ROTC as an Indicator of Civil-Military Relations

A Monograph

by

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ROTC as an Indicator of Civil Military Relations

ROTC is a key indicator of American civil-military relations, both between the military service and host college, and the American military and people writ large. The historic relationship between the US Army and elite American colleges and universities is indicative of their shared history dating to before the Declaration of Independence. ROTC is as much a product of its host colleges as the Army or other military services. Prior to 1969, Ivy League host colleges boasted some of the largest and most active ROTC programs in the nation.

While the student protests of the late 1960s exiled ROTC from most elite campuses, the military had consistently operated ROTC as a secondary effort to produce large quantities of adequate, but unremarkable, junior officers to lead a nationally mobilized army (as in the World Wars), or later to maintain the massive Cold War conscription-based Army. However, improved standards of education and training and converging social policies of the military have enabled a return of ROTC to elite campuses. The Army, in particular, must take advantage of this period of historic convergence to leverage the unique educational and cultural capabilities of the Ivy League.
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Abstract


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While the student protests of the late 1960s exiled ROTC from most elite campuses, the military had consistently operated ROTC as a secondary effort to produce large quantities of adequate, but unremarkable, junior officers to lead a nationally mobilized army (as in the World Wars), or later to maintain the massive Cold War conscription-based Army. However, improved standards of education and training and converging social policies of the military have enabled a return of ROTC to elite campuses. The Army, in particular, must take advantage of this period of historic convergence to leverage the unique educational and cultural capabilities of the Ivy League.
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To my friends in Seminar 3, thank you for your thoughts, insights, and assistance. It has been an honor to work with you over the past year, and I hope I have given to you all some small measure of the tremendous learning I have gained from the group.

Finally, thanks most of all to my wife and best friend, Dr. Melody Marchman Schade for lighting the way along an otherwise dark and crooked intellectual path. I will never catch up to your brilliance, but I will happily give chase for the rest of my lifetime!
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CME</td>
<td>Committee on Militarism in Education (pacifist organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DADT</td>
<td>“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy (regarding homosexual service members)</td>
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<td>DCSROTC</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAIR</td>
<td>Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
<td>General Military Science (curriculum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGSC</td>
<td>Harvard Gender and Sexuality Caucus</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender/Transsexual</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>Line of Effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Defense Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMS</td>
<td>Professor of Military Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATC</td>
<td>Student Army Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society (protest organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACC</td>
<td>US Army Cadet Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>US Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Table</td>
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Introduction

The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.

—Sir William Francis Butler

The notion that young people here at Columbia or anywhere, in any university, aren’t offered the choice, the option of participating in military service, I think is a mistake.

—Barack Obama

In twenty-first century America, the terms “liberal academia” and “military service” may, at first glance, seem diametrically opposed. Writing in 2016, retired Marine Corps Gen. (now Secretary of Defense) James N. Mattis decried that “public ignorance or indifference to military issues provides leeway for liberal shapers of culture and politicians with a progressive agenda to impose their ideas on the military.¹

Here, Mattis describes a conflict of American power structures that is significant, complex, and fundamental to American identity. Mattis’ words are, in essence, an expression of the fundamental tension between liberal democratic and military institutions that is present throughout recorded history, and likely inspired by the writings of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz:

War is … a paradoxical trinity—composed of the primordial violence of its elements, hatred and enmity, are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.²


At a micro level, Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity of passion, reason, and chance applies to each Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. Throughout ROTC’s history, the students of a particular college, like the people of a nation, provide the force passion; college faculty, administrators, and trustees correspond to the force of reason; and, the military leadership has based its decision making based on the probability of ROTC’s best contribution to war. Thus, as a program, ROTC must remain suspended between these three “points of attraction” to function effectively. History demonstrates that the tension between the three points are dampened in state colleges and universities by state and federal support dating back to the Morill Act of 1862, which established a paradigm of college-military cooperation under federal government oversight.  

Yet elite colleges, such as initially the Ivy League, and later others like Stanford University, did not conform to this paradigm. The history of ROTC at these institutions demonstrates that elite colleges can be among the military’s staunchest supporters, but can just as forcefully assert their independence to defend their academic integrity. Likewise, the students of elite colleges have historically exerted exceptional pressure on their institutions through political activism, be it for better as in the mass petitions of Ivy League students to fund ROTC programs at their schools in 1916-17, or worse when schools such as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Stanford chose to end their ROTC programs just over half a century later. In both cases, faculties, administrations, and students acted independently of, or even contrary to, the expressed interest of the federal government.  

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How then is it possible for such independent, powerful, and iconic institutions as the US Army and the Ivy League colleges cooperate to achieve mutually supportive ends? Again, the common history of the US Army and Ivy League through ROTC shows a lineage of close cooperation between these institutions for much of their common existence. The Ivy League and many other elite colleges were instrumental in supporting America’s national defense, through ROTC and other research projects, from the War of Independence to the Korean War. It was not until the late 1960s, during the most fractious period of the Vietnam War, when several prominent Ivy League and elite schools ended their support for ROTC.

The history of ROTC is best understood in four discrete phases: Pre-Formal (1819-1915), Formal (1916-1963), Ossified (1964-2011), and Recovering (2011-present). By applying lenses of systems theory and civil-military relations, one can understand how Ivy League and elite ROTC programs served as a catalyst to promote both the expansion and reform of ROTC during different phases. Thus, each phase corresponds respectively to the following civil-military theories and systems constructs:

Table 1. ROTC History/Theory Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Civil-Military Theory</th>
<th>Systems Theory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preformal</td>
<td>Moderate Whig</td>
<td>“Mindless”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Huntington</td>
<td>“Uniminded”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossified/Recovering</td>
<td>Janowitz</td>
<td>“Multiminded”</td>
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The pre-formal phase began with the founding of America’s first private military college in 1819, and culminated in the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862 in order to meet the
demands of the American Civil War. While this phase adhered to the Moderate Whig tradition of a limited professional military through a “civilian alternative” to the US Military Academy at West Point, the military training offered at Norwich and early land grand colleges was inconsistent and under-resourced. In this regard, the system was essentially mechanistic and mindless in that various college-based programs were organized to provide trained men as potential officers, but the colleges and the Army (there was no naval equivalent) had virtually no overlap between military training and education.5

The formal phase began as a result of the National Defense Act of 1916, which formally established the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The formal phase saw the gradual expansion of ROTC despite suspension during both World Wars and limited funding and pacifist protests during the interwar period. With greater standardization, ROTC transitioned to behave as a “Uniminded System,” by imposing standardized military training, but ultimately resisting academic refinement from host colleges. Such behavior attempted to conform to the civil-military relations model of Samuel Huntington through clear delineation between civilian and professional military expertise. Ironically, Huntington’s concept of subordination to civilian authority was inverted at the local level, with catastrophic results in the Ivy League.6

The ROTC Revitalization Act of 1964 marks beginning of ROTC’s period of crisis and ossification. This policy increased emphasis on military training and on-campus drill, while diminishing opportunities for collaboration with college faculties, and cost ROTC the support of many Ivy League faculty. Ivy League ROTC programs were thus isolated during student protests against the Vietnam War during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and by the end of 1972, six of

5 Gharajedaghi, 10.

eight Ivy League schools, plus Stanford, had forced the termination of their ROTC programs. This failure proves the limitations of the Huntingtonian model and the Uniminded System, and both the Department of Defense and US Army adjusted their thinking to that of Morris Janowitz, and Gharajedaghi’s “Multi-Minded System.” This gradual thought adjustment led to efforts that preserved ROTC in most state and some elite colleges, but not for much of the Ivy League.7

The final ongoing phase of Quiet Recovery begins with the repeal of the Department of Defense’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy in 2011 and continues to the present day. The limited return of ROTC to all eight Ivies and Stanford represents an historic point of convergence between America’s academic and military elite, but this progress is still fragile and must be strengthened by first understanding the historic tendencies of the ROTC system.

Pre-Formal Phase (1819 to 1915)

America’s oldest colleges were both incubators for the ideals of the American Revolution as well as active participants in the War itself. Elite American colleges such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton claimed numerous participants in the revolution and even provided facilities in direct support of Continental forces. Alexander Hamilton was a graduate of Columbia (then King’s College), and famous Yale graduates include Nathan Hale—often called the first hero of the Revolution—and Washington’s intelligence chief, Benjamin Tallmadge.8 Harvard and Brown (known then as The College of Rhode Island) both quartered Continental and French troops at different points in the war. Likewise, Princeton sheltered both Continental and British

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troops (the latter by force) during the campaign for New Jersey, and John Witherspoon is the only college president to have signed the Declaration of Independence. All of these events and individuals support the narrative that the citizens of a republic are obliged to support its defense in accordance with their means.

