Engaged in Debate: Major Albert C. Wedemeyer and the 1941 Victory Plan in Historical Memory

A Monograph

by

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2017

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# Engaged in Debate: Major Albert C. Wedemeyer and the 1941 Victory Plan in Historical Memory

In the final months leading up to World War II, America’s strategic leaders recognized a troubling gap between the nation’s industrial capacity and the projected requirements of a full-scale mobilization. Their recognition created momentum for a strategic estimate encompassing not only theaters and military operations, but manpower and industrial production as well. The result was the Victory Program, which officially began in the summer of 1941 with a joint Army and Navy response to President Roosevelt’s request for industrial production requirements necessary to defeat America’s potential enemies known as the Victory Plan. According to the official history, the strategic genius behind the Victory Plan was not a senior Army officer, but the uniquely qualified Major Albert Wedemeyer. For more than six decades, accounts ranging from Wedemeyer’s autobiography, Army official history, and various secondary sources maintained a consensus regarding Wedemeyer’s unique and invaluable contribution to American war planning. In recent years, however, intensifying interest in the Victory Program, including the role played by economists, spawned an opposing narrative that diminishes Wedemeyer’s role in the creation of the Victory Plan, as well as the enduring Victory Program and Anglo-American grand strategy. The two schools of thought offer little middle ground; they portray Wedemeyer as either a gifted strategic genius or an inconsequential staff officer. The truth lies somewhere in the middle, with Wedemeyer serving in a key position at a critical point in the nation’s history, but not quite the savior some have made him out to be.
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Abstract

Engaged in Debate: Major Albert C. Wedemeyer and the 1941 Victory Plan in Historical Memory, By MAJ Neil B. Stark, US Army, 62 pages

In the final months leading up to World War II, America’s strategic leaders recognized a troubling gap between the nation’s industrial capacity and the projected requirements of a full-scale mobilization. Their recognition created momentum for a strategic estimate encompassing not only theaters and military operations, but manpower and industrial production as well. The result was the Victory Program, which officially began in the summer of 1941 with a joint Army and Navy response to President Roosevelt’s request for industrial production requirements necessary to defeat America’s potential enemies known as the Victory Plan. According to the official history, the strategic genius behind the Victory Plan was not a senior Army officer, but the uniquely qualified Major Albert Wedemeyer. For more than six decades, accounts ranging from Wedemeyer’s autobiography, Army official history, and various secondary sources maintained a consensus regarding Wedemeyer’s unique and invaluable contribution to American war planning. In recent years, however, intensifying interest in the Victory Program, including the role played by economists, spawned an opposing narrative that diminishes Wedemeyer’s role in the creation of the Victory Plan, as well as the enduring Victory Program and Anglo-American grand strategy. The two schools of thought offer little middle ground; they portray Wedemeyer as either a gifted strategic genius or an inconsequential staff officer. The truth lies somewhere in the middle, with Wedemeyer serving in a key position at a critical point in the nation’s history, but not quite the savior some have made him out to be.
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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I owe much to my family, Kelly, Reagan, and Whitney, for their enduring understanding and support through what must have seemed an eternity of research and writing. Thanks are due to my parents, who often served as valuable sounding boards and occasionally assisted by proofreading. A special thanks is due to Major Chris Hanna, who provided pointed and valuable feedback at critical stages in the writing process. I would also like to thank Mr. Robert Brown and Dr. Marlyn Pierce, two exceptional instructors who agreed to expend their valuable time and effort to help a former student organize his thoughts. Finally, I must thank Dr. Mark Calhoun, with whom I shared much frustration and excitement about the details, trajectory, and possibilities of this project. His timely guidance, assistance, and encouragement were invaluable to the writing of this monograph.
Acronyms

AAF Army Air Forces
ABC-1 American – British Conversation
AGF Army Ground Forces
AIC Army Industrial College
ANMB Army Navy Munitions Board
AWC Army War College
CGSS Command and General Staff School
GHQ General Headquarters
IMP Industrial Mobilization Plan
JPC Joint Planning Committee
NDAC Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense
OEM Office of Emergency Management
OPM Office of Production Management
PMP Personnel Mobilization Plan
SPAB Supply Priorities and Allocation Board
UK United Kingdom
US United States
USSR Soviet Union (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics)
WPB War Production Board
WPD War Plans Division
WRA War Resources Administration
WRB War Resources Board
Illustrations

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Introduction

In the period leading up to America’s involvement in World War II, the nation’s strategic leaders identified a troubling gap between the nation’s industrial capacity and the projected requirements of a full-scale mobilization. This created institutional momentum for a new strategic estimate encompassing theaters, operations, military units, manpower, and industrial production.¹ Work on the Victory Program, regarded by many at the time as an ‘ultimate program,’ officially began in the summer of 1941 as a joint Army and Navy response to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s query regarding industrial production requirements necessary to defeat America’s potential enemies in the event of war. In keeping with the American tradition of broad strategic guidance, the President only vaguely referenced potential enemies when he described the nation as an arsenal of democracy.² Paired with the seeming inevitability of direct participation in the war, despite the lack of public support for such a policy, this vagueness frustrated the efforts of military planners caught between national sentiment and US foreign policy on one hand, and the terrifying reality of Axis aggression on the other. Due to the timing and scope of the 1941 Victory Plan, it superficially appears that this seminal document underpinned US strategy in World War II. However, the Victory Plan is more aptly characterized as an initial step in the gradual


formulation of strategy, which found its fundamental tenets in an existing Rainbow plan, modified in Anglo-American strategy months earlier.3

According to official history, the strategic genius behind the 1941 Victory Plan was not a senior Army officer, but newly minted Major Albert Wedemeyer, only recently assigned to the War Plans Division (WPD). One of four American graduates of the German General Staff School known as the Kriegsakademie, Wedemeyer possessed unique insight into German strategy, operational doctrine, tactics, equipment, and organization. As recounted in Charles Kirkpatrick’s official history of the Victory Plan, it was his unique insight that led the US Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, Jr., and the WPD chief, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow, to select Wedemeyer from among many qualified WPD officers to orchestrate an expert strategic estimate that answered President Roosevelt’s request.4

According to Kirkpatrick, and Mark Watson before him, the absence of an overarching strategic concept precluded premature generalizations about industrial production requirements and forced Gerow, WPD, and Wedemeyer to broaden the scope of the Victory Plan. Through a process of conceptual planning and dialogue, a team of WPD planners led by Wedemeyer produced a strategic estimate that went beyond requirements and identified likely enemies as the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and named the Atlantic and Europe as the decisive

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theater. This estimate foreshadowed ground offensive operations by a massive mechanized army, and the ultimate elimination of totalitarianism from Europe. It was the first official US military correspondence to contemplate the challenges of defeating the vaunted German army in land-based battle on the European continent. Although Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate eventually proved to have substantial flaws, his work on the Victory Plan represented the opening salvo in an essential civil-military dialogue.

Methodology

This monograph examines Wedemeyer’s role in the development of the Victory Plan within the strategic context of the Interwar Period—a subject of debate in recent years as historians such as James Lacey have challenged the narrative contained in the US Army’s official history. Largely the work of Mark Watson and Charles Kirkpatrick, writing for the Center of Military History, the official record upholds the Victory Plan as a comprehensive, grand strategic blueprint for American involvement in World War II, and heralds Wedemeyer as its chief architect. Lacey, on the other hand, argued in Keep From All Thoughtful Men: How U.S. Economists Won World War II that the Victory Program emerged and matured without Wedemeyer, that his role was inconsequential, and that the strategic impact of the program was

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5 Kirkpatrick, 63, 86-88; McLaughlin, 38; War Plans Division, “Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of Army Ground Forces,” September 1941, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) II, College Park, MD, Record Group (RG) 165, NH-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494-21, 1-2, 8-10; Calhoun, 162. During the Intervar Period, the US Army, like its British and German counterparts, struggled to adapt to the changing character of warfare, notably contending with the demands of mechanization and motorization. During this time, the US Army transformed from the paradigmatic square infantry division to the smaller, more mobile, and more powerful triangular infantry division, and experimented with the armored division, which Wedemeyer would embrace in the Victory Plan.

insignificant. This study arbitrates between the two predominant narratives to present an objective record of Wedemeyer’s role.7

The first section of this monograph briefly investigates Wedemeyer’s personal and career experiences relevant to his development and assignment to WPD. Insight into the man behind the plan offers a necessary understanding of his education, experience, and abilities in comparison with those of his peers. It also explains how and why he came to be associated with the Victory Program. The next section will include a survey of the US war planning process during the Interwar Period to establish the strategic context at the time of the Victory Program’s inception. The Victory Program emerged from the American strategic context during the period between the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, an event that forced American leadership to enter a war the nation had hoped to avoid.8

The analysis that follows centers on Wedemeyer’s role in developing the initial version of the Victory Program, sometimes referred to as the Victory Plan, which was both a strategic concept of operations and as a manpower estimate. After describing the genesis of the Victory Plan and briefly explaining how responsibility fell to the relatively inexperienced Wedemeyer, this section analyzes Wedemeyer’s role in its development. While the fundamental strategic tenets of the American strategy in World War II coalesced several months before the Victory Plan, Wedemeyer’s version represented a step in the direction of continental land warfare. Significantly, Wedemeyer expounded on the Joint Board’s strategic concept and succinctly stated the military establishment’s preferred strategy for World War II, and therein lies its value.

Wedemeyer’s manpower estimate, on the other hand, was truly original work. As the nearest point of consilience among the authors, this section will analyze Wedemeyer’s manpower

7 Kirkpatrick, 1-2; Watson, 340; Lacey, *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*, 13, 16, 19, 88. While both Kirkpatrick and Watson seem to follow Wedemeyer’s own description of his accomplishments, Lacey comes across as both strident in tone and short of evidence given the severity of his claims.

8 Grotelueschen, 15-18.
estimate, including the method he used to arrive at his final recommendation. This section will consider the estimate’s accuracy, relevance to overall strategy, and impact on subsequent war planning. As the various authors agree, the manpower estimate was Wedemeyer’s responsibility; therefore, his estimate can provide the clearest indicator of his significance with respect to Allied strategy and war planning. Furthermore, the impact of his manpower estimate on US war planning indicates how assimilation of Wedemeyer’s conclusions shaped the views of US Army planners, thereby indicating the significance of his strategic influence.\(^9\)

**Wedemeyer’s Role: Disputed History**

An important distinction is necessary before delving into the history of the Victory Program, and how the relatively unknown Wedemeyer came to be associated with this monumental task. Historically speaking, the Victory Program consisted of initial estimates of industrial production requirements completed between July and September 1941 known as The Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements and The Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of the Army Ground Forces. The Victory Program also included the ongoing military-industrial dialogue that continued in various forms until 1943. In 1991, Charles Kirkpatrick, in *An Unknown Future and Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941*, popularized the term “Victory Plan” to describe this first set of estimates, which he attributed to Wedemeyer. However, the majority of historians refer to the effort only as the “Victory Program.” For that reason, this monograph will use “Victory Plan” by exception when referring to the estimates produced in the summer of 1941, or to arguments made by, or directed at, Kirkpatrick.\(^10\)

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\(^9\) Kirkpatrick, 2, 63-64; Watson, 337, 352-54; Lacey, *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*, 18-9, 14.

\(^10\) Carew, 210, 236; Kirkpatrick, 1; Lacey, 9.
The extent of Wedemeyer’s role in the Victory Program recently emerged as a point of contention among military historians. Wedemeyer’s contribution to American war planning, as characterized by the official history contained in the Center of Military History’s “The US Army in World War II” series, commonly known as the Green Books, enjoyed six decades of consensus. Wedemeyer even experienced a revival in the 1990s upon the publication of Kirkpatrick’s *An Unknown Future and Doubtful Present*. Intensifying interest in the Victory Program, including the role played by economists spawned an opposing narrative epitomized by Jim Lacey’s *Keep from All Thoughtful Men*, published in 2011. The two schools of thought offer little middle ground; they portray Wedemeyer as either a uniquely gifted strategic genius or an inconsequential staff officer.

