Evolving Military Intelligence: The Effect of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) During the Korean and Vietnam Wars

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Art of War Scholars

by

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This study focuses on the development of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO). It addresses the need for leaders to understand why military intelligence units developed. It argues that the U.S. Army implemented MIO too quickly, that it was not properly tested and may not have been a viable unit structure in a future war, though it was effective in the Vietnam War. MIS on the other hand, predicated on small cellular teams that can deploy flexibly and quickly, was developed based on World War II structures and recommendations of G-2s during that war. Brigadier General Thomas F. MIO manning and doctrine, published in 1956, established the military intelligence organizations that deployed into Vietnam a decade later. However, the Army never fully implemented MIO due to personnel and budget cuts. Units organized under MIS and MIO, aided by the slow build-up and the primacy given to intelligence collection during the initial stages of the conflict, performed well during the Vietnam War. While MIS and MIO were successful in Vietnam, there are still deficiencies leaders must consider when utilizing the organizations or during future changes of how military intelligence supports tactical combat commanders.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

Evolving Military Intelligence: The Effect of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, by Major Kenneth T. King, 126 pages.

This study focuses on the development of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO). It addresses the need for leaders to understand why military intelligence units developed. It argues that the U.S. Army implemented MIO too quickly; that it was not properly tested and may not have been a viable unit structure in a future war, though it was effective in the Vietnam War. MIS on the other hand, predicated on small cellular teams that can deploy flexibly and quickly, was developed based on World War II structures and recommendations of G-2s during that war. Brigadier General Thomas F. MIO manning and doctrine, published in 1956, established the military intelligence organizations that deployed into Vietnam a decade later. However, the Army never fully implemented MIO due to personnel and budget cuts. Units organized under MIS and MIO, aided by the slow build-up and the primacy given to intelligence collection during the initial stages of the conflict, performed well during the Vietnam War. While MIS and MIO were successful in Vietnam, there are still deficiencies leaders must consider when utilizing the organizations or during future changes of how military intelligence supports tactical combat commanders.
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I was only able to write this thesis standing on the shoulders of giants. Though never having met them, I feel like I personally know two previous authors that have addressed military intelligence organizations, Patrick Finnegan and Marc Powe. Mr. Powe, who had a tragic accident just as I began researching for this thesis, has been a consistent writer about Army military intelligence. His daughter, Alexander Allred, sent me most of his notes throughout his life which I have passed on to the CW2 Christopher
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Last, the officers and soldiers from Delta Company, 16th Engineer Battalion during my time as their commander from 2014 to 2015 helped me develop the idea that organization in military intelligence drive effectiveness and that historical research can provide answers to current problems.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Service Organization</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Military Intelligence in the 21st Century</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Military Intelligence Organization in World War I</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Military Intelligence Organization in World War II</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in World War II</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army Ground Forces and the Military Intelligence Service</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding Intelligence to the Division</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Service in the Korean War</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 DECISIONS LEADING TO THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of the Atomic Testing Field Army</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence in the Atomic Testing Field Army</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 EXERCISE SAGEBRUSH</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Execute .......................................................................................................................... 61
Phase II: Deployment ..................................................................................................... 64
Phase III: Withdrawal .................................................................................................... 65
Phase IV: Redeployment ............................................................................................... 69
Phase V: Offensive ......................................................................................................... 70
Assess ............................................................................................................................ 72
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 73

CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPING THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION CONCEPT ..........................................................................................75

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 75
Intelligence Survives the Atomic Testing Field Army ..................................................... 75
Intelligence during Reorganization of the Airborne Division ........................................ 78
Implementing the Military Intelligence Organization .................................................... 84
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 86

CHAPTER 6 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR ..........88

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 88
Operation Cedar Falls ................................................................................................... 91
Altering Tactical Intelligence for the Vietnam War ......................................................... 93
The Role of the Army Intelligence and Security Branch in Integrating the Intelligence Enterprise ................................................................. 96
Challenges in the Vietnam War not addressed by Military Intelligence Organization ................................................................. 101
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 103

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................105

Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 105
Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 108
Provisional Implications for Future Study .................................................................... 110

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................113
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Army Ground Forces Army Intelligence and Security</td>
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<td>API</td>
<td>Aerial Photo Interpretation</td>
</tr>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Army Security Agency</td>
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<td>CEWI</td>
<td>Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Counter Intelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETO</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Field Operations Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPW</td>
<td>Interrogator, Prisoners of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICO</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Service Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

This study evaluates Military Intelligence (MI) organization from World War II through the Vietnam War. It critically analyzes the methods used to develop MI organizations during this period. The deployment of MI units to Vietnam and their initial performance in that war is the culmination of this paper. During the Vietnam War, leaders deployed MI soldiers in organizational structures based on intelligence units used during World War II and the Korean War. MI units performed well during the Vietnam War despite incomplete testing of organizational concepts developed during the 1950s. It will inform readers what organizational concepts worked well and why. It is important to deconstruct MI organization structures so leaders know which parts soldiers rigorously tested in combat and those they should skeptically apply.

Contemporary military intelligence organization hails from the United States Army’s experience in World War II. The conventional war which took place from 1939 to 1945, allowed the Army to determine what was important on the battlefield. After World War II, it was evident those leaders should not throw lessons about intelligence by the wayside. Military intelligence support to tactical units needed to reflect these experiences. The Korean War, though benefiting from improvements made in intelligence after World War II, furthered the argument that reorganization was required. Tactical intelligence units in the context of this thesis are Army staff sections or units in corps or lower echelons that collect, process, integrate, evaluate, analyze or interpret
“available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces.”

The formation of Military Intelligence Service Organization (MIS) and Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) was integral to the later development of MI as a profession. MI leadership must understand past MI reorganizations to understand how to utilize their units effectively.

Reorganization of tactical intelligence units is of particular importance as the Army shifts its focus from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to other threats. Major General Scott D. Berrier, the commander of the United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, labeled post-Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan as a “period of introspection.” Consequently, Berrier initiated a “bottom-up” review to identify capability gaps in Army intelligence units, to include the tactical level units. He believes that military intelligence as a profession must continue to evolve to maintain relevancy and effectiveness across the range of military operations. This evolution is especially pertinent to how the Army can best organize military intelligence to support tactical commanders.

The institutionalization of MI organization post-World War II is addressed in chapter 2. These structures, based on intelligence teams, were actually used during World War II in the European Theater of Operations, and are the organizational models on which MI tactical support is predicated. The implementation of these lessons by the

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2 Scott D. Berrier, “ILE Branch Day” (Lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, August 3, 2016).
Army Ground Forces (AGF) detail the specific billets established post-World War II.³ While the focus of World War II was on small MI teams, corps and division G-2 sections also received additional soldiers, providing more officers to control diverse intelligence collectors. The Army used the intelligence team structure on a limited basis during the Korean War, though personnel and budgetary constraints retarded successful performance of intelligence units.

The development of the different division structures after the Korean War is the subject of chapter 3, examining the concepts of military organization that changed. The development of MI after the war was a bureaucratic process. There were issues leaders had in garnering recognition of the tactical intelligence unit’s utility in a future war. It also addresses longer-term problems of how the Army conducted unit reorganizations during the period.

The Army’s Exercise Sagebrush maneuvers in 1955 and the role of military intelligence units is analyzed in chapter 4. This exercise, the only full testing of the significant military intelligence reorganization post-Korean War, was a failure. It did not vindicate the concepts behind the intelligence billets and tasks developed for the MI units being evaluated during the exercise. The chapter approaches the exercise through the operations process (plan, prepare, execute and assess) and its different phases, in order to provide a description of the Army’s efforts to validate aspects related to the new MI unit.

³ The Army Ground Forces is succeeded by the Army Field Forces in 1948. While the roles of the two organizations are different, both organizations play a similar role as it relates to development of MI organizations. The same can be said of the Continental Army Command (CONARC), the 1955 successor to Army Field Forces.
The further development of intelligence organization amidst turbulence in the restructuring of Army divisions as well as budget and personnel declines is addresses in chapter 5. The chapter defines the standard MI units as implemented in 1956, which were similar to the units deployed during the Vietnam War. Personnel shortages severely impaired implementation, therefore only a few intelligence units were able to operate as the Army prescribed.

The structure of MI units prior to and during the Vietnam War is discussed in chapter 6. Small changes in MI unit structure took place since 1956. Operation Cedar Falls, an intelligence driven effort, was successful in part because MI teams and detachments worked in tandem at different echelons and integrated with tactical combat leaders. Other developments, such as the creation of the Army Intelligence and Security (AIS) Branch, played a role in the efficacy of MI during the Vietnam War. It also addresses challenges MI leaders had during that conflict.

The basic construct of the MIS and MIO and a review the history of Army MI from World War I to the Korean War will be presented in this chapter.

**Military Intelligence Service Organization**

The MIS developed immediately after World War II according to a “cellular” concept, with teams established as building blocks so the size and expertise of the unit were flexible. The cellular structure allowed the use of specific intelligence team capabilities where they were most beneficial. The MIS teams deployed separately, but consolidated at the tactical level. Theater G-2s attached teams of interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle specialists, and other intelligence disciplines to tactical units. For example, if a division G-2 needed an interrogator team, photo interpretation team or
order of battle specialist, the Field Army G-2 allocated them from the theater intelligence personnel “pool,” attaching them to a division with a MI headquarters and administrative team.¹ Soldiers with differing experience levels composed MIS teams. Generally, higher echelons received teams that were more experienced. For example, “Team GE Aerial Photo Interpretation,” usually provided to a division, were comprised of two sergeants (E-5) and one specialist (E-4) whereas “Team GH Aerial Photo Interpretation,” usually provided to a field army, included one major (O-4), one sergeant first class (E-7) and one corporal (E-4).² Because of this hierarchal structure, which included headquarters and administration teams, the MIS provided a unique structure, not only in use, but also in potential for promotion for MI soldiers.³ However, problems associated with the cellular concept derived from some of its strengths. Unless the MIS team ended up working together for an extended period, as had happened in World War II, then neither intelligence team members nor tactical combat leaders would know a lot about each other. Additionally, the 1951 Combat Intelligence Field Manual 30-5 contained no emphasis on the need to develop multi-source intelligence; doctrine had not yet caught up to concepts of employment.⁴ The cellular concept was effective because it created

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groups of MI specialist teams within a larger tactical unit; allowing cross talk and
decreasing “stove piping,” or not sharing information, between intelligence disciplines.
The MIS also decreased the workload of the G-2 because members of every team
conducted administrative and operational tasks.8

**Military Intelligence Organization**

The MIO, developed in 1955, organized counterintelligence, photo interpretation,
interrogators and order of battle specialists under the direct control of the division, corps,
or field army G-2. The rationale was that intelligence professionals could better
understand the requirements and operations as part of the unit and as a result be more
responsive to corps, division, and brigade commanders than they had in World War II or
the Korean War.9 The MIO institutionalized and integrated concepts of intelligence
support developed during previous wars in addition to the framework of MIS. It was not
until the development of MIO that intelligence soldiers became part of the commander’s
tactical unit. The MIO institutionalized tactical intelligence capability and, in doing so,
fundamentally changed how intelligence supports Army operations.10

Military intelligence professionals need to recognize that MIS and MIO are a
significant part of Army MI history. However, intelligence professionals often

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9 Matthew Ridgeway to Chief of Army Field Forces, Memorandum, subj:
Intelligence Concept for Prepared Infantry and Armored Divisions, RG 337, Entry 30B-300, National Archives and Records Administration.

overlooked both organizational evolutions because the Army, during periods of personnel and budget cuts after World War II and the Korean War, were unable to fully implemented either organization type until the nation’s entry into Vietnam.\textsuperscript{11}

The next permutation of MI organization after MIS and the MIO was the Ursano Study and the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalion, a triumphant and well-chronicled part of military intelligence history. The Army commissioned the Ursano Study after it became apparent, during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, that tactical intelligence units were not capable of providing necessary collection during a conventional war.\textsuperscript{12} Major General James J. Ursano, the director of Management in the Army Chief of Staff, made several recommendations regarding the integration of intelligence organizations, all of which built on the foundations of the MIS and MIO concepts. The Army assigned, and eventually fully manned, military intelligence battalions to divisions beginning in 1976. The infusion of intelligence that a CEWI battalion brought to the tactical level finished the integration of intelligence that MIO started, incorporating signals intelligence. The CEWI battalion was a combination of all Army intelligence disciplines, including a signals intelligence and electronic warfare capability, a discipline held separate up to that point. Under the CEWI battalions, other intelligence capabilities expanded exponentially. The CEWI battalion was bigger, better,

\begin{footnotesize}

\end{footnotesize}
and could disseminate intelligence faster than units organized under MIS or MIO. The MIS and MIO were foundational to the development of CEWI.13

The MIS and MIO together fundamentally changed how the Army collected and analyzed MI and was the genesis of contemporary Army intelligence organizations.14 Historians have consistently overlooked the MIS and MIO’s impact on the United States Army. This is significant because without understanding the guiding principles behind the formation of MIS and MIO, leaders may not be able to comprehend the reasons why the Army conducts MI operations a certain way. This loss of historical perspective precludes MI leaders from learning from past lessons and optimizing the use of their units. Additional topics addressed in this paper will include MIS and MIO’s contribution to the development of the Military Intelligence Branch and the concept’s execution during the Vietnam War.

Tactical Military Intelligence in the 21st Century

Currently, a Military Intelligence Company (MICO) fielded within each brigade combat team provides the unit with intelligence collection and analysis.15 The


15 The structure of the introduction was developed to provide a basic construct of military intelligence units as they exist at the writing of this thesis so the reader can draw comparisons to how tactical military intelligence evolved over the time periods addressed in this chapter. Additionally, this thesis omits the time period after the end of the Vietnam
identification of the brigade combat team as the “unit of action” in 2004 and the organic assignment of MICOs was the result of a perceived need for an intelligence collection capability at lower echelons. During the Gulf War, with refinement during the current Global War on Terrorism, the Army increasingly delegated control of intelligence collection assets to lower echelons. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the Army has established the Multi-Function Team, Unmanned Aerial System Platoon, and Company Intelligence Support teams at the battalion level. These changes in MI organizations and doctrine are necessary to keep pace with the capabilities of American adversaries. Change must be continuous to keep up with technological, tactical, and other advancements in warfare. Leaders must continue to challenge the underlying assumptions about how to optimize intelligence collection and analysis. It is important that leaders do not just task organize units based on their experiences, they need to have a foundational understanding of why they are structured a certain way in the first place. Understanding this evolution is important to appreciating MI units historically and how best to use them today. While understanding recent changes is necessary, the period immediately following World War II through the Vietnam War is of particular importance because of the fundamental changes in Army MI that took place from 1945 to 1973. MI soldiers, provided to division commanders, increased capability to collect and analyze battlefield information.  

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War. A chronological account would have significant holes and would not adequately flow to achieve the argument of this paper.

ability is rooted in the G-2 staff position created in World War I, MIS developed after World War II, and the MIO pioneered in 1955.17

Tactical Military Intelligence Organization in World War I

The contemporary construct for United States Army military intelligence evolved from World War I under the direction of General John J. Pershing.18 Pershing developed intelligence positions on his staff and assigned them the designation of “G-2.” Based on his example, Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force adopted intelligence billets at every echelon.19 The Army dedicated intelligence positions to help commanders understand the battlefield. An interpreter, topographic officer and a staff of intelligence analysts comprised Pershing’s division G-2 section. The G-2 supervised patrolling activities and other information collection activities. Regimental and battalion S-2s had a smaller staff, controlling scouts and observation teams that collected information in their assigned area.20 21


18 Bigelow, 23.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Over the years, commanders have developed a non-TO&E position at the brigade echelon called, “Chief of Reconnaissance.” This position is meant to more fully integrate the brigade S-2 section with the Squadron. Integration between these two entities is by no means a bad thing, however the Chief of Reconnaissance position is a symptom of a larger problem between the intelligence staff section and the squadron, possibly based on the personalities of the two leaders. If the BCT is training correctly and if the Squadron Commander, MICO Commander and BCT S-2 have a good working relationship and train together, then there is no reason to have a Chief of Reconnaissance. One straightforward organizational way to increase the chances of success is to make the
During World War I the G-2s of corps and army echelons directly controlled collection assets. Corps G-2s, for example, controlled aerial observation from airplanes and balloons. Also, the Army’s Counter Intelligence Police assigned a dedicated element of four soldiers to each G-2. Under Pershing, intelligence capability grew significantly during the war. However, as soon as the war was over, the Army released many soldiers filling intelligence billets. This reduction was a part of wider divestitures that shrunk the Army to less than 3 percent of its wartime strength and budget. The staffs and responsibilities of the division G-2 and regimental or battalion S-2s of 1941 were very similar to their counterparts at the end of the last world war, but technology and the character of the war necessitated change.

**Tactical Military Intelligence Organization in World War II**

During World War II, the division G-2 had a staff of 11 soldiers and many attached units to assist his section with collection and analysis. However, there were several differences between the G-2 staff of World War I and World War II. An attached brigade collection manager either the former Squadron S-2 or the Assistant S-2. These soldiers should have an intimate knowledge of how scouts can most effectively be deployed. Recent TO&Es that subordinate the MICO to the Squadron should help to alleviate a lot of discontinuity between the Squadron and the BCT S-2/MICO.

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22 The Counter Intelligence Police, formed in 1917, was a part of the Army until renamed the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 1942.