Following the Wars of Independence (to include the calamities of the War of 1812), it is no small coincidence that the concept of ROTC originated with Army Captain Aldan Partridge, a graduate of both Dartmouth and the United States Military Academy. Following his court-martial and dismissal from West Point, Partridge founded the nation’s first private military college in 1819, the American Scientific and Literary Academy, now called Norwich University. In keeping with the “Moderate Whig” tradition, Partridge believed that private citizens educated in military art and science could defend the United States from external threats while maintaining their civic virtue through their presence in civil society. In Partridge’s original design, Norwich was to be the first of many private military colleges throughout the country that collectively would provide a diverse and competent cadre of men who could rise to assume leadership of a citizen army in times of war. Though Partridge would not live to see the full extent of his dream realized, it provided the inspiration for a network of American citizen-soldier programs beyond the scale of his wildest ambitions.

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9 Lawrence D. Cress, *Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 23. Both Moderate and Radical Whigs believed that citizen armies were the cornerstone of free society; citing the ancient Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, and Gothic Denmark as examples of “free people” who began with citizen armies, but eventually fell into the use of professional mercenaries out of laziness. The Radical Whigs abhorred all professional military forces, while Moderate Whigs accepted limited standing armies to defend against limited threats, such as Native American tribes.

While West Point, Norwich, and other military colleges produced a sufficient number of military educated men to lead the US Army in peacetime and in limited wars, such as the Mexican War of 1848, they would be woefully insufficient to support the massive armies raised to preserve the Union in the American Civil War. Historian Michael Neiberg of the US Army War College describes how West Point and Norwich combined could only produce about 1,500 officers per year to support a force of roughly 200,000 in 1861 and peak at over 600,000 by 1863.\footnote{“Civil War Facts,” US National Parks Service, accessed December 5, 2016, https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/facts.htm.} To fill the gap, Vermont Congressman Justin Morrill (a neighbor of Partridge and admirer of Norwich) sponsored a bill to provide military training at civilian educational institutions. The resulting Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 provided both land and funding to establish public colleges in each state to provide mandatory training for agriculture, mechanical arts, and military tactics, in addition to optional courses. Though military training was left largely at the discretion of local college officials and not always taught by active Army officers, the land-grant schools were popular and laid the foundation for the formal ROTC program.\footnote{Neiberg, 20-22.} Most significantly, Neiberg notes that “a loose connection between the War Department and civilian institutions of higher learning had been established, and a preference for non-professional officers had become a consistent feature of the American culture.”\footnote{Ibid., 22.}

While at first glance, the Morrill Act can be viewed as a populist measure to increase educational opportunities for average Americans, the inclusion of military training in the land-grant mandate impacted elite colleges as well. In *Arms and the University*, Professors Donald Alexander Downs and Ilia Murtazashvili describe how the mandatory inclusion of military
science instruction at Cornell, an elite land-grant university, prompted voluntary military
instruction at Yale. From 1851-1863, roughly 35 percent of Yale graduates served in the
military. Not to be outdone, roughly 55 percent of Harvard graduates of classes 1859, 1860,
and 1861 served in the Union Army or Navy, eight of whom earned the Medal of Honor. The fact
that all eight of the Harvard Medal of Honor winners served as officers, in grades ranging from
Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel, demonstrates that they and other men of the Ivy League were
renowned for their leadership as well as valor.

**Formal Phase (1916 to 1963)**

While the nation-wide paradigm of the citizen-soldier was born of the Civil War and the
Land Grant Act, it came of age in the wake of the Spanish-American War and the onset of the
American Progressive movement. The logistical and administrative challenges during the
preparation and execution of the Spanish-American War, inspired progressive Secretary of War
Elihu Root—serving under President Theodore Roosevelt—to enact sweeping changes in the
form and function of the US military. The so-called “Root Reforms” ultimately included the
National Defense Act (NDA) of 1916, which established an Army General Staff, a federally
controlled Army Reserve, and increased federal funding for and control over the National
Guard. To provide leaders for the newly created Army Reserve and expanded National Guard,
NDA 1916 created ROTC to standardize and enhance training of cadets, and to manage the flow

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14 Downs and Murtazashvili, 106.

the Integration of Harvard University and the US Military,” May 25, 2015, 66. Eighteen Harvard men are
Medal of Honor recipients, the highest of any college after the US Military Academy and US Naval
Academy.

16 George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776*
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 348-49.
of commissioned officers. The formation of ROTC in 1916 was the second major point of convergence with the Ivy League:

The initial number of ROTC units was limited, due to relatively meager funds the War Department made available for the new program; therefore intense competition developed among schools that wished to acquire a unit. At many private eastern colleges, for example, students demanded that their school be included in the ROTC system along with the land-grant schools, so that the latter would not have a monopoly on patriotism. Students at Bowdoin, Williams, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and Dartmouth all circulated petitions asking to have an ROTC unit; all were approved.

Indeed, the onset of World War I intertwined the courses of ROTC and elite universities almost from the point of ROTC’s inception. With the proverbial ink on the National Defense Act of 1916 barely dry, the War Department assumed direct control of the program under the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) in 1917. Consequently, ‘Cornell in 1918 became a military school,’” which over the course of the war produced 4,598 US Army Officers; even more than West Point. Likewise, Yale’s Morrill Act military science program was quickly incorporated into ROTC and then SATC. In total, over 9,000 Yale graduates served in the First World War at various ranks, and the university featured ROTC’s only field artillery training program. Columbia contributed over 2,600 of its graduates, and was among the first colleges to establish a Naval ROTC program that “at one point, was producing more officers per year than even the US

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17 Neiberg states on p. 22 that “these [land-grant college] programs had no connection to the system of appointing and commissioning officers for either active-duty forces or the National Guard.” Thus prior to ROTC, graduates of land-grant or private/state military colleges held no official military titles or designation. In time of war, these men would be trusted to identify themselves as having additional training and would be awarded commensurate rank as the situation demanded.

18 Neiberg, 24.

19 Downs and Murtazashvili, 108.


21 Ibid., 109.
Naval Academy.” The campuses of virtually all the elite colleges came to resemble military installations more than universities. For example, Downs and Murtazashvili cite that “at the University of Pennsylvania ‘the campus had become militarized,’” and by 1918 over 6,000 University of Pennsylvania graduates were serving in the war.

However well intended or necessary, it is hard to imagine how such a rapid and forcible integration between the military, government, and academia can proceed without some adverse consequences. As demonstrated in the model below, the government directed standardization of ROTC in 1916 and the implementation of the SATC during World War I exerted unwelcome pressure on college faculty to compromise academic standards and norms to facilitate better relations with the military.

For one example, historian Gaddis Smith asserts that “less than stellar” instructors and course material flawed ROTC from its inception. Smith notes that even before the US entry into World War I, the Yale faculty, at the behest of university President Arthur Hadley, voted to accredit ROTC courses out of patriotism more than genuine approval.

Accreditation of ROTC courses would become a major point of contention for college faculties, who grew resentful of the military’s external control over ROTC course content. Even in America’s most prestigious colleges, the college-military relationship, as defined by ROTC, restricted college faculty and administrators to an “all or nothing” approach of either approving or disapproving ROTC courses with no authority to modify course material within their respective institutions. While the accreditation question at Yale and other schools would emerge as a major issue during the Vietnam era anti-ROTC protests, in 1916 the pre-World War I surge of

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22 Ibid., 110.

23 Ibid.

nationalism compelled the faculty and administrators of Yale, and dozens of other colleges to demonstrate their patriotism, even if it meant compromising academic standards.25

Following World War I, the War Department deactivated SATC and returned ROTC to normal operation. While most universities, to include elites, welcomed ROTC as means of secular patriotic moral development, the post-war Army quickly grew resentful. In the wake of post-war demobilization, Congress drastically reduced the Army’s budget while providing it additional missions, including the management of both high school level “Junior ROTC” and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Neiberg assesses that while these missions were an example of Congress’ confidence in the Army’s ability to “make boys into men,” much of the Army’s leadership remained focused on preserving its dwindling resources for future doctrinal and technological developments.26

Thus, ROTC became a low priority for the Army, as indicated in part by the active-duty instructor to cadet ratio, which dropped to as low one to one hundred by the mid-1920s.27 Mandatory participation exacerbated the instructor to student ratio by forcing unmotivated students on the program; in a typical year, the Army was required to train over 150,000 young men, of whom only about 3,500 completed the program and earned reserve commissions. By contemporary standards, it may be hard to imagine participation in ROTC as a graduation requirement for most American colleges and universities. Nevertheless, this was exactly the case in all land-grant and many private colleges and universities.28

25 Neiberg, 14.

26 Ibid., 31.


28 Neiberg, 27.
Yet while the Army may have been less than enthusiastic toward its ROTC mission, it was loath to relinquish a program that produced hundreds of thousands of partially trained young men who could be recruited to fight in a future war. Writing in the 1969-70 winter issue of *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Ronald Schaffer describes how ROTC became a point of controversy between the US War Department and the various groups comprising the American pacifist movement. Schaffer describes the Army’s logic as follows: “If compulsory ROTC were abandoned, they [the War Department and Army] believed, the next step might be to eliminate the program entirely; and they claimed that ROTC would achieve its objectives more readily if the largest possible number of students enrolled.”

