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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Liberia is one of the poorest countries in West Africa and prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, was still struggling to recover from the 1980 to 2003 civil war. The international humanitarian community, led by the United Nations Mission in Liberia, has attempted to address Liberia’s recovery and reconstruction. The analysis reveals that with clearly defined ends, the U.S. military can be used to achieve narrow facets of specific national security strategy. Economic and information aspects of national power must be addressed by other U.S. government agencies for Liberia’s recovery and reconstruction to be effective. Liberia has made significant efforts to achieving increased gender integration. Consistent, combined efforts by Liberia and international partners must continue these initial efforts. Since 2010, U.S. Africa Command, through the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa, has been mentoring the Armed Forces of Liberia counterparts. This has significantly professionalized Liberia’s security forces. However, the Liberian security forces need to continue to grow and professionalize for the defense of Liberia. The United States should continue to provide consistent military, economic, and information assistance to Liberia through 2020.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Liberia is one of the poorest countries in West Africa and prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, was still struggling to recover from the 1980 to 2003 civil war. The international humanitarian community, led by the United Nations Mission in Liberia, has attempted to address Liberia’s recovery and reconstruction. The analysis reveals that with clearly defined ends, the U.S. military can be used to achieve narrow facets of specific national security strategy. Economic and information aspects of national power must be addressed by other U.S. government agencies for Liberia’s recovery and reconstruction to be effective. Liberia has made significant efforts to achieving increased gender integration. Consistent, combined efforts by Liberia and international partners must continue these initial efforts. Since 2010, U.S. Africa Command, through the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa, has been mentoring the Armed Forces of Liberia counterparts. This has significantly professionalized Liberia’s security forces. However, the Liberian security forces need to continue to grow and professionalize for the defense of Liberia. The United States should continue to provide consistent military, economic, and information assistance to Liberia through 2020.
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Recognizing that no society will succeed if it does not draw on the potential of all its people, we are pressing for the political and economic participation of women and girls—who are too often denied their inalienable rights and face substantial barriers to opportunity in too many places. Our efforts include helping girls everywhere get the education they need to participate fully in the economy and realize their potential. We are focused on reducing the scourge of violence against women around the globe by providing support for affected populations and enhancing efforts to improve judicial systems so perpetrators are held accountable.

—U.S. President, National Security Strategy

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa saw over 6,000 cases diagnosed in Liberia from 25 March through 19 November 2014. The capital, Monrovia, was perceived by the international community to be overwhelmed with the initial outbreak; quick action was taken to stem the disease from spreading further. An already post-conflict situation was further exasperated by Liberia’s lack of capacity and capability to care for the sick and appropriately handle the deceased. The international community’s concern with this crisis was linked to the knowledge that Liberia is still recovering from two periods of conflict from the 1980s through 2003, with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) still engaged in rebuilding efforts. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would lead the United States government (USG) response to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia (U.S. President 2014, 1).

At the end of November 2014, the 101st Airborne Division deployed over 700 soldiers to Western Africa to support USAID in fighting the disease with engineer support, logistics, and training support, a total Department of Defense (DOD) commitment of over 3,500 personnel (U.S. President 2014, 1). The DOD response is in a
supporting role, to provide USAID capabilities not readily available through other means. For at least the next year, possibly the next few years, the U.S. military, in coordination with the pre-existing UNMIL mission will form a western presence in Liberia.

This presents an opportunity for the United States to take a whole of government approach (WOGA), through Operation Unified Assistance, to influence our Liberian partners to increase gender integration at the ministerial level. Liberia will continue to recover from both the 2014 Ebola outbreak and develop sustainable national institutions following twenty-three of conflict. The U.S. military, in a supporting role, can build on its most recent experiences while engaged in stabilization and reconstruction efforts during the previous thirteen-plus years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. forces could influence Liberian partners towards greater gender normalization now, while in the shaping phase, which in turn would help Liberia stabilize following the Ebola outbreak and the previous conflicts. This may seem an altruistic goal for the US government to undertake, but is a responsible use of U.S. military personnel towards strengthening long-term U.S. national security, while aiding the Government of Liberia’s (GOL) ongoing reconstruction and stability efforts. These efforts would also support the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) goal to advance equality by, “reducing the scourge of violence against women around the globe by providing support for affected populations and enhancing efforts to improve the judicial systems so perpetrators are held accountable” (U.S. President 2015, 20).

This thesis presents the means the U.S. military, specifically the Army, can implement the ways identified in the 2015 NSS to increase gender integration in Liberia at the cabinet level. An increased U.S. focus on gender integration was ordered by the
Executive Order signed by President Obama entitled “Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.” This plan describes the course the USG will take to accelerate, institutionalize, and better coordinate our efforts to advance women’s inclusion in peace negotiations, peacebuilding activities, and conflict prevention; to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence; and to ensure equal access to relief and recovery assistance, in areas of conflict and insecurity (U.S. President 2011, 1). The 2011 United States National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security (NAP on WPS) builds on the previously published 2010 NSS and both facilitate U.S. NSS goals towards “promoting universal values abroad” (U.S. President 2011, 1).

Chapter 1 of this thesis will include two parts. The first part provides a general history and background on Liberia and historical U.S. and Liberian diplomatic, informational, military, and economic relationships. In the second portion, the problem statement, primary and secondary research questions, definitions, and other pertinent research issues will be discussed.

Background

This section will discuss an overview of Liberia and the political situation from 1971 to 2014, and how Ebola has further strained a country still in post-conflict recovery. This section will also provide a brief overview of U.S. involvement in Liberia since the end of World War II in 1945. The background provides an overview of Liberia’s politics during the 1980 to 2003 eras of conflict. This provides a better understanding of the complexity of containing the Ebola outbreak or a future epidemic, while balancing the ongoing Liberian reconstruction efforts, in a challenging security environment. Further, it builds the context for the use of the U.S. national diplomatic, information, military, and
economic power, as directed by U.S. strategic documents, towards improving Liberian
gender integration.

Overview and Political Situation in Liberia

Liberia is located on the west coast of Africa, bordered by Sierra Leone to the
northwest, Guinea to north, and Cote D’Ivoire to the east. It has a population of over 4.5
million, founded in 1847, as a republic by former slaves from the United States. The
former slaves arrived throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century and ruled
the country with inconsistent assimilation of the native inland tribes. Early settlers called
themselves Americo-Liberians and engaged in civil wars with the native tribes through
much of the nineteenth and twentieth century. It is both the oldest African nation and the
only one never colonized (Intelligence Knowledge Network and Forum 2014, 1).

Liberia has been through three constitutions with the latest taking effect in
January 2006. The president, elected by popular vote every six years, is both the chief of
state and head of the government, with a cabinet ratified by the senate. The senate and
house of representatives is also elected every six years. There are fifteen administrative
divisions throughout the country ruled through a mixed legal system consisting of
common law, based on Anglo-American law, and tribal law. The official language is
English with thirteen native languages also spoken (Intelligence Knowledge Network and
Forum 2014, 1).

The president of Liberia from 1944 to 1971, William Tubman, worked with the
United States to increase foreign investment in the country, using it to build the country’s
infrastructure, increase educational opportunities, and assimilate the inland tribes.
Tubman abolished presidential term limits and allowed the appearance of cronyism to
develop during his long term-rule. This resulted in both attempts on his life and the Tubman regime turning increasingly authoritarian. After his death in 1971, William Tolbert, his long-serving vice-president, replaced him doing little to appease any of the opposition parties (Waugh 2011, 13).

Tolbert attempted reforms to integrate larger portions of the native population into the existing one-party government. He also amended the constitution to limit presidential time in office to twelve years. However, many of his reforms were too late for the restless rival parties and he continued to face growing opposition. The native tribes of the interior areas were no longer content with the ruling Americo-Liberian elite, one party political system. Tolbert also turned away from the United States and made diplomatic connections with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Libya in an attempt to rule the country without U.S. interference and build Liberia’s reputation as an independent nation. The connections to communism were not received well by the United States and diplomatic connections were severed until 1980. In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, from the Liberian Army, led a rebellion to overthrow Tolbert which would plunge the country into strife, corruption, and conflict until 2003 (Waugh 2011, 13-14).
After the successful coup, Doe promoted himself to general, suspended the national constitution, and declared himself head of state. Along with the People’s Redemption Council, the Doe regime almost immediately began publicly executing Tolbert’s remaining cabinet members and close supporters. He did much of this under the watch of the international community as he invited international media to witness and record the mass executions on the beaches of Monrovia. He relied heavily on his tribal roots to empower many of his soldiers from the Krahn tribe to carry out the executions. Doe was the first indigenous ruler of the nation, but was handicapped by his limited...
education to run a country after decimating the former ruling party. Elites that did escape execution often fled to the United States or European nations (Waugh 2011, 4-6).

Doe attempted to modernize the nation by opening his country’s ports to foreign investment and holding elections in 1985, but was largely unsuccessful due to his inability to rule and administrate Liberia, rampant government corruption, and cronyism. He was considered an important ally to the United States during the Cold War and formally broke Liberian diplomatic ties with the United Soviet Socialist Republic and Cuba. Charles Taylor, a former ally, killed Doe in a 1990 coup. By this time, the United States and much of the western world had grown tired of corrupt Liberian rulers. With the United Soviet Socialist Republic’s recent collapse and the dwindling threat of communism’s spread, the United States no longer needed Liberia as an ally on the African continent and began to distance themselves by stopping economic aid (Waugh 2011, 4).

Taylor graduated from Bentley College in Massachusetts with a bachelor’s degree, spending much of his young adult life on the U.S. east coast. He supported Doe’s coup first from the United States and after returning to Liberia, secured a position as the Director General of the General Service Administration in the Doe administration (Waugh 2011, 65). In 1985, following charges of embezzlement by Doe, Taylor fled Liberia and was detained in Massachusetts for two years at the request of the Doe regime. Taylor later escaped through Mexico in 1987 (Waugh 2011, 65).

Much of Taylor’s detention, escape from detention in the United States, and rise to power in Liberia reads like a movie. He returned to Africa in 1987 and first trained in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi as a guerrilla fighter and leader before returning to the
tribal areas of Liberia to rally tribal followers to take over much of the countryside. Despite the joint military intervention by the Economic Community Monitoring Group, led by Nigeria, by 1990 Taylor gained control of key ports and infrastructure in the country. His soldiers were known for brutal treatment of non-combatant men, women, and children and lived by the motto ‘Pay yourself.’ Since Taylor did not have the means to feed or pay his men, they raped and pillaged their way through the Liberian countryside (Waugh 2011, 173). He gained control over much of the country’s resources and the conflict became an inter-tribal fight for control of the country’s natural resources. Taylor remained in power until 2003, when he resigned due to international pressure and was exiled to Nigeria. In 2012, the international Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague, Netherlands sentenced him to fifty years in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during both the Liberian Civil Wars and the Sierra Leone Civil War (Brumfield 2012).

In 2003, the current President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf assumed power under a transitional government and in 2006 was democratically elected and subsequently re-elected in 2011. Sirleaf was the first female president on the continent of Africa and in Liberia (Cooper 2010, 43). UNMIL was established by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1509 on 19 September 2003 in order to implement the ceasefire and supervise the peace agreement, support humanitarian and human rights activities, and help train and restructure the security forces (UNSC 2003, 3). The Sirleaf administration, with the help of the UNMIL and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), had begun the hard work of reconciling former warring parties while also rebuilding the country’s decimated infrastructure and economy.
This has been quite an undertaking prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak and likely will require at least another decade, since as of 2005 there was no electricity or clean drinking water even in the capital of Monrovia (Cooper 2010, 47). The re-building of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) also only began in 2010. Prior to 2010, the focus had been on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of the former warring factions (USAFRICOM 2015, 1).

Liberia’s Economic Situation, Internal Security, and Ebola

According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, Liberia is highly dependent on foreign assistance due to the low gross national product; ranked 184th in the world in 2014. This is due to much of the national economy and infrastructure being destroyed during the previous twenty-plus years of conflict. International investors also fled the country taking both capital and expertise. Since 2006 and the election of President Sirleaf, a Harvard educated, former World Bank (WB) administrator, the Liberian ports have opened to international businesses and outside investment has begun to return to the country (CIA 2014).

Liberia’s largest resources are mineral resources, water, and forests. The national economy has grown through the export of timber, iron ore, and rubber. Reforming corruption inherited from the previous government and former warlords continues to plague Sirleaf and her administration. The WB issued a report on 2 December 2014, estimating the impact of the Ebola epidemic on Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. The Liberian gross domestic product growth will drop to a 2.2 percent increase as opposed to a pre-crisis estimate of 5.9 percent increase. However, Liberia’s gross domestic product growth estimate for 2015 is three percent, higher than both neighboring Sierra Leone,
downgraded to negative two percent decline, and Guinea, downgraded to less than one percent growth (WB 2014a).