23 Bigelow, 29.

24 Powe and Wilson, 39, 55.

interrogation team replaced the resident interrogator of World War I. An interpretation team, cross-trained in intelligence techniques to increase their utility, was part of the section as well. The G-2’s topographic officer in World War I became an attached photo interpretation team by World War II. The G-2 section of World War II had a similar counterintelligence detachment as its World War I counterpart. Moreover, the order of battle and document team provided an analytical element.\textsuperscript{26} A radio intelligence platoon provided signals intelligence to the G-2s was available at the army level.\textsuperscript{27}

Division intelligence officers sometimes were able to utilize a cavalry squadron for intelligence collection. However, commanders in World War II most often used them for combat operations, not reconnaissance, in much the same manner as their horse-bound predecessors; that is, as a disrupting or security force.\textsuperscript{28} Additionally, eight light aircraft, assigned to the division in support of artillery units, identified enemy indirect fire assets.\textsuperscript{29} While the G-2 section initially started out small, the number of attachments quickly increased the intelligence effort at division and corps. In fact, Colonel Oscar W. Koch, the G-2 of the Third Army under General Patton, estimated that “each division had at least fifty intelligence specialist personnel attached in the form of teams.”\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Chandler and Robb, 35.
\item \textsuperscript{28} John J. McGrath, \textit{Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies} (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 109.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Chandler and Robb, 66.
\end{itemize}
the teams remained at division or corps; they were scattered around the battlefield based on where the intelligence was.

The G-2, if he did not need them, attached interpreters and interrogators down to the regimental or battalion echelon. The regimental S-2 retained control over an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. It was common practice to assign two soldiers from the battalion’s intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, to each rifle company as intelligence observers. These observers passed ground-level intelligence up to the regiment.31 Additionally, battalion S-2s could expect to get some support from portions of the division cavalry unit.32

Intelligence collection assets at corps and division during World War II were not under the direct operational control of the tactical combat commanders at these echelons. In many cases, the G-2 did not have the direct support of these units, but in a prolonged war where habitual relationships formed over four years, the non-habitual organization worked. However, the symbiotic relationship between the commanders and these intelligence attachments was by no means instant, and it was only after an initial period of distrust and unpopularity that some commanders accepted the soldiers as part of their unit.33 The relationship between supported tactical commander could be just as fractured as the intelligence discipline as a whole.

31 Chandler and Robb, 43.
32 McGrath, 105.
33 Koch, 137-38.
During World War II, the Army’s three intelligence organizations, supervised by the Army G-2, included the Signal Security Agency for signal intelligence, the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), and the Military Intelligence Service for all other intelligence disciplines. These three agencies were responsible for the intelligence soldiers, who supported combat units down to the division level. During World War II, the CIC deployed 241 detachments, the Military Intelligence Service sent 3,500 soldiers, and the Signal Security Agency deployed companies to each theater. Instead of having headquarters elements co-located within a theater of operations, these small teams and companies reported to the Military Intelligence Service and CIC in Washington, DC or the Signal Security Agency in Arlington, Virginia. The remote supervision of these MI teams sometimes caused misunderstandings where the teams were supposed to be going and did not provide necessary back up when MI teams were not being utilized correctly.

Tactical intelligence collection was utilized to great effect in World War II. It provided tactical commanders the intelligence they needed to conduct effective operations. However, at the end of World War II, there was a massive drawdown of intelligence officers and soldiers, draining institutional knowledge of intelligence

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34 The Military Intelligence Service was established in Washington, D.C. during World War II to control the allocation of intelligence soldiers throughout the war. The Military Intelligence Service was a significant part of the history of military intelligence in World War II. Unfortunately, the term was used by T.F. Van Natta and others to describe the 1948 Military Intelligence Service Organization. Throughout this thesis, references to the 1948 organizational concept will be presented as an acronym. References to the World War II administrative organization will always be spelled out fully.

35 Bigelow, 36-37.
techniques. Many World War II veterans with intelligence expertise joined the reserves after the war.\textsuperscript{36} Units retained their G-2s, but the Army nearly eliminated interpreters, interrogators, and analysts when the Military Intelligence Service deactivated. The Army also significantly curtailed the size of the CIC and SSA. The prevailing wisdom was that intelligence soldiers, except for counterintelligence and signals intelligence, did not need training in peacetime.\textsuperscript{37} But several far-sighted leaders understood the benefits of intelligence and their recommendations led to the establishment of MIS in 1948. These leaders, as part of the European Theater of Operations (ETO) General Board, codified lessons painfully gleaned during World War II. An idea that would eventually spark the development of the MIS was the CIC tested concepts in cellular design of organizations in 1944. Going into the war, the CIC’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) included cellular units that could flexibly generate detachments in support of particular field units, based on their mission.\textsuperscript{38} The development of the MIS in 1948 used the same concept, making intelligence collections organizations much more responsive to specific needs of tactical units.

\textsuperscript{36} Schultz, 41.

\textsuperscript{37} Powe and Wilson, 85.

Conclusion

Just as MIS and MIO were foundational to contemporary MI units, both of these institutions built on the experiences of soldiers and the collective memory of the Army. This survey of MI organization provides context for later discussions of the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the interwar period between the two conflicts. The utilization of MI throughout American military history is sporadic. While the MI branch dates its inception back to 1863 when Major General Joseph Hooker created the Bureau of Military Information for the Union’s Army of the Potomac, the employment of MI from that time has been anything but consistent. The Army discarded nearly the entire intelligence apparatus after both World War I and World War II. Even when the Army did its best to preserve lessons, through the development of the ETO General Board, the actual implementation of those lessons, such as the development of MIS, leaders could not implement them due to the Army’s personnel cuts.

The MIS and MIO are complementary concepts built on the lessons of World War II and the Korean War. They were both intertwined in the methodology of how the Army thought it should organize intelligence. Leaders gained a flexible intelligence capability to use on the future battlefield. MI has come a long way since World War I, and it has been at the expense of many hard lessons, sometimes learned repeatedly. It is important going forward, as leaders continue to evolve tactical MI organizations to contend with current operational environments, that they understand how we got where we are. The principles developed under MIS and MIO have increased the Army’s capability to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence. They have established integrated MI
support to tactical combat commanders. MI officers should understand that impact and the remaining weaknesses of these concepts.
CHAPTER 2
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

Over four long years in World War II, the United States Army learned how to collect intelligence. It developed effective techniques to determine where German forces were on the battlefield. The G-2s learned who needed to know what type of information their commanders needed. Then World War II ended. Soldiers the Army drafted during mobilization for the war, who were deeply concerned about intelligence when the Germans were shooting at them, suddenly cared very little. How many conversations took place between leaders and soldiers during the war, trying to discover ways to get intelligence faster and more accurately? Unfortunately, we will never know. Immediately after the war, Dwight Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff of the Army, wanted to capture the lessons of World War II. He commissioned a series of “General Boards,” including three boards focusing on intelligence.39

From this introspective endeavor, the Army Field Forces, based on the methodology used to organize intelligence in World War II and lessons of the General Boards, institutionalized the MIS. The MIS was a foundational capability for MI as a profession, establishing a structure which could support tactical units. It was the first step to develop an all-inclusive concept of intelligence support for the tactical commander.40


40 Van Natta, “The New G-2 Section.”
World War II had proved that intelligence was going to be important in the next war. Technological improvements had propelled the collection of information beyond what a cavalry squadron could collect by “fighting for information.” Until MIS, “intelligence” was a historic lesson or an ephemeral wish. MIS formalized the concept that tactical commanders could receive dedicated intelligence in the next war. It also established the foundation for later improvements in intelligence units supporting tactical combat units.

Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in World War II

Based on surveys of intelligence officers across the European Theater of Operations, the General Board recommendations provided post-World War II addressed the utility of the MI specialists teams. MI specialist teams deployed quickly upon mobilization, arriving in Britain in April 1943 before significant deployments of Army troops, to prepare for Operation Overlord. Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence, deployed intelligence specialists in small teams to Europe. By the summer of 1943, the Military Intelligence Service had deployed at least one team dedicated to each of the following intelligence specialties: Interrogator, Prisoners of War (IPW), military interpreter, photo interpreter and order of battle. An example of how small the specialist teams’ footprint was, by September 1943 there were only 12 IPW teams, 72 interrogators, in Britain. The Military Intelligence Service, a department of the theater G-2 and precursor to the 1948 MIS concept managed the teams

from the European Theater Headquarters. While the speed of deployment was impressive, the MI teams also performed well throughout the war, integrating into units and providing tactical commanders with significant collection capability.\textsuperscript{42} Intelligence leaders across the Army were favorable of the soldiers attached to them from the MIS. The General Board noted that the MI specialist teams performed well throughout World War II.\textsuperscript{43}

The first recommendation by the General Board was to assign, rather than attach, specialist teams to divisions rather than remaining attached as they were during the war. The General Board noted that there were misunderstandings regarding to whom specialist teams reported, by both the tactical commanders and the specialist teams. Additionally, the Board pointed out that intelligence specialists were not able to operate in the standard military hierarchy and had lax supervision, resulting in less than optimal integration in some cases.\textsuperscript{44} As a result, among intelligence leaders, there was significant opposition to this recommendation, most notably from leaders at Camp Ritchie. The MI instructors seemed to have a general aversion to assigning MI soldiers to non-MI commanders.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 28-29.


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 22.

\textsuperscript{45} “Intelligence Division, the Ground General School-Recommended Changes, Revisions, Extension or Reduction in Instruction Presently Conducted,” The Army Ground Force Intelligence Conference 2 (1947): T.6-T.7, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Library.
Additionally, the Board suggested an “intelligence service be established to procure, maintain, train, initially supply, and assign intelligence teams,” functions that eventually incorporated the 1948 MIS. Allocation of IPW teams, editorial sections, and order of battle teams changed due to recommendations of the General Board. The Board wanted intelligence teams assigned to combat units in habitual relationships, training with the units in peacetime. The exodus of soldiers from the Army blunted the recommendations provided by the boards. However, the General Board established the general principles future MI reorganizations would follow.

The Army Ground Forces and the Military Intelligence Service

General Jacob Devers was responsible for implementing the recommendations of the post-World War II General Boards. Devers took command of the AGF in 1945, just before the war ended. He brought several officers he had worked with in World War II into the AGF; among them was Colonel Eugene Harrison. In 1940, Devers picked Harrison to be part of his closest staff. Their relationship began when both were on the faculty at West Point. Harrison began working for Devers when the general was given a corps command during World War II. They worked together for the duration of the war. Harrison did not have a significant background in MI before World War II. His


appointment in 1944, as the Chief of Intelligence, G-2 in the Sixth Army Group, under the command of Devers, was his first assignment in a MI billet. However, Harrison found his assignment as a G-2 to be “the most challenging and rewarding of his career,” and he was involved in various intelligence-driven operations throughout the war to include the 1945 Alsos mission to capture German atomic laboratories. As the G-2 of the AGF, Harrison dedicated himself to the intelligence community, participating in the Lovett Commission that founded the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and worked hard to implement change with Devers, his “enthusiastic” commander. Harrison developed the MIS TO&Es based mostly on recommendations from the General Board. Although the AGF was the proponent of TO&Es, they were not responsible for Army doctrine. Harrison worked with faculty members of the Command and General Staff College and other officers at Fort Leavenworth to help with that task. One of those faculty members was Colonel Thomas Fraley Van Natta, who doggedly sought to extend MI’s influence within the Army. Harrison was deeply involved in MI reorganization, until he left AGF in 1948 for an assignment in Japan.

Van Natta, more than any other soldier, was responsible for the improvement of military intelligence through the post-World War II and Korean War period. He conceptualized employment of the MIS as a faculty member at the Command and

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50 West Point Association of Graduates, “Memorials: Eugene L. Harrison 1923.”

General Staff College then developed the MIO as the G-2 of Army Field Forces, the successor of the Army Ground Forces. Van Natta was born in the Philippines on November 10, 1906, and commissioned as a cavalry officer from the United States Military Academy in 1928. He served in Paraguay beginning in 1941 through the beginning of World War II. From 1944 to 1945, he was part of the Combat Liaison Officer Headquarters for China, Burma, and India. After the war, he served as a faculty member at the Command and General Staff College before the Army sent him to Korea. During the Korean War, he served as the G2 of Eighth Army from 1952 to 1953, working closely with the commander, General Mathew B. Ridgeway. He also served as the G2 of Army Field Forces (the precursor to CONARC and TRADOC) in Washington, DC in 1953 and as the Army attaché to Mexico in 1955. Van Natta was an influential advocate for Army intelligence throughout his career. He believed that intelligence was an essential component of the Army’s capability, and he was part of a small group of officers who influenced the Army to develop an intelligence branch.

Adding Intelligence to the Division

Harrison helped develop TO&E 7-IN published on July 7, 1948 based on recommendations from the post-World War II General Board. The infantry division

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54 Schultz, 62.
reorganization increased the size of regiments “adding soldiers to provide intelligence and reconnaissance.” Because advances in rocketry and aircraft following World War II, Harrison argued that the post-war battlefield had expanded to “greater depth and breadth . . . [and] . . . increased the difficulty of conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection.” In the immediate post-war years, the infantry division grew slightly from its World War II size. However, the MI billets within the division did change significantly. The G-2 section, only authorized three officers and seven enlisted members during World War II, increased to ten officers and thirty enlisted members under TO&E 7-IN. The TO&E included a captain in charge of each specialty section within the G-2: order of battle, photo interpretation, and interrogation. It added a billet for a staff sergeant as the NCOIC of the section, where previously NCOIC was an additional duty. The increased leadership within the G-2 served as control elements for attached MI teams and soldiers. The analytical capability of the G-2 section expanded with the addition of two order of battle soldiers. The number of photo interpreters increased from two to six. Lastly, 16 interrogators became part of the organization to provide a robust human intelligence collection capability. This latter capability was based on lessons captured by the General Board from over 76 G-2s that served in World War II.


56 Wilson, 227.

57 Van Natta, “The New G-2 Section.”

58 Ibid.
The Board considered human intelligence one of the most effective collection capabilities at the tactical level.59 The movement to provide more assigned capability to the divisions was a general trend across the Army, not just restricted to military intelligence. Intelligence soldiers habitually attached during World War II were made organic to units.60

The increase in MI specialists under TO&E 7-IN provided the division, according to Colonel Van Natta, “the intelligence specialists that it would normally use throughout an entire campaign.”61 In designing the division’s organic MI capability, Harrison expected the interrogators to be fluent in the enemy’s foreign language. He reasoned that a unit encountered “one enemy language in a major campaign” and presumed the enemy would be known far enough in advance for the language school to train interrogators in those languages before joining the division, or that they could later learn additional languages.62 The intelligence community, including Van Natta, believed the Army should allocate additional linguist capability to a division by MI units based on the character of the war.63 These linguists and other intelligence specialists included in TO&E 30-600 were a part of the new MIS. Colonel Harrison augmented the G-2 with the MIS teams

59 Ibid.

60 Wilson, 232.

61 Van Natta, “The New G-2 Section.”

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.
based on recommendations from the General Board and other Army officers involved in the World War II intelligence effort.\textsuperscript{64}

Harrison published TO&E 30-600 on October 20th, 1948, which standardized intelligence specialists into teams, formalizing MI support to tactical units developed during World War II. Harrison established thirty-eight teams of varying specialties. A MI headquarters administered them at theater-level. MIS created small reinforcing units, most consisting of only three soldiers (one officer and two enlisted), but could be as large as 12 soldiers. Interrogators, as well as translators and interpreters, developed in teams as part of the MIS, augmented the interrogators that were part of the division G-2 shop. Though a particular unit may only face one enemy nationality during a campaign, they “may in the same campaign encounter four or more Allied, friendly, or neutral languages” and would need specific support from a pool of linguists during a particular campaign.\textsuperscript{65} In addition to interrogators and linguists, MIS standardized other small units. The document exploitation team, for instance, was composed of soldiers who combined “a reading knowledge of a language with ability to analyze information . . . to read a foreign document and pick out any items of military significance.”\textsuperscript{66} Other newly designated units were the technical intelligence coordination and the editorial teams. The


\textsuperscript{65} Van Natta, “The New G-2 Section.”

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
technical intelligence coordination team was developed because of the “lack of understanding between [the technical intelligence] team member and [the intelligence] staff officer.” Also, Harrison emphasized editorial soldiers to “write and edit” intelligence reports for the G-2 section, thus acting as a bridge between mostly literate intelligence staff officers and less grammatically refined intelligence soldiers. The distribution of MIS, associated with tactical headquarters, was a departure from World War II in which the Army sent intelligence soldiers to units based on perceived need by commanders.

Under the new MIS, the Army allocated MIS teams based on the number of troops within a unit. This provided adequate support depending on the number of soldiers in a field army or area of operations. This process accounted for units attached, as well as organic, under a corps or division. The TO&E took into account the number of troops in the unit and provided more intelligence capability to the larger organization; for units’ whose attachments significantly increased the size of the unit. Each team, under MIS, did have a “Basis of Allocation” that not only defined the number of troops the team was supposed to support, but also how many teams were attached to each corps or division. For example, “Team FF Translator” provided two translators per division or one per 30,000 soldiers. Additionally, an administrative team usually oversaw any MIS units. For example, the Army allocated one administrative team per four FF Translator teams.

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 46.
may seem counter-intuitive to base the number of intelligence soldiers allocated to a particular organization on the number of soldiers within that unit and not necessarily on the size of the enemy. However, a larger friendly unit will usually have a wider front and therefore face more enemy forces. MIS teams could also surge during a major operation, a degree of flexibility used to great effect during the Vietnam War.70

The MIS institutionalized most of the ETO General Board recommendations.71 However, MIS did not address how to organize organic intelligence capability within the G-2 effectively. The principal goal of MIS was to decrease the burden of the G-2 coordinating collection and conducting analysis. MIS reduced the number of intelligence soldiers he had to supervise. While the G-2 section under TO&E 7-IN, developed as a companion to MIS, was four times as large as the same section during World War II. The addition of eleven officers, five warrant officers and 24 enlisted personnel, attached to the division headquarters in MIS teams under TO&E 30-600, more effectively allowed the G-2 to share his administrative and operational burden.72 These efficiencies, of course, assumed that the Army filled all of the intelligence billets within the G-2 section and the full complement of MIS teams were available to tactical commanders. This assumption ended up not being valid in the Korean War.

