PROTECTING FILES HOSTED ON VIRTUAL MACHINES
WITH OUT-OF-GUEST ACCESS CONTROL

by

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December 2017

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When an operating system (OS) runs on a virtual machine (VM), a hypervisor, the software that facilitates virtualization of computer hardware, provides a service called introspection, which is used for monitoring the internal state of the VM. However, a VM still shares all of the vulnerabilities of its resident OS and software. At some point in time, it will likely be the victim of a successful exploitation. In this research, we develop a security solution, leveraging introspection and enforcement of a separate shadow access control list (SACL) in the hypervisor to protect critical user files hosted on a VM against a range of zero-day attacks.

The main security features of our solution include 1) zero-footprint in the guest VM by maintaining an out-of-guest SACL and other required security information in the hypervisor; 2) protection of critical user files from unauthorized access even if an attacker has managed to obtain root privileges on the VM; 3) application white listing to thwart malware execution; and 4) kernel protection by denying both kernel reboot and runtime addition of kernel modules. We conclude that our solution can successfully protect user files against unauthorized access. The observed performance overhead, although significant, remains within usable levels and is mainly attributed to the context switch between the hypervisor and the VM.

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<th>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</th>
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PROTECTING FILES HOSTED ON VIRTUAL MACHINES WITH OUT-OF-GUEST ACCESS CONTROL

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Lieutenant, Hellenic Navy
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<tr>
<td>ACL</td>
<td>access control list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>application program interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>central processing unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPT</td>
<td>extended page table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GID</td>
<td>groupID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMFN</td>
<td>guest machine frame number</td>
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<td>GVA</td>
<td>guest virtual address</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAP</td>
<td>high assurance process</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIDS</td>
<td>host intrusion detection system</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDS</td>
<td>intrusion detection system</td>
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<tr>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>input/output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOMMU</td>
<td>input/output memory management unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IoT</td>
<td>Internet of Things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>mandatory access control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>machine frame number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>network interface card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIDS</td>
<td>network intrusion detection system</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Institute of Standards and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>object identifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>operating systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>pluggable authentication module</td>
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<td>PT</td>
<td>page table</td>
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<td>PWD</td>
<td>present working directory</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAACL</td>
<td>shadow access control list</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCADA</td>
<td>supervisory control and data acquisition</td>
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<td>SGX</td>
<td>software guard extensions</td>
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<td>VT</td>
<td>virtualization technology</td>
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I would like to thank my wife, Evi, for the love, patience, support, and motivation she gave me during my studies. I would not have been here and accomplished what I have without her help.

I would also like to thank my advisors, Geoffrey Xie and Charles Prince, who conceived the premise of my thesis, for their support and guidance. Furthermore, I also extend my gratitude to Chris Eagle and Michael Thompson, who were always there to answer my questions.
System virtualization, which has been increasing in popularity over the last few years, makes it possible to run multiple different operating systems (OS) on the same physical machine. Virtual machines (VM) are run independently of each other on the same physical machine, known as a host, without any indication that there is another OS running on the same host. The software that facilitates this resource sharing capability is called a hypervisor.

The emergence of cloud computing has increased the need for many new and different services from global vendors. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [1], "cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction."

Such services require increased resources, a demand that virtualization addressed. Instead of having many separate physical machines running the required various software, which usually results in under-utilization, one machine with better technical specifications and capabilities\(^1\) was used; with virtualization, each vendor could run services on a dedicated VM.

In order to improve network security on these machines, as well as redundancy among different services, service providers started using many different VMs per vendor, instead of having one VM running all the required services. In addition to requiring fewer resources by running one or two services, vendors could be reassured by knowing that if one VM fails, the rest of the services would keep running. Furthermore, having each VM run only a few services significantly reduces the attack surface available for possible vulnerability exploitation.

This increase in the use of virtualization has driven hardware manufacturers like Intel and AMD to introduce special virtualization CPU instructions that demonstrate better, more

\(^1\)Technical specifications and capabilities include memory capacity and multi-core central processing units (CPUs).
reliable, and more secure allocation, sharing, usage, and performance.

1.1 Problem Statement

When an OS runs directly on a physical machine, the OS allocates and uses the machine’s resources to protect itself from network or other types of attacks. When it runs on a virtualization platform, however, the hypervisor stands between the hardware and the running software, and can monitor what is happening inside a VM.

Despite the evolution of CPU virtualization instructions and the continuous development of more efficient and secure hypervisors, the bottom line remains the same: a VM is still a system with all the vulnerabilities of its running OS and software. At some point in time, it will most likely be the victim of a successful exploitation.

Although simple to manage and efficient, the native Linux file permission system lacks fine-grained user/group access to files. Once users belong to a group, nothing prohibits them from accessing all the files accessible to that group. Furthermore, when attackers gain access to a system, they will usually try to escalate their privileges by having access to the root account. After privilege escalation, there is unrestricted access to the entire system and nothing out of reach; the attackers are free to read and modify files and change the system’s configuration to their liking in order to serve their purposes.

Garfinkel et al. [2] introduced a new technique that leverages the hypervisor’s viewing ability. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is the “approach of inspecting a virtual machine from the outside for the purpose of analyzing the software running inside it” [2]. In this context, outside means that the inspecting application resides outside the monitored VM and can access the VM’s state through the hypervisor. Because a system will be eventually subverted, we wanted to leverage the introspection capability of a hypervisor to try to protect critical files for the OS, the user, or both. We wanted to create an out-of-guest access control list (ACL), which we call the shadow access control list (SACL), for managing file access inside a VM. We call this mechanism Protecting Compromised Systems with a virtual-machine protection and checking system using out-of-guest permissions (VMPCS-OGP).

In our research, we developed a prototype for a file-access monitor and control outside a VM. We used a 64-bit Ubuntu OS running on top of a Xen hypervisor. The prototype
leverages the VMI capability of the Xen hypervisor leveraged with the LibVMI application program interface (API) [3], as well as DRAKVUF [4], a system used for dynamic malware analysis. It includes a modified DRAKVUF implementation and prototypes of the ACL kept on the hypervisor and enforced on the guest VM. Our approach is to provide a stricter environment for file access.

In this work, we try to assess how we can leverage the introspection capabilities of the Xen hypervisor to improve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability mechanisms built into the OS. Some of these cases include denying the root user access to parts of the filesystem. We aim to make a more fine-grained access control to fill the gap of the Linux native permission bits by denying file access to certain users that belong to a group with access. Furthermore, we aim to alter the user permissions by keeping a SACL. Moreover, as part of covering the tracks of the malicious activities, we try to enforce append-only permissions instead of writing for specific cases of files, which include primarily log files, as we aim to prevent a malicious action being removed from any logs.

This solution could potentially be used in a variety of platforms like Internet of Things (IoT) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, cellphones, cloud solutions; essentially, everything that runs on a virtualized environment. It could also be used to enhance the filesystem security of end-of-life systems that do not receive any security updates and are more susceptible to exploitation.

1.2 Research Questions
The primary issue we address in this research is whether we could enforce out-of-guest permissions to check access to the files of a system so that the attacker is not able to read or write critical files on the system. Following are the questions addressed by this research:

- What is the best way to implement a monitor for file access on the guest?
- What is the performance overhead?
- Can this mechanism be leveraged to identify a compromised system or a system actively being compromised?
- Is it manageable to monitor all files on a system or only specific ones?
- What is the best way to implement VMPCS-OGP on a guest and still provide usability and protection?
• Can VMPCS-OGP be used to discover how a system was compromised and the attackers’ methods for compromising a system?
• Can we return a valid error to the VM while denying access to a file so that it does not reveal the extra security check imposed by the hypervisor?
• Can we enforce an append-only write policy for files like logs?

### 1.3 Organization

This paper is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the concepts and thesis focus. Chapter 2 covers some background information for the platform used in this research, as well as some of the security solutions already presented that make use of VMI. Chapter 3 analyzes the design and methodology of the implemented mechanism, while Chapter 4 explains the test methodology, test cases, and performance testing results. It also considers the impacts not only on performance overhead but on overall system usability. Chapter 5 presents our conclusions and suggest possibilities for future work.
CHAPTER 2: Background

This chapter presents information about the relevant software and hardware. The first section gives a brief introduction on virtualization and its benefits; it then describes the Xen hypervisor. The next section overviews the LibVMI API and DRAKVUF, the library and main application we leverage in this research, as well as the system call functionality and conventions. Finally, we review some of the existing solutions that leverage introspection.

2.1 Virtualization

As mentioned in Rosenblum and Garfinkel [5], running multiple or different services on a single OS is an implementation method that vendors are abandoning. In recent years, advances in computing have enabled users to run a plethora of different software, which became a challenge to manage efficiently and securely because each service required its own specific OS configuration. Over time, hardware has become inexpensive and service providers now prefer to run one service per physical system to achieve higher security, since each OS can be configured specifically for the one service it is dedicated to running. On the downside, running one service per physical machine results in the under-utilization of hardware and capabilities, as well as increased maintenance costs. However, as observed by Rosenblum and Garfinkel [5], hosting different VMs on a single and powerful system (Figure 2.1) solves many of the problems. VMs result in resources being used efficiently, with each service using only a part of the underlying hardware. VMs also allow easier security implementation, as it is much simpler securing one VM running one service than having to combine all of them into one. Additionally, virtualization achieves redundancy between services since each VM is independent of the rest; any one failure does not affect the other VMs.

The advantages of virtualization do not stop there: easy backup, restore, cloning, and system migration are just a few of them. In case of corruption or misconfiguration, creating snapshots of entire machines and restoration to a previous state has become an extremely easy task. Also, modern hypervisors implement a very solid and sophisticated VM isolation; thus, pivoting from one VM to another has become extremely difficult.
Hypervisor is the software that drives the mechanism of virtualization. It runs directly on the hardware, uses a separate OS installation, and resides outside all the guest VMs. At the same time, since the hypervisor manages the allocation and usage of all physical resources, it can see the internal state of each VM.

### 2.1.1 Hypervisor Types

Different vendors provide their solutions for virtualization. Generally, hypervisors are separated in two categories: Type-I (bare-metal) hypervisors and type-II (hosted) hypervisors. Figure 2.2 shows the basic architectural difference between these two types.

Type-II hypervisors are applications which require a host OS to run on. These hypervisors work like any other application and the VMs run on top of them. Although the average user, as well as those using them for simpler applications or as a testing environment, will find them less complicated to manage, type-II hypervisors perform worse than type-I, as

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2Typical type-II solutions are VMWare Workstation and Oracle VirtualBox.
explained later.

Type-I hypervisors run directly on the hardware, managing the resources directly without the intervention of any host OS, and provide a significant performance advantage. The advantage comes from eliminating the underlying OS of the type-II hypervisors. A type-II hypervisor must ask the host OS every time for the resources it needs to allocate, an action that produces performance overhead. Type-I hypervisors implement the resource management on their own, since they run on a more privileged OS, and they are actually part of it. The type-I hypervisors run at the same privilege level with the OS and can manage the resources without asking the host OS. Therefore, type-I hypervisors provide more efficient resource management of the hypervisor and its hosted VMs. Type-I hypervisors are most commonly used in server deployment and enterprise solutions, where performance and efficiency are important.

2.1.2 The Xen Project

The product of the Xen Project [6] is an open-source, type-I hypervisor. Its small footprint and limited interface to the guest make it more robust and secure. The hypervisor runs directly on top of the hardware, as depicted in Figure 2.3. It requires a host OS that acts as an interface between the hypervisor and the user, as well as “paravirtualized” guests. This host OS is called the control or privileged domain, also known as Dom0, and runs at a more privileged level than the rest of the VMs. The rest of the VMs are called guest domains, or DomUs, and run on a lower privilege level.
To understand how this happens, we need to introduce another CPU architectural feature, which provides different privilege levels for the execution of the CPU’s instructions, depending on the nature of the program invoking them. This mechanism, called protection rings, is present on all modern CPUs and is used by all modern OSes. Protection rings are numbered 0 to 3, with 0 being the most privileged. Usually, applications run in ring 3 and the kernel and device drivers run in ring 0. But, in order to allocate and manage the shared resources the hypervisor must run at a more privileged level than the guest OS; otherwise, there will be a conflict when the guest OS and the hypervisor try to manage the same resource. Paravirtualization, a technique by which OS vendors had to modify their kernels to run on a privilege level other than 0, such as 1 or 2, was initially used to avoid that conflict between the guest OS kernel and the hypervisor.

For type-I hypervisors to work more efficiently and without any guest OS modification, CPU manufacturers have introduced a new ring, -1 (Figure 2.4), to support virtualization. Called hypervisor mode, this new ring is even more privileged than ring 0 and is employed only during hypervisor execution. This architecture is supported on newer CPUs that employ

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3 Ring 3 is also called unprivileged or user mode, or user space.
4 Ring 0 is also called privileged or supervisor mode, or kernel space.
virtualization technology (VT), VT-x for Intel and AMD-V for AMD processors.

As virtualization keeps advancing, there is always the question of whether we can leverage virtualization to provide more than simply efficient sharing and usage of resources. The unique ability of the hypervisor to access the state of a VM, at the granular level of CPU registers and memory bytes, has been the center of research ever since the technology was invented.

![x86 protection rings](image)

Figure 2.4. x86 protection rings. Adapted from [7].

### 2.2 Virtual Machine Introspection

In this section, we introduce a rough timeline of the APIs significant for our research that evolved around virtualization and VMI. These include LibVMI and the later implemented altp2m for Xen. We also mention DRAKVUF [4], a tool that employs LibVMI and altp2m to implement a virtualization-based, agentless black-box binary analysis system. We base our solution on the DRAKVUF platform.

First introduced as a concept by Garfinkel et al. [2], VMI leverages the more privileged status of the hypervisor to inspect the internal state of a VM. The Xen hypervisor was first to include introspection methods to inspect its guest VMs. Although these introspection methods were included in Xen, implementing introspection in a way that is secure and efficient is a significant task. To make these methods more accessible to programmers, XenAccess [8] was implemented, as well as an API called mem-events. Because of strong research and security interest, introspection in Xen progressed; eventually, LibVMI [3], a
library that makes the implementation and automation of introspection on the Xen hypervisor easier, was introduced. LibVMI provides access to third-party applications for part of the hypervisor’s introspection methods, using a C or Python interface, the latter called PyVMI.

Initially, hypervisor memory management included an extra step in the memory-access mechanism (Figure 2.5), because each VM assumes that it has complete control over the entire address space and that it writes directly on the hardware. Normally, the OS would translate the virtual address used by an application to a physical address on the hardware. To a hypervisor, each VM is considered an application. Since every OS will eventually try to write on the same physical address, the hypervisor must make a distinction between the VMs. To achieve that distinction, the hypervisor assigns each VM a specific physical address space and, as explained in Chisnall [9], tracks the overall memory usage with an additional page table (PT) translating between a VM-specific guest machine frame number (GMFN) and the machine frame number (MFN).

![Hypervisor memory management concept](source:[9].)

With the introduction of input/output memory management unit (IOMMU), this extra step is no longer needed because hardware extended page tables (EPTs) are included in the CPUs; the hypervisors can use these hardware EPTs instead of software ones, a method called hardware-assisted paging. Hardware-assisted paging implemented better isolation, and enhanced security between the VMs, with significantly reduced overhead. Following that development, as well as Intel’s addition of 512 EPTs in its Haswell generation CPU, XenAccess and mem-events were redesigned and evolved into a system called altp2m.
One of the most critical changes that came with altp2m was the concurrent assignment of multiple EPTs per VM (Figure 2.6). Monitoring processes of multi-virtual CPU guests is more secure and is clearly a significant improvement. Because each virtual CPU can be assigned its own EPT the hypervisor can now keep track of different EPTs with different permissions, which can change during the execution of the VM. Other solutions keep only one EPT per VM, resulting in a less secure and isolated virtual environment between the VMs and the VMs’ processes.

LibVMI is an API that provides exposure to a subset of Xen’s VMI functionalities, as well as other platforms. LibVMI makes it possible to monitor the state of any VM, including the memory and CPU state. Memory can be accessed directly using physical addresses, or indirectly with the use of virtual addresses, OS symbols, and user-application symbols. It can monitor memory events,\(^5\) register events, and provide notifications for them. This allows the execution of callback functions, while the monitoring application resides outside the VMs and accesses the VMs through the hypervisor (Figure 2.7).

LibVMI focuses on a subset of introspection methods that provide memory reading and writing capabilities from running VMs. It also provides methods for accessing and mod-

\(^5\)Memory events are classified as memory read, write, and execute.
ifying CPU registers, as well as helper methods to pause and un-pause a VM. Accessing a VM’s memory space is not a trivial task. After detecting where the page directory is, a scan of the page tables follows in order to detect the memory mapping of the running process. This gets translated into a virtual address, which the hypervisor later translates into a physical address. Figure 2.8 shows a slightly different request, reading a kernel symbol.

![Figure 2.7. LibVMI out-of-guest access of VM state. Source: [11].](image)

Xen’s introspection methods significantly impact system security. The monitoring application resides on the host and accesses the VMs’ state from the hypervisor, which implies a zero-footprint monitoring tool from the VM’s perspective. In other words, the monitor does not leave a trace of its action that can be detected from inside the guest.

Although this development was game-changing, it had its drawbacks. Just monitoring those values of specific parts of memory, or the CPU registers, over an interval to make any inferences about the running state of the VM leaves the VM vulnerable during the waiting period. A solution for this is to trap the memory regions that we want to monitor for access or modification; this, however, can be detected by a knowledgeable adversary.

To solve this problem, LibVMI and altp2m, along with the substantial number of EPTs on
the latest CPUs, were combined in DRAKVUF [4], a dynamic malware analysis platform. One of DRAKVUF’s most significant key features is that it traps the memory addresses the user wants to monitor for access. When an event gets triggered, the EPT with the trapped address gets swapped with the original so that the execution of the guest VM continues. This allows the monitoring of many user-determined memory addresses, providing notification and response capabilities on every such event, while at the same time being untraceable from inside the guest. We explain how this mechanism works in more depth in Section 3.5.4.

![Diagram of VMI application and kernel symbol access](image)

The VMI application requests a kernel symbol. LibVMI looks up the symbol in the System Map. Then, it searches the Page Directory to find the correct Page Table. Once it finds the symbol in the Page Table, it reads the data and returns the value to the application.

Figure 2.8. Using LibVMI to access the value of a kernel symbol. Source: [11].

