions that DLA and USAID/OFDA have shared, seem to skip the cooperation level and go straight into the coordination level at the least. One example of this occurred during the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort; once CENTCOM released orders to DLA to begin assistance in support of the IDPs in Iraq, DLA was coordinating materials and kits with USAID
to ensure they met all the specific requirements. Although this initiated a steep learning curve for both agencies, DLA immediately began working with USAID/OFDA personnel and did not spend time in the cooperation level of interaction. In this instance however, the urgency of the requirement coupled with the shortened timeline in which to execute the mission did not allow for functioning at only the cooperation level. Nonetheless, considering the content of the interview data, several historical examples, as well as both tables’ findings regarding code application, one can make the case that the current relationship between USAID/OFDA and DLA stands at the coordination level of the collaboration model.

Several examples supporting this inference begin with the coordination it takes between the two agencies to hold joint conferences where DLA and USAID have the opportunity to discuss important matters facing the humanitarian community. One USAID/OFDA representative states, “With DLA, we sit together on the Whole of Government Council. DLA and well as USAID/OFDA, meet quarterly to discuss things like logistic capabilities, challenges, gaps, and opportunities within the logistics profession across the whole of government”.

Another instance in support of DLA and USAID/OFDA residing at the coordination level, is that USAID/OFDA uses their MLTs to coordinate with the DoD and DLA in what they call an interagency forum. This is another quarterly dialogue that occurs, that provides an open forum to discuss disaster response and what has been done in the past, it also allows leadership to share concerns, issues, and opportunities while sitting at one table. It facilitates the compilation of AARs after disasters have been responded to, and documents better ways to move forward so that mistakes are not repeated. Coordination, consensus building, invested time and resources have also taken place in order for both agencies to have a nearly completed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The agreement will be a foothold in the movement from coordination to
collaboration as long as it is adhered to by both agencies. Last but not least, there is yet another initiative headed by USAID/OFDA to construct a data base that has compiled and inventoried all of the commercial authorities, directives, executive memos, presidential memos, and any policies that relate to conducting international humanitarian response efforts. Although this process is still underway, USAID/OFDA mentioned that DLA will be called upon to assist in providing many of their directives and policies to contribute to the database. Completing such a complex endeavor as this will definitely call for coordination and time between both agencies, but upon its launch, this data base can give all humanitarian organizations the means to become familiar with one another’s legal boundaries, operational constructs, and offer some justification to their execution methods.

IQ2: What are the current initiatives for USAID/OFDA and DLA to pursue progress from cooperation to coordination to collaboration?

Incorporating the answer for IQ1, where during HA/DR operations, USAID/OFDA and DLA seem to jump straight into the coordination level of interaction, that is not to say that they never reside at the cooperation level. Within the first described Collaboration model, agencies can move back and forth as in reality, relationships can fluctuate. Even though the count of instances at that level only amounted to four, (and three on the Co-occurrence Table), there are lull times where USAID/OFDA and DLA don’t work together at all. Recall that the frequency where DLA or DoD are called upon by USAID to assist in HA/DR operations is not very often. This is because a unique capability offered by DLA or DoD may not be in demand by USAID/OFDA at these times. With this understanding embraced by both agencies, it’s
reasonable to understand why they may only interact at a cooperation level especially when there are no urgent HA/DR missions occurring.

Even though initiative to pursue progress from cooperation to coordination to collaboration may be a lower priority at these slow times, when HA/DR operations strike, many members from both agencies are quickly motivated to initiate progress towards collaboration in order to achieve mission objectives more efficiently. Several initiatives exist for continual progress on the Collaboration model regardless of the operations tempo, due to these inevitable crises.

One of the main initiatives is to complete the MOA between DLA and USAID/OFDA. This MOA has been a progressive effort that began as a result of the Syria/Iraq Humanitarian Relief effort. It is currently still in a draft status, but once approved, it will serve as a mechanism that captures the lessons learned and instills guidance that will ideally keep both agencies from repeating historical mistakes. It will also help educate newcomers into the agencies on the motives behind certain policies and business practices. As with any organization, when certain leadership personnel decide to leave the agency or that particular department, whether it’s due to retirement, different positions, or other job opportunities, they take all their experience with them, and sometimes a gap in knowledge exists for periods of time before it is regained.

Therefore, the MOA not only helps to remind both agencies of good business practices, but it helps DLA keep the mindset of USAID being the customer and DLA the supporting agency. It will also outline new training initiatives, providing for more opportunities to communicate and build trust with their counterparts. It is important to realize that the MOA is not the ‘one-off’ solution to achieving a completely synchronized relationship between DLA and OFDA. But once it is approved and signed, and both agencies adhere to it, and allow it to guide
their interactions, it can shape the evolution of their inner workings and outward performance for the better. The MOA is only the beginning, and a necessary step towards achieving each agency’s goals.

Another initiative shared between DLA and USAID/OFDA is the motivation to achieve a more mature, performance-based logistics relationship where trust and transparency are valued. A justified question is ‘what does a performance-based logistic relationship look like, from a practical standpoint?’ One viewpoint that DLA shared mentioned the various benefits of being involved at the onset of disaster coordination meetings. When disasters strike, and USAID first begins coordinating with its NGO partners, UN organizations, or DoS agencies, giving DLA a seat at the table can help decision makers realize all benefits they can leverage to achieve their collective aims. Even if DLA’s capacities are not ultimately utilized, being involved in the planning discussions can keep them aware and allow them to be proactive should assistance from them be requested. Being frontloaded with information and potential requirements positions DLA in a much more preemptive stance versus waiting until the exact requirements are completely fleshed out and DLA’s timeline to respond is almost unfeasibly shortened. The latter actions do both agencies a disservice.

Another example shared by DLA illuminated facts about their operations that most federal agencies don’t realize are at their disposal via DLA’s logistic enterprise. One element regarding the materials stockpiled at their warehouses is that over 75 percent of DLA’s stock numbers are commercial, off-the-shelf items. They are not ‘MILSPEC’ items with U.S. military markings, brandings, or colors, but they have what one could find on the local U.S. economy. Despite their wide range of materials stored, DLA recognizes that they may not always be the most cost-effective choice for USAID/OFDA and their subsequent customers. Part of what
USAID aims to achieve is to help support developing countries’ economies, and from their strategic viewpoint, acquiring material from one developing country to assist another in need after a disaster, would likely take precedence over giving that business opportunity to a U.S. organization. Of course, this is very situationally dependent, but to have USAID/OFDA consider all angles of assistance is one of the practical applications of a collaborative relationship.

Other initiatives that would assist in the stride from coordination to collaboration are the training efforts and conference meetings that each agency holds for the other or attends in conjunction with other humanitarian agencies. Courses that the Operations Division of USAID/OFDA instructs, namely the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) is a great tool that USAID/OFDA uses to educate other agencies on their mission, OFDA’s roles in HA/DR responses, and how the Mission Tasking Matrix, or MITAM, process works. Conversely, DLA hosts several training courses, one of which is called the Senior Leadership Course, which helps to develop leaders within the agency as well as with DLA’s partners.