The US Army’s official history of World War II contains the key elements of the Wedemeyer legend. The Green Books series, especially Mark Watson’s account of the Victory Program in *The War Department – Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, laid the foundation. Kirkpatrick’s *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, also published by the Center of Military History in 1990, four decades after the Green Books, did much to perpetuate and expand—possibly too much—historical understanding of Wedemeyer’s role in the development of US strategy. According to Watson and Kirkpatrick, Wedemeyer produced an unprecedented statement of the Army’s views on strategy. An uncritical reading of the official history can lead one to believe that Wedemeyer’s work on the Victory Program revealed strategic genius, the effects of which reverberated throughout World War II.\(^{11}\)

In 2011, Jim Lacey’s *Keep From All Thoughtful Men* highlighted the role of civilian economists and industrialists in American mobilization for the war. Lacey contended that his research revealed a different picture of Wedemeyer’s responsibility than the image presented by

\(^{11}\) Watson, 331, 354; Kirkpatrick, 103.
the official history. According to Lacey, Wedemeyer’s only responsibility was to estimate the total strength of ground forces necessary to win the war, a far less comprehensive effort than development of the holistic Victory Program. Lacey contends that the actual American World War II strategy emerged from Admiral Harold Stark’s groundbreaking Plan Dog memorandum in November 1940, which served as a conceptual framework for American participation in the American – British Conversation (ABC-1) from January to March 1941, and was codified into American war plans in May 1941 in an update to Rainbow Five. To Lacey, this strategy, combined with Office of Production Management (OPM) economist Stacy May’s estimate of Allied industrial potential in the fall of 1941, represented the real Victory Plan. Furthermore, Lacey scathingly criticized the rigor of Wedemeyer’s estimate, describing both an arbitrary method and Wedemeyer’s later exaggeration of his role in strategic planning. Lacey also criticized Watson and Kirkpatrick for writing an uncritical history based largely on Wedemeyer’s own recollections, acquired through personal interviews. Lacey argued that the absence of corroborating evidence for Wedemeyer’s account debunks claims that the Victory Program was a product of Wedemeyer’s genius, and casts doubt on claims that Wedemeyer’s work substantially influenced strategic planning throughout the duration of the war. In short, Lacey concluded that Wedemeyer served as the source of his own legend.

John J. McLaughlin entered the fray in 2012. An eighty-year old retired lawyer, McLaughlin became interested in Wedemeyer while researching his doctoral dissertation as a student of the Caspersen School of Graduate Studies Doctor of Arts and Letters program at Drew University, known for offering an interdisciplinary humanities alternative to traditional PhD

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12 Lacey, *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*, 9, 19.

13 James G. Lacey, “World War II’s Real Victory Program,” *Journal of Military History* 75, no. 3 (July 2011): 811-12; Lacey, *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*, 4, 9-10; Watson, 340n33; Kirkpatrick, vii; Calhoun, 196n63. Lacey used “Victory Plan” in this context as a rebuke of Kirkpatrick. He also harshly criticized Wedemeyer’s recollection of the Victory Program as “a myth of self-promotion.”
programs. In his biography, *General Albert Wedemeyer: America’s Unsung Strategist in World War II*, he credited Wedemeyer with exceptional strategic aptitude. McLaughlin argued that Wedemeyer directly contributed to the Victory Program’s revolutionary effect on both industry and military strategy during World War II. He even attributed to Wedemeyer the initial concept for a force build-up and an early invasion of Europe, which paved the way for Operations Bolero and Sledgehammer, later renamed Overlord.\(^{14}\)

Although he supplemented his work with an array of primary and secondary sources, McLaughlin most frequently cited Wedemeyer’s autobiography and the official history to arrive at his flattering portrayal of Wedemeyer’s role in the development of the Victory Program. In fact, McLaughlin’s organization roughly mirrors that of *Wedemeyer Reports!* His failure to critically analyze the official history hints at personal bias, or even unadulterated myth, a prospect that Lacey considered upon learning of McLaughlin’s book.\(^{15}\) The objectivity of *Unsung Strategist* is therefore suspect, and its usefulness as a historical source to enable analysis of Wedemeyer’s role in the Victory Program is limited.\(^{16}\)

In 2013, McLaughlin coauthored an article in *Journal of Military History (JMH)* that purported to repudiate Lacey’s version of the events. McLaughlin drew on a breadth of resources including the personal and official correspondence of Wedemeyer, Marshall, and Roosevelt,

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\(^{15}\) Lacey, “Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills,” 268.

\(^{16}\) McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer*, v, 250-77; Wedemeyer, xi-xii. The ‘official history’ refers to the narrative contained in Watson’s *The War Department – Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* and reinforced by Kirkpatrick’s *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941*, which, as previously described, was heavily influenced by Wedemeyer himself.
while relying less heavily on Watson’s and Kirkpatrick’s accounts. His argument presented Wedemeyer as the self-deprecating principal author of the Army portion of the Victory Plan. The *JMH* editors invited Lacey, the author of an earlier article decrying the Wedemeyer myth, to respond, and Lacey wrote a scathing counterpoint, alternating between attacking McLaughlin’s academic credentials and reiterating his own detailed case against Wedemeyer. Lacey’s volley appears to have silenced his critics.17

The stark dichotomy between the official history and the more recent revisionist narrative presents Wedemeyer as either a strategic genius, or merely another replaceable cog in the WPD machine. Arguments critical of the official history, such as Lacey’s, imply that Wedemeyer played a lesser role in both the Victory Program and American World War II strategy than previously believed. Yet Wedemeyer’s long and distinguished military career imbues him with a degree of professional credibility, and the fact that none of his peers ever contradicted the official history suggests that Wedemeyer’s personal account of the Victory Program contains a measure of truth. On the other hand, evidence reveals Wedemeyer’s personal contribution to the official history, and implies that he perhaps embellished his role in war planning and strategy development. When combined with the lack of corroborating evidence, Wedemeyer’s account becomes marred by doubt and suspicion. As in most cases of debate from two such extreme positions, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle, placing Wedemeyer in a key position within WPD at a critical point in the nation’s history, and cast in history somewhere between scoundrel and savior.18


18 Kirkpatrick, 2; Lacey, *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*, 8, 13; McLaughlin and Lomazow, 263; Watson, 340n33.
Background

Biographical Information

Albert Coady Wedemeyer was born in 1897 into a modest German-American family from Nebraska. Early on, Wedemeyer’s father encouraged an interest in history, geography, politics, and economics, as well as a healthy dose of skepticism, which provided a solid foundation for critical thinking. Wedemeyer pursued, and ultimately earned, an appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and in the process shunned his parents’ desire for a career in medicine. Wedemeyer enrolled at West Point in 1916, and after a year and a half of instruction, he and his classmates received early commissions and deployed in support of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) of World War I. Arriving too late in the war to gain actual combat experience, Wedemeyer and his classmates returned to West Point shortly after the armistice. After completing the West Point curriculum, many of these young officers returned to Europe on official duty to glean valuable information from first-hand accounts and tours of the battlefields.19

While at West Point, Wedemeyer was academically unremarkable. Then his career got off to an ignominious start with an ill-timed court-martial.20 Like so many of his peers during the Interwar Period, Wedemeyer languished as a junior officer for nearly two decades, spending seventeen years as lieutenant. During that time, Wedemeyer enjoyed modest success as a leader of troops in the Philippines, a staff officer in China, a stateside commander, and a four-time aide de camp. As a company grade officer, Wedemeyer, as well as many of his peers, contemplated modern warfare through professional dialogue. Specifically, Wedemeyer addressed the science

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19 McLaughlin, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 13, 17-19; Kirkpatrick, 6-7, 14; Wedemeyer, 46.

20 Colonel G.S. Goodale, “Subject: Action Under 104th Article of War,” February 17, 1921, National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO, RG 319, Folder 5, Disciplinary (February 1921 – March 1921).
and tactics of antitank defense in an article that ran in both *The Infantry Journal* and *The Field Artillery Journal* in 1941. His tactical expertise at this stage of his career is demonstrative of his broad professional development; however, it neither distinguished him from his peers nor indicated a unique proclivity for strategic thinking.\(^{21}\)

Wedemeyer’s personal development during this period may have been more significant than his professional development. As a well-traveled junior officer in the US Army, Wedemeyer seized on opportunities to enrich himself and expand his abilities by achieving varying levels of fluency in German, French, and Chinese. In 1923, while underway for his first tour to the Philippines, Wedemeyer met Major General Stanley Embick, with whom he instantly developed a classic mentor-protégé relationship. Embick stoked Wedemeyer’s interest in strategy and the economic aspects of war, and encouraged him to remain engaged in significant military and political issues. Embick played a role in Wedemeyer’s development as a strategist by broadening his worldview beyond the isolationist political context of the time, and introducing him to elements of strategy such as diplomacy, economics, and military power.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{22}\) Wedemeyer, 48-49; Kirkpatrick, 8; McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer*, 19-21; Eiler, *Wedemeyer on War and Peace*, 1. An ability to read and speak multiple languages enabled him to learn more broadly as it allowed him to engage with other cultures and study foreign literature. While assigned to the Philippines, Wedemeyer married Embick’s daughter, and later served as Embick’s aide de camp in China.
In 1936, Wedemeyer graduated first in his class from the US Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The two-year program of instruction focused on mastery of tactics and logistics at the division level and below, while providing an overview of corps and army level operations. However, CGSS only provided a theoretical foundation in mechanized warfare. In his own assessment, Wedemeyer described the CGSS curriculum as overly theoretical and lacking in practical application of learned concepts and procedures, and the instructors as only marginally qualified for the task.23

During his time at CGSS, American foreign policy became increasingly concerned with a resurgent Germany and the likelihood of renewed conflict in Europe. Axis aggression began as early as October 1935 with Mussolini’s attack on Abyssinia, and the Germans joined the fray in the summer of 1936 with their open military support of Spanish Nationalists under Francisco Franco. This volatile security atmosphere led to a desire to discern German intentions and capabilities. Likely due to his CGSS performance and German fluency, Wedemeyer was selected to attend the Kriegsakademie from 1936 to 1938 as part of a short-lived officer exchange program. Established in 1809 during the Prussian military reorganization program, the Kriegsakademie was comparable to the US Army War College (AWC) in terms of the rank of the attendees and the school’s focus on preparation of its graduates for service in large units as chiefs of staff to senior general officers. The Kriegsakademie benefited from a faculty of experienced and knowledgeable instructors, and the curriculum included many opportunities for practical application of theory in classroom and field exercises. The school mirrored the national character

23 Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, 1; McLaughlin, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 21; Wedemeyer, 48, 50; Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics,” 209, 221; Timothy K. Nenninger, “Creating Officers,” Military Review 69, no. 11 (November 1989): 59, 63; Schifferle, 71-71, 117-18; Calhoun, 179-80. Nenninger described the CGSS curriculum as highly practical, with nearly seventy percent of instruction time dedicated to applicatory map maneuvers. In his assessment of CGSS, Wedemeyer compared the school against his Kriegsakademie experience.
of interwar Germany, including the hierarchical, nested relationship between military and national strategy, and the curriculum emphasized the elements of grand strategy.24

As part of his regular Kriegsakademie studies, Wedemeyer analyzed international affairs, geopolitical tensions, and the use of the various elements of strategy to achieve war aims in support of national policy. While at the Kriegsakademie, Wedemeyer developed a personal relationship with Chief of the German General Staff General Ludwig von Beck, who imparted upon him a nuanced appreciation of European geopolitics, strategy, and military force. The confluence of the Kriegsakademie curriculum, General von Beck’s mentorship, and relationships with his classmates inspired Wedemeyer’s embryonic concept of grand strategy. Wedemeyer’s professional military education between 1934 and 1938 honed his tactical and low-operational prowess via CGSC, and expanded his capacity for strategic thinking via the Kriegsakademie.25

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25 Wedemeyer, 49; Kirkpatrick, 10; McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer*, 26; Eiler, “The Man Who Planned Victory.”
Wedemeyer’s purpose at the *Kriegsakademie* was not, however, entirely benevolent. The War Department’s curiosity to know more about their potential German enemies and the Nazi Party inferred upon Wedemeyer a responsibility to collect intelligence about his hosts. His *Kriegsakademie* instruction introduced him to German concepts of mechanized warfare, air power, combined arms operations, and logistics. He participated in field exercises, including the 1938 annual maneuvers in which he commanded a German antitank company, which afforded him witness first-hand German maneuver doctrine and the mobility of the German army. Wedemeyer collected his findings and presented his analysis of the *Kriegsakademie* as well as German army doctrine and capabilities in a summary report filed through the military attaché in Berlin to the Army intelligence section of the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Washington, DC.26

In 1939, Chief of Staff of the US Army General George C. Marshall reviewed Wedemeyer’s report, in which he recognized Wedemeyer’s unique insight into a potential strategy for defeating the German army. In this manner, Wedemeyer was discovered by Marshall, who himself held an affinity for German military doctrine. Wedemeyer’s background and training in German battle tactics uniquely suited him to execute Marshall’s ambitions. In 1940, now Major Wedemeyer joined the War Department’s ongoing effort to write antitank defense doctrine. In May 1941, he transferred to WPD and went on to play a critical role in the development of World War II strategy as a key contributor to the Victory Program.27

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26 Wedemeyer, 49; Kirkpatrick, 10-11; McLaughlin, 2; *German General Staff School, 1938*, 1.