The principal source of the opposition to compulsory training and ROTC formed in 1925 when elements of various pacifist organizations coalesced into the Committee on Militarism in Education (CME) to combat what they viewed as the corrupting influence of military presence on college campuses. The CME functioned as an organizing body that included a plethora of pacifist groups—ranging from the Young Men’s Christian Association to the American Communist Party. While the CME opposed the very existence of ROTC, they strategically focused their opposition on the policy of compulsory participation in the “basic” portion of ROTC during the students’ freshman and sophomore years. To this end, Schaffer describes the various tactics employed by the CME to undermine ROTC throughout the 1920s and 1930s:

[The CME] spread their arguments in floods of pamphlets and handbills and at dozens of campus rallies, most of them peaceful, a few violent. They lobbied in state legislatures and tried to influence boards of regents, trustees, college administrators, and faculty members to make ROTC elective. Year after year, with the aid of sympathetic Congressmen, they introduced bills to kill compulsory training either by withholding appropriations for it or by amending the National Defense Act specifically to forbid it. Antimilitarists sent delegates to campuses to agitate against the military program, to debate its supporters and to inform students of ways to avoid taking ROTC. Seeking out

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29 Schaffer, 111.

30 Ibid., 109.
potential conscientious objectors, they encouraged them to refuse to drill, and when these students were suspended, helped them fight their cases through the courts. Every campus rally, every campaign in Congress or in a statehouse, every court battle, lost or won, became an occasion for more attacks against ROTC.\textsuperscript{31}

The exact nature and source of “compulsory” ROTC, however, may not be as obvious as simple logic of interest may suggest. By law, NDA 1916 provided for the formation of ROTC as an organizing body over military training already ‘mandated’ by the Morrill Act of 1862. Yet a closer inspection of the Morrill Act reveals that while land-grant colleges must provide “military training,” the law did not specify the exact percentage of students to be trained or the source of the military trainers.\textsuperscript{32} Instead, many of the schools in question chose compulsory military training as a form of physical and moral development for their young male students. Neiberg notes that as early as 1910, many schools found the moral development aspects of ROTC particularly useful as a secular replacement for the mandatory church attendance and theology classes which had been standard in the previous century—the coincidental rise of college sports was also intended to fill this void.\textsuperscript{33} Having decided to mandate participation in military training, the inclusion of ROTC was an easy choice, as it relieved the school of virtually all budget requirements for military training, to include equipment, training plans, and instructors.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, the War Department and ROTC host schools had wide latitude within federal law to operate their program as they saw fit.

Army leaders such as Chief of Staff Gen. Charles P. Summerall and his successor Gen. Douglas MacArthur devised an operational approach that can be summarized in three basic “lines

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 110.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Schaffer, 118.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Neiberg, 27-29.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Schaffer, 180.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of effort” (LOE). First, the War Department would engage state and federal lawmakers and
government officials to defeat legal challenges to compulsory training. Second, they enlisted the
aid of proxy organizations such as the American Legion and Daughters of the American
Revolution to challenge the CME publicly while avoiding the appearance of military aggression
against US citizens. Third, and finally, they negotiated directly with college presidents and
administrators to achieve lasting solutions. These first two LOEs essentially supported the third
by setting conditions to negotiate from a position of strength. In this approach, the Army correctly
identified the college presidents as the critical variables or ‘centers of gravity’ whose support was
key to achieve lasting agreements.35

The Army’s approach was largely successful, though not without difficulty. The second
LOE risked negative press if the Army’s support to proxy organizations were exposed, which
Shaffer notes happened on occasion:

In 1931 Mrs. Elizabeth Ryder wrote the Department to ask if it had “detrimental”
information about the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Not
realizing that Mrs. Ryder was a member of the League, a G-2 officer referred her to the
Daughters of the American Revolution whose attitude toward the WIL was at best cool.
Word of the incident reached the National Council for Prevention of War whose
executive secretary, Frederick J. Libby, wrote a cutting letter to the Secretary of War. 36

Despite the negative press, this and similar episodes had only temporary strategic impact.
The three most significant challenges to compulsory ROTC came from the University of
Wisconsin in 1923, the University of Minnesota in 1934, and North Dakota State Legislature in
1936. In the first challenge, the University of Wisconsin, a land-grant school, simply chose to
limit its ROTC program to voluntary participation. The US Department of the Interior, the

35 Schaffer, 112-20; Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology

36 Schaffer, 151.
authority for land-grant funding, deemed the university’s action legal and the War Department acquiesced. Schaffer notes, however, that the War Department’s acquiescence had the critical effect of avoiding a court decision that would bind future conflicts, as a legal opinion, the Department of Interior’s response only applied to the University of Wisconsin.37

By the mid-1930s, the War Department would be far better prepared. When the University of Minnesota prepared to make its ROTC program elective, the Army intervened directly by threatening to withdraw its support for the University’s ROTC program entirely. This course of action, which was devised by Assistant Chief of Staff for G-3, Gen. John H. Hughes, exploited the original terms of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, in that the law required land-grant colleges and universities to provide “military training” without specifying the source of said training. The Army had voluntarily supported the land-grant training requirements out of mutual interest, and NDA 1916, through its creation of ROTC, only standardized the Army’s support. By threatening to withdraw its ROTC program from the University of Minnesota, the Army would leave the university responsible to provide military training (elective or mandatory) to its students at its own expense or risk losing federal funding under the Morrill Act. This threat ultimately convinced the university to continue mandatory ROTC, though with a reduced presence, and to provide academic credit for ROTC courses.38

Two years later, in 1936, the North Dakota State Legislature attempted to abolish mandatory ROTC at two of its colleges, one of which fell under the Morrill Act. Again using direct negotiation and the threat to withdraw ROTC entirely, the Army and the state legislature agreed to maintain compulsory ROTC in spirit by requiring college freshmen and sophomores to participate in either ROTC or “another course requiring equivalent time,” while also compelling

37 Ibid., 118.

38 Ibid.
the colleges, through the legislature, to grant additional academic credit to ROTC classes.\textsuperscript{39} Again, by negotiating directly and avoiding a legally binding court battle, the Army achieved its goal to maintain the largest number of men with some, even if very little, military training through compulsory ROTC.

Ultimately, the CME and other pacifist movements succeeded in raising national awareness and dialogue about compulsory ROTC and ‘militarism’ in general, but failed to achieve substantial policy changes, to include a failed Supreme Court challenge in 1934 (\textit{Hamilton et al. v. Regents of the University of California}).\textsuperscript{40} By 1940, the Committee on Militarism in Education suspended its activities, and the pacifist movement in general lost virtually all public support as America entered World War II.\textsuperscript{41} And while compulsory ROTC was never an issue for elite colleges, especially as they did not rely on federal aid under the Morrill Act, the ways and means employed by the Army during this conflict foreshadowed the very similar approach adopted by the Army against the Anti-War movement during Vietnam. The resulting approach, however, would have drastically different results for top tier colleges, verses their state and land grant counterparts.

As with the previous world war, the War Department suspended ROTC and reactivated the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) at the onset of World War II. As in its previous incarnation, the SATC transformed participating colleges and universities in to armed camps and laboratories of war; albeit to an even greater extent than during the previous war. Again, top-tier colleges were no exception. Downs and Murtazashvili are quick to note the ideological motivations of Harvard President James Bryant Conant who publicaly framed the Second World

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 119.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.; Herring, 538.
War as an existential struggle of liberal democracy against fascism, stating “It is time for war, therefore, and not for peace that we must now lay our immediate educational plans.”

Conant’s words characterized the actions of faculty, administrators, and alumni from across America’s elite colleges. Under Conant’s leadership, Harvard played a central role in setting up the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) and the Manhattan Project. Yale was intimately involved in the establishment and running of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the precursor to the CIA. Dartmouth and Columbia were transformed into virtual Navy bases; with Columbia producing, at one point, nearly as many Naval officers as the US Naval Academy. Additionally, thousands of alumni and graduates of these institutions served in uniform, with hundreds from each school making the ultimate sacrifice (see Table 2).

Table 2: Estimated World War II Casualties of Select Ivy League Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Est. Alumni in Service</th>
<th>Number of Alumni KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>~27,000</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>18,678</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dartmouth</td>
<td>11,091</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>&gt;15,000</td>
<td>~450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given such significant contributions and sacrifices, how is it possible that these and other elite colleges completely broke with ROTC roughly a generation later? The most fundamental answer is institutional overreach. What Downs and Murtazashvili billed the “World War II

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42 Downs and Murtazashvili, 112-13.