Security in the country has improved since 2003 despite the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and due to the 2014 outbreak, the UNMIL mission will be maintained at current levels through 2015 (UNSC 2015, 1). However, the slowly increasing gross domestic product combined with corruption has kept international investment stagnant. These factors are inextricably linked as investment in Liberia’s infrastructure development is essential to continued growth, which would also help the long-term fight against Ebola. Investors and NGOs can rapidly become unsettled by corruption or the threat of another Ebola outbreak next spring. Recovery from these interlinked problems will need to be addressed for years, if not decades to come, with the United States likely playing a part in leading this international recovery effort.

**U.S. Involvement in Liberia since 1945**

The western settlement of Liberia began in the nineteenth century. It was an unevenly supported project to move former and freed slaves back to Africa prior to the American Civil War and the U.S. abolishment of slavery. The effort was backed financially by the U.S. Congress, in 1819, with $100,000 to help fund the American Colonization Society transportation and logistics for the trip to Africa. The American Colonization Society sent three negotiators to accompany the first settlers, help bargain for land, and provide initial security requirements during settlement. Although many of the first Liberian settlers had emotional ties to America, the sentiments were not shared in both directions thus straining relationships, over the decades, until 2003 and the end of the Taylor regime (Waugh 2011, 7-8).
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States and the American Colonization Society sent additional settlers to Liberia, mostly through the society’s fundraising efforts versus U.S. funding. The United States and Liberia maintained diplomatic ties, especially following the end of World War II, but the United States was uneasy about becoming overly engaged in imperialistic operations in the country. Firestone Corporation (FC) established a million-acre rubber plantation in 1926, which infused the Liberian economy with revenue and jobs to help develop the nation’s infrastructure in the capital and surrounding areas. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States leveraged Liberia, first during the Doe and then later Taylor administrations, in order to counter the United Soviet Socialist Republic and communism’s spread in Africa. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. interest and financial support diminished (Waugh 2011, 28).

During the 1990s through 2003, specifically Taylor’s time as head of the country, the United States and Liberia interacted less frequently. There were several breaks in the country’s civil wars during this time but the United States stayed out of most discussions and allowed African countries to arrange peace agreements in the country. Unchecked rule by Taylor allowed the conflict to spread across borders as he sought to export neighboring countries’ natural resources through the Liberian ports he controlled. In 2003, the United States used its influence with Liberia to encourage Taylor to relinquish his presidency because of accusations alleging his support of Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah (Waugh 2011, 225-226). As previously covered, this is when current president Sirleaf entered office. The UNMIL was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping mission providing humanitarian and human rights assistance, along with recruiting and training the Liberian
National Police. Currently there are 7,500 defense forces committed to the mission (UNSC 2013, 1). As of October 2014, due to the Ebola outbreak, the United States had 3,500 joint forces committed to Operation United Assistance in Liberia (U.S. President 2014, 1).

The aforementioned minority rulers failed to adequately integrate the rural, tribal country with the economic centers in the capital and coastal area. This was followed by over twenty years of corrupt rulers, from the tribal areas, exploiting the country’s natural resources for personal gain. During this twenty years there was on again, off again conflict that has left Liberia in need of infrastructure re-building, economic development and stabilization, and long-term recovery. These efforts were further disrupted by the 2014 Ebola outbreak.

Problem Statement

This research will focus on the ability of the U.S. military, primarily the Army, as part of a WOGA, to successfully implement increased gender integration at the ministerial level in accordance with current U.S. national strategic documents. The role of the military will likely be as a supporting USG agency to either the Department of State (DOS) or USAID. Current U.S. strategic level policy documents and gender integration efforts will be examined to cognitively and practically link them to the Joint and Army stability support operations doctrine and concepts, building partner capacity (BPC), and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) doctrine. Past research has used Liberia as a case study to examine developing gender equality at the ministerial level and offered recommendations for improving the cause of gender equality through Security Cooperation (SC) by improving the military and USG agencies use of a WOGA.
This issue will continue to be present in future U.S. conflicts, SC, and stability operations. Currently groups like the Da’sh, formerly called the Islamic State in Iraq, and Boko Haram are kidnapping women and girls to be used as temporary brides, to use slaves for their men, or ransom for money. It has been reported that they are often being sexually abused and tossed aside (Leitsinger and Burton 2015). Since 9/11, the United States has been fighting conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Increasing gender integration and women’s political representation was included in both Iraqi and Afghan constitutions but not implemented rigorously by the host nation or U.S. agencies, often for fear of offending the host nation. The issue has now been integrated into the more recent national strategy documents, DOS and USAID strategy, and DOD strategic and operational level documents (U.S. President 2011, 1-2).

The 2010 NSS also included gender integration, not as a stated priority, but as part of a need to synchronize efforts across the USG through the adequate implementation of measures of effectiveness and performance across a WOGA. Because of the 2010 NSS, the DOS issued the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) in 2010, and subsequently in 2011, the White House also issued the NAP on WPS. Since DOD is, and will remain, the largest USG agency, the U.S. military is likely to provide capacities or capabilities to increase gender integration at the ministerial level during stability and reconstruction operations across the Combatant Commands, as well during participation in Stability Operations (SO), TSC, or BPC missions.
Primary Research Question

How can the U.S. DOD support the U.S. NAP on WPS in Liberia, by using U.S. military power (means) to implement the national strategy (ways) to increase stability (ends)?

Secondary Research Question

What is Liberia’s national strategy (ways) and military power (means) towards increasing gender integration?

Assumptions

The following assumptions are believed to remain true, and add relevance to this research project. The U.S. military will play a supporting role, as part of a WOGA during stability and reconstruction operations, in order to shape or deter conflict across U.S. areas of responsibility. The USG will continue to strive to strengthen nations recovering, both at risk and recovering from conflict, while ensuring greater protections of human rights in these same countries. Implementing greater gender integration and equality will be part of the efforts to ensure human rights to improve local conditions as part of the goal for U.S. stability efforts in post-conflict or at-risk states. Gender integration is a crosscutting issue that cannot be addressed alone, but considered during all development and reconstruction efforts.

Joint forces will play a role in this effort with the U.S. Army playing the largest role as the provider of the preponderance of the nation’s ground forces. This will be done as part of a WOGA, likely with the DOS and USAID remaining the supported USG agency and the military a supporting agency. Although the U.S. military has the capacity
to conduct this and other stability operations, the capability for this largely resides inside the DOS, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), and NGOs.

Definitions

**Cabinet or Ministerial Level:** Cabinet and ministerial level refer to an equal level group of government advisors to the head of the state who are normally the head of individual administrative government departments. The composition of cabinets varies widely by country, sometimes elected but often appointed by the ruling or majority party.

**Capability:** In DOD Directive 7045.20, “Capability Portfolio Management,” it is defined as “Ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and ways across doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action” (DOD 2008a, 8).

**Capacity:** A proposed definition from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The US Army Operating Concept* is “sufficient scale to accomplish the mission; actual or potential ability to perform” (USATRADOC 2014, 45).

**Culture:** Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession* defines culture as consisting of “the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution over time. Culture is deeply rooted in long-held beliefs and customs and evolves slowly” (HQDA 2013a, A-1).

**Ends, Ways, and Means:** H. Richard Yarger states, “ends are objectives that support the desired end state. Ways are the actions to be taken to achieve the objectives
or ends. Means refers to the resources required to accomplish the actions” (Yarger 2010, 1).

**Gender Integration:** In “Gender Integration and Female Empowerment Policy,” USAID, March 2012, gender integration is explained as “concerns women and men, and it involves working with men and boys, women and girls to bring about changes in attitudes, behaviors, roles, and responsibilities at home, in the workplace, and in the community. Genuine integration means more than parity in numbers or laws on the books; it means expanding freedoms and improving overall quality of life so that integration is achieved without sacrificing gains for males or females” (USAID 2012a, 3).

**Partnership:** Defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability Operations* as “Collaborating closely with governments, communities, donors, IGOs, NGOs, the private sector, and universities” (JCS 2011b, F-2).

**Security Assistance (SA):** Defined by JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* as, “Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency” (JCS 2014, 222).

**Whole of Government Approach:** JP 3-07, *Stability Operations* discusses WOGA as an “approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Under unified action, a
whole-of-government approach is driven by the search for those combinations of USG resources and activities that reinforce progress made in one sector or enable success in another. To do this, interagency members must, to the greatest degree possible, resist seeing their resources (financial, diplomatic, military, development, intelligence, economic, SC, law enforcement, consular, commerce) as belonging to any one agency, Service, or entity. All are tools of USG power” (JCS 2011b, B1).

Limitations

Time constraints are a limitation of this study, limiting the amount of data that can be reviewed and analyzed in ten months. This will be mitigated by setting 1 May 2015 as the latest date that new sources will be included in the this study. The research will largely be restricted to primary and secondary sources available at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and online. The research is also limited by my cultural perspective and background as a white middle-class male, raised in the United States with only growing second hand knowledge of Liberia and Western Africa.

Delimitations

This study will offer recommendations for updates to elements of U.S. Army Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). The categories of material, leadership, personnel, and facilities will not be analyzed. These categories are outside the scope and ten-month time limit of this study.

This study will also only cover gender integration efforts in Liberia. The literature review contained in this study will not cover evolving field of feminist international
relations theory or holistic gender approaches. Feminist international relations focus on
the current patriarchal nature of international and national organization leadership. In
short, it strives to examine how increasing women’s role as leaders in national and
international organizations, can improve the field of international relations (Tickner,
1992, 1-5). Although feminist international relations theory contains additional
perspectives to consider, it is outside the scope of this thesis.

This research will also only focus on the post-conflict period in Liberia, after
2003. There is growing research that analyzes the role of women as combatants and men
as non-combatants in conflict (Vess et al. 2013, 1). It seeks to recast gender in a more
holistic view and examine how traditional gender roles have changed in several recent
conflicts. Both approaches were informative to the challenges of gender integration
efforts and are relevant to future research projects but are outside the limits of this
research.

Conclusion

This study explores the idea that in order to implement increased gender
integration at the cabinet level, as mandated in U.S. strategic level documents, the U.S.
military must be focused on this goal during stability and reconstruction efforts before
and after conflict in at risk countries. It recognizes these NSS goals are legal obligations
extending from both The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UNUHDR) of 1948, and the 2000 UNSCR 1325 on WPS. Most recently, this has been
an objective during Iraq and Afghanistan recovery and reconstruction efforts. A post-
conflict national experience, in the case study selected, can highlight best practices that
the USG can adapt during stability and reconstruction operations in order to achieve
stated U.S. national security objectives. During these efforts, the ability to influence
gender integration is achievable as part of a WOGA. The U.S. military possesses both the
capacity and capability, on its own or as a supporting agency, as part of a WOGA to
improve the USG’s gender integration efforts.

The literature review will focus on the U.S. national and strategic documents,
joint and Army doctrine, the current operational environment, and common ground in
gender issues, as they all relate to the primary and secondary research questions. An
explanation of the methodology used in the research will be described in chapter 3.
Chapter 4 will discuss the findings of the qualitative study and outline past best efforts at
gender integration. The final chapter will contain the conclusions and recommendations
for U.S. military gender integration efforts and possible areas for future research in this or
related areas of study.
We also know that countries are more likely to prosper when they tap the talents of all their people. In addition that’s why we’re investing in the health, education and rights of women, and working to empower the next generation of women entrepreneurs and leaders. Because when mothers and daughters have access to opportunity, that’s when economies grow, that’s when governance improves.

— President Barrack Obama, “Remarks at the Millennium Development Goals Summit,” quoted in USAID, U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender Based Violence

Introduction

The responsibility to increase gender equality and women’s rights in post-conflict, recovering states has been integrated into U.S. national and strategic level documents, legally extending from UNUDHR. The United States, as a drafting member and signatory of the 1948 UNUDHR and the 2000 UNSCR 1325 on WPS subsequently published the 2011 NAP on WPS. The 2015 NSS, 2010 QDDR, and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review are national level documents addressing the U.S. legal obligation to integrate gender into U.S. diplomacy, development, and security operations. Several documents also address the need to protect women and children prior to and following conflict as they are at an increased risk of being injured or abused during these precarious times.

There is also a great deal written about the long-term role education, economic opportunity, and the impact of women’s inequality in the family and community can play in safeguarding societies against conflict. There are several sources that address the U.S. military’s SO, BPC, and TSC efforts directly that offer applicability to the research questions. All of the above referenced sources will be discussed as they relate to the
primary research question: How can the U.S. DOD support the U.S. NAP for on WPS in Liberia, by using the U.S. military power (means) to implement the national strategy (ways) to increase stability (ends)?

The literature review in this chapter is divided into six sections that will address both the primary and secondary research questions. The first section will address U.S. national and strategic level documents and Liberia’s national development strategy. The second section covers joint and Army foundational and stability operations doctrine. The common operational environment will be discussed in the next section to link the changes in joint and Army doctrine to the implementation of new concepts because of the most recent doctrine. The U.S. military experience with gender integration will be covered in the fifth section. The last section will cover the common ground in gender issues across the sources covered in the literature review.

