IMPROVING JUNIOR INFANTRY OFFICER LEADER
DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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B.S., Washington State University, Pullman, Washington, 2006

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2017

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ABSTRACT

IMPROVING JUNIOR INFANTRY OFFICER LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE, by MAJ Colin B. Thorne, 224 pages.

The infantry operational environment is uncommonly lethal and unforgiving. Yet, junior infantry officers must succeed and simultaneously overcome the developmental challenge of preparing to operate in nine different infantry formations (light, wheeled, tracked, air mobile, airborne, mortar, anti-armor, Ranger, and reconnaissance). This thesis includes details, qualitative analysis, and recommended solutions to this problem. The primary researcher proposes leveraging the existing Army Leadership Requirements Model and administrative practices across the Army Leader Development Model institutional, operational, and self-development domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance. The primary researcher used a qualitative literature review and semi-structured interview methodology to analyze Army leadership theories and leader development doctrine, regulations, Department of the Army Pamphlets, development strategies, institutional course websites, and the 2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership. The results of this analysis are visualized using a scaled Venn diagram and Force Field Analysis. Additionally, five proposals are presented for future study in this field.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Leader Development is a deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process grounded in the Army Values. It grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent, confident Leaders capable of directing teams and organizations. Army Leaders, as stewards of the Army profession, must place the needs of the Army as a whole above organizational or personal needs. This is particularly true in developing subordinates. Leader Development occurs through the lifelong synthesis of education, training, and experience. Successful Leaders balance the long-term needs of the Army, the near-term and career needs of their subordinates, and the immediate needs of their unit missions. The Army requires all its Leaders to develop subordinates into Leaders for the next level.

— Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, Army Leadership

Introduction

This quote from Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, describes the way Army leader development is ideally supposed to occur in accordance with the concepts and details provided within Army leadership and leader development doctrine. Development of junior infantry officers should take place in the same way. However, things in the real world do not always happen exactly as one might plan or hope. This type of real world discrepancy between theory and reality is exactly what the primary researcher and many other infantry officers experienced.

Picture the following example of a junior infantry officer’s development journey. A newly minted infantry officer arrives at Fort Benning, Georgia to receive his initial infantry officer training. This impressionable young infantry officer is soon trained primarily on offensive and defensive light infantry tactics. This officer, and a few of his classmates, may get the opportunity to develop their skills further at Ranger School.
complete with his initial officer training, the young infantry officer is then assigned to one of the nine different types of infantry units.

For example, the infantry officer may be assigned as an anti-armor platoon leader. This assignment would likely come as a shock to the junior infantry officer, because being an anti-armor platoon leader is an assignment for which he was not trained. For the next few years, this infantry officer likely deployed several times, in support of a named contingency operation or as part of a regionally aligned force. This officer likely executed combat missions based out of forward operating bases relying heavily on wheeled maneuver platforms, rather than executing purely Light infantry patrols. These skill sets would have been learned almost entirely on the job, during combat operations. These skills were not developed through professional military education or through personal self-development.

As a captain, the young infantry officer may be assigned as an instructor at Fort Benning, entrusted with training the next generation of infantrymen. This dedicated infantryman then perpetuated the educational paradigm he received by training his young infantry officer students heavily focused on light infantry tactics. After serving selflessly for a few years, this young infantry officer completed the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC). During this time at the MCCC, the young officer conducted only minimal training on mechanized and striker formations, but did not conduct any training on airborne or air assault operations. This MCCC certified graduate was then re-assigned and served as a company commander for a mechanized infantry formation.

While in command, the junior infantry captain again had to learn on the job how to man, train, maintain, and fight a mechanized infantry formation. During this time, the
officer may have deployed to the Republic of Korea as part of a nine-month regionally aligned force, focusing on countering weapons of mass destruction, combined arms maneuver, air assault, and subterranean operations. Again, the junior infantry officer had to develop and learn new skills and competencies on the job. During the officer’s extended company command assignment, the junior infantry officer was the direct supervisor for numerous other junior infantry, field artillery, and armor officers.