43 Ibid., 113-15.
University” gave way to the “Cold War University,” and the similarities between the two far outweigh the differences. While the SATC, again, stood down to allow the return of ROTC, many colleges and universities, the elites in particular, continued receiving tens of millions of dollars in federal research grants to maintain a competitive scientific edge over the Soviet Union.

As the nation transitioned from World War II victor to Cold War hegemon, American civil-military relations theory struggled to reconcile the vindication of the citizen-soldier, as exemplified by the US Army’s eleven million “citizens in uniform” who served victoriously in World War II, with the sudden and dramatic introduction of atomic weapons. The Korean War further underscored the fact that the distance to Cold War battlefields would not allow the time to mobilize and deploy an army from scratch. As political scientist Robert Jervis explains:

Korea, again, appeared to prove this point—the Russians had tried to gain a small prize in spite of America's atomic weapons and mobilization base; would they not be tempted to gain a much greater one unless the local imbalance were corrected? Furthermore, Korea was an unpleasant reminder of the deficiencies of having to mobilize an army after the war had started. Allied forces were nearly pushed off the peninsula before adequate reinforcements could arrive, and the same thing could happen in Europe.45

This new strategic environment placed the United States in an unprecedented height of global power and responsibility. Accordingly, American policy makers abandoned their hopes of broad post-World War II demobilization. Theorists such as Professor Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz searched for ways to make peace with America’s long-held fear of a standing army, while preserving some element of the citizen-soldier construct that connected the Army to society, by codifying a new American civil-military relations model that met the challenges of the Cold War environment.

44 Ibid., 118.

Huntington made the first widely accepted contribution to the shifting civil-military relations paradigm in 1957, with his seminal work *The Soldier and the State*. Huntington described, at length, his theory of the professional military ethic as governed by competence, pragmatism, and above all, obedience to civilian authority. Huntington bounded his theory in the concept of “objective” verses “subjective” civilian control of the military. Subjective control, Huntington argued, requires the civil government to maximize its own power, while minimizing the military’s autonomy, in order to explicitly direct the military in the broadest possible range of activities. Thus, a government with limited/separated powers, such as the United States must maintain a necessarily limited/separated military, such as the militia described in the second amendment of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution and subsequent early American governments’ reliance on subjective control was politically acceptable because Americans feared abuse by standing armies, and practical because of America’s geographic isolation from hostile nations.

As the United States matured technologically and politically, subjective control became less practical. As noted earlier, America’s increasing involvement in foreign conflict, culminating with the World Wars and Korean War, all but eliminated the US government’s opportunity to raise and disband armies on an “as needed” basis. Thus, Huntington argued the United States increasingly relied on objective control, wherein the civil government provides increased power and autonomy to the military, but maintains control by narrowing the range of activities associated with the professional military identity. This military “professional ethic” cultivated the separation of military and political affairs so that military leaders could focus their increased

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46 Huntington, 80-85.

47 Ibid., 196.
power and resources against a narrow range of threats that were determined by political leadership. Thus, a powerful standing Cold War army could be objectively controlled, so long as it remained sufficiently professional.48

Although the Huntington model laid a definitive foundation for modern American civil-military theory, the evolution from subjective to objective control provides, at best, a two-dimensional image of American soldiers. Huntington’s ideal soldier was a loyal technical expert whose patriotism was manifest through unflinching devotion to duty and “professional ethic,” but who did little thinking for himself. Huntington may have admired, and even loved soldiers, but his theory places them firmly in the realm of action, at the bidding of civilian policy makers.49

Sociologist Morris Janowitz offered a more nuanced depiction of the military in *The Professional Soldier.* While Janowitz agreed with Huntington that the military is an extension of the state, he added that the military was also an autonomous social group with unique values, perspectives, and interests. Further, Janowitz saw no evidence that military leaders aspired to wrest political authority from civilian government, and categorically rejected Huntington’s argument that the standing military inherently threatened liberal democracy. For Janowitz, the US military may act as a “pressure group” in with regard to certain policy debates, but had conclusively accepted the limits of objective control, and the issue need not be revisited.50

By closing the issue of objective verses subjective control, Janowitz was able to focus his theory toward the nature of the military force itself. Janowitz was profoundly concerned with the

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48 Ibid., 83.
49 Ibid., 96-97.
50 Janowitz, xlvii-xlxi, 420. In his research, Janowitz surveyed hundreds of senior and mid-level military officers from all services and found no evidence to suggest that any of them harbored ambitions to seize power from civilian authorities. To the contrary, he argued that the American “military man” was definitively content to serve at the pleasure of civilian authority in return for the resources and political direction necessary to accomplish his mission honorably.
impact of nuclear weapons on global conflict. Because such weapons made unrestricted state on state warfare too destructive to achieve any rational political ends, Janowitz argued that conventional military forces would be increasingly involved in limited wars, and that the military required a “constabulary force” model to address a range of potential limited conflicts. Again, Janowitz breaks from Huntington by arguing that military leaders, particularly senior officers, must be educated to apply nebulous political guidance in conflicts with uncertain desired outcomes. Where the Huntingtonian soldier must execute strictly within the bounds of established policy and seek guidance from political leaders as needed, the Janowitzian soldier must help inform national policy at home and adapt said policy to conditions in the field.51

The triumph of “total war” in World War II combined with the uncertainty of nuclear weapons and Korean War style conflict led to a rather volatile expansion of militarism in American colleges and universities.52 Accordingly, Neiberg characterizes ROTC as retaining a “Favored Position on Campus” for the military, the student population, and college administration. First, ROTC provided the most practical means to increase rapidly and sustain high officer production; the academies could not legally or physically expand quickly enough, and post-graduate Officer Candidate School lacked ROTC’s capability for sustained character development over four years of college. Second, the peacetime draft incentivized college bound men to enroll in ROTC to serve “on their own terms” as Army officers, rather than be drafted as enlisted soldiers. Finally, college administrations and research-oriented faculty were prone to

51 Ibid., 418-19.
52 Downs and Murtzashvili, 111.
support any military program on campus in order to protect the millions of dollars in federal research grants that had steadily increased with the onset of the Cold War. 53

The elite and Ivy League schools were not as heavily dependent on federal research grants for three interrelated reasons. First, schools such as Harvard, Yale, and Columbia operate with large monetary endowments sufficient to cover operating costs for several years; federal research funding was very welcome, but not necessary to maintain the school’s operations or prestige.54 Second, as noted earlier, the leadership and administrations of elite schools were strong ideological supporters of the struggles against Nazi and Japanese fascism, and Soviet Communism (Harvard President James Conant and his successor Nathan Pusey are prime examples).55 Such ideological support contributed to their schools’ image as American institutions and the intellectual leaders of the free world. Finally, intellectual independence is the core of any college or university’s institutional creditability. The Ivy League and other elite colleges could hardly claim to lead the field of academia under the perception of overwhelming government influence.

The question of academic credibility began to generate a serious challenge between college faculties and their assigned ROTC instructors. There existed a fundamental tension between academically credentialed faculty, concerned with imparting sound education, and an ROTC cadre whose chief concern was to produce immediately employable junior officers upon graduation. This tension manifested over the quality and qualifications of ROTC instructors, and the accreditation of ROTC courses. As noted earlier by Gaddis Smith, quoting Yale President

53 Ibid., 111-13; Neiberg, 36-37.


55 Neiberg, 130.
Arthur Hadley, these qualitative issues nagged ROTC from the time of its inception. Given that ROTC’s informal beginnings and rapid institutionalization on the eve of World War I, the program deserved all the patience it received from the Ivory tower in the years immediately following 1916.

Crisis and Ossification (1964 to 2010)

By the mid-1960s, however, ROTC’s quality challenges had metastasized into systemic flaws. Neiberg aptly describes first how instead of reciprocating the patience shown to them during the first half century of ROTC, the US Army required ROTC to produce officers that were ready for immediate employment from the day of their graduation and commissioning.56

The Army’s General Military Science (GMS) curriculum in the late 1950s was a significant improvement over the prior system of branch specific programs, but was hardly a model of Socratic enlightenment.57 The GMS included classes such as Weapons and Marksmanship, Leadership Lab (drill), and Military History, which were highly relevant military tasks, but did not blend well in an academic environment. Even courses such as Military History were initially taught only by ROTC instructors, who themselves generally lacked advanced, or even undergraduate degrees.58

56 Ibid., 60.

57 Ibid., 68-70. In the years immediately following World War II, the Army assigned each of its ROTC programs functional branch designation, such as Engineering Branch for the University of Colorado, or Artillery Branch for the University of Missouri. Cadets could therefore only commission into the career field supported by their college. This program was difficult to resource with branch specific instructors, undermined recruiting efforts by forcing students to weight their choice of school against choice of branch, and ultimately produced junior officers who were at best proficient, but hardly expert in their designated branch.