**U.S. Strategic Documents**

The U.S. military’s actions are mandated by several USG programmatic strategy documents. The NSS, published February 2015, is mandated to be published every four years as a principal document to explain the U.S. vision of its role in the international community. In the current NSS, the administration focused on ensuring the United States holds “ourselves to international norms and standards that we expect other nations to uphold” (U.S. President 2015, 3). It also highlights the need to press “for the political and economic participation of women and girls” (U.S. President 2015, 20).

The promotion of universal values, increasing human rights abroad, and upholding the rule of law are highlighted as key goals that advance U.S. national objectives. As mentioned above, the 2015 U.S. NSS and 2011 NAP on WPS is written as
a legal responsibility from the UNUDHR. Under the 2015 NSS promotion of democracy section, “Supporting the Rights of Women and Girls,” is expanded upon:

Women should have access to the same opportunities and be able to make the same choices as men. Experience shows that countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity. When those rights and opportunities are denied, countries often lag behind. Furthermore, women and girls often disproportionately bear the burden of crises and conflict. Therefore the United States is working with regional and international organizations to prevent violence against women and girls, especially in conflict zones. We are supporting women’s equal access to justice and their participation in the political process. We are promoting child and maternal health. We are combating human trafficking, especially in women and girls, through domestic and international law enforcement. And we are supporting education, employment, and micro-finance to empower women globally. (U.S. President 2015, 38)

Consequently, the current administration, in 2011, issued the NAP on WPS to detail expectations of subordinate government agencies.

The DOS QDDR was issued in 2010 prior to the NAP on WPS and was first to directly address the need to increase developmental investment in women by focusing on gender equality. It calls for gender to be considered in all diplomatic and development policies and planning efforts throughout DOS and the USAID. Additionally, it calls to elevate gender integration in Washington, DC and expand gender integration training in the field. Increasing gender equality and integration is held up as a responsible effort for the continued development of democracy, human rights, and governance across the globe (U.S. President 2010, 89).

The December 2011 NAP on WPS directly addressed the tasks needed for the United States to develop a comprehensive gender plan integrated throughout subsequent national security, and diplomacy and development strategies. The NAP “builds upon the goals for gender integration described in the U.S. NSS and 2010 QDDR. Gender
integration involves identifying and addressing, in all our policies and programs, gender differences and inequalities, as well as the roles of women and men. The goal of gender integration or ‘mainstreaming’ is to promote gender equality and improve programming and policy outcomes” (U.S. President 2011, 1). The combined elements of U.S. diplomatic, information, military, and economic national power are called to action in order to work together in a WOGA, alongside international partners, to achieve the policy objectives in the plan. The five national objectives identified in the NAP are national integration and institutionalization, participation in peace process and decision-making, protection from violence, conflict prevention, and access to relief and recovery. Additionally, the DOD, DOS, and USAID were directed to appoint at least one officer responsible for “coordination and implementation of the NAP” (U.S. President 2011, 12-13).

In 2012, DOD published Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense detailing how U.S. strategic interests would be advanced and protected in the future. The ten core missions that DOD must be expected to accomplish are:

1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
3. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
4. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
5. Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
6. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
7. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence
9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations (DOD 2012, 4-6).

Five of the ten DOD identified missions: deterring aggression, providing a stabilizing presence, conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations, and conducting humanitarian, and disaster relief operations, are proposed as ways to deter aggression and ensure stability, build partner capacity through SA and TSC, and strengthen partner relationships (DOD 2012, 7). Further, this document points out that the U.S. military must improve innovative and low-cost approaches in achieving our national security objectives, through integration with likeminded partners who share a common vision (DOD 2012, 3).

The DOD has subsequently addressed the national objectives of the NAP on WPS with *Department of Defense Implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, issued on 5 April 2012 to detail the U.S. military’s role in the WOGA effort. The Secretary of Defense directed all Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff, the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Combatant Commands, and other equivalent defense agencies to incorporate the NAP concepts into all appropriate programs and policies. The memorandum designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the responsible DOD agent for implementation of the NAP objectives specific to the DOD strategic planning processes, and reporting on progress (DOD 2012, 4). DOD outlined eighteen activities that support the five NAP objectives. Table 1 illustrates the framework to be implemented across DOD to support the five NAP objectives.
<table>
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<th>DOD Outcomes</th>
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| Institutionalization: | a. Establish and improve policy frameworks to support achievements in gender equality and women’s empowerment throughout defense work.  
   b. Enhance staff capacity for applying a gender-sensitive approach to defense in conflict-affected environments.  
   c. Establish mechanisms to promote accountability for implementation of gender-related policies in conflict-affected environments.  
   d. Establish processes to evaluate and learn from activities undertaken in support of Women, Peace, and Security initiatives.  |
| Participation: | a. Effectively engage women in peace negotiations, security initiatives, conflict prevention, peace-building, and decision-making during all phases of conflict prevention and resolution, and transition.  
   b. Laws, policies, and practices in partner states promote and strengthen gender equality at national and local levels.  |
| Protection: | a. Decrease risks of Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in crisis and conflict-affected environments through the increased capacity of individuals, communities, and protection actors to address the threats and vulnerability associated with SGBV.  
   b. Develop and implement laws, policies, and reconciliation, transitional justice, and accountability mechanisms designed to combat exploitation, abuse, discrimination, and violence against women and girls.  
   c. Improve interventions to prevent TIP and protect trafficking survivors in conflict and crisis-affected areas.  |
| Prevention: | a. Ensure conflict early warning and response systems include gender-specific data and are responsive to SGBV, and women participate in early warning, preparedness, and response initiatives.  |
| Access: | a. Address the distinct needs of men and women in reintegration and early recovery programs.  |

Liberia Strategic Documents

The *Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy* (LPRS) was published in 2008, integrating gender throughout the recovery plan. This publication addressed gender in Liberia directly in annex one, “Cross-Cutting Issue Strategy Brief: Gender Equity.” Although Liberia has a female president they suffer gender segregation in the labor market throughout all sectors of the economy contributing to poverty, along with a high rate of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and domestic violence across the country.

Subsequently, the “Liberia National Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Resolution 1325,” (LNAP) was published in 2009. The LPRS and LNAP are complementary documents. The LNAP is organized into four overarching pillars that provide a framework to present ten strategic gender issues. Liberia was the “first post-conflict developing country in Africa to have undertaken an inclusive and participatory bottom-up process to develop” the LNAP to implement UNSCR 1325 (Liberia 2009, 2). The LNAP was put together by the Government of Liberia (GOL), ministry of Gender and Development with the help of other GOL ministries, UN organizations, IGOs, and NGOs (Liberia 2009, 2). The document is comparable to the 2011, U.S. NAP on WPS.

As of 2007, women only held fourteen percent of the legislative positions. Women have lower literacy rates at both the grade school and high school levels. Female representation in the AFL is less than five percent, with the Liberian National Police having around twenty percent. For a frame of reference, as of June 2014, the CIA Factbook states the Liberian male population is 2,040,170 and the Liberian female population is slightly higher at 2,052,140 (CIA 2014). Specific gender strategies are
proposed to seek to increase women’s participation at all levels of the government and security agencies, appointing gender advisors in the security sector, and adopting policies to reduce SGBV and sexual harassment (IMF 2008, 163-164).

**Army Doctrine**

Since the end of combat operations in Iraq in 2012 and Afghanistan in 2014, the United States military transitioned to operating under the joint concept of Unified Action. “Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, IGOs (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort” (JCS 2013, xiii). The Army has also updated its doctrine to support this joint concept by adopting Unified Land Operations in the May 2013 with ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. The Army has also updated FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* in May 2014 and FM 3-07, *Stability* in June 2014.

The U.S. military’s increased focus on updating doctrine and operational concepts are based on the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), along with an understanding that combat operations are not all that the military must be prepared to execute during all phases of operations. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, military forces often remained in the lead longer than anticipated, until security was well established (JCS 2012, 2). For the other USG agencies, this demonstrated the military’s capacity and capability to conduct stability operations missions. The Unified Land Operations and other doctrinal updates demonstrates that the Army has come to the realization that missions short of combat must be embraced and executed with the same importance as combat operations.
In ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, for the first time, stability operations (SO) is given co-equal attention with the traditional Army tasks of offensive and defensive operations. The U.S. Army has institutionally accepted a greater need to internalize the lessons learned from over thirteen years of conflict, while acquiescing that there will likely be a need to conduct SO during all phases of conflict in the future. In the near future, U.S. led stability and reconstruction operations will be conducted prior to conflict to shape the operational environment or after conflict has calmed. It is likely U.S. joint forces and the U.S. Army will do so alongside host nation forces, while simultaneously conducting combinations of BPC or TSC operations. This includes, but is not limited to, training and advising host nation security forces; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration; penal system and judicial system reform; and advising host nation ministries. In phase zero, these missions would normally be conducted as part of TSC or SA operations to build partner nation capacity in security forces in countries recovering from conflict or to build capacity in at-risk countries. The eighteen DOD outcomes outlined in *Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, can be accomplished during phase one, four, and five operations as part of WOGA to best influence gender integration in our partners. As the changes to joint and Army doctrine are new, they have seen limited utilization in the current operational environment providing U.S. joint forces opportunities to assess the updates.

The Current Operational Environment

The current administration’s Pacific pivot started in 2011, while still maintaining ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and Korea. At the operational level, this has
included a greater emphasis on preventing and deterring conflict, or shaping operations through both SA and TSC missions. The pace of operations has not slowed, only becoming more varied. To operationalize the Unified Land Operations, the Army has begun to employ the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept to provide Combatant Commanders with a tailor-able ground force package for SA and TSC operations. However, in the summer of 2014, a still developing obligation began anew in Iraq, with the Army also deploying a division headquarters to help fight the further spread of Ebola in Liberia.

The Army deployed the first RAF, in 2012 when the 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division out of Fort Riley, KS conducted over 79 missions in 30 countries by March 2013, all in support of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). These missions have focused on preventing war through TSC, SA, and BPC. Many of these missions involve multi-functional teams of soldiers deploying for less than two months against specific requirements or missions. An example is the 1-18th Infantry deploying to Mali in May 2013 for six weeks to train Nigerian security forces for their participation in an African led international mission to Mali. This deployment was funded by the DOS, requiring coordination from Fort Riley, Kansas to the USAFRICOM headquarters to the U.S. head of mission in Niger (Field, Charland, and Learmount, 2013, 61-62). This mission and the 101st Airborne Division’s more recent deployment to Liberia is a demonstration of the military’s capacity, or means that other USG agencies often need to accomplish the USG ways or strategy.

In the examples above the DOS or USAID are the lead USG agency with the DOD the supporting agency. Until the conduct of OEF and OIF, other USG agencies had
limited knowledge of the DOD’s capacities. DOD knowledge of other USG agencies, especially DOS and USAID capability and capacities was also limited. This knowledge gap meant coordination was stove-piped inside of organizational bureaucracies during the early phases of OEF and OIF. As a result, there has been a greater emphasis placed on developing WOGA solutions by placing an increased focus or achieving unity of effort between the U.S. military and other USG agencies.

However, although WOGA was first introduced by the 2010 NSS, there is no shared definition used across the numerous USG agencies involved in SO. In the latest HQDA FM 3-07, Stability the formal definition of WOGA was removed but still used throughout the publication (HQDA 2014a, vi). This leaves the use and definition of WOGA up to individual USG agencies and must be defined each time individual agencies work together to coordinate across bureaucracies. The Army National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is a program, which has previously worked out many of the issues with WOGA.

Independent of the active Army’s recent focus on RAF, it is the long standing National Guard Bureau’s SPP, which has built habitual relationships with partner nations over the last twenty years. Currently there are state National Guard units partnered with seventy-four countries across all six Combatant Commands conducting activities such as: leadership, officer and non-commissioned officer development; defense reform and military modernization; medical and engineering activities; border, port, and aviation security; disaster preparedness and crisis management; critical infrastructure and resources protection; and deployment planning and family support programs. The Michigan National Guard established a SPP with Liberia in 2010 (National Guard 2013,
Through these numerous opportunities, U.S. military officers and senior non-commissioned officers at the operational and tactical levels have influenced counterparts from across the Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility. The combination of the active Army RAF focus, along with the National Guard Bureau’s SPP program, offers the U.S. military numerous opportunities to improve the manner it operates as part of a WOGA with various USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. The SPP also offers opportunities to influence gender integration with their respective counterparts (National Guard 2013, 5). The next section will present U.S. military gender integration efforts.