There is also a United Nations Civilian-Military Coordination conference that is held annually in Geneva where multiple humanitarian organizations such as the WFP, USAID/OFDA, DoS PRM, NGOs, and the DoD, among others, come together to discuss issues facing international humanitarian communities, to learn how to better work with each other, and to codify standards. As I came across data segments that mentioned these training efforts and conferences, they served as prime examples where the co-occurrence of codes, Generating Value and Building Trust, applies. Through these activities, USAID/OFDA and DLA learn how the other is governed, why certain mechanisms are institutionalized, and what the other’s core competencies are. This generates value that each agency sees in the other, as well as provides the environment and opportunities to build trust and credibility with one another. Due to these
secondary effects, the paired use of these codes assists in identifying the training efforts and joint conferences as current initiatives that each agency should continue to pursue. The use of this code-pair amounted to 18 applications which demonstrates the prevalence with which these initiatives are occupying the mentalities of each agency’s members. Ultimately, sustained pursuit of cross-training and joint conferences would provide USAID/OFDA and DLA the knowledge on how best to leverage each other’s strengths and utilize their differences to the other’s advantage.

**IQ3: What are the barriers to collaboration between the two agencies?**

As each agency is well aware, there are numerable restrictions that prevent the smooth and direct support of DLA to USAID/OFDA as well as the consideration USAID/OFDA can give to DLA as a provider. Most of these barriers are in the form of legislation, statutes, directives, executive orders, and regulations, which are often connected to different types of funding authorities. Even with the acknowledgment that most laws and directives are enacted to give agencies the authority needed to perform their missions, or provide them protection from litigations, some of the primary governance is seen as an inhibitor to effective logistic or contractual support. Not only do legislative barriers exist, but the bureaucratic processes that accompany them can be extraordinarily labor-intensive as well.

One of the main directives that gives DLA the authority to contribute to humanitarian operations at the request of the U.S. Government, is DoD Directive 5100.46 which is part of DoD policy in accordance with Title 10 U.S. Code (USC) and Executive Order 12966. The directive states that the DoD and DoD components shall respond to foreign disasters in support
of USAID if the appropriate departmental or agency’s Executive Secretariat provides an official, written request to the DoD Executive Secretary, and if providing requested assistance does not negatively impact ongoing military operations or security cooperation objectives. While this directive stemming from Title 10 USC, grants DLA a means to contribute to FDR operations, there is another section within Title 10 USC that can sometimes be a large barrier for DLA in providing expedient humanitarian assistance. The Berry Amendment was originally passed by Congress in 1941 to promote the purchase of U.S. goods. The amendment was made permanent in Public Law 103-139 and was later codified in Title 10 USC under section 2533a (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2014).

This law restricts any DoD funding from being used to buy food, clothing, tents, tarpaulins, covers, cotton, woven silk or silk blend material, synthetic fabric, canvas products, wool fibers or yarns, textile fibers, or any article of individual equipment or hand tools, from any non-domestic source. Restrictions imposed by the Berry Amendment are far reaching, however, there is an exception that has been built into it; there is a waiver process that can attempt to be pursued in what is called a Domestic Non-Availability Determination, or DNAD. This waiver may be granted if it is determined that the items requested cannot be grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced in sufficient quantity, quality and timeliness, at U.S. market prices. The laborious efforts which come into this waiver process begin with the determination aspect. In order for the item(s) to be determined as not available, the procuring agency must conduct market research and analysis of potential alternative sources. The list of specifications that the item(s) must meet has to be provided and explained, in writing, and why an alternative material, or item would not be accepted by the requiring agency. As part of the procurement agency’s market research, they must publicly advertise a ‘sources sought notification’ and allow bidding contracts to be
submitted by certain agencies if they claim to be capable of meeting all specified requirements within the provided timelines.

The results of market research and analysis must be included in the package for DNAD approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics serves as the approval authority for DoD agencies, but it will only reach that level after going through DLA’s internal approval processes. Needless to say, acquiring the DNAD waiver to the Berry Amendment can take extensive amounts of time and with urgent situations such as HA/DR support, time is a commodity that should not be wasted. It is another reason that DLA shared their desire for receiving the requirements early, even if they are not fully known or have yet to be validated. In situations where DLA knows they are going to be receiving requirements from USAID/OFDA, they don’t want to wait to begin material research and vendor coordination until the Executive Secretary Memorandum is approved, as research and coordination with vendors are activities that can be done ahead of time without actually expending funds. This way, once the defined requirements are validated and passed to DLA, DLA may already be positioned to just execute with purchasing and delivery.

As far as legislation concerning USAID, the establishment of the agency began with the passing of the Foreign Assistance Act, enacted on September 4th, 1961. The Act reorganized the structure of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs, separated military from non-military aid, and created a new agency, USAID, to administer those non-military, economic assistance programs. Since its establishment however, USAID has implemented many other legislative principles. Two examples are the Oslo Guidelines drafted in 1994, as well as the Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets Guidelines, or MCDA Guidelines, written in 2003. These guidelines explain that in certain complex situations, any foreign military assistance, whether or
not provided by parties to an on-going military operation, could be perceived as being associated with military operations. And in order to preserve the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of humanitarian action, all realistic civilian alternatives must be explored first, and the principle of complementarity upheld before using foreign militaries to support humanitarian operations (OHCA-CMCS, 2011).

They go on to mention that priority should always be given to the use of civilian assets in responding to humanitarian needs, and they seek to balance these principles by reverting to the use of foreign MCDA as a ‘last resort’. They aim to limit the use of military assistance to a clear supporting and temporary role, with a focus on infrastructure support and indirect support, rather than direct, assistance to those in need (OHCA-CMCS, 2011). Throughout the data collection phase of this study, there was a perceived understanding of these principles, as many DLA personnel realized the potentially dangerous second and third order effects that could arise from defense personnel being seen directly assisting those in the disaster-stricken areas.

Understanding the political sensitivities that can be unique to every country is paramount and even though a majority of DLA employees embrace this knowledge, educating all of the DoD is still an ongoing process. A process that most times has to be taught and re-taught when USAID/OFDA is mandated to go through one of the CCMDs for humanitarian assistance. Of course, this mandate only applies when OHDACA funds are used, and since they are congressionally appropriated, they are highly scrutinized, and it makes the use of them much more bureaucratically complex. Evidence in support of the difficulty that the multitude of legislation and funding authorities produce for each agency is found throughout the data and was coded accordingly. Referring back to Table - 4 Code Co-occurrence, the second highest application of pair-codes was Legislative Barriers – Funding Limitations, with 12 counts
throughout the data. Although a notional perspective, one could conclude that a reason as to why each agency operates within immeasurably different cultures, is partially due to the legislative and funding limitations that have governed each agency from the beginning of their establishments.