27 McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer*, 8, 26; Bonura, 259; Major General Adams, “War Department Special Orders No. 228,” September 26, 1940, NPRC, St. Louis, MO, RG 319, Folder 1, Service Documents (November 1918 – May 1944); Eiler, *Wedemeyer on War and Peace*, 10. While the director of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, General Marshall initiated and cultivated an unofficial reform movement to adopt a new intellectual battlefield framework based on German doctrinal principles. In September 1940, Wedemeyer, after helping to organize the Army’s first antitank battalion, reported to Washington, DC to write US Army antitank doctrine. Coinciding with perturbation about inferior US antitank capability, Wedemeyer’s work was likely on the minds of senior leaders such as Marshall and McNair.
American War Planning in the Interwar Period

US Strategic Context

Nearly eighty percent of Americans opposed US intervention in international conflict until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Emboldened by America’s secure geographic position and encouraged by an historical aversion to large, standing armies and pernicious alliances, many American politicians trumpeted non-interventionism and opposed defense spending throughout the Interwar Period despite growing threats in both the Pacific and Europe. 28 As late as 1940, President Roosevelt, under pressure from a vocal non-interventionist camp during a contested election campaign, acted with restraint, keeping his words and actions related to military matters muted. 29

A lack of overt policy guidance from their civilian leaders created an atmosphere of uncertainty in which military planners operated. For fear of political backlash, politicians abstained from providing anything but the most basic direction to the military services. Often, this direction took the form of Congressionally imposed budgetary limitations, force size restrictions, treaty negotiations, or overseas basing agreements. Unsurprisingly, these Congressional edicts were rarely synchronized with either existing policies or military strategy. Fortuitously, politicians’ disinclination to engage in national and military strategy presented a unique opportunity for military leaders on the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) to direct military strategy and national policy from the bottom-up. 30

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30 Ross, American War Plans: 1890-1939, 183; Miller, 9-10.
Color Plans

From 1919 to 1938, the JPC assumed the mantle of US war planning and initially assumed the responsibility of revising existing Color Plans, which drew their name from the color designator assigned to the enemy nation that the plan focused on; for example, Japan was Orange and Great Britain was Red. Without adequate policy guidance, these plans remained largely theoretical, and, therefore, had limited value during actual contingencies. Regardless of their practical usefulness, the Color Plans of the 1920s and 30s provided critical staff exercise for the fledgling JPC, and served as an intellectual training ground for the officers who attended the AWC during the Interwar Period and combined the various colors into oftentimes outrageous, but occasionally realistic contingency scenarios in the mid to late-1930s.31

The most prominent, most detailed, and most realistic of the Color Plans was Plan Orange, which focused on a potential conflict with the Asian nationalist empire of Japan. In response to a hypothetical Japanese aggressive incursion against US interests in the Pacific, the US military planned to encircle Japan with sea power along a chain of island outposts. Next the Navy would blockade and economically isolate the island, and ultimately destroy the Japanese Imperial Navy in a decisive naval battle of the sort envisioned in the work of sea power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan. Significantly, Plan Orange did not call for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, but rather the economic strangulation, naval destruction, and subsequent entreaty of the Japanese empire. Effectively, the US Navy would defeat the Japanese army from the sea by pitting American industrial superiority against Japan’s comparatively short military endurance.32

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The fact that US military planners opted for economic warfare when considering their most likely contingency speaks to their recognition of the social and political constraints under which they operated. From these, institutional constraints emerged in the form of declining military strength relative to global threats. As late as 1938, the US Army boasted only 184,000 total troops, and US Navy tonnage had decreased over the previous two decades from the already inadequate World War I capacity. To mitigate this significant vulnerability, the joint planners periodically recommended updates to the Personnel Mobilization Plan (PMP) and the Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP) to inform mobilization and gain strategic flexibility in the event of a major war.  

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33 Kirkpatrick, 37, 45; Grotelueschen 11; Ross, *American War Plans: 1890-1939*, 161-63; Gole, 27; Calhoun, 46-47. Social constraints, including non-interventionism and isolationism, combined with political constraints such as the 1922 Washington arms limitations treaties, the 1929 Kellogg-Briand anti-
Rainbow Plans

The Munich crisis of 1938 caused the JPC to consider the possibility of a two-ocean war. From this came the decision to replace the Color Plans with the Rainbow Plans, so named for the combination of legacy colors in international coalitions. The Rainbow Plans emphasized the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of US and Allied interests in the Pacific. The July 23, 1939 versions of Rainbows One and Four focused on hemisphere defense, including the security of the Panama Canal. Rainbow Two included additional tasks for force projection into the Atlantic Ocean, and Rainbow Three into the Pacific. Rainbow One became the base plan, from which all other Rainbow Plans derived, and Rainbow Four was designated as the most probable for execution. The signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939, followed closely by the German invasion of Poland reoriented the JPC towards Europe and Rainbow Two.34

Just weeks later, the Rainbow plans were revised again to include Rainbow Five, which contemplated the projection of force deep into the Eastern Atlantic. Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 stoked the interest of the Joint Board in Rainbow Five as a legitimate operational concept, and served as the harbinger of the strategy to defeat Germany first. The fall of France in June 1940 focused the US war planning effort on the twin goals of sustaining the military viability of Great Britain, and joint operations to control the Atlantic and launch a potential land offensive onto a Nazi-dominated terrain. The American reorientation towards Europe culminated on June 17, 1940, with a joint memorandum from General Marshall

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34 Morton, 21, 23; Keegan, 26-27; Watson, 103; Grotelueschen, 13-14; Ross, U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945, 17, 33.
and Admiral Harold K. Stark, the two top-ranking US military officers, who also recommended reframing national policy to place the country on a war footing.35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Rainbow Plans (as of July 1939)</th>
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<td><strong>One</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Two</strong></td>
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The simultaneous deterioration of the situation in Europe, and overt Japanese military ambition continued unabated throughout the fall of 1940. Unfortunately, these percolating threats coincided with the 1940 US Presidential campaign. President Roosevelt, seeking reelection and attempting to appease the non-interventionist bloc, declined to mobilize national manpower and industry despite indicating his fundamental agreement with the strategic assumptions presented

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35 Kirkpatrick, 39-41; Morton, 28-29; Grotelueschen, 14, Kennedy, 451.
by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. Roosevelt’s tacit consent, however, was enough to encourage Stark to continue planning for conflict in the Atlantic theater.\footnote{Morton, 30; Calhoun, 197; Kennedy, 458, 460, 468-69.}

On November 12, 1940, just one week after the election, Stark presented his Plan Dog memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.\footnote{Watson, 118.} In his memorandum, Stark inextricably tied the fate of US interests to the outcome of Great Britain’s existential struggle against Germany, and hinted at inevitable land operations. The Plan Dog memorandum, arguably the most important strategic document of the World War II planning effort, outlined the strategic situation, advocated robust support to Great Britain, and described the build-up of air and ground forces necessary for an eventual invasion of the European continent. Inevitably, Stark’s strategic approach made its way to Roosevelt, who, now secure in his incumbency, voiced his approval.\footnote{Ross, \textit{U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945}, 55, 57; Morton, 35, 41; Groteleuschen, 15; Kennedy, 480.}

**ABC-1**

With Plan Dog and Germany-first as a guiding strategic framework, US planners secretly hosted their British counterparts in the first American – British Staff Conversation (ABC-1) in Washington, DC from January 29 to March 27, 1941. In a consolidated report issued at the conclusion of the conference, the joint US-British planning team stated the broad strategic principles of the Allied effort: the defeat of Germany was the major objective, the Atlantic, including Europe, was the decisive theater, and a strategic defense characterized by economy of force operations would mitigate potential war in the Pacific. Critically, the ABC-1 report called for the inevitable Allied invasion of the European continent, and from this point forward
consideration of the size disparity between Allied and Axis militaries underpinned operational planning.\textsuperscript{39}

Following ABC-1, US military planners set out to revise Rainbow Five in accordance with the results of the conference. In fact, in some cases the JPC quoted directly from ABC-1 in its revision of Rainbow Five. The JPC submitted the updated plan to the Joint Board on 30 April and it was approved two weeks later, on May 14, 1941. By this time, Rainbow Five, born of Stark’s Plan Dog memorandum and matured through the Allied discourse of ABC-1, fully encapsulated the American strategy for defeating the Axis powers. However, the updated Rainbow Five still did not include any specific plans for a major land offensive against Germany, instead emphasizing the build-up of forces for an eventual offensive. Determining the plan’s feasibility would require an estimate of the size and composition of forces necessary for the offensive. In keeping with his usual practice, President Roosevelt declined to formally approve the new Rainbow Five; however, he did direct the Joint Board to present the plan for his approval in the event of war.\textsuperscript{40}

The Army War College

Rainbow Five represented the culmination of nearly two decades of American war planning. Focus on the Atlantic and the threat posed by Nazi Germany—despite impending Japanese aggression—demonstrated American assumptions about the inevitability of a two-ocean war. During the mid- to late-1930s, while WPD and JPC planners were occupied with ABC-1 and Rainbow Five, the AWC student exercised creative hypothetical conflicts that resembled the two-

\textsuperscript{39} Ross, \textit{U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945}, 67; Grotelueschen, 16-18; Morton, 43-44; Weigley, 314. Experience with the hypothetical Red-Orange (UK-Japan) scenario convinced American planners of the wisdom of addressing a trans-Atlantic threat, such as Germany, before turning attention to the Pacific, thus Germany-first. After the conclusion of the ABC-1 conference in March 1941, all war planning conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom was coordinated among the various Allies.

\textsuperscript{40} Morton, 45-46; Ross, \textit{U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945}, 135-54; Grotelueschen, 18-19.
ocean war. In the 1936 “Participation with Allies” exercise, AWC students envisioned a massive Allied ground force on the European continent enabled by a decisive economic advantage. Interestingly, nine officers from the 1936 AWC class went on to serve in WPD between 1936 and 1944. Surely, these officers brought their experience from AWC exercises into concrete war planning. In 1940, AWC’s hypothetical exercises gained an element of realism, as students worked on what became known as Rainbow X. This hypothetical plan assumed German domination of the European continent, emphasized the importance of air superiority, and required the opening of additional theaters to siphon German military might away from the main effort, all of which became characteristics of Rainbow Five in execution.41

Iterative war planning between 1919 and 1940, both real and hypothetical, resulted in vast institutional knowledge throughout the Army, but especially at WPD. By 1941, the American strategic context had undoubtedly crystallized in the Germany-first strategy for a two-ocean war that originally evolved from Plan Orange, to Plan Dog, and through ABC-1, culminated in Rainbow Five. By 1940, the Army possessed vast institutional knowledge across the force. No one man was solely responsible for the strategy that produced victory; rather, many contributed to it.42

Industrial Mobilization Planning

The American experience in World War I proffered several important lessons about the nature of modern war, not least of which involved the essential importance of planning for a transition from the normal pattern of life to “the full effectiveness of the military machine.”43

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42 Morton, 40; Gole, 122-131.