Military Intelligence units, just like the rest of the Army were subject to severe personnel and budget shortages after World War II. The demobilization of the Army


necessitated severe personnel cuts, while President Truman’s military budget cuts forced the Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins to “skeletonize the force structure” with only a small number of “cadre” members in most units.\textsuperscript{73} Van Natta understood the Army’s constraints, in personnel and budget, supporting the MIS. He believed it was “doubtful if a Military Intelligence Service will be organized in peacetime, for without an active enemy there is little need for these types of intelligence specialists in tactical units.”\textsuperscript{74} He was right, General Collins never implemented MIS as envisioned in 1948.\textsuperscript{75} Additionally, the MI Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was decommissioned in October 1945 due to budget cuts. Truman and Collins did not believe there was a need for intelligence soldiers, except for counterintelligence and signals intelligence, during peacetime.\textsuperscript{76} In fact, a 1951 survey found that only 7 percent of Eighth Army soldiers in intelligence billets had any prior training or experience in military intelligence.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{Military Intelligence Service in the Korean War}

Army MI leaders, like most of the rest of the Army, were unprepared for the Korean War, requiring a significant amount of time to call-up and re-train intelligence soldiers. During North Korea’s invasion of its southern neighbor, the Army divisions

\textsuperscript{73} Linn, 23.

\textsuperscript{74} Van Natta, “The New G-2 Section,” 47.

\textsuperscript{75} Finnegan and Danysh, 112.

\textsuperscript{76} Powe, 85.

\textsuperscript{77} Finnegan and Danysh, 115.
stationed in Japan were understrength and reorganizing.\textsuperscript{78} Lack of intelligence was an issue for these divisions, but to make matters worse, none of the divisions in Japan had any reconnaissance capability, primarily because of decreased manning and equipment for authorized scout troops.\textsuperscript{79} Counterintelligence detachments were the only functional Army intelligence organizations able to deploy to Korea to support divisions attempting to slow the North Korean advance south in July of 1950.\textsuperscript{80} It was not until September that the 60th Signal Service Company was in the theater of war.\textsuperscript{81} Other MI specialist units were not active until the Inchon landing in September. The mobilization of reserves, the development of an intelligence training curriculum at Fort Riley and the training of interrogators, linguists, photo interpreters, technical intelligence, and censorship personnel all took precious time.\textsuperscript{82} It was not until 1952 that MI capability in Korea was comparable with World War II.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{78} Wilson, 239.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Finnegan and Danysh, 91.

\textsuperscript{81} Powe, 91.

\textsuperscript{82} The Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie was closed in October 1945, an intelligence school was opened as part of the Cavalry School at Fort Riley in July 1946. Both officers and enlisted personnel were trained there but not to the level needed to meet the requirements of the Korean War. Gerd Grombacher notes that much of the training conducted during World War II had been lost and that an unidentified instructor had to come to Fort Riley to reinvigorate the instruction and attempt to model intelligence training conducted at Camp Ritchie during the war.

In the same fashion as in World War II, the first intelligence units during the Korean War deployed as teams, detachments, and companies. By December 1950, at the theater echelon the Army activated the 525th Military Intelligence Service Group, one of three stood-up during the Korean War. The groups consolidated interrogators, photo interpreters, and order of battle specialty units for dispersion at the tactical level.\textsuperscript{84} These groups, composed along a cellular concept, were tailored platoons to meet specific intelligence requirements of division commanders and their G-2s. The groups also provided companies and battalions of intelligence specialists to corps and army echelons.\textsuperscript{85} The CIC and Army Security Agency ((ASA)-previously the Signal Security Agency) developed similar types of organizations assigned to Field Army headquarters and attached to lower echelons.\textsuperscript{86}

**Conclusion**

The MIS was a natural development of lessons from World War II. The AGF developed MIS directly based on the ETO General Board recommendations. Colonel Harrison omitted controversial portions, such as the assignment of MI soldiers to tactical combat units. Implementing the recommendations directly and avoiding controversy that would hold up the process, was the most expedient method to preserve the organization that had worked so well in World War II. Though personnel cuts after World War II

\textsuperscript{84} Finnegan and Danysh, 116.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 114-17.
blocked implementation of MIS Army-wide, the development of MIS in the Korean War is a testament to the concept’s utility.

Subsequent organizational refinements, such as the MIO, drew inspiration from MIS. The success of MIS again shined in the Vietnam War. When Army leaders consider how they should organize or deploy MI soldiers, they need to look at the lessons of World War II and the Korean War. They need to consider the success of MIS as a basic methodology to deploy low-density soldiers quickly to the most critical locations. MIS proved the importance of attaching intelligence to other organizations.
CHAPTER 3
DECISIONS LEADING TO THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

By 1948, when the Army published TO&E 30-600 and MIS became the way intelligence organized itself, the world was already changing. Army divisions needed another restructuring, due to technological advances and personnel shortages, to make them more lethal. General Ridgeway, the Chief of Staff for the Army, published guidance on the development of the Atomic Testing Field Army (ATFA) for this purpose. President Eisenhower directed substantial decreases in Army personnel and funds. Ridgeway wanted to develop the ATFA prior to the end of 1956, when a bulk of the cuts were supposed to take effect.

The G-2s of World War II forged MIS through the most enduring trials of World War II, testing it in actual war. Leaders did not test MI support for the ATFA as rigorously, the changes were not battle tested. Exercises for the ATFA attempted, but fell extremely short, of replicating battlefield conditions. Consequently, it is questionable whether the changes improved the support MI soldiers provided on a conventional battlefield. Planners initially downsized intelligence support substantially, wanting to downgrade the G-2’s position below the G-3 to decrease the size of the staff. The development of the ATFA, and subsequently the MIO, is a case in which the Army let political considerations drive the evolution of the profession. Luckily, there were dedicated officers at the Army Field Forces, the proponent for the restructuring, which fought for MI in the Army’s next organizational permutation.
Almost all of the officers working to bring the ATFA in existence were veterans of the Second World War and the Korean War. If the Army needed to change, they were the ones to improve it. If anyone knew what the Army needed to do to win the next conventional war, it was the veteran officers working at Army Field Forces in the 1950s. However, when the Department of the Army staff published its initial plans, there was no attention given to military intelligence. It was only through the insubordination and zealous proselyting by Brigadier General T.F. Van Natta that the MIO developed as part of the ATFA. Most of Van Natta’s concepts addressed recommendations by the General Board after World War II which Colonel Harrison, the Army Ground Forces G-2 from 1945 to 1948, shelved due to dissent from the Combat Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie. Van Natta, personally, was able to revive the debate within the Army about the importance of MI to the tactical combat commander. MI may not exist in the Army today if Van Natta had not interceded. However, the alterations he championed fundamentally changed the way MI supports maneuver.

87 Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, subj: “Concept of the Plan of Field Test of the Provisional Armored Division,” RG 337, Entry NMS 56, Box 488, NARA.; Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, subj: “Concept of the Plan of Field Test of the Provisional Infantry Division,” RG 337, Entry NMS 56, Box 488, NARA.

88 Thomas Van Natta and Behnken, subj: Correspondence between Colonel Behnken and Brigadier General Van Natta; Memorandum from Chief of Army Field Forces, “Intelligence Concept for Proposed Infantry and Armored Divisions,” October 26, 1954, RG 337, Entry 30B-300, Box 488, National Archives and Records Administration.; T.F. Van Natta was promoted to Brigadier General in 1953 and Major General in 1957.
Development of the Atomic Testing Field Army

General Ridgeway was again under significant pressure from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and President Eisenhower to decrease the size of the Army. This pressure and Ridgeway’s penchant for resisting it saved the Army and the role of MI within it. Wilson believed a large pool of reserve soldiers, brought in under the 1955 Armed Forces Reserve Act, could allow the Active Duty Army to shrink significantly.\(^8^9\) Wilson initially believed that the administration could rely on the reserve to deploy, if war lasted more than a month under Eisenhower’s 1954 “Massive Retaliation” nuclear warfare strategy.\(^9^0\) Ridgeway, for his part, did not believe a wholesale disregard for the Army was a sound strategy. He reasoned that, “in the past it has taken us from ten to thirteen months to convert reserve forces into battle-ready divisions” and that, at a minimum, the United States should maintain active duty forces to fight in the first six months of the next conflict.\(^9^1\) However, Secretary Wilson and Eisenhower, over the non-concurrence of Ridgeway, decided in January of 1954 to cut Army rolls by 500,000 active duty soldiers to take effect in 1956.\(^9^2\)

Military Intelligence personnel strength mirrored the Army’s decline through the 1950s. Among the impactful cuts were 155 billets (14 percent) from the Department of the Army, G-2, headed by Major General Richard Clare Partridge from 1952 to 1953.


\(^{9^0}\) Linn, 147.

\(^{9^1}\) Martin, 291.

\(^{9^2}\) Ibid., 288.
Partridge proved to be a tireless, though realistic, advocate for Army intelligence. Partridge, unfortunately, entered a challenging situation in 1952 when he became the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for Intelligence (ACSI) for the Department of the Army. The same month Partridge took his position, a report directed by Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins called for significant reductions in the intelligence section. Though Partridge did his best to argue against reductions, Collins cut 155 personnel from the DA, G-2 at the end of 1953. Senator McCarthy accused Partridge as being a communist and a “completely incompetent” G-2 for defending human intelligence sources in the Soviet Union. Ridgeway transferred Partridge to Europe. Major General Arthur Trudeau, an Army Engineer and vehement anti-communist, took Partridge’s position as the ACSI in the winter of 1953. Trudeau was less concerned than Partridge about the future of MI within the Army. He instead spent a significant amount of his tenure as G-2, from 1953 to 1955, visiting embassies abroad. Consequently, within the Department of the Army, Trudeau was not an advocate for intelligence. His office did not provide a substantial vision for intelligence support to the divisions, allowing a denigration of the G-2’s position within the division.\footnote{General Trudeau’s contribution to the military intelligence community is not denigrated by this account. There is no doubt that Trudeau did a great many things that furthered the cause against communism and the furthering of Army intelligence initiatives during his time as the ACSI. However, his contribution to MI organization, addressed in this thesis, was marginal.}

While Ridgeway bemoaned the cuts to his Army, he understood that in adversity there is opportunity.\footnote{Martin, 296-300.} In 1954 Ridgeway anticipated cuts in Army strength and focused
efforts on redesigning Army formations. He embarked on a program to make the active
duty army more lethal by seeking greater combat manpower ratios, higher combat to
support unit ratios, greater flexibility, increased mobility, and maximum use of
technological improvements. For the Army’s MI community, this was a monumental
decision. Ridgeway’s emphasis on mobility and smaller units necessitated good
intelligence as part of the active duty force. His vision contrasted with retrenchment
policies after World War II in which the Army shunted many of the soldiers experienced
in MI away to the reserves. A redesign of Army units, following similar principles, had
already begun on a limited basis by General James Gavin, Commander of the U.S. VII
Army Corps in Europe. He believed a redesign was necessary because he did not believe
infantry and airborne units could “function in atomic war.” Gavin thought that the
“atomic battlefield would be much deeper, wider, and less structured than the one in
World War II,” and he supported the idea that units would need to disperse so Soviets
could not destroy them in a single nuclear attack. Both of these concepts required
greater intelligence support. A higher degree of intelligence, based on concepts and
technologies developed during the Korean War, needed to provide awareness of enemy
formations required for Gavin’s and Ridgeway’s ideas. The ability to disperse quickly
then mass at decisive points was important to Army forces on a nuclear battlefield. The

95 Letter, OCoS to OCAFF, 19 Apr 54, Subj: Organizational Studies to Improve
the Army Combat Potential-to-Manpower Ratio, RG 337, National Archives and Records
Administration.

96 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited
War, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 49.

97 Ibid.
Army needed to deny the Soviet Army’s ability to target formations with nuclear arsenals, but still be able to mass at critical points. However, the Army still needed to work out the particulars of Gavin’s concept. In some cases, technology had not advanced far enough. Technologies such as frequency modulated radios and better photo-reconnaissance were developing but were not yet able to provide adequate support to commanders so they could mass and disperse as the tempo of atomic warfare required.\footnote{Ibid., 29, 42.}

By April 1954, Ridgeway published guidance on the creation of the ATFA. The Army Field Forces, in the development of the ATFA, pursued six lines of effort. The Army Field Forces’ most intensive efforts were in the development of concepts and manning, as well as planning the training for the infantry and armor divisions. This training was to take place in early 1955. The Army Field Forces staff provided the TO&Es to the two test divisions, 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division by September 1954, five months after Ridgeway’s request for the ATFA. The two divisions used December and January to train their altered formations. The Army Field Forces scheduled the testing of the concepts for February 1955 during Exercise Follow Me at Fort Benning and Exercise Blue Bolt at Fort Hood, testing infantry and armor, but not MI, concepts respectively.

The General John Dalhquist, the Commander of the Army Field Forces, reviewed the results of the two field tests in April 1955. He and his staff revised all TO&Es and finalized them by mid-October 1955. In addition to TO&E and concept development, Dahlquist directed a parallel effort be conducted to write doctrine and Task Lists for the
ATFA organizations. The Army Field Forces staff completed the task lists in November 1955, before the two divisions’ training periods. The Army Field Forces staff allotted more time for development of concepts and manning for Support Units (including MI), because their structure was based on the ATFA division-set. The support unit’s manning was not due to the Department of the Army, G-3 until April 1955, after the divisions were field-tested.99

Military Intelligence in the Atomic Testing Field Army

Concepts of MI collection and the role of the G-2 were not included in the early development processes of the ATFA. Under the supervision of Trudeau and the Command and General Staff College, the importance of the ATFA G-2 decreased compared to other staff positions. The concept in July 1954 combined the G-2 and G-3 sections into a consolidated “operations section” in which the intelligence officer became an assistant.100 General Van Natta had other ideas about the role of the G-2 in the future Army. Despite these disagreements, Van Natta initially focused on intelligence collection, not the G-2 intelligence section. Van Natta’s concept of collection as part of the new design included the “administrative consolidation of intelligence specialists.” He wanted to provide the “G-2 with a single technical [intelligence] advisor” instead of

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99 Planning Schedule for ATFA-1, Army Field Forces, RG 337, Entry 30B, Box 489, National Archives and Records Administration.

100 Command and General Staff College, Memorandum, “Comments on ATFA-1 Armored Division Manning Charts Prepared by Other Agencies,” to Chief, Army Field Forces, July 30, 1954. RG 337, Entry 30B-300, National Archives and Records Administration.
having to direct intelligence collection and analysis of various intelligence specialties.\textsuperscript{101} This idea was not solely Van Natta’s. General Dahlquist wanted to consolidate and reduce unit staffs, among other efforts, to “relieve the combat commanders of much of their current administrative and supply duties in order that their attention can be directed toward the actual fighting.”\textsuperscript{102} Dahlquist and his staff had various meetings regarding the ATFA throughout 1954. However, the meetings did not have significant representation from Brigadier General Van Natta and others from his G-2 section. Dahlquist wanted his planning team to develop initial concepts for the ATFA by September 1954. Van Natta did not receive the information or the emphasis he needed to reform MI units. He continued to work on his concept of MIO.

One of the strengths and weaknesses of ATFA’s short timeline was that the concepts were a product of the experience and bias of a small number of Army leaders. This was especially true with regard to Van Natta’s concept of MIO. His emphasis on providing corps and division commanders, and by extension their G-2s, more control over MI soldiers may have been based on his very personal experience in the Korean War. Van Natta struggled to coordinate MI collection during his time in Korea and this bias carried over to his time at Army Field Forces. For example, as the G-2 of Eighth United States (U.S.) Army-Korea, Van Natta worked with the CIA developing covert

\textsuperscript{101} Thomas Van Natta and Behnken, Subj: Correspondence between Colonel Behnken and Brigadier General Van Natta

\textsuperscript{102} Subj: Briefing-Tactical Air Command re: ATFA, pg. 2-3; RG 337, Entry 30B, Box 488, National Archives and Records Administration.; One of the driving concepts of the ATFA was to put support organizations such as logistics and signal in self-contained units which would provide a tactical commander on-demand capabilities.
human intelligence collection behind North Korean lines. However, the CIA did not want
to share all of their information regarding sources and safe houses with their Army
counterparts. A confrontation between Van Natta and CIA leadership took place over the
location of safe houses in Seoul. Van Natta and other G-2 officers in the Far East
Command thought the CIA could have been more cooperative and transparent regarding
intelligence collection in the Korean combat theater. The CIA concluded that he and
others ultimately wanted the information to control CIA sources.¹⁰³ This penchant for
control, whether Van Natta wanted to govern the CIA or not, manifested itself in the
MIO.

By September 1954, General Ridgeway had evolved his thinking into distinct
testing criteria for Infantry and Armor units. Army Field Forces guidance emphasized
mobility, flexibility, sustained combat, fire support, and security as tenets of the ATFA
organization.¹⁰⁴ Many tasks implied, but did not specify robust intelligence collection and
analytical capability. The ATFA force required units to “mass in time . . . [in] . . . various
formations to meet changing operational circumstances.”¹⁰⁵ Additionally, Ridgeway’s
concept had the ATFA mass artillery fire and then disperse due to the threat of atomic
attack. All of these capabilities, by implication, necessitated intelligence of enemy

¹⁰³ Central Intelligence Agency, Far East Division, “The Secret War in Korea:
June 1950 to June 1952,” Clandestine Services History, July 17, 1968, accessed May 2,

¹⁰⁴ Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Subj: “Concept of the Plan of Field Test
of the Provisional Armored Division”; Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, subj:
“Concept of the Plan of Field Test of the Provisional Infantry Division.”