This presents the one of the main barriers to collaboration, which primarily stems from deeply rooted cultural differences. The way in which both agencies approach HA/DR operations and basic problem-solving techniques are fundamentally different. USAID’s experience in working with the DoD has shaped their approach and mentality of DLA. As an example, USAID/OFDA believes that the way the military conducts contingency planning, is once a mission from OFDA has come to them, they will examine all the gathered information and conceive of what all the worst-case scenarios could be. The military will formulate multiple Courses of Operations (COAs) and commanders or leading personnel will desire to bring all sorts of capabilities that could possibly be needed to the AOR. USAID/OFDA has frequently encountered commanders who want to push various capabilities, people, resources, materials when the majority of the time, they are not needed. The DoD may have brought special forces/combat troops, but all USAID/OFDA needs is a few personnel to help install a water-purification system, or commanders will want to have their C-130 aircraft perform air drop missions delivering containers of supplies, but people in the area only need a bulldozer to help clear a road. For instance, one USAID/OFDA representative states:

“Commanders love to use all the capabilities they have, so when a Joint Task Force shows up for disaster response and the only thing we need from them is a couple of UH-60s, they go, ‘Well, we’ve got these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, we’ve got these engineer
teams, we’ve got these K-9 units, you name it, we’ve got it’ Then we say, ‘You know, all that stuff really is not needed, let’s please not use it’. And that becomes difficult to get across sometimes. So we work with commanders to try and help them see that there other, better ways to do things.’

USAID has come to understand that military commanders yearn to use every capability at their disposal and the Military Liaison Teams in OFDA spend a lot of time ‘turning off’ ideas that are simply overkill. They still see the DoD as a large entity wanting to come into the affected area, establish command and control, leave a large footprint, and have this overwhelming presence that the military believes to be suitable. Many times, this way of thinking about the DoD as a whole, has filtered over into having that same mentality about DLA.

However, much of DLA’s leadership, especially those in the WOG division, are more in-line with the methods and approaches USAID/OFDA uses to get their missions accomplished. They are aware of the humanitarian principles that declare military assets should always be limited in time and scope during HA/DR operations, and that any plan for rendering support needs to be accompanied by an intentional transition to civilian authorities as soon as appropriately feasible. DLA is committed to setting up a more finely-tuned support mechanism for USAID/OFDA to utilize when they see fit to do so.

Abiding by particular authorities and being restricted by certain legislative barriers for such a long period of time, has most assuredly affected the way each agency handles situations. Their respective outlooks on humanitarian response efforts are incredibly diverse, and this diversity can often times be viewed as a large barrier to collaboration. The laws that govern each
agency feed into their cultural differences and could claim a large justification as to why the cultural differences are so deep.

While some of these regulations are binding and are out of each agencies’ administrative control, there are almost always potential loop holes that, when justified, could help facilitate more efficient support of HA/DR operations. Furthermore, as with any organization, educating your customers as well as internal personnel, on how and why certain operating structures are incorporated and practiced is a constant endeavor, if the organization is to be successful.

**IQ4: What future initiatives exist for each agency as motivation to overcome those collaborative barriers?**

Most would argue that the main initiative for overcoming barriers to collaboration should simply be to help those in need after a disaster or complex emergency strikes. With this initiative indeed being at the foundation of collaboration, there are many practical applications that can help in overcoming barriers to that end. The first initiative that each agency should consider is conducting parallel strategic planning. Strategic planning performed jointly between the two agencies is the key to effective USAID-DLA collaboration. This type of joint planning would also foster a mutual understanding of USAID’s development objectives and DoD’s/DLA’s military objectives, especially where they align and where they diverge (USAID, 2015). The DoD has certain lines of effort they are seeking to fulfill alongside various allied countries throughout the globe and these lines of effort are normally encompassed in each countries’ Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The TCPs are documents that each U.S. Embassy’s
Office of Security Cooperation monitors and works toward accomplishing with the help of other DoS, DoD, and local national authorities.

A similar document, in support of the DoS’s Integrated Country Strategy, is USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). USAID translates its policies and priorities into plans through this process and works towards fulfilling the CDCS’s objectives. As stated in USAID’s policy for working with the DoD, it’s important that the DoD work with USAID/OFDA, as well as other divisions within USAID, to consult with and invite their inputs when reviewing these strategic documents. Their policy also articulates that:

“USAID should be welcomed to provide inputs into DoD campaign planning efforts through their Senior and Deputy Development Advisors and Humanitarian Assistance Advisors located at the CCMDs. Furthermore, USAID will reciprocate by inviting DoD consultation on CDCS development in the formulation of regional plans and strategies at appropriate levels” (USAID, 2015).

Recognizing that a collaborative relationship needs continual maintenance, a periodic review of these documents should be expected and performed by both agencies, along with all others in the collective review process. Having this USAID–DoD Cooperation policy in place is evidence that a written partnership exists, as the groundwork has been laid for the collaboration to be given substance. But merely having a written policy, that is not put into practice does not allow the relational ties between USAID and DoD to develop trust nor does it allow either agency to reap the benefits of more accurate strategic planning. This concept applies to planning
efforts conducted between USAID/OFDA and DLA in general since there are multiple policies, initiatives, and contingency plans that could benefit from cross-talk amongst the two agencies.

Another initiative towards further collaboration was shared from the USAID/OFDA perspective, and that is to further the education and training efforts between USAID and DLA. Recall that one of the current initiatives in response to Investigative Question 2, is the current training and education between the agencies. This encompasses the ongoing courses such as JHOC and Senior Leader Courses. But there is another course USAID/OFDA would like to be able to offer its internal personnel in the future regarding aviation support. This course would help those team members in USAID that may potentially be leading DARTs, or formulating the RMTs at their headquarters in Washington D.C., and many others who assist in logistics coordination, by providing them the knowledge of the capabilities different types of DoD aircraft could offer. Many times, when the DoD is called upon to assist in HA/DR, it’s because the unique capacity they bring to the support effort is their speed and ability to move massive amounts of cargo via airlift. Additionally, lessons on rotary wing support can also be extremely useful and generate more value in the prospect of DoD capabilities being leveraged. Thus, a tutorial on the range of aircraft, the unique abilities each type has, and the different configurations of each aircraft, can greatly assist USAID by having them know what to ask for, based on what they know will best meet the needs of each situation. A course such as ‘DoD Airlift 101’ can help USAID become a better customer of DoD and DLA, which will greatly assist in overcoming collaborative barriers to their relationship.

An additional lesson within such a course may also include the enormous benefit of DoD’s analytic capabilities such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle imagery and geospatial mapping proficiencies. This is yet another pivotal benefit that USAID can take advantage of, when and if
it is needed. Since one of USAID’s goals is to develop a shared understanding of the common operating environment and collectively conduct mission analysis, requesting this type of DoD support can help USAID achieve that goal. Moreover, it is a goal that they have in common with DLA when DLA is involved in support efforts. Historical data and aerial imagery could help USAID conduct their assessments of countries/regions that they have restricted access to, help identify where intermediate distribution centers should be located, pinpoint border crossings or checkpoints, as well as assist in identifying any gaps in the overall operation.