The junior infantry commander was directly responsible for the critical role of professionally developing these young officers, and yet the junior officer was not a master of these developmental skills himself. Many of this young officer’s subordinate officers arrived at his company from their initial military training, woefully unprepared for this non-light infantry, non-traditional operational environment. These new young officers had to learn many of their skills on the job as well. Many of these newly minted infantry officers understandably struggled with these development challenges.

Throughout the officer’s ten years as a junior infantry officer, he progressed successfully, above his peers, through all of the mandatory Army and infantry professional military education. The officer likely sought out and graduated several other special Army schools. The officer likely earned multiple additional Army skill badges, and probably considered himself to be an above average, motivated, professional infantry officer. Yet, despite these diverse and formative experiences, personal motivation, and dedication to the Army profession, the young infantry officer repeatedly found himself unprepared for his next duty assignment.

This was because the professional development was not conducted as described in the passage from ADRP 6-22 quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The young infantry
The young infantry officer’s professional development was not sufficiently deliberate or sequential. The young officer trained predominately on light infantry tactics, yet he was assigned to multiple different infantry formation types, all without effective or deliberate pre-requisite training. The young infantry officer’s development was not continuous or progressive; rather it was segmented and abrupt. The young infantry officer was only formally developed for relatively short periods, and then he was abruptly re-assigned into diverse and dynamic operational experiences for the majority of his career. The majority of the young infantry officer’s formative experiences resulted from the crucible of combat or in support of a named contingency operation, rather than a product of deliberate education or training.

For the most part, the young infantry officer’s leaders did not effectively balance his individual development or the long-term needs of the Army, with the immediate needs of their organizations. As a result, the young infantry officer’s professional development suffered. This was probably not the result of any malicious intent or actions on the part of the young infantry officer’s leaders, but rather was more likely simply an unfortunate symptom of the officer’s commanders’ competing demands. The young infantry officer’s limited professional development was likely an undesired product of a relatively ineffective junior infantry officer leader development system. As such, the young infantry officer is not as developed as an infantry officer as he could or should be. This situation constitutes a problem that is unacceptable, preventable, should be addressed. This is also the primary focus of this thesis.
Problem Statement

Infantry officers, captain and below, often lack critical technical, tactical, and leader skills, resulting in increased numbers of marginally performing leaders in charge of soldiers on a regular basis. This is due to the ineffectiveness of the Army’s Leader development Model (ALDM) to develop leaders through the military’s institutional, operational, and self-development domains.

Research Question

How can Army leaders leverage the existing Army Leadership Requirements Model (ALRM) and administrative practices across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?

Supporting Research Questions (SRQs)

SRQ1. What is the ALRM?

SRQ2. What is the ALDM?

SRQ3. What are the Army administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

SRQ4. What are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM’s institutional, organizational, and self-development domains?

Leader development, and how it is executed, is not a new concept within the U.S. Army. What follows is more in depth background information that should provide the
reader with context to this problem and the supporting research questions for this inquiry into junior infantry officer leader development.

Background: Problem and Research Question

U.S. Army soldiers and leaders are tasked by the American people with fighting and winning the nation’s wars.\(^1\) Infantry Branch soldiers and officers have the ultimate task of physically imposing the American people’s will on an enemy force. This is epitomized through the infantry platoon mission: “to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy, capture, or repel an assault by fire, close combat . . . in order to succeed, Infantry platoons and squads are aggressive, physically fit, disciplined, and well-trained.”\(^2\) This is a complex, lethal, and unforgiving mission.

The infantry mission requires infantry soldiers and officers to engage in combat operations ranging from hand-to-hand combat, employing state of the art weaponry, employing many varied combat vehicle platforms, to coordinating and employing nearly the full arsenal of combat power from across the joint and multinational arsenal.\(^3\) A single mistake by an infantry officer can result not only in the instantaneous deaths of his soldiers, the deaths of innocent non-combatants, but his own death as well.