### 2.3 System Calls

Modern OSs are responsible for allocating their resources efficiently and securely for themselves, as well as to the user-level applications. The part of the OS assigned to manage these resources — like memory, hard disk drive access, or CPU time — is the kernel of the OS. The kernel, which runs in its own space, is the heart of the OS that makes everything work without conflicts; it also resolves any conflicts that arise. When an application is running, it runs in the so-called “user space”. This distinction exists to prevent applications from having direct access to the underlying hardware and is enforced with the protection rings, as explained previously. The running application has no knowledge of any other applica-
tion(s) being executed on the same machine, and whenever it requires a resource, it asks the OS through the kernel. The kernel, on its behalf, accesses the hard disk drive, allocates memory, or executes other commands that are considered privileged and the application cannot execute. It handles all the low-level details of what the application requested and returns the results of the action.

This very complicated software is the most crucial part of the OS. Therefore, not every process can access the kernel directly or invoke all the kernel’s functions in order to avoid corruption or misuse the low-level access the kernel has (i.e., to gain access where a process should not). This limited interface to the kernel, a sort of protection mechanism, is called a system call. The details of making a system call depend on the OS.

Programming with a high-level language usually does not involve making system calls directly. Most languages have implemented wrappers for making a system call and simplifying the system call interface. Regardless, the application will eventually have to make a system call to access some of the system’s resources. One type of resource an application needs to request access for from the OS is files. This is performed with the open() system call. Access to input devices, such as a keyboard, is also requested from the OS with the use of the read() system call.

2.4 Related Work

Whether resulting from user error or targeted malicious activity, system compromise is inevitable because of errors in the running programs. This eventuality led researchers to invest their resources in VM security space. The introspection concept gave birth to numerous interesting solutions that target a more critical issue of the information world, that of computer security. Some solutions focus on the analysis part by leveraging the hypervisor’s introspection methods to gain better insight and understanding of the behavior and impact of a malware so that it can be successfully intercepted. Other solutions take more active roles by trying to protect crucial parts of a running VM. They prevent the kernel from becoming corrupted or provide secure access to the parts of the memory where critical information or applications are stored. Each of these solutions, in their own unique ways, can provide valuable information on which events and actions led to a compromised system, or protect the vital OS space from being corrupted by malicious activity. The following
categories of methods of securing VM-based systems represent only some of the solutions produced so far, and the categories are based on the work by Bauman et al. [12].

### 2.4.1 In-VM Monitoring

In-VM solutions implement part of the functionality inside the VM. They employ an inside agent to gather information on the VM’s execution state and use the elevated privileges of the hypervisor to protect the agent from corruption or subversion. Depending on the application, we can further refine the classification in terms of detection and prevention. There are also some recovery solutions, but we consider them outside the scope of this research. Working in a VM to gather information for the hypervisor can become a very intensive task, resulting in increased performance overhead. As with every VM, the hypervisor is a complete OS, intercepting its own interrupts while running its processes, applications, and scheduler. There is additional performance overhead when the execution switches between a VM and the hypervisor and vice versa. The events related to hypervisor and VM switching are called **VM-exit** and **VM-entry** (Figure 2.9). Having a monitoring and logging application on the hypervisor triggers a considerable number of VM-exit events. This is a problem some of the following solutions try to address by using different approaches.

![Figure 2.9. VM-exit and VM-entry events.](image)

**Detection**

The hypervisor, since it provides all the resource allocation, can mark the memory pages allocated to a VM differently than the guest OS would. It can mark a page read-only when the OS marks it as read/write. This will trigger a VM-exit event and the hypervisor can act according to a different policy than that of the VM’s OS. To prevent performance
overhead, SIM [13], a monitoring solution, used the hypervisor in the following way: SIM is placed inside the VM, monitoring the guest OS, but at the same time it is protected by the hypervisor by being placed on a protected region of the VM’s address space.

Gathering information at the hypervisor level, though, presents a new problem. Each action collected has the potential for having been executed by different processes. This uncertainty makes it harder to understand the higher-level action being executed; it is a semantic gap between the hypervisor and the guest VMs. Virtuoso [14] is a tool that tries to bridge that semantic gap by automating the process of extracting OS kernel information relevant to introspection. By running a helper program inside the VM, which yields the wanted result(s), it analyzes the execution trace of that helper program and generates the introspection code that will give the same result when executed from the hypervisor. This method helps gain some knowledge about the machine’s internal state from the hypervisor’s point of view without requiring the intricate knowledge of the OS.

**Prevention**

Lares [15], in the same manner, tried to modify the guest OS minimally so that the code used for monitoring could be protected easily, while all the introspection and decision making code was placed in a “security VM.” The two communicated through the hypervisor, which protected the hooked code in the untrusted VM, while at the same time provided information to the “security VM.” It also provided communication between the VMs, so that the decision making from the “security VM” could be applied to the untrusted one. In this situation, the monitoring happens during process creation, allowing or denying the execution of programs as defined in a white list.

SHype [16] is a modified hypervisor that implements mandatory access control (MAC) on shared resources between VMs. SHype is used also in Hay and Nance [17] to provide a more fine-grained MAC on data flow between VMs and services. HyperLink [18] implements a hybrid of protected in-VM monitoring and MAC-based hypervisor protection for guest VM and hypervisor protection.

InkTag [19] introduces many different new concepts to run a high assurance process (HAP) on an untrusted OS. The threat model for this approach is more advanced and sophisticated: InkTag, to protect the HAP, employs many different mechanisms on various levels to ensure
that there is no data leak or malicious intervention during the HAP’s runtime.

InkTag also introduces “paraverification” [19], in which the kernel is required to perform some extra tasks to provide the hypervisor high-level information about the process state. This way, the hypervisor can easily determine the high-level effects of low-level actions. Furthermore, the HAP does not interact directly with the kernel; this is done by an untrusted trampoline code, which is responsible for making the system calls instead of the HAP. Upon receiving the system call results from the OS and validating them, the untrusted code returns them to the HAP.

To protect the contents of the HAPs’ memory address space, InkTag employs two EPTs: one for use during untrusted execution, which is visible by the untrusted OS, and one for use during trusted execution, which is only visible to and used by the hypervisor. In addition, if a page from the HAP’s address space needs to be evicted, InkTag hashes the contents and encrypts them before they get written on the disk. This way, it provides protection against malicious modification and access. Also, to further protect the HAP and its files, a different access control mechanism is used: each process and file is followed by attributes that are used to enforce access policies. These will protect the files, the processes, and their spawned processes. To address memory and files, InkTag also uses a different convention; the use of object identifiers (OI), an internal representation visible and known only to the HAP and the hypervisor. These are used to define the permissions available to each HAP. Finally, to provide crash consistency InkTag modifies the actual media layout by injecting file metadata. These metadata are not visible to the untrusted OS, since these sectors are not included in the media view of the OS.

Although InkTag provides many assurances for the secure execution of a HAP, the need to re-compile applications so that they can run securely poses a significant drawback and compromise of usability.

Using a similar approach, Overshadow [20] provides a one-to-many memory mapping from the VM to physical memory, as well as other mechanisms to further protect the applications and their data. The actual data in memory depend on the process(es) trying to access them. The contents get encrypted and hashed for untrusted processes and decrypted when a trusted application tries to access them.
To manage a secure application execution inside a compromised OS, Haven [21] takes a different approach. To protect the application, Haven employs Intel’s software guard extensions (SGX). SGX allow a process to define a secure region of an address space, called an enclave. Haven puts the whole application in an enclave and uses an in-enclave library OS for the interactions with the OS.

Unfortunately, these solutions are not foolproof. InkTag and Haven were attacked in Xu et al. [22] with the use of controlled-channel attacks, resulting in the extraction of substantial amounts of sensitive information from protected applications. Complete text documents were extracted, as well as outlines of JPEG images, showing that data protection during a process is not an insignificant task.

2.4.2 Out-VM Monitoring

Having a monitoring tool reside completely on the hypervisor has its benefits, but is also a significant drawback. Although everything is visible from the hypervisor’s perspective, it is extremely difficult to understand the context of the data collected by analyzing memory and CPU register values during every execution cycle, a semantic gap that needs to be filled. This section presents some of the out-VM solutions: some work on raw collected data, while others try to bridge the semantic gap to better understand the high-level commands being executed in the VM.

Detection

ReVirt [23] is a logging application that uses the hypervisor’s VM access to create extensive logs of a VM’s execution. Since the hypervisor has unlimited access to the state of the VM, ReVirt can collect and record enough information to be able to re-create and simulate the execution of the target machine. This can be very valuable for collecting malware activity data even after the system has been compromised, hijacked, or even replaced. The replay data can prove very useful in the malware analysis field, as every non-deterministic action of a malware is recorded and deterministic results can be recreated, providing a full view of the system and the malware’s impact at every step of the malicious activity.

From the moment the VM starts booting, the solution in Macko et al. [24] uses the ability of the hypervisor to transparently access the running VM’s internal state to collect system-level
provenance.

Using a different approach, Crawford and Peterson [25] implement a mechanism to detect insider threats, using VMI to stealthily monitor the users’ actions and detect suspicious activity that correlates to an insider threat. Although this alert mechanism is very useful, especially due to its transparency, the attacker still gets access to the information sought after.

When the introspection idea was conceived by Garfinkel et al. [2], it was utilized to create a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS). The IDS solution combined the best of both worlds, a host intrusion detection system (HIDS) and a network intrusion detection system (NIDS), by being placed on the hypervisor. Since it is placed outside the VM, the IDS solution has the advantage of not being prone to detection, attack and corruption, or evasion. It can directly monitor the network traffic, given that the network interface card (NIC) is a common shared resource. On the other hand, by having the hypervisor’s introspection capability, it can act also as a HIDS by monitoring the actual system behavior and execution.

Other solutions, like Strider Ghostbuster [26], PoKeR [27], and VMWatcher [28], have been proposed to fill the semantic gap between the hypervisor and the guest VM. All of them employ different techniques, but unfortunately, as later researchers like Mahapatra and Selvakumar [29] mention, they all fail at some point because this semantic gap is difficult to bridge.

Prevention
This semantic gap was also addressed in Srinivasan et al. [30] with a technique called process out-grafting. Instead of monitoring the VM as a whole, this method focuses on each separate process for fine-grained execution monitoring and is done by implementing two new techniques. The first is called on-demand grafting, which can relocate a running process from the guest target VM to a security VM. This effectively bridges the semantic gap, as, for all intents and purposes, the process is running on the same system as the monitor. This way, the monitor can intercept all instructions executed by the suspicious process without the need of hypervisor intervention. The second technique, called split execution, makes a logical separation on the execution of instructions. If the process runs in user space, it continues to run on the security VM. When there is a kernel request, like a
system call, it executes that instruction on the target VM. Since they do not run on the same kernel, this technique isolates the monitor from the suspicious process; it is still running inside the target VM, from the suspect’s process perspective.

Furthermore, SecVisor [31] and HUKO [32] propose a kernel integrity method that protects the kernel against rootkit code injection. In this case, SecVisor and HUKO are part of the hypervisor. They permit user-allowed code execution, while at the same time preventing malicious code execution.

In [33], Sentry provides a more granular kernel protection by preventing low-trust kernel components from altering security-critical data used by the kernel to manage itself and the system. It protects dynamically allocated memory, is isolated from the untrusted kernel by running on the Hypervisor, and reduces the overhead by monitoring only the kernel-related memory pages for suspicious activity.

With Paladin, Baliga et al. [34] first introduced the concept of an Out-of-Guest ACL. The ACLs in this case have a rule-based system that marks whole folders or files with generic permissions. In this case, “generic permissions” means that they affect all users and groups in the same way; there is no user or group-specific ruling and all file accesses fall in the same category. Therefore, Paladin provides its file security at a coarser level than the one desired. Additionally, it uses an in-guest module that, although relatively small and protected, still runs in the guest VM. Also, as stated in Baliga et al. [34], this ACL implementation introduces many usability problems, like trying to upgrade running applications. To perform such an action the system must be taken offline, its ACL rules must be changed to perform the upgrade, and then the system’s online presence must be restored.

A more direct approach to file integrity is presented in [35] with Nasab trying to protect the OS from accessing maliciously modified files. The target VM is deployed offline and all the files are signed digitally using a private key; the digests are then stored on the hypervisor. When the process has been completed for all the files to be protected, the VM returns to online status. During its execution, whenever a file is accessed but before it gets loaded into memory, the system retrieves its digest and compares it to the copy on the hypervisor. If the file has not changed, access or execution continues; otherwise, access or execution is denied.
Table 2.1 shows a representation of the key features of the solutions presented.

Table 2.1. Overview of solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>In-VM</th>
<th>Out-VM</th>
<th>OS Detection</th>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>File Protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIM [13]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtuoso [14]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lares [15]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHype [16]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InkTag [19]</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overshadow [20]</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haven [21]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReVirt [23]</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macko et al. [24]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crawford and Peterson [25]</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMi [2]</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strider Ghostbuster [26]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoKeR [27]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMWatcher [28]</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srinivasan et al. [30]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecVisor [31]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUKO [32]</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry [33]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasab [35]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paladin [34]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As best as we could determine, all work on VM monitoring and security focuses on kernel and OS protection, malicious activity monitoring, extensive logging for replay and online or offline forensic purposes, or secure resource-sharing among VMs. Only Paladin [34] provides protection for the actual files of the system. Even this solution, as mentioned before, provides a generic out-VM ACL approach and can introduce various usability issues. Also, it will need further development to protect against newly created attacks that can maliciously access files when the VM has been compromised. Furthermore, it is an in-VM solution, as there is code of Paladin running in the guestVM, thereby leaving a footprint of its presence. VM security is a very active research field that has produced many solutions, each with a different focus, but generally surrounding the malware protection realm, as depicted in Table 2.1 and even more extensively in Bauman et al. [12].

Because zero-day vulnerabilities are constantly discovered and exploited, we do not want to focus on detecting specific behaviors to assess the presence of malware and methods to

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6Bauman et al. [12] is an extensive survey of hypervisor-based solutions.
restrain it, since these behaviors change and evolve with the development of new attacks. We do want to focus on a more generic case where we expect the running system to be hacked and can protect files in a compromised running VM against insider threats, rootkits, and malware in general.
In this chapter, we discuss the design and the implementation choices that we made for this research, including the threat model and assumptions made.

3.1 Overview

In this research, we extended the Xen hypervisor by leveraging its VMI capabilities to create a system, which we called ferify. Ferify protects critical files on a VM’s mounted filesystem by intercepting and monitoring all systems calls that may operate on these files. It maintains its own file ACLs and allows a system call to read or write a file if, and only if, the ACL permits the action explicitly for the userID (UID) and groupID (GID) combination of the calling process. We call this ACL the SACL to differentiate it from other ACLs configured on guest VMs. It is important to note that the content of the SACL cannot be read nor modified by any process, including kernel processes from guest VMs. The aforementioned permissions can be different compared to those on the guest VM, allowing for the enforcement of different file access policies than the ones enforced by the guest VM, even while under VM-compromised attacks. The ACL policies enforced by the guest OS remain active, meaning that if for some reason the SACL entry allows file access, but the guest OS ACL does not, the file will not be accessed.

First, before presenting the design and implementation details, we briefly discuss why our solution is secure: we choose to monitor which files were being accessed by trapping the system calls that are being invoked.

As mentioned in [36], a User Mode process cannot directly access the hardware; each file operation must be performed in Kernel Mode as the OS will not allow direct access to hardware. If a process needs file access, it must perform a system call, asking the OS in this way for the desired operation. The OS checks if the request is valid and, if it is, accesses the file on behalf of the process and returns the result of the operations to the process, as shown in Figure 3.1. This requirement of making a system call for all file operations provides a place in the OS executable code, which, if we monitor, we can extract the information of all
files being accessed. So, we cannot miss any file that any process tries to open.

![Diagram of system call information flow]

Table 12.1 in [36] shows the list of system calls relevant to file systems. According to that table, the system calls of importance to us are `open()`, `rename()`, `link()`, `symlink()`, `unlink()`, and `truncate()`. Some of these system calls have evolved over time to provide better security and to eliminate problems. Such an evolved system call is `openat()`. Going through the available system call list in `/usr/include/asm/unistd_64.h`, we assess that the system calls mentioned in Table 3.1, provide full coverage of the possible ways a file can be accessed when being on a mounted device.

As explained in [37], it is possible for an attacker to modify the credentials of a process after acquiring root privileges. This exploit is a significant security issue for `ferify`, since it collects the UID and GID of the running process from the VM’s kernel memory. To avoid the success of such an exploit, `ferify` monitors the credentials of all running processes inside the guest VM, and monitors the creation of new processes to record their credentials as well. Then, according to preset rules, `ferify` decides whether a change in the credentials of a process is allowed or not and acts accordingly. This way, we can secure the validity of the information collected from the guest VM.

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7 The column “Number” in Table 3.1 represents the system call number as it is passed to the kernel.
LibVMI, and therefore DRAKVUF, needs for the guest VM to have reached a state, after launching, in which it is able to start monitoring the guest VM. After we launch a VM there might be a small time window in which the guest VM is running without the protection of our system. Until we find a way to determine the exact amount of time in which LibVMI can be initialized to protect the guest VM, we will consider attacks that modify the running system during boot time outside the scope of this research. To prevent the system from being attacked during that small time frame, we do not connect the VM to the network until after this initialization process is completed.

### 3.2 Threat Model

Computer security has been evolving because the attackers’ methods evolve, too. Modern OSes and applications are so complex that they inevitably introduce many bugs in their code. Some of these bugs are benign, but some are serious enough to allow security breaches like remote access to a system, administrator/root access, or arbitrary code execution.

For this research, we have adopted a *moderate* threat model where we assume that the guest VM is insecure. We assume that physical access to the hosting machine is restricted and the attacker cannot use physical media like USB sticks or CD-ROMs to compromise the host system. The protected files are only remotely accessible and protected by a public-key authentication and encryption scheme (i.e., SSH). The private keys of authorized users are secure, while the attacker may have obtained root privileges on the VM through a successful attack. The assumption that the target VM would only be accessible remotely reflects many applications and systems working over a network connection as well as cloud solutions.
A significant concern in computer security is that of replay attacks. Even if a legitimate user connects using SSH, there are attacks that can monitor network traffic on the host and steal sensitive data after they are decrypted. We consider these types of attacks and how to mitigate them outside the scope of this research, as the SSH protocol is widely used and evolving. Finally, the files we want to protect are on a mounted disk.

Moreover, we assume that the OS installed on the guest VM is not trusted. This essentially means that the adversaries could gain root privileges, allowing them to modify system executables this way, as well as load kernel modules during runtime. This allows for kernel memory modification.

We consider the hypervisor, along with its Dom0, to be secure and trusted; hypervisor vectored attacks or how to protect the hypervisor is outside the scope of this research.