IQ5: How can DLA work with USAID/OFDA in order to formulate broad-based requirements to ensure the correct supplies are prepared and ready for transport before disasters occur?

A first step in the right direction of formulating broad based requirements is to know what the other agency currently has in quantity, functionality, and location. During the data collection phase, USAID/OFDA shared a forward-thinking perspective of working towards a relationship where DLA and OFDA can share overall readiness levels, or capability postures, or general readiness metrics that help one another understand the status of each other’s capacity to respond at any given time. What would be needed first however, are the standards that the agencies measure their readiness criteria against. Comprehending the basis of which capacities each agency is evaluated on would allow both DLA and USAID/OFDA to speak a common language and to conduct better planning efforts, ultimately leading to higher preparedness levels.

An example would be to indicate where current vendor contracts are in the approval process and/or which ones are already established; these criteria may feed into an acquisition-
type of readiness level. Another point was made about initially establishing a measure of readiness from the USAID/OFDA side, “Once you have criteria for measuring readiness, it has to be evaluated on a regular basis, but it could be anything; your level of readiness is your knowledge, and it is your accommodation of changes to be able and ready to execute”. The challenges that come with this sharing of information is again, the explanation of what each readiness metric means, as well as staying committed to evaluating and sharing the results regularly.

This initiative can be hard to sustain by both agencies, but if each agency was determined to pursue it, even on a biannual basis, it can lead to substantial benefits and cost savings. Current examples of USAID/OFDA’s readiness information are warehouse stockpile data, including weight, cubes, etc., established vendor contracts, and the number of personnel on-call to fulfill roles in operation centers should the need arise. Data segments that discussed these readiness levels and the potential information that could comprise them were segregated through the creation of memorandums within the Dedoose software. The memos allowed me to document my line of thinking on significant statements such as sharing readiness criteria, and how the agencies could benefit from them.

Enabling both agencies to check one another’s readiness levels to see if certain elements would present any delays or indicate any temporarily diminished operations is central to efficient resource utilization. An instance where sharing this type of information proved to be beneficial occurred at Dover AFB, when their readiness posture was temporarily diminished due to their primary runway being resurfaced. This impacted Fairfax County’s Search and Rescue’s ability to deploy an urban search and rescue team for the east coast that was needed and working with USAID/OFDA at the time. Gratefully, there was no negative impact, but it simply took a phone
call from the base to USAID to notify them about Dover’s diminished operating level. This
concept can be applied for any number of instances, especially unforeseen ones that may require
a quicker response to navigate it successfully.

Circumstances such as construction operations that limit the number of employees that
can work, or appointing a whole new team of liaison officers within USAID/OFDA, or a newly
discovered problem/defect with a container that was just sourced and delivered, are all examples
of information that DLA and USAID/OFDA should be made aware of as they pertain to each
other’s missions. Various situations could be communicated via readiness level sharing that can help each agency know which resources are located where, and how to better prepare for any major HA/DR operations.

Another key point to establishing broad-based requirements between both agencies kept emerging throughout the data collected from DLA. It resurfaced frequently enough that it necessitated its own in-vivo code in order to accurately capture the views and appeals of numerous DLA members. This was the concept of having enough trust built between the agencies where each was willing to share the details of various playbooks with their appropriate interagency counterparts. The phrase ‘playbooks’ refers to pre-canned, contingency requirements that USAID/OFDA may have regarding potential crises, or long-standing humanitarian efforts. Similar to this concept, the DoD and DLA have Operational Plans, which although may not encompass the totality of efforts, resources, and capabilities, they still provide an overall breakdown of the phases of response and duties of units involved. They mandate keeping those particular base functions operating at healthy levels.

DLA strongly seeks to be positioned in a proactive posture by learning the playbooks of USAID/OFDA, so that when future requirements do come to their agency, they waste no time in
executing their fulfillment. The pre-scripted mission assignments for each play book would allow pre-coordination with vendors, possibly even purchasing materials, and simply stocking them at the best locations until they are needed from DLA or their vendors.

A practical example applies to the situation of the Mosul Dam in Baghdad, Iraq. If the worst-case scenario were to happen and the dam fails, approximately 4 million Iraqi citizens and 12,000 to 15,000 U.S. citizens would be in harm’s way due to the flooding. The DoS has already worked with USTRANSCOM to formulate an evacuation plan for U.S. citizens, embassy employees, families, etc., but DLA is unsure of USAID’s response to assist Iraqi citizens. If items such as plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, food, and water-purification systems, are the items that USAID/OFDA would need, they could put a list together in the form of a Bill of Material, or BOM, and DLA could begin work on at least identifying vendors that could support the specific requirements. If a plan already exists that indicates USAID/OFDA would source everything from alternate agencies besides DLA, then knowing that information would be beneficial as well.

Both DLA and USAID/OFDA should pursue a collaborative relationship where trust and transparency are valued. If they get to this level, then perhaps USAID/OFDA may be more apt to share their play books or equivalent efforts, and as long as DLA or DoD contributes constructively and advances OFDA’s capabilities in the way they want them advanced, this collective interaction would only generate more value in furthering their relationship.

As new, written agreements are established, proactive mindsets adopted, and more interaction between the agencies occurs, new relational ties will be created. New motives to further DLA’s and USAID/OFDA’s mission objectives will encourage a new willingness to work together. This motivation must be harnessed to ensure every effort is made to prevent the
dwindling of collaborative efforts to only mere words, or good intentions; true collaboration comes with the long-term investment of resources, people, and time.

In summation of all the responses provided for Investigative Questions one through five, I would like to offer a collective response addressing the overall Research Question:

**RQ: How can DLA enhance its overall interagency coordination with USAID so that it improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations?**

DLA can engage in multifaceted activities such as continued pursuit of training efforts, exercises, and quarterly meetings to share the knowledge of their missions and capabilities. Furthermore, DLA should help share the realities (within the agency as well as with DoD) of being politically and culturally sensitive to the people in need of support along with their economic and social environment. Another step towards improving support is doing their part in adhering to written policy so that ‘operational pain’ is not forgotten and repeated. This is understandably a two-part effort as the other half of this responsibility should be undertaken by USAID/OFDA, but regardless, it serves as a step toward strengthening credibility and accountability with DLA’s strategic partners. Lastly, DLA should attempt to create environments where constructive inputs are exchanged, transparency is valued, and habitual relationships are institutionalized.