Bernard Baruch was the head of the War Industries Board and the architect of the American
economic mobilization for World War I. In March 1921, he recommended to President Harding
several institutional changes to expedite economic mobilization and achieve maximum productive
output in the event of a future war. While the President rejected Baruch’s proposals, the 1920
National Defense Act did include a Congressional mandate for peacetime mobilization planning.
This responsibility divested to the Planning Branch of the War Department, where it remained
until the Reorganization Act of April 1939.44

The 1920s proved to be formative years for the American concept of industrial
mobilization planning, and Baruch remained influential in military circles throughout the period.
As the Army sought to avoid the mistakes of World War I, it settled on a three-pronged approach
that centered on the IMP. The Army Industrial College (AIC), established in 1924 at the urging of
Baruch, would train military officers in “the art of setting the whole nation in battle array.”45
Planning Branch, staffed by AIC-trained officers, produced the IMP, which was periodically
reviewed by the Army-Navy Munitions Board (ANMB). By 1930, the Army seemed to have
learned from the World War I industrial mobilization experience, and produced the first version
of the IMP, which met Baruch’s approval.46

The 1930 IMP, largely authored by General (then Major) Dwight D. Eisenhower,
accounted for the changing nature of war and the subsequent requirement for central planning to

Affairs* 29, no. 1 (Spring, 1965): 3; Kelly E. Irish, “Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial
Mobilization Plan,” *Journal of Military History* 70, no. 1 (January 2006): 32; Tobin, 686; Paul A.C.
Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945*, vol. 4,


Harry B. Yoshpe, “Economic Mobilization Planning Between the Two World Wars,” *Military Affairs* 15,
no. 4 (Winter 1951): 200; Irish, 34.
achieve rapid economic mobilization and maximum industrial production.47 Updated in 1933, 1936, and 1939, many details within the IMP changed, but the underlying principles of the plan remained unaltered.48 Roosevelt eventually discarded the IMP in favor of a civilian board of economists and industrialists more in keeping with his personal leadership style. However, the 1930s represented a decade of grassroots industrial mobilization planning that proved immensely beneficial to the Army as the prospect of global war loomed large once again.49

Several factors contributed to the rejection of the IMP, not least of which was Roosevelt’s suspicion of the broad regulatory powers it granted to the War Resources Administration (WRA). More relevant to the narrative of Interwar Period plans and US strategic context, however, was the inability of the ANMB to translate military requirements into specific demands in terms of raw materials and services, the lack of a statistical framework, and the absence of a wartime reporting system, all of which evoked memories of the inefficient industrial mobilization for World War I. The reliability of Army estimates remained a constant concern throughout the economic mobilization for World War II, as the Army proved unable to evaluate the national industrial productive potential as well as communicate requirements in clear terms of basic materials understood by industrialists. The fact that the Interwar Period US Army was ill prepared for the scale and scope of modern warfare exacerbated such weaknesses.50


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>National Defense Act of 1920</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>Establishment of Procurement Division in the War Department, including the Planning Branch</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) created</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922 - 1939</td>
<td>Four Industrial Mobilization Plans (IMP) written and revised</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Army Industrial College (AIC) founded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>War Resources Board (WRB) formed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Office of Emergency Management (OEM) established within the Executive Office of the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense (NDAC) reestablished</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Office of Production Management (OPM) founded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (SPAB) formed</td>
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In contrast with the changing American social landscape that corresponded with the New Deal programs, the 1939 IMP eschewed previous emphasis on organized labor, while retaining close ties to business leaders. New Dealers in Roosevelt’s administration were suspicious of centralized economic control. The Army’s inability to appreciate societal tensions and the managerial preferences of their commander in chief in the context of a contentious 1940 reelection campaign spelled doom for the IMP. Deficiencies such as the inability to express demand in terms of raw materials, the lack of a statistical framework, and the absence of reporting system combined to undermine the reliability of IMP estimates. Calhoun argued that the military continued to be plagued by an inability to produce reliable estimates throughout World War II, ultimately coming to a head during the so-called ‘feasibility dispute’ in 1942.
Analysis of the Victory Plan

Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements

As the American strategy coalesced into Rainbow Five, cognizance of the imbalance between ends and means spurred an estimate of industrial production and manpower requirements. As early as February 18, 1941, William S. Knudsen, the advisor for industrial production on the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), recognized the need for a unified program to place American industrial production on a path towards meeting domestic and international military materiel demands. The Office of Production Management (OPM) echoed Knudsen’s urgings with frequent calls for consolidated production objectives under the umbrella of a general strategic plan. In early April, OPM issued an anonymous memorandum emphasizing the unprecedented industrial demands being placed on the US economy, citing operational needs for a two million-man army, a two-ocean navy, and the Lend Lease Act. On April 18, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, in a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson noted the combined demands of Lend Lease and US military expansion, and recommended the swift mobilization of American industry, as well as a clear articulation of national policy with respect to the ongoing war.51

Seeking to bypass bureaucratic inertia, Patterson’s executive officer, Major General James H. Burns, rushed the memorandum, along with a note indicating Stimson’s approval directly to General Marshall. On May 21, Marshall directed WPD, under then-Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow to produce an estimate of the Army’s consolidated requirements to achieve the military strategy espoused in Rainbow Five. Marshall’s explicit guidance led Gerow to frame the estimate within a clearly defined strategy, and to cast the requirements as a “base of departure” for the expansion of industrial production. In effect, Marshall’s guidance represented an early effort to match industrial capacity with the approved military strategy.52

Under the direction of Donald M. Nelson, the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB), charged with overall responsibility for economic mobilization, pursued an industrial production program that paralleled the military effort. Among of a group of the president’s New Deal economists and private industrialists, Nelson and Stacy May initiated a wartime industrial

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52 Watson, 333, 335-36; Smith, 135; Pogue, 140. Burns forwarded Patterson’s memorandum to Marshall a mere eleven days after Patterson provided it to Stimson. Interestingly, Burns also played a critical role in prompting Patterson’s original memorandum, and it seems as though his early and enduring role in the American industrial production saga has gone largely unheralded.
production estimate rooted in hard economic science. The process of estimating US industrial capacity was relatively immature compared to Great Britain’s lengthy wartime experience. Therefore, Nelson and May recognized the prudence of collaboration with their potential allies. Beginning in June 1941, May met with his colleagues in London to compile the total industrial and raw material potentials of both the United States and Great Britain. The two countries, along with Canada, produced a statement of combined industrial potential based on available material resources, later known as the Anglo-American Consolidated Statement. May’s report exposed American policymakers and industrialists to the challenge of simultaneously expanding the production of both raw materials and manufactured goods, an endeavor that would forever revolutionize the American economy. However, May’s seminal report was not delivered until December 4, 1941, almost three months after the military presented the Victory Plan.53

In July, President Roosevelt intervened to move military and industrial experts towards the discourse necessary to enable a full-scale economic mobilization for war. On July 9, 1941, Roosevelt issued a letter to Stimson and Knox, effectively ordering a study of arms requirements necessary for the defeat of America’s potential enemies, and giving birth to The Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements, later known as the Victory Program. Specifically, he directed a review of the strategic assumptions laid out in Rainbow Five, an estimate of production necessary to meet the strategic objectives, and a recommendation for distribution of industrial output among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. With respect to the initial service-specific estimates from the Army Ground Forces (AGF), the Army Air Forces (AAF), the Maritime Commission, and the Navy, the Victory Program was

53 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 181-82; Jeffery M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991), 38, 43; Carew, 189; Edelstein, 49, 57; Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production (New York: Da Capo Press, 1973), 132, 137; Lacey, Keep From All Thoughtful Men, 31, 67. Stacy May was the chief of the Bureau of Research and Statistics (BRS) of OPM. Another economist named Robert Nathan worked for May as the chief of Military and Civilian Requirements branch of BRS.
arguably nothing more than a feasibility analysis of American capacity to execute the strategy proposed in Rainbow Five.\textsuperscript{54}

In keeping with his arsenal of democracy policy, Roosevelt’s expectation was a determination of required American industrial output followed by an integrated national industrial program. It was widely understood that the President expected his military experts and civilian economists to produce general estimates that would serve as a starting point for an ongoing discussion about wartime munitions production. Roosevelt intended for the Victory Program to force military-industrial discourse, rather than serve as the final word on manpower and industrial production requirements.\textsuperscript{55}

The term “Victory Program” loosely described the initial estimates due to the President in September 1941, sometimes referred to as the Victory Plan, as well as the series of revisions based on continuing military-industrial dialogue that continued into 1943. As expected, the Army portion of Roosevelt’s survey fell to Marshall, who simply expanded the scope of the ongoing WPD strategic estimate begun in May of that year to include the President’s request.\textsuperscript{56} Gerow and his WPD planners rejected Roosevelt’s implication that an all-out production program alone could win the war, and instead insisted on a sound strategic concept first.\textsuperscript{57} For Gerow’s few

\textsuperscript{54} President Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Letter from the President to the Secretary of War,” July 9, 1941, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494; Maury Klein, \textit{A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for World War II} (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 272; Watson, 340. President Roosevelt’s instruction to use Rainbow Five as the basis for estimating requirements, referenced by Watson, lends credence to Klein’s assertion that the Victory Plan was a feasibility estimate.


\textsuperscript{56} Smith, 137; Kirkpatrick, 50-51.

WPD planners, implicit in the President’s request was an estimate of the type and scale of operations inherent in the military strategy, as well as the size and composition of ground forces needed to execute those operations. In need of an action officer to orchestrate the strategic review, estimate the forces required, and carry the Victory Program through to completion, Gerow selected Major Albert Wedemeyer.  

The Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of the Army Ground Forces  

Assigned to WPD on April 26, 1941, Wedemeyer had served barely one month in his current duty position when Gerow assigned him to Marshall’s strategic estimate, and less than three months when Roosevelt expanded the scope of the estimate to include industrial production requirements. In the strategic context of Plan Dog and Rainbow Five, Wedemeyer’s expertise in German tactics and operations, demonstrated in his 1938 Kriegsakademie report, certainly contributed to his selection for such a high-profile task as the Victory Program.

In framing the environment for his young action officer, Gerow delineated Roosevelt’s potential enemies as Germany first, followed by Italy and Japan. From there, Kirkpatrick

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59 Kirkpatrick, 35, 55-57; McLaughlin, 26; German General Staff School, 1938, 80-138.