3.3 Requirements

The goal of this research is to provide a virtualization extension that will extend the granular-level file access control of the Linux OS. The requirements we have defined for our system are:

- (R1) The solution must be out-VM to avoid modification from the potential adversary.
- (R2) The system must remain efficient and usable by not introducing significant overhead on the runtime of the VM, as well as by not enforcing many restrictions to the users.
- (R3) All relevant system calls must be monitored.

3.4 Design

We used a type-I hypervisor, as this type is more efficient and deployed more often as commercial solutions, instead of type-II, which is used mostly for testing and analysis. We chose the Xen hypervisor as it is open-source and is used widely, so the results of the research can be used in a variety of applications. By leveraging Xen’s introspection methods, we created an Out-VM monitoring agent,\(^8\) completely outside the VM, conforming this way with (R1). Also, by ensuring that there is no code running on the guest OS, we have

\(^8\)Out-VM means that the agent runs on Dom0.
increased the deployment speed, as there is no need to modify the guest VM in any way. The required pre-deployment configuration for the guest VM is kept to a minimum and does not involve any modification, only data collection for building the SACLs.

As a platform on which to base our solution, we chose DRAKVUF [4]. DRAKVUF provided us with a stealthy monitoring base, as it leverages alternate EPTs with different permissions, thus preventing any detection from applications inside a VM. As explained later in this chapter, we had to restrict some of the usability of the system, although not during normal execution, to achieve the file confidentiality, integrity, and availability we wanted. Therefore, we assumed that (R2) is achieved in the part of restrictions, although a few restrictions apply, mostly concerning the root user. Overhead and usability of the system is discussed in Chapter 4.

Generally, we wanted to protect any type of data, regardless of the content. We employed the stealthy property of DRAKVUF to make the process of file protection completely transparent to the guest OS, retaining a zero-footprint monitor on the guest. By having access to selected kernel structures, DRAKVUF also helps bridge the semantic gap between the hypervisor and the VM with the use of a Rekall profile [38]. Furthermore, we wanted to employ a per-user ACL, to be enforced on specific files or whole folders; these are not always essential to the OS, but are essential to the user. We improved confidentiality by denying read access, integrity by denying write, and availability by protecting deletion or moving of files. Since our threat model assumes that the system is compromised, this mechanism must also extend to the root user. To achieve that, we intercept all relevant system calls from all users and verify the validity of the request.

Monitoring the execution of the system calls in Table 3.1 and validating the request made to the guest OS kernel is sufficient for ensuring the guest VM file confidentiality, integrity, and availability as we want to enforce it, thus conforming to (R3).

### 3.5 Implementation

In the following discussion, we expand on how we implemented the mechanism to provide the file access security of our system.
3.5.1 Architecture
We developed ferify as a plugin for DRAKVUF. As such, it is a C++ class that extends the class plugin, as per requirements of DRAKVUF. It is located in the directory src/plugins/ferify/ and consists of two files, ferify.h and ferify.cpp, as shown in Figure 3.2.

![Figure 3.2. ferify directory tree.](image)

3.5.2 Shadow Access Control List
During the initialization of our DRAKVUF plugin, we read the SACLs we had created for the VM to be protected. The SACLs are implemented in the form of hash tables in order to improve search speed. The key of the hash table is the full pathname of the file and the value is a structure, depicted in Table 3.2, used to store the rest of each SACL entry’s information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pathname</td>
<td>char *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mode</td>
<td>unsigned int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>uid_t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>gid_t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2. struct protected_files memory layout.

The memory structure shown in Table 3.2 is used for both protected folders and protected files, as they are handled the same. Moreover, we create two; one for the root user and one for the rest. Searching in the SACLs is performed with the pathname of the file being accessed as the hash-table key. The return value is a pointer to the structure of Table 3.2.

In the SACL file, permissions are set according to the Linux permission bits schema. This means that the last three digits of the mode field, when encoded in octal form, define the permissions we want to enforce. The first digit defines the owner permissions, the second the group permissions, and the third the other user permissions. The number itself is the sum of the permissions: 4 for read, 2 for write, and 1 for execute. As an example, if we
encounter or set permissions 744, it means that the owner can read, write, and execute the file; everyone else can only read the file.

The SACL’s format was kept as simple as possible so that editing and reviewing it is easy. Additionally, by keeping the format of the Linux ACL, we provide the system administrator with a familiar permissions schema so it is easier to understand and manage. Figure 3.3 shows an example, which we analyze later.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathname</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/home/user/Documents/readme.txt</td>
<td>100644</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/home/user/Desktop/credit.pdf</td>
<td>100400</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/home/user/Documents</td>
<td>140220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3. SACL sample.

The system keeps two SACLs: one for all non-root users and one for root, since this account is of greater significance. Furthermore, two different checks are performed. First, verify checks for a protected folder, or a parent, as this is a more generic case. If no entry is found, it then checks for specific files that match those in the list.

We chose to create two separate SACLs to improve the permissions policy of our solution. By making this separation we allow for the creation of separate permissions for normal users and the root user. It makes managing of different permissions easier. Besides this simple refinement of the SACL entries, the level of protection applied to the files is the same for any user.

As we see in Figure 3.4, the SACL for protecting files from the root user is simpler. Since it is targeted for this specific user, we do not need the entries for the owner or group. Furthermore, the permission bits for group and others are ignored when parsed, since they are meaningless.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathname</th>
<th>Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/etc/shadow</td>
<td>100400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/etc/pam.d/su</td>
<td>100000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4. root user SACL sample.

Before moving on, we must emphasize that the system does not alter basic properties of the files that are being protected, nor does it change the owner or the group, since this
requires intervention in the VM. Although in the SACL we can define a different owner, the generic effect is denial of access. This means that we cannot change who can access a file; rather, we can change who cannot. This system acts as a supplementary and more refined access control mechanism to make more strict file access policies. Therefore, if we change the owner of a file in the SACL, we essentially prohibit access to that file by the owner. Similarly, we do specify a new one, as the final call for file access comes from the unmodified guest OS.

3.5.3 System Call Interception and Admission Control

All applications running in user space need to ask the kernel to access a file. Applications do not have knowledge of the low-level OS and device details to access the files they need, so they request the kernel to do that work for them. The kernel accesses the requested file using the device drivers and, when the operation is completed, returns to the application a handle to that file.\(^9\) This happens for many operations restricted to the kernel for security reasons. Also, it provides an abstraction to the applications, which are written without the need for knowledge of device specifics, and works on variations of the underlying hardware running the same OS.

For applications to be compatible with OS version upgrades and portable between different systems, a specific standard calling convention of these kernel functions is needed. This calling convention is a system call. System calls are specific entry points to the kernel which, when provided specific arguments, perform an operation on behalf of the application. Many system calls exist, each performing a different operation. We focus on those that are relevant to accessing files, whether to read or modify. These are depicted in Table 3.1.

To gain the insight needed on what files are being accessed, we need to know whenever this event happens. We will use DRAKVUF to create a trap on all the aforementioned system calls; this gives us the opportunity to stop the VM execution when these system calls are made. At this point, we will access the registers related with each system call to retrieve the information we need to perform the validation of the requested call. Figure 3.5 gives an overview of the flow of information during a trapped system call.

The arguments for the system calls for the 64-bit Linux OS we used as our test platform

\(^9\)The handle to the file is called the file descriptor.
are passed to the kernel through the registers in the order of rdi, rsi, rdx, r10, r8, and r9, while the system call number is passed in rax. Additionally, rcx holds the return address for execution after the system call has been completed. Table 3.3 shows which arguments need to be passed to each system call on each register for it to perform the requested operation, as found online [39].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syscall Name</th>
<th>rax</th>
<th>rdi</th>
<th>rsi</th>
<th>rdx</th>
<th>r10</th>
<th>r8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>open</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>openat</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>name_to_handle_at</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>struct</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open_by_handle_at</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>struct</td>
<td>file_handle</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>flags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renameat</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>const char</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renameat2</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>const char</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linkat</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>const char</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symlink</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symlinkat</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlinkat</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truncate</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execve</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execveat</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>const char</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3. Arguments of file related trapped system calls.
3.5.4 System Call Hooking

To achieve the aforementioned system call intercept, we need to place traps to the system calls of interest. These get implemented by DRAKVUF; LibVMI reads the Rekall profile of the guest VM to get the base address of the kernel symbol table. DRAKVUF then starts from that base address and searches for the system call table. This table includes the function pointers for all supported system calls. Going through that table makes the detection and trapping of system calls possible. This is achieved by reading the address of the system call from the system call table, going to that address, and placing the \texttt{INT3 (0xCC)} byte at the beginning of the system call function. This does not alter the system call table; the system call table is stored information, while the injected byte is written in the actual code section. This byte is executed by the CPU as a debugging interrupt or a breakpoint. This in turn triggers a VM-exit, which is caught by DRAKVUF and handled by our callback function. DRAKVUF implements multiple EPTs with different permissions for the same page; this allows placing the trap in the system calls code. When the particular page is accessed for reading, an exception is raised, which is caught by the hypervisor. While the VM is paused the hypervisor switches the page with the correct one and resumes the VM. When the OS tries to execute that part of code the opposite switch happens. The original function’s code is accessed, without revealing the injected breakpoint. This process is transparent to
the VM because the contents of the pages are exactly the same, with the exception of the breakpoint, and all this happens when the VM is paused.

Table 3.3 shows that there are two generic cases we need to examine. One case is for the open(), rename(), link(), symlink(), unlink(), and truncate() system calls, where we have to find the string pointed by the pointer in the rdi register, and in the rsi register in the case of rename().

The second case is for the openat(), renameat(), renameat2(), linkat(), symlinkat(), and unlinkat() system calls, where we have to retrieve the string of the file being accessed from different registers, according to Table 3.3.

### 3.5.5 The task_struct Kernel Structure

A crucial part in the design of our solution is the Linux kernel task_struct. It is a complex structure where the kernel stores extensive information concerning the running processes. Each running process is assigned one such structure by the kernel, so that the kernel can monitor the process and retrieve various information about it. A special macro, current, retrieves a pointer to the task_struct of the currently running process.\(^{10}\) We then need to map this structure and find the address offsets of the information we need. We must make sure that the information we retrieve from the task_struct is not corrupted, so we store the required information on the hypervisor, keeping track of all the processes. Additionally, to prevent a big attack surface on the kernel we decide to deny kernel module loading, as explained in detail in Subsection 4.1.2. We revisit the task_struct in the next sections, as we mention what we need to access.

Although normally this process is not complex, in our case there were some challenges, such as the semantic gap already mentioned for all out-VM solutions. The first is that we need to find the correct offsets inside the task_struct for the entries we want, which depend on the kernel version. Furthermore, we need to make constant conversions between GMFN and MFN, as the memory values we retrieve correspond to the VMs address space. Instead, we need to access the actual physical memory to read the information we require.

---

\(^{10}\)The value is the return value of a function. Manipulating this value has no result, as each time it is called the correct value is always returned.
3.5.6 Trap Handling

After a hooked system call gets executed, our callback function is called. We retrieve the file that is being accessed and, by getting the current process ID (Figure 3.6), we determine which process is making the system call.

```c
currpid = vmi_dtb_to_pid(vmi, info->regs->cr3);
switch (info->regs->rax){
    case S_OPEN:
    case S_RENAME:
    case S_UNLINK:
        addr = vmi_translate_uv2p(vmi, info->regs->rdi, currpid);
        filename = vmi_read_str_pa(vmi, addr);
        .
        .
        break;
    case S_OPENAT:
    case S_UNLINKAT:
    case S_RENAMEAT:
    case S_RENAMEAT2:
        addr = vmi_translate_uv2p(vmi, info->regs->rsi, currpid);
        filename = vmi_read_str_pa(vmi, addr);
        .
        .
        break;
}
```

Figure 3.6. Getting the file being accessed.

When a system call is executed, the file being accessed is passed as a string pointer. After we retrieve the string, we check whether the file is given in the form of an absolute or relative path. If the path is absolute there is nothing more to do and the algorithm continues. If the path is relative, the retrieval procedure is more complicated because we need to recreate the present working directory (PWD). The Linux kernel does not store this information anywhere. On the contrary, in the `task_struct`, the kernel only stores the parent directory in a different structure. Therefore, we need to loop through the parent folders so that by prepending the parent each time, we recreate the PWD and the full pathname. To achieve this, we created a new function that recursively walks through the `task_struct` to collect all the required information.

The case for the `openat()`, `renameat()`, `renameat2()`, `linkat()`, `symlinkat()`, and `unlinkat()` system calls is different. Among the arguments, there is one called
dirfd. This argument is not always used. When it is not, the algorithm is the same as described previously. When it is used, it is in the form of a directory descriptor. This means that the process has already successfully opened a directory and passed its descriptor as an argument, which represents the mount directory for the file. In this case, we go through the task_struct structure of the current running process and retrieve the directory that maps to the directory descriptor, so that we can recreate the pathname of the file.

After we have retrieved the pathname, we then check for the system call that triggered the VM-exit event. For this research, we will not handle the name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at() system calls. At this point, we are unaware of any compiled program that uses this specific system call, but this does not hinder our proof of concept. Support for them can be added in the future. The rest of the system calls are handled as follows:

- link(), linkat(), symlink(), symlinkat(), unlink(), and unlinkat()
- open() and openat()
- rename(), renameat(), and renameat2()

In the first case, where the system calls are used for linking and file deletion, the procedure is straightforward. If there is an entry in the SACL, we verify that the user or group accessing the file has sufficient permissions. If that is correct, the callback function returns control to the VM to resume execution. If the permissions do not match, the pointer to the filename string is modified to NULL so that the system call, after the VM resumes execution, fails (Figure 3.7). By hooking and preventing execution of these system calls, we prevent deletion and linking of the protected files, improving the availability and confidentiality assurances of the underlying OS.

The search for a match in the SACLs is performed in two steps for all cases: once to go through protected folders and once to go through individually protected files. Also, the root user is handled separately from the rest of the users because of the special elevated privileges that account is granted.

In the case of rename(), renameat() and renameat2(), which are used for file moving, we perform the same check as per unlink() and unlinat(), with the difference that if we do not find a match for the oldname of the system call, we additionally check for
a match on the new name. As enforced by our SACL, the first part ensures that if the user or group does not have read permissions, the file cannot be renamed or moved to an unprotected folder or filename, ensuring the *confidentiality* of the information stored in the file. In the second case, we prevent the protected file from being overwritten by another file if the permissions are not correct. This way, we improve *integrity* of the underlying OS by preventing modification of the protected file.

```c
    case S_UNLINK:
    case S_UNLINKAT:
        switch (info->userid){
            case ROOT: // root user
                if(strcmp(check->pathname, filename)==0){
                    check_permissions(check,info,vmi,ROOT);
                    .
                    .
                    break; // other users
            default: // other users
                if(strcmp(check->pathname, filename)==0){
                    if (check->u == info->userid){
                        check_permissions(check,info,vmi,USER);
                    } else if (check->g == info->groupid){
                        check_permissions(check,info,vmi,GROUP);
                    } else {
                        check_permissions(check,info,vmi,OTHER);
                    }
                    .
                    .
                    break;
        }
```

Figure 3.7. `unlink()` and `unlinkat()` skeleton code flow.

Finally, in the case of `open()` and `openat()` we only must check for one filename in our SACLs. If there is an entry, then the permission check algorithm is more complicated. This happens because we have to match the requested access mode with the permissions we want to enforce. So, we check for read permission when a `O_RDONLY` access is requested, and for write permission on a `O_WRONLY`. In the case of a `O_RDWR` request, we initially check for both permissions. If that fails, we then check if the process user or group has read permissions. If that is the case, we alter the file access mode to read-only and allow execution. If all of them fail, we change the `rax` register contents to `NULL` and resume VM execution; this results in a failed system call. This more complex permission check
improves confidentiality by not allowing read access to those who do not have the right, as well as integrity and availability by denying write access to those who cannot write to the file, as per the SACL-enforced policy. Figure 3.8 shows the code for the permission checks done in the case of the `open()` and `openat()` system calls.

```c
switch (info->regs->rax) {
  case S_OPEN:
  case S_OPENAT:
    if ( ((info->regs->rsi & 07) | O_RDONLY) == O_RDONLY) {
      if ( !(check->mode & r) ) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
        return 1; }
    } else if ( ((info->regs->rsi & 07) | O_WRONLY) == O_WRONLY) {
      if ( !(check->mode & w) ) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
        return 1; }
    } else if ( ((info->regs->rsi & 07) | O_RDWR) == O_RDWR) {
      if ( !(check->mode & w) && !(check->mode & r) ) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
        return 1; }
      else if ( !(check->mode & w) ){
        vmi_set_vcpureg(vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
        return 1; }
    }
    break;
}
```

When one of the trapped system calls gets executed, LibVMI pauses the VM execution. It then passes the VM’s state information to DRAKVUF, where our running plug-in retrieves it. Being unable to bypass and alter the VM’s state, at this point the guest OS is paused and none of its processes continue running. By going through some VM memory accesses, the plug-in gets the file being accessed, the UID, and the GID. With this information, it goes through the SACL to find any matching files or folders that are being protected. If none are found, it returns control to LibVMI, which then resumes the VM’s execution. If an entry in the SACL is found, then the plug-in checks whether the requested file access is prohibited. If it is allowed, execution continues normally. On the other hand, if it is prohibited, then the plug-in changes the value of some registers related to the system call so that it will fail.

Figure 3.8. `open()` and `openat()` permission checks.
3.6 Monitoring of Program Execution

In addition to the system calls of Table 3.1, we also trapped the execve() and execveat() system calls. Following the technique described in 3.5.6, we retrieve the pathname of the program that is requested to be executed. We then check the permissions stored in the SACLs and decide on allowing execution or not.

Instead of just checking the SACL permissions, we immediately deny execution if the file is not in the SACL. This creates an efficient application white-list monitoring tool that can mitigate a broad variety of viruses and malware in general. The reason for this is that most of the malware will save its code on a file for later use. When it tries to execute this file, since it is not part of the original filesystem, execution will stop. We must note that for a malware to create a persistence mechanism on a compromised system, it must write its code on a file. By write protecting the already present executable files, and denying execution of new files, we mitigate a significant volume of old and new malware, including zero-day attacks.

3.7 Guest VM Configuration

As mentioned before, there is no significant setup in the guest VM in order for our system to run. The only requirement coming from LibVMI and DRAKVUF is the creation and export of a Rekall profile in the guest VM. Because this profile depends on the kernel version that is running, it is imperative to recreate the profile in the case of a kernel version update.