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3 Ibid., 3.
The infantry battlefield threat environment is unique in that the infantry soldier has little to no protective equipment. Aside from his individual Kevlar helmet, ceramic ballistic vest, plastic kneepads, gloves, and eye protection, infantry soldiers lack substantial protection against lethal enemy attacks. Although these tools are better than no protection, these pieces of equipment are only moderately effective against small arms and minor fragmentation. They are worthless against larger caliber weapons. This means that almost every weapon on the battlefield can seriously harm or kill an infantry soldier. The disparity between the limited protections an infantry soldier has, compared to the highly lethal operational environment in which infantry soldiers regularly operate, stands as a stark daily reality for infantry soldiers. Infantry soldiers do not have overwhelming technological advantages, un-matched armor plating, dominant vehicle speeds, or unparalleled digital situational awareness to help ensure better survival on the battlefield. Instead, infantry soldiers must rely on themselves, their battle buddies to their left and right, and their skills as infantry soldiers to survive and win in combat.

In addition to the enemy threat, infantry soldiers must also overcome substantial environmental challenges. Hardships from cold, heat, darkness, dehydration, hunger, and fatigue all add up against the infantryman to degrade his strength and ability to fight, win, and survive. This requires the infantry officer to be both exceptionally physically fit and emotionally resilient.

On top of these challenging and lethal environmental obstacles, infantry leaders must master the complex technical and tactical skills needed to effectively employ and lead soldiers across the nine different infantry fighting formations of light, wheeled, tracked, air mobile, airborne, mortar, anti-armor, Ranger, and reconnaissance units. The
infantry officer is required to master many additional technical disciplines as he progresses through his dynamic career assignments.

This assignment evolution is enforced by Infantry Branch leader’s vehicular/non-vehicular imperative. Current guidance effectively requires infantry leaders to switch units of assignment and technical discipline after every Key developmental (KD) assignment. Failure to follow this directive puts an infantry officer at risk of not being competitive for promotion. The vehicular/non-vehicular imperative means that an infantry officer will not likely be assigned to the same type of infantry formation sequentially, or repeatedly, throughout their career. This imperative results in both beneficial and deleterious outcomes for junior infantry officer development. On the positive side, it allows infantry officers to experience more diverse, Army-wide, developmental experiences and assignments. This is good for developing general officers, but it has its drawbacks as well.

On the negative side, the vehicular/non-vehicular imperative means that infantry officers are less likely to build true expertise in any one, or all of the nine different infantry formations. Secondly, the vehicular/non-vehicular imperative means that infantry officers are required to develop a completely new set of technical and tactical skills every few years. This is excessively time consuming and challenging. This is particularly significant for junior infantry officers because they are required to directly lead soldiers from the front, as both platoon leaders and company commanders, likely in two different

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types of infantry formations, within their first six years in the Army. Junior infantry officers must accomplish all of these leadership demands, while simultaneously overcoming the harsh infantry operational environment. These are exceptionally difficult odds to overcome. The continuous requirement for infantry officers to develop new skills, while simultaneously directly leading soldiers, in an exceptionally complex, lethal, and unforgiving environment, increases the demands and importance placed on the junior infantry officer leader development system.

The peacetime nature of the all-volunteer Army, and the legal and political aspects of the current officer accessions and recruitment systems, require Army leaders to develop future infantry leaders internally. The infantry leaders do not have the option to unilaterally select only the best of the best officer candidates from the entire pool of newly commissioned officers. The infantry officer accessions process is a complex talent management system controlled by Army Cadet Command. Cadet Command leaders employ a branching model that is theoretically designed to balance infantry leaders’ desires for only the highest quality officers, with Army leaders’ requirements to adequately balance officer talent and legally mandated diversity across all branches, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Active Army components, while also taking

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into consideration each cadet’s personal branch preferences. This means that a diverse and varied range of individuals, personalities, and motivation levels enter the infantry. This is most significant because cadets that are branched into the infantry involuntarily, due to the mandated diversity and talent distribution policies, can often present infantry leaders with substantial motivational challenges. Among this group of reluctant infantry officers, may reside some who may not pro-actively seek or respond efficiently to instructor and/or rater development efforts across the three ALDM domains.