60 Brigadier General L.T. Gerow, “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Subject: Ultimate Production Requirements,” July 14, 1941, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494-1. By March 1941, Roosevelt, through his strategic communication regarding German and Japanese aggression, had clearly designated the potential enemies in priority. Gerow, in his initial correspondence to G-2 regarding the Victory Program, stated precisely which enemies his planners should consider.
portrays Wedemeyer and his team as they set out to describe the national objective, strategy, and military operations, and to produce an estimate of the manpower and munitions requirements to defeat those enemies. Ultimately, Wedemeyer provided not only an assessment of the total number of troops necessary, but also a broad operational approach that embodied the existing strategic context from Plan Dog and Rainbow Five, and a new army organization, evocative of embryonic concepts of mechanization and combined arms maneuver. However, when considered in the context of Interwar Period American strategy, it is apparent that Wedemeyer’s approach was merely an extension of previous plans, and that it benefited enormously from the assistance of a team of planners. Most disastrously, virtually no evidence exists to substantiate the scientific rigor of Wedemeyer’s process, leaving his and other historians’ claims susceptible to doubt.61

Wedemeyer’s role in preparing the response to the Presidential request is uncontroversial, and enjoys support from Lacey, as well as Watson and Kirkpatrick.62 As the WPD action officer for the Victory Program, Wedemeyer had two key responsibilities. First, Marshall and Gerow empowered him to supervise the development of a strategic concept of operations by consolidating contributions from various military and civilian offices. In this respect, Wedemeyer’s role was comparable to a modern operational planning team leader. Armed with the authority of the president, he experienced little in the way of institutional resistance; however, information security proved challenging.63

Second, he was to prepare an estimate of the ultimate size of the ground forces necessary to defeat America’s potential enemies, hence the title, “The Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of the Army Ground Forces.” The scope of the estimate ensured that it would have

62 Watson, 337; Kirkpatrick, 57; Lacey, Keep From All Thoughtful Men, 9.
63 Cline, 61, Watson, 340; Kirkpatrick, 1; Wedemeyer, 15. The details of the Victory Program were leaked to Chicago Tribune reporter and published on December 5, 1941. The source of the leak remains unknown; at the time, speculation placed Wedemeyer himself under suspicion, though he was later cleared of any wrongdoing.
broad and lasting impacts on the industrial mobilization process. On this task, Lacey takes irredeemable issue with the predominant historical narrative. Lacey refuted the long-standing assertion that Wedemeyer’s methods were deliberate and logical. Furthermore, Lacey contended that Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate was neither boldly original, nor useful. Lacey argued that SPAB economists regarded Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate in the original Victory Plan as insufficient and arbitrary, and that the appraisal of requirements only became realistic after Stacy May meticulously converted it into industry-by-industry estimates.64

A Strategic Concept of Operations

The competing historical narratives cast Wedemeyer’s strategic concept as either the work of unparalleled genius, per Watson, Kirkpatrick, and McLaughlin, or, as Lacey argued, the product of deliberate, determined staff work, the acclaim for which historians have clumsily attributed to Wedemeyer.65 The official historical narrative, beginning with Watson and extending through Kirkpatrick and McLaughlin, holds that Wedemeyer’s estimate was a first-of-its-kind foray into the mobilization and deployment of a truly massive US Army. Watson and Kirkpatrick describe Wedemeyer as an audacious and talented officer faced with the daunting task of estimating the size and composition of forces needed to execute an unapproved military strategy against an undeclared foe in an uncertain theater. As such, Wedemeyer’s method of inquiry was exalted as both inspired and worthy of replication.66

Watson and Kirkpatrick wrote that Wedemeyer derived an original national strategy, including the type of victory required and the type of peace desired, from notional US national

64 Lacey, “World War II’s Real Victory Program,” 821; Lacey, Keep From All Thoughtful Men, 23, 63, 88; Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 99, 119; Gropman, 45. May’s office, the Bureau of Research and Statistics, delivered the completed report in December 1941, just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

65 Kirkpatrick, 2; Lacey, “Historical Truth and Tilting at Windmills,” 267.

66 Matloff and Snell, 59; Watson, 337-42; Kirkpatrick, 60-61.
policy objectives. He then extrapolated the military strategy and types of operations from those objectives. Finally, he derived basic assumptions about recruiting, equipping, and training a ground force to execute those military operations. By deconstructing the problem in this way, Wedemeyer could estimate the size and composition of forces necessary to defeat Germany. Far from a novel approach, however, Wedemeyer’s analysis mirrored the ubiquitous WPD method described by Gerow and universally employed by WPD planners.67

Although the American strategy was evident in Rainbow Five, Wedemeyer was left to infer what victory looked like, and what that would require. According to Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, Wedemeyer and his peers, in keeping with the tenets of Plan Dog and Rainbow Five, presumed that the total military defeat of Germany, the strongest of the Axis powers, would be the initial and overarching strategic objective. Like many of his colleagues, Wedemeyer was well versed in Clausewitz and assumed that the total defeat of Germany entailed breaking the German will. A strategic objective of such magnitude required America and her potential allies to indisputably defeat the German army via offensive operations on land.68 Although evident in the strategic context of Plan Dog and ABC-1, this logical but ambitious assumption had not yet generated contemplation of detailed military requirements. Wedemeyer’s strategic approach outlined in the Ultimate Requirements Study made it the first American strategic document to clearly envisage the use of a large ground force on the European continent to overthrow the Nazi

67 Wedemeyer, 63; Kirkpatrick, 61; Leighton and Coakley, 129; Gole, 131. Many of the WPD planners were schooled in just such an approach during planning exercises at the AWC. The existence of such a method implies that Wedemeyer, instead of devising a novel approach to problem solving, benefited from standard practices and institutional expertise.

regime by force of arms. However, both the strategy and the broad operational approach clearly predated Wedemeyer’s arrival at WPD.\textsuperscript{69}

In his account of the Victory Plan’s development, Kirkpatrick resolutely stated that the scope of the estimate far exceeded the natural capabilities of a single man. Wedemeyer, under the astute guidance and supervision of Colonel Thomas Handy, and with the editorial counsel of a board of similarly talented officers, toiled against time and uncertainty to produce an estimate of the number and type of forces required to achieve the military end state.\textsuperscript{70}

Colonel Truman Smith, representing the intelligence section, provided provocative, although intimidating, estimates of German military capabilities. Most distressing among these was the potential for the German army to defeat the Soviets, consolidate the European heartland, and accumulate upwards of four hundred combat divisions by July 1943. Meanwhile, responsibility for equipment and munitions requirements fell to Colonel Henry S. Aurand of the sustainment section, who characterized the current state of American military readiness as desperate, and projected mid-1943 as the earliest possible date that sufficient equipment and manpower would be available to launch offensive operations against Germany.\textsuperscript{71} The confluence of the intelligence and sustainment estimates led Wedemeyer to set a target of July 1943 for an invasion of Europe. Armed with a date, and fearful of an impending Soviet defeat at the hands of the burgeoning German empire, the WPD team proffered a phased approach that, similar to both Plan Dog and Rainbow Five, prioritized the continued resistance of both the United Kingdom (UK) and the Soviet Union (USSR), while America built up industrial production capacity.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{69} Groteleuschen, 22; Morton, 44. Watson, 354. Although both ABC-1 and Rainbow Five envisioned eventual ground combat in the Atlantic theater, neither articulated a precise operational approach including locations and forces.

\textsuperscript{70} Kirkpatrick, 57-58.

\textsuperscript{71} Kirkpatrick, 64, 72, 80; Watson, 340; Lacey, \textit{Keep From All Thoughtful Men}, 24; Joel R. Davidson, “Personnel, Politics, and Planning” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1992), 10.

\textsuperscript{72} Kirkpatrick, 72; Ross, \textit{U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945}, 104 “Ultimate Requirements Study:
Following the continued political and military viability of the British and Soviet regimes, the next logical step was the eastward movement of men and equipment along sea lines of communication from America to forward staging bases near Europe. From these bases, AAF would execute a strategic bombing campaign, and AGF would conduct combat operations on the periphery of contested territory. Hearkening back to Plan Dog and Rainbow Five, the intended effect was to restrict the operational reach of the German army by both interdicting German industrial production and forcing the dispersal of German forces to contend with multiple American and Allied challenges, culminating with a full-scale invasion of Europe in the summer of 1943. While the Anglo-American invasion of Europe took place essentially as envisioned in this concept, it took the Americans one year longer than hoped, with the build-up of American ground and air forces in England ultimately leading to the invasion of Europe, known as Operation Overlord, on June 6, 1944. Although Wedemeyer’s conceptual approach proved largely accurate, it was Stacey May and the other civilians who contributed to the feasibility analysis in late 1942 that brought attention to the impending manpower crisis and the infeasibility of a 1943 invasion.73

Likely exceeding his limited mandate, Wedemeyer, in his plan, offered a radical new organization for the task forces that would execute ground combat operations in Europe. Perhaps

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in homage to his Kriegsakademie experience, he opted for a heavy reliance on smaller armored divisions with increased firepower. He envisioned a mechanized force organized around interchangeable standard units, replete with critical enablers including antitank, antiaircraft, and mobile logistics capabilities. Never forgetting his foes, Wedemeyer’s task forces mimicked the Germans’ best qualities, while retaining the distinctly American tradition of concentrating power early for a decisive blow against the heart of the enemy. Despite Wedemeyer’s unique German insight, the trend toward mechanization and combined arms teams of air and armor was already well established in the US Army by 1941.74

Although Wedemeyer’s strategic approach was debatably an original extension of the prevailing strategic context, it most definitely was not novel. Neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow Five proffered plans for a European land offensive, however, both suggested a build-up of forces in the Atlantic theater for an inevitable showdown with the German army. In his July letter, President Roosevelt provided the military with definite, albeit limited, strategic guidance demanding the defeat of the Axis powers, and subsequently Gerow clearly named the enemies against which Wedemeyer should plan. Wedemeyer’s method of inquiry, much ballyhooed by Watson and Kirkpatrick, deviated little from Gerow’s explicit instructions, which were clearly articulated to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy in August. Furthermore, a veritable corps of AWC graduates studied and wargamed strikingly similar scenarios in 1936 and again in 1940, some of whom later found themselves engaged in strategic planning at WPD. Finally, the armored emphasis that distinguished Wedemeyer’s strategic concept represented little more than the culmination of two decades of professional dialogue about the utility and employment of

74 Kirkpatrick, 81, 86, 88-89; Watson, 345; Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, 6, 8. Wedemeyer’s concept of interchangeable standard units comes from the German “einheit” principle.
mechanized forces. It appears that the relevance of Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate was limited to an articulation of emerging strategy, which encompassed trends in military operational thinking.75

The Manpower Estimate

Having pinned down the strategic objective, the military strategy, and the type of forces needed to secure the victory, Wedemeyer’s plan had a single critical question remaining. He still lacked a basis for determining how many men and, consequently, the number of divisions necessary to execute the strategy and win the war. Wedemeyer, by his own account, used a standard two-to-one ratio of attacking to defending units, and assessed that the defeat of four hundred German divisions would require approximately eight hundred Allied divisions, of which, roughly two hundred would be American. In keeping with the President’s arsenal policy, equipping the nearly eight hundred Allied divisions called for the complete mobilization of American industry in support of the war effort, as anything less would be tantamount to dereliction. To allocate too little manpower doomed the strategy to certain failure, but to allocate too much threatened the sustainability of the national industrial economy. 76

To estimate the size of the ground forces, Wedemeyer set out to determine the total amount of manpower available to the military. Seemingly controverting his previous adherence to WPD methods, at this point Wedemeyer inexplicably departed from those expedients. The long-accepted official history describes a process of meticulous research and personal visits to the Library of Congress in search of historical precedents, as well as the enlistment of the Bureau of the Census and Princeton University Demographics Center for expert advice. Eventually,

75 Heinrichs, 105; Watson, 342; Weigley, 316; Wedemeyer, 9-10. Gole, 48-55, 66, 107; Calhoun, 182-87. In his autobiography, Wedemeyer conceded that the strategic concept of the Victory Plan derived from Plan Dog.

Wedemeyer determined that ten percent of the national population could be apportioned to the military without endangering the economy. However, evidence indicates that Wedemeyer’s method was more arbitrary than scientific.\textsuperscript{77}

While both Watson and Kirkpatrick describe an intellectually rigorous process leading Wedemeyer to a factor of ten percent, other historians, including Lacey and Mark Calhoun, have unsuccessfully attempted to corroborate these claims. Virtually no evidence exists to substantiate Wedemeyer’s recollection of how he arrived at the ten percent factor.\textsuperscript{78} In fact, the official history of the manpower estimate, from Watson to Kirkpatrick, rests entirely on Wedemeyer’s own first-hand accounts.\textsuperscript{79} Lacey emphatically hammers this point in his counter-narrative. Economic historian Michael Edelstein noted the lack of evidence produced by either Wedemeyer or the historians. Furthermore, he revealed that the prominent, and conspicuously available, BRS economist Robert Nathan, whom Edelstein interviewed during his research, recalled no consultations with Wedemeyer ever. Edelstein postulated that perhaps the ten percent factor was nothing more than conventional wisdom among Wedemeyer and his peers.\textsuperscript{80}

Therefore, rather than the product of disciplined inquiry, it seems just as likely that Wedemeyer and his WPD colleagues arrived at ten percent arbitrarily, and settled on it out of a lack of firm numbers elsewhere. The possibility that the ten percent factor represented little more than a guess undermines Wedemeyer’s claims and later praise for his methodical approach. If

\textsuperscript{77} Kirkpatrick, 78-79; Mead, 307; Edelstein, 55. Kirkpatrick claimed that Wedemeyer requested the assistance of Princeton University Demographics Center to ascertain the minimum manpower requirement to sustain the national economy. However, Lacey questions this claim on the grounds of lack of evidence.