**New Collaboration Model**

Subsequently, this research provides the audience with an overall picture of where DLA and USAID/OFDA reside in their inter-organizational relationship that can be viewed under a
newly-constructed lens. Regarding the original Collaboration Model discussed in Chapter Two and portrayed in the Figure 1 – Collaboration Model, by Saab et al., 2009, this study’s results did not conform exactly to this framework, as there are several modifications as well as additions resulting from this case study that contribute to a new models’ sequence:

![New Collaboration Model Diagram](image)

**Figure 2 – New Collaboration Model**

First, one can see that Constructive Interaction is the initial triggering event that must occur in order to give way to building trust with another organization. Constructive interaction is represented well by the current initiatives between DLA and USAID/OFDA, any interaction that is positive, educational, and constructive in nature contribute to the next step of Building Trust. Once trust is established, each agency would begin to see value in maintaining the relationships and would be supportive of continuing further interaction with one another. Generation of these attitudes and establishing these preceding linkages would then give way to Collaborative Behaviors, where each agency is operating in that performance-based logistics mentality, synchronized efforts are in motion, and the habitual dependencies are being fulfilled and strengthened.
Once these collaborative behaviors are institutionalized, and it’s easier to reach this level as an operative norm, successful HA/DR efforts are achieved, and mission objectives attained, ultimately benefitting those in need of support. This completes the main steps in the New Collaboration Model. However, note the dashed lines from each step going back to the triggering event of Constructive Interaction, these dashed lines demonstrate the need to oftentimes begin with additional interaction in order to progress to the next step in the sequence. For example, before agencies can move from Generating Value to Collaborative Behaviors, they may have to return to additional constructive interaction, which will subsequently build more trust. The same movements can be made between steps represented by the shorter dashed arrows between each step. It is not always a direct pathway to successful HA/DR operations, as many back and forth movements will most likely be performed throughout the partnership’s development, but this serves a positive reinforcement of all previous steps.

After analysis of all data and the coding results, the findings reveal that DLA and USAID/OFDA are currently flowing through the sequence of Constructive Interaction – Build Trust – Generate Value, and back and forth through the cycle as occasions rise. This is not to say that the agencies have never reached the step of Collaborative Behaviors, but as far as normal operations, they most often reside in a cycle of the first three steps. Progress will be made to Collaborative Behaviors as long as each agency expresses their dedication to invest time and resources into productive activities that enhance each agency’s skill sets and further their common goals.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions of Research

Collaborative action in humanitarian response operations is a key challenge that many organizations are facing both in the international domain and stateside domain. The presence of multiple decision makers and multiple objectives often times add to the complexity of HA/DR operations regarding logistics, finances, and capabilities. However, the research shows the motivation that each agency has to overcome the multitude of collaborative barriers is enduring and stronger than the challenges facing each organization.

At the onset of this case study research, the intent of offering a collective strategy to help both agencies resolve collective problems began to seem almost impossible due to the deeply-rooted disparities and oppositions between DLA and USAID/OFDA. But after filtering through each agency’s complaints, differences, and weaknesses, the ability to focus on the motives and similar objectives assisted in winnowing down to the essence of collaborative alliances and how they function. Each agency has the potential to enhance their preparedness for HA/DR operations when they collectively focus on long-term development of themselves and one another.

Recommendations for Action

DLA should consider three lines of effort in order to improve coordination with USAID in the conduct of HA/DR: the first being a continued pursuit of the current and future initiatives they have already introduced with USAID/OFDA, (initiatives such as the MOA, quarterly
conferences/meetings, attendance at USAID/OFDA training courses, etc.) The second is to ensure that all DLA personnel cultivate an environment where trust and transparency are valued when working with USAID/OFDA. It’s imperative to maintain an open mind when building any partnership, but even more so when collective gains can be achieved. And third is to assist USAID/OFDA in any of their outreaches for further coordination whether it be sharing of readiness level data or the legislation and directives to contribute to their data base compilation. Learning more about their mission and organizational structure must be performed and then shared among other DLA personnel. Reciprocally, USAID/OFDA should involve DLA in the early stages of planning, even if they are only at the discussion/brainstorming levels, and at the very least entertain the offers of DLA assistance in identifying support gaps.

As USAID/OFDA learns more about how DLA can contribute to HA/DR and all the capabilities they bring, it is only a matter of time before a disaster strikes, and DLA will have to prove their aptitude, and put many of these initiatives into action.

### Managerial Implications

Current and future leaders in the humanitarian community need to be aware of the concept of the *Fog of Relief*, as explained by an experienced leader in USAID/OFDA during the data collection phase of this study. Similar to the concept of the *Fog of War*, the *Fog of Relief* refers to that convoluted cross-section of various organizations participating in humanitarian response efforts each having their own missions, capabilities, and modes of operating, etc. It was explained as the gray intersection in the middle of multiple colored circles overlapping each other, each representing a different organization. Managers in the humanitarian sector would do well to not only comprehend their own organization’s roles and responsibilities, but also those of
the participant organizations that will be operating in the same environment. Managers should also recognize the collective gains that can come from collaborative alliances formed with (similar and different) organizations. Once these alliances are created and sustained, each agency can leverage the other’s core competencies and use their interdependencies to provide the exact support needed by disaster victims. This simultaneously allows divestment of extra responsibilities neither organization are suited to perform. Finally, managers should take the time to familiarize themselves with various interagency collaborative studies, corporate performance theories, analyses on strategic management among multiple agencies, and studies that inform the leader on general inter-organizational dynamics.

**Research Implications**

As discussed in the previous chapter, the primary research implication this study offers is the New Collaboration Model portrayed in Figure 2, not only as a more accurate indicator of the specific DLA-USAID/OFDA relationship, but as a theoretical contribution to the topic of interagency collaboration in general. With the dashed lines representing the back and forth motion that an organizational relationship can undergo, this research implication represents the realistic fluctuation experienced by many corporations and federal agencies today. Furthermore, the addition of the Constructive Interaction Triggering Event is essential to initiate the Building of Trust between agencies, and must occur sometimes repeatedly, before the next step can be attained. As represented by the new model, inter-organizational collaboration is not always achieved in a sequentially direct manner, thus, the dashed feedback loops represent the potential for repetition beginning at one previous level or the very first Interaction level. This only serves as reinforcement of each indicated step. Ultimately, this new model expresses a more in-depth
procedure that emphasizes the indirect process that two or more agencies can undergo towards accomplishing a successful HA/DR operation.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

Some may consider the fact that this case study only analyzed one pair of organizations as a limiting factor to generalization. This was a single case study; however, justification resides in the circumstance that each agency is in the midst of these collaborative obstacles in real time. As a current situation facing both agencies, the specific research and recommendations pertain to each agency accordingly and can be acted upon or shared with others presently. Furthermore, the issues surrounding inter-organizational collaboration also currently affect multiple U.S. federal agencies, who can glean some benefit or practical knowledge about DLA and USAID/OFDA, both of which may be among their partners in the humanitarian community.

Another limitation affecting this research is the fact that only three interviews were able to be conducted with USAID/OFDA individuals, while ten interviews were performed with DLA personnel. This surely impacted the outcomes with being one-sided, and even contributed to several biases about USAID/OFDA’s willingness to share information or collaborate with DLA. However, as previously mentioned, despite the fact that only three interviews were conducted with USAID/OFDA, a surprising level of saturation was achieved and the substance of their primary messages negated many of the initial biases obtained from beginning of the data collection phase. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that additional interviews with USAID/OFDA personnel would have increased the validity of the findings.