Another challenge facing infantry leaders is the current promotion system. The promotion rate to captain for fiscal year 2016 was 89.1 percent, with an above the zone rate of 60 percent. This means that approximately 95 percent of all junior infantry officers were promoted to the rank of captain. This high promotion rate means that there is very little statistical risk of an infantry officer failing to promote to captain. The result is an infantry officer population where nearly the entire year group cohort of infantry officers remain in the Army for at least their entire first term of service, often longer. This small rate of junior infantry officer professional attrition means that the junior infantry officer population in the Army may or may not pose high levels of technical or tactical competency. This potentially low infantry officer competency rate is possible due to the lack of a highly selective promotion system. Additionally, this means that junior infantry

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officers’ skills must therefore develop as a product of the ALDM, and not based solely on cadets’ varied pre-commissioning talents, or as the results of more highly selective promotion board attrition. Therefore, leader development systems within the Army take on considerable significance.

Army leaders must rely on the ALDM to develop junior infantry officers from within. This consists of synchronized development actions and efforts across the three institutional, operational, and self-development domains. Army leaders use the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) and other administrative records to evaluate an officer’s performance and potential for future success as an Army leader. Army leaders rely on these administrative systems to simultaneously support junior infantry officer leader development, and to evaluate junior infantry officer performance, ultimately selectively retaining only the best infantry officers. As previously indicated in this chapter, junior infantry officer promotion rates do not reflect a high level of selectivity. This means that infantry officers are continually promoted and put in charge of soldiers, even though they may or may not perform at high levels. This also means that infantry leaders must rely on the ALDM system to mitigate the negative effects that possibly high numbers of

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The junior infantry officer leader development system is not as effective as it should be. The lethal and unforgiving nature of the infantry mission, and the diversity and complexity of its varied fighting formations, means that junior infantry officers must perform at the highest possible levels. The existing recruitment and accessions systems, vehicular/non-vehicular assignment imperative, and disproportionately high promotion rates represent daunting challenges to the junior infantry officer development system. However, Army and infantry leaders rely on the ALDM and ALRM to mitigate or solve these issues, in order to consistently develop high quality junior infantry officers from within their formations. Improvements need to be made across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains in order to meet the multitude of natural and man-made challenges placed on the junior infantry officer development system. This is the primary researcher’s main area of focus throughout this study.

**Assumptions**

To accomplish this study the primary researcher made three assumptions. These assumptions allowed the primary researcher to focus more precisely. Additionally, these three assumptions allowed the primary researcher to complete analysis and propose logical conclusions and executable recommendations.

A1. The foundations of the ALDM are sound and do not need to be changed.

A2. The current all-volunteer force, officer accessions, and promotion systems will remain in place for the foreseeable future.
A3. Junior infantry leader competencies are not fixed. They can be preferentially developed through proper training, education, and experiences.

Scope

The scope of this study is junior infantry officers, second lieutenant through captain, from 5 May 2006 to 1 March 2017. The primary researcher investigated how junior infantry officer leader development takes place across all three domains of the ALDM. These areas include institutional, operational, and self-development. The primary researcher qualitatively reviewed leading civilian leadership theories, qualitative modeling methods, Army doctrine, Army leader development strategies, Army administrative systems and tools, and existing primary Army leadership survey data. The primary researcher focused on the current ALDM, with contextual references extending back to 2006 as appropriate. The primary researcher analyzed the institutional domain, starting with the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC), and ending with the MCCC.

The primary researcher took into account senior Army leaders’ heightened interest in developing more creative and adaptive leaders in an increasingly resource constrained environment. The primary researcher also took into account the Army Doctrine 2015, the implementation of the new OER and the ALRM, the relative growth and subsequent curtailment of Army force structure, and realistic threats of federal budget sequestration.