To prevent the VM from running unprotected in such a case, we have set the options in the Xen guest configuration file, which resides on the hypervisor, to shut down the VM in case it needs to reboot, as shown in Figure 3.9. This does not significantly affect the usability of the guest system as the Linux OS seldom requires a reboot even after software updates. Additionally, we trap and deny the kexec_load() system call, which is used to load a new kernel to be used during the next boot sequence. These two steps protect against custom-built kernels, created by attackers, since the VM will not run unsupervised, and will not allow the loading of a new kernel. The administrator will need to investigate further to determine why the VM was rebooted or powered off in the first place.

To support file confidentiality, integrity, and availability even from root access, we need to
prohibit the root user from executing the su command. This command, short for switch user, allows the root user to switch to any account in the OS. To do that, we need to edit a configuration file so that the execution of this command is not allowed. Our test VM uses the pluggable authentication module (PAM). To achieve the required result, we edited the /etc/pam.d/su file in the guest OS by adding the line shown in Figure 3.10, and then denied the write permissions of all users for that file in the SACL so that it cannot be modified.

```
  on_poweroff = "destroy"
  on_reboot = "destroy"
  on_crash = "destroy"
```

Figure 3.9. Guest VM shutdown configuration line.

Furthermore, since the root user can change other user passwords, we also need to deny that capability. To do that, we do not need any special in-VM configuration; we just need to protect the /etc/shadow file from being modified. Therefore, a sample SACL to enforce these minimum security requirements we have set is shown in Figure 3.4.

```
auth required pam_wheel.so deny group=root
```

Figure 3.10. Guest VM configuration to deny root from running su.

In conclusion, we have seen that we make no alterations at all at the guest VM; we only modify configuration files in order to set up the appropriate environment. Concerning usability, the only things we have restricted are the ability of the root user to change the password of any other user, and the capability of the root user to switch to any other user. This can be troublesome in the event that a user has forgotten his password, but we assess it as an acceptable usability limitation.
CHAPTER 4: 
Evaluation

In this chapter, we present the evaluation of ferify. In the first section, we validate our design of ferify. Next, we explain the tests we performed to verify that ferify has the results we expected. These tests covered typical use cases in which ferify can be employed. Finally we perform some tests to evaluate the performance overhead and the degree to which our solution impacts overall system usability.

4.1 Validation

In Section 3.1 we discussed why ferify is secure. To expand on this and confirm that our claim is correct, we will present the security challenges we identified and tried to solve during the implementation of ferify. We can classify them by the permission level required to perform certain malicious operations on the running OS.

4.1.1 Ring 3 Operations

The ring 3 operations include all the actions an attacker can perform in the user space. Assuming that the attacker has gained root access, these actions include modification of system configuration files and executables to serve certain purposes for the attacker.

The ferify process can be employed to overcome the challenge of how to protect the OS at the ring 3 level from a malicious root user. By adding critical system files in the SACLs along with the correct permissions, we can deny write access to any user, including the root user. Depending on the security risk that is anticipated, the administrator must decide which files are critical. To ensure some of our assumptions, a few basic files we assessed needed protection are /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/pam.d/su. Tests for these cases are covered in the next section.

4.1.2 Ring 0 Operations

File operations are performed by the kernel through system calls. The kernel can be modified only by the root user and, therefore, kernel memory can be accessed only while operating
in ring 0 in the following ways:

- System calls
- Kernel modules
- Kernel compilation and loading
- Kernel bugs

Generally, the system call API is well defined and difficult to exploit. System call attacks usually target the system call table to modify the address of the system call functions with others of the attacker’s choosing. However, to do that the attacker needs to be able to load kernel modules. So, this type of attack already falls into the second category, that of the kernel modules.

Everything is within reach when an attacker manages to load a kernel module. The module is running as part of the kernel, in ring 0, and has access to every physical and virtual resource available on the system. Kernel modules have access to and are able to modify all kernel functions and structures. There are protection mechanisms, like module digital signing, but all these checks are running on the same privilege level. To protect the guest OS from that category of attacks, which can also result in the installation of root-kits, we trap and block the \texttt{init\_mod()} and \texttt{finit\_mod()} system calls; by blocking the use of kernel module system calls we make module loading impossible.

To protect against a modified kernel, we took a simple approach that is easily implemented with \texttt{ferify}: initially we blocked the system call \texttt{kexec\_load()}.\footnote{This system call is used to load a new kernel for later execution.} In addition to that, we can detect the kernel files that are used to boot the system and write-protect them from all users. Also, in case of a reboot, the configuration will shut down the VM, so automatically running on a modified kernel is prohibited. Aside from these protection measures, we decide not to expand further on this specific attack vector; there are already solutions, like vTPM [40], which implement a more sophisticated way of securing the system’s boot procedure and verifying that the code launched by firmware is trusted.

The kernel of an OS is a program, and, as such, some bugs are typically expected: some might simply just crash parts of the kernel without any other consequences, but some can potentially be used to manipulate kernel memory structures and contents, or generally allow
arbitrary code execution. These types of attacks require a very deep knowledge of the intricate Linux kernel to work successfully. Security patches are rolled out frequently to fix or secure against these bugs. We assessed these attacks to be out of the scope of this research, as the Linux kernel is constantly evolving.

4.2 Testing

We want to assess whether the files we protect with ferify are secure and cannot be accessed, except from those we have allowed in the SACLs. To assess that ferify worked as intended, we assume two basic scenarios. The first is that a remotely-connected authorized user should be able to work as before; we wanted usability at the user level to remain unchanged. The second scenario is that of a hacked user account in which the attacker has remote access to the target VM through exploitation of a vulnerability in the guest OS. In this second case, we assume a “worst case scenario” in which the attacker has gained root privileges.

As all higher-level programs and attacks eventually resort to the execution of system calls, we create an environmental setup to assess all the test cases relevant to the system calls we trapped, in order to observe the behavior of the system and whether it conformed to expectations. We perform specific commands, as explained later, on the guest VM to emulate the actions of an attacker. These commands reflect the cases when ferify could be applied and correspond to the most basic commands one can issue.

The configuration includes two user accounts in the sudoers group: one authorized and one hacked by an attacker. The hacked account is assumed to have become a sudoer through malicious actions. Additionally we create a group that includes both users, with the intention of assessing the per group policy enforcement to file access. The intent is to check detection of the illegal escalation of the hacked account to root and the effect this has. A high-level overview of our design is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

We also try, as root, to access files that were being protected from this specific user. These files include the /etc/shadow and /etc/pam.d/su, which were included in the SACLs to protect our initial VM configuration.

By themselves these cases cover the basic set of actions that ferify was initially designed to
monitor. Any combination of them is handled separately from the underlying OS, reducing our problem to these elementary cases and making it easier to monitor and handle.

First, we test whether an illegal root escalation is possible; then we test the file operations including create, open, read, write, copy, move, and delete.

4.2.1 Root Escalation
One of the first actions of an attacker or malicious program is to try to escalate its privileges to that of the root account. One of the techniques commonly employed is to add the compromised user to the sudoers group. To avoid such an exploitation, every time a trap gets caught by the hypervisor we check whether the user executing a sudo command is actually allowed to do so.\textsuperscript{12} If the user is a legitimate sudoer, the flow of our plugin continues normally to check the validity of the file operation against the SACLs. If the user is not supposed to have sudo privileges, the system calls trapped by ferify that get invoked then get canceled, denying the ability to perform any sudo commands. Figure 4.2 shows the result of trying to execute a sudo command that gets denied, while also notifying the hypervisor of the event as shown in Figure 4.3.

\textsuperscript{12}If a user is allowed to execute the sudo command, that is specified in the initial administrative setup of ferify for the specific VM.
Figure 4.2. Denying `sudo`.

Warning: Process root identity corruption detected in task 1377! Is 0 and should be 1002.
Invalidating syscall.

    [SYSCALL: 2] CR3:0x1afec000 , RDI: 0x7f2178a931f7 , sudo
    PID:1377 [0:1002] wants 0 access to file:
    /etc/sudoers (mode:0)

Figure 4.3. Denying `sudo` notification on the hypervisor.

In the same manner, the result of trying to change a user’s password is shown in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4. Denying password change from root account.

Having solved the issue of malicious root access, we then need to validate the expected behavior for file access, regardless of root user request.

### 4.2.2 Authorized User Operation

A very important aspect of any security solution is its impact on usability for the normal user. The implementation of a secure system that remains fully usable is always a challenge. In this test we evaluate whether authorized users could normally access and work on their files. To test the file operations we create two files, `file1` and `file2`, and check whether we can open, move, or overwrite them. In the SACLs, we have entries for three files to test whether the third file could be created. The permissions for the files on the guest OS and the SACLs are explained in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. File permissions for authorized user.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Owner Read</th>
<th>Owner Write</th>
<th>Owner Execute</th>
<th>Group Read</th>
<th>Group Write</th>
<th>Group Execute</th>
<th>Others Read</th>
<th>Others Write</th>
<th>Others Execute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>file1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file2</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file3</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guest OS

Hypervisor User’s SACL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Owner Read</th>
<th>Owner Write</th>
<th>Owner Execute</th>
<th>Group Read</th>
<th>Group Write</th>
<th>Group Execute</th>
<th>Others Read</th>
<th>Others Write</th>
<th>Others Execute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>file1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file2</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file3</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After running our test script\textsuperscript{13} to verify the ability to access the user’s files normally, the results show that the files are accessible as expected in every mode (Figure 4.5).

```
$ ./file_tests file1 file2 file3
Success: Opened file1 for reading by user alex. Able to copy.
Success: Opened file1 for writing by user alex.
Success: file2 created by user alex.
Success: user alex deleted file2.
Success: user alex moved file1 to file3.
```

Figure 4.5. File operations execution for authorized user.

All basic file operations are available to an authorized user. We assess that the usability level for a normal user remains unchanged. By modifying the SACL permissions, we can allow or deny certain operations on user- or group-owned files, according to the desired policy to be enforced.

4.2.3 Attacker Operation - root Access - Immutable Objects

One of the biggest problems in information security is that a root user or administrator of the system has access to all its files and folders. That is the reason most attacks try to result in escalation of privileges to an administrative account. While the administrator is usually someone trusted and should have access to all OS files for management issues, there are cases when even that person should not get access to certain information. The ferify process can provide the capability for normal users to have full access to their files, while at the same time the administrator cannot have full or even limited access to them. By setting

\textsuperscript{13}The source code of the test script is included in Appendix A.
the relevant file permissions, as per Table 4.2, we can deny total access to the administrator on any file. This SACL is different from the previous one, allowing for user-based policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Name</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Write</th>
<th>Execute</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Write</th>
<th>Execute</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Write</th>
<th>Execute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest OS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file1</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file2</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file3</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypervisor root’s SACL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After running our test script to verify the ability to deny access to root on the user’s files, the results (Figure 4.6) show that the files are inaccessible in every mode expected, according to the permissions we set in the SACL. We assess that denying file access to the root user is an important security implementation, as it provides great confidentiality assurance, as well as nullifying a range of attack vectors on systems, old or new.

A result of ferify is that it can be used to create immutable files on a system. With write access denied to everyone, there can be files that cannot be modified yet remain accessible for reading, providing great integrity assurance.

$ sudo ./file_tests file1 file2 file3
Failure: Could not open file1 for reading by user root.
    Cannot copy.
Failure: Could not open file1 for writing by user root.
Failure: file2 could not be created by user root.
Failure: user root could not delete file2.
Failure: user root could not move file1 to file3.

Figure 4.6. File operations execution for non-authorized user.

### 4.2.4 Malware Protection

To make ferify work as a white-listing security application we implement a slightly different logic for the `execve()` and `execveat()` system calls. The results of our testing are satisfactory, but more thorough testing should be performed.
We have successfully managed to apply different execution permissions and block application execution on a per-user level. This differs from the other system call’s handling in that if the executable is not in the SACL, we deny execution. There is no different SACL implementation for this case, just separate handling of the execve() system call. Since we assume that the system is secure when we launch verify, any file in the filesystem should not be malicious. For a malware to create a persistence mechanism, it will have to write executable code on the victim system and run it at some point. Since that file will not be in the SACL, we automatically block that executable from running, thus having efficiently mitigated a large attack-vector of malware. To mitigate against attacks that modify OS executables with malicious ones, system executables should also be marked as non-writable in the SACLs to prevent modification and ensure their integrity.

4.2.5 Append-only Mode

Once attackers have achieved system penetration, they start accessing the OS in many ways; accessing of files for information gathering, creation of persistence mechanisms, and installation of back-doors are just a few. To remain undetected they must “hide their tracks”; attackers usually edit system logs to erase their presence. Log files are created by appending entries at the end of the file, but this is not an enforced file-access policy. As such, log files are generally accessible to and editable by attackers. Forcing log files to be writable only at the end of the file can prevent attackers from hiding their tracks.

Due to the OS limitations, we could not enforce partial write permissions on a file. Given the permissions the user requests, a file can be opened only in its entirety. The verify process is capable of enforcing a write-only access policy to files and attackers are not able to open a file in read-write mode, select, and delete the log entries that reveal their presence. Attackers would have to blindly delete entries or empty the entire log, actions that should be noticed by the system administrator. We believe that this policy can be proven to be a substantial hindrance to malicious actors trying to “cover their tracks” in the system.
4.3 Performance Overhead

In this section we present the performance overhead observed on the guest OS when running ferify. To have a baseline for comparison, we created a Python script\textsuperscript{14} that performs some of the trapped system calls and measures the execution time. From the results we calculated the average execution time of each system call and the standard deviation. We then performed time-execution measurements in three stages: The first was under normal CPU scheduling preferences. For the second run, we set the niceness of ferify to -20. Niceness for Linux is how favorable the scheduling will be for the process, with -20 being the best value and 10 the normal value. Finally, for the third run, in conjunction with changing the niceness of the process, we additionally set the input/output (I/O) niceness to the best available value. This changes the I/O scheduling of processes, giving ferify I/O priority over all others. Initially, we timed the execution of the script over a number of iterations without running ferify to extract an average time that we will use as a reference. Figure 4.7 shows the three commands we used to run ferify with different priorities.

\begin{verbatim}
$ sudo ./ferify
$ sudo nice -n -30 ./ferify
$ sudo nice -n -30 ionice -c 1 -n 0 ./ferify
\end{verbatim}

Figure 4.7. Ferify priority command-line settings.

4.3.1 Hypervisor - VM Switch

As mentioned in Subsection 2.4.1, one of the most intense operations in virtualization is the switch between the hypervisor and the VM. CPU virtualization extensions improve with every new model release, but this switch is still significant. To measure this overhead in performance, we ran ferify with empty SACLs. This way, ferify trapped the appropriate system calls and performed the switch between the VM and the hypervisor. Because the SACLs were empty, there was insignificant computation performed while on the hypervisor, almost immediately switching back to the VM.

Table 4.3 shows the results and the performance overhead of the VM context-switch. As expected, the cost of VM-exit and VM-entry is significant.

\textsuperscript{14}The source code of the performance test script is included in Appendix B.
Table 4.3. Context-switch performance overhead measurements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System call</th>
<th>With verify</th>
<th>Without verify</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg time (msec)</td>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>Avg time (msec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No scheduler priority set</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>1.410575</td>
<td>0.042011</td>
<td>0.272977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>1.177306</td>
<td>0.060151</td>
<td>0.119034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>1.265741</td>
<td>0.044768</td>
<td>0.110438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With best nice value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>1.808050</td>
<td>0.118523</td>
<td>0.272977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>1.510058</td>
<td>0.114244</td>
<td>0.119034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>1.617183</td>
<td>0.116488</td>
<td>0.110438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With best nice and ionice values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>1.763718</td>
<td>0.131143</td>
<td>0.272977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>1.547484</td>
<td>0.111831</td>
<td>0.119034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>1.648374</td>
<td>0.120758</td>
<td>0.110438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.2 SACL Performance Overhead

The information for the files in the SACLs is stored in a hash table. The index of the table is the pathname. Since the lookups made in the hash table depend on the depth of the file’s directory tree, the searching of a file in the SACL is of $O(d)$ complexity, where $d$ is the aforementioned depth. Since the depth of a directory tree is usually relatively short, we assess the algorithm to be efficient. To verify the claim that the search time does not depend on the entries of the SACL, we ran the same test with the same settings and files, but with different SACL sizes each time (as shown in Table 4.4). To avoid as much OS interference as we could, we set both settings of niceness to the best value. The results seem to support our claim; the average execution time of the tested system calls is of the same magnitude.

Table 4.4. Hash-table search times (msec).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System call</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>1,000</th>
<th>10,000</th>
<th>100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>0.203920</td>
<td>0.204899</td>
<td>0.206650</td>
<td>0.202786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>0.256427</td>
<td>0.256371</td>
<td>0.259813</td>
<td>0.255484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>0.191526</td>
<td>0.193019</td>
<td>0.194595</td>
<td>0.190740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the promising results, we needed to measure ferify’s total performance overhead
when running on a full filesystem. To evaluate *ferify*’s efficiency, we ran the same script as before, but with a full filesystem SACL containing more than 400,000 entries. For the purposes of testing, our VM had no extra programs installed and we had created just a few user files. In a normally used OS many more entries would be expected.

Although the increase in execution time seems extremely large, the average execution time of a single system call seems to remain within usable limits. While using the guest VM to evaluate the use experience, we did not notice any delays.

Table 4.5 shows the result of the second run of our test. We observed that the total performance overhead remained in the same magnitude. Some numbers might seem contradictory, but this is normal as the Linux kernel schedules each running process differently and continuously creates more. This is the reason we focused on the magnitude instead of the actual numbers. Compared to the dominant cost of switching between the hypervisor and the guest VM, we assessed that the hash-table implementation and the permission checking algorithm had an insignificant impact on performance. This is the exact reason we decided to trap each system call individually, instead of trapping the system call handler, which is the kernel’s entry point to all system calls. This case would cause even greater overhead, as the VM context switch would happen for each and every system call invoked by all processes running on the OS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System call</th>
<th>With <em>ferify</em></th>
<th>Without <em>ferify</em></th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg time (msec)</td>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>Avg time (msec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>1.742811</td>
<td>0.064730</td>
<td>0.272977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>1.824321</td>
<td>0.059661</td>
<td>0.119034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>1.627008</td>
<td>0.098494</td>
<td>0.110438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>With best nice value</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>1.743948</td>
<td>0.047873</td>
<td>0.272977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>1.776946</td>
<td>0.057694</td>
<td>0.119034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>1.593204</td>
<td>0.047137</td>
<td>0.110438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>With best nice and ionice values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open()</td>
<td>2.105518</td>
<td>0.101172</td>
<td>0.272977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rename()</td>
<td>2.170908</td>
<td>0.155974</td>
<td>0.119034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlink()</td>
<td>1.919827</td>
<td>0.149137</td>
<td>0.110438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion and Future Work

In this chapter, we present the benefits of ferify and the lessons we learned during its development. We also present some limitations of a security solution that is completely transparent to the guest VM, as we encountered them. Finally, we present some ideas for future development of ferify.