¹⁰⁵ Subj: Concept of the Plan of Field Test, Exercise Follow Me, RG 337, Entry
30B, Box 488, National Archives and Records Administration.
dispositions. However, the testing criteria only mentioned military intelligence under “flexibility,” invoking the need to “process intelligence.”

Unfortunately, as Army Field Forces planners published details on Exercise Follow-Me, the actual implementation of Van Natta’s concepts fell horribly short. Instead of an integrated unit of military intelligence soldiers and a G-2, that had specialized personnel in his shop to facilitate ATFA operations (hallmarks of MIO) the developers of Follow-Me stripped the G-2 of order of battle specialists and aerial photo interpreters and instead assigned intelligence teams based on the MIS model. While the exercise planners did allocate “Team GB, Order of Battle” and four teams for “Aerial Photo Interpretation” to the exercise, this was not enough for Van Natta. In a letter to General Dahlquist, Van Natta fumed. He believed the lack of intelligence support to the exercise was “a serious error and a backward step, counter to modern developments.” The training eliminated “a specific intelligence capability at a time when efforts to improve and extend intelligence” had been directed. Van Natta got little traction with Dahlquist. He decided to call in an old favor.

106 Ibid.

107 Subj: Appendix to Intelligence Annex to Guidance for Plan of Field Test, Exercise Follow Me, RG 337, Entry 30B-300, National Archives and Records Administration.

108 Thomas Van Natta, Elimination of Intelligence Specialists, ATFA-1 Organization, October 1, 1954. RG 337, Entry 30B-300, National Archives and Records Administration.

109 Van Natta, Elimination of Intelligence Specialists.

110 This assertion is based on two memoranda provided to General Dahlquist which General Van Natta was responsible. This first “Elimination of Intelligence Specialists, ATFA-1 Organization” and the follow-up memorandum by Ridgeway which
Van Natta contacted his former boss, Ridgeway, under whom he served as G-2 in the Eighth U.S. Army-Korea. Van Natta asked Ridgeway if he could ghostwrite a memorandum extolling the “importance of intelligence in Exercises Follow Me and Blue Bolt . . . [to] . . . rectify the impression that intelligence has been slighted.” He believed the memorandum would guide the 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division in the employment of intelligence soldiers developed under MIO. Ridgeway complied. The memorandum was sent on October 8th to Dahlquist with a note from Ridgeway who hoped “the importance of intelligence to the successful employment of the new infantry and armored divisions be fully appreciated at all levels.” Possibly annoyed by the jump in the chain of command, William Miley, the Chief of Staff of Army Field Forces, told Van Natta, and briefed Dahlquist, that the TO&Es for the ATFA infantry and armored divisions exercises were “inadequate in intelligence specialists” but that “we should not, at this time, change published TO&Es.” However, on October 26th, Dahlquist sent out refined guidance to the commandants and commanders of the Army’s various schools,

was written in such detail and in line with Van Natta’s assertion of what Army military intelligence should look like, that he had to be involved in the process, Subj: Intelligence Concept for Prepared Infantry and Armored Divisions; Van Natta, Elimination of Intelligence Specialists; Matthew Ridgeway to Chief of Army Field Forces.

111 Matthew Ridgeway to Chief of Army Field Forces.

112 Ibid.

113 Van Natta, Cover Page.

114 Matthew Ridgeway to Chief of Army Field Forces.

115 Letter from G3 to COFS, “Elimination of Intelligence Specialist, ATFA-1 Organization,” October 14, 1954, National Archives and Records Administration.
including the commander of III Corps, whose divisions were being tested during Exercise Follow Me and Blue Bolt. Dahlquist wanted to make leaders aware of the “Intelligence Concept for Proposed Infantry and Armored Divisions” which sought to ensure “the importance of intelligence to the successful employment of the new infantry and armored divisions be fully appreciated at all levels.”

Dahlquist included the line and block chart for the “Division Military Intelligence Platoon” and the “Organization of the Infantry Battalion Operations and Intelligence Section.” Ridgeway’s memorandum, almost surely written by Van Natta, discussed the concepts of MIO.

A meeting on October 29th, 1954, was instrumental in outlining changes to military intelligence support to the ATFA, emphasizing reorganizations to support theater and field army commands. The conference, run by General Van Natta, was attended by representatives from the Department of the Army G-2, Army Ground General School and the Army Intelligence Center, newly established at Fort Holabird, Maryland. Van Natta’s presentation established very specific guidance in anticipation of MIO. His plan specifically developed MI Groups under theater commanders and MI Battalions under field army commanders. His vision was that MI detachments “be habitually attached to the tactical or logistical unit” they supported, and that they “physically join the supported unit (less linguists) early in the unit phase of training.”

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116 Memorandum from Chief of Army Field Forces, “Intelligence Concept for Proposed Infantry and Armored Divisions.”

Most importantly to MI support, Van Natta wanted most units to be “functional and non-cellular” with some MI soldiers maintained under the MIS structure (TO&E 30-600) to augment the G-2s of tactical commanders. Consequently, Van Atta emphasized the relationships of the MI detachments with the G-2 and the relationships of the MI soldiers within the detachment. Van Natta’s concept of an MI Detachment Commander functioned as an assistant G-2 and was a senior MI officer, integrating the MI Detachment’s operations with the G-2 intelligence officer of the supported unit. Van Natta emphasized the cross training of intelligence specialists within the detachments noting, “personnel in MI units may be used for other intelligence duties when not functioning in their specialty but not to the extent of losing their skill in their specialty.” This concept of cross training was useful during the implementation of Van Natta’s concept in various exercises and eventually in Vietnam.

Last, Van Natta presented the work he had done on ten TO&Es, which comprised the new MI units under ATFA, to include: MI Detachments for Corps and Division (TO&E 30-10 & 30-20), MI Battalion Headquarters and Companies (TO&E 30-70), and MI Group Headquarters (TO&E 30-80). He wanted the Army Ground General School to complete the TO&Es as well as a “training text” by December 15, 1954. The Army

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118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Memorandum, “G2 Conference, October 29, 1954.”
Intelligence Center was also supposed to assist in the development of the TO&Es and doctrine about counterintelligence and field operations intelligence (FOI).

Field operations intelligence was an intelligence discipline developed during the Korean War that involved using human intelligence sources, something that had previously only been a counterintelligence function. FOI were a particular breed of MI billet developed after World War II. Unlike in counterintelligence, FOI soldiers did not require any specialized training; the FOI specialty could be award by the Army G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Army Intelligence Center, or by theater commanders. The organization, comprised of individuals that primarily stayed in overseas billets, were unlike CIC Soldiers whose billets were primarily within the United States. A rivalry existed between the two specialties as theater commanders became more comfortable with their FOI collectors, assigning them to counter-espionage missions traditionally reserved for CIC soldiers. FOI standards in security clearance and operational security were lower than comparable CIC personnel and operations. For example, the CIC denied entrance of soldiers due to foreign connections, however they were allowed to join the FOI. This rivalry became important in 1955 when CIC and the Army Intelligence Center gained nominal control over the Army’s MI soldiers.

Van Natta pressed for inclusion of the new intelligence organizations for the February exercises. In a conversation between Van Natta and Colonel Behnken, a Deputy

\[122\] Finnegan and Danysh, 125.

\[123\] Ibid., 126.

\[124\] Ibid.
G-3 for Army Field Forces, Behnken acknowledged that “administrative consolidation of intelligence specialists” was going to be tested as part of the ATFA. However, the only intelligence soldiers for the two exercises were a CIC operational detachment, a linguist detachment, a censorship detachment, and an ASA platoon. Some order of battle analysts and photo interpreter soldiers were already a part of the Division G-2s. The reason for the choice was that these intelligence units were already available at Fort Benning and Fort Hood. The divisions were to use the intelligence support they already had on the installation, configured as closely as possible to the new TO&Es. However, the divisions were far short of the intelligence support prescribed under the new MIO. The Division G-2s had no interrogators and much smaller order of battle and photo interpretation sections. Even with the attachments of other teams on the installation, the number of intelligence soldiers participating in the exercise was inadequate, in Van Natta’s view. However, he acquiesced to the budgetary decisions not to move additional MI soldiers and equipment to Fort Benning and Fort Hood. He had done all he could to increase the importance of MI to the ATFA and the role of the MIO in the 1956 Army. Van Natta left Army Field Forces to become an Army attaché to Mexico before Exercise Follow-Me and Blue Bolt began.

The two divisions, 3rd Infantry and 1st Armored, executed Exercises Follow-Me and Blue Bolt, field-tested the ATFA successfully in early 1955. Predictably, leaders

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125 Thomas Van Natta and Behnken, Subj: Correspondence between Colonel Behnken and Brigadier General Van Natta.

126 Ibid.

127 Department of the Army, TOE 30-600.
recommended the exercises include more intelligence and reconnaissance support to the division. Exercise Follow Me was the first to test the ATFA in February 1955. Major General George Lynch, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division during the exercise, did not think there were any considerable advantages to the ATFA over existing divisions.\textsuperscript{128} The frontage and increased flexibility of the ATFA under the concept of nuclear war strained the ability of a commander to understand what was going on in his area of operations. He needed more intelligence and reconnaissance capability.\textsuperscript{129}

Exercise Blue Bolt was the second exercise to proof the ATFA concept and the first for an armored division. The training, held at Fort Hood in February 1955, was conducted by the 1st Armored Division under the command of Major General Robert Howze. The exercise lasted 20 days and consisted of a deliberate attack on enemy airborne forces at two different locations as well as a delaying action and a counter-attack against notional elements of a mechanized army.\textsuperscript{130} General Howze, disagreed with Lynch about the new organizations. His assessment was that the ATFA armor division did make useful improvements over pre-ATFA formations and suggested only minor improvements.\textsuperscript{131} The disagreements between the two commanders and the differing results during testing required the Army Field Forces to revise the ATFA.

\textsuperscript{128} Trauschweizer, 51.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} “Tentative Scenario and Scheme of Maneuver for Test of Combat Command During Exercise Blue Bolt” and “Tentative Scenario for Phase III Exercise Blue Bolt” RG 337, Entry 30B, Box 488, National Archives and Records Administration.

\textsuperscript{131} Trauschweizer, 51.
Unfortunately, these revisions meant the ATFA organization was far from developed by October 1955, several months before Exercise Sagebrush. Exercises Follow-Me and Blue Bolt did not evaluate the MIO, though Van Natta developed it prior to the training events. MIO did not debut until Exercise Sagebrush, the last exercise of the year. The exercise, which Dahlquist initially viewed as a culminating exercise, became another proof of concept and testing exercise for the ATFA. General Maxwell Taylor, Ridgeway’s successor as Army Chief of Staff, ultimately scrapped the ATFA in deference to his Pentomic Division concept. But the intellectual work that went into the development of ATFA, specifically the MIO, affected later reorganizations.

**Conclusion**

The development of the ATFA was a fast-paced process, measured against somewhat arbitrary, though informed, guidance from the Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgeway. The ATFA was Ridgeway’s answer to Eisenhower’s wish to shrink the military. Instead of just decreasing the number of divisions Ridgeway’s restructuring program reduced their overall size. The decrease was a departure from recommendations after World War II. However, technological advances and assumptions about warfare in a nuclear environment also necessitated a change. Interestingly, while General Maxwell Taylor eventually scrapped the ATFA, leaders incorporated other concepts to support the division reorganization into subsequent designs, such as the Pentomic Division. The MIO was not just a fad; it changed how future leaders perceived tactical military intelligence.¹³² The MIO incorporated some recommendations of the post-World War II

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¹³² Wilson, 276.
General Board, such as the recommendation to attach intelligence teams to divisions, but MIO continued to develop because it coincided with the Army’s vision of future battle. In this respect, Van Natta and the MI profession were lucky, though working amongst those same leaders in the Korean War and at the Army Field Forces, Van Natta no doubt influenced some of their thinking.

Military Intelligence had gained its reputation for being indispensable to the tactical commander during World War II, a tradition continued through the Korean War. However, by 1954 it required General Van Natta to remind the Army, through General Ridgeway, of the importance of tactical intelligence. In this respect, Army leaders had a very short memory. Additionally, the short timeline of the ATFA’s development precluded a wider introspective consensus on what needed to change within Army MI. Unlike after World War II, when 76 G-2s from across the Army, as a part of the ETO General Board, submitted surveys on improvements they thought could be made to intelligence in the Army, the MIO was predominantly the work of one man. Van Natta alone determined the lessons of the Korean War and developed the MIO in response to those lessons. It was because of this sole control over the MIO that problems would arise during Exercise Sagebrush.
CHAPTER 4
EXERCISE SAGEBRUSH

Introduction

There are significant contradictions to the different ways in which MIS, based on the flexible employment of small cellular intelligence teams, and MIO, based on functional tactical units attached to corps and division headquarters, developed as foundational organizations within Army MI. Colonel Harrison refined MIS based on recommendations of G-2s across the ETO in the immediate post-war period. The MIO’s pedigree was much more synthetic. The Army developed it quickly, over a two-year period rife with bureaucratic infighting. It was based mostly on the experiences of T.F. Van Natta, not on wide-ranging lessons of the Korean War. Additionally, the MIO was not tested in combat, especially not against an existential conventional war like World War II. In fact, out of the three exercises in which the ATFA, and by consequence MIO, was developing, the MI detachments were only attempted in the last one, Exercise Sagebrush. The results of the test were underwhelming. A detailed analysis of the exercise provides important insights into the weaknesses of MIO.

Plan

In preparation for Exercise Sagebrush, the Army needed experienced soldiers to measure the feasibility of concepts developed for the ATFA during “free play” training exercises. To do this, Continental Army Command (CONARC—the successor to Army Field Forces) assembled a wide-range of military specialists, some of which were teachers at the Army’s various specialty schools. One of those teachers was a young
Army Captain named Gerd Grombacher. Before Exercise Sagebrush, the Army previously detailed him to intelligence billets through World War II and the Korean War. He had intermediate assignments teaching at various intelligence schools. Grombacher was uniquely qualified to assist in the creation of the MIO. He was born in Germany in 1923 to two Jewish parents. Shortly after Hitler came to power, the U.S. granted him and his sister visas to stay with family in New York. Grombacher joined the Army in 1943, and because he spoke fluent German, the Army detailed him to be an IPW. He was a part of the invasion of Normandy, working at a regimental headquarters and later as a member of General Patton’s Third Army moving across France. As an enlisted interrogator, Grombacher remained at the regimental level. After receiving a battlefield commission to Lieutenant, Grombacher began to ascend to ever higher echelons within the U.S. Army. He accompanied the 10th Armored Division into Bastogne to end the Battle of the Bulge and spent time briefly at Ninth Army and the 95th Division as a CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) detachment linguist.

Grombacher left the Army after World War II, but was recalled to active duty in 1950, deploying to Korea in 1952. He joined the 25th Infantry Division as a division IPW in the Korean War. By the time he returned back to the U.S. in 1953, he had become the Assistant G-2 of the 25th Infantry Division, filling a billet for a major, as a captain. On his return stateside, he joined the Combat Intelligence School (a part of the Army General

133 Schultz, 32.

134 Ibid., 38.
School) at Fort Riley.\textsuperscript{135} After only a short time, the Combat Intelligence School attached Grombacher to Ninth Army Headquarters in San Antonio. He served as an evaluator of MIO during Exercise Sagebrush. Grombacher, with experience in World War II and Korea, as well as time as an instructor at the Army’s Combat Intelligence School, brought lots of experience to Sagebrush. He shaped the doctrine and organization of MI units through his leadership during the exercise as well as his follow-up work in writing doctrine and TO&E for the Army. However, Grombacher had done none of those things when he arrived at the Ninth Army Headquarters in San Antonio, Texas.

When the leadership of the Combat Intelligence School told Captain Grombacher that he was to validate MIO during Exercise Sagebrush, he had no idea what MIO was. He definitely did not know what he was supposed to validate. It was only after several calls to CONARC that he was able to determine the intent behind MIO as envisioned by the Army and CONARC’s G-2.\textsuperscript{136} Captain Grombacher learned he was supposed to write “tests and questionnaires” for commanders and intelligence soldiers participating in the exercise.\textsuperscript{137} With this small amount of guidance, Grombacher began the initial stages of evaluation for the new type of MI units developed under MIO. The MIO, as least as far as Grombacher could tell, formalized relationships between intelligence disciplines so they


\textsuperscript{136} John Della-Giustina, “Interview with Major General Gerd S. Grombacher, USA, Retired” (Transcript, November 8, 1993, CW2 Christopher G. Nason Library, United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca), 31.

\textsuperscript{137} Schultz, 59.
“work together and perform functions together.”

His understanding was tenuous at best.

When Grombacher arrived in San Antonio, he was the only intelligence officer working to evaluate MIO and he believed he needed help. He wrote to his superiors in the Combat Intelligence School, explaining that the workload was too much for one person and requesting assistance. However, Grombacher sent his requests at an inopportune moment, as the Combat Intelligence School at Fort Riley was integrating with the CIC School in Fort Holabird and leaders at the two schools did not immediately answer his requests. His superiors took no action on his requests, forwarding them to the CIC School. Either because the CIC School understood the importance of the exercise or, more likely due to Grombacher’s repeated reports begging for assistance, the school eventually sent two lieutenant colonels to help evaluate the exercise. Far from helping, the officers were instead critical of what Grombacher was doing. The two lieutenant colonels, according to Grombacher, seemed to know or care little about combat intelligence. While they “weren’t particularly anxious to do a lot of work,” they did send several reports back to Fort Holabird disparaging the ineptitude of the intelligence contribution to the exercise. Grombacher worked hard to direct the MIO effort, but the

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138 Della-Giustina, 32.