By the late 1950s, some college faculty and administrators, such as those of Ohio State and the University of Pittsburgh, proposed substitution of the more “academic” ROTC courses for equivalent courses offered by the college and taught by qualified college faculty. Air Force ROTC was particularly receptive to the Ohio State program, which provided substitution for AFROTC courses such as Fundamentals of Global Geography, Military Aspects of World Political Geography, and even Problem Solving and Leadership Management. Both Army and Air Force ROTC at the University of Pittsburgh agreed to substitute several of their required courses for equivalent civilian courses in geography and political science.59

Substitution was active in the Ivy League as well. Articles from the Harvard Crimson (the university student newspaper) describe both the rational and practical efforts to infuse more liberal education into the ROTC curriculum. In 1953, Harvard Professor of Military Science Col. Trevor N. Dupuy won approval from the Pentagon to “liberalize” elements of his program by increasing academic hours in freshman and sophomore ROTC courses (Military Science I and II) from 18 and 13 hours respectively to 25 hours per year. Though initially all courses were still taught by military officers, by 1955 Harvard ROTC’s senior course on government and defense was taught by Professor Samuel P. Huntington.60

Princeton, likewise, substituted a one-credit course on the history of war taught by civilian faculty in 1953. In the words of then University President Harold W. Dodds:

The techniques [of ROTC] are of a trade school sort, in contrast to the courses designed to strengthen the muscles of the mind by challenging its interest and stimulating its exercise. The movements of history... the problems of a dynamic social order, the curiosity that science arouses, are more effective to this end than memorizing bare facts.

59 Neiberg, 78-79.

...The general objection of educators is that the emphasis of ROTC is so exclusively on practical details of the “how” to the neglect of the complementary “know why.”

Such cooperation demonstrates the creative capacity of the ROTC system when Professors of Military Science (PMS)—or Naval or Air Science—had the latitude to cooperate freely with the host college faculty and administration, as well as the interest of college faculty and senior administrators in maximizing the educational value of ROTC. The substitution experiments strengthened both the academic and military aspects of their respective ROTC programs; the college faculty provided more qualified academic instruction and, by extension, provided more time for ROTC instructors to train and mentor their cadets. However, substitution, at this point, was regarded by both the military and host colleges as more of an experiment than a policy goal. Even among college faculty and administrators, there was no consensus on the true purpose of ROTC, with some faculty still regarding ROTC as a “vocational program,” particularly in the Ivy League, as expressed in the Harvard Crimson, “It seems strange, therefore, to criticize what is essentially a vocational program by the standards of the liberal arts. In normal times, ROTC with credit would have no place at a liberal arts college.”

To this end, Harvard produced its own proposal to operate an experimental modification of ROTC that formalized substitution where appropriate, and reduced the overall program duration to three years by concentrating technical training into off campus summer exercises. The Army, however, rejected this proposal because extended summer training was too costly on a national basis, though as noted earlier, some substitution was allowed. As historians Gene M.


62 Ibid.

63 Lyons and Masland, 220-21.
Lyons and John W. Masland conclude: “In so arguing [against the Harvard plan] the Army did, in fact, recognize the special facilities and teaching talent which a university like Harvard has. It also succeeded in preventing its own program from taking advantage of these same assets.”

Ultimately, none of the services would formalize substitution at the national level until over a decade later, and the military-academic relationship would soon fall victim to the competing interests of Congress and the military service leadership. The Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 marked America’s large-scale entry into the Vietnam War, and the consequences of the draft became far more serious. In response to declining ROTC enrollments, Congress passed the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 which provided many key improvements: 5,500 scholarships per service, per year, cross enrollment into ROTC programs from non-ROTC colleges, and even increased cadet stipends to fifty dollars per month, but at the cost of reduced instructor contact hours from 480 to 360 hours over the four-year program, or from five to three hours per week.

While the reduced hours were necessary to fund the worthwhile improvements, Neiberg notes that the real problem was Congress and the military services’—particularly the Army’s—decision to cut only academic courses in favor of preserving maximum hours for technical subjects:

The services’ desire to maintain high standards for on-campus technical military preparation meant that reduction in contact hours would have to come from academic subjects. The new curricula deemphasized liberal arts courses and authorized the end of the substitution experiments of the late 1950s. They [the services] chose to emphasize nonacademic military subjects because they believed deficiencies in these areas made postcommissioning training more expensive. They also believed that academic subjects were only tangentially related to the military and to the successful completion of the mission for the American junior officer.

64 Ibid., 221.

65 Neiberg, 94-97.

66 Ibid., 96.
The end of substitution, in particular, met with almost universal criticism from college faculties across the country. Neiberg cites Michigan State and Princeton as two of the most ardent critics, who lamented both loss of influence over their ROTC programs, and the growing dissonance between the liberal education and technical training of future military officers. Although college faculty and administrators expressed their argument for substitution on ideological grounds, the damage to the college-military relationship was clearly as much about control and ownership of ROTC programs. The loss of academic control over ROTC, as a result of the Vitalization Act, cost the ROTC the support of college faculty throughout the country; support that would be dearly needed to buttress the rising opposition to ROTC by its association with the Vietnam War.

By the late 1960s, the tension between military leadership, college faculty, and student opposition to the Vietnam War was near its breaking point. By this time, the power structure surrounding ROTC began to reflect a “Multiminded System,” in that it could no longer function on the unipolar authority of the military chain of command. In the Ivy League, in particular, groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had come to identify ROTC as a physical manifestation of the military-industrial complex. While student protests across the country resulted in violence and vandalism of ROTC buildings, they lacked the legal capacity to influence ROTC without the support of either their college administration or the US Government. As during the War Department’s conflict with the pacifist movement of the 1920-40s, the Department of Defense maintained that ROTC was a critical source of junior military officers necessary to support the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, and required the consent of host colleges to

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67 Ibid., 98-99.

68 Gharajedaghi, 12.
continue each program. The decision to maintain or dismiss ROTC was therefore, left to each
host college or university faculty.\textsuperscript{69}

Amid student protests against ROTC, many college faculty and administrators also
voiced their concerns against the program. While student grievances focused acutely on ROTC as
a supporting effort to the Vietnam War, the faculty and administration typically focused on more
nuanced questions such as the authority to accredit of ROTC courses and the quality and titles of
ROTC instructors.\textsuperscript{70}

Vietnam gave the universities the motive and the opportunity to correct long standing
anomalies presented by the ROTC programs. Critics later charged that academics set
conditions that were solely intended to make it impossible for ROTC to remain on
campus; this was simply not the case. Instead, the faculties issued reports that challenged
ROTC to reform itself to become more a part of the university according to the same
criteria applied to other programs.\textsuperscript{71}

In a concerted effort to address the concerns of various college faculties nation-wide, the
US Secretary of Defense organized the Special Committee on ROTC in 1969, chaired by
founding President of Claremont College, George C. Benson, and which included numerous
prominent military and academic leaders of the time. The committee’s findings, known
colloquially as the “Benson Report,” concluded that preservation of ROTC was indeed in the best
interests of both the military and academia (and the nation as a whole), but that colleges must be
given full authority over the accreditation of ROTC courses within their institutions, and greater
influence to the status of ROTC as a program.\textsuperscript{72} Further, the Benson Report affirmed the practice

\textsuperscript{69} Downs and Murtazashvili, 127-28.

\textsuperscript{70} Report of the Special Subcommittee on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC:

\textsuperscript{71} Neiberg, 123.

\textsuperscript{72} Report of the Special Subcommittee on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense, 47-52. “Status” in
this case refers to numerous localized issues such as the academic titling of “Professor” for ROTC
instructors and the identification of ROTC as a “program” rather than a “department.”
of academic substitution, and strongly recommended the reduction of rote memorization and military drill. These findings represented a major shift away from the Huntingtonian separation of liberal from military education, toward the integrated approach of Janowitz’s concepts of the constabulary force and military intellectualism, and convinced the majority of host colleges to preserve their ROTC programs.

So, what exactly forced the military services to withdraw ROTC from Ivy League campuses between 1969 and 1971? A closer look at the timing of key administrative decisions by members of the Ivy League reveals that the Benson Report, published in September 1969, was too late to diffuse the opposition to ROTC at most of America’s most elite schools. By that time, the faculties of Penn, Harvard, and Yale had already voted to withdraw academic credit for ROTC courses and academic titles of ROTC cadre. Though the Benson Report makes no mention of these developments, the timing and conciliatory tone of the report (particularly regarding academic credit and titles) suggest that the actions of these Ivy League schools, at a minimum, provided a sense of urgency to the Special Committee on ROTC. Certainly, the decision to promote academic standards at the cost of good relations with the military and federal government demonstrate a clear assertion of independence on the part of the universities in question.