U.S. Military Gender Integration

For perspective, a concise background on the current U.S. military and Army gender integration efforts is presented. This is included because the purpose of the study is to understand how the U.S. military, as the means, can be employed to meet U.S. national security policy, the ways, to achieve stated, U.S. national security ends. In this case, the end was stated first in the 2011 NAP on WPS and reinforced in the 2015 NSS. As such, it is informative to appreciate the U.S. military experiences with gender integration, as the part of the U.S. means, which will be acting to influence Liberian gender integration efforts.

Since World War I, the U.S. military has made considerable gender integrations efforts. By World War II, the U.S. military had “approximately 350,000 women” serving primarily as nurses, in administrative roles, and other non-combat roles (Beckett and Chien 2002, 1). At that time, these roles were consummate with women’s role in the U.S. civilian workforce. Just after the end to World War II, the U.S. military established the
Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), to analyze wider gender integration in the US military (Beckett and Chien 2002, 1).

Since 1951, the United States has maintained DACOWITS. The committee is currently composed of twenty members, who serve without compensation. The committee members have backgrounds ranging from military service, public service, industry, and academia. The DACOWITS charter, valid for two years, includes, “visiting military installations each year, conducting evaluation of current research on military women, and developing an annual report with recommendations on these issues for service leadership and the Secretary of Defense” (DACOWITS 1).

DACOWITS has previously played an important role during this evolution through 2015. DACOWITS will play an important role in the U.S. military, as the military seeks to attain full gender integration by 2016. If the past is accepted as an indicator, DACOWITS will undoubtedly inform future U.S. military gender integration efforts.

In the U.S. military, gender integration continues to evolve. As of 28 April 2015, six women are attending the first gender integrated U.S. Army Ranger course. This is part of the DOD’s directive to open all combat arms positions to women by fiscal year 2016 (Tan 2015). This change has been driven by both politics and recent OIF and OEF operational experiences. OIF and OEF experiences and innovations, such as Female Engagement Teams (FET), have increased the U.S. military experience of women in direct combat roles. To support the DOD’s directive, the U.S. Army’s TRADOC Analysis Center is currently conducting a Gender Integration Study to be published in the next calendar year (DACOWITS 2014, 40).
The U.S. military, as the means, can be employed to meet U.S. national security policy, the ways, to achieve stated, U.S. national security ends. The stated ends are increasing gender integration in partner nations. DOD published *Department of Defense Implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, issued on 5 April 2012, in support of the 2011 NAP on WPS. The U.S. military experience with gender integration will continue to evolve in the next decade, inside the service and as the means to implement U.S. national security ends. This section has presented the U.S. military gender integration efforts, in order to inform how, the U.S. military, as the means has experienced gender integration.

**Common Ground in Gender Issues**

Throughout the literature discussed in this chapter there is an acknowledgement that gender is a crosscutting issue, which needs to be considered by responsible USG agencies during the conduct of stability and reconstruction efforts. This includes inside the military during the planning and conduct of all military operations. The December 2011 NAP on WPS, 2012 *Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, and the 2012 USAID *U.S. Strategy to Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence* are important first steps in implementing an increased awareness throughout all levels of the USG. The LPRS published for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) subsidy campaigns in Liberia also contains important objectives developed in conjunction with the Liberian government. Additionally, the theme throughout the doctrine reviewed, is an expectation that many of the missions the joint and Army forces are likely to undertake will probably involve SO,
TSC, SA, or BPC, at overlapping times in operations, but with an emphasis on stability and reconstruction operations.

The current U.S. administration first elevated gender as an implied goal in the 2010 NSS, subsequently updated to a priority objective with the 2011 NAP on WPS. This being a U.S. responsibility is explained in the NSS as, “These efforts to advance security and prosperity are enhanced by our support for certain values that are universal” (U.S. President 2010, 5). The spread of U.S. beliefs and ideals through pursuit of a more peaceful and democratic world, especially in developing countries and post-conflict areas, advances the U.S. interests. It is part of efforts to build “more successful and stronger partners” (U.S. President 2010, 5). In turn, the DOS, USAID, and DOD have also issued guidance to subordinate organizations to further implement gender considerations in all relevant aspects of policy and planning. The DOD has also adapted doctrine and policy in reflection from the lessons learned from both OEF and OIF, where much of the U.S. military experience was in a non-traditional role alongside DOS, USAID, various NGOs, and IGOs. These stability and reconstruction operational experiences helped to stabilize operational areas and return control to the civil authorities, in order to return civil control to the host nation. The experiences can be built upon as the military increases its involvement in SO, TSC, and BPC efforts as part of the Army’s RAF focus. Implementing the current U.S. NAP on WPS is a task the U.S. military or any other USG agency cannot undertake alone. It will take a sustained WOGA to affect change in U.S. gender integration efforts across the USG agencies.
Conclusion

The literature review has addressed the primary and secondary research questions for this thesis. The review covered the U.S. national and strategic documents and the LPRS. Army doctrine was also assessed to better understand how the latest unified doctrine and concepts, placing a greater emphasis on phase zero and one operations through SA and TSC missions, can be linked to the U.S. national and strategic documents. The contemporary operational environment was reviewed next to examine how the newly updated doctrine has been implemented. Lastly, the U.S. military experience with gender integration was discussed as it relates to the U.S. Army as the means to achieve the national security ends.

The literature review contained in this chapter confirmed the significance and viability of the primary and secondary research questions. Chapter 3 will discuss the research methodology employed to answer the research questions. Chapter 4 will present the data analysis and chapter 5 will present conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research design process in qualitative research begins with philosophical assumptions that the inquirers make in deciding to undertake a qualitative study. In addition, researchers bring their own worldviews, paradigms, or sets of beliefs to a research project, and these inform the conduct and writing of the qualitative study. Further, in many approaches to qualitative research, the researchers use interpretative and theoretical frameworks to further shape the study. Good research requires making these assumptions, paradigms, and frameworks explicit in the writing of a study, and, at a minimum, to be aware that they influence the conduct of inquiry.

― John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*

**Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used to answer the primary and secondary research question for this thesis. This study will use a qualitative research methodology, with a case study design, to analyze the gender integration efforts in Liberia. Gender integration was isolated as the issue to be studied across this case study. Creswell states, “collective case studies (emphasis from Creswell)” are used to present data across “multiple case studies to illustrate the issue” (Creswell 2007, 74). He further expands on this by stating that several cases help a researcher illustrate different perspectives on the issue being researched (Creswell 2007, 74). Studying the case of Liberian gender integration efforts has helped this researcher understand the issues related to gender integration from diverse perspectives.

In “What Is a Case Study and What is it Good for?” John Gerring states that a case study is “best defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units. Case studies rely on the same sort of conventional evidence
utilized in non-case study research. Thus, the case study method is correctly understood as a particular way of defining cases” (Gerring 2004, 341). In this research, the case study method will enable the definition of the case for Liberian gender integration.

This study will seek to establish correlation versus causation using a case study to demonstrate both the ways gender integration has occurred in Liberia and to offer indicators for future use by the U.S. Army and/or in Liberia (Koening 2014, 53:35). Evidence gathered from analysis of the Liberian case study will show causation and can indicate success for future gender integration efforts in Liberia. Evidence will then be analyzed against the table two, adapted from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction” (Conway 2007, 14-21). Correlation may be present but is less relevant when analyzing the crosscutting issue of gender integration with overlapping factors, such as culture, geography, local economy, tribal issues, religion, and other obstacles to change.

Gerring additionally defines the five examples that case study researchers have used in attempting to define a case study. The last definition Gerring uses in “What is a Case Study?” is the best explanation to focus and bond this specific case study. Gerring defines the case study “as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger set of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person—observed at a single point in time or over delimited period of time” (Gerring 2004, 342). The specific unit to be studied in this study is the crosscutting issue of gender in Liberia, in order to understand if the current U.S. ends, ways, and means can increase gender integration in Liberia.
Liberia is the case study selected to better understand ongoing gender integration efforts in the country and how the USG can assist. This researcher will use an embedded analysis of gender integration, as in this case study, it is the “specific aspect of each case” (Gerring 2004, 75). The analysis of Liberian’s gender integrations efforts will serve to highlight the lessons learned, offering best practices for future use in Liberia and by the U.S. military.

**Data Collection Methods**

The Liberian case study selected illustrates national level governmental gender integration efforts. In the case selected, there are contradictory levels of cultural, tribal, economic, and religious challenges to gender integration. Liberia has aspects of a post-conflict society. The varying levels of cultural, tribal, economic, and religion present in the Liberia case analyzed offers unique aspects of each, which may be helpful in illustrating recommendations specific to Liberia and the U.S. DOD.

The research and data collected should present measurable data that can answer both the primary and secondary research questions. This will lead to the presentation of the best practices for future use in Liberia. Specific to the US Army will be recommendations for updates to US Army against DOTMLPF-P (JCS 2012, 2). DOTMLPF-P is an acronym that stands for doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. It is used by combatant commanders and the U.S. military chiefs of the each respective Service to define requirements across DOTMLPF-P to close requirement and capability gaps. This analysis will display how the U.S. Army can best support the US NAP for WPS. The analysis will also offer how the US Army, as the means and an element of DIME can increase gender
integration in Liberia. As applicable, recommended changes to DOTMLPF-P will be offered in chapter 5.

**Data Analysis Methodology**

This qualitative case study of Liberia will analyze national level governmental gender integration efforts to highlight past efforts and successes in the case study. Table 2 was adapted from the USIP report, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction” (Conway 2006, 14-21). It was selected to analyze the data in the case study because the categories presented from Conway’s report present gender in depth across a wide manner of factors present in post-conflict countries and reconstruction and stabilization missions. The report uses five main categories, each containing several sub-categories. The main categories from the report are:

1. Institutionalizing Women, Peace, and Security
2. Security
3. Governance and Political Participation
4. Justice and Reconciliation
5. Economic and Social Well Being (Conway 2006, 14-21).

The Liberian case study was analyzed against the five categories above to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Chapter 4 will present the data from the case study in the framework of the five categories above to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The primary research question is, How can the U.S. DOD support the U.S. NAP for WPS, in Liberia, by using the U.S. military power (means) to implement the national strategy (ways) to increase stability (ends)? The secondary
research question is, What is Liberia’s national strategy (ways) and military power (means) towards increasing gender integration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Institutionalizing Women, Peace, and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Governance and Political Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Justice and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic and Social Well Being</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The case study of Liberia will be analyzed against the main categories in the matrix above. Conclusions drawn from the selected case study will enable this researcher to draw concrete conclusions and recommendations as part of this study. Table 2 will be completed using the grading standards listed in table 3.
| NO MARK | No factors found in the case study. |
| X       | One to three factors found in the case study. |
| +       | Three or more factors found in the case study. |

*Source:* Created by author.

Additionally, the ability of the U.S. military, primarily the Army, to support the NAP on WPS to increase gender integration at the ministerial level will be measured. The analysis from this data will be presented in a completed table 4. This analysis will inform the conclusion and be presented in chapter 4, as recommended changes to joint and Army DOTMLPF-P (JCS 2012, 2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. U.S. Joint DOTMLPF-P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Reliability of Research**

The issue of reliability and rigor is important for a research project to be taken seriously. It is most important in medical research, and as such, medical and science researchers have written extensively about it. Sharan B. Merriam in “What Can You Tell From An N of 1?: Issues of Validity and Reliability in Qualitative Research,” addresses
the need to establish reliability and rigor in the social science research (Merriam 1995, 55). Two aspects, triangulation and “reader generalizability,” in the Merriam article will be used for the research methodology in this project (Merriam 1995, 58).

Merriam defines triangulation as using “multiple investigators, multiple sources of data, or multiple methods to confirm the emerging findings” (Merriam 1995, 54). For this research, multiple sources of data for the case study will be used to gather data for analysis. The additional aspect that will be used for this project to ensure rigor is reader generalizability.

Merriam defines reader generalizability as “a way of viewing external validity is something becoming known as reader or user generalizability” (Merriam 1995, 58). This aspect of rigor addresses whether or not the research can be applied to other research or situations. Merriam reasons this is up to the “consumer of the research” (Merriam 1995, 58). She further suggests addressing rigor as a facet of qualitative research by presenting four strategies. Of the four, “thick description,” was selected to verify enough data is gathered for the case study to confirm the author understands the subject and any reviewers of the research are able to “determine how closely their situations match the research situation” (Merriam 1995, 58).

Two aspects of Merriam’s in “What Can You Tell From An N of 1?: Issues of Validity and Reliability in Qualitative Research,” were selected to ensure reliability and rigor in this thesis. This will ensure the data collection methods and data analysis methodology employed maintain rigor in the chapter 4 presentation of the case study analysis, in order to complete table 3, recommendations.
Conclusion

A qualitative embedded case study analysis of Liberia, using the rubric adopted from the USIP report, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” (Conway 2006, 14-21) will be presented in this thesis. While gender integration is the “specific aspect of each case” to be analyzed, the selected case study contains unique characteristics specific to Liberia’s post-conflict recovery (Merriam 1995, 55). The data collected through the analysis of the case study will be analyzed against two categories in the matrix of the USIP report and presented through recommended changes to five categories of Army DOTMPF-P. Recommended changes to Army doctrine, organizations, training, personnel, or policy will be presented in table 9, as a completed table 4, of chapter 5.