139 Schultz, 62.

140 Ibid.
problems of travel arrangements, shipment of equipment, and integration of MI into the notional field armies were issues outside the authority of Grombacher.\footnote{Ibid.}

The negative reports sent by the CIC Lieutenant Colonels did serve to convince the Army G-2 to send General Van Natta to help in the evaluative effort of Exercise Sagebrush. Van Natta, plucked from his new position as a military attaché in Mexico City, arrived promptly in San Antonio. Despite the seniority of the lieutenant colonels, Grombacher became Van Natta’s executive officer and the torchbearer of MIO legacy. Van Natta worked extensively to bring the vision of MIO to life during the exercise, visiting Fort Polk and CONARC several times over the next several months to procure resources, support, and soldiers to participate in the training.\footnote{Ibid., 64.} Van Natta believed that “the results of Sagebrush were critical to the future of Army intelligence,” and he worked tirelessly in the months leading up to the exercise to bring his concepts to reality. He knew the tested concepts would advance the intelligence profession.\footnote{Powe and Wilson, 103.}

The MIO as originally envisioned by Van Natta in 1954 had changed. Military intelligence unit’s tests for Sagebrush had to account for resource constraints and inter-military intelligence politics between CONARC, ASA, the Army Intelligence School and CIC, as well as resource constraints. The MIO in Sagebrush still merged specialty personnel, such as analysts, interrogators, and photo interpreters, which Van Natta believed were critical to mission success. Van Natta believed the MI disciplines that
should be part of corps and division to be: order of battle, prisoner of war interrogation, photo interpretation, counterintelligence and ASA signals intelligence. However, by the time of Sagebrush, the ASA declined to be a part of the MIO due to security concerns. The ASA, responsible for Army cryptology and signals intelligence, maintained a direct reporting requirement for cryptographic teams and did not want them integrated into the division or corps’ command structure. Instead, a communications reconnaissance battalion, not a part of MIO, took part in Exercise Sagebrush to support signals intelligence collection. The focus of the ASA battalion was not on integration into the G-2 but testing technological improvements in “tactical voice interceptors.”

Exercise Sagebrush tested a plethora of concepts and technologies that were precursors to contemporary intelligence practices and equipment. For example, Project Michigan, during Exercise Sagebrush, conducted preliminary research into incorporating computers into the G-2 staff section to facilitate “combat surveillance and target acquisition.” Project Michigan encompassed a myriad of technological innovations unique to Army intelligence to include “battlefield surveillance encompassing radar,

\[144\] Ibid., 103.

\[145\] Finnegan and Danysh, 117.

\[146\] John Della-Giustina, “Interview with Major General Gerd S. Grombacher, USA, Retired” (Transcript, November 8, 1993, CW2 Christopher G. Nason Library, United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca), 34.

\[147\] Ibid.

acoustics, seismic detection, infrared sensing” and other observations. Project Michigan was multi-faceted and included efforts to develop various types of aircraft and missiles with cameras and other surveillance platforms that could observe and locate targets up to 200 miles away. During Exercise Sagebrush, Project Michigan was still in initial stages of development. The scientists of the project utilized Sagebrush to ask MI soldiers questions about their jobs and to observe how technology could assist G-2s.

During Exercise Sagebrush, the division reconnaissance battalion’s units, coupled with Air Force H-21 “Flying Banana” helicopters expeditiously moved around the area of operations, markedly increasing their ability to conduct reconnaissance over vast swaths of the battlefield. Up to 20 soldiers fit in the troop carrier at a time. The tandem-rotor helicopter, outfitted with its “many electronic devices, including airborne television cameras,” leveraged technology to collect more information on the battlefield. The H-21 played a significant role in expanding the amount of information provided to G-2s. It was also pivotal in the development of the “Skycav.”

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150 Finnegan and Danysh, 119.

151 Schultz, 58.


The Skycav reconnaissance unit developed for Exercise Sagebrush was later designated an “Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, Provisional (Experimental)” with Army oversight by 1957. While the SkyCav was not a part of MIO, it increased the amount of information the G-2 section had to process. This increase of information was something MIO, by augmenting personnel, had been designed to handle for the overburdened intelligence officer. The SkyCav concept was an important cognitive crossroads for aerial reconnaissance. The SkyCav, as utilized during Exercise Sagebrush, was not only a reconnaissance and intelligence asset. The Army tested it under a concept significantly influenced by the aviation community and was designed to be “completely air-mobile, air-mounted, fast-moving, hard-hitting, [and] flexible.” Skycav units fulfilled a myriad of roles to include, “reconnaissance; counter-reconnaissance; flank protection; rear area defense to include antiguerilla, antiairborne, [and] anti-infiltration,” whether any system could fulfill all of those diverse mission sets is questionable. After the exercise, the Army’s aviation journal noted that SkyCav would have better supported MI collection if it had had “infrared, TV, radar, and cameras” on the H-21s to cue indirect fire targeting missions. Such a mission was not conceived before the exercise and would have added to the variables that affected a true test of MIO.

154 Theodore Wasko et al., eds. “The Last Three Years of Army Aviation, Progress and Problems, Research and Development, Officer Career Program,” special issue, United States Army Aviation Digest 4, no. 3 (March 1958): 58.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.
A focus of the testing for MIO was the III Corps G-2 section and the 203rd Military Intelligence Company. Grombacher worked to develop the evaluative procedures for the exercise. These methods included surveys, checklists, and after-action reviews meant to capture significant successes and problems with MIO as executed.

**Prepare**

The Army chose the 203rd MICO, stationed in Fort Bragg, North Carolina to be the unit that would exercise MIO. The company commander began correspondence with the III Corps G-2, Colonel John L Behrns. Behrns had become the G-2, in September of 1955 right before Sagebrush began. Coordination between the 203rd MICO and Behrns was sparse leading up to Sagebrush. It was only in late September, when the 203rd MICO transferred to Fort Hood in anticipation of the exercise, that the two leaders were able to coordinate and produce standard operating procedures. This preparation continued until the Corps deployed to Camp Polk the last week of October.\(^\text{157}\) However, the MICO and Behrns needed more time to prepare. The MICO was plagued by problems during execution. The 203rd MICO’s training coming into Exercise Sagebrush was “marginal” and “adversely affect[ed] certain phases of operations” during the exercise.\(^\text{158}\)


\(^{158}\) Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.
Before the order to participate in Exercise Sagebrush; there was no 203rd MICO. This unit, previously the 203rd Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, activated just for the exercise. The authorizations for the unit increased in September. Personnel of other intelligence specialties from Fort Bragg came from the 165th Military Intelligence Company or the 527th Military Intelligence Company; administrative units of non-CIC and non-ASA soldiers whose predecessors had fought in the Korean War. Much as the Army had done after previous wars, the Army inactivated military intelligence service companies such as the 165th MI and 527th MI companies in 1958. CIC units absorbed the soldiers of there different intelligence disciplines, incorporating them into TO&Es. When this happened, counterintelligence units reflagged to military intelligence units.\textsuperscript{159} The consolidation around the CIC was a part of a larger process of post-Korean War consolidation within the Army’s MI community. This same process meant that most intelligence training transferred to the U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAINTS) at Fort Holabird.\textsuperscript{160} Given the improvised nature of the 203rd MICO before Exercise Sagebrush, it is doubtful the company could conduct much training. Right up to the move to Camp Polk, the soldiers in the company adjusting to the MICO’s organization and the Exercise Sagebrush field problem. The company arrived at Fort Hood “too late . . . [to participate] . . . in preparatory field exercises.”\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{159} Finnegan and Danysh, 228, 244, 272, 275, 278, 281, 296, 298, 358, 367, 396, 406, 414.

\textsuperscript{160} Bigelow, 52.

\textsuperscript{161} Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.
The Army attached the 203rd MICO, organized under TO&E 30-20, to Behrns from a notional MI battalion at the Field Army level. The MICO consisted of a company headquarters, seven independent sections (editorial, document translation, order of battle, interrogation of prisoners of war, interpreter and translation, technical intelligence, and security) and one photo interpretation platoon. The photo interpretation platoon detached sections to each division field artillery group, to the corps artillery and the corps HQ.162 Not assigned within the MICO, the Corps G-2 also had a CIC detachment controlled by the staff counterintelligence officer. The CIC detachment’s position in the G-2 section became a point of contention after the exercise. The CIC, as well as the Army Security Agency (signals intelligence) elements, outside the MICO, provided incomplete and sporadic information to Behrns and the division G-2s; a trend that continued for the ASA through Vietnam.163 This disconnect was due to the strict security procedures required to handle communications intelligence and to the efforts of the National Security Agency to ensure operational control of all ASA units.

Execute

Exercise Sagebrush was a joint exercise conducted by the Army and Air Force to test “units, weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques and organization under conditions of atomic, conventional, psychological and physiological warfare.”164 Exercise Sagebrush

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162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.

unfolded through six phases with the first phase consisting of movement to Camp Polk and receipt of equipment. The second phase included a command post exercise and reconnaissance. The third phase consisted of retrograde in the face of overwhelming Aggressor advances. The exercise simulated the anticipated movement of forces in Western Europe fighting the Soviet armies. The fourth phase was a reconsolidation and reconstitution phase. The fifth phase was the counter-attack by U.S. forces. The last phase was focused of capturing lessons, writing reports and movement back to home-station.

In 1955, the exercise was the largest conducted by the Army since before World War II. The exercise pitted U.S. Forces consisting of the headquarters of the III Corps, the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Infantry Division against the Aggressor forces comprised of the headquarters of the XVIII Airborne Corps, 4th Armored Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. Other Army units of lesser importance, such as the 203rd MICO, also participated in the exercise under the control of these major commands. Exercise Sagebrush’s maneuver commander separated Tactical Air Command’s Ninth Air Force into two units, so each side had its own “air force.” He dubbed the air forces in support of U.S. forces the Twenty-Ninth Air Force and the so-called Sixth Air Army flew in support of the Aggressor forces.

General O.P. Weyland, the Maneuver Director and Unified Commander for Exercise Sagebrush, based the training scenario on a notional situation in which

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165 Ibid., 4.

166 Ibid., 23.
Aggressor forces invaded the U.S. Gulf Coast. In the scenario, a truce brokered by the United Nations was broken when the U.S. fighters shot down Aggressor reconnaissance planes flown north of the armistice line. The Aggressor forces launched an attack in response, prompting U.S. forces to withdraw due to Aggressor “numerical superiority in both ground and air forces.” After taking up defendable positions, the U.S. reconsolidated and reinforced front-line positions. They counter-attacked against Aggressor forces with the “objective of destroying his forces or driving him into the Gulf of Mexico.” Both sides employed notional tactical atomic weapons during the exercise. Tactical nuclear weapons, maneuvered around the battlefield, had a low yield in comparison to strategic nuclear weapon capabilities. The emphasis of the testing was on broad concepts such as “decentralization, dispersal” and “mobility,” but also included “timely and accurate intelligence . . . support.”

Reconnaissance for the exercise began on the morning of November 8th and continued through November 14th. Reconnaissance elements crossed the line of departure to determine the locations of Aggressor forces. Information began to pour into the G-2s from these reconnaissance elements. The information received was partially due to increases in reconnaissance capabilities at the divisions. Before Exercise Sagebrush, the 3rd Infantry Division only had a reconnaissance company of 151 Soldiers, and the 1st Armored Division had a Reconnaissance Battalion of 808 soldiers. For the exercise, both

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167 Ibid., 2.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid., 4.
divisions received a full Reconnaissance Battalion of 808 Soldiers.\textsuperscript{170} Partially because of the information from reconnaissance elements, as well as photo reconnaissance, Behrns was unable to manage the flow of information even at this early stage in the exercise.\textsuperscript{171}

**Phase II: Deployment**

Coinciding with reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance efforts, III Corps conducted a three-day command post exercise. Grombacher insisted the corps follow the TO&E published for the exercise. Unfortunately, Behrns did not have enough personnel in the right billets and was overwhelmed by the amount of intelligence traffic the Corps’ divisions and attached units were providing. Dissemination of information based on restrictions in radio technology was also a problem identified by Grombacher.\textsuperscript{172} The command post exercise culminated with an Aggressor air strike against the III Corps’ rear area, prompting the Corps to displace, disrupting Behrns’ focus on intelligence analysis. Moving into the second day of the exercise, he had to shift personnel from their TO&E positions to surge on delinquent tasks.\textsuperscript{173}

On November 15th, the Aggressors coordinated air and ground attack, moving from DeRidder approximately 100 miles to the Red River. A mass of intelligence traffic stressed the Corps G-2 section during the command post exercise. The rate of information

\textsuperscript{170} Wilson, 266-68.

\textsuperscript{171} Schultz, 32.

\textsuperscript{172} Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
became even more overwhelming once the Aggressor units began conducting offensive operations in the south and units from both sides started receiving contact. Due to the threat of missiles (nuclear and conventional) during the exercise, Major General Thomas Harrold, III Corps Commander, consistently ordered his headquarters to change position to prevent targeting by Aggressor forces. These movements weighed heavily on Behrns and his G-2 section, which was barely functioning to keep Harrold abreast of the tactical situation. Due to these frequent moves, soldiers within the G-2 spent a significant amount of time breaking down and putting up tents or packing and unpacking trucks during combat operations. It was only due to the augmentation by the 203rd MICO that Behrns had enough Soldiers to handle these additional tasks.\footnote{174 Ibid.} Where previously a Corps G-2 Section only consisted of a handful of officers, NCOs, and soldiers, the MICO provided a depth of personnel, though perhaps not enough, to help analyze the large volumes of intelligence provided by sensors, both human and technological, on the battlefield. Additionally, its attachment added soldiers to Behrns’ section that could help out with necessary, non-intelligence, related tasks. However, the lack of personnel and large quantities of information were not his only problems.

**Phase III: Withdrawal**

Behrns attempted to use aircraft extensively throughout Phase III for intelligence collection, often with disappointing results. The Corps G-2 section, at different points throughout the phase, did have direct communication with several pilots in-flight who could view a full 20 miles or more into enemy formations. Grombacher believed that
aircraft directed by III Corps was “one of the most important and reliable sources of all intelligence collection” for the corps and the subordinate divisions. The Aerial Photo Interpretation (API) Section of the MICO provided support to Behrns, but aerial photo technology was undergoing technological changes of dissemination and frequency in 1955. The G-2, unfortunately, did not have full control of the aviation unit flying the aerial photography missions. Additionally, the Ninth Field Army, III Corps’ higher command, assigned the photo missions with only a portion of them supporting III Corps. The lack of support created gaps in III Corps’ intelligence. The scarcity of collection meant aerial assets could not collect against the entire Aggressor front. There was, actually, no useful photo reconnaissance for III Corps during the withdrawal. During all of Sagebrush, Behrns’ API section received 25 imagery reels from aerial photography though many more should have been provided. Only one of these had immediate tactical value. The differential in time lost between a photo taken by an aerial platform and photo delivered to the Corps Artillery for targeting illustrated the difficulties of promptly providing operationally significant imagery. Throughout the exercise, the minimum time Corps Artillery received a photo reel from aerial photography was 31 hours and the

175 Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.

176 Ibid.

177 Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence. The AAR notes that “The API sections were limited in their ability to produce information of intelligence value due to the restrictions placed on their photo missions” (because of the exercise rules), additionally “The Air Photo Interpretation Detachment at III Corps Artillery Headquarters received . . . photo missions . . . only one of which had any immediate tactical value.”
maximum period was 146 hours (nearly six days!).\textsuperscript{178} Most of this lag in time was in transition from aerial aviation to the API section. Once the API section received the imagery, the turnaround to Corps Artillery was only a few hours.\textsuperscript{179} The technological requirements to relay intelligence quickly to the soldier on the ground had not yet caught up to the conceptual requirements. However, the API section was a necessary link in that chain during Exercise Sagebrush. API had been very successful when used for operational or strategic detection, but technological constraints still limited its use at the tactical level.\textsuperscript{180} The API section, more than anything else, highlighted that the MIO was a conceptual organizational structure, which up to that point, had not worked in reality.

The API sections allocated to the division’s artillery were even less useful. Given top-down dissemination, there was no unique imagery for divisions to collect. For the most part, the corps had already shot all the actionable targets by the time divisions received the imagery.\textsuperscript{181} Technology at the time necessitated a top-down dissemination of intelligence. Grombacher saw that the small number of imagery flights, with only a trickle of photos coming in during the exercise, did not significantly stress the Corps

\textsuperscript{178} For comparison, indications are that processing times for rudimentary battlefield photography during World War I was about an hour. Unfortunately, no definitive timeline has been observed by this author.

\textsuperscript{179} Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
API.\textsuperscript{182} Though combat units received little utility from the Division Artillery’s APIs in Exercise Sagebrush, they remained in the TO&Es eventually published for MIO.

The FOI, on the other hand, performed well during the exercise both within their specialty and as utility soldiers in support of Behrns. The FOI section in the MICO during the maneuvers was a controlling agency for individual FOI teams at the division echelon. However, the FOI section at III Corps was duplicating the effort of the FOI section at Ninth Army, III Corps’ parent organization. Both FOI sections were working with the same sources and writing reports on the same intelligence. The divisions, for their part, did not employ the FOI sections effectively during the exercise, ignoring the teams or not understanding how to apply them.\textsuperscript{183}

In Phase III of the exercise, the Document and Translation Section worked near the Corps HQ. The Document and Translation Section comprised three soldiers whose job it was to translate documents found on the battlefield or carried by prisoners of war. While the section was useful when called on, tactical units did not deliver many documents to the section in a timely or organized fashion. Documents that required exploitation did not have a standard chain of custody. Any untranslated documents that reached the section did so haphazardly through any number of methods; thereby limiting the benefit of exploiting near random pieces of paper.\textsuperscript{184} Grombacher believed that frontline soldiers did not understand the importance of collecting enemy materials and the

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
IPW teams, either through negligence or ignorance, did not actively attempt to exploit POW documents.\textsuperscript{185}

The 203rd MICO attached IPW teams down to divisions with one IPW team assigned to the Corps HQ. The IPW teams had dedicated Army linguists. Of the prisoners Grombacher interviewed after the exercise, 50 percent stated that interrogators did not fluently speak their language; which was mostly Spanish. Interrogators knew enough about the various languages used in the exercise to get most of the intelligence from prisoners. In contrast to other disciplines represented in the MICO, the IPW Sections were mostly competent. In fact, 66 percent of Aggressor prisoners stated they believed the interrogators “seem[ed] to know their job.”\textsuperscript{186} Both the Document and Translation section as well as IPW teams were moderately successful during the exercise. However, their weaknesses, especially in the case of document exploitation, in many cases was based on a lack of training of maneuver forces. Problems associated with document exploitation, namely organization, and collection by soldiers, continued to be an issue in the Vietnam War.