In addition to being untimely, the recommendations of the Benson Report were insufficient to promote reconciliation with Ivy League. By 1969, the group Students for a

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73 Neiberg, 67-68. Drill, in particular, was among the most incendiary ROTC activities as it exposed military formations to potential crowds of protesting students in an uncontrolled outdoor environment. Drill was not completely eliminated, but the Benson report recommended devoting portions of drill hours to other forms of military instruction, and advised that drill be conducted indoors when necessary.

74 Report of the Special Subcommittee on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense, 44-46; Neiberg, 148-49.

75 Neiberg, 130; Downs and Murtazashvili, 156-58.
Democratic Society (SDS) had established thriving chapters in dozens of American colleges, particularly in the Ivy League, and vehemently advocated the complete termination of ROTC. Columbia University hosted the largest and most active chapter of SDS, and thus experienced the greatest degree of institutional change compared to the other Ivies. In the spring semester of 1968, SDS-led protests contributed to a school-wide strike and virtual collapse of Columbia’s administration. By the fall of 1968, protests had forced the resignation of Columbia’s president and dean of students, and a complete overhaul of the university government. Columbia’s Naval ROTC program, once the largest in the nation, was the target of many SDS-sponsored protests.

Under the leadership of the new president and dean, traditional student council, faculty, and the university administration reorganized into a three-tiered committee system that substantially enhanced the student government’s influence over university policy. This approach stabilized the relationship between the university and restive student population through ongoing dialogue, but offered little hope for the continued presence of ROTC, which remained the most incendiary and visible connection to the ongoing war in Vietnam. Over the following two years, many prominent faculty members had come to sympathize with student demands to abolish ROTC, including Nobel Laureat Polykarp Kusch to proclaimed that “NROTC contributed nothing to the university.” An attempt by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, via a letter of concern to Columbia’s board of trustees, only exacerbated the situation by highlighting ROTC as a source of unwelcome external influence in university affairs. The Columbia Board of Trustees ultimately voted to terminate their NROTC program on May 13, 1969.

On the heels of Columbia’s administrative implosion, Harvard experienced a similar pattern of events, culminating on April 9, 1969, when over one hundred SDS-led protestors

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76 Downs and Murtazashvili, 159.
77 Ibid., 158-59.
occupied Harvard’s University Hall demanding, among other things, the complete and permanent removal of all Harvard ROTC programs. The occupation remained largely non-violent, though protestors forcibly removed Harvard administrators (including the deans of faculty and students) from the building. Several hundred additional protestors gathered in the quad outside University Hall, in both support and opposition to the occupiers. Harvard administrators argued and negotiated with the occupiers, but after forty-eight hours of stalemate, University President Nathan Pusy called upon the Boston Police Department to end the stand-off. The police dispatched roughly four hundred officers who promptly removed the occupiers by force. The administration’s employment of such heavy-handed tactics inspired a university-wide student strike for several weeks, and shocked many members of the faculty into greater sympathy with the student protestors. In an article marking the fifteen-year anniversary of the incident, the Harvard Crimson reported:

In the wake of the bust, the Faculty split into two organized factions, a liberal caucus and a conservative caucus…. After a heated debate, the Faculty voted in mid-April [1969] to press the Governing Boards to strip ROTC of all privileges not accorded to other extra-curricular activities—for example, free use of University rooms, and scholarships—and to grant amnesty to students arrested for participation in the take-over. Students seemed responsive to the Faculty’s willingness to listen to demands; on April 18, when 5,000 students voted to suspend the strike after nine days, they cited the “Faculty’s commitment to continuing progress” as their chief reason for agreeing to return to class.\footnote{Jean E. Engelmayer and Melissa I. Weissenberg, “Reflecting on the 1969 Student Strike,” Harvard Crimson, April 9, 1984, accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1984/4/9/reflecting-on-the-1969-student-strike/?page=2; Downs and Murtazashvili, 142-44.}  

After roughly two weeks of intense faculty meetings, with student representation, the Harvard faculty voted to reaffirm their decision stripping ROTC of course credit, academic titles, and administrative support, which, in addition to the hostile student population, compelled the military services to terminate their ROTC programs at Harvard.
With Columbia opening the breach between the Ivy League and ROTC, and Harvard passing through, the other Ivies quickly followed suite. Within a month, Yale president Kingman Brewster, rattled by dramatic events at Harvard, convened a university-wide meeting in the school’s hockey rink to vote on the continued presence of ROTC that resulted in a dramatic tie: 1,286 to 1,286. Like Harvard, the Yale faculty resorted to their previous semester’s vote to reduce ROTC essentially to extracurricular status. Subsequent negotiations between Yale’s administration and ROTC leadership failed to produce an acceptable compromise, and the ROTCs withdrew from Yale.79

Later that year, Dartmouth convened a student vote on the question of ROTC, and terminated its contracts with the military services, though currently enrolled cadets and midshipmen were allowed to complete their ROTC training for commissioning. In June of 1970, Princeton trustees voted to terminate ROTC after a year of extra-curricular status. Brown drove the final nail into the Ivy League ROTC coffin in 1971, when its ad-hoc committee on ROTC voted to terminate its programs after a roughly two-year period of probation. By 1971, only Cornell and Penn had maintained ROTC in an extra-curricular status, and Princeton, after a student inspired vote in favor of ROTC, accepted the return of extra-curricular Army ROTC; the other services however, declined Princeton’s offer.80

While political rhetoric against the Vietnam War and the “military industrial complex” found sympathetic ears among much of the Ivy League faculty and administration, institutional independence was the true common cause of dissent toward ROTC. The students in each of the aforementioned schools were lashing out against their universities’ perceived subservience to the

79 Downs and Murtazashvili, 141-42.

80 Ibid., 138-41.
government and military that was sending young men to fight and die in what many of them considered an unjust war.

College and university faculty and trustees, therefore, aimed to assert their institutional independence and authority by challenging ROTC’s academic credibility. The brilliance of this approach was threefold. First, college and university faculties played to their strengths against ROTC’s weaknesses by framing the question of ROTC in academic terms. As noted previously ROTC, particularly in the Army, had a track record of academic mediocrity and resistance to change. By contrast, the faculties of the Ivy League were generally regarded as the foremost experts in their field, and could claim a sound track record of supporting and attempting to improve ROTC through course substitution; Harvard’s three-year ROTC plan was the boldest attempt.

Second, the faculty could reinstate course credit as easily as they removed it, which provided the faculty leverage in negotiations with the military services and an opportunity for compromise. A January 1970 issue of Princeton’s student newspaper, The Princetonian, described its faculty’s decision to withdraw course credit and academic titles of ROTC cadre as “a statement of policy by the faculty in order to open negotiations with the defense department” and quoted then President Goheen stating “I would hope we get an immediate response from the defense department.”

Third, and finally, by voting only to modify ROTC, the faculties avoided direct responsibility for the termination of any ROTC program. Just as the War Department set conditions for Land grant colleges to either retain compulsory ROTC or provide their own

military training during the 1930s, the Ivy League faculties set conditions for the military services
to either accept a diminished presence on their campuses, or withdraw entirely. Whereas the War
Department had the support of federal land grant legislation and rising public support preceding
World War II, the Ivy League recognized that their institutional independence and the growing
unpopularity of Vietnam placed them in a position of relative advantage over the Department of
Defense. This is not to say the Ivies organized a pervasive conspiracy against ROTC, but simply
that they recognized the risk of losing their flawed and unpopular ROTC programs was preferable
to the continued institutional paralysis as experienced by Columbia and Harvard.

In battle, the defeated party retains some measure of decision on when to end (at least
short of complete annihilation). As noted earlier, Ivy League colleges compelled their ROTC
programs to leave campus, but in all cases, the military services made the final decision to leave.
Why, then, did the services not fight harder to maintain their presence on Ivy League campuses?
In general terms, the answers boil down to numbers and politics.