5.1 Conclusion

In this thesis we developed ferify, a virtual file-protection system for preventing a range of zero-day attacks. As mentioned in Chapter 2, other virtualization solutions exist, with others being continuously developed. We believe that ferify has some unique characteristics that make it more efficient than the already existing solutions. As we observed them, the benefits of ferify, as well as some limitations of a security solution that is completely transparent to the guest VM, can be summarized as follows:

- Deciding to use DRAKVUF [4] as our base platform, we necessarily gave ferify a zero-footprint in the guest VM, making it a full out-VM solution that cannot be detected by the guest VM. Although there are techniques for detecting whether an OS is virtualized or not, there is no way to detect whether ferify is running, nor how to bypass the settings of the SACL.
- Making ferify a complete out-VM solution in which all code and information is stored on the hypervisor makes interacting and subverting ferify almost impossible, effectively isolating our solution from the guest OS. Hypervisor-based attacks are outside the scope of this thesis: we expect that hypervisors will become more secure and robust over time.
- Using ferify can provide significant improvement on an OS’s file confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As we have managed to tighten the Linux file permissions, we can enforce a different user-based ACL policy than the one in the guest OS, protecting critical files and information in a transparent way. We can deny reading, modification, and deletion of files, as well as execution of programs, on a white-list basis. Applying all these for the root account also offers a significant improvement
in information security and system integrity, as until now the system’s administrator could access everything stored on the OS.

• Using ferify also provides kernel security and integrity by denying kernel module loading and new kernel booting. This step ensures that the guest OS kernel will remain unmodified by attackers, and that existing and new zero-day attacks will not work on a ferify protected VM.

• Using the LibVMI’s current API is limited to accessing and modifying a VM’s CPU registers or memory contents. It does not provide functions to access files and devices. This is an important limitation on what introspection can achieve. For cases like ferify, protecting files must be done on a different level than that of the actual file. This is the reason we had to trap the system calls and introduce an insignificant performance overhead.

• Assessing performance overhead, as measured in Section 4.3, is a significant consideration. Trapping of many system calls can result in a less usable environment. Our measurements were performed using only one VM. In a more expanded environment, where many VMs are running, the hypervisor-VM switch overhead can increase significantly and be a limiting factor in the use of virtualization security applications.

• Making assumptions and inferences of the high-level actions in a VM by examining its internal state is at best extremely difficult, if not impossible, as we acknowledged in Chapter 2 in regard to the existing data semantic gap between the hypervisor and a VM. To achieve that, we need to know the internals of the guest OS at a deep level in order to be able to retrieve information that allows us to recreate the high-level actions. This data semantic gap is a huge obstacle and limitation of an out-VM security solution. In the case of ferify, the design was such that we did not need to make any inferences about the state of the guest OS. The file access control policy monitoring does not need to implement intricate relations between different kernel memory structures or user space memory. This allowed for a simpler design, but could become more complex as new features might need access to additional data.
5.2 Lessons Learned

During the development of ferify we encountered some problems, which we were required to solve in order to continue our progress.

Creating an out-VM solution has some challenges, with the most important being the data semantic gap mentioned in Chapter 2. Although for ferify there is need for minimal context of what is happening in the guest VM, we needed to bridge that gap in some cases. This bridging required deep research of the Linux kernel to determine where the required information is stored and how to recreate some information that is not directly stored in the kernel. In the case of the development of a solution that is required to make some decisions and inferences based on higher level information, bridging this semantic gap could be extremely challenging.

To make a more complete and robust application, researchers must understand that building a security solution is a complex process that requires several iterations and revisiting of already implemented parts for improvements and integration of newer features. During this thesis, we initially considered trapping only three system calls. As ferify evolved, and we discovered other vectors of file access, we finally trapped a total of 19 system calls so that we could monitor all possible ways of accessing a file.

5.3 Future Work

As in every case of a developed application, ferify can also be improved to provide enhanced efficiency and better monitoring. Although we believe that we have addressed all possible ways a file can be accessed, there are ways ferify can be improved:

- Finding the thread count of a process and monitoring the additions and exits should be added in ferify’s logic. Although the basic functionality is present, missing the initial thread count of a process does not allow us to know when a process completely terminates, and is not always removed from our task list. This can result in some errors during the validation of the process’s identity, particularly in the case of the creation of a new process with a duplicate pid as the one we did not detect exiting. Although we have trapped the exit_group() system call, we cannot be sure that the last thread will invoke it and not the exit() system call. Furthermore, more
research and testing is required to verify whether multi-threaded processes have the same CR3 value between threads and keep track of it for use in the process identity validation.

- Testing ferify in our research, we used a single-CPU VM. Future work might be needed to modify ferify to work on multi-CPU VMs. DRAKVUF, when running a callback function, provides the information about the virtual-CPU that causes the VM-exit event. That information can be used to adjust ferify’s code, if needed, to trap and handle all system calls from all virtual-CPUs of the guest VM.
- Reloading the SACLs while ferify is running is a desired feature that would also make ferify more robust and secure. This could be done by registering a new signal handler, or modifying an existing one, to destroy and recreate the hash tables from the new SACLs. Additionally, the development of an administrative interface that allows easier management of the SACLs will increase the usability of the system. Currently, if there is a need to change the SACLs, we need to terminate ferify and relaunch it for the changes to take effect, leaving a window of vulnerability between the termination and re-initialization of ferify.
- Blocking all kernal modules that users try to load, which ferify currently accomplishes, is a good start. Usually, after the system has booted there is no need to load a new kernel module. There are cases though, that a trusted kernel module needs to be loaded. Allowing digitally signed modules can improve usability of the system, as they can be considered trusted and allowed to execute. This could be implemented by reading the digital signature from the hypervisor and then checking its validity before continuing execution of the guest VM.
- Logging of important events in a VM is a current capability of ferify. A notification mechanism to alert the system’s administrators of illegal access would improve incident response time. This mechanism could potentially include options like auto-pausing for handling a maliciously accessed VM.
- Testing must be done to ensure compatibility with other Linux distribution as our development only used the Ubuntu distribution. We expect that this will not be an issue as most Linux distributions use the same kernel.

The previous list is by no means exhaustive. As new problems or desired features surface, other features or enhancements are likely to be required.
APPENDIX A:
File Access Test Script

This appendix contains the script we created to test the various file access methods.

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>

int main(int argc, char** argv){

    int fp = 0, r = 0;
    void * buf = malloc(64);
    char * a = "a";
    struct passwd *p = getpwuid(getuid());

    fp = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
    if (fp < 0){
        printf("Failure: Could not open %s for reading by user %s. Cannot copy .\n", argv[1], p->pw_name);
    } else {
        printf("Success: Opened %s for reading by user %s. Able to copy.\n", argv[1], p->pw_name);
        close(fp);
    }

    fp = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY);
    if (fp < 0){
        printf("Failure: Could not open %s for writing by user %s.\n", argv[1], p->pw_name);
    } else {
        printf("Success: Opened %s for writing by user %s.\n", argv[1], p->pw_name);
        close(fp);
    }

    fp = open(argv[2], O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666);
    if (fp < 0){
        printf("Failure: %s could not be created by user %s.\n", argv[2], p->pw_name);
    } else {
        printf("Success: %s created by user %s.\n", argv[2], p->pw_name);
        close(fp);
    }
}
```
fp = unlink(argv[2]);
if (fp != 0) {
    printf("Failure: user %s could not delete %s\n", p->pw_name, argv[2]);
} else {
    printf("Success: user %s deleted %s\n", p->pw_name, argv[2]);
}

fp = rename(argv[1], argv[3]);
if (fp != 0) {
    printf("Failure: user %s could not move %s to %s\n", p->pw_name, argv[1], argv[3]);
} else {
    printf("Success: user %s moved %s to %s\n", p->pw_name, argv[1], argv[3]);
    fp = rename(argv[3], argv[1]);
}

return 0;
}
This appendix contains the script we created to measure the performance overhead of `verify`.

```python
#!/usr/bin/python3

import time
from timeit import default_timer as timer
import math
import os
import sys

def test(iterations = 100, sleep_time = 1):
    timing_overhead = []
    total_timing = 0

    o_results = []
    o_total = 0
    o_avg = 0
    o_s = 0
    o_var = 0

    u_results = []
    u_total = 0
    u_avg = 0
    u_s = 0
    u_var = 0

    r_results = []
    r_total = 0
    r_avg = 0
    r_s = 0
    r_var = 0

    for i in range(iterations):
        f = open("test" + str(i) + ".txt", "w")
        f.close()

        o_start = timer()
        for i in range(iterations):
            time.sleep(sleep_time)
        o_stop = timer()
        baseline = o_stop - o_start

        f = [None] * iterations
```
o_start = timer()
for i in range(iterations):
    f[i] = open("test" + str(i) + ".txt", "w")
    time.sleep(sleep_time)
o_stop = timer()
o_overhead = ((o_stop - o_start) - baseline) / iterations
for i in range(iterations):
    f[i].close()

r_start = timer()
for i in range(iterations):
    os.rename("test" + str(i) + ".txt", "test" + str(i) + "._.txt")
    time.sleep(sleep_time)
r_stop = timer()
r_overhead = ((r_stop - r_start) - baseline) / iterations

u_start = timer()
for i in range(iterations):
    os.unlink("test" + str(i) + "._.txt")
    time.sleep(sleep_time)
u_stop = timer()
u_overhead = ((u_stop - u_start) - baseline) / iterations

print("Timing:	" + str(baseline))
print("Open:	" + str(o_overhead))
print("Rename:	" + str(r_overhead))
print("Unlink:	" + str(u_overhead))

if __name__ == '__main__':
    if len(sys.argv) == 3:
        test(int(sys.argv[1]), int(sys.argv[2]))
    else:
        test()
This appendix contains the two files of ferify. The license terms presented in both files are verbatim those of DRAKVUF.

ferify.h