11 HQDA, ALDS, 7.
It was important for the primary researcher to pay considerable attention to these numerous and diverse aspects of the operational environment. This was because these aspects provided critical context in which any findings or recommendations must be evaluated and considered. Of particular note, the new OER requires the supervisor to evaluate their subordinate officers in accordance with the ALRM six attributes and competencies.\textsuperscript{12} This codified in regulation, for the first time, the specific requirement for a rater to evaluate a rated officer’s ability to effectively develop others, prepare self, and display intellectual expertise.\textsuperscript{13} The new OER forces evaluators to structure how they evaluate and communicate their subordinate’s performance within the context of the ALRM. This new administrative paradigm makes the new OER and the ALRM key forces within the junior infantry officer development system. Additionally, the complex political and wartime operational environments magnify the significance of all of the previously listed leader development challenges, on an ever-decreasing number of over-stressed, under-developed junior infantry officers.

\textbf{Limitations}

There was only one limitation to this study beyond the control of the primary researcher that might have affected the outcomes. This constraint was time available. The primary researcher was a student during the 2016-2017 Command and General Staff School academic year. This meant that the study had to be completed within this


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
timeframe. This externally imposed nine-month timeframe may have had impacts on the primary researcher’s ability to conduct research and editing efforts. In addition to this external constraint, the primary researcher self-imposed several delimitations on this study.

**Delimitations**

The delimitations in this study were self-imposed constraints by the primary researcher related to the scope of the study, and the primary researcher’s reliance on existing leadership studies. These delimitations reflect the primary researcher’s ten years of Active Duty service as a junior infantry officer, as well as the primary researcher’s limited time and access to appropriately sample populations of junior infantry officers during the 2016-2017 Command and General Staff School academic year. Additionally, the delimitations were meant to facilitate the primary researcher’s personal and professional familiarity with the subject matter, and allowed the primary researcher to focus time and effort more efficiently.


D2. Limited analysis for only second lieutenant through captain infantry officers.

D3. Relied on existing leadership studies.

Despite these limitations and delimitations placed on this study, the results and recommendations that the primary researcher presented are still significant.

**Significance of the Study**

This thesis is important because Army leader development directly increases unit readiness, which is Army Chief of Staff, General Mark A. Milley’s number one
priority. Additionally, improving leader development specifically addresses Army Warfighting Challenge (AWFC) Ten: “Developing Leaders: Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders-How to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative Leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.”

AWFCs are “enduring first order problems” that the Army leaders at the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) are studying, and challenging all Army soldiers and leaders to solve. Solutions to the AWFCs “will improve current and future force combat effectiveness” of the entire Army. The findings and recommendations proposed by the primary researcher in this study will be conceptually applicable to all other Army branch leaders, and can likely provide possible solutions to AWFC Ten. This has the potential to beneficially impact and improve leader development across the entire Army. Chapters 2 and 5 address this issue further.

The present and future threats of congressionally mandated federal budget sequestration, and today’s complex operational environment, add tremendous value and significance to advancements to the field of leader development. This study is significant because the primary researcher recommends specific changes to the junior infantry

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16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.
officer leader development system, across the ALDM three domains. The primary researcher's findings are unique because they are purposefully crafted in such a way that they have the potential to be extremely low-impact, low-cost solutions to infantry and Army leaders’ leadership development problems. The primary researcher intended this resource-friendly problem solving methodology to increase the likelihood that infantry and Army leaders would accept his recommendations, and implement them as soon as possible. The primary researcher accomplished this by providing recommendations that practically leverage existing Army doctrine, leader development strategies, administrative systems, and Army programs of record in order to improve junior infantry officer development. This is important because Army leaders do not have excess time or resources to waste on developing a completely new leader development system.
CHAPTER 2
QUALITATIVE LITERATURE REVIEW AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Introduction to Qualitative Literature Review

The primary researcher started the qualitative literature review by identifying several of the most popular leadership theories today. The primary researcher does not intend to break new theoretical ground in the field of leadership theory. Instead, the primary researcher intends to provide qualitative analysis regarding the effectiveness of the ALRM, ALDM, and other administrative systems and processes to develop the most competent junior infantry officers possible. Additionally, the primary researcher conducted several semi-structured interviews in order to obtain expert information about the literature resources. The primary researcher used these sources of information to build a deeper understanding of the junior infantry officer leader development system and to identify common themes within the system. The primary researcher will draw on this deeper understanding and themes in later chapters to conduct qualitative analysis, and develop conclusions and recommendations.