Just as during the crisis over compulsory college military training, Army leadership
focused primarily on raw production of Army officers. Given the general state of crisis in all of
ROTC, as indicated by the Benson Report, the Army focused on retaining ROTC programs at the
largest schools where it could anticipate the highest levels of production per program. In this
light, the Ivy League programs seemed hardly worth saving. In their ten-year history of Cadet
Command, historians Arthur Coumbe and Lee Harford state that as early as 1965, nine elite
colleges (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, MIT, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Georgia Tech, Stanford, and
Rice University) combined produced only six Regular Army commissions.82

82 Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee S. Harford, US Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History (Fort

34
This number, however, fails to account for the large number of reserve commissions produced by these schools, which was typical of ROTC programs at the time. The full report details officer production at the aforementioned schools as follows:

Table 3. Elite ROTC Commissions, Regular Army (RA) and Reserve (RES) AY 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>ROTC Graduates:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yale University</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Tech</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornell University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia Institute of Tech</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice University</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While these levels of production are not particularly high (with the exception of Georgia Tech’s substantial contribution of reserve officers), they are not wildly below average and within the Congressionally mandated minimum levels of officer production established in 1971. Therefore, low officer production was only half the Army’s rationale for quitting the Ivy League. The other half, can only be explained by the disproportionate cultural friction between the Army and SDS strongholds such as Columbia, Harvard, and Yale. The counterexample of Princeton demonstrates that the Army was willing to return under limited conditions (loss of ROTC course credit and substitution of applicable Princeton academic courses) only because the university offered first. The fact that Coumbe and Harford, writing in 1996, were willing to omit the commissioning of hundreds of reserve officers to argue against the productivity of Ivy League
programs in their official history of Cadet Command indicates a persistent cultural rift between the Army and the majority of Ivy League and elite colleges and universities.83

Quiet Recovery (2011 to Present)

Ultimately, the Army was forced to reflect on its organizational challenges with ROTC and adjust its approach toward both the lost Ivy League programs and ROTC as a whole. Writing shortly after the vote against ROTC at Columbia in May of 1969, Army Chief of Staff Gen. William C. Westmoreland confided some of his thoughts on the direction of ROTC to the commander of US Continental Army Command:

Many—to include some senior officers as well as junior—will find it difficult to accept the fact that we no longer expect ROTC to provide trained platoon leaders. Instead, we expect the program to produce well-educated men with high moral standards who are motivated toward the military service and who have only a minimum of military training who have the potential to become junior officers of high quality.84

While Westmoreland was hardly enthusiastic about the changing emphasis of Army ROTC, he clearly acknowledges that ROTC is as shared program between the Army and civilian colleges and universities. His closing remarks of “potential” and “high quality” also suggested hope for a new way forward, but that progress would be slow and lengthy.

Having achieved near term stability at the expense of long-term college-military relations, the Ivy League and the military continued into the Ossified Phase of their combined history. From 1971 to 2011, the two institutions continued on separate, but virtually parallel lines of development. President Richard Nixon’s decision to end the draft appeased the demands of all but the most radical anti-war protesters, and initiated the transition to an all-volunteer military. As

83 Coumbe and Harford, 221-23.

the “All-Volunteer Force” (AVF) gained its footing, ROTC continued to expand, but away from
the old elite schools of the Northeast and toward the expanding network of state colleges and
universities in the South, Midwest, and Southwest. In these regions, the military, particularly the
Army, found more cultural compatibility, and colleges and universities who had more to gain
from the prestige and funding of an ROTC program. According to the Wall Street Journal, the
Army closed forty-three ROTC programs in the Northeast and opened forty-five new programs in
the South from 1968 to 1974.85

Despite their growing geographic schism, both the military (particularly the Army) and
Ivy League struggled with similar challenges of reestablishing trust between their entry level
members and institutional leadership. Army leadership allotted greater standards of living and
pay to the now all volunteer privates, and employed them more explicitly in combat focused
training than menial work details.86 The AVF also brought greater recruitment and integration of
women and racial minorities.87

Further, the US Army took the Ivy League’s accusations of poor academic and training
standards to heart as part of its wider reorganization to the AVF. In 1973, the Army’s newly
formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) formed the office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for ROTC (DCSROTC), which provided a major general and a small staff of sixty personnel
to standardize ROTC training nationwide. Though limited in means and authority, the DCSROTC
was able to assess accurately ROTC’s challenges of low recruitment, inconsistent training

85 Greg Jaffe, “A Retreat from Big Cities Hurts ROTC Recruiting,” Wall Street Journal, February


DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1990), 287-88. ROTC was first open to women in 1972, and
grew almost exponentially from a pilot program of about 200 to over 3,000 in 1973, and over 15,000 by
1978. See also, Griffith, 235; and Neiberg, 164.
practices, and large proportion of underperforming ROTC graduates. The DCSROTC’s approach to solve these issues focused on standardizing training, motivating or replacing underperforming professors of military science (PMS), and increasing resources and standards for summer cadet training. In this final regard, the DCSROTC emulated the spirit of the “Harvard Plan” that was rejected two decades earlier. The DCSROTC became the foundation for the formation of US Army Cadet Command in 1986, which further expanded Army ROTC’s ability to modernize and implement standards.88

Despite these improvements, the Ivy League remained wary of association with the military. By the 1970s, the Ivy League had fully transitioned from the intellectual “arsenals of democracy” to what Downs and Murtazashvili frame as the “Paradigm of Civil Rights,” and posit that this paradigm shift explains the Ivy League’s continued resistance to ROTC, despite the end of the draft and modernization of the armed forces:

The civil rights paradigm became the centerpiece of new objections to ROTC—ironically, at the same time that general attitudes toward the military were leavening around the country. The ROTC movement at Columbia and elsewhere were appropriated the same language and logic of civil rights and identity (in the form of the politics of recognition) that its opponents deployed.89

While this new paradigm aligned well with the Army’s expanded integration of women and African-Americans, the Ivy League diverged significantly from the military over the issue of gay rights. Downs and Murtazashvili astutely recognize that in addition to the previously noted student riots of 1969, the gay rights movement rose to national prominence as a result of the Greenwich Village riots of June 28 that same year.90

88 Coumbe and Harford, 53-60.
89 Downs and Murtazashvili. 169-70.
90 Ibid., 169.
Thus, the attempts of ROTC advocates to reestablish programs at several Ivies throughout the 1980s and 1990s were frustrated by the increasing strength of the lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender (LGBT) rights advocates who fiercely opposed ROTC as an extension of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) prohibition of homosexual conduct and identification, which the DoD had reinforced at the end of 1980. The conflict came to a head in 1994 with the adoption of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy implemented under President William J. Clinton. The DADT was intended as a compromise to protect closeted gay and lesbian service members without legitimizing homosexuality in military culture. This compromise, however, only angered and emboldened LGBT rights advocates, especially in the Ivy League. The Harvard Gender and Sexuality Caucus (HGSC), for example, made DADT the centerpiece of its opposition to military cooperation. The HGSC successfully lobbied Harvard to ban all funding for ROTC until 2011, and to deny military recruiters access Harvard Law School to from 1998 to 2005.

However, Ivy League and elite schools such as Harvard, Yale, and Stanford, cornered themselves by opposing ROTC strictly on grounds that the program violated their non-discrimination policies. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, advocates for ROTC at banned universities argued that DADT, while indefensible, was insufficient to absolve universities of their responsibility to contribute to national defense.

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91 “The new DoD policy specified that gay sexual orientation alone, if unaccompanied by other charges, would result in an honorable (administrative) discharge. The new standards for an administrative discharge were: (1) a statement by a member that he or she is gay; (2) engagement in or attempted engagement in same-sex sexual acts; and (3) marriage or attempted marriage to a person of the same sex.” Bernard D. Rostker, Sexual Orientation and US Military Personnel Policy: An Update of RAND’s 1993 Study (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2010), 3.


The first significant milestone on the path toward renewed cooperation between the Ivy League and the military was the US Supreme Court case *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights* (FAIR). Writing in *Parameters*, US Army officer and Ivy League graduate Marc Lindemann describes how the Supreme Court upheld then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to enforce the 1994 Solomon Amendment, which required any university receiving federal research funding to allow military recruiters access to their students on par with civilian employers. The opponent, FAIR (a consortium of thirty-one law schools and professors), argued that the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment rights, but the court decided unanimously in favor of Rumsfeld. The court’s decision was particularly helpful to advocates of ROTC, in that it affirmed Rumsfeld’s interpretation that the Solomon Amendment held universities accountable for the policies of all their subordinate colleges. Thus, if Yale Medical School wished to receive US Government funding, military recruiters must receive fair access to all of Yale’s colleges, to include the undergraduate college that would host ROTC.94

The return of military recruiters to Ivy League and elite campuses increased discussion about the return of ROTC, but the issue was far from settled. Proponents of ROTC included university administrators, some students, and alumni groups such as “Advocates for ROTC,” while the most vocal opposition came from some faculty and the LGBT community.95 Despite openness by many faculty, students, and administrators, opposition to DADT remained insurmountable, as evidenced by the resignation of Harvard President Lawrence Summers,

94 Ibid., 45-46.

resulting from a vote of “no confidence” from the faculty after he publicly expressed support for returning ROTC to Harvard.⁹⁶

Ultimately, the repeal of DADT by President Barack Obama in 2010 cleared the path for ROTC’s return to the Ivy League. Much like the DoD’s recognition of gay service members, the return of ROTC to many Ivy League and elite campuses was a tremendous policy triumph with little measurable impact on the larger institutions. To a gay service member or aspiring Ivy League ROTC cadet, the repeal of DADT was monumental, but the average military service member or Ivy League student could still go about much of their day without knowingly encountering a homosexual in their ranks or a cadet in their classroom. Indeed, according to a 2009 RAND study, only 2.2 percent of men and 10.2 percent of women in the military identified as homosexual, and most Ivy League ROTC programs hosted fewer than a few dozen cadets out of several thousand undergraduates.⁹⁷

Recommendations

As stated previously, the present state of ROTC in the Ivy League and elite colleges is delicate, but improving. While there is lingering tension among LGBT rights advocates over the integration of transgender individuals, the DoD’s current policy allows current transgender servicemembers to serve openly (without the possibility for discharge solely on the basis of transgender status), and provides for the recruitment and induction of new transgender

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⁹⁶ Lindemann, 51.

servicemembers by July 2017. Barring a sudden policy reversal, the military is well on the way to full alignment with the university policy of individual rights.  