Areas for future research include conducting a similar study but looking at several organizations allowing for cross-case analyses. If time and resources permit, a comparison
between multiple agencies will significantly add to the validity and generalization of the results, having a broader impact on inter-organizational coordination as a whole. Future studies can also take the approach of testing the New Collaboration Model, comparing it to the theory and original model created by Saab et al. 2009, as well as making any relevant modifications thereby generating an updated version of the Collaboration Model. The areas of future studies in such a broad concept of collaboration between humanitarian organizations can be investigated endlessly. However, as Gray and Wood (1991), express in their work on collaborative alliances, future researchers should consider that there is no single theoretical or practical perspective that provides an all-encompassing foundation for understanding the inner workings of collaborative networks. Rather, grasping some semblance of comprehension comes from the collective study of multiple collaboration strategies, theories, and observations of inter-organizational relationships.

Summary

USAID/OFDA and DLA each desire to see the same objectives achieved, the main one being alleviating the suffering of disaster victims in the most effective and efficient manner possible. But culturally, they understand how to accomplish that objective differently. They each have limitations, expectations, and challenges that they manage differently and often times, separately. DLA and USAID/OFDA understand that each agency contributes very different elements in order to achieve common goals, and each expresses a deep sense of ownership in their missions. But what was most interesting is that most of the people comprising the workforce of each agency are the same in certain aspects of character. Both DLA and USAID/OFDA are motivated to do what they do out of a sacrificial offering of skills for the
betterment of others. Both workforces are driven by the same things whether they be contributing to the welfare and protection of the warfighter or providing the means for a community to thrive economically and socially, each agency sincerely believes in their work and each have a profound influence on their customers.
Appendix A: DLA and USAID Case Study Protocol

Overview of the Case Study

1. DLA either purchases or sources everything the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to operate, and due to their various depot locations, their capacity to store massive amounts of material, and access to resources that are otherwise scarce, DLA is uniquely qualified to provide humanitarian aid for disaster response efforts when called upon. The division of DLA responsible for coordinating Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts is known as the Whole of Government division, and they are a pivotal member of the humanitarian logistic enterprise (DLA, 2014).

DLA has created various relationships with their customers and strategic partners, many of which are with various federal agencies within the U.S. Department of State. In the realm of HA/DR operations, the U.S. Agency for the International Development (USAID) is the lead agency responsible for managing foreign relief efforts for the U.S. Government. The specific division within USAID dedicated to international disaster response is called the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, or OFDA. Both the Whole of Government division within DLA and OFDA within USAID, have previously worked together to accomplish HA/DR coordination operations. With a look toward the future, one should consider that the relationship between DLA and USAID be improved upon due to the occasional, yet inevitable disasters where DLA may be called upon to render supplementary aid.
Problem Statement

Saving lives and alleviating suffering brought on by all types of natural disasters and complex situations is a large and important responsibility for any single organization to undertake. Therefore, the relationships formed with partners who are willing to help shoulder that responsibility are pivotal to uphold and to continuously develop. Leaders at the headquarters level of both agencies could have a tremendous impact on cultivating better interagency-coordination between DLA and USAID in all aspects. Through examination of each agency’s internal governing mechanisms, HA/DR execution procedures, and potential collaboration barriers, this research seeks to help improve DLA’s collaboration with USAID in the conduct of HA/DR.

Using two collaboration models as the main framework (Saab et al., 2009), the research will be conducted as a single case study with semi-structured interviews and analysis of archival documents as the main data sources.

2. The primary research question to be addressed is:

   RQ: How can DLA enhance its overall interagency coordination with USAID so that it improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations?

Once a common language is established by providing several definitions regarding the overarching collaboration model, a better understanding of how to address subsequent
investigative questions can be acquired. The research question can be addressed by collectively answering the following investigative questions:

IQ1: How can the current relationship between USAID and DLA (in conducting HA/DR operations) be characterized?

IQ2: What are the current initiatives for USAID and DLA to pursue progress from cooperation to coordination to collaboration?

IQ3: What are the barriers to collaboration between the two agencies?

IQ4: What future initiatives exist for each agency as motivation to overcome those collaborative barriers?

IQ5: How can DLA work with USAID in order to formulate broad-based requirements to ensure the correct supplies are prepared and ready for transport before disasters occur?

3. Archival documents and interview transcripts will be analyzed both inductively and deductively. Any common themes that emerge will be evaluated against the pre-determined constructs presented in the two collaboration models (see Saab et al., 2009). The current state of interagency coordination between DLA and USAID is expected to be at the cooperation level, with only transactional communication currently taking place between both agencies.
Key readings are as follows:


Data Collection Procedures

1. Researcher: Capt Jessica M. Thomas (ENS AFIT Master’s Student)

2. DLA POC: Mr. Chris Stephens (Deputy Chief of Whole of Government (WOG) Support Division J3)

3. Data collection plan (See Appendix B for a complete list of archival documents and interview questions)
   - The following types of archival documents and visual materials from DLA will be collected for analysis: Directive Type Memorandums, (DTMs); guidance documents; organizational flow charts; briefing slides; mission statements; training material; and any documentation deemed important by the researcher which is pursuant to the research topic.
   - The following types of archival documents and visual materials from USAID will be collected for analysis: Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) training material; USAID/OFDA Quick Reference Guide; HA/DR execution procedures;
organizational flow charts; and any documentation deemed important by the researcher which is pursuant to the research topic.

- Over-the-phone interviews will be conducted with DLA and USAID personnel. Interviewees per DLA and USAID POCs will include headquarter leadership personnel. Interviewees will provide informed consent (see Appendix C). Interviews will be recorded (only with interviewee’s permission), and transcribed for analysis purposes, and information from interviews will be aggregated and kept confidential.

- Researcher will also document any noteworthy information during interviews.

4. Preparation prior to fieldwork

- Researcher will conduct a self-assessment of skills and abilities to maintain the following efforts:
  - Asking good questions – and interpreting the answers fairly
  - Being a good listener – and not trapped by existing ideologies or preconceptions
  - Staying adaptive – so that newly encountered situations are seen as opportunities, not threats
  - Have a firm grasp of the issues being studied – even when in exploratory mode
  - Avoiding biases – by being sensitive to contrary evidence and conducting research ethically (Yin, 2014).

- Researcher will review the following prior to fieldwork: research proposal; case study protocol; key readings (referenced above); key archival documents; and interview protocols.
• Researcher will establish contact with designated DLA/USAID point of contact to set up initial interviews.

Data Collection Questions (to guide researcher efforts and avoid mission creep; these are not interview questions)

1. Core Considerations
   a. Attempt to see DLA/USAID from the perspective of the interviewee upon learning their responsibilities and expectations they are required to meet/authorities they must report to.
   b. How do these interagency relationships develop and mature over time? Are they indeed progressing from cooperation to coordination to collaboration?
   c. A lot of activity/communication between both agencies transpired in order to get the MOU to the place it is now. How did that process work?
   d. What are the driving forces behind these relationships? What are the barriers to these relationships?