The primary researcher accomplished this by reviewing several of the leading civilian leadership theories, Army leadership and leader development doctrine, Army administrative systems, Army development strategies, Army regulations, Army institutional websites, and Army leadership effectiveness studies. Next, the primary researcher then reviewed two qualitative modeling tools to assist with visualization and the analysis portions of this study. First, the primary researcher selected a scaled Venn diagram as a meaning making model, to qualitatively visualize the effectiveness of the current junior infantry officer development system. Second, the primary researcher
selected Force Field Analysis as a change model, to qualitatively visualize each of the literature resources as either driving or resisting forces within the junior infantry officer development system. The primary researcher presented a more detailed explanation of these models in chapter 3, and presented qualitative analysis and results in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Figure 1 depicts the sequence and resource-grouping hierarchy followed throughout the course of this qualitative literature review chapter.

Figure 1. Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure

*Source:* Created by author.
The figure above contains three concentric rings, each labeled for the types of documents reviewed within each portion of this literature review.

Starting from the outer ring and working inward, the literature review began with various resources that would help develop a broader theoretical context of leadership theories. Helping develop this broader theoretical context helps address SRQ1—what is the ALRM? The literature resources reviewed by the primary researcher in the outer ring help the reader understand how the study of junior infantry Army officer leader development ties in to the larger fields of civilian leadership and leader development study. This is important because this linked a seemingly Army leader-centric problem to other disciplines and civilian sectors. In turn, this increased the applicability and significance of the conclusions and recommendations presented by the primary researcher in this study. Within the first section of this study, the researcher reviewed several of the most-popular civilian leadership theories, and focused on the theory that the primary researcher concluded best represents Army leadership and leader development doctrine.

The next ring moving inward is Army doctrine. This middle ring represents the section of this study in which the primary researcher focused on reviewing all of the Army doctrine that applies to the development of junior infantry officers. These sources helped the researcher address SRQ1—what is the ALRM, and SRQ2—what is the ALDM? The primary researcher identified and selected these pieces of literature by methodically cross-referencing each manual’s reference list. This process was tedious, but absolutely necessary, because each manual listed a sizable number of generally applicable documents, but did not clearly identify which manuals applied significantly to this study. The primary researcher reviewed each of the manuals listed, and then reduced
the number to a more focused list, consisting of only those that directly applied to the field of junior infantry officer leader development.

The final circle, located at the center of the literature review figure, represents literature resources that allow Army leaders to effectively apply all of the theories and concepts provided from the sources reviewed in the two outer rings. These resources help the primary researcher address SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? The literature resources reviewed in this inner circle provide Army leaders with specific details, guidance, and directives in order to allow them to effectively develop junior infantry officers. The information found in these resources may also allow the primary researcher to address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains? Table 1 lists all of the literature resources reviewed in this chapter, organized by type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Documents</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journals/Periodicals</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papers/Reports/Studies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
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*Source:* Created by author.
The reader should not be put off by the sheer quantity of literature reviewed in this chapter. Such an in-depth literature review was critical for both the reader and the primary researcher to develop the necessary working knowledge and deep understanding of the junior infantry officer leader development system. This deep understanding is essential in order to fully appreciate the primary researcher’s analysis and findings presented in chapters 4 and 5. Having explained the format of this chapter, the primary researcher will review the selected civilian leadership theories and other literature resources that will provide a broader theoretical context regarding junior infantry officer leader development.