Chapter 3 presented the data collection methods, data analysis methodology, and reliability methods to be used for this research. Chapter 4 will present the case study analysis in order to complete table 2, using the grading criteria established in table 3. Table 4 will be completed in order to answer the primary research question: How can the U.S. DOD support the U.S. NAP on WPS, in Liberia, in order to use U.S. military power (means) to implement the national strategy (ways) to increase stability (ends)?

The analysis presented in chapter 4 will explain if the U.S. military can support the U.S. NAP on WPS in Liberia. It will also present Liberia’s efforts to implement gender integration. Chapter 5 will present any recommended changes to Army DOTMPF-P and additional recommendations. Chapter 5 will also present the conclusion and recommendations for additional research in associated areas.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

For Liberia to be successful, it cannot simply recreate the economic and political structures of the past, which produced widespread income disparities, economic and political marginalization, and deep social cleavages, and ultimately fueled the conflict. Liberia must create much greater opportunities for all its citizens and ensure that growth and development are widely shared, with the benefits spread much more equitably throughout the population.

— International Monetary Fund, Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy

Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to present the case study analysis in order to answer the thesis primary and secondary research questions. The results are divided into six sections to analyze two of five categories listed in table 2 of chapter 3, from Conway’s, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction.” Works consulted for background only will not be covered in this chapter.

This first section provides a concise overview and introduction. The second section provides table 5, presented as a completed table 2, in order to graphically display the answers to the primary and secondary research questions. The next section presents the Liberia case study evaluation of Liberian gender integration efforts since 2003, the end of Liberia’s civil war. This section also presents the LNAP as it pertains to the case study and Liberia’s post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.

The rebuilding of the economic sector is covered in the third section. Liberia’s experiences with the FC are covered after the economic section to present the manner in which foreign investment can facilitate Liberian economic, health, and social
improvements. Lastly, Liberian security considerations and the conclusion are covered in the last two sections.

This study used a qualitative research methodology, with a case study design, of the gender integration efforts made in Liberia. Gender integration was isolated as the issue to be studied in the case study. Table 5, presented as a completed table 2 provided a framework for analysis of the case study. As discussed in chapter 2, gender integration is a crosscutting issue to be considered during reconciliation, stability, reconstruction, recovery, and development efforts. As such, it is not possible to strictly isolate gender integration without overlapping other subjects in the presentation of the research.

**Liberia Case Study**

Based on the distinct case study of Liberian gender integration efforts, table 2, as a completed table 5 is presented. Taken as a whole, the case study analysis exhibits that Liberia has made substantial gender integration efforts since the end of the twenty-year civil war. However, Liberia, as a post-conflict nation, is continuing to face unique challenges in many parts of society during the ongoing recovery from the civil war. “Women and girls continue to have limited access to education, health services and judicial services, which has severely curtailed their participation in the formal economy” (IMF 2008, 163). Economic growth is essential to Liberia’s recovery and stabilization. Including Liberian women in the economy is key to increasing women’s role and stake in the local economy.

Several Liberian and Western African NGOs and IGOs have worked since before the end of the civil war in 2003, to increase women’s and girls’ access to vocational training and education. Liberian gender integration is interrelated with increasing
women’s and girls’ access to the economy, through vocational training and education. This not only includes increasing Liberian women’s economic opportunities, but also providing the legal basis to provide women equal opportunities to property rights and commercial credit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Institutionalizing Women, Peace, and Security</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Security</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Governance and Political Participation</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Justice and Reconciliation</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic and Social Well Being</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Completed Data Analysis


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO MARK</th>
<th>No factors found in the case study.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>One to three factors found in the case study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Three or more factors found in the case study.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Data Analysis Standards

*Source:* Created by author.
Through the combined efforts of the GOL, Liberian women’s groups, IGOs, and NGOs, the GOL issued the LNAP. The LNAP supports the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by providing a framework and plan to increase Liberia’s identified gender integration gaps. The LNAP also fundamentally aligns with both the U.S. NAP on WPS and the Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, covered in the chapter 2 literature review.

LNAP

The LNAP is divided into four overarching pillars into which national and strategic issues were grouped (Liberia 2009, 13).” The pillars align with the UNSCR 1325 and the gender and equality standards used by the NGO development and reconstruction community. The LNAP framework is:
### Table 7. LNAP Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR 1: PROTECTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The protection of women and girls from all types of violence including SGBV is divided into three strategic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 1: Provide psych-social and trauma counseling to women and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 2: Protect the rights and strengthen security for women and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 3: Increase access to quality health education for women and girls with a specific emphasis on reproductive health and HIV/AIDS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR 2: PREVENTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The prevention of all types of violence against women and girls including against rape and systematic rape, trafficking and other human rights abuses incorporates one main strategic issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 4: Prevent all types of violence against women and girls, including SGBV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR 3: PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote women’s full participation in all conflict prevention, peace-building, and post-conflict recovery processes at community, county, national, and sub-regional levels is divided into two strategic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 5: Promote women’s full participation in all conflict prevention, peace-building, and post-conflict recovery processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 6: Empower women through increased access to housing and natural resources and strengthen their participation in the management of the environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR 4: PROMOTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop and implement strategies to ensure that the implementation of the LNAP is fully and sustainably resourced has four strategic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 7: Promote the involvement of women’s groups in the implementation of the LNAP and advocate for increased access to resources for both the Government and women’s groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 8: Promote the participation of girls in conflict prevention, early warning, peace security, and post-conflict recovery issues through education and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 9: Enhance the technical and institutional capacities of governmental and civil society actors, including women’s groups to effectively implement the LNAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Issue 10: Promote the full involvement of governmental and civil society actors, including women’s groups in the monitoring and evaluation of the LNAP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liberia was the “first post-conflict developing country in Africa to have undertaken an inclusive and participatory bottom-up process to develop” the LNAP to implement UNSCR 1325 (Liberia 2009, 2). Liberia’s LNAP acknowledges the challenges that the recovery and reconstruction process entail. In contrast to the U.S. NAP on WPS, the LNAP has a post-conflict perspective. Liberia’s plan focuses attention on healing the trauma citizens suffered during the twenty-year civil war. Further, it looks to strengthen and protect the rights of women and girls, while preventing future SGBV. A greater emphasis is also placed on technical and institutional capacity building of government and civilian actors (Liberia 2009, 13).

In one major way, the LNAP differs from the U.S. NAP on WPS. It does not direct GOL ministries to develop their respective gender integration strategies. This may be due to the Liberia’s emphasis on IGO and NGO development and reconstruction efforts. However, this is a theme throughout Liberia’s ministerial agencies. As such, Liberia does not have a published national security strategy or a national military strategy. Also missing is a strategy similar to the Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. Ministerial level documents would help the overall GOL to advance the LNAP goals in the government sector. Despite a missing link from the national level LNAP to ministerial documents, Liberia’s president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, has placed gender integration as a high priority during Liberia’s reconstruction.

In 2009, when the LNAP was published, Liberia was the only country with a female as a Special Representative to the UN Security-General. Liberia hosted the “first UN all female formed police unit deployed by India” (Liberia 2009, 7), to help build the
capacity of the Liberian National Police. Further, President Sirleaf has built upon the work of women’s groups to end Liberia’s civil war and continued to rebuild the nation while working to improve gender integration.

Sirleaf has also ensured a continued and steady involvement of IGOs, NGOs, and UNMIL to rebuild enduring Liberian systems capable of maintaining the peace, administrating the nation, and rebuilding Liberia. Liberia’s government agencies and women’s groups have also remained integral to the process. The focus has remained on two primary areas: institutionalizing women, peace, and security; and increasing Liberian women’s economic and social well-being to enable the rebuilding efforts.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Efforts

In Conway’s USIP sponsored report, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” her recommendation matrix places institutionalizing women, peace, and security as a priority focus for reconstruction efforts. This first recommendation is further sub-divided into three categories. The categories are: build internal capacity, improve information gathering, and establish connections with women’s organizations (Conway 2006, 14-15). President Sirleaf and her administration maintained three focus areas during the early years of the Liberian recovery and reconciliation process.

After her 2006 election, Sirleaf had the support of the Liberian women’s groups on her side. Her next task was to synchronize their efforts, along with the efforts of IGOs and NGOs. Sirleaf assumed the challenging task of building the Liberian women’s groups into policy advocates, capable of rebuilding Liberia capability and capacity (Kilcullen 2013, 274-277).
The USIP also sponsored a Liberia Working Group, which met on 23 April 2007, to summarize the role women played in ending the Liberian civil war and reconstruction of the country. Their recommendations are relevant as they coincide with both the LNAP and Conway’s 2006 USIP report recommendations. The Liberia Working Group offered three specific recommendations to “increase the inclusion of women in Liberia’s reconstruction” (Conway 2006, 4).

The first recommendation highlights the importance of preparing grassroots, women’s organizations to transition to post-conflict activism and recovery work. This must be achieved, along with increasing basic literacy and life skills, to influence policy in a democratic setting. The second recommendation was to empower women economically. This was important for Liberia’s recovery to ensure policy was implemented and not just accomplished with temporary NGO or IGO funding or initiatives. Both goals build into the LNAP strategic issues number 7, 9, and 10, of table 7, to improve women’s groups’ participation in the recovery process by increasing women’s economic involvement (Conway 2006, 4-5).

The last recommendation was the hardest goal and achievable only with a long-term strategy. It called for changing the Liberian national perception of women in traditional gender roles and integrating them into mainstream commerce and politics (Conway 2006, 4-5). This recommendation would also facilitate the institutionalization of women through the expansion of their inclusion in a larger portion of both society and the economy. IGOs were essential to begin helping Liberia implement many of these recovery recommendations.
Establishing connections with Liberian women’s groups was a continuation of the various organizations previous involvement in ending the civil war, by working “tirelessly to bring warring parties to the negotiating table so that the country might achieve peace” (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 1). In 2006, Liberia was the first African nation to democratically elect a female president. Many of the grass-roots organizations, which previously brought warring parties to the negotiating table, helped register women voters for the 2005 national elections. This was an important facet to Liberia continuing to build internal capacity, improve information gathering, and establish connections with women’s organizations (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 2).

Furthermore, in 2007, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed female heads of the ministries of commerce, justice, finance, youth and sports, and gender development. During the same time, there were also five of fifteen county managers that were women (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 2). The combination of these factors helped to maintain momentum from the end of the conflict and began to build Liberian internal capacity towards institutionalizing women, peace, and security.

The presence of IGOs, NGOs, USAID, and the British Department of International Development in Liberia facilitated the building of the grassroots movements to aid the building of Liberia internal capacity. This does not discount the essential role Liberian women’s organizations played to end the Liberia civil war and bring warring parties to the negotiating table. However, this process would not have been possible without the presence of African, U.S., British, and UN programs coordinated to help establish the Liberian led West Africa Network for Peace and Women in Peacebuilding Network (Kilcullen 2013, 274-277).
As an example, the leader of West Africa Network for Peace, Sam Gbaydee, mentored Leymah Roberta Gbowee, the 2003 leader of the Liberian peace movement, as a trauma worker in a United Nations Children’s Fund program earlier in the Liberian civil war (Kilcullen 2013, 275). This is one approach Liberia used to build internal capacity and improved information gathering to establish connections with local and non-local women’s organizations. Although the combination of these efforts was essential to ending the Liberian civil war, challenges remained. “In continuing to advance the participation of women, civil society organizations today face the challenge of transitioning from a grassroots movement to a policy and advocacy group” (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 2.) The women’s groups were essential to bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table and later to increasing women’s participation during the election of President Sirleaf. However, they were then left with the challenging work of helping to re-build the country and government.

Growth from an advocacy group to a legitimate part of a government proved not to be a simple process. In Liberia, it was done through the Mano River Women’s Peace Network. Without the presence of IGOs and NGOs in Liberia, the establishment of this organization would not have been possible. The IGOs and NGOs helped to organize the Liberian women’s peace movement into the groups like the Mano River Women’s Peace Network to enable women to take part in the recovery and reconstruction of Liberia. The Mano River Women’s Peace Network provided Liberian women trade and craft training for viable local employment to help the Liberian economy. They also provided legal counsel and representation for redress of wartime SGBV and to build legal protection for women and children in the future (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 3).
Providing women increased economic and social well-being is inescapably linked to the institutionalization of WPS. During Liberia’s recovery, IGOs continued to focus on working with local NGOs to find local solutions with Liberian women’s groups, like the Mano River Women’s Peace Network, the West Africa Network for Peace, and the Women in Peacebuilding Network. President Sirleaf’s previous experience in working at the WB was instrumental to this process. To increase women’s involvement in the Liberian economy, the WB and IMF studied the problems in Liberia and developed Liberia specific innovative methods.