\textbf{Phase IV: Redeployment}

At the end of Phase III in Exercise Sagebrush, units of III Corps terminated their retreat and were just north of the Red River. Phase IV was a five-day consolidation and reorganization, non-tactical phase. General O.P. Weyland, the exercise director, allowed

\textsuperscript{185} “525 MI Det (PW)(P) Final Report Phase III Exercise Sagebrush, Exhibit VII and VIII” (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1955), 2.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
U.S. Forces to reinforce themselves during this phase to provide better force ratios against the Aggressor force in Phase V of the exercise. After taking note of some deficiencies in the MIO, Van Natta and Grombacher also allowed Behrns to redistribute some soldiers of the 203rd MICO’s teams around the battlefield and within the G-2 section. In many cases, this increased their effectiveness during the last phase of the exercise.

Phase V: Offensive

Phase V began on November 29th with a III Corps counterattack south against the Aggressor’s forces. Units crossed back over the Red River with 1st Armored Division meeting with a regiment of 3rd Infantry Division inserted in an airborne operation behind Aggressor forces. The first notable change by Behrns during this phase was the co-location of the IPW section near the Corps HQ. While all the IPW teams had been useful in Phase III, Behrns received IPW intelligence too late because teams were too far away from him to pass critical information. During Phase V, however, in addition to interrogating POWs that had intelligence pertinent to the corps, Behrns tasked the IPW section to be a “monitoring and relay station” during the exercise. Primarily because of this change in mission the section helped to process a total of 209 interrogation reports. Additionally, the FOI Section played a similar role, focused on receiving and

disseminating intelligence through the different echelons within the corps area of operations.  

The Communications Reconnaissance Battalion from the ASA was one of the units not providing Behrns with finished intelligence. Sections within the 203rd MICO improved markedly between Phase III and V, however the Communications Reconnaissance Battalion was not improving. There was never a liaison established between the G-2 Corps and the Communications Reconnaissance Battalion to facilitate the flow of information. Grombacher believed a liaison would have been helpful to interpret reports sent by the signals intelligence unit. The compartmentalization of the Communications Reconnaissance Battalion put a strain on Behrns, sometimes requiring extensive dialogue between the two units to synchronize collection efforts. Based on the dysfunctional relationship between the G-2 and ASA, the number of collectors on the battlefield necessitated that Behrns needed more analysts. His staff and the MICO’s order of battle section were not enough to handle all of the traffic received from the myriad of collectors and units on the battlefield. The lack of analysis and the disconnectedness from the wider intelligence effort remained a critique of the ASA through Vietnam.

There was a much more robust photo collection effort for the corps in Phase V. This was due to several factors, the most important of which was favorable weather. However, there was still “little to no value” of photo interpretation for Behrns because of

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188 Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.

189 Ibid.

190 Bigelow, 56.
the lag between when the camera took the picture and the time it took to get the exploited photos to an artillery battery or maneuver unit to engage the enemy. The primary reason for the inadequacy of the intelligence was time. During Phase V, the Corps did not receive “flash or immediate” reports derived from aerial photo missions until an average of twelve hours after the mission. There was, on average, an additional 48 hours that elapsed before the Corps G-2 received photos. This decrease was a small improvement over Phase III, but still too much time to be significant for the G-2.

Assess

By the end of Phase V, the U.S. forces under the III Corps “won” and beat the Aggressor forces back (notionally) to the Gulf of Mexico. The final phase of the exercise was used to consolidate umpire evaluations, conduct after-action reviews and moving units back to their duty stations. To this end, there was an extensive review process in which each echelon down to battalions and separate companies was required to capture lessons and evaluate specific ideas. Van Natta and Grombacher wrote several reports detailing the exercise included with recommendations towards a future

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191 Headquarters III Corps (ATFA PROV), Subj: Appendix B to Annex 11, Final Report “Sagebrush” Intelligence.

192 Ibid.

193 Ibid.

194 Wargames: Operation Sagebrush–United States Army: Big Picture Video.

195 Memorandum of Augmented Documentation of the Final Report, Subj: Headquarters Ninth Field Army (Provisional), November 19, 1955, RG 338, P50131, Box 4: HQIII Corps Sagebrush, National Archives and Records Administration.
intelligence force. The reports, according to Grombacher, “constituted a footlocker of paper.”\textsuperscript{196} This footlocker was the work of almost nine months of toil for Grombacher and much more for Van Natta. They sent the reports to CONARC for review.\textsuperscript{197} Despite the debatable success of MI during the exercise, the official report noted that the results “indicated clearly that . . . [MIO] . . . was the proper direction for tactical intelligence.”\textsuperscript{198}

Conclusion

As far as exercises go, Sagebrush was large. At the time, it was the largest exercise the Army had ever attempted. However, the planners for Sagebrush tried to do too much, especially as applied to MIO. Despite the Army’s efforts to make the exercise as real as possible, it just was not. Among other problems, it was difficult to make nuclear attacks in a free-play exercise realistic.

Sagebrush tested widely diverse concepts and technology in one exercise. A perfect example of this difficulty was the implementation of aerial photo interpreters attached to field artillery groups as a part of MIO. It was a level of intelligence support the Army had never previously attempted and needed to be validated. However, technology tested during the exercise and new procedures of the Air Force changed the way aerial photo interpreters received photos.\textsuperscript{199} The maneuvers tried to change too many

\textsuperscript{196} Schultz, 64.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{198} Powe and Wilson, 103.

\textsuperscript{199} During Exercise Sagebrush, the Air Force tested “facsimile transmission” and methods to deliver “photos or negatives to forward units without the courier or reconnaissance aircraft being required to land” though no specifics are given in the Final
inter-dependent systems. In the end, Van Natta reported that MIO was a success, but the
truth was that it failed in more ways than it succeeded. Intelligence soldiers were not
trained properly before the exercise, and comments regarding the efficacy of the
interrogators, though helpful in diagnosing the overall health of the MI community, had
no bearing on whether the MIO worked or not. Behrns, throughout the exercise, shifted
MI soldiers to support the larger exercise at the expense of fully testing MIO. The ability
to flex soldiers, in and of itself was one of the tenets of MIO; however, the exercise was
the only opportunity to test the efficacy of the MI specialist prior to final TO&Es being
published. Sagebrush was the only exercise, before the Vietnam War that the MIO was
operational and it was wavering at best.

Report; Tactical Air Command and Continental Army Command, Exercise Sagebrush,
5.3.
CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPING THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION CONCEPT

Introduction

Over a period of several months after the completion of Sagebrush, MIO progressed from a concept to a reality for the Army in terms of official TO&Es and doctrine. General Van Natta returned to his position as military attaché post in Mexico City. Trudeau, still ACSI of the Department of the Army, was not involved with the restructuring effort. Advocacy had passed to the Army Intelligence School to complete the TO&Es and doctrine associated with MIO. Captain Grombacher was the center of this effort. Van Natta had passed the torch to the young officer to complete the difficult work required to push the concept out to the rest of the Army. Whereas development of MIO continued, the larger division reorganizations continued from ATFA to other permutations. The Army Intelligence School published MIO into doctrine in 1957. The new doctrine made some small changes to the Sagebrush TO&Es but mostly kept them intact.

Intelligence Survives the Atomic Testing Field Army

Once Exercise Sagebrush was over Grombacher joined the newly christened U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAINTS) at Fort Holabird. The school’s commander placed Grombacher in charge of updating intelligence doctrine and TO&Es. To accomplish this task, USAINTS very graciously furnished all the information they had available about the ATFA to Grombacher. The only thing he received was the same footlocker of reports he
had compiled only months earlier during Exercise Sagebrush. Based on his experiences and the reports he and Van Natta had collected, Grombacher wrote a series of manuals detailing how an “integrated military intelligence organization” should operate.

The ATFA became a manifestation of the wishful thinking of the U.S. Army at the start of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration. The ATFA, prepared under the direction of Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgeway in April 1954, was an attempt to increase the mobility and flexibility of divisions. Ridgeway mandated the ATFA with “seven objectives” to make the division more lean. He emphasized utilization of task forces and technology to increase lethality with smaller units. While Ridgeway wanted the reorganization to take place by January 1956, it did not happen. His decisions to modernize the force, despite the outcome of the ATFA, are responsible for the development of MIO.

However, in 1956, General Maxwell Taylor succeeded Ridgeway as the Army Chief of Staff. Taylor believed that ATFA had grown despite Ridgeway’s direction and that the Army needed something different. The ATFA had not met Ridgeway's guidance, and Taylor scrapped the project. Surprisingly, Taylor’s action did not affect the

200 Schultz, 65.
201 Ibid.
202 Wilson, 264-265.
203 Ibid., 265.
204 Trauschweizer, 52.
progression of MIO. Taylor acknowledged the usefulness of intelligence on a deeper and wider battlefield, though he believed that “one of the primary purposes of ground combat would be to discover or to develop, targets for our [atomic] weapons.”205 Additionally, President Eisenhower and Taylor emphasized active armed forces. He believed Army Reserve forces could not be deployed fast enough, specifically to Europe, to stop a Soviet advance.206 This belief necessitated that the intelligence capability be in the active force, not relegated to the reserves. A standing intelligence capability had to be available to units that could deploy in a very short timeframe.207 These were the principles of MIO Van Natta envisioned.

General Willard G. Wyman, the commander of CONARC at the time of Taylor’s dismissal of the ATFA, believed that current division structures could be altered to meet the demands of the future, Taylor disagreed.208 He thought an overhaul was necessary and found inspiration in a November 1954 Army War College’s report, “Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army during the Period 1960-1970.”209 The PENTANA study put into motion the development of Taylor’s Pentomic Division concept, a division based on five independent battle groups instead of brigades or

205 Trauschweizer, 57.
206 Martin, 290-291.
207 Trauschweizer, 64.
208 Ibid., 52.
209 Ibid.
regiments.210 This idea, officially named Reorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD), Reorganization of Current Infantry Division (ROCID), and Reorganization of Current Armor Division (ROCAD) fundamentally changed division organizational structure in 1956 with implications for intelligence support.211

**Intelligence during Reorganization of the Airborne Division**

The first exercise conducted under ROTAD was in July 1956 to June 1957, but it was not a full division exercise. Different elements of the 101st Division determined the feasibility of the ROTAD concept.212 ROTAD did not employ MIO, and thus the 101st Division did not have dedicated intelligence support except for the G-2 staff section.213 Lieutenant General Thomas F. Hickey, the test director for ROTAD, recommended an MI detachment be included “to the division’s headquarters battalion to help with order of battle, photographic interpretation, and other G-2 duties.”214 The Army Staff concurred and recommended “the addition of the military intelligence detachment.”215

The endorsement of an MI detachment to the ROTAD was an affirmation that the TO&Es for MIO, which Grombacher was finalizing, were going to be useful. The recommendation marked a change in the way the Army perceived MI utility at the

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210 Ibid.
211 Wilson, 274.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid., 275.
214 Ibid., 276.
215 Ibid.
tactical level. Army leaders understood they needed intelligence and that they needed to train how best to use it. The idea of a consolidated MI support package to a G-2 was no longer an errant idea sprouted from the mind of a few intelligence die-hards, nor was it a project to push on a lowly captain from Fort Riley. Not having intelligence support for the G-2 in training, as well as in wartime, became a perceived deficiency.216

Luckily, Grombacher had almost completed the MIO doctrine and TO&Es for implementation. In December 1957, the first TO&Es for an MI Battalion at the field army level were published. These TO&Es reflected MIO and was the “the approach provided for [necessary] tailored intelligence support” to combat units.217 218

The MI Battalion at the field army became an umbrella organization for the MI detachments to corps and divisions. The battalion had six subordinate organizations: a Headquarters & Headquarters Company, a varied number of “Military Intelligence Detachment, Division,” a varied number of “Military Intelligence Detachment, Corps or Airborne Corps,” a Military Intelligence Collection Company, Military Intelligence Linguist Company, and a Military Intelligence Security Company.219 The number of MI detachments for corps and divisions depended on the number of tactical combat units under field army command. The TO&Es were flexible in this regard. The MI detachments stayed under the same corps or division no matter what field army or

216 Wilson, 276.

217 Powe and Wilson, 103.


219 Ibid.
associated MI Battalion controlled these units. This habitual relationship emphasized continuity of MI support at the tactical level, despite administrative complications.220 The battalion, in addition to providing logistic support, also assisted the detachments to corps and divisions with “technical supervision.”221

The Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army, much larger than a standard Infantry Battalion Headquarters Section of the time. It included a colonel as the commander, three lieutenant colonels, eleven majors, eleven warrant officers, and five sergeants first class.222 The Headquarters Company became partially absorbed by the field army G-2 section augmenting it as needed. 223 Several units, not intended to be detached downward, supported the field army. Three platoons comprised the Military Intelligence Collection Company: the IPW platoon, the document translation platoon, and the interpreter and translator platoon. The IPW platoon consisted of one captain, four lieutenants, seven noncommissioned officers, and six enlisted Soldiers separated to interrogate at three “field army prisoner of war cages.”224 Whereas the document translation platoon supported the field army with translation, the interpreter and translator platoon was not “an administrative interpreter


221 Department of the Army, TOE 30-15D.


223 Ibid.

224 Ibid., 125.
pool for the field headquarters . . . [but for] . . . the operational elements of the military intelligence battalion.”

The Military Intelligence Linguist Companies were the interpreters and translators that assisted the field army in day-to-day operations. Lastly, the security company comprised 118 CIC soldiers, to include a lieutenant colonel in command of the company, six majors, eight captains, nine warrant officers, and fifteen sergeants first class. The security company, separated into five field office teams, allocated one team per corps, one field office within the field army area of operations, and one team that remained at the MI Battalion, Field Army Headquarters. Additionally, a Civil Affairs Section of counterintelligence agents worked in conjunction with civil affairs soldiers or in coordination with “line crossers.”

The Army at the time required counterintelligence soldiers to maintain proficiency in a language, all of the units of the MI Battalion, Field Army except perhaps the headquarters, were proficient in a foreign language.

At the corps level, the G-2 controlled the detachment but its commander was responsible for the “discipline, training, and administration” of the soldiers. The commander advised the G-2 on the deployment of the detachment’s teams. A lieutenant colonel, three majors, thirteen captains, two warrant officers and three sergeants first class led the 69-soldier detachment. The corps detachment had a document

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225 Ibid.
226 Department of the Army, TOE 30-15D.
227 Heymont, 125.
228 Ibid., 126.
translation section, interpreter and translator section, IPW section, and security section much like the Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. The detachment headquarters was understandably smaller at the corps detachment than at the Field Army. Additionally, the detachment had an “editorial section” to provide quality assurance on intelligence sent to the force. An order of battle section was the corps detachment’s analytical contribution to the G-2. They published order of battle and other intelligence studies as applicable. Grombacher incorporated the technical intelligence section into the TO&E, despite its underperformance at Exercise Sagebrush. The technical intelligence section still did not have control over other technical intelligence detachments; no such technical intelligence detachments fell under the corps or the divisions. Last, the TO&E assigned a photo interpretation platoon to the Corps Headquarters, Corps Artillery, and field artillery groups. In some cases, the MI detachment allocated a portion of the photo interpretation platoon to the corps’ aviation company. Thus, the corps’ detachment was a much more diverse array of intelligence capability than that held by the field army. A larger emphasis of the corps detachment was on photo interpretation. This was due to corps control of the aviation assets available to take aerial pictures and the artillery that could shoot the targets.

At the Division level, the MI detachment had a headquarters, IPW, order of battle, photo interpretation, security, and an interpreter and translation section. The detachment comprised 61 Soldiers, to include a major as the commander with a captain in charge of each section, except for the interpreter and translator section led by a lieutenant. By far the section with the highest-ranking leadership was the security section, manned by CIC soldiers two of which were captains with an additional lieutenant, four warrant officers
and three sergeants first class. \textsuperscript{229} The security, order of battle, and interpreter and translator sections operated the same at the division level as they did at the corps level. The IPW section, manned with personnel and equipment to support the division, established a division’s foundational interrogation capability. \textsuperscript{230} The idea of providing the necessary intelligence support to the division was at the heart of MIO. The IPW section accurately embodied this approach. Frequently the G-2 allocated teams to subordinate units, such as an IPW section to brigades, providing soldiers to augment intelligence collection at that level. \textsuperscript{231} The IPW section fielded five interrogation teams with one remaining at the division echelon to serve as a prisoner of war consolidated interrogation area. \textsuperscript{232} Likewise, the photo interpreter section comprised of four officers, five NCOs, and one enlisted soldier was separated within the Division’s rear area. One team would work in collaboration with the Division G-2, and another was attached to the Division Artillery. A third team located at the division airstrip allowed soldiers to process imagery as fast as possible. In this way, the MIO reinforced the link of the sensor-to-shooter connection between artillery and intelligence.