```c
/**********************************IMPORTANT DRAKVUF LICENSE TERMS**********************************
  *
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  * software, alternative licenses can be acquired from the author.
  *
  * Note that the GPL places important restrictions on "derivative works",
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  * misunderstandings, we interpret that term as broadly as copyright law
  * allows. For example, we consider an application to constitute a
  * derivative work for the purpose of this license if it does any of the
  * following with any software or content covered by this license
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  *
  * o Integrates source code from Covered Software.
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  * o Is designed specifically to execute Covered Software and parse the
    results (as opposed to typical shell or execution-menu apps, which will
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  * o Includes Covered Software in a proprietary executable installer. The
    installers produced by InstallShield are an example of this. Including
    DRAKVUF with other software in compressed or archival form does not
    trigger this provision, provided appropriate open source decompression
    or de-archiving software is widely available for no charge. For the
    purposes of this license, an installer is considered to include Covered
    Software even if it actually retrieves a copy of Covered Software from
    another source during runtime (such as by downloading it from the
    Internet).
  *
  *  
  *
  *
```
* o Links (statically or dynamically) to a library which does any of the
* above.
* *
* o Executes a helper program, module, or script to do any of the above.
* *
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* This also allows you to audit the software for security holes.
* *
* Source code also allows you to port DRAKVUF to new platforms, fix bugs,
* and add new features. You are highly encouraged to submit your changes
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**************************************************************************
*/

#define FERIFY_H

#define MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4096
#define MAX_FILENAME_LEN 256
#define AT_FDCWD1 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF9C
#define AT_FDCWD2 0xFFFFFFFF9C
#define PERMISSIONS 07
#define S_ISDIR 040000
#define MATCH 0
#define ROOT 0
#define USER 1
#define GROUP 2
#define OTHER 3
#define INV -1
#define SOURCE 0
#define DEST 1
#define IS_FILE 0
#define IS_DIR 16384
#define MAX_SUDOERS_COUNT 16
#define S_OPEN 2
#define S_CLOSE 3
#define S_CLONE 56
#define S_FORK 57
#define S_VFORK 58
#define S_OPENAT 257
#define S_RENAME 82
#define S_RENAMEAT 264
#define S_RENAMEAT2 316
#define S_UNLINK 87
#define S_UNLINKAT 263
#define S_SYMLINK 88

#define S_SYMLINKAT 266
#define S_LINK 86
#define S_LINKAT 265
#define S_EXECVE 59
#define S_EXECVEAT 322
#define S_INIT_MOD 175
#define S_FINIT_MOD 313
#define S_TRUNCATE 76
#define S_EXIT 60
#define S_EXIT_GROUP 231
#define S_NAME_TO_HANDLE_AT 303
#define S_OPEN_BY_HANDLE_AT 304
#define S_KEXEC_LOAD 246
#define S_KEXEC_FILE_LOAD 320

#include <glib.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include "plugins/plugins.h"
#include "plugins/private.h"

typedef struct protected_files {
    char * pathname;
    unsigned int mode;
    uid_t u, g;
    struct protected_files * next = NULL;
} p_files;

typedef struct task_t {
    addr_t task_addr;
    pid_t pid;
    uint64_t uid;
    gid_t gid;
    uint32_t threads = 0;
    short checked = 1;
} task;

typedef struct task_entry_t {
    addr_t task_addr;
    struct task ;
} task_entry;

typedef struct entry_t {
    unsigned int mode;
    uid_t u;
    gid_t g;
} entry;

class ferify: public plugin {


private:
    GSList *traps;

public:
    uint8_t reg_size;
    output_format_t format;
    os_t os;
    addr_t rva = 0;
    addr_t kaslr = 0;

    addr_t s_open = 0;
    addr_t s_openat = 0;
    addr_t s_rename = 0;
    addr_t s_renameat = 0;
    addr_t s_renameat2 = 0;
    addr_t s_unlink = 0;
    addr_t s_unlinkat = 0;
    addr_t s_close = 0;
    addr_t s_execve = 0;
    addr_t s_execveat = 0;
    addr_t s_exit = 0;
    addr_t s_exit_group = 0;
    addr_t s_truncate = 0;
    addr_t fork_ret = 0;
    addr_t s_clone = 0;
    addr_t s_fork = 0;
    addr_t s_vfork = 0;
    addr_t s_symlink = 0;
    addr_t s_symlinkat = 0;
    addr_t s_link = 0;
    addr_t s_linkat = 0;
    addr_t s_init_mod = 0;
    addr_t s_finit_mod = 0;
    addr_t s_kexec_load = 0;
    addr_t s_kexec_file_load = 0;
    task *task_list[32768] = { NULL };
    vmi_pid_t p_pid = -1;

    GHashTable *filelist = NULL;
    GHashTable *filelist_root = NULL;
    GHashTable *folderlist = NULL;
    GHashTable *folderlist_root = NULL;

    uint32_t sudoers[MAX_SUDOERS_COUNT] = { 0 };
    verify(drakvuf_t drakvuf, const void *config, output_format_t output);
    ~verify();
};

int permissions_check2(drakvuf_t drakvuf, char *filename, entry *e,
    drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, int id, int reg);
int identity_check(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, vmi_pid_t current_pid);
int add_task(ferify * f, vmi_pid_t current_pid, uid_t u, gid_t g, addr_t process, short checked);
void intercept_print(drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, char * filename, char * filename2, vmi_pid_t currpid);
void process_list(drakvuf_t drakvuf, ferify * s, vmi_instance_t vmi);
void check_syscall_table_corruption(ferify *s, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info);
char * get_pathname(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, char * filename, int append_filename);
char * get_dirfd(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, vmi_instance_t vmi, char * filename, vmi_pid_t currpid, addr_t process_base);
char * get_pathname_from_reg(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, vmi_instance_t vmi, vmi_pid_t currpid, int reg);
char * get_pathname_from_reg_at(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info, vmi_instance_t vmi, vmi_pid_t currpid, addr_t process_base, int reg);
static event_response_t fork_cb(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info);
static event_response_t exit_cb(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info);
void free_entry(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data);
#endif

free_entry(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data);
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another source during runtime (such as by downloading it from the
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− o Links (statically or dynamically) to a library which does any of the
above.

− o Executes a helper program, module, or script to do any of the above.

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static event_response_t linux_cb(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info) {
    ferify *s = (ferify*)info->trap->data;
    char *name, *filename = NULL, *filename2 = NULL, *dirfd = NULL;
    size_t t = 0, len = 0, len2 = 0;
    p_files *check = NULL, *check2 = NULL;
    vmi_instance_t vmi = NULL;
    vmi_pid_t currpid;
    uid_t uid = 0;
    gid_t gid = 0;
    uint64_t val = 0;
    uint64_t mode = 0;
    addr_t addr = 0, process_base = 0;
    void *k = NULL, *v = NULL;
    entry *e = NULL;
    gchar *f = NULL, *f2 = NULL;
    gchar *h = NULL, *h2 = NULL;
    uint32_t fd = 3;
    access_context_t ctx;
    vmi = drakvuf_lock_and_get_vmi(drakvuf);
    currpid = vmi_dtb_to_pid(vmi, info->regs->cr3);
    process_base = drakvuf_get_current_process(drakvuf, info->vcpu);
    if (process_base == 0) {
        printf("[ ERROR ] Could not get current process base.\n");
    }
    check_syscall_table_corruption(s, info);
    switch (info->regs->rax){
case S_OPEN:
case S_RENAME:
case S_UNLINK:
case S_TRUNCATE:
case S_LINK:
case S_SYMLINK:
case S_SYMLINKAT:
    filename = get_pathname_from_reg(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, 1);
    break;

case S_OPENAT:
case S_UNLINKAT:
case S_RENAMEAT:
case S_RENAMEAT2:
case S_LINKAT:
case S_EXECVEAT:
    filename = get_pathname_from_reg_at(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, process_base, 2);
    break;

default:
    if (info->regs->rax == s->s_execve)
        filename = get_pathname_from_reg(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, 1);
    else if (info->regs->rax == s->s_execveat)
        filename = get_pathname_from_reg_at(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, process_base, 2);
    break;
}

if (filename != NULL){
    if (strncmp(filename, "/dev/", 5) == 0){
        drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf);
        return 0;
    }
    if (strncmp(filename, "/run/user/", 10) == 0){
        drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf);
        return 0;
    }
    if (strncmp(filename, "/sys/", 5) == 0){
        drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf);
        return 0;
    }
}

switch (info->regs->rax){
case S_OPEN:  // Open syscall
    case S_OPENAT:  // openat syscall
47
if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
    break;
}

if (filename == NULL) {
    break;
}

switch (info->userid) {
    case ROOT: // Cases for filtering root access
        // Check root folder list
        if (filename != NULL) {
            h = g_strdup(filename);
            f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
            while (f != NULL) {
                f[1] = '\0';
                if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v))
                {
                    e = (entry *)v;
                    permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
                    break;
                }
                f[0] = '\0';
                f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
            }

        // Check root file list
        if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename, &k, &v)){
            e = (entry *)v;
            permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
            break;
        }
        break;
    default: // other users
        // Check folder list
        if (filename != NULL ) {
            h = g_strdup(filename);
            f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
            while (f != NULL) {
                f[1] = '\0';
                if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, h, &k, &v)){
                    e = (entry *)v;
                    if (e->u == info->userid) {
                        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
                    } else {
                        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, INV);
                    }
                    break;
                }
                f[0] = '\0';
                f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
            }
        }
        break;
}

break;
}
else if (e->g == info->groupid){
  permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
  break;
}
else {
  permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
  break;
}
}
f[0] = '"\0';
f = g_strrstr(h, "/*/");

// Check file list
if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, filename, &k, &v)){
e = (entry *)v;
  if (e->u == info->userid){
    permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
    break;
  }
  else if (e->g == info->groupid){
    permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
    break;
  }
  else {
    permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
    break;
  }
  break;
}
}
break;

case S_RENAME:     // Rename syscall
  case S_RENAMEAT:  // renameat syscall
  case S_RENAMEAT2:
  case S_LINK:
  case S_SYMLINK:
  case S_LINKAT:
  case S_SYMLINKAT:
  switch(info->regs->rax){
    case S_RENAME:
    case S_LINK:
    case S_SYMLINK:
      filename2 = get_pathname_from_reg(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, 2)
if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
    intercept_print(info, filename, filename2, currpid);
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
    break;
}

break;

switch (info->userid) {
    case ROOT: // Cases for filtering root access
        // Check root folder list
        if (filename != NULL) {
            h = g_strdup(filename);
            f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
            while (f != NULL) {
                f[1] = '\0';
                if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v))
                {
                    // Process found root folder
                    continue;
                }
            }
        }
        break;
    case S_RENAMEAT:
    case S_RENAMEAT2:
    case S_LINKAT:
        filename2 = get_pathname_from_reg_at(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, process_base, 4);
        if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
            intercept_print(info, filename, filename2, currpid);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            break;
        }
        break;
    case S_SYMLINKAT:
        filename2 = get_pathname_from_reg_at(drakvuf, info, vmi, currpid, process_base, 3);
        if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
            intercept_print(info, filename, filename2, currpid);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDX, info->vcpu);
            break;
        }
        break;
}

{ 
    e = (entry *)v;
    permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, SOURCE);
}

    break;
}

f[0] = '\0';

if (filename2 != NULL) {
    h2 = g_strdup(filename2);
    f2 = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    while (f2 != NULL) {
        f2[1] = '\0';
        if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h2, &k, &v)) {
            e = (entry *)v;
            permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename2, e, info, ROOT, DEST);
            break;
        }
        f2[0] = '\0';
        f2 = g_strrstr(h2, "/");
    } // Check root file list
    if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename2, &k, &v)) {
        e = (entry *)v;
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename2, e, info, ROOT, DEST);
    }
}

break; // other users

if (filename != NULL) {
    h = g_strdup(filename);
    f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    while (f != NULL) {
        f[1] = '\0';
        if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v)) {
            e = (entry *)v;
            permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, SOURCE);
            break;
        }
        f[0] = '\0';
        f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    } // Check root file list
    if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename, &k, &v)) {
        e = (entry *)v;
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, SOURCE);
        break;
    }
}

break;
f[1] = '\0';
if( g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, h, &k, &v)) {
  e = (entry *)v;
  if (e->u == info->userid){
    permissions_check2(dracvuf, filename, e, info, USER, SOURCE);
    break;
  }
  else if (e->g == info->groupid){
    permissions_check2(dracvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, SOURCE);
    break;
  }
  else {
    permissions_check2(dracvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, SOURCE);
    break;
  }
}
}
f[0] = '\0';
f = g_strrstr(h, "/");

if ( filename2 != NULL ) {
  h2 = g_strdup(filename2);
  f2 = g_strrstr(h, "/");
  while (f2 != NULL) {
    f2[1] = '\0';
    if( g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, h2, &k, &v)) {
      e = (entry *)v;
      if (e->u == info->userid){
        permissions_check2(dracvuf, filename2, e, info, USER, DEST);
        break;
      }
      else if (e->g == info->groupid){
        permissions_check2(dracvuf, filename2, e, info, GROUP, DEST);
        break;
      }
      else {
        permissions_check2(dracvuf, filename2, e, info, OTHER, DEST);
        break;
      }
    }
    f2[0] = '\0';
    f2 = g_strrstr(h2, "/");
  }
}
if ( filename != NULL ) {
    if( g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, filename, &k, &v)) {
        e = (entry *)v;
        if (e->u == info->userid){
            permissions_check2(dракувф, filename, e, info, USER, SOURCE);
            break;
        } else if (e->g == info->groupid){
            permissions_check2(dракувф, filename, e, info, GROUP, SOURCE);
            break;
        } else {
            permissions_check2(dрукувф, filename, e, info, OTHER, SOURCE);
            break;
        }
    }
}

if ( filename2 != NULL ) {
    if( g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename2, &k, &v)) {
        e = (entry *)v;
        if (e->u == info->userid){
            permissions_check2(dрукувф, filename2, e, info, USER, DEST);
            break;
        } else if (e->g == info->groupid){
            permissions_check2(dрукувф, filename2, e, info, GROUP, DEST);
            break;
        } else {
            permissions_check2(dрукувф, filename2, e, info, OTHER, DEST);
            break;
        }
    }
}

break;

case S_UNLINK:    // unlink syscall (to prevent deletion of a file)
case S_UNLINKAT:  // unlinkat syscall (to prevent deletion of a file)

    if (identity_check(dрукувф, info, currpid) == false) {
intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);

vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
break;
}

switch (info->userid) {
  
  case ROOT: // Cases for filtering root access
    
    if (filename != NULL) {
      h = g_strdup(filename);
      f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
      while (f != NULL) {
        f[1] = '0';
        if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v)) {
          e = (entry *)v;
          permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
          break;
        }
        f[0] = '0';
        f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
      }
    }

    if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename, &k, &v)) {
      e = (entry *)v;
      permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
    }
    
    break; // other users

  default: // other users
    if (filename != NULL) {
      h = g_strdup(filename);
      f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
      while (f != NULL) {
        f[1] = '0';
        if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, h, &k, &v)) {
          e = (entry *)v;
          if (e->u == info->userid) {
            permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
          } else if (e->g == info->groupid) {
            permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
          }
      }
    }
  }
break;
}
else {
    permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
    break;
}
break;
break;
break;

f[0] = '\0';
f = g_strrstr(h, "*/");

if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, filename, &k, &v))
{
    e = (entry *)v;
    if (e->u == info->userid){
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
        break;
    } else if (e->g == info->groupid){
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
        break;
    } else {
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
        break;
    }
}
break;
}
break);

break;

case S_TRUNCATE: // unlink syscall (to prevent deletion of a file)
if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
    break;
}

switch (info->userid){

case ROOT: // Cases for filtering root access

if (filename != NULL ) {
    h = g_strdup(filename);
    f = g_strrstr(h, "*/");
    while (f != NULL ) {
        f[1] = '\0';
        if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v))

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e = (entry *)v;
permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
break;
}
f[0] = '\0';
f = g_strstr(h, "/");
}

if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s−>filelist_root, filename, &k, &v)){
e = (entry *)v;
permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
}
break;
default: // other users

if (filename != NULL ) {
h = g_strdup(filename);
f = g_strstr(h, "/*");
while (f != NULL ) {
f[1] = '\0';
if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s−>filelist, h, &k, &v)){
e = (entry *)v;
if (e−>u == info−>userid){
permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV)
break;
}
else if (e−>g == info−>groupid){
permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV)
break;
}
else {
permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV)
break;
}
break;

break;
}
f[0] = '\0';
f = g_strstr(h, "/");
}

if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s−>filelist, filename, &k, &v))
e = (entry *)v;
if (e->u == info->userid){
  permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
  break;
} else if (e->g == info->groupid){
  permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
  break;
} else {
  permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
  break;
}
break;
}

break;

case S_NAME_TO_HANDLE_AT:
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
  intercept_print(info, NULL, NULL, currpid);
  break;

case S_OPEN_BY_HANDLE_AT:
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
  intercept_print(info, NULL, NULL, currpid);
  break;

case S_INIT_MOD:
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
  break;

case S_FINIT_MOD:
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, -1, RDI, info->vcpu);
  break;

case S_KEXEC_LOAD:
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDX, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, R10, info->vcpu);
  break;

case S_KEXEC_FILE_LOAD:
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDX, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, R10, info->vcpu);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, R8, info->vcpu);
  break;
case S_FORK:
case S_VFORK:
s->p_pid = currpid;
if (s->task_list[currpid] == NULL) {
  add_task(s, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, process_base, 1);
}
intercept_print(info, NULL, NULL, currpid);
break;

case S_CLONE:
s->p_pid = currpid;
if (s->task_list[currpid] == NULL) {
  add_task(s, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, process_base, 1);
}
intercept_print(info, NULL, NULL, currpid);
break;

case S_EXECVE:
case S_EXECVEAT:
if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
  intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
  vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
  break;
}

switch (info->userid){

case ROOT:  // Cases for filtering root access

  if (filename != NULL) {
    h = g_strdup(filename);
    f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    while (f != NULL) {
      f[1] = '\0';
      if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v)) {
        e = (entry *)v;
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
        break;
      }
      f[0] = '\0';
      f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    }
    if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename, &k, &v)) {
      e = (entry *)v;
      permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
    }
  }

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break;

default: // other users

if ( filename != NULL ) {
    h = g_strdup(filename);
    f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    while (f != NULL ) {
        f[1] = '\0';
        if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, h, &k, &v)) {
            e = (entry *)v;
            if (e->u == info->userid) {
                permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
                break;
            } else if (e->g == info->groupid) {
                permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
                break;
            } else {
                permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
            }
        }
        f[0] = '\0';
        f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    }
}

if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, filename, &k, &v) != 0) {
    e = (entry *)v;
    if (e->u == info->userid) {
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
        break;
    } else if (e->g == info->groupid) {
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
        break;
    } else {
        permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
    }
    break;
}
break;

break;

default:

if ((info->regs->rax == s->s_execve) || (info->regs->rax == s->s_execveat)){
  if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
    break;
  }
  switch (info->userid){
    case ROOT: // Cases for filtering root access
      if (filename != NULL) {
        h = g_strdup(filename);
        f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
        while (f != NULL) {
          f[1] = '\0';
          if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, h, &k, &v)) {
            e = (entry *)v;
            permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
          } else {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked execution of %s for user: %ld because it was NOT in the SACL.\n", filename, info->userid);
          }
          f[0] = '\0';
          f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
        }
        if(g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist_root, filename, &k, &v)) {
          e = (entry *)v;
          permissions_check2(drakvuf, filename, e, info, ROOT, INV);
        } else {
          vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
          intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
          printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked execution of %s for user: %ld because it was NOT in the SACL.\n", filename, info->userid);
        }
      }
  }
break;

default: // other users
if (filename != NULL) {
    h = g_strdup(filename);
    f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    while (f != NULL) {
        f[1] = '\0';
        if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, h, &k, &v)) {
            e = (entry*)v;
            if (e->u == info->userid) {
                permissions_check2(drvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
                break;
            } else if (e->g == info->groupid) {
                permissions_check2(drvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
                break;
            } else {
                permissions_check2(drvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
                break;
            }
        }
        f[0] = '\0';
        f = g_strrstr(h, "/");
    }

    if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended(s->filelist, filename, &k, &v) != 0) {
        e = (entry*)v;
        if (e->u == info->userid) {
            permissions_check2(drvuf, filename, e, info, USER, INV);
            break;
        } else if (e->g == info->groupid) {
            permissions_check2(drvuf, filename, e, info, GROUP, INV);
            break;
        } else {
            permissions_check2(drvuf, filename, e, info, OTHER, INV);
            break;
        }
    } else {
        vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
        intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
        printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked execution of \%s for user: \%ld because it was NOT in the SACL.\n", filename, info->userid);
    }
else if ( (info->regs->rax == s->s_clone) ||
           (info->regs->rax == s->s_fork) ||
           (info->regs->rax == s->s_vfork) ) {

    if (identity_check(drakvuf, info, currpid) == false) {
        intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
        vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
        break;
    }

    s->p_pid = currpid;
    if (s->task_list[currpid] == NULL) {
        add_task(s, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, process_base, 1);
    }

    break;
}

drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf);
return 0;

---

static GSList* create_trap_config(drakvuf_t drakvuf, ferify *s, symbols_t *
symbols, const char* rekkall_profile) {

    GSList *ret = NULL;
    unsigned long i, j;
    uint64_t sc = 0;

    PRINT_DEBUG("Received %lu symbols\n", symbols->count);

    if (s->os == VMI_OS_WINDOWS ) {
        printf("OS not supported.\n");
        throw -1;
    }

    if (s->os == VMI_OS_LINUX ) {
        addr_t rva = 0;
        
        sc = 0;
        for (i = 0; i < symbols->count; i++) {
            sc += symbols->values[i] - symbols->base;
        }
        
        ret = g_slist_prepend(ret, g_slist_new());
        ret->data = &sc;
        ret->data2 = symbols;
        ret->data3 = rekkall_profile;
        ret->data4 = NULL;
        
    return ret;
}
addr_t offset = 0x0001000000000000;

if ( !drakvuf_get_constant_rva(rekall_profile, "_text", &rva) )
    return NULL;

s->rva = rva;
addr_t kaslr = drakvuf_get_kernel_base(drakvuf) - rva;

s->kaslr = kaslr;

for (i=0; i < symbols->count; i++)
{
    const struct symbol *symbol = &symbols->symbols[i];

    if ( strcmp(symbol->name, "system_call") == 0) {
        printf("%s\n", symbol->name);
    }

    if ( strcmp(symbol->name, "ret_from_fork") == 0) {
        printf("[ INFO ] Adding trap to ret_from_fork in %" PRIx64 "\n", symbol->rva + kaslr);

        drakvuf_trap_t *trap = (drakvuf_trap_t *)g_malloc0(sizeof(drakvuf_trap_t));
        trap->breakpoint.lookup_type = LOOKUP_PID;
        trap->breakpoint.pid = 0;
        trap->breakpoint.addr_type = ADDR_VA;
        trap->breakpoint.addr = symbol->rva + kaslr;
        trap->breakpoint.module = "linux";
        trap->name = g_strdup(symbol->name);
        trap->type = BREAKPOINT;
        trap->cb = fork_cb;
        trap->data = s;

        ret = g_slist_prepend(ret, trap);
    }

    if ( strncmp(symbol->name, "sys_exit", 8) == 0){
        PRINT_DEBUG("[ INFO ] Adding trap to %s at 0x%x (kaslr 0x%x)\n", symbol->name, symbol->rva + kaslr, kaslr);
        printf("[ INFO ] Adding trap to %s in %" PRIx64 "\n", symbol->name, symbol->rva + kaslr);

        drakvuf_trap_t *trap = (drakvuf_trap_t *)g_malloc0(sizeof(drakvuf_trap_t));
        trap->breakpoint.lookup_type = LOOKUP_PID;
        trap->breakpoint.pid = 0;
        trap->breakpoint.addr_type = ADDR_VA;

    }

    fork_ret = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
}
trap->breakpoint.addr = symbol->rva + kaslr;
trap->breakpoint.module = "linux";
trap->name = g_strdup(symbol->name);
trap->type = BREAKPOINT;
trap->cb = exit_cb;
trap->data = s;
ret = g_slist_prepend(ret, trap);

if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_exit") == 0)
    s->s_exit = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_exit_group") == 0)
    s->s_exit_group = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
}

if ((strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_open")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_openat")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_link")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_linkat")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_vfork")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_cloned")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_vfork")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_symlink")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_symlinkat")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_execve")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_execveat")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_init_module")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_finit_module")) &&
    // (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_close")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_rename")) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_renameat", 12)) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_unlink", 10)) &&
    (strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_truncate"))
    continue;

/* This is the address of the table itself so skip it */
if (!strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_call_table") )
    continue;
}

PRINT_DEBUG("[ INFO ] Adding trap to %s at 0x%lx (kaslr 0x%lx)\n", symbol->name, symbol->rva + kaslr, kaslr);
printf("[ INFO ] Adding trap to %s in %" PRIx64 "\n", symbol->name, symbol->rva + kaslr);

drakvuf_trap_t *trap = (drakvuf_trap_t *)g_malloc0(sizeof(drakvuf_trap_t));
trap->breakpoint.lookup_type = LOOKUP_PID;
trap->breakpoint.pid = 0;
trap->breakpoint.addr_type = ADDR_VA;
trap->breakpoint.addr = symbol->rva + kaslr;
trap->breakpoint.module = "linux";
trap->name = g_strdup(symbol->name);
trap->type = BREAKPOINT;
trap->cb = linux_cb;
trap->data = s;

ret = g_slist_prepend(ret, trap);

if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_open") == 0)
  s->s_open = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_openat") == 0)
  s->s_openat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_execve") == 0)
  s->s_execve = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_execveat") == 0)
  s->s_execveat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_clone") == 0)
  s->s_clone = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_fork") == 0)
  s->s_fork = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_vfork") == 0)
  s->s_vfork = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_rename") == 0)
  s->s_rename = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_renameat") == 0)
  s->s_renameat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_renameat2") == 0)
  s->s_renameat2 = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_unlink") == 0)
  s->s_unlink = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_unlinkat") == 0)
  s->s_unlinkat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_truncate") == 0)
  s->s_truncate = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
}

return ret;
}

ferify::ferify(drakvuf_t drakvuf, const void *config, output_format_t output)
{
  FILE *fp = NULL;

  char tmp[MAX_PATHNAME_LEN];

  trap->breakpoint.addr = symbol->rva + kaslr;
  trap->breakpoint.module = "linux";
  trap->name = g_strdup(symbol->name);
  trap->type = BREAKPOINT;
  trap->cb = linux_cb;
  trap->data = s;

  ret = g_slist_prepend(ret, trap);

  if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_open") == 0)
    s->s_open = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_openat") == 0)
    s->s_openat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_execve") == 0)
    s->s_execve = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_execveat") == 0)
    s->s_execveat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_clone") == 0)
    s->s_clone = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_fork") == 0)
    s->s_fork = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_vfork") == 0)
    s->s_vfork = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_rename") == 0)
    s->s_rename = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_renameat") == 0)
    s->s_renameat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_renameat2") == 0)
    s->s_renameat2 = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_unlink") == 0)
    s->s_unlink = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_unlinkat") == 0)
    s->s_unlinkat = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  else if(strcmp(symbol->name, "sys_truncate") == 0)
    s->s_truncate = symbol->rva + kaslr + offset;
  }

  return ret;
}
int i = 0;
int q = 0;
unsigned int uu, gg, mm;
int len = 0;
int count = 0;
p_files * file = NULL, * next = NULL;
const char * rekall_profile = (const char *) config;
char * name;
char filename[MAX_FILENAME_LEN] = {'\0'};
char sudo_file[MAX_FILENAME_LEN] = {'\0'};
char c[11] = {'\0'};
uint32_t sudoer = 0;
entry * e = NULL, * v1 = NULL;
void * k = NULL, * v = NULL;
this->filelist = g_hash_table_new_full(g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, g_free);
this->filelist_root = g_hash_table_new_full(g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, g_free);
symbols_t * symbols = drakvuf_get_symbols_from_rekall(rekall_profile);
if (!symbols)
{
    fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse Rekall profile at %s\n",
        rekall_profile);
    throw -1;
}
this->os = drakvuf_get_os_type(drakvuf);
this->traps = create_trap_config(drakvuf, this, symbols, rekall_profile);
this->format = output;
vmi_instance_t vmi = drakvuf_lock_and_get_vmi(drakvuf);
this->reg_size = vmi_get_address_width(vmi); // 4 or 8 (bytes)
drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf);
vmi_pause_vm(vmi);
name = vmi_get_name(vmi);
strncat(filename, "/root/", 255 - strlen(filename));
strncat(sudo_file, "/root/", 255 - strlen(sudo_file));
strncat(filename, name, 255 - strlen(filename));
strncat(sudo_file, name, 255 - strlen(sudo_file));
strncat(filename, "_pfiles", 255 - strlen(filename));
strncat(sudo_file, "_sudoers", 255 - strlen(sudo_file));
fp = fopen(sudo_file, "r");
printf("[ INFO ] Reading sudoers : ");
if(fp != NULL) {
  while ( fscanf (fp , "%u", & sudoer ) == 1) {
    this->sudoers[i] = sudoer;
    printf("%u ", sudoer);
    i++;
  }
}
printf("\n");
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
fp = fopen(filename, "r");
if (fp != NULL){
  while ( fscanf(fp, "%s\t%o\t%u\t%u", tmp , &mm , &uu , &gg) == 4){
    count++;
    e = (entry *)malloc(sizeof(entry));
    if (e == NULL){
      printf("Error allocating memory in ubuntu1_pfiles file.\n");
      throw -1;
    }
    len = strlen(tmp);
    e->u = uu;
    e->g = gg;
    e->mode = mm;
    if(!g_hash_table_insert(filelist, g_strdup(tmp), e)){
      printf("Found duplicate entry. Updating.\n");
      g_hash_table_lookup_extended(filelist, tmp, &k, &v);
      v1 = (entry*)v;
      v1->mode = mm;
      v1->u = uu;
      v1->g = gg;
      v = NULL;
      k = NULL;
    }
  }
  fclose(fp);
  fp = NULL;
}
printf("%d\n", count);
strncat(filename, "_root ", 255 - strlen(filename));
fp = fopen(filename, "r");
if (fp != NULL){
  while ( fscanf(fp, "%s\t%o", tmp , &mm) == 2){
    printf("%s ", tmp);
    printf("%o ", mm);
  }
  fclose(fp);
  fp = NULL;
}
e = (entry *)malloc(sizeof(entry));
if (e == NULL) {
    printf("Error allocating memory in root ubuntu1_pfiles_root file.\n")
    throw -1;
}

len = strlen(tmp);
e->mode = mm;
e->u = 0;
e->g = 0;

if(!g_hash_table_insert(filelist_root, g_strdup(tmp), e)){
    printf("Found duplicate entry. Updating.\n");
    g_hash_table_lookup_extended(filelist_root, tmp, &k, &v);
    v1 = (entry*)v;
    v1->mode = mm;
    v1->u = uu;
    v1->g = gg;
    v = NULL;
    k = NULL;
}
}
}

fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
}

drakovuf_free_symbols(symbols);
printf("[ INFO ] Done parsing files.\n");
process_list(drakovuf, this, vmi);
GSList *loop = this->traps;
vmi_resume_vm(vmi);

while (loop) {
    drakovuf_trap_t *trap = (drakovuf_trap_t *)loop->data;
    if (!drakovuf_add_trap(drakovuf, trap)){
        printf("Error with trap.\n");
        throw -1;
    }

    loop = loop->next;
}

 ferify::~ferify() {

ferify::~ferify() {
int q = 0;

GSLList *loop = this->traps;
while (loop) {
  drakvuf_trap_t *trap = (drakvuf_trap_t *)loop->data;
  g_free((char*)trap->name);
  if (trap->data != (void*)this) {
    g_free(trap->data);
  }
  g_free(loop->data);
  loop = loop->next;
}

p_files * current = NULL, * next = NULL;
for (q = 0; q < 32768; q++) {
  if (this->task_list[q] != NULL) {
    free(this->task_list[q]);
  }
}

g_hash_table_foreach(filelist, free_entry, NULL);
for (current = filelist_root; current != NULL; current = current->next) {
  g_hash_table_foreach(filelist_root, free_entry, NULL);
  g_hash_table_destroy(filelist);
  g_hash_table_destroy(filelist_root);
  g_slist_free(this->traps);
  printf("[ INFO ] Exited cleanly.\n");
}

___________________________________________________________________

int permissions_check2(drakvuf_t drakvuf, char * filename, entry * e,
                       drakvuf_trap_info_t * info, int id, int reg) {

  for (current = filelist_root; current != NULL; current = current->next) {
    g_hash_table_foreach(filelist_root, free_entry, NULL);
    g_hash_table_foreach(filelist_root, free_entry, NULL);
    g_hash_table_destroy(filelist);
    g_hash_table_destroy(filelist_root);
    g_slist_free(this->traps);
    printf("[ INFO ] Exited cleanly.\n");
  }

  //...
id_check = 1;
break;
case GROUP:
r = 040;
w = 020;
x = 010;
if (e->g != info->groupid)
id_check = 0;
else
    id_check = 1;
break;
case OTHER:
r = 04;
w = 02;
x = 01;
id_check = 1;
break;
default:
    return -1;
}
switch(info->regs->rax){
case S_OPEN:
    if ( ((info->regs->rsi & PERMISSIONS) | O_RDONLY) == O_RDONLY){
        if ( !((e->mode & r) && (id_check))) {
            printf("%d	%d", e->mode , r);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    }
    else if ( ((info->regs->rsi & PERMISSIONS) & O_WRONLY) == O_WRONLY) {
        if ( !((e->mode & w) && (id_check))) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked write access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    }
    else if ( ((info->regs->rsi & PERMISSIONS) & O_RDWR) == O_RDWR) {
        if ( !((e->mode & w) && (e->mode & r) && (id_check))) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
        }
    }
}
return 1;
}
else if ( !(e->mode & w) && (id_check) ) {
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked write access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
    return 1;
}
else if ( !(e->mode & r) && (id_check) ) {
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 1, RSI, info->vcpu);
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
    return 1;
}
}

break;

case S_OPENAT:
    if ( (info->regs->rsi & PERMISSIONS) | O_RDONLY ) == O_RDONLY ){
        if ( !(e->mode & r) && (id_check) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    } else if ( (info->regs->rsi & PERMISSIONS) & O_WRONLY ) == O_WRONLY ){
        if ( !(e->mode & w) && (id_check) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked write access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    } else if ( (info->regs->rsi & PERMISSIONS) & O_RDWR ) == O_RDWR ) {
        if ( !(e->mode & w) && (e->mode & r) && (id_check) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    } else if ( !(e->mode & w) && (id_check) ) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg(drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDX, info->vcpu);
    }
intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked write access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
    return 1;
}
else if ( !((e->mode & r) && (id_check)) ){
    vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 1, RDX, info->vcpu);
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
    return 1;
}
}
break;

case S_RENAME:
case S_LINK:
case S_SYMLINK:

    if (reg == SOURCE){
        if ( !((e->mode & r) && (e->mode & w) && (id_check)) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    } else if (reg == DEST) {
        if ( !((e->mode & w) && (id_check)) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked write access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    }
break;

case S_RENAMEAT:
case S_RENAMEAT2:
case S_LINKAT:

    if (reg == SOURCE){
        if ( !((e->mode & r) && (e->mode & w) && (id_check)) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
        return 1;
    }
}
}
    }
}
break;

    case S_SYMLINKAT:
        if (reg == SOURCE) {
            if ( !((e->mode & r) && (e->mode & w) && (id_check)) ) {
                vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
                vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
                intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
                printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked read access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
                return 1;
            }
        } else if (reg == DEST) {
            if ( !((e->mode & w) && (id_check)) ) {
                vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
                vmi_set_vcpureg(drvuf->vmi, 0, RDX, info->vcpu);
                intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
                printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked write access for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
                return 1;
            }
        }
    break;

    case S_UNLINK:
        if ( !((e->mode & w) && (id_check)) ) {
            vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
            intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
            printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked delete for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
            return 1;
        }
    break;
break;

case S_UNLINKAT:

    if (!((e->mode & w) && (id_check))) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
        intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
        printf("[ WARNING | Blocked delete for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
        return 1;
    }
    break;

case S_TRUNCATE:

    if (!((e->mode & w) && (id_check))) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
        intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
        printf("[ WARNING | Blocked truncate for user: %ld\n", info->userid);
        return 1;
    }
    break;

case S_EXECVE:

    if (!((e->mode & x) && (e->mode & r) && (id_check))) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
        intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
        printf("[ WARNING | Blocked execution of %s for user: %ld\n", filename, info->userid);
        return 1;
    }
    break;

case S_EXECVEAT:

    if (!((e->mode & x) && (id_check))) {
        vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
        intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
        printf("[ WARNING | Blocked execution of %s for user: %ld\n", filename, info->userid);
        return 1;
    }
    break;

default:

    if (info->regs->rax == s->s_execve) {
if ( !((e->mode & x) && (e->mode & r) && (id_check)) ) {
  vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RDI, info->vcpu);
  intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
  printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked execution of %s for user: %ld\n", filename, info->userid);
  return 1;
}

else if (info->regs->rax == s_execveat) {
  if ( !((e->mode & x) && (e->mode & r) && (id_check)) ) {
    vmi_set_vcpureg (drakvuf->vmi, 0, RSI, info->vcpu);
    intercept_print(info, filename, NULL, currpid);
    printf("[ WARNING ] Blocked execution of %s for user: %ld\n", filename, info->userid);
    return 1;
  }

  break;
}
return 0;

void intercept_print(drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, char *filename, char *filename2, vmi_pid_t currpid) {

  verify *s = (verify*)info->trap->data;
  uint64_t mode = 0;

  switch(info->regs->rax){

    case S_OPEN:

      if ( ((info->regs->rsi & O_CREAT) == O_CREAT) )
        mode = info->regs->rdx;
      printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%-10" PRIx64 " , RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants %lo access to file: %s ( mode:%lo)\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, info->regs->rsi, filename, mode);
      break;

    case S_OPENAT:

      if ( ((info->regs->rdx & O_CREAT) == O_CREAT) )
        mode = info->regs->rdx;
      printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%-10" PRIx64 " , RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants %lo access to file: %s ( mode:%lo)\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, info->regs->rsi, filename, mode);
      break;

    }
    
  }

void intercept_print(drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, char *filename, char *filename2, vmi_pid_t currpid) {
mode = info->regs->r10;
printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants %lo access to file: %s (mode:%lo)\n",
    info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rsi, info->procname,
    currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, info->regs->rdx, filename,
    mode);
break;

case S_RENAME:
printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] RDI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " RSI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to execute move with file: %s\n",
    info->regs->rax, info->regs->rdi, info->regs->rsi, info->procname,
    currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
break;

case S_RENAMEAT:
case S_RENAMEAT2:
printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] RDI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " RSI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to execute move with file: %s
",
    info->regs->rax, info->regs->rdi, info->regs->rsi, info->regs->r10, info->procname,
    currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
break;

case S_UNLINK:
printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to delete file %s\n",
    info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname,
    currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
break;

case S_EXECVE:
printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to execute file %s\n",
    info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname,
    currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
break;

case S_EXECVEAT:
printf("[SYSCALL: %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to execute file %s\n",
    info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname,
    currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
break;
```c
case S_UNLINKAT:
    printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%−10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%−12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to delete file %s
", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
    break;