**Rebuilding the Economic Sector**

In Conway’s USIP sponsored report, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” another recommendation listed in her matrix places economic and social well-being as a critical focus of reconstruction efforts. From Conway’s report, six of the identified nine categories will be highlighted in this study:

1. Physical Infrastructure
2. Public Health
3. Educational System
4. Labor and Employment
5. Property Rights

It is important to simultaneously work to institutionalize WPS, while improving the economic sector. In turn, this increases women’s economic opportunities and social well-being (Conway 2006, 20-21). These six focus areas, from the USIP report, also connect with the LNAP framework. As Liberia continued the recovery process, President
Sirleaf and her administration leveraged the international development community presence to help achieve this objective by including four LNAP pillars overlapping with these focus areas. From table 7, the LNAP strategic issues numbers 3, 6, 7, 9, and 10 are:

3. Increase access to quality health education for women and girls with a specific emphasis on reproductive health and HIV/AIDS.

6. Empower women through increased access to housing and natural resources and strengthen their participation in the management of the environment.

7. Promote the involvement of women’s groups in the implementation of the LNAP and advocate for increased access to resources for both the Government and women’s groups.

9. Enhance the technical and institutional capacities of governmental and civil society actors, including women’s groups to effectively implement the LNAP.

10. Promote the full involvement of governmental and civil society actors, including women’s groups in the monitoring and evaluation of the LNAP. (Liberia 2009, 13)

The IGOs, the WB, and IMF proved essential during Liberia’s early national recovery and reconstruction process. In 2008, Liberia and the IMF jointly published, the LPRS as a five-year Liberian recovery framework. Liberia and the IMF specifically deal with gender in Annex 1 of the LPRS. Prior to this, the WB had been absent from Liberia since 1987:

After placing Liberia on a non-accrual status in 1987, the World Bank reengaged in Liberia in October 2006, simultaneously unveiling its Gender Action Plan (GAP). Within this plan, Liberia was selected as a focus country, as well as for a pilot intervention, for the Bank’s “Gender Equality as Smart Economics” plan. As a first step, the Bank undertook a rigorous gender needs assessment in order to determine the long-term needs of Liberian women. In the short term, the Bank focuses on preparing development and reconstruction plans. (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 3)

The WB assessment revealed that Liberian women participated actively in the economy, just not in the major or most profitable economic sectors. The assessment also
learned that Liberian women made up “53 percent of the agricultural labor force; produce 60% of all agricultural products in Liberia; and comprise a large number of entrepreneurs—77 percent of women are self-employed” (Beoke and Parajon 2007, 3). In response to this assessment, the focus of Liberian WB reconstruction efforts helped women gain increased access to commercial credit and loans.

In table 8, the results of WB research is depicted to illustrate women’s economic standing in Liberia across six factors. These factors are highlighted as they affect women’s ability to be included in the most beneficial economic sectors. The lack of property rights, property titling, and equal property status after marriage inhibit women’s ability to gain a larger stake in the economy.

The two negatives listed in table 8 are WB established factors, which can increase Liberian women’s economic stake. Liberian women are not added to property titles after marriage. Constitutional equality, as an economic factor, is split. Liberian women are constitutionally guaranteed equality but there is no Liberian constitutional clause specifically addressing sex or gender. Liberian women must seek their husband’s permission to use property as collateral for commercial credit. They also do not share equal rights in Liberia’s court system (World Bank Group 2015).
IGOs introduced Liberian women to additional methods to secure commercial credit. “Reputation collateral” was introduced to help build women’s credit by using microfinance institutions and successfully repaying the loan (Almodovar-Reteguis, Kushair, and Mulland 2012, 1-3). Micro-loans can be as small as a few hundred U.S. dollars over shorter repayment horizons. In Liberia, Kiva.org currently has a ninety-eight percent repayment rate (Kiva 2015). While mixMarket.org has over 17.8 million in U.S dollars on loan in Liberia, to over 53,000 Liberian borrowers, and three different micro-lenders in Liberia (MixMarket 2014).

In addition to innovative ways to secure loans, in several Liberian counties new farming methods were introduced to women. Methods focused on increasing crop’s yield. Both of these new WB solutions were an adjustment from normal WB reconstruction efforts. Although the WB has traditionally been focused on larger scale loans, grants, and national banking assistance, they used these pilot projects to bridge the gap in the areas identified by the Gender Equality as Smart Economics study and the subsequent LNAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Equality in Property ownership</th>
<th>Inheritance Equality</th>
<th>Property Titling</th>
<th>Status &amp; Capacity</th>
<th>Access to Judicial System</th>
<th>Constitutional Equality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>N</td>
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</table>

Outside of IGO and NGO sponsored activities, foreign investment in the Liberian economy is also essential to both the reconstruction and gender integration efforts. However, much of Liberia’s infrastructure is still in disrepair. The next section will cover the development of the Liberian power grid.

Developing the Power Grid

For Liberia, the continued development of the national power grid is possibly the most important factor to rebuild the national economy. The development of the Liberian national infrastructure through foreign investment will serve to improve the economy over the long term. Liberia is a member of both the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the specialized ECOWAS institution, West African Power Pool. The West African Power Pool covers fourteen of the fifteen countries of ECOWAS. There are currently twenty-six companies involved in the West African Power Pool initiative (West African Power Pool 2011, 8). For Liberia the current West African Power Pool project:

Comprises the construction of four substations and 532km of 225kV transmission lines. One substation in Sanniquelle town, one in Buchanan, one to be located at Mount Coffee in Monrovia and the other one to be located near Mambo Town in Grand Cape Mount County. The construction of the substations and high tension electric transmission lines from Yekepa to Mano River run across the entire length and breadth of Liberia. The line passes through seven administrative subdivisions in Liberia (Nimba, Bong, Bassa, Margibi, Montserrado, Bomi and Grand Cape Mount Counties) within a narrow corridor of 40 m. (West African Power Pool 2011, 12)

As the Liberian power grid develops, it can help attract additional foreign investment. It will also help connect the Liberian power grid with neighboring countries (West African Power Pool 2011, 13). The development of the power grid in particular
will benefit the Liberian population by increasing job opportunities and providing increased access to electricity.

**Liberia and Firestone**

The FC in Liberia offers both lessons learned and demonstrates how foreign investment can improve Liberia’s economy, social wellbeing, and access to adequate medical care. A short background on FC in Liberia is covered in chapter 1. This section will examine the role of this large foreign corporation’s impact on Liberia and the economy:

Firestone Liberia, Inc. is an affiliate of Firestone Natural Rubber Company, LLC, a division of Bridgestone Americas, Inc. Since 1926, it has operated a rubber tree plantation in an area of approximately 185 square miles within Margibi County, Liberia. Employees and their dependents live in 121 communities inside the Firestone District. (CDC 2014)

This same area was controlled in the 1990s by the Charles Taylor government. In 2014, ProPublica and FRONTLINE published an investigative report on FC dealings with the Taylor regime during the 1990s. It was highly critical of FC for staying in Liberia during the 1990s because the corporation signed a memorandum of understanding directly with Taylor to continue operating in Liberia. Taylor’s forces also strong-armed FC employees for use of FC lodging, vehicles, and communications facilities as barracks, transportation, and logistical support areas (Miller and Jones 2014).

Though FC did deal directly with Taylor and his forces at the time, the war crimes Taylor committed were unknown to FC. For the FC, staying in Liberia was a pragmatic, business decision. FC acted to defend their Liberian investment and infrastructure. Because of this business decision, they were able to employ, house, and educate
Liberians on the FC plantation. During the conflict, FC also worked with NGOs to provide humanitarian relief in other Liberian counties (Miller and Jones 2014, 15).

Many of the former FC leaders in Liberia interviewed for the report expressed being uncomfortable with Taylor and his forces during the conflict. They also emphasize the decision to remain in Liberia as a pragmatic financial decision (Miller and Jones 2014, 37). This is highlighted to offer risks associated with relying on foreign investment to improve the economy. Businesses will logically seek self-preservation of their investment and infrastructure.

Firestone and the 2014 Ebola Outbreak

The antithesis to the FC experience of the 1990s is the more recent FC reaction to the 2014 Liberian Ebola outbreak. In October 2014, the FC was commended by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for their reaction to the Liberia Ebola outbreak. The CDC cited FC as providing health care, early warning and monitoring, and treatment during the 2014 Ebola outbreak. From 1 August to 23 September 2014:

there were 71 total (confirmed and suspected) Ebola cases among the approximately 80,000 Liberians for whom Firestone provides health care—a much lower rate (0.09 percent) than in the rest of Margibi Country (0.23 percent) during the same period. Eighteen (thirty-two percent) of the 57 patients with laboratory-confirmed Ebola survived. (CDC 2014)

The same report also noted the FC medical treatment facilities were compassionate and meticulous in their treatment of patients and potential patients. FC’s reaction also offered education to caregivers and medical workers. Immediate isolation was implemented for Ebola patients, along with infection control guidelines to prevent the spread of the disease (CDC 2014, 1).
The totality of the FC experience in Liberia is informative of how foreign economic investment could help the Liberia economy recover while also providing needed essential services. The FC medical clinics service over 5,500 patients per month and are resourced to handle viral breakouts (CDC 2014, 1). However, foreign investment in Liberia will not increase without improving Liberia’s infrastructure and long-term stability.

Ebola is not the only threat to Liberia. Boko Harma is in Nigeria and Da’sh is a growing presence in Mali and Nigeria, while Guinea is continuing to contain their own Ebola outbreak (U.S. Congress 2015, 1). Due to the porous nature of Liberia’s shared borders with Sierra Leone to the northwest, Guinea to north, and Cote D’Ivoire to the east, improving internal security is essential to sustain long-term economic growth and garner foreign economic investment. Improving Liberia’s capacity and capabilities to maintain internal security must also be developed to prevent any non-state actors from disrupting Liberia.

Security

In 2003, the GOL, with the assistance of the UN, IGOs, and NGOs, initially focused on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration tasks. UNMIL was established by UNSCR 1509 in September 2003. As of 2 April 2015, the UNSCR 2215, downsized the UNMIL force structure to 3,590 military personnel and 1,515 police to remain in Liberia until 30 June 2016. The UNMIL mandate has established five priorities:

1. Protection of civilians
2. Humanitarian Assistance Support
3. Reform of Justice and Security Institutions

4. Human Rights Promotion and Protection

5. Protection of United Nations personnel (UN Security Council 2015, 4-5)

The AFL currently has ground units capable of operating at the company level, totaling an infantry brigade with supporting units. Liberia has no air force and the coast guard currently consists of only forty personnel. The AFL numbers only 2,000 total military personnel (U.S. Congress 2014, 3).

Since 2010, USAFRICOM, led by U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa, has been mentoring AFL counterparts. Operation Onward Liberty (OOL) is a five-year mission, continuing the DOS and UN led Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration mission. It currently consists of fifty personnel from the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Army’s Michigan National Guard, and the U.S. Air Force. Also in 2010, the Michigan National Guard began a SPP with Liberia. The Michigan SPP provides USAFRICOM flexibility to task specific competencies to support AFL training or mentorship (USAFRICOM 2015).

Despite UNMIL and OOL efforts, given ongoing security threats in Western Africa and Ebola still thriving in Guinea, by 2016 the AFL and LNP are unlikely to be fully capable of providing for Liberian’s internal and border security. Liberia lacks key operational experience and has no published national strategy for the employment of the AFL. For instance, the Liberian ministry of national defence (sic) has built a website but currently it is without any significant Liberia defense, national defense, or AFL documents. In comparison, the GOL Ministry of State has a fully functioning website with links to some national level Liberian documents.
As previously stated, the GOL has not published a NSS after the conclusion of the UN led Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration mission. The GOL NSS should outline internal and external security objectives to safeguard Liberia. This is important to prevent the spread of a future disease epidemic and prevent the non-state actors from infiltrating Liberia from eastern African neighbors. The NSS should also set clear objectives for the AFL and LNP to secure key Liberian infrastructure. In addition, the Liberian NSS should address the need to increase the AFL’s size and capabilities to best provide for Liberia’s security.

Before the end of the U.S. and UNMIL missions, the GOL needs to increase the size of the AFL. To do this, Liberia must increase the military budget, increase military recruiting efforts, and professionalization the AFL. Including U.S. mentors and the UNMIL, the total number of security personnel in Liberia is less than 10,000 for a population of over 4.5 million. Both missions are set to end in 2016. Currently, the AFL has one general, a brigade commander and headquarters, two infantry battalions, and associated support companies. At least three brigades should be established to provide for Liberia’s internal security.

Efforts to build the AFL should include a focus on expanding the number of women in the AFL. This should be done to provide AFL capabilities, which can address Liberian women’s issues, such as conducting tactical questioning or inspections of women at border crossing sites (Kem 2012, 133-134). The AFL should also professionalize the force by including SGBV education in basic training and at all levels of professional military education.
Liberia’s NSS should be published to outline national security objectives that can match the development and employment of the AFL. Two lines of effort would help increase the AFL’s capability while also increasing AFL gender integration. The first step is publishing a NSS by 2016. The Liberian NSS should also include gender recruitment quotas to increase the percentage of women in the AFL.