The MIO emphasized the subordination of intelligence soldiers to the tactical commander. Leaders expected MI soldiers to “fight as infantrymen when required,” but also were supposed to perform non-intelligence “staff functions in addition to assigned

\textsuperscript{229} Department of the Army, TOE 30-17D, \textit{Military Intelligence Detachment, Division} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), CGSC Archives.

\textsuperscript{230} Heymont, 129.

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
specialties.” MIS did not denote commonality between the MI teams and the supported maneuver unit. MI collection teams provided very specific support to units during World War II and the Korean War. Usually soldiers during these earlier conflicts were not used for other functions or the commander of the MIS could detach them.

Signals intelligence teams were absent from the design of the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID), Division. Signals intelligence was under the purview of the ASA, which did not believe that division, or corps G-2s, could maintain proper security and insisted on the stovepipe of control of signals intelligence. Therefore, the MID, Division, did not integrate ASA. Also available to the G-2, as in the Korean War and Sagebrush were signals intelligence detachments; organized similarly to MIO units. The CIC, on the other hand, did join MIO, and the concept’s initial success was possible in part due to the agreeance of the CIC’s involvement in the new organization. Grombacher believed that CIC elements which remained separate during Sagebrush, should be integrated into the detachment. He included them in the published TO&Es. The CIC was a well-established branch with a very specific mission. The MIO necessitated they give up some level of control over CIC soldiers.

Implementing the Military Intelligence Organization

Despite complications with ASA and other organizations, in 1960 the 66th MI Group became the first unit to change its structure to comply with MIO TO&Es. The 66th

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233 Department of the Army, TOE 30-15D; Department of the Army, TOE 30-17D.

234 Department of the Army, TOE 30-600.
MI Group in Europe supported the Seventh Army with various intelligence disciplines including counterintelligence, interrogation, and technical intelligence. Smaller detachments supported armored cavalry units, corps, and divisions.\textsuperscript{235} Several other units, such as the 500th MI Group in the Pacific theater also attached MI units, such as the 502d MI Battalion to Eighth Army in Korea.\textsuperscript{236} By the end of 1958, each echelon in the Army down to division integrated MI companies or battalions. By the time the AIS branch (what would later be the Military Intelligence Branch), was established in 1962, all MIO units had filled at least to cadre strength.\textsuperscript{237}

A number of factors contributed to the lack of preparedness of the Army’s MI capability on the eve of Vietnam, to include personnel strength lower than requirements and training draftees. As troop levels shrunk and budget cuts continued for the Army through Eisenhower’s presidency and into Kennedy’s tenure, the ability to fill the billets was difficult. In the years before Vietnam the Army had a neutered tactical intelligence capability, billets were allocated but soldiers were not.\textsuperscript{238} The draftee Army complicated

\begin{footnotesize}

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\item \textsuperscript{235} Powe and Wilson, 104.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 106.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Finnegan and Danysh, 130-31. It is entirely possible that MIO was not completely manned due to other factors than personnel shortages. Lack of money, difficulties in training a draftee army, or an increased strategic intelligence mission may all have been issues. While there is always more research that can be done, information about MI training in the National Archives, Carlisle Barracks, Ft. Riley (home of the Army General School), and Ft. Huachuca suggest that historical documentation of MI training between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Vietnam War is sparse. There are several likely reasons for this. The first is that the Army Intelligence Service (the predecessor to the Military Intelligence branch) was constituted in 1962, prior to that time period there is no organization whose priority it is to maintain records pertinent to MI history. Secondly, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center moved to Fort
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the training of intelligence soldiers. Draftees enjoyed the idea of spending their time in the Army working in plainclothes for the ASA or the CIC. Retention rates in the CIC during the 1950s was 7 percent for lieutenants and 3 percent for enlisted soldiers.\textsuperscript{239} As units were activated in preparation for deployment to Vietnam, entire units were just finishing basic training prior to deployment.\textsuperscript{240}

**Conclusion**

In 1956, General Maxwell Taylor championed the “Pentomic Division.” During initial testing for this type of organization, commanders cited the need for intelligence in order to make their units more lethal. The lessons from the exercises bolstered the argument that the Army needed to integrate intelligence into tactical combat units. The lessons highlighted the principles of delegating intelligence collection down to echelons at which intelligence is actionable. Overall, there were very few intelligence billets within the Pentomic Division G-2 section, so perhaps Pentomic commanders believed any intelligence support would have been helpful.\textsuperscript{241}

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\textsuperscript{239} Finnegan and Danysh, 127.

\textsuperscript{240} McQueen, 31.

\textsuperscript{241} Department of the Army, TOE 30-600.
After Exercise Sagebrush and the Army’s transition from the ATFA to the Pentomic Division, the further development of MIO was in question. Development of MIO continued at the Army Intelligence School despite not being included in ROTAD exercises by airborne infantry units. When the TO&Es that developed MIO were published by 1958, they were the basic structure of tactical intelligence units through the Vietnam War. However, there were significant issues filling billets before the Vietnam War with only minimal manning established for those units. The MIO, come to fruition, was still a concept more than an actual combat multiplier for tactical units.
CHAPTER 6

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION AND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR

Introduction

Compared to any previous war the U.S. Army fought, intelligence support during the Vietnam War was exponentially better.242 The Army was able to deploy more intelligence soldiers forward into Vietnam quicker than in any previous war.243 Additionally, many intelligence soldiers integrated at the tactical level understood the organizations they supported, and how their collection and analysis influenced units.244 There are various reasons for this shift in responsiveness and competency. However, the most important reason for success was the Army’s adoption of MIS and MIO. MIS primarily structured intelligence professionals in functional teams that deployed in groups to provide a tailored intelligence capability to a commander with a headquarters section to control the element. The best feature of MIS was the ability to flexibly organize the

242 Powe, 51.
243 Finnegan and Danysh, 147-48.
unit, efficiently allocating scarce intelligence soldiers. However, there were issues with
the efficacy of the unit and the degree of control the G-2 had over its headquarters.245

Small cellular MI teams were critical to the ability of MI soldiers to deploy
quickly to Vietnam. These teams, as well as ASA’s parallel structure of small teams for
signals intelligence, allowed the Army to kick out intelligence soldiers, as they became
available, into Vietnam. These teams made a significant impact during combat operations
in a short amount of time.246 The Army provided intelligence from within the country
even before major hostilities began. In 1959, Army military intelligence soldiers advised
the South Vietnamese military.247 An unfortunate testament to this organizational agility
was that in 1961, Specialist 4 James Davis was killed in Vietnam during the initial stages
of special forces deployments to the country. Davis, a part of the 3d Radio Research Unit,
collecting signals intelligence, was the first MI soldier killed in the war.248 Of course, the
Army Intelligence School could not train intelligence soldiers fast enough to deploy to
Vietnam as it tried to make up shortages caused by the Army’s personnel and budget cuts
that took place during the 1950s and 1960s. To Major General Joseph A. McChristian,
the J-2 of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1965 to 1967,

245 Eric Smith, Not by the Book: A Combat Intelligence Officer in Vietnam (New

246 McQueen, 30.

247 Powe, 59.

248 WSMV, “First Vietnam War Casualty was Tennessee Soldier,” Updated
vietnam-war-casualty-was-tennessee-soldier.
deployments were slower than he expected, so that “more than two years would be required to receive most of the resources originally requested.”\textsuperscript{249} However, in actuality MI soldiers deployed relatively quickly. MI teams deployed “initial increments of the existing organizations” of the 525th Military Intelligence Group with conventional forces within three months; relatively quickly based on the Group’s unreadiness. The rest of the Group flowed to Vietnam through 1966 as it requisitioned soldiers.\textsuperscript{250} The cellular construct of military intelligence teams, developed under MIS in the late 1940s was important to the low-density MI units to deploy to the country quickly to support tactical combat units.

The MIO integrated MI teams with tactical combat units, which were crucial to the intelligence support in the Vietnam War. As the United States deployed conventional forces into Vietnam, tactical MI units became the foundational intelligence capability in the country. The 172d MI detachment “was probably the first tactical intelligence unit in the country” when it deployed in May 1965 with the 173d Airborne Brigade.\textsuperscript{251} By 1966, MIO had become the way every division, separate brigade, or cavalry regiment’s intelligence support deployed to Vietnam.\textsuperscript{252} The 4th MI Detachment in support of the 4th Infantry Division was typical of the MI support provided. The 4th MI Detachment, under the operational control of the 4th ID G-2, provided personnel to the intelligence


\textsuperscript{250} McQueen, 30.

\textsuperscript{251} Powe and Wilson, 108.

\textsuperscript{252} Powe, 50.
staff section and rounded out its capability to accomplish its assigned missions.

Additionally, the Commanding Officer of the Detachment “served as both the leader of
the unit and as an advisor to the G-2 on the best ways to employ the unit’s
capabilities.” G-2s frequently attached teams of interrogators and counterintelligence
soldiers to the brigade and division armored cavalry squadron for specific operations.

Some divisions integrated Radio Research Companies with the MI detachments in what
were termed “Current Intelligence Sections,” but this practice was not the norm. The
MI detachments and the current intelligence section provided refined and tailorable
intelligence based on organic collection to the G-2. Additionally, and maybe more
importantly, the embedding of MI detachments with tactical combat units provided an
initial intelligence capability as soon as the units were in the theater, this ability was
significantly absent in the Korean War.

**Operation Cedar Falls**

The focus of the intelligence organization before Vietnam was a combination of
structural changes and experience of the commanders and leaders, based on lessons
learned in World War II and the Korean War. This effort is evident through various
successes of tactical military intelligence throughout the war. McChristian initiated a

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253 Powe and Wilson, 112.

254 Smith, 156-57.

255 Powe and Wilson, 113.

256 Powe, 50.

focused intelligence collection and analysis effort in 1966. This effort is a punctuated example of how far Army MI had come. Operation Rendezvous, as McChristian titled the effort, “utilized all sources of intelligence collection” and dedicated analysis from division MI detachments to MACV combined intelligence centers.\textsuperscript{258} In consequence, General Westmoreland, the commander of MACV, ordered the execution of Operations Cedar Falls in January 1956. The 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, supported by the 173rd Airborne Infantry Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, conducted the operation. Intelligence teams from the 525th and the 149th Military Intelligence Groups, as well as the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (MI Bn) (Air Reconnaissance Support), augmented the G-2s of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions. The 1st MI Bn “provided aerial photographic coverage of access routes and potential targets.” Once the operation began, the unit “provided local support to the G-2 and S-2’s of the divisions and separate brigades.”\textsuperscript{259} The 149th MI Group, as part of the Operation Rendezvous collection effort, had been collecting in the area for six months before the 1st and 25th Infantry Division’s action.\textsuperscript{260}

Operation Cedar Falls provides a great snapshot of MIO’s critical role in intelligence collection and analysis during the Vietnam War. The order of battle sections and photo-interpreters of both the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions developed “detailed

\textsuperscript{258} McChristian, 121.

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid.
briefings” and intelligence products to help interrogators question detainees. This information allowed the interrogators to screen “thousands of refugees” each day in “forward base camps.” Once screened, interrogators and counterintelligence soldiers “worked in consonance” extracting as much information from detainees as possible. Additionally, the photo interpreters and order of battle analysts “worked together to provide hard targets to the attacking units” and provided intelligence to “various G-2’s for exploitation by infantry troops.” The integration between different intelligence disciplines at the divisions was possible because of long-standing relationships developed as part of MIO. Histories of World War II do not describe similar levels of integration demonstrated between soldiers of different intelligence disciplines as during the Vietnam War.

Altering Tactical Intelligence for the Vietnam War

The TO&Es that MI units used during the Vietnam War were almost the same TO&Es published after Exercise Sagebrush. However, the peculiarities of the Vietnam War and technological advances in the intervening years provided a significant amount of information and intelligence to the tactical G-2 beyond what was expected in the

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261 McChristian, 123.

262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

264 Chandler and Robb, 137-49.
The G-2 had a large staff of dedicated intelligence soldiers, as well as a MI detachment assigned, not just attached, to the division. ASA units provided general support to the division, having to service national and theater requirements as well. However, due to the local nature of the war, the ASA’s Radio Research Units frequently worked directly with the division. Additionally, peculiar to Vietnam, the G-2 was able to leverage intelligence from American advisors in Vietnamese units as well as Vietnamese partnering with U.S. intelligence Soldiers from the tactical to the theater level. An array of theater non-divisional intelligence collectors of all disciplines and MACV intelligence analysis centers provided additional intelligence to the division. However, intelligence provided from these centers were not always timely or actionable.

During the Vietnam War units took the principles of MIO further by creating MI detachments at the brigade echelon. The 635th MID, attached to the 23rd Infantry Division is a unique, though illustrative example. Three separate brigades combined in Vietnam to constitute the 23rd Infantry Division. Prior to consolidation into a division, each brigade had their own military intelligence team, as structured under MIS. Upon consolidation, the teams were brought under the supervision of the 635th MID, however

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266 Bonnot, 13.

267 Powe, 51.

268 Ibid.
they were “still independent operations run like little feudal kingdoms by lieutenants.”269

It was not until December 1968 that the teams were reorganized under the control of the 635th MID, in accordance with MIO.270 A brigade MI detachment, when it existed, was “usually made up of a dozen interrogators and counterintelligence agents” who would screen and, in some cases, interrogate detainees before further processing.271 Just as in World War II, human intelligence was critical to the tactical combat unit in the Vietnam War. Lieutenant Eric McAllister Smith was the officer in charge of a brigade detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division. His team, upon interrogating prisoners with helpful information, rode with the detainee to reconnoiter the area.272 This source validation process, where “the intelligence officer at brigade level can see how his information is

269 Smith, 36.

270 Department of the Army. TOE 30-17G; Department of the Army, TOE 30-14G, Military Intelligence Detachment, Armored Cavalry Regiment/Separate Brigade (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), CGSC Archives; According to TOE 30-17G (Military Intelligence Company) June 26, 1968: brigades were not authorized their own MI detachment. If brigades were allocated detachments TOE 30-17G would denote units for that purpose, but it does not. TOE 30-14G (Military Intelligence Detachment, Armored Cavalry Regiment/Separate Infantry Brigade) does denote that each separate brigade will have a MI Detachment comprised of a headquarters, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, interrogation, and order of battle sections; Eric Smith, Not by the Book: A Combat Intelligence Officer in Vietnam (New York: Ivy Books, 1993), 36; Based on Eric Smith’s memoirs when he arrived at the 23rd Infantry Division in the summer of 1968, a full year after the 23rd Infantry Division took operational control of the 11th, 196th, and 198th Light Infantry Brigades (Separate), small MI Detachments focused around interrogators and counterintelligence soldiers were at the brigade echelon.

271 Smith, 58-59.

272 Ibid.
used and how accurate it is” was a very effective method of intelligence gathering, providing immediate feedback and veracity.273

Military Intelligence detachments became large MI companies that fell directly under division commanders during the Vietnam War. Leaders assigned MI companies (formally detachments) to divisions and brigades, instead of just attaching them as the TO&E prescribed.274 Additionally, brigade military intelligence detachments became military intelligence teams under the direct control of the division’s MI company commander.275 Because the Army deployed intelligence teams as available, MACV reassigned some MI detachments during the war. A larger shuffling of tactical units to align brigades with divisions also facilitated reallocation because the Army also deployed some divisions to the country in a piecemeal fashion.276

The Role of the Army Intelligence and Security Branch in Integrating the Intelligence Enterprise

After the Korean War, T.F. Van Natta and others developed MIO based on their experiences in that war and the need to improve MI support. MIO semi-permanently attached MI company-sized units to the field army, corps and divisions. G-2s during the Vietnam War had more decentralized collectors providing his section with information than envisioned by MIS. If MIO had not developed, then it would have been harder for

273 Smith, 58-59.

274 Department of the Army, TOE 30-17G; Powe, 51.

275 Smith, 118.

276 Ibid.
the G-2s to control the information flowing in.²⁷⁷ MI Detachments under MIO had a much larger data collection and analytical capability. However, MIO’s greatest strength was that the detachments were part of the unit they were supporting, increasing unity of effort.²⁷⁸ This structure and coordination did much to further the intelligence collection and analysis effort in the war; several other developments also allowed the combination of MIS and MIO to be useful.

First among these was the 1962 establishment of Army Intelligence and Security Branch, eventually becoming the Military Intelligence Branch. Major General Alva R. Fitch, the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence for the Department of the Army, worked hard during his tenure to create the AIS.²⁷⁹ The AIS dedicated MI soldiers to intelligence billets instead of using infantry, armor or other branches to fill these billets. Developing MI as a profession meant officers and soldiers could devote their career to military intelligence exclusively.²⁸⁰ The effect of the AIS had a significant impact on the way tactical commanders perceived military intelligence soldiers as more competent.²⁸¹ Second, the U.S. Army Intelligence School, established in 1954, at Fort Holabird, Maryland, consolidated most Army intelligence schools previously separated by

²⁷⁷ Powe, 53.
²⁷⁸ Powe and Wilson, 113.
²⁷⁹ Finnegan and Danysh, 142.
²⁸⁰ Davidson, 5.
²⁸¹ Powe, 52-53.
However, counterintelligence, interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle analysts, and MI officers trained at the consolidated school, though with separate curriculum in most cases. Last, the ASA, organized into similar organizations as MIO, detaching teams to tactical units. ASA organized small detachments to support Army divisions when deployed, but also maintained small cellular signals intelligence teams to provide a quick and tailored capability to a commander.