case S_TRUNCATE:
    printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%−10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%−12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to truncate file %s to size %" PRIu64 ",\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename, info->regs->rsi);
    break;

case S_CLOSE:
    printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%−10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%−12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] wants to close fd %" PRIu64 " .\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
    break;

case S_EXIT:
    if (s->task_list[currpid]->threads == 0)
        printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%−10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%−12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is exiting. Deleting from s->task_list.\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
    else
        printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%−10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%−12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is exiting. Deleting thread.\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
    break;

case S_EXIT_GROUP:
    printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%−10" PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%−12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is exiting. Deleting from s->task_list.\n", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
    break;
```
case S_CLONE:

printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%-10* PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is cloning.
", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
break;

case S_FORK:

printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%-10* PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is forking.
", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
break;

case S_VFORK:

printf("[ SYSCALL : %3" PRIu64 " ] CR3:0x%-10* PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is forking.
", info->regs->rax, info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
break;

case S_NAME_TO_HANDLE_AT:

break;

case S_OPEN_BY_HANDLE_AT:

break;

default:

if (info->regs->rax == s->s_clone)

printf("[ SYSCALL: 56] CR3:0x%-10* PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is cloning
", info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid);
else if (info->regs->rax == s->s_execve)

printf("[ SYSCALL: 59] CR3:0x%-10* PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is executing %s
", info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname, currpid, info->userid, info->groupid, filename);
else if (info->regs->rax == s->s_execveat)

printf("[ SYSCALL: 59] CR3:0x%-10* PRIx64 ", RDI: 0x%-12" PRIx64 " ,%s PID:%d [%ld:%ld] is executing %s
", info->regs->cr3, info->regs->rdi, info->procname,
char * get_pathname(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info, char *filename, int append_filename)
{
    char * ret, * cut;
    int tmp;

    if (filename[0] != '/'){
        if ( (filename[0] == '.') && (filename[1] == '/') ){
            filename += 2;
            ret = drakvuf_get_current_process_parent_folder(drakvuf, info->vcpu);
            ret = (char *) realloc(ret, strlen(ret) + strlen(filename) + 1);
            if(append_filename)
                strcat(ret, filename);
            filename = ret;
        } else if((filename[0] == '.') && (filename[1] == '.')){
            ret = drakvuf_get_current_process_parent_folder(drakvuf, info->vcpu);
            while ( (filename[0] == '.') && (filename[1] == '.') ){
                filename += 2;
                tmp = strlen(ret);
                ret[tmp - 1] = '\0';
                cut = strrchr(ret, '/');
                *cut = '\0';
                filename++;
            }
            filename--;
            if(append_filename) {
                ret = (char *) realloc(ret, strlen(ret) + strlen(filename) + 1);
                strcat(ret, filename);
            }
            filename = ret;
        } else {
            ret = drakvuf_get_current_process_parent_folder(drakvuf, info->vcpu);
            if(append_filename) {
                ret = (char *) realloc(ret, strlen(ret) + strlen(filename) + 1);
                strcat(ret, filename);
            }
            filename = ret;
        }
    } else {
        ret = drakvuf_get_current_process_parent_folder(drakvuf, info->vcpu);
        if(append_filename) {
            ret = (char *) realloc(ret, strlen(ret) + strlen(filename) + 1);
            strcat(ret, filename);
        }
        filename = ret;
    }

    return filename;
}
char * get_dirfd(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info,
    vmi_instance_t vmi, char *filename, vmi_pid_t currpid, addr_t
    process_base);

addr_t fs, pwd, dentry, parent, parent_name, parent_d_name, d_name, name,
    fdd, path;
char * dirfd = NULL;
addr_t files = 0, fd_array = 0, filp = 0, f_dentry = 0, f_name = 0, fdt =
    0;
access_context_t ctx;
char slash[] = "/";
char * dir = NULL;
char ** strings = (char **) calloc(sizeof(char *), 10);
char ** strings_ = (char **) calloc(sizeof(char *), 10);
char * ret = (char *) calloc(4096, 1);

int i = 0, q;

ctx = {
    .translate_mechanism = VMI_TM_PROCESS_DTB,
    .dtb = drakvuf->regs[info->vcpu]->cr3,
    .addr = process_base + drakvuf->offsets[TASK_STRUCT_FILES]
};

if ( VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(vmi, &ctx, &files) ) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Could not read task_struct files entry for PID %d\n",
         currpid);
    vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
    return 0;
}

ctx.addr = files + drakvuf->offsets[FILES_STRUCT_FDT];
if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(vmi, &ctx, &fdt)) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Could not read fdt for PID %d.\n", currpid);
    vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
    return 0;
}

ctx.addr = fdt + drakvuf->offsets[FDTABLE_FD];
if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(vmi, &ctx, &fd_array)) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Could not read fd_array for PID %d.\n", currpid);
    vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
    return 0;
}

ctx.addr = fd_array + (8 * (info->regs->rdi));
if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(vmi, &ctx, &filp)) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Could not read fd_array for PID %d.\n", currpid);
    vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
}
return 0;
}

ctx.addr = filp + drakvuf->offsets[FILE_STRUCT_F_PATH] + drakvuf->offsets[PATH_STRUCT_DENTRY];
if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(vmi, &ctx, &dentry)){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Could not read fd_array for PID %d.\n", currpid);
    vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
    return 0;
}

ctx.addr = d_name + drakvuf->offsets[DENTRY_STRUCT_DNAME];
if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(vmi, &ctx, &name)){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Could not read fd_array for PID %d.\n", currpid);
    vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
    return 0;
}

ctx.addr = name;
dirfd = vmi_read_str(vmi, &ctx);
strings[i++] = dirfd;
parent = dentry;
if (strcmp(slash, dirfd) != 0){
    while (strcmp(slash, vmi_read_str(drakvuf->vmi, &ctx)) != 0){
        ctx.addr = parent + drakvuf->offsets[DENTRY_STRUCT_PARENT];
        if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(drakvuf->vmi, &ctx, &parent)){
            return NULL;
        }
        parent_d_name = parent + drakvuf->offsets[DENTRY_STRUCT_DNAME];
        ctx.addr = parent_d_name + drakvuf->offsets[QSTR_STRUCT_NAME];
        if (VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_addr(drakvuf->vmi, &ctx, &parent_name)){
            return NULL;
        }
        ctx.addr = parent_name;
        strings[i++] = vmi_read_str(drakvuf->vmi, &ctx);
        if (i > 9){
            strings_ = strings;
            *strings = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char *) * (i + 1));
            if (strings == NULL){
                printf("[ ERROR ] Cannot allocate memory.\n");
                vmi_resume_vm(vmi);
                return 0;
            }
            for(int q = 0; q < i; q++){
strings[q] = strings_[q];
}
free(strings_);
}
}
}
strcat(ret, slash);
for (q = i - 2; q >= 0; q--){
  strcat(ret, strings[q]);
  strcat(ret, slash);
}
dir = (char*) malloc(strlen(ret) + strlen(filename) + 2);
strncpy(dir, ret, strlen(ret) + 1);
strncat(dir, filename, strlen(filename) + 1);
free(filename);
free(ret);
return dir;
}

void process_list (drakvuf_t drakvuf, ferify * s, vmi_instance_t vmi){

int counter = 0;
addr_t list_head = 0, next_list_entry = 0, prev_list_entry = 0;
addr_t current_process = 0, cred = 0, real_cred = 0;
uid_t uid = -1, suid = -1, euid = -1;
gid_t gid = -1, sgid = -1, egid = -1;
uid_t r_uid = -1, r_suid = -1, r_euid = -1;
gid_t r_gid = -1, r_sgid = -1, r_egid = -1;
char *procname = NULL;
vmi_pid_t pid = 0;
unsigned long tasks_offset = 0, pid_offset = 0, name_offset = 0;
status_t status =

  tasks_offset = vmi_get_offset(vmi, "linux_tasks");
  name_offset = vmi_get_offset(vmi, "linux_name");
  pid_offset = vmi_get_offset(vmi, "linux_pid");

  list_head = vmi_translate_ksym2v(vmi, "init_task") + tasks_offset;
next_list_entry = list_head;

  /* walk the task list */
do {
      current_process = next_list_entry - tasks_offset;


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procname = vmi_read_str_va(vmi, current_process + name_offset, 0);

if (!procname) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to find procname\n");
}

if(vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, current_process + drakvuf->offsets[TASK_STRUCT_CRED], 0, &cred) == VMI_FAILURE){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read cred struct\n");
}
if(vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, current_process + drakvuf->offsets[TASK_STRUCT_REAL_CRED], 0, &real_cred) == VMI_FAILURE){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read cred struct\n");
}
if( vmi_read_32_va(vmi, cred + drakvuf->offsets[CRED_UID], 0, &uid) == VMI_FAILURE){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read uid\n");
}
if( vmi_read_32_va(vmi, cred + drakvuf->offsets[CRED_GID], 0, &gid) == VMI_FAILURE){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read gid\n");
}
if ( VMI_FAILURE == vmi_read_32_va(vmi, current_process + pid_offset, 0, (uint32_t*)&pid))
    continue;

add_task(s, pid, uid, gid, current_process, 0); counter += 1;
printf("%3d. [%5d] %-20s ( %5u:%5u ) ( struct addr:" PRIx64 " )\n",
    counter, pid, procname, uid, gid, current_process);

status = vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, next_list_entry, 0, &next_list_entry);
if (status == VMI_FAILURE) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read next pointer in loop at "% PRIx64 "\n", next_list_entry);
}
}
while (next_list_entry != list_head);

printf("[ INFO ] Found and added %d processes.\n", counter);
return;
}

------------------------------------------------------

static event_response_t fork_cb(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info) {
ferify *s = (ferify*)info->trap->data;
addr_t parent_process = 0, child_process = 0, parent_cred = 0, child_cred = 0, t_process = 0;
vmi_pid_t parent_pid = -1, child_pid = -1, t_pid = -1;
unsigned long tasks_offset = 0, pid_offset = 0, name_offset = 0;
vmi_instance_t vmi = NULL;
char * parent_name = NULL, *child_name = NULL, *t_name = NULL;
uid_t parent_uid = -1, child_uid = -1, t_uid = -1;
gid_t parent_gid = -1, child_gid = -1, t_gid = -1;
task *t = NULL;
int i = 0;
int p_pid = s->p_pid;
s->p_pid = -1;

vmi = drakvuf_lock_and_get_vmi (drakvuf);
drakvuf_release_vmi (drakvuf);

tasks_offset = vmi_get_offset (vmi, "linux_tasks");
name_offset = vmi_get_offset (vmi, "linux_name");
pid_offset = vmi_get_offset (vmi, "linux_pid");

// Get parent and child process base address
parent_process = info->regs->rax;
child_process = drakvuf_get_current_process (drakvuf, info->vcpu);

// Get parent and child pid
vmi_read_32_va (vmi, parent_process + pid_offset, 0, (uint32_t*)&parent_pid);
child_pid = vmi_dtb_to_pid (vmi, info->regs->cr3);

if ( (parent_pid == -1) || (child_pid == -1) ) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] ret_from_fork returned -1.
    return 0;
}

// Get parent and child procname
parent_name = vmi_read_str_va (vmi, parent_process + name_offset, 0);
child_name = vmi_read_str_va (vmi, child_process + name_offset, 0);

// Get parent and child uid and gid
if (vmi_read_addr_va (vmi, parent_process + drakvuf->offsets[TASK_STRUCT_CRED], 0, &parent_cred) == VMI_FAILURE){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read cred struct\n");
}
if (vmi_read_addr_va (vmi, child_process + drakvuf->offsets[TASK_STRUCT_CRED], 0, &child_cred) == VMI_FAILURE){
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read cred struct\n");
}
if( vmi_read_32_va(vmi, parent_cred + drakvuf->offsets[CRED_UID], 0, &parent_uid) == VMI_FAILURE) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read uid \n");
}
if( vmi_read_32_va(vmi, parent_cred + drakvuf->offsets[CRED_GID], 0, &parent_gid) == VMI_FAILURE) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read gid \n");
}
if( vmi_read_32_va(vmi, child_cred + drakvuf->offsets[CRED_UID], 0, &child_uid) == VMI_FAILURE) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read uid \n");
}
if( vmi_read_32_va(vmi, child_cred + drakvuf->offsets[CRED_GID], 0, &child_gid) == VMI_FAILURE) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Failed to read gid \n");
}
if (p_pid != -1) {
    if (p_pid == parent_pid) {
        if (s->task_list[parent_pid] == NULL) {
            if (add_task(s, parent_pid, parent_uid, parent_gid, parent_process, 0) == -1) {
                printf("[ ERROR ] Could not add parent process to the task_list.\n");
            }
        } else {
            s->task_list[parent_pid]->threads++;
        }
    } else if (p_pid == child_pid) {
        t_pid = parent_pid;
        parent_pid = child_pid;
        child_pid = t_pid;
        t_uid = parent_uid;
        parent_uid = child_uid;
        child_uid = t_uid;
        t_gid = parent_gid;
        parent_gid = child_gid;
    } else if (p_pid == -1) {
        if (s->task_list[child_pid] == NULL) {
            if (add_task(s, child_pid, child_uid, child_gid, child_process, 0) == -1) {
                printf("[ ERROR ] Could not add child process to the task_list.\n");
            }
        } else {
            s->task_list[child_pid]->threads++;
        }
    }
} else if (p_pid == -1) {
    if (s->task_list[parent_pid] == NULL) {
        if (add_task(s, parent_pid, parent_uid, parent_gid, parent_process, 0) == -1) {
            printf("[ ERROR ] Could not add parent process to the task_list.\n");
        }
    } else {
        s->task_list[parent_pid]->threads++;
    }
}
child_gid = t_gid;
t_process = parent_process;
parent_process = child_process;
child_process = t_process;

if (s->task_list[parent_pid] == NULL) {
    if (add_task(s, parent_pid, parent_uid, parent_gid, parent_process, 0) == -1){
        printf("[ ERROR ] Could not add parent process to the task_list.\n");
    }
}

if (s->task_list[child_pid] == NULL) {
    if (add_task(s, child_pid, child_uid, child_gid, child_process, 0) == -1){
        printf("[ ERROR ] Could not add child process to the task_list.\n");
    }
} else {
    s->task_list[child_pid] -> threads ++;
}

} else {
    printf("[ WARNING ] Lost track of parent process forking.\n");
    return 0;
}

printf("[ INFO ] Process [%u] ( %5u:%-5u ) added to task list from parent %d.\n", child_pid, child_uid, child_gid, p_pid);

if (s->task_list[parent_pid] == NULL) {
    if (add_task(s, parent_pid, parent_uid, parent_gid, parent_process, 0) != 0)
        return 0;
}

if ((parent_uid == ROOT) && (s->task_list[parent_pid] -> uid != ROOT)){
    while (s->sudoers[i] != 0) {
        if (s->task_list[parent_pid] -> uid == s->sudoers[i]){
            s->task_list[parent_pid] -> uid = parent_uid;
        }
        i ++;
    }
    if (s->task_list[parent_pid] -> uid < 1000) {
        s->task_list[parent_pid] -> uid = parent_uid;
    }
if(s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid != parent_uid){
    printf("[ WARNING ] Found corrupted credentials in task %u. UID is %u and should be %ld\n", parent_pid, parent_uid, s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid);
    s->task_list[child_pid]->uid = s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid;
} else if ((parent_uid != s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid) && (s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid != ROOT)){
    // TODO: check for system users
    printf("[ WARNING ] Found corrupted credentials in task %u. UID is %u and should be %ld\n\t", parent_pid, parent_uid, s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid);
    s->task_list[child_pid]->uid = s->task_list[parent_pid]->uid;
} return 0;
}

---

int identity_check(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info, vmi_pid_t current_pid){
    ferify_t s = (ferify_t) info->trap->data;
    int flag = 1, i = 0;

    addr_t process = info->regs->cr3; // drakvuf_get_current_process(drakvuf,
    info->vcpu);

    if (s->task_list[current_pid] != NULL) {
        if ((s->task_list[current_pid]->checked == 0) && (s->task_list[
        current_pid]->task_addr != process)) {
            printf("[ INFO ] Updating PID %d address base from %" PRIx64 " to %" PRIx64 "\n", current_pid, s->task_list[current_pid]->task_addr, process);
            s->task_list[current_pid]->task_addr = process;
            s->task_list[current_pid]->checked = 1;
        } else if (s->task_list[current_pid]->checked == 0){
            s->task_list[current_pid]->checked = 1;
        }
    }

    if (process != s->task_list[current_pid]->task_addr) {
        //TODO
        // printf("[ WARNING ] Current process PID: %d-%s base seems different: %" PRIx64 " saved: %" PRIx64 "\n", current_pid, info->
        procline, process, s->task_list[current_pid]->task_addr);
    }
}
switch(info->userid){
    case ROOT:
        if ((s->task_list[current_pid] != NULL) && (s->task_list[current_pid]->uid != 0)) {
            flag = 0;
            while(s->sudoers[i] != 0){
                if (s->task_list[current_pid]->uid == s->sudoers[i]) {
                    flag = 1;
                    break;
                }
                i++;
            }
        }
        if (flag == 0){
            if ((s->task_list[current_pid]->uid == 118) || (s->task_list[current_pid]->uid < 100)) {
                flag = 1;
                break;
            }
            printf("[ WARNING ] Process root identity corruption detected in task %u! Is %" PRIu64 " and should be %ld. Invalidating syscall.\n\t", current_pid, info->userid, s->task_list[current_pid]->uid);
        }
        break;
    default:
        if (s->task_list[current_pid] != NULL) {
            if ((info->userid != s->task_list[current_pid]->uid) && (info->userid < 1000)) {
                if (s->task_list[current_pid]->uid == 0) {
                    s->task_list[current_pid]->uid = (uid_t)info->userid;
                    s->task_list[current_pid]->gid = (gid_t)info->groupid;
                    printf("[ INFO ] Assessing valid user change from 0 to %ld for (%u)\n", info->userid, current_pid);
                }
                printf("[ WARNING ] Process root identity corruption detected in task %u! Is %" PRIu64 " and should be %ld. Invalidating syscall.\n\t", current_pid, info->userid, s->task_list[current_pid]->uid);
                flag = 0;
            }
        }
        break;
    }
    return flag;
}
static event_response_t exit_cb (drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info) {
    ferify_t *s = (ferify_t*)info->trap->data;
    vmi_instance_t vmi = NULL;
    vmi_pid_t current_pid = 0;

    vmi = drakvuf_lock_and_get_vmi (drakvuf);
    drakvuf_release_vmi (drakvuf);

    if (vmi == NULL) {
        printf("Could not get vmi.\n");
        return -1;
    }

    current_pid = vmi_dtb_to_pid (vmi, info->regs->cr3);

    if (current_pid == 0) {
        printf("Could not get pid.\n");
        return -1;
    }

    switch (info->regs->rax){
    case S_EXIT_GROUP:
        free (s->task_list[current_pid]);
        s->task_list[current_pid] = NULL;
        break;
    case S_EXIT:
        s->task_list[current_pid]->threads--;
        break;
    }
    return 0;
}

int add_task (ferify_t f, vmi_pid_t current_pid, uid_t u, gid_t g, addr_t process, short checked){

    task_t *t = (task_t*)malloc (sizeof(task), 1);
    if (t == NULL) {
        printf("[ ERROR ] Could not allocate memory.\n");
        return -1;
    }

    // Continue with the rest of the function...
}
t->pid = current_pid;
t->uid = (uint64_t) u;
t->gid = g;
t->task_addr = process;
t->threads++;
t->checked = checked;

f->task_list[current_pid] = t;
t = NULL;
return 0;
}

void check_syscall_table_corruption ( ferify * s, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info)
{

switch (info->regs->rax){

    case S_OPEN:
        if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_open)
            printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_open %" PRIx64 " instead of
                 saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_open);
            break;

    case S_RENAME:
        if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_rename)
            printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_rename %" PRIx64 " instead of
                 saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_rename);
            break;

    case S_UNLINK:
        if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_unlink)
            printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_unlink %" PRIx64 " instead of
                 saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_unlink);
            break;

    case S_TRUNCATE:
        if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_truncate)
            printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_truncate %" PRIx64 " instead of
                 saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_truncate);
            break;

    case S_OPENAT:
        if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_openat)
            printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_openat %" PRIx64 " instead of
                 saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_openat);
            break;

    case S_UNLINKAT:
        if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_unlinkat)
            printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_unlinkat %" PRIx64 " instead of
                 saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_unlinkat);
            break;

}
if ((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_unlinkat)
    printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_unlinkat %" PRIx64 " instead of
            saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_unlinkat);
    break;
}

case S_RENAMEAT:
    if (((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_renameat)
        printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_renameat %" PRIx64 " instead of
            saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_renameat);
    break;

case S_RENAMEAT2:
    if (((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_renameat2)
        printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_renameat2 %" PRIx64 " instead
            of saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_renameat2);
    break;

case S_EXIT:
    if (((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_exit)
        printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_exit %" PRIx64 " instead of
            saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_exit);
    break;

case S_EXIT_GROUP:
    if (((uint64_t)info->regs->rip != (uint64_t)s->s_exit_group)
        printf("[ ERROR ] Corruption in sys_exit_group %" PRIx64 " instead
            of saved RIP: %" PRIx64 "\n", info->regs->rip, s->s_exit_group);
    break;

return;
}

char * get_pathname_from_reg(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t *info,
    vmi_instance_t vmi, vmi_pid_t currpid, int reg){

    char * filename = NULL;
    int len = 0;
    reg_t reg1;

    switch (reg){
        case 1:
            reg1 = info->regs->rdi;
            break;
        case 2:
            reg1 = info->regs->rsi;
            break;
    }
default:
    return NULL;
    break;
}

filename = vmi_read_str_va(vmi, reg1, currpid);
if (filename == NULL) {
    printf("\[ ERROR \] Syscall [ %3" PRIi64 " ] Could not read filename (0x%" PRIx64 " ) for PID %d: %s\n", info−regs−rax, reg1, currpid, info−procname);
    return NULL;
}
filename = get_pathname(drakvuf, info, filename, TRUE);

len = strlen(filename);
if (len > MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) {
    printf("\[ WARNING \] Weird filename length detected for PID %d.\nTruncating.\n\n", currpid);
    filename[0] = '\0';
    len = 0;
}

return filename;

-----------------------------------

char * get_pathname_from_reg_at(drakvuf_t drakvuf, drakvuf_trap_info_t * info, vmi_instance_t vmi, vmi_pid_t currpid, addr_t process_base, int reg){
char * filename = NULL;
int len = 0;
addr_t addr = 0;

reg_t reg1, reg2;
switch (reg){
    case 2:
        reg1 = info−regs−rdi;
        reg2 = info−regs−rsi;
        break;
    case 3:
        reg1 = info−regs−rsi;
        reg2 = info−regs−rdx;
        break;
    case 4:
        reg1 = info−regs−rdx;
        reg2 = info−regs−r10;
        break;

    }
default:
    return NULL;
    break;
}

addr = vmi_translate_uv2p(vmi, reg2, currpid);
if (addr == 0) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Syscall [ %3" PRIi64 " ] Could not read address: %" PRIx64 " address for PID %d.
          info->regs->rax, reg2, currpid);
    return NULL;
}
filename = vmi_read_str_pa(vmi, addr);
if (filename == NULL) {
    printf("[ ERROR ] Syscall [ %3" PRIi64 " ] Could not read filename for
          PID %d: %s.
          info->regs->rax, currpid, info->procname);
    return NULL;
}

if ((reg1 == AT_FDCWD1) || (reg1 == AT_FDCWD2))
    filename = get_pathname(drakvuf , info , filename , TRUE);
else {
    filename = get_dirfd(drakvuf , info , vmi , filename , currpid ,
                         process_base);
}

len = strlen(filename);
if (len > MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) {
    printf("[ WARNING ] Weird filename length detected for PID %d.
           Truncating.
           currid);
    filename[0] = '\0';
    len = 0;
}

    return filename;
}

void free_entry(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data){
}
List of References


Initial Distribution List

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California