Liberia also must increase the percentage of the national budget dedicated to the AFL. Current levels are the second lowest in sub-Saharan Africa military spending and in 2011 was reduced to below one percent of the gross domestic product (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2015). This level should be increased by at least half a percent per year over the next five years.

Attaching strings to the carrots of continued UNMIL and U.S. Marine Forces Africa involvement in Liberia’s security force assistance would help ensure the accomplishment of these two objectives. The NSS publication with the inclusion of AFL gender quotas must be matched with increased funding from the Liberian budget. If a Liberian NSS with defined objectives was published by 2016, then the UNMIL and U.S. Marine Forces Africa missions could be continued to train, advise, and assist a larger AFL.

This would enable the AFL to handle the next Ebola outbreak or security threats, such as Boko Haram and Da’sh, without international assistance. With adequate carrots and strings the AFL can develop into a more professional and capable military force. This would enable Liberia to grow less reliant on IGOs and NGOs in any future security challenges or in reaction to a disease outbreak. Publishing a Liberia NSS with gender
quotas will increase the AFL capabilities and capacity. It will also ensure the advancement of both the LNAP and the U.S. NAP on WPS.

Conclusion

The primary research question asked: How can the U.S. DOD support the U.S. NAP on WPS, in Liberia, by using U.S. military power (means) to implement the national strategy (ways) to increase stability (ends)? Figure 2 below illustrates the four interlinked objectives proposed to increase Liberia’s gender integration. These objectives should be undertaken over the next five years. The GOL, UNMIL, and USAFRICOM should also coordinate to establish intermediate goals to enable the achievement of the five-year objectives.

Figure 2. Increasing Liberia Gender Integration

Source: Created by author.

The secondary research question asked: What is Liberia’s national strategy (ways) and military power (means) towards increasing gender integration? The data collected through the Liberia case study was analyzed against the main categories in the matrix of the USIP report, “The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction.” It demonstrates that Liberia has made significant gender integration efforts across the two
selected USIP matrix categories with fewer measurable efforts in three of the other categories (Conway 2006, 14-21).

This study also informed recommended changes to U.S. Army DOTMLPF-P. The recommended changes will be presented in table 9 of chapter 5. Based on this study, chapter 5 will also present conclusions and recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, “Experience shows that countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity.” In order to bring about the peace and prosperity we seek, the United States is promoting better understanding and integration of gender issues across all our agencies.

— U.S. President, United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security

Conclusions

The primary research question asked: How can the U.S. DOD support the U.S. NAP on WPS, in Liberia, by using U.S. military power (means) to implement the national strategy (ways) to increase stability (ends)? The secondary research question asked: What is Liberia’s national strategy (ways) and military power (means) towards increasing gender integration? The analysis presented in chapter 4 illustrates that the U.S. military can support the U.S. NAP on WPS in Liberia.

Liberia also has implemented the LNAP to address gender integration. Liberia can accomplish increased gender integration through three inter-linked objectives. Over the next five years, the percentage of the Liberia GDP spending on the AFL should be increased. By 2016, Liberia should also publish a NSS and national military strategy. Gender quotas should be included in both the NSS and the national military strategy. USAFRICOM and the UNMIL should advise and assist the Liberian ministry of defence (sic) and AFL in the accomplishment of these objectives. U.S. Army support to the U.S. NAP on WPS is illustrated in table 9 below based on the analysis in this study.
A completed table 9 identified recommended changes to Army doctrine, organizations, training, and policy. This is offered to graphically display an answer to the primary research question. If U.S. Army is likely to play a role in a future Liberia 2014, type scenario, then some modifications to Army DOTMLPF-P should also be implemented to address a likely non-traditional mission.

**DOTMLP-PF**

This study identified four categories of Army DOTMLP-PF for which changes or modifications would facilitate U.S. Army gender integration efforts in Liberia. These changes are recommended to existing programs in the Army, not the creation of new programs. They would help the U.S. Army better mentor the AFL in Liberia as part of OOL and possibly other security partners in the future. Doing so would also ensure the Army is able to best support the *Department of Defense Implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*. Table 9 identifies recommended changes to Army doctrine, organizations, training, and policy. Army material, doctrine, personnel, and facilities were not analyzed and are omitted from table 9.
Table 9. Recommended Changes to US Army DOTMLPF-P

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Include gender integration and SGBV in US Army stability doctrine. Use vignettes from recent atrocities in Liberia, Sudan, and Rwanda to build lessons learned for Female Engagement Teams (FETs), RAF, BPC, or TSC missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Include gender integration experts in NG SPPs. For RAF units consider including FETs, as gender experts, to focus on the RAF unit’s country specific SGBV and gender issues. This should be included as part of RAF cultural awareness and language training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Include lessons on SGBV in officer and enlisted professional military education. At the unit level this training should be included in to US Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Omitted by author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Omitted by author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Omitted by author.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Omitted by author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>DACOWITS continually manned to at least 20 personnel and entirely focused on US and partner nation gender integration efforts. DACOWITS should study and report on the utility of institutionalizing FETs as an enduring mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Recommendations

DOD is the largest USG agency and a critical part of U.S. national power. As such, the DOD and the U.S. Army must be connected more directly to the NAP on WPS
to achieve the five objectives identified in the 2011 NAP on WPS. This does not mean DOD should be the lead USG agency for the NAP on WPS but DOD agencies should be prepared to assume a supporting role during military operations. There are two existing Army programs that can be leveraged to facilitate achievement of this end state. They are the Army National Guard Bureau SPP and the Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) program.

The US Army NGB SPP has built habitual relationships with partner nations over the last twenty years. Currently, there are state National Guards partnered with seventy-four countries across all six Combatant Commands conducting activities such as: leadership, officer and non-commissioned officer development; defense reform and military modernization; medical and engineering activities; border, port, and aviation security; disaster preparedness and crisis management; critical infrastructure and resources protection; and deployment planning and family support programs (National Guard 2013, 6). During these numerous opportunities, U.S. military officers and senior non-commissioned officers at the operational and tactical levels have influenced counterparts from across the Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility. The SPP offers significant opportunities to influence gender integration with their respective counterparts (National Guard 2013, 5). The use of the SPP could also help build U.S. Army gender experts and advisors who can leverage existing relationships towards the achievement of increased gender integration in partner nations’ security forces.

Additionally, the Army Reserve CA has established a new Area of Concentration (AOC) focused on government and the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG). The IMSG is managing the new AOC. They have attempted to leverage existing civilian expertise and academia to build initial governance experts. These changes
support the concept for building CA governance advisory teams along the stability lines of operation (Van Roosen 2015, 1-5).

CA officers and noncommissioned officers are uniquely qualified and positioned to support gender integration efforts with partner nations’ security forces. The addition of the 38G AOC and IMSG align with increasing gender integration in partner nations, under the role of building governance experts in the Reserve CA career field. This would also put action to the *Department of Defense Implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*.

Using the Army National Guard SPP and ensuring full support of both the new Army Reserve CA AOC and IMSG can help the U.S. military operationalize the NAP on WPS. In the 2015 NSS, the current administration focused on ensuring the U.S. holds “ourselves to international norms and standards that we expect other nations to uphold” (U.S. President 2015, 3). It also highlights the need to press “for the political and economic participation of women and girls” (U.S. President 2015, 20). Without the support of the best U.S. military forces available, support for the NAP on WPS will be left incomplete.

Further, the DOD should reinvigorate DACOWITS. DOD should continue to man the DACOWITS committee with a minimum of twenty qualified personnel. DOD should also encourage closer coordination with Combatant Commands and service equivalents of Army Service Component Command organizations. When relevant, services should be allowed to provide senior leadership input and testimony directly to DACOWITS. Integrating the NAP on WPS across DOD should the first priority for DACOWITS in 2015 and the near future.
In the interim, to increase awareness of the DOD mandate to focus on NAP on WPS, each service must look to the equivalent of the U.S. Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program. The SHARP’s goals seek to increase awareness and create a positive climate for all individuals. It also seeks to hold every person “accountable for their behavior, actions, and inactions” (SHARP 2015). Integrating the *Department of Defense Implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* into the Army’s SHARP program would not overburden this program and is closely related to goals that support the NAP on WPS.

The recommendations above are a few ways that may help the US Army improve gender integration in Liberia and other Areas of Responsibility. The key to success in gender integration efforts is long-term effort with a systematic approach. This has to account for the differences in conditions of each area. Differences in culture, geography, local economy, tribal issues, and religion leave no suitable checklist for every country in Africa. However, in at risk nations, increasing gender integration is essential to implement as part of the U.S. national strategy. Listed below are four related areas for further research.

**Areas for Future Research**

Offered are four areas of recommended future research related to this topic. Further research on the utility of FETs should be conducted to consider how or where to institutionalize them into existing Army formations. The utility of Army FETs in coordination with the RAF mission should be studied. Further investigation of FETs use with CA teams, a SPP, or in RAF units to provide focused gender experts is also necessary.
There is also a need to conduct research on both USAFRICOM OOL mission effectiveness and the success of the 2014 101st Airborne Liberia mission. Lastly, gender integration in the U.S. Army is an area that should be studied. The first US Army gender integrated Ranger school class was starting as this thesis was concluding. Studying the efforts made in Ranger school to increase U.S. Army gender integration is also an area ready for further investigation.

It is essential for the U.S Army to embrace the need to increase gender integration in our security partners. This is not an altruistic goal to change the fabrics of disparate societies across the globe. Including women in military formations increases the capacity and capabilities of U.S partners. It allows local women to conduct security operations without the need to have local men or U.S. service members interfere in foreign situations. The U.S. Army SPP, FETs, the emerging 38G CA AOC, and CA IMSG are steps to increase gender integration. Building upon these efforts will continue to increase the U.S. Army ability to support the U.S. NAP for WPS.
## APPENDIX A

### THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalizing Women, Peace, and Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Build Internal Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Ensure women’s leadership as ambassadors, heads of missions, special envoys, senior staff, delegations to donor conferences, and leaders of negotiating and mediating teams.</td>
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<td>b. Provide ample funding and internal support for women’s offices and gender focal points.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Ensure that women, peace, and security are not only addressed in a single office or through a gender focal point, but are integrated into all aspects of intervention and reconstruction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Train staff on international mandates to promote women’s participation in peace and security and the rationale of the efficiency of women’s involvement; provide them with implementation tools, mechanisms, and best practices. Institutionalize this training as part of the standard curriculum of the Foreign Service Institute at entry, mid-, and ambassadorial levels.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Build the internal capacity of the U.S. military, in particular, to recognize and address gender issues during war and in postwar reconstruction. Provide human rights and gender training, including the mandates of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, to all members of the armed forces through the war colleges and as a component of standard military training prior to deployment.</td>
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<td>f. Extend the mandate of women’s participation to contracting agencies and funding recipients in all aspects of stabilization operations, including aid disbursement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, elections planning and monitoring, the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, and the re-establishment of education and health care systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Improve Information Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Collect and utilize gender-disaggregated data and information on women’s experiences in conflict and postwar situations in needs assessments, fact-finding reports, initial appraisals, situation reports, program designs, implementation plans, status reports, and monitoring mechanisms for all sectors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Conduct gender budget analyses of humanitarian assistance and postwar reconstruction programs to ensure that women benefit directly from resources mobilized through multilateral and bilateral donors, including donor conferences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Conduct a baseline literature review to determine the existing resources within the U.S. government on women, peace, and security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Fund the collection of best practices and utilize, disseminate, and share relevant information and experiences with other international agencies and branches in order to develop solid institutional memory on women, peace, and security. Develop a coordination mechanism to serve as a clearinghouse for this information.</td>
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</table>
### 3. Establish Connections with Women’s Organizations

- a. Require field staff to foster contact with local women’s organizations by inviting them to relevant meetings, events, and conferences. Formulate a contact list and maintain regular updates on their activities; ensure that this information is transferred to relevant offices at headquarters.
- b. Invite key women leaders to headquarters to provide direct input at critical decision-making points.
- c. Make such meetings public, when appropriate, to provide women with a measure of protection and raise their profile in their home countries.
- d. Connect with other bilateral and multilateral agencies and donors to gather and share information on women’s organizations.
- e. Ensure that women’s organizations are equally represented as recipients of financial and technical resources during times of war and peace.

### Security

#### 1. International Intervention

- a. Provide training on human rights and gender, including the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, to international military forces and civilian staff in advance of deployment.
- b. Increase the recruitment of women as military observers, peacekeeping troops, and civilian police.
- c. Incorporate gender perspectives explicitly into the mandate of international missions; ensure that gender units are established and well-resourced within the mission.
- d. Recognize and address sexual violence and exploitation by international and regional troops with aggressive policies of zero tolerance, justice appropriate to international law, and support to victims.