Thus, current and future challenges to strengthening ROTC in the Ivy League result largely from a lack of awareness, administrative support, and long term opportunities for service. In the first case, awareness, is already on the road to improvement. For example, current Harvard University President Drew Faust, who first invited ROTC’s return to Harvard in 2011, recently presided over a celebration of Harvard’s military heritage and conducted speaking engagements at the US Military Academy at West Point. While this level of public engagement by a university president lends considerable legitimacy to ROTC, the most effective promotion of a college’s program can come from the ROTC instructors themselves. Greg Jaffe, of the Wall Street Journal cites the example of Army Maj. Mike Hoblin of Fordham University, who increased participation of New York University students in his program from zero to nine in 2007 by personally engaging faculty and admissions representatives. As a New York City native and Fordham alumnus, Hoblin’s knowledge of the area and its politics was a critical factor in his ability to engage multiple schools, and should be a key consideration in the Army’s assignment of Professors of Military Science in Ivy League Schools.  

Outreach alone, however, cannot sustain growth without reformed administrative support. In this regard, Army Col. Everett Spain and Capt. Daniel Fisher provide excellent policy recommendations to promote the growth of ROTC at Ivy League and elite colleges in their white paper, “The Long Crimson Line.” In particular, Spain and Fisher note that ROTC scholarships, which negate other forms of financial aid at Harvard, placing undue financial burdens on the

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student. Thus, a high school senior who earns a national ROTC scholarship is more likely to choose a lower tier school with full support, and current Harvard students are less likely to accept an ROTC scholarship only to be disqualified for other financial aid they already receive. Harvard and other schools must adjust their financial aid policies to allow ROTC scholarship recipients to receive other forms of applicable financial aid. Likewise, the military should consider providing additional financial support to ROTC scholarship recipients who choose to attend Ivy League and elite colleges in return for additional active duty service commitment and/or high demand courses of study, such as cyber security. Harvard and other Ivy League and elite colleges should adopt Spain and Fisher’s recommendation to use Princeton’s Army ROTC program (consisting of twenty to thirty cadets) as a benchmark for recruiting goals.\textsuperscript{100}

Administratively and logistically, ROTC programs at most Ivy League and elite colleges remain satellites of larger programs at other schools: Harvard students attend training at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dartmouth at Norwich University, Yale at University of Connecticut, Stanford at Santa Clara University, and many others. These cross-enrollment agreements are efficient from an administrative perspective, but impose significant travel burdens on the cadets, who must attend classes away from their own campus. While Harvard, Yale, and Stanford all provide support to traveling students (such as zip-cars) and many academic courses are taught on campus (under the contemporary substitution model), cadets must still travel to host schools for physical training and leadership laboratory. These activities require direct supervision of ROTC cadre and are most effective in groups of twelve or more cadets. Thus, the logistical challenges of participating in an Ivy League or elite college ROTC program are not likely to change without sufficient enrollment to support full on-campus training.

\textsuperscript{100} Spain and Fisher, 9.
Accreditation of ROTC courses presents another opportunity to support greater interest in and feasibility of Ivy League and elite ROTC programs. Substituting ROTC academic courses for those taught by host colleges must continue, as it takes full advantage of the elite college’s world class learning environment. Likewise, ROTC Cadet Command must not be satisfied with the lack of course credit for exclusively military courses. Practically speaking, course credit for mil-lab and technical training (such as land navigation) may not be an issue at fully independent programs such as Princeton and MIT, but could ease the course load on travelling cadets at Harvard, Stanford, and elsewhere. Attaining course credit in technical subjects also presents a positive challenge for ROTC training developers to strengthen the theoretic and pedagogical foundations of their training. To avoid a mass overhaul of the Army ROTC Program of Instruction, modification of technical courses at elite schools could be done locally on an experimental basis. This approach would facilitate further college faculty and ROTC cadre collaboration, and potentially increase the value of ROTC training nation-wide.

Finally, the military services, particularly the Army in this case, should by providing specialized career opportunities for Ivy League and elite college graduates, as recommended by Spain and Fisher. 101 As noted earlier, the Army could offer supplemental financial support (beyond normal ROTC scholarships) in return for greater active duty service obligations and directed academic specialization. Such a program would complement and support the Army Talent Management Strategy by providing a source of specialized talent educated in academically

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101 Ibid., 48.
superior institutions. To cope with historically low retention rates among elite college graduate junior officers, the Army should consider alternative career paths such as direct commissioning cyber warfare officers and placement of junior Military Intelligence officers in strategic-level organizations. In keeping with Morris Janowitz’s concept of the “military intellectual,” such officers’ career paths would be focused from the outset on key advisory roles and the command of small but highly specialized units.

Conclusion

Each of these recommendations are sufficiently broad and significant to warrant extensive further study prior to implementation. At this phase, however, it is sufficient for the Army recognize that it must evaluate its partnerships with Ivy League and elite colleges through different metrics than state universities. Just as US Army Cadet Command operates on special considerations for senior military colleges (to include a separate subordinate command), special consideration is warranted for America’s most competitive colleges.

While the addition of more officers with Ivy League and elite college degrees would be a tremendous boon to the US Military and the nation as a whole, the true lesson of the marriage

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103 “Cyber Warfare Officer (17A),” US Army Careers and Jobs, accessed April 9, 2017, http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/computers-and-technology/cyber-operations-officer.html. The Army now accepts new officers into its Cyber Warfare branch, but with specific undergraduate education requirements, to include a bachelor’s (or higher) degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, information systems, information assurance, cyber security or mathematics. See also, Janowitz, 430-31.
between the Ivy League and the US Military is on the emergence of ROTC’s true nature. The system of ROTC began with the vision of Alden Partridge, an intellectual vision focused foremost on the development of character and intellect, followed by technical skill. This vision, however, remained as unpopular with the American military establishment as it was when Partridge was court-martialed and dismissed commandant of West Point. Throughout ROTC’s history, the Army demonstrated consistent intent for ROTC to serve as an economic source of average officers to be defended or modified in times of internal crisis but otherwise largely ignored. Whenever resource constraints forced the Army to choose between intellectual or martial development of its ROTC cadets, it chose the latter. This decades-long pattern of decision-making added fuel for the fiery protests of the late 1960s, and left elite college faculty indifferent or openly hostile to ROTC’s continued presence in their institutions. The Army had its own rich intellectual traditions at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, but not in ROTC prior to the 1980s.

Prior to “the divorce” (to borrow Downs and Murtazashvili’s characterization), various elite and regular college faculties and administrators were the only consistent advocates for improving ROTC’s intellectual content. While the colleges’ self-interest in reforming ROTC was a clear factor, the elite schools in particular could have just as easily rejected ROTC entirely, as many of them did in and around 1969. Yet their decision to reject ROTC came only after decades of quiet frustration over low academic standards, perceived indifference toward academic titles, and a clear preference for rote memorization and drill.

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104 Webb, 12. Partridge’s original name for his school, The American Scientific and Literary Academy, bears no mention of military training at all, but advocates the value of a liberal arts education.

105 Coumbe and Harford, 170.
Even under such challenges, faculty in Ivy League and elite schools supported ROTC until faced with existential challenges from student protests. Short of ending the draft in 1967 (a year prior to the culmination of Columbia’s protests), neither college administrators nor military leaders could have prevented the massive social upheaval generated by SDS and sympathetic students and faculty. However, a more proactive, accommodating, and unified response to protest demands by both college and military leadership, such as that of the Benson Report, could have helped ROTC weather the storm in the Ivy League. The relatively swift, albeit diminished, return of Princeton’s Army ROTC program offers a case in point. Such unity of effort cannot be manufactured at the onset of crisis, but grown and tended over years of positive interaction and shared ownership of each ROTC program between the Army and the host college.

Fortunately, the wider arch of history favors a greater alignment of military and elite academic interests than that of the past half century. ROTC programs can continue to function as institutional bridges between elite campuses and military. A new generation of students and cadets, unsullied by either the open hostility of Vietnam era protests or the quiet ossification of DADT, is rising to take their place at America’s elite colleges. Some of these young people will answer the call to serve their nation through ROTC, while many more will ascend to positions of significant political and economic influence. Now is the opportunity to educate this new generation to form, as the framers intended, “a more perfect union” between the institutions that have both thought and fought to define and protect these United States of America.
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