\textsuperscript{78} Lacey, \textit{Keep From All Thoughtful Men}, 10; Mark Calhoun, e-mail message to the author, February 24, 2017.

\textsuperscript{79} Kirkpatrick, vii, 78n48; Watson, 340n33, 342n41.

\textsuperscript{80} Edelstein, 55n11, 56n12.
arbitrary, then virtually anyone, especially his talented WPD peers, could have arrived at the final number just as easily as Wedemeyer did.81

Regardless of the procedure used to arrive at ten percent, this figure enabled Wedemeyer to continue planning. From this, he could describe his envisioned force in tangible numbers of men and divisions. Applied against the American population in 1941, ten percent revealed that approximately fourteen million men would be available to the military. Next, Wedemeyer apportioned the number of men required by the Navy and the AAF, which left him with eight and a half million men available for the AGF. After distributing forces for the defense of the Western hemisphere in accordance with Rainbow Five, Wedemeyer had five and a half million men remaining to fill out the task forces and strategic reserves for the offensive against Germany.82

To determine how this gross number of men equated to divisions, Wedemeyer reverted to considering his potential enemies. According to Kirkpatrick, Wedemeyer used a two-to-one ratio of attacking forces to defending forces, and ultimately settled on two hundred and fifteen divisions organized in five field armies. His estimate called for sixty-one armored divisions, sixty-one motorized divisions, fifty-four triangular infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions, ten mountain divisions, and seven airborne divisions. The preponderance of armored divisions, nearly thirty percent of the total number, revealed Wedemeyer’s advocacy for mechanized forces and armored tactics. It is unclear if his armored emphasis was the direct result of his Kriegsakademie experience, or more representative of a general trend in the US Army. Regardless, by the end of

81 Fairchild and Grossman, 46; Kirkpatrick, 78; Leighton and Coakley, 131-132. Kirkpatrick quotes Wedemeyer as saying, “I stuck my neck out,” and paraphrases him to imply that there was no opposition to his ten percent estimate. General Burns once supposed as much in an interview with Watson and implied that the original figure was only eight percent and wholly arbitrary. In later planning engagements such as the Arcadia and Casablanca conferences, the lack of a specific connection between troop estimates and strategy astonished WPD’s British counterparts.

82 Kirkpatrick, 78-79; Eiler, “The Man Who Planned Victory;” Pogue, 159-60.
World War II, the Army had notably fielded only sixteen armored divisions and no mechanized divisions, far fewer than Wedemeyer’s prediction.\textsuperscript{83}

Wedemeyer’s manpower estimate proved to be strikingly close to the actual total fielded forces at the peak of the war effort. The Victory Program called for 8,795,658 men, while the total Army strength on May 31, 1945 was 8,291,336 men, at which time ninety-six percent of all US Army combat troops were deployed overseas, with none remaining for the strategic reserve. However, the short list of similarities between Wedemeyer’s estimate and the actual fielded forces ends there. The US Army never fielded the number and type of divisions Wedemeyer foresaw; ultimately topping out at only ninety-eight—mostly infantry—divisions. The qualitative weight of the differences between Wedemeyer’s estimate and the actual fielded forces implies that Wedemeyer’s prescient estimation was more coincidence than foresight.\textsuperscript{84}

As the war progressed and conditions changed, several of Wedemeyer’s assumptions proved invalid, thereby undermining the accuracy of his estimates and their continuing relevance for military strategy. For instance, the standard planning factor used by WPD to estimate the number of combat troops to service troops transferred poorly from the paradigmatic triangular infantry division to the armored divisions proposed in the strategic concept. Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate assumed the defeat of the USSR at the hands of the Nazis, but Soviets success on the Eastern front significantly lessened combat requirements on the Western Front when the Anglo-American Allies finally invaded the Normandy beaches. Absent the Soviets’ surprising operational success, America certainly would have needed a total mobilization of the national economy to achieve the desired victory. Furthermore, the Allies unexpectedly achieved air

\textsuperscript{83}Kirkpatrick, 95-96, 98; Mead, 318; Keegan, 32; Schifferle, 54-55; Calhoun, 234; Gropman, 42.

\textsuperscript{84}Keegan, 32, Watson, 344; Edelstein, 56; Kirkpatrick, 112; Leighton and Coakley, 131.
superiority in Europe, a condition that cancelled the need for many of Wedemeyer’s specialized antiaircraft and antitank enabling units.\textsuperscript{85}

The End is the Beginning

Wedemeyer’s estimate of ground forces was a bold step in the strategic context established by ABC-1 and Rainbow Five, and it represented an audacious statement about the past and future organization of the US Army. By August 23, 1941, a mere forty-five days after President Roosevelt initiated the Victory Program, the Army staff principals had approved the strategic concept. On September 11, WPD presented the completed estimate to a secret meeting of the Joint Board. By September 25, Wedemeyer’s estimate had evolved into the Strategic Concept of Operations, representing the Army’s holistic military strategy for defeating the Axis powers, in contrast to Roosevelt’s arsenal of democracy policy.\textsuperscript{86}

While the military estimate matriculated through the summer and fall of 1941, SPAB economists Stacy May and Robert Nathan engaged in their own study of industrial potential, as well as production requirements. In June 1941, May traveled to London for two months to produce a consolidated balance sheet of potential Allied industrial production. Shortly after the presentation of the military estimate in September, the Victory Plan circulated to Nathan and May, who analyzed the plan’s economics and reported to Nelson. While they generally regarded the Victory Program as feasible, they noted that it would only be seventy-five percent complete by September 1943, effectively ruling out a 1943 invasion of Europe. May delivered his completed report, the Anglo-American Consolidated Statement, on December 4, 1941. It included a comprehensive estimate of domestic and foreign demand for military materiel, as well as

\textsuperscript{85} Calhoun, 261, 319; Watson, 344; Kennedy, 631; Edelstein, 83.

\textsuperscript{86} Kirkpatrick, 101; Smith, 137; Watson, 352-54; Leighton and Coakley, 132. According to Watson, Wedemeyer participated in a joint Army and Navy conference regarding the Victory Program’s strategic concept from September 16 to 17, 1941.
detailed, industry-by-industry estimates based on the military’s proposed requirements. May’s report represented a tipping point in the mobilization of American industry for World War II.  

The Japanese surprise attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 represented a significant reframing moment for American strategy. The ensuing declaration of war provided a much-needed catalyst for mobilization. Just days after Pearl Harbor, SPAB economists approached the War Department with a request for the Victory Program’s monthly production rates through June 1942. The subsequent revision of the Victory Program’s manpower estimate bore little resemblance to Wedemeyer’s original prediction. The imminent threat caused WPD to reconsider the number of divisions and the amount of personnel needed in 1942, 1943, and 1944, ultimately reducing their near-term estimates for the sake of feasibility.  

On January 6, 1942, President Roosevelt unveiled his ‘must items’, including sixty thousand airplanes and forty-five thousand tanks in 1942 and another one hundred and twenty-five thousand airplanes and seventy-five thousand tanks in 1943. Interestingly, it was the President’s ‘must items’ program, and not the Victory Program, that contributed to the feasibility dispute in 1942. Also in early January 1942, the War Munitions Program under the War

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88 Ohl, 56; Edelstein, 59.  
89 Secretary of War Stimson, “Memorandum for Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Executive Director, SPAB, Subject: The Victory Program,” December 16, 1941, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494; Brigadier General Harry L. Twaddle, “Memorandum for the Commanding General, Field Forces, Subject: Tentative Planning Basis for Expansion of Army, 1942,” January 5, 1942, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Box 248, Folder 4494. This memorandum, with Wedemeyer’s initials handwritten on the bottom, indicates a significant downward revision of the projected number of divisions for 1942. Combined with Stacy May’s Anglo-American Consolidated Statement delivered in the first week of December 1941, it implies that the Victory Program estimates had rapidly become irrelevant and required extensive revision, as recommended by William Knudsen in February 1942.  
91 Edelstein, 60; Ohl, 56-57, 76-77.
Production Board (WPB) subsumed the Victory Program. The Victory Plan lived on through the continuing military-industrial dialogue of the Victory Program, and, as part of this effort, WPD updated the troop basis every six months for the duration of the war.

In June 1942, Colonel Handy selected Wedemeyer as his replacement for chief of WPD’s Strategy and Policy group. His new role placed him at the epicenter of Allied planning for World War II. He participated in nearly every meeting during the Casablanca, Trident, and Quadrant Conferences between January and December 1943. Wedemeyer was transferred from the War Department to Southeast Asia in October 1943. There he replaced General Joe Stilwell as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Allied Command, and effectively controlled all American forces under Allied command in the China-Burma-India theater. Wedemeyer continued his dedicated service to the nation for another decade, finally retiring in 1951 at the rank of Lieutenant General.

At the time of its inception, the Victory Program represented a first step towards maximizing industrial production in support of a potential war. By the spring of 1942, the Victory Program had fulfilled its purpose as the starting point for wartime calculation of munitions production, and the ongoing Victory Program continued to serve as a valuable channel for civil-military dialogue.

92 Major General R.C. Moore, “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, Subject: Former Victory Program,” January 7, 1942, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, Box 247, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494-32.
93 Watson, 360; Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 188, 195; Cline, 130; Gropman, 56.
95 Cline, 194; McLaughlin, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 10, 126-27, 201-3; Wedemeyer, 249, 290; Eiler, “An Uncommon Soldier;” Resume of Service Career of Albert Coady Wedemeyer, General, February 11, 1972, National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO, RG 319, Folder 2, Service Documents (July 1944 – February 1972) Wedemeyer postulated that his stubborn support of a cross-channel invasion had created among his British counterparts, and Prime Minister Churchill specifically, enough opposition to persuade Roosevelt to find a more politically amenable replacement. Wedemeyer was advanced to four-star General on the retired list on Aug 4, 1954.
96 Cline, 61, 279; Carew, 236; Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 187.
Conclusion

Findings

The 1941 Victory Plan served two purposes: first, as a strategic concept of operations it was a statement of the US military’s broad concept for winning World War II, and second, as a manpower estimate it initiated iterative discourse about the feasibility of simultaneously growing the US Army and mobilizing American industry. Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate paved the way for successive iterations of strategy including Operations Bolero and Overlord. However, the singular impact of Wedemeyer’s contribution to the American strategy for winning World War II is overstated. His strategic estimate was neither revolutionary, nor qualitatively peerless.

Although a first of its kind study, and widely accepted throughout the military, Wedemeyer’s operational approach was arguably nothing more than an extension of the existing strategic context, the foundational principles of which originated in Plan Dog and were codified in Rainbow Five. Significantly, American strategic leaders from the President, to the Chief of Staff of the Army, to the Chief of WPD, explicitly directed that Rainbow Five be used as the foundational strategy for the Victory Program.  

By his own admission, the strategic concept was a task too great for one man. Wedemeyer certainly benefited from the institutional knowledge cultivated by the Army during the Interwar Period. The IMPs of the 1930s, the AIC, and especially AWC with its creative, and, sometimes, realistic, planning scenarios served the Army well in laying a foundation for an incumbent military strategy and industrial mobilization planning before the outbreak of war. Furthermore, Wedemeyer’s bold approach to framing the problem and developing a strategic

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97 Watson, 337, 340-41; Brigadier General L.T. Gerow, “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Subject: Ultimate Production Requirements,” July 14, 1941, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494-1.
approach was more likely an artifact of American interwar military institutional knowledge, well known to Brigadier General Gerow and many of the WPD planners.