The MIO placed officers, trained and focused on the management of intelligence, in charge of the G-2 and MI detachments. The Army Intelligence School provided intelligence officers that had common acquaintances across the intelligence enterprise, making the profession more cohesive. A good example is a commander of the 635th MID, Major Raymond Zickle, who ordered that soldiers had to visit the order of battle section before conducting interrogations. The visit ensured interrogators knew what they should be asking and provided them up-to-date information particular to the prisoner and the enemy situation in general. The required integration of different intelligence disciplines was an arrangement the G-2 of World War II or the Korean War would have been hard pressed to enforce. However, while Zickle created the rule under the auspices of MIO, the establishment of the Army Intelligence School, and the relationships between

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282 The ASA, focused on signals intelligence, still trained elsewhere. Primarily at Fort Devens through 1994 when, due to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure bill shuttered the Army post.

283 Bigelow, 51.

284 Bonnot, 3.

285 Smith, 93.
officers because of the school, contributed to the process. Lieutenant Bobby Biggers, one of the officers in the order of battle section of the MI detachment, knew many of the other intelligence lieutenants within the 23rd Infantry Division and was friends with them through the intelligence and language school attended by some of the officers. The MI detachment developed by MIO and forged stronger through the Army Intelligence School provided an environment predicated on personal relationships which made intelligence more meaningful. The sharing of multi-discipline information that developed under MIO did not necessarily extend outside of individual tactical units. When Lieutenant Biggers visited some friends from language school, at the Combined Military Interrogation Center, a theater facility in Saigon, they would not talk to him about prisoners his division had sent to the interrogation center only a week before. He was “too low on the intelligence totem pole” and Biggers did not have a “need-to-know.”

This issue of compartmentalization was inevitable in MI to protect sources and methods, even though the MIO was specifically intended to break these barriers. However, MIO could only bring commanders and intelligence soldiers together so much; a large part of integrating intelligence internally and with tactical actions is understanding

\[\text{286}\text{ These common experiences were only resident in soldiers that attended the Army Intelligence School. It did not include members of ASA who attended courses at Fort Devens, Massachusetts and were not part of the integrated MIO. Thus, as will be addressed later in the chapter, there was a disconnect between signals intelligence and most of the rest of the intelligence disciplines in Vietnam.}\]

\[\text{287}\text{ Smith, 93.}\]

\[\text{288}\text{ Ibid., 109.}\]

\[\text{289}\text{ Davidson, 5.}\]
and familiarity. The Army Intelligence School and the development of the AIS Branch, specifically, furthered understanding and familiarity with the intelligence discipline. Additionally, the development of the AIS Branch put many intelligence officers in leadership positions where they could translate and oversee intelligence operations. By 1968 MI officers occupied most G-2 billets. However, it was the Army intelligence detachments, where all of the different intelligence disciplines integrated that optimized the effect of the school and the formation of the branch really made a difference. Unfortunately, ASA units attached at the tactical level did not have similar levels of integration.

The ASA structured signals intelligence units in much the same way as MI detachments, attaching them down to divisions and lower echelons, but their compartmentalization precluded them from being an integrated partner to the MI detachments or the G-2. Though ASA soldiers provided much actionable intelligence to units during the Vietnam War, often their efforts were undermined because they were not a part of the integrated MI detachment. ASA units attached to divisions primarily worked through the Special Security Officer who provided information to the G-2. However, the Special Security Officer was not always familiar with ASA capabilities and did not have a command relationship with the ASA unit. In fact, not all divisions had Special Security Officers and the dissemination of signals intelligence, if ASA had a unit located with the division at all, was difficult. The 265th Radio Research Company (Airborne) was an

290 Powe, 52.

291 Finnegan and Danysh, 166.
example of an ASA unit that had a complicated rapport with the division it supported, the 101st Airborne Division. The 265th Radio Research Company mostly passed information through the division’s Special Security Officer and had limited contact with other elements of the unit’s intelligence enterprise or combat leaders. At different points, the Radio Research Company broke regulations and laws on collecting data on U.S. persons, “tapping” phone lines within the division headquarters to maintain a situational understanding of what the unit was doing. 292 These problems may have forced greater signals intelligence integration after the war.

Challenges in the Vietnam War not addressed by Military Intelligence Organization

The MIO was not perfect, and often biases by both MI soldiers and tactical commanders got in the way of disseminating good intelligence. Some intelligence officers were too protective of their sources and undermined their credibility by not revealing where they received a specific piece of information. 293 The close relationship that MIO predicated between MI officers and tactical commanders framed the conflict of sources and methods more definitively. Additionally, bias often played a role in what MI produced and consumed. Despite the integrated nature of MIO, leaders in some cases

292 Douglas W. Bonnot, *The Sentinel and the Shooter* (Livermore, CA: WingSpan Press, 2010); With regard to collecting intelligence of U.S. soldiers and units, as well as allies, Douglas Bonnot mentions “contravention methods” to monitor both “wire and wireless communications links.” Though EO 12333 was not signed until 1981, it is possible that the ASA or MACV restricted ASA units’ ability to collect on U.S. persons. This thesis does not cite specific regulations side-stepped by the 265th RRC but uses Mr. Bonnot’s perception, written in 2010, of the monitoring.

293 Powe, 52.
became fixated on single intelligence sources. Others tried to provide commanders with extreme, though possibly incorrect, intelligence reports. Lieutenant Eric McAllister Smith, for example, took advantage of this propensity of “brass hats in Vietnam . . . [to] . . . confuse exciting items with important ones” by publishing a report about a piece of dubious, though interesting, intelligence in the Division’s Periodic Intelligence Report. In consequence, he became a “minor celebrity.” Overall, the MI detachments provided multi-source intelligence that integrated well into tactical operations.

One of the greatest weaknesses of MI in the Vietnam War was the timeliness and responsiveness of analysis and dissemination, a problem identified in Exercise Sagebrush. There was still too much information coming in and not enough personnel or dedicated communications to manage and disseminate the information promptly. Major General Orwin Talbott, the 1st Infantry Division commander in Vietnam in 1968 and his MI detachment attempted to ameliorate this problem by increasing the intelligence staff and dedicating communications to a battlefield intelligence center attached to all the G/S-2 sections from battalion to division. The battlefield intelligence centers in the 1st Infantry Division were able to collate and disseminate information at a much faster pace than was possible at the beginning of the war, increasingly the situational awareness of the division and its subordinate units. This effort by the 1st Infantry Division to transfer soldiers and communication equipment to help the intelligence effort is a product

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294 Smith, 115.

295 Powe, 53.
of the close relationship between the division and its MI detachment, as envisioned by the MIO concept.

Conclusion

The Vietnam War was a significant proof of concept for both MIS and MIO. Both organizational developments performed well, bringing an unprecedented strategic ability to deploy intelligence soldiers forward quickly under MIS and robust support to tactical combat units under MIO. Tactical intelligence units performed remarkably well during the initial stages of the war. The success of the intelligence disciplines under MIO contrasts with the stilted relationships the ASA had with corps and division commanders. However, the Vietnam War was an anomaly in several respects that worked in MIS and MIO’s, favor. Mobilization of intelligence soldiers took place over several years, first in an advisory role and then directly supporting combat operations. This allowed time to train necessary soldiers. While the MIS allowed the 525th MI Group to deploy small teams of intelligence soldiers forward quickly, the long mobilization period of the Vietnam War reduced some negative effects of the military budget and personnel cuts of MI after the Korean War.

In a departure from the Army’s priorities during World War II or the Korean War in which the infantry soldier took precedence, during the Vietnam War the Army focused on building intelligence capability at the beginning of the war. According to Lieutenant General Phillip Davidson, General McChristian’s successor as MACV J-2, the Army

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296 The most striking examples of these relationships between ASA units and tactical commanders can be found in: Douglas W. Bonnot, The Sentinel and the Shooter (Livermore, CA: WingSpan Press, 2010), 27-29.
emphasized intelligence gathering during the Vietnam War, providing McChristian with an “unlimited financial budget” and imposed no limits on “personnel strength.”\textsuperscript{297} Unlike in World War II and the Korean War, where the emphasis was getting infantry soldiers into theater, the Army specifically emphasized building its intelligence capability in the country prior to significant combat operations. Thus, in wars in which the Army is actively involved in pre-hostilities and intelligence gathering, the MIO worked well. However, when the Army for political reasons or scarcity of resources has to mobilize and deploy quickly to a theater of conflict, MIO may not be as effective.

\textsuperscript{297} Davidson, 5.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Analysis

The use of intelligence is not new to the Army. General George Washington and his intelligence officer, Major Benjamin Tallmadge, collected information on enemy forces during the Revolutionary War. However, it was not until World War I, 135 years later, that General Pershing institutionalized intelligence at the tactical level by developing his G-2 section as part of the Army Expeditionary Forces. Unfortunately, the Army did not maintain robust intelligence capabilities after the war. Because of this demobilization, it took some time to mobilize intelligence units for World War II. By the end of the war combat commanders respected tactical intelligence as a significant combat multiplier. G-2 staffs, augmented by teams of MI soldiers attached to divisions, increased the situational understanding of commanders.

After 1945, as part of a wider effort to capture lessons from the war, the European Theater of Operations General Boards established the blueprint for what would eventually become the MIS organization. Colonel Harrison, the G-2 of the Army Ground Forces from 1945 to 1948, published the initial TO&Es establishing “cellular” teams and a robust G-2. However, the Army never completely filled the MIS billets and instead ambled into the Korean War without any significant tactical intelligence capability. In fact, MIS concepts were used by only a few units during that conflict and the bulk of

298 Finnegan and Danysh, 23, 33.

299 Powe, 82.
Army units still used intelligence teams, but not in the structured way that MIS organization prescribed.

After the Korean War, the Army altered its structure at the tactical level and MI consequently needed to do the same. General Ridgeway only allowed the Army Field Forces two years to develop, test, and publish these changes. General Van Natta jumped on the opportunity to ameliorate what he saw as significant faults of MI support to tactical units. His experiences led him to propose the creation of MIO, a concept of MI units attached to the field army, corps and division echelons. The MI units, comprised of soldiers in various MI specialty branches, provided G-2s with an in-house “functional” as opposed to “cellular” intelligence collection and robust analysis capability. However, due to constraints imposed by General Dahlquist, the Army Field Forces Commander, MIO was not included in initial redesigns for the Army’s divisions. Frustrated, Van Natta went over Dahlquist’s head and expressed his viewpoint to his old boss, General Ridgeway. Ridgeway supported Van Natta’s efforts to inculcate intelligence at the tactical level. Even with Ridgeway’s support, MIO was not included in initial testing of the division reorganization.

In 1955, Exercise Sagebrush tested MIO units before the Army published TO&Es and doctrine implementing the concept. The exercise was a failure in determining whether MIO was viable for MI detachment and G-2 integration. The 203rd MICO was an improvised amalgamation of several different intelligence units and was not trained to standard prior to the exercise. Sagebrush tried to test too many concepts at once. Though General Van Natta, Captain Grombacher and Colonel Behrns considered MIO a success,
the conclusion is dubious. During different portions of the exercise, intelligence soldiers did not even work in their assigned billets, precluding analysis of the MIO’s efficacy.

As the Army continued to test different configurations of its corps and divisions, the MIO became the answer to the recommendations of Army leaders to include more intelligence support to tactical units. MIO TO&Es published in 1956 provided a robust intelligence collection capability attached to tactical combat units. Unfortunately, due to continued budget and personnel cuts, the Army did not fully implement MIO across the force. It was not until Vietnam that MIO became significant to corps and division commanders.

During the mobilization for the Vietnam War, both MIS and MIO played a significant part in expanding intelligence capability in the country. Under MIS, soldiers deployed in small teams quickly to Vietnam. These teams served as the Army’s initial intelligence footprint and provided significant initial intelligence widely sought at the beginning of the war. The multi-year build-up of military forces provided time for the Army to fill MIO units, it had previously neglected to deploying tactical headquarters. MIO units provided divisions with situational awareness as soon as they touched ground in Vietnam. The ASA had a parallel, though less integrated structure because they were not assigned directly to the units they supported. The development of the Army Intelligence School and AIS Branch deepened the utility of MIO to division commanders.

300 Matthew Ridgeway to Chief of Army Field Forces.

301 McQueen, 31.
Conclusions

Army Doctrinal Publication 2-0 (Intelligence) notes that intelligence soldiers must continually re-evaluate the premise on which they base a warning of impending action.\textsuperscript{302} The reason soldiers must reflect is to ensure they are not biased and basing their prediction on faulty principles. Leaders within the intelligence community need to conduct the same retrospective evaluation of the organizations, techniques and equipment soldiers use to ensure success in the next war. It is impossible to understand the reasons why leaders have organized tactical intelligence the way they have unless we understand why they were compelled to improve the design. Major General Sidney Weinstein, the commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School in 1984, believed that “knowledge of the evolution of Military Intelligence is lacking” and that members of the MI community needed to “gain an appreciation of the dynamics that have shaped our current intelligence structure.”\textsuperscript{303}

However, even those who have researched the evolution have often given short-shift to MIS and MIO in their histories.\textsuperscript{304} The reasons for this are likely that the

\textsuperscript{302} Department of the Army, ADP 2-0, 7.


\textsuperscript{304} Three Authors in particular are notable in studying the organization of Army military intelligence. There omission may be due to the sources they were working with or because their topics was so much larger that MIS and MIO only required a paragraph or a page: John Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh, Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence (Washington, DC: Center of Military History U.S. Army, 1998); Marc B. Powe, The Evolution of American Military Intelligence (Fort Huachuca: US Army Intelligence Center and School, 1973); and Michael E. Bigelow, “A Short History of
programs, published in 1948 and 1956 respectively, were not fully implemented until the Vietnam War. They were closely followed by another reorganization to CEWI battalions in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these two organizational methods were the foundations of contemporary MI. They are important milestones in the evolution of the Army’s contemporary intelligence capability. Detailed research of MIS and MIO provide startling discoveries about the foundations in which the Army’s MI capability are laid.

The developments of MIS and MIO are starkly different and indicate the effectiveness of the organization based on the character of the war after which they were developed. Army leaders developed the MIS using lessons from World War II and the surveying of G-2s across the European Theater of Operations. MIS was well thought out and based directly on concepts used during the war. However, one Army officer, General Van Natta, developed the concepts of MIO. He used his position as the G-2 of Army Field Forces and his personal relationships with General Ridgeway to further his ideas of robust intelligence support integrated into corps and division headquarters.

By no means was Van Natta wrong in pursuing the MIO. On the contrary, the Vietnam War vindicated the effectiveness of MI detachments. However, in a future war where the conditions are different, it is entirely possible MIO will not be able to keep pace with the deployment or expansion of the Army. Billets for intelligence soldiers may not be able to be filled as quickly as divisions are needed to mobilize. If this is the case, MI leaders must understand the utility of MIS and its success in the initial stages of the Vietnam War. They must understand the intelligence capability tactical units had as soon

Army Intelligence,” in “PB 34-12-3,” special issue, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 38, no. 3 (September 2012): 52.
as they touched down in Vietnam under MIO. There is room for both concepts, MIS and MIO, in the Army though they should be used in ways that maximize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. Ultimately, the Army must keep both capabilities available in its intelligence arsenal.

Provisional Implications for Future Study

Continued investigation needs to be done on the organizational evolution from the end of the Vietnam War to the present. The post-Vietnam War Army continued to change. This was especially true in the intelligence community after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, which led to the Intelligence Organization Station Study, also known as the Ursano Study. This 1975 study was the basis for the development of the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Battalion.\(^{305}\) The CEWI battalion built on MIO, increasing the intelligence support to division and finally adding signals intelligence organically to the division. Historians have not completed a comprehensive analysis of the CEWI battalion because key portions of the history, to include the Ursano Study, are still classified. As information becomes declassified, it will be necessary to review this thesis again; drawing conclusions forward or discarding them based on additional evidence. Additionally, the concept of this thesis should be applied to the period of the CEWI battalion from 1972 through the advent of the brigade combat team’s Military Intelligence Company in 2004.

Others should conduct research for the evolution of the Army’s strategic intelligence assets and the organizational changes of MI Groups, Battlefield Surveillance

\(^{305}\) Finnegan and Danysh, 179-182.
Brigades, to Expeditionary MI Brigades (E-MIB). Specifically with regard to these strategic intelligence unit configurations, it may be useful for the Intelligence and Security Command to record these histories for later declassification. Intelligence professionals have much more fidelity on the transition of MI Groups to E-MIBs than historians will have in a decade from now.

A weakness of this thesis is that it suffers from limited scope of the intelligence community. Future research should address how other agencies affected changes in the Army. Alluded to briefly in chapter 3, the relationship between T.F. Van Natta and the CIA may have been formative in the development of MIO. In the above case, the policies of the CIA in the Korean War may have influenced the trajectory of Army intelligence at the tactical level. The intelligence community, by its nature, is a complex relationship of interconnected organizations and capabilities. Isolating one organization, such as Army intelligence, and drawing definitive conclusions is a fallacy because of these relationships. A continuous effort to understand the larger picture of the intelligence community from the viewpoint of the Army needs to be maintained. Historians need to work on additional studies to explore the most impactful agencies to the Army. These studies should illustrate how their policies and capabilities influenced Army organizations.

Studying MI organizational and doctrinal evolution should have a wider goal of bringing awareness to the MI community about its history. The techniques intelligence

306 Central Intelligence Agency, Far East Division, 10.

307 Patrick Finnegan’s *Army Heritage Center: Military Intelligence* is a great example of these histories.
soldiers use to collect, analyze, and disseminate dictate the doctrine of employment of MI soldiers and units. The possibility of technology also influences the equipment MI soldier’s use on the battlefield. The organization of the unit is one of the most important determinants of the efficacy of a MI unit. More than any other type of unit, sharing information between MI soldiers can be a force multiplier. In order for intelligence to be effective, it must be disseminated to the right person in enough time to make a difference. If intelligence is not shared, then it is not worth the paper it is written on. MIS and MIO integrated these principles at the tactical level and the Army has been better for it.
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