#### 2. Protection of Civilians

- a. Protect women and girls under threat of physical violence by training the military and police to prevent and address gender-based violence, cooperating with local women’s groups to provide safe havens for victims, and conducting public information campaigns. Condemn violations of their rights and call upon all parties to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law.
- b. Consult with women’s organizations to collect information on the impact of armed conflict and address the specific needs of women and girls.
- c. Include women in the design and implementation of aid programs.

#### 3. Ceasefire and Peace Agreement

- a. Ensure that women leaders are involved throughout the peace process—in donor conferences, in formal and informal negotiations, and in implementation mechanisms and structures.
- b. Provide technical and financial resources to women’s organizations to maximize the impact of their initiatives and their access to all major actors.
- c. Support the creation of a women’s monitoring commission to oversee and promote gender equality in the implementation of all aspects of the peace agreement with access to all relevant actors.
| 4. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) | a. Include gender experts to work with agencies designing and implementing DDR programs.  
b. Assume that women and girls are part of fighting forces—as combatants, supporters, and family members—and plan for their participation accordingly by creating secure housing centers for women and girls, addressing reproductive and psychosocial health care, and providing child care during training and educational courses.  
c. Ensure the security of women and girls in assembly areas through regular patrols, fences where appropriate, and awareness-raising programs on violence prevention.  
d. Consult with women’s networks to devise incentives and strategies to encourage people to surrender their weapons.  
e. Include women leaders in training and education on weapons safety and responsibility.  
f. Support women’s efforts at the community level to design creative weapons collection programs, educate their families about the dangers of weapons and landmines, rehabilitate victims, and educate youth and community leaders in conflict resolution.  
g. Specify the percentage of women’s involvement in reintegration programs in the terms of reference for contracting organizations; the figure should be appropriate to the estimated number of women and men engaged as combatants and supporters to the fighting force.  
h. Increase resources and training for community groups to ensure sustainability of reintegration programs.  
i. Prepare communities, through awareness raising projects, for the issues that former combatants, particularly women, child soldiers, and girls, may face upon their reintegration; support local efforts to reconcile and re-establish relationships. |
|---|---|
| 5. Security Sector Reform | a. Ensure that new defense ministries and police forces promote women’s full participation, and consult with women’s organizations to include gender-sensitive training for forces and a gender perspective in new mandates.  
b. Provide training to the police force specifically on the prevention and treatment of gender-based violence.  
c. Encourage open forums to ensure that public opinion regarding security threats is addressed and the security sector begins to gain legitimacy and credibility with the public; ensure that the priorities of women for safety and security are voiced through consultations with women’s organizations.  
d. Conduct capacity-building programs at national, provincial, and community levels to enable women to participate effectively in security sector reform. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance and Political Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Transitional Administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Ensure that women’s organizations are consulted regarding the design of a transitional administration, including its laws, mechanisms, and mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Identify and support means and mechanisms to ensure that women participate equally in all committees, commissions, temporary ministries, and other structures of the interim administration, and that they participate in all relevant meetings with international mediators and representatives overseeing the process. Tools may include quotas, reserved seats, political parties, women’s advisory committees, or other innovative mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Recognize that this interim period is a “window of opportunity” to advance the role of women in society; utilize the platform to encourage their participation, advance women’s rights, and promote gender equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. National Constitution Process</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Ensure that women participate in all mechanisms related to the formulation of a new constitution, including constitutional commissions, constituent assemblies, national conventions, and public consultations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Encourage the “engendering” of the constitution to ensure equality between men and women, drawing from international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Recognize and support women’s creative solutions to merge traditions, beliefs, and customs with legal guarantees of women’s rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Executive Branch and Ministries</strong></td>
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<td>a. Ensure that women’s networks are consulted to determine how their needs and concerns are best addressed: by a women’s ministry, by mainstreaming throughout the executive branch, a combination of both, or through other innovative mechanisms. Fully support whatever system is chosen.</td>
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<td>b. Promote the appointment of women to high-level positions within the new government.</td>
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<td>c. Promote the institution of “gender budgeting” to develop the national budget based on a system of expenditures responsive to the needs of women and men.</td>
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<td>d. Train women for employment in public service.</td>
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<td><strong>4. Legislative Branch</strong></td>
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<td>a. Provide national, provincial, and local forums for women’s organizations to convene and formulate a strategy to ensure their participation in legislative assemblies: through a quota, reserved seats, political parties, indirect elections, or other innovative mechanisms. Support their efforts for equal political participation.</td>
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<td>b. Consider the possibility that women candidates may face gender-based threats to their participation and provide security as required to facilitate their involvement.</td>
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<td>c. Support the creation of a cross-party women’s caucus or committee.</td>
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<td>d. Fund and develop capacity-building and mentoring programs to train women candidates on issues including leadership, decision making, public speaking, and campaigning.</td>
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<td>e. Provide training for all legislative members on critical issues of concern to women and what legal provisions are needed.</td>
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| 5. Local Governance | a. Promote the participation of women leaders in local governance structures by encouraging political parties, instituting quotas or reserved seats, and/or training candidates.  
  b. Conduct training for women on municipal legislation, budgeting and taxation, service delivery systems, poverty alleviation methods, community and environmental management, and communication skills.  
  c. Support the efforts of civil society to encourage women candidates, including the establishment of women councilor associations, mentoring and exchange programs, and capacity-building projects. |
| 6. Forming Political Parties | a. Encourage political parties to put forth women candidates from among their ranks for national and local elections and to develop initiatives to allow women to participate fully in all internal policymaking structures and appointive and electoral nominating processes.  
  b. Promote a party platform that endorses gender equality and women’s rights. |
| 7. Planning Elections | a. Consider creative means to qualify women as voters, as many may be internally displaced or may not have access to legal identification and citizenship documents.  
  b. Plan the polling sites and voting hours with women’s safety and security needs in mind.  
  c. Ensure that women participate fully as election administrators, poll workers, election observers, and members of a national election body through quotas, reserved seats, political parties, women’s advisory committees, or other innovative mechanisms.  
  d. Conduct sex-segregated voter education training to ensure that women are fully apprised of the process. |
| 8. Strengthening Civil Society | a. Support a constitutional and legal framework that enables the establishment of a vibrant civil society, including the right to assembly, free speech, and freedom of the press.  
  b. Target resources at mass-based women’s groups and gender-sensitive mainstream organizations engaged in non-violent conflict resolution and peace education, particularly those that represent and reach across ethnic, religious, or party lines. In addition to financial resources, technical training should be offered in management principles, budgeting, fundraising, grant applications, human resources, media outreach, networking, and advocacy.  
  c. Within the international mission, establish a well-resourced civil society liaison office.  
  d. Encourage civil society–government dialogue to ensure informed policymaking on issues of critical importance in the postwar period, such as the new constitution, transitional justice mechanisms, and security sector reform. |
| 9. Media: | a. Fund newspapers, magazines, and radio programs to educate and inform citizens of their rights and responsibilities and to highlight women’s contributions to society, emphasize human rights, and present role models for women.  
  b. Facilitate women’s ownership of media and support the establishment of women’s radio networks, TV, and mobile media.  
  c. Train women leaders in media strategies and the basics of media, including press releases, public speaking, interviews, and electronic media.  
  d. Connect local women’s groups to international women’s media networks.  
  e. Support women’s efforts to utilize media creatively to establish a culture of peace. |
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<th>Justice and Reconciliation</th>
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| **1. Community Rebuilding** | a. Recognize and support local groups, including women, who serve as links from official transitional justice and reconciliation processes to the grassroots level.  
b. Financially and technically support women’s organizations that promote reconciliation and psychosocial healing at national and local levels, particularly those that work across conflict lines.  
c. Encourage and support local mechanisms for dispute resolution, confidence building, dialogue, healing, and reconciliation. |
| **2. Transitional Justice Mechanisms** | a. Conduct a national consultation process that includes women’s organizations and gender-sensitive analysis to determine the most appropriate form of transitional justice mechanism: international tribunal, national courts, truth commissions, amnesty, reparations, lustration, institutional reform, traditional options, or a combination of these.  
b. Ensure women are equally represented in all processes at all levels: as designers, judges, commissioners, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, and observers.  
c. Document and monitor violations of women’s human rights and institutionalize a process within the transitional justice system to address them. Ensure that crimes against women are addressed consistent to international standards.  
d. Design mechanisms to gather evidence, protect witnesses, and report proceedings that meet the specific needs and concerns of women.  
e. Draw on the expertise of women’s groups to train international, national, and local staff that will implement transitional justice on gender issues, including rape and sexual assault. |
b. Support women’s groups in their efforts to monitor and defend human rights and to educate the public on their rights.  
c. Translate and disseminate key international and national human rights instruments to the general public as part of an awareness-raising campaign to transform the culture of violence.  
| **4. Reform of the Judicial System:** | a. Ensure that civil society, including women, is included in consultations regarding judicial, legal, police, and penal reform.  
b. Train judges, lawyers, and court personnel specifically on international and national laws and processes that affect women.  
c. Ensure that prison staff is adequately trained on the specific needs of female perpetrators and that they are separately housed with appropriate facilities.  
d. Conduct information campaigns to educate the public on their legal rights, specifically reaching out to women in rural and remote areas and to local authorities and leaders who enforce rights and responsibilities. |
5. Rewriting Laws:

| a. Ensure that violence against women, including domestic violence, is prohibited under criminal law, punishable with the same severity as other crimes, and does not require additional evidence or testimony. Support the establishment of witness protection programs and the provision of adequate legal redress and support services for victims. |
| b. Conduct a national review of existing laws to ensure gender, racial, religious, and ethnic equality throughout legislative and policy reforms. The principles of nondiscrimination, equality, freedom, and security should be reaffirmed. |
| c. Ensure that women are granted equal rights in new laws regarding national and citizenship and that they can pass these rights on to their children. |
| d. Encourage formal family laws to articulate the equality of men and women in marriage, provide voluntary consent of both parties to enter a marriage agreement, require the same minimum age for marriage, and ensure equal rights of divorce and fair divorce proceedings. |
| e. Support efforts to monitor the implementation of new laws. |

### Economic and Social Well Being

1. Management of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):

| a. Ensure that women are leaders in camp design and management. |
| b. Provide security for women and girls in camps through regular patrols, fences where appropriate, separate and safe facilities, and awareness-raising programs on violence prevention. |
| c. Consult with women when designing plans for repatriation and resettlement. |

2. Physical Infrastructure

| a. Ensure that women’s priorities for infrastructure are included in early discussions and throughout the life of the project. |
| b. Explore creative mechanisms to include women in public works projects, such as partnering with women’s organizations or the women’s ministry to recruit women as laborers or cooks. |

3. Food Security

| a. Consult with women regarding the design and implementation of emergency food aid programs. |
| b. Ensure that the food provided is complementary to the cultural and traditional context and recognize that women are often agricultural workers. |
| c. Include adequate provisions for women’s ownership and participation in land reform and reallocation. |

4. Public Health:

| a. Ensure that reproductive health supplies and equipment are part of the emergency medical package. |
| b. Train medical staff to address sexual violence and adequately equip facilities to provide reproductive health care. |
| c. Ensure that HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs include women and girls and address their specific needs and concerns. |
| d. Consult with women regarding water and waste management and capitalize on their knowledge and skills to implement projects. |

5. Educational System

| a. Ensure that girls are recruited into new classrooms equally with boys. Provide adequate security and offer incentives to families and communities for girls’ attendance. |
| b. Develop a curriculum that respects diversity and promotes gender equality. |
| c. Develop an adult literacy campaign that targets women as well as men. |
| d. Support women’s groups that are promoting peace education to youth at local and national levels. |
| 6. Labor and Employment | a. Support the reform of labor laws to ensure that women have equal access to employment opportunities.  
b. Conduct vocational training programs for women; select the project or field based on the input of women, rather than cultural or traditional assumptions.  
c. Prioritize the recruitment and employment of women in international development programs. Design innovative mechanisms to transfer the trained and knowledgeable personnel back into the national system as the international community departs. |
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<td>7. Property Rights</td>
<td>a. Support legal reforms to ensure that women have equal legal rights to attain, own, transfer, and inherit land and personal property.</td>
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| 8. Business Ownership   | a. Support the reform of business ownership laws and statutes to ensure women’s equal access.  
b. Target women with micro-enterprise loans and grants as well as more substantial projects, including funds and training for small, medium, and large-scale businesses.  |
| 9. Long-term Development| a. Ensure that economic policymaking includes women’s input and that national budget processes reflect women’s needs and concerns.  
b. Encourage macroeconomic policies that prioritize the public provision of food, water, sanitation, health, and energy— key sectors in which women provide unpaid labor.  
c. Include a requirement in contracts with implementing agencies that mandates women’s participation in reconstruction projects. |