It seems clear that the primary purpose of the Victory Program, as President Roosevelt, intended, was to bring military, industrial, and economic experts together to critically analyze the feasibility of executing Rainbow Five in the context of his arsenal of democracy policy. The pressure of achieving the President’s audacious goals generated palpable institutional momentum throughout military and industrial circles during the winter and spring of 1941. The various memorandums circulating the halls of the Office of the Secretary of War, the War Department, and OPM codified the experts’ apprehension about all-out industrial mobilization, and embodied an institutional sense of urgency. In this respect, the Victory Plan was simply a “base of departure” or “benchmark” for continuing military-industrial dialogue, and, in this light, Wedemeyer’s manpower estimate was a necessary first step.98

The manpower estimate served admirably as an initial benchmark for future iterations of military-industrial dialogue, and it undoubtedly fed into the SPAB and BRS analyses of industrial mobilization preceding the 1942 feasibility dispute. Wedemeyer’s estimate paved the way for industrial mobilization under the ongoing Victory Program. However, the manpower estimate was initially of limited value, and required iterative reevaluation and revision to reach its full potential as a tool for mobilizing the nation. Furthermore, the range of historical evidence does not support Wedemeyer’s claims regarding the scientific rigor of his method. In fact, many sources indicate that his ten percent factor was wholly arbitrary, and any similarity between his 1941 estimate and the 1943 troop levels was merely coincidental.

98 Kennedy, 486; Watson, 335, Carew, 236.
Implications and Recommendations

Through their historical narrative of the Victory Program, Watson and Kirkpatrick canonized Wedemeyer. Veritable cult followings emerged among students of military history, which elevated Wedemeyer and his manpower estimate as icons of professional staff work. Perhaps a more thorough study of the man and his plan is in order, before bestowing such adulation upon him.

Lacey’s criticism of Wedemeyer’s influence on the official history is justified. Watson and Kirkpatrick, by relying on personal interviews with Wedemeyer to fill the gaps in their narrative, left their methods open to criticism. Both Watson and Kirkpatrick should have taken care to balance their praise for Wedemeyer with professional skepticism. McLaughlin’s biography of Wedemeyer and his brief foray into the Victory Program debate does little to address Lacey’s pointed criticism.

Regardless, Lacey’s contention that May’s Anglo-American Consolidated Statement represented the single most critical cog in the Victory Program is unsupported by the range of historical accounts. The iterative and discursive nature of the Victory Program implies that no seminal document, nor single man was more important than the ongoing military-industrial dialogue about mobilization. Accordingly, neither Wedemeyer nor Stacy May were individually essential to the Victory Program. Even the off chance that the December consolidated statement incorporated Nathan’s analysis of Wedemeyer’s initial September estimates leaves open the possibility that Wedemeyer’s work influenced May, and demands that Lacey temper his criticism.

The realized strategy for the force build-up and invasion of Europe emerged throughout the Allied discourse from Casablanca to Trident and Quadrant. If the ultimate Allied strategy for defeating Germany did not emerge until the Trident Conference in May 1943, as Lacey insists, then it follows that Wedemeyer’s strategic estimate represented the initiation of military-industrial negotiations. Perhaps the discursive and emergent nature of Allied strategy shrouds the
impact of the Victory Plan in obscurity.\footnote{Lacey, *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*, 16.} Additional research may be able to confirm or deny the tenuous connection established in this monograph between Wedemeyer’s strategic concept, eventually adopted by the War Department, and the concrete plans for Operations Bolero and Overlord.
Appendix

Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of Army Ground Forces\textsuperscript{100}

1. The specific operations necessary to accomplish the defeat of the Axis Powers cannot be predicted at this time. Irrespective of the nature and scope of these operations, we must prepared to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat. Such requirement establishes the necessity for powerful ground elements, flexibly organized into task forces which are equipped and trained to do their respective jobs. The Germans and their associates with between 11 and 12 million men under arms, now have approximately 300 divisions fully equipped and splendidly trained. It is estimated that they can have by 1943, a total of 400 divisions available in the European Theater.

2. The important influence of the air arm in modern combat has been irrefutably established. The degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theater will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed. The necessity for a strong sea force, consisting principally of fast cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, torpedo boats, and submarines, continues in spite of the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Employment of enemy air units has not yet deprived naval vessels of their vital role on the high seas, but has greatly accelerated methods and changed the technique in their employment. It appears that the success of naval operations, assuming air support, will still be determined by sound strategic concepts and adroit leadership. A sea blockade will not accomplish an economic strangulation or military defeat of Germany. Nor will air operations alone bring victory. Air and sea forces will make important contributions but effective

\textsuperscript{100} War Plans Division, “Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of Army Ground Forces,” September 1941, NARA II, College Park, MD, RG 165, NM-84, Entry 422, WPD General Correspondence, Folder 4494-21.
and adequate ground forces must be available to close with and destroy the enemy with his citadel.

3. It is therefore important that we create the productive capacity to provide equipment for the following:
   a. Appropriate forces distributed for the defense of the United States, outlying possessions, and bases selected to facilitate the defense of the country and the Western Hemisphere.
   b. Task Forces which can effectively conduct military operations, primarily in the European Theater, as well as in the Western Hemisphere and in other strategically important areas.
   c. The military forces of associates and friendly powers committed to the policy of opposing Nazi aggression. Quantities to be limited only by our own strategic requirements and the ability of the friendly powers to use the equipment effectively.

4. A sound approach to the problem of determining appropriate military means requires careful consideration of WHERE, HOW, and WHEN, they will be employed to defeat our potential enemies and to assist our associates.
   a. WHERE. Accepting the premise, that we must come to grips with the enemy ground forces, our principal theater of war is Central Europe. Possible subsidiary theaters include Africa, the Near East, the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula, and the Far East; however, the operations in those theaters must be so conducted as to facilitate the decisive employment of Allied forces in Central Europe.
   b. HOW. The combined and carefully coordinated operations of our military forces, in collaboration with associated powers, must accomplish the following:
      (1) The surface and subsurface vessels of the Axis and associated powers must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic and war areas contiguous to Europe.
(2) Overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished.

(3) The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, ports, and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials.

(4) The combat effectiveness of the German military forces must be greatly reduced by over-extension, dispersion, shortage of materiel, including fuel, and a deterioration of the home front. Popular support of the war effort, by the peoples of the Axis Powers must be weakened and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation, and the destruction wrought and chaos created.

(5) Existing military bases (the British Isles and the Near East) must be maintained. Additional bases, which encircle and close in on the Nazi citadel, must be established in order to facilitate air operations designed to shatter the German industrial and economic life. Such bases may also provide feasible points of departure for the combined operations of ground and air forces. In disposing of our forces, we must guard against dispersions of means in operations that do not make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany.

(6) The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theater (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).

c. WHEN. The following factors with regard to the time element are important in determining the production capacity necessary to realize our national objectives:

(1) The lag between plan and execution is considerable. Past experience indicates that from eighteen months to two years are required.

(2) How many months will Germany require to defeat Russia, to reconstitute her forces subsequent to Russia’s defeat, and to exploit to any perceptible degree the
vast resources of Russia? It is believed that Germy will occupy Russian territory west of the
general line; White Sea, Moscow, Volga River, (all inclusive) by July 1, 1942, and that militarily,
Russia will be substantially impotent subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Germany will
“Coventry” all industrial areas, lines of communications, and sources of raw materials east of the
line indicated, unless a drastic Nazi treaty is accepted by Russia. Germany will probably require a
full year to bring order out of chaos in the conquered areas, so that it will be July 1, 1943, before
she will largely profit economically by her “drive to the east.” The maintenance of huge armies of
occupation has become unnecessary. By totally disarming the conquered people, maintain
splendidly organized intelligence, and communications nets, and employing strategically located,
highly mobile forces (parachute, air-borne, mechanized, and motorized), Germany may control
the occupied areas with relatively small forces, thus releasing the bulk of the military for other
tasks. Obviously, our war effort time-table, covering the production of munitions, the creation of
trained military forces, and the increase of transportation facilities (air, ground, and sea), is
strongly influenced by events transpiring in the Russian theater.

(3) We are confronted by two possibilities; first, a rapidly accelerated all-
out effort with a view to conducting decisive, offensive operations against the enemy before he
can liquidate or recoup from his struggle with Russia; second, a long drawn-out war of attrition.
Under our present production schedule, we will soon have adequate military means to defend our
outlying possessions and bases and to provide for the security of the Western Hemisphere, but we
will not be able to provide sufficient appropriate forces for timely offensive action in the principal
theater of operations. The urgency for positive action exists, particularly while the enemy is
contained militarily in Russia. It would strongly contribute to the early and decisive defeat of the
Axis Powers, if the Allied forces could seize and firmly establish military bases from which
immediate air and subsequent ground and air operations might be undertaken.
(4) The United States is approaching its task in a logical manner, but the production of materiel must be greatly accelerated to permit its accomplishment. At present, the bulk of our production has to be devoted to the support of Great Britain and associates, rendering it impracticable for us to undertake offensive commitments. But time is of the essence and the longer we delay effective offensive operations against the Axis, the more difficult will become the attainment of victory. It is mandatory that we reach an early appreciation of our stupendous task, and gain the whole-hearted support of the entire country in the production of trained men, ships, munitions, and ample reserves. Otherwise, we will be confronted in the not distant future by a Germany strongly entrenched economically, supported by newly acquired sources of vital supplies and industries, with her military forces operating on interior lines, and in a position of hegemony in Europe which will be comparatively easy to defend and maintain.

(5) The time by which production can reach the levels defined by our national objectives is highly speculative. July 1, 1943, has been establish as the earliest date on which the equipment necessary to initiate and sustain our projected operations can be provided. The ability of industry to meet the requirement is contingent upon many intangibles; however, the program can be definitely accomplished, in fact, greatly exceeded, if the industrial potential of the country is fully exploited. The urgency of speed and the desirability of employing our present great economic and industrial advantage over our potential enemies cannot be overemphasized.

5. **Strategic Employment of Ground Forces**

a. The future alignment of powers and their respective combat capacities cannot be accurately predicted. In order to arrive at a plausible basis from which to determine our future requirements, the following assumptions pertaining to the world situation as of July 1, 1943, are made:

(1) Russia is substantially impotent militarily in Europe. Resistance in Siberia, to include the maritime provinces, probably continuing.
(2) The Axis military strength is materially weakened through economic blockade; by losses in the Russian campaign; by British air and sea operations; by the inability to exploit quickly the extensively sabotaged Russian industries and raw materials; by lowered morale of the people.

(3) The military forces of Japan are fully involved with or contained by campaigns against a somewhat strengthened China, by the Russian forces in the Fare East maritime provinces, or by the threat of United States – British military and economic reprisals.

(4) Great Britain and associates have increased their fighting forces by creating and equipping additional combat units.

(5) The French will probably continue their passive collaboration with Germany.

(6) Control of the Mediterranean Theater, including North Africa and the Near East, remains disputed.