2. Implementation
   a. Have any agreed upon activities/initiatives been incorporated into the regular routines/governance structures of either organization?
   b. How does the MOU truly characterize the relationship?
c. There's a difference between carrying out specific tasks because they are written
down and we are forced to do them, and forecasting (or anticipating) requirements
for a customer before they need help.

3. Interview Quality and Validation
   a. The majority of data collected are interviews. This will provide several
      advantages as the force of the interview is its privileged access to the subject’s
everyday world (Kvale, 2007).
   b. Each interview participant will add their own subjective interpretation of the
      agencies’ strengths, weaknesses, goals, problems, etc, which will contribute to
each agency’s understanding of the other.
   c. Commonalities in facing the same struggles brings a distinct awareness level that
      may or may not have been present in the past and sharing this information may
      allow for a united front in resolving current apprehension.
   d. Controlled use of leading questions can lead to knowledge and the plurality of
      interpretations enriches the meanings of each agencies’ world view (Kvale, 2007).
   e. Generalization becomes possible with the transfer of knowledge gained between
      leadership personnel at USAID and DLA.
Code Definitions

1. **Building Trust**: Activities or behaviors that constitute building trust can begin with the establishment of bilateral or interpersonal relationships, working on projects where consensus must be reached, or operational cooperation across engagements. Trust is the expectation that an actor can be relied on to fulfill obligations, will behave in a particular manner, and will act/negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present (Zaheer et al., 1998).

2. **Generating Value**: The necessary question to ask is, ‘Despite the many organizational, governmental, and cultural challenges each agency faces, do they provide value to their respective members?’. The members of each agency must see the value acquired from working together and that it outweighs any discordancy. Did DLA or USAID provide what no other organization could? Members need to see the other agency as fulfilling an important role that they cannot fill as effectively by themselves.

3. **Cooperation**: Usually manifests as a primarily verbal dialogue and takes place in informal settings. One organization can present a need that the organization could satisfy without a formal contract or agreement (Hord, 1986). Cooperation activities can be considered transactional in nature and generally do not interfere with autonomous programs of the participants, hence there are no risks or loss of independence with this kind of communication (Mattesich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).
4. **Coordination**: Is more formal than cooperation. It can be considered as a step toward further and more enhanced cooperation. It takes place when the organizations find that their individual goals are similar, so they can work together on their, ‘separate, yet compatible missions’ (Czajkowski, 2007). The organizations would be more involved in the planning of activities and there are more risks associated because they commit resources toward a common goal. Most coordination efforts do not alter the individual organization authority, but it involves a form of central power that can add complexity to the decision-making process (Mattesich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001).

5. **Collaboration**: Takes place when organizations share authority and responsibility for planning and implementing an action to solve a problem. Stakeholders engage in an interactive process, using shared norms, rules, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain. (Wood & Gray, 1991). Basically, collaboration is working alongside the other organization on the same task (Hveinden, 1994).

6. **Cultural Differences**: Contrasting views on methods of accomplishing tasks; why one organization will do something one way, and the other will do that same thing a completely different way. They are bound by different legislative and political directives, they work for different government entities, and they each speak a different ‘language’.

7. **Legislative Barriers**: Each agency is bound under different statutory regulations and/or directives. Additionally, different funding authorities are accompanied with their own timelines and rules on expenditure. DoD Directive 5100.46 Foreign Disaster Relief is one
of the main directives DoD and DLA must adhere to, moreover, they are bound by the Berry Amendment of US Code Title 10, section 2533a, which dictates they give procurement preference to domestically manufactured/produced products. USAID/OFDA’s responsibilities and authority are explained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as well as USAID’s Automated Directives System 251 and Foreign Affairs Manual.

8. **Funding Limitations:** This was a ‘sub-code’ under Legislative Barriers due to the fact that often times they each go hand-in-hand. The myriad of funding limitations often times restricts both agencies as to what types of items can be procured and when they can be procured. These financial rules also come with their own set of allocation, expenditure, tracking, and reporting mechanisms that must be followed by each agency.

9. **DLA Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value:** With C3 as an abbreviation for ‘Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration’, this code is used to capture DLA’s attempts to further develop these five concepts with USAID/OFDA. The primary notion this code was meant to track was the number of times DLA was the initiating agency and demonstrated proactive instigation of development of their relationship with USAID/OFDA.

10. **USAID Attempts to Improve C3, Build Trust, and Generate Value:** Conversely, this code was used to grasp the number of instances where USAID/OFDA was the initiating agency in reaching out to DLA to develop the 5 concepts and build on their relationship.
11. DLA Attempts to Acquire USAID’s ‘Playbook’: This code captured data that entailed instances where DLA inquired with USAID/OFDA to become informed on the operational plan for a particular HA/DR effort. These requests were generally for detailed information to assist DLA in accomplishing the desired outcomes of USAID/OFDA but unfortunately, were many times left unanswered or were delayed in reaching DLA.

12. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA): This code was used to categorize segments of data that had anything to do with the MOA currently underway with both agencies. The intent behind using this code to was examine whether either agency relied on the MOA’s approval to be the ‘one-off’ solution to their inter-agency collaboration, or if they were merely working on its finalization and referencing it for future interactions.

13. USAID Managing Funds: This code was developed in order to capture reoccurring instances where DLA, or even internal employees of USAID/OFDA, saw USAID/OFDA as ‘money managers’ and this being their primary function in the majority of HA/DR relief efforts. Many personnel believe USAID/OFDA to be more of a contractor that employs other agencies to conduct the supply chain responsibilities of HA/DR efforts, rather than be responsible for them themselves.

14. USAID Restricting the Amount of Information Shared: This relates back to DLA Attempting to Acquire USAID’s Playbook, in that this code was used to describe any
segment of data that indicated that USAID was withholding certain pieces of desired information from other agencies, not just from DLA. But whether this action was occurring intentionally, or because USAID truly didn’t have the desired details on operational planning efforts, is still to be determined. Either way, it places DLA in a very reactive posture versus proactive.

15. **DLA Giving USAID Credit:** This code was used to capture the examples where DLA exhibited recognition of the fact that they are not always the ‘best’ fit for support in certain HA/DR operations. It was also used to describe data where DLA would comment on USAID/OFDA’s strengths and core competencies of being the country experts and understanding the suitable, cultural accommodations that have to be made under each circumstance.
Appendix B: DLA and USAID Interview Scripts

DLA Interview Script

1) Talk to me about what you do here at DLA. What are your roles?

2) Have you ever worked with USAID in the past?

3) Talk to me about your experiences with USAID…
   
   a. What were some of the successes and challenges you experienced while working with them during HA/DR operations? Can you give examples of both?

   b. What are some of the lessons learned from those experiences?

4) In your opinion, what current initiatives or activities exist to help improve communication with USAID?

5) From your experience, are there any redundancies or overlap in tasks or responsibilities between DLA and USAID?

   a. Can you provide an example relevant to a specific HA/DR operation?