(7) The United States is an active belligerent and is collaborating in an all-out effort to defeat Germany.

b. If these assumptions are correct, or even reasonably sound, on July 1, 1943, there will be no military bases remaining in Allied hands, other than the United Kingdom, possibly the northern coast of Africa and the Near East. The establishment of additional bases, for example, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula, and Northwest Africa will be bitterly contested by the Axis. However, to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany, those bases and others even more difficult to establish, must be available to the Allies. Obviously, carefully planned action, involving appropriate sea, air, and ground units must be undertaken. Allied success is directly contingent upon the coordinated employment of overwhelming forces, surprise, and mobility, supported by sufficient reserves in materiel and man-power to insure a succession of effective impulses throughout the operations.
c. Latest information pertaining to the potential industrial capacities and military strengths of the opposing powers (excluding the US), as of July 1, 1943, indicates that the Axis Powers will have about 400 divisions available in the European-Near East Theater and the Allied Powers approximately 100 divisions. To accomplish the numerical superiority, about two to one, usually considered necessary before undertaking offensive operations, the Allies would have to raise about 700 divisions. A force of 700 divisions with appropriate supporting and service troops would approximate 22 million men. If Great Britain and the United States should induct so many men for military service, added to the tremendous numbers already under arms, the economic and industrial effort, necessary to conduct the war, should be definitely imperiled.

d. It is believed that the enemy can be defeated without creating the numerical superiority indicated. Effective employment of modern air and ground fighting machines and a tight economic blockade may create conditions that will make the realization of the Allied war aims perfectly feasible with numerically less fighting men. Another million men in Flanders would not have turned the tide of battle for France. If the French army had had sufficient tanks and planes, and quantities of antitank and antiaircraft materiel, France might have remained a dominant power in Europe. In June, 1941, when the Germans launched their invasion of Russia, they knew that their adversary was numerically superior and could maintain that superiority in spite of tremendous losses. The probably also knew that Stalin was creating a military force of great power, consisting primarily of effective modern fighting machines, and that if they delayed their “drive to the east” another year, Russia would possess armadas of air and ground machines which would not only render an offensive campaign impossible, but would make large demands upon the German military to secure her eastern frontier. The Crete campaign also presents illuminating evidence in favor of modern fighting means when opposed by superior numbers that re equipped with inappropriate means and are operating under World War I static tactical
concepts. Approximately 17,000 Germans attacked and conquered the island which was defended by about 30,000 British.

e. Our broad concept, of encircling and advancing step-by-step, with a view to closing-in on Germany, will remain sound regardless of future developments in the European situation, for it envisages the only practical way in which military and economic pressure may be brought to bear effectively against Germany. The loss of potential bases of operation, presently available, would render the accomplishment of our strategic plans extremely difficult and costly. It is important, therefore, that the Allies take effective measure to hold the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and North African areas. Also the islands off the northwestern coast of Africa should be denied to the enemy. Before undertaking operations in connection with the establishment of additional military bases, for example, in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, Africa, and the Low Countries, a careful survey of the areas of projected operations and a thorough examination of the enemy capabilities are mandatory. The unfortunate Norway campaign of 1940 is a glaring example of a total lack of appreciation of such realities on the part of those responsible for the British expedition. The Germans employed approximately 175,000 men, strongly supported by the Air Force, to conquer and secure their lodgment in Norway. Special Task Forces, including two mountain division and numerous parachute units made effective contributions to the success of the operation. Having gained a foothold, the Germans quickly established themselves in order to hold their bases and to facilitate exploitation. The British Forces dispatched against Norway totaled about 24,000 men, with no mountain troops and with inadequate air supporting units. The failure of the British Expedition is directly attributed to insufficient and inappropriate means. If and when the situation indicates the feasibility of an Allied expedition against Norway for example, powerful and appropriate means, especially trained and equipped for the task, must be provided. Large and effective reserves must be readily available to preclude dislodgment of the initial forces and to facilitate subsequent
exploitation. A careful study of Norway, including the terrain and communications net, and a survey of possible enemy capabilities, indicates the necessity for mountain, infantry foot, and motorized divisions, numerous parachute, tank, antitank, antiaircraft, and airborne units. The force required for the entire operation may total several hundred thousand men. The execution of the plan would be predicated on sea and local air superiority. The size of this force may appear large. However, even though our enemy may not be strong initially in the area of projected operations, the mobility of modern fighting means will enable him to concentrate destructive forces against us with unprecedented speed and surprise effect. The foregoing considerations apply with equal emphasis to pro-posed forces for other theaters of operations. Careful studies, concerning the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, the Near East and Africa, have been made by the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and these studies made important contributions in the determination of the estimated Ground Forces (See Tab A). The enemy capabilities in those theaters in 1943 would obviously be conjecture. Task Forces consisting principally of armored and motorized divisions, must be created for possible operations in North Africa, the Middle East, France and the Low Countries. The exact strength and composition of the Task Forces, necessary to seize and maintain military bases, will be determined immediately prior to the operation. We can avoid the unfortunate disasters experienced by our potential allies in Norway, France, the Balkans and in Crete by planning now and creating quickly the production capacity necessary to equip the ground forces recommended (Tab A). We must not suffer ignominious defeat and be expelled from the bases that we elect to establish. If the premises and assumptions made earlier in this study are appropriate and sound, additional strategically located bases are vital to the splendidly conceived plans of the Air Force and finally may serve as areas of departure for the combined operations of air and ground forces. The seizure, retention, and effective utilization of these bases is predicated on the successful operations of adequate sea, air and ground forces.
5. Shipping was a bottleneck in the last war and again increased demands will be placed on all transportation facilities, particularly water, by constant troop movements and the expanded war industrial and economic effort. In order to transport and maintain effective forces in European areas, several million tons of shipping and adequate port facilities must be made available essentially for military service. To transport five million men with their modern air and mechanized equipment to European ports over a period of approximately one year would require about seven million tons of shipping or 1,000 ships. To maintain such a force in the theater of operations would require about ten million tons of shipping or 1,500 ships. But it is highly improbable that the situation in Europe will develop in such a manner as to permit or to require operations involving the movement of so large a force across the Atlantic within the limited time of one year, even if the ship tonnage were available. The progressive building-up of large military forces in the theater will probably extend over a period of at least two years. This progressive movement would greatly reduce the demands upon maritime shipping for essentially military purposes and further would extend the period of time for the augmentation of maritime shipping now available. The realization of our present national policies may require operations in distant theaters by military forces of unprecedented strength. It would be folly to create strong fighting forces without providing the transportation to move and maintain them in the contemplated theaters of operations. The maximum possible shipbuilding capacity of our country, coordinated of course with other essential demands upon industry and raw materials, must be exploited and continued in operation for the next several years.

6. The foregoing considerations clearly indicate the importance of creating a productive capacity in this country, that will provide the most modern equipment designed to give mobility and destructive power to our striking forces. The forces that we now estimate as necessary to realize our national objectives and for which production capacity must be provided, may not be adequate or appropriate. No one can predict the situation that will confront the United States in
July, 1943. We may require much larger forces than those indicated below, and correspondingly greater increased quantities of equipment. Emphasis has been placed on destructive power and mobility, with a view to offensive maneuvers in our principal theater of operations (Europe). The forces deemed necessary to accomplish the role of ground units in the supreme effort to defeat our potential enemies, total 5 Field Armies consisting of approximately 215 divisions (infantry, armored, motorized, airborne, mountain and cavalry) with appropriate supporting and service elements. The strategic concept outlined in this paper contemplates distribution of U.S. ground forces approximately as follows: (More specific data will be found in Tab A).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippine Islands</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller Outlying Bases</td>
<td>32,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential Task Forces</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>775,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Army</td>
<td>590,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Army</td>
<td>710,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia-Ecuador-Peru</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategic Reserves for which production capacity must be established but whose activation, location, and training will be determined by developments in the international situation. 3,000,000

Troops in the Zone of the Interior and Fixed Defense Units (Ground) 1,200,000

TOTAL GROUND FORCES 6,700,000
TAB A

The Ground Forces estimated as necessary to provide for the security of the U.S. outlying possessions, the Western Hemisphere and to make available appropriate forces for projected military operations follow:

1. Units organized, fully equipped and trained as soon as practicable:

a. Military Bases and Outlying Possessions.

Newfoundland  5,690
Greenland  2,531
Caribbean Bases  40,199
Puerto Rico  34,757
Panama  42,614
Hawaii  61,337
Philippines  25,397
Alaska  28,823
Iceland  28,709
Bases in British Isles  76,160
Total  346,217

b. Potential Task Forces

Brazil

1 Army Corps (1 Div. foot, 1 Div. Airborne)  42,392
2 Artillery Battalions Pack  1,804
1 Cavalry Regiment  1,591
5 Parachute Battalions  2,590
1 Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions  3,619
2 Aircraft Warming Regiments  2,600
2 Tank Battalions (Light)  1,086
3 Anti-Tank Battalions  2,100
Services  28,864
Total  86,646

Colombia-Ecuador-Peru

1 Division  15,245
2 Artillery Battalions  1,400
3 Parachute Battalions  1,554
1 Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions  3,619
2 Tank Battalions (Light)  1,086
1 Aircraft Warming Regiment  1,300
Services  13,035
Total  37,239
First Army

1 Army of 3 Corps of 3 Divs. ea. 242,216
2 Armored Corps of 2 Armd Div. ea. 53,556
8 Divisions (4 Mtzd, 2 Mtn, 2 Abn) 108,516
5 Parachute Bns. 2,590
13 Artillery Bns. (4 heavy, 6 (105mm), 375mm How Pk) 9,906
20 Antiaircraft Regts and 10 extra Bns. 37mm 46,970
11 Tank Battalions (3 Medium and 5 Light) 4,839
12 Aircraft Warning Regts 1,300
10 Tank Destroyer Bns; and 10 anti-tank Bn (Gun) 14,000
Services (Ord., QM, Sig., Engr., Med.) 278,069
Total 776,262

Third Army

1 Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions) 242,216
1 Armored Corps (2 Divisions) 26,778
2 Divisions Motorized 32,258
6 Artillery Battalions (Medium & Heavy) 4,300
1 Cavalry Corps and 2 H-Mecz Regiments 26,867
2 Airborne Divisions 20,000
5 Parachute Battalions 2,590
5 Antiaircraft Regiments and 3 Med. Bns. 12,166
3 Aircraft Warning Regiments 3,900
15 Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions 10,500
Services 207,860
Total 589,435

Fourth Army

1 Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions) 242,216
1 Armored Corps (2 Divisions) 25,394
4 Divisions, Motorized 64,516
8 Artillery Battalions (Med. or Heavy) 8,800
4 Divisions (2 Mountain, 2 Air-Borne) 44,000
2 Parachute Battalions 1,036
15 Antiaircraft Regiments & 10 Med. Bns. 37,345
8 Tank Battalions (Medium or Light) 4,839
6 Aircraft Warning Regiments 7,800
25 Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions 17,500
Services 256,413
Total 709,859

Total Task Forces 2,199,441
c. The troops considered necessary in the ground forces, i.e. organized, fully equipped and trained, for current and future employment as security forces in military bases and outlying possessions, and as striking forces in any theater, follows:

| Military Bases and Outlying Possessions | 346,217 |
| Potential Task Forces                   | 2,199,441 |
| **Total**                               | **2,545,658** |

2. Production capacity should be created to equip approximately 3 million for the reserve units indicated below. Activation, location and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.

a. Strategic Reserves.

- 2 Armies (10 Army Corps, 27 Divisions)
- 14 Armored Corps (53 Armored Divisions)
- 51 Divisions Motorized
- 115 Artillery Battalions (Pack Medium or Heavy)
- 9 Divisions (2 Cavalry, 6 Mountain, 3 Airborne)
- 22 Parachute Battalions
- 129 Anti-aircraft Regiments and 133 Medium Bns.
- 86 Tank Battalions (70 Medium, 6 Light, 10 Heavy)
- 29 Aircraft Warning Regiments
- 290 Tank Destroyer Battalions
- 262 Anti-Tank Battalions (Gun)

Total – approximately 3,000,000

3. Ground troops required for the Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense Units 1,200,000

4. Recapitulation of Ground Forces

| Military Bases and Outlying Possessions | 346,217 |
| Potential Task Forces                   | 2,199,441 |
| Zone of Interior – Fixed Defenses       | 1,200,000 |
| **Total**                               | **3,745,658** |

Units in reserve to be activated when situation requires 3,000,000

Total Army Ground Forces 6,745,658

5. Air Force requirements (details submitted in a separate study)

<p>| Air Force Combat                      | 1,100,000 |
| Zone of Interior Service Units        | 950,000   |
| <strong>Total Air Force</strong>                   | <strong>2,050,000</strong> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Ground Forces</th>
<th>6,745,658</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Forces</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL ARMY FORCES</strong></td>
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Bibliography