6) In your opinion, what are some of the main barriers to working with USAID?

   a. How have these barriers affected DLA’s performance while working HA/DR tasks?

7) How do you initially react when you discover that your organization will be working a HA/DR operation with USAID?
a. What do you think most influences your attitude toward USAID?

8) In a perfect world, what pieces of information are a “must-have” in order to carry out your taskings to fill orders/requests placed by USAID?

   a. What are the timelines you would like to receive them in?

   b. What could you do (if anything) to improve the information quality, accuracy, or timeliness of the information transfer?

9) What advantages do you think USAID brings to DLA’s ability to carry out HA/DR operations?

10) In your opinion, describe how the relationship between DLA and USAID should look in the future when conducting HA/DR operations…

11) Is there anything else you think I should know to understand the interactions and relationship between DLA and USAID?

12) Do you have any questions for me?

USAID Interview Script

1) Talk to me about what you do here at USAID. What are your roles?

2) Have you ever worked with DLA in the past?

3) Talk to me about your experiences with DLA…
a. What were some of the successes and challenges you experienced while working with them during HA/DR operations? Can you give examples of both?

b. What are some of the lessons learned from those experiences?

4) In your opinion, what current initiatives or activities exist to help improve communication with DLA?

5) From your experience, are there any redundancies or overlap in tasks or responsibilities between DLA and USAID?

   a. Can you provide an example relevant to a specific HA/DR operation?

6) In your opinion, what are some of the main barriers to working with DLA?

   a. How have these barriers affected USAID’s performance while working HA/DR tasks?

7) How do you initially react when told your organization will be working a HA/DR operation with DLA?

   a. What do you think most influences your attitude toward DLA?

8) In a perfect world, what pieces of information are a “must-have” from DLA in order to carry out your taskings to fill orders/requests placed by your customers?

   a. What are the timelines you would like to receive them in?
b. What could you do (if anything) to improve the information quality, accuracy, or timeliness of the information transfer?

9) What advantages do you think DLA brings to USAID’s ability to carry out HA/DR operations?

10) In your opinion, describe how the relationship between USAID and DLA should look in the future when conducting HA/DR operations…

11) Is there anything else you think I should know to understand the interactions and relationship between DLA and USAID?

12) Do you have any questions for me?

**List of Archival Documents**

- Defense Logistics Agency Whole of Government Strategy PowerPoint Presentation
- Role of DoD in Foreign Disaster Relief from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Stabilization and Humanitarian Affairs
- Missions/Functions Listing of DLA’s J3 and Regional Commands
- Syrian Refugee Crisis After Action Report PowerPoint Presentation
- Sphere Project Handbook
- MITAM 18 (SBU)
- Berry Amendment FAQ/General Information Webpage
- Email Correspondence Accompanying MITAM 18 (SBU)
- Memorandum for Executive Secretary Department of Defense from US Department of State (SBU)
- Lessons Learned from Syrian Refugee Crisis
• Email Coordination on Syrian Refugee Crisis AAR Development
• USAID’s OFDA Fiscal Year 2018 Webpage
• Adaptive Logistics Network Guides USARAF Operations Article Webpage
• Humanitarian Civ-Mil Coordination (UN-CM Coord) on United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) Webpage
• Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 14-028 DLA’s Support to Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) Operations
• DLA Public Affairs Article: DLA Division Uses Parachutes, Partnership to Support Humanitarian Aid (April 4, 2017)
• DLA Public Affairs Article: DLA Energy Supports Relief Efforts in Nepal (May 15, 2015)
• USAID/OFDA Guidance for Disaster Planning and Response 2014 Action Cable FY 2014 (JHOC 2014)
• USAID/OFDA Quick Reference Guide (JHOC 2014)
Appendix C: Background Provision & Informed Consent Procedures

TALKING PAPER

ON

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION BETWEEN DLA AND USAID

- The purpose of this talking paper is to introduce a Defense Logistics Agency sponsored research study being conducted by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). The purpose of the study is to uncover ways to improve interagency coordination and decision quality for two agencies: The Defense Logistics Agency, (DLA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development, (USAID). The best practices revealed from this study will help each agency to overcome communication barriers and improve their inter-organizational communication during both normal operations and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts.

- Issue / Research Problem Statement

-- DLA is able to support and render aid to HA/DR missions around the world when called upon by the U.S. Department of State. With various successful support operations executed in the past, DLA has since codified their policies and instructions to help establish common objectives and procedures for other support agencies as well as DLA itself. However, despite a foundation of reliability DLA has established with many of their customers and strategic partners, not all of their inter-organizational relationships are fully developed.
USAID is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of State and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is responsible as the lead agency for foreign HA/DR operations. As each agency plays a large role in the success of various HA/DR efforts, it is pivotal to uphold and improve upon their relationship. They each have an impact on saving lives and alleviating suffering brought on by natural disasters, which is a large responsibility for any one organization to carry out alone.

- Research Objectives

-- Uncover how DLA can enhance their overall interagency coordination with USAID so that it improves support to and execution of HA/DR operations.

-- Determine how to overcome collaboration barriers between both agencies

- Research Methodology

-- Examination of both DLA’s and USAID’s internal governing mechanisms and HA/DR procedures

-- Semi-structured interviews with leadership of both agencies

- Points of Contact
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION BETWEEN DLA AND USAID RESEARCH

You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by researchers from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Department of Operational Sciences. The main objective of the project is to understand the current level of interagency coordination between DLA and USAID, and see if there are any methods by which to improve their collaboration. The results of this study will be included in a report and briefing distributed to DLA, USAID, and the AFIT Department of Operational Sciences. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your knowledge and experience within DLA/USAID regarding HA/DR operations. You should read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not understand before deciding whether or not to participate.

- This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time or for any reason. I expect that the interview will take 30-60 minutes.
- You will not be compensated for this interview.

- The information you tell us will be kept confidential.

- I would like to record this interview so that I can transcribe it and use it for analysis as part of this study. I will not record this interview without your permission. If you grant permission for this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke permission and/or end the interview at any time.

- Data collection for this project will be completed by December of 2017. All interview documents will be securely stored.

I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

(Please initial)

[ ] I give permission for this interview to be recorded and transcribed.

Name of Subject:

Signature of Subject ____________________________  _________ Date ___

Signature of Investigator __________________________ Date ______

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Please contact Col Matthew A. Douglas with any questions or concerns at

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Work Cited


A STUDY OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY AND THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

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Many organizations are finding it advantageous and often necessary to form collaborative alliances with strategic partners in order to solve collective problems and jointly work towards mutually desirable ends. This research examines a single case study of inter-agency coordination between the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and their involvement in humanitarian relief efforts. Pursuit of advancement through two collaboration models provided the framework of the research and contributed to the analysis of data. Resulting outcomes offer incentives for both organizations to develop stronger social networks assisting in a deeper understanding of the others organizational cultures and as well as urges operational collaboration across institutional lines.

SUBJECT TERMS
Department of Defense DoD; Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

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