**Leadership Theoretical Context**

**Leading Civilian Leadership Theories**

Through the literature review process, the primary researcher confirmed that there are an exceptionally large number of different leader development theories in existence today. The primary researcher highlighted four of the most prominent leadership theories today in the following passages. The primary researcher’s review of the leading civilian leadership theories enables the reader to better understand how past leadership theorists’ thoughts and ideas evolved over time. This chapter also ultimately allows the reader to understand which civilian leadership theory most closely matches the theory that appears in Army leadership and leader development doctrine. These sources were examined to address SRQ1—what is the ALRM?

Humans have undoubtedly studied leadership throughout time, but only in the last one hundred years or so have they conducted legitimate theoretical studies of the
leadership topic. These formally published studies are more significant than the less formal, un-published endeavors because they represent the consolidated thoughts and ideas of the leading leadership theorists and peoples of their day. The primary researcher will begin by reviewing the Great Man Theories.

**Great Man or Trait Theories**

Starting in the early 1900s, leadership theorists officially developed the Great Man or Trait Theories. Edgar Borgatta, Robert Bales, and Arthur Couch describe this theory as one of the oldest formalized leadership theories. The primary researcher identified that the two theoretical names are often used interchangeably, and are based on the premise that leaders innately exist, imbued with nature-given traits that enable successful leadership. This theory is unique in this regard, in that leaders are clearly separated from followers due to their so-called innate leadership traits. Followers of this theory believe that their subordinates are simply incapable of leading or learning to lead, since they were not born with specific leadership traits.

Borgatta, Bales, and Couch provide commentary in their study that supports the idea that the Great Man Theory might have gained its historical popularity due to the its simplicity and ease with which it supports the manipulation of systems and organizations.

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20 Northouse, 19.
by manipulating one individual, the Great Man.\textsuperscript{21} The authors attempted to fill their perceived gap in Great Man Theory literature regarding the effectiveness of Great Man-like leaders to positively affect group performance and environments.\textsuperscript{22} The study ultimately provided details and findings that supported the idea that great men, as defined by three specific abilities defined in their study, do indeed “make great groups.”\textsuperscript{23}

In contrast to this example above, the primary researcher’s observations that robust, leader development doctrine and systems do currently exist within the Army, supports the idea that Army leaders predominately support a leadership theory that allows for junior leaders to be developed. If, for example, Army leaders did believe in the Great Man Theory, there would be no need for the ALRM or ALDM, and these systems would not exist in the Army today.

If Army leaders can be developed, then there must be some exterior force that drives their development. Forces can be manmade or natural; both types of forces combine to create the environments in which every individual exists. The leadership theory that addresses the impact of environmental forces on leadership is the Contingency Theory. The primary researcher will review this theory next.

**Contingency Theory**

A second prominent leadership theory is the Contingency Theory developed in the 1960s. Followers of this theory believe that leadership is defined in terms of a

\textsuperscript{21} Borgatta, Bales, and Couch, 756.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 759.
leader’s ability to adapt their leadership method to a given environment or follower group. The Contingency Theory’s central focus on a leader’s ability/requirement to adjust to their given operational environment, challenges other leadership theories.

Followers of this theory believe that a leader’s leadership method is based on whether the environment is focused more on accomplishing tasks or fostering positive relationships with the workforce. Believers of the Contingency Theory laud how its tenets reportedly assist practitioners of the theory in predicting what type of leadership method is likely to succeed in a given environment, and because it does not require leaders to perform exceptionally in all situations in order for them to be deemed good leaders. The Contingency Theory provides leaders with a survey-based evaluation methodology, called the Least Preferred Coworker, to rate an individual’s personality inclinations towards being more human-interaction focused or task-accomplishment focused. The Least Preferred Coworker evaluation method, and the Contingency Theory as a whole, has drawn criticism from non-subscribers, due to user observations that it can be difficult to reliably measure situational characteristics and leaders’ leadership styles in terms of

24 Northouse, 123.


26 Northouse, 123.

27 Ibid., 127.

28 da Cruz, Nunes, and Pinheiro, 12.
favorableness and leadership effectiveness. This may be why this leadership theory is not more dominant today.

The analysis of Army doctrine, examined later in chapter 4, suggests that Army leaders do not subscribe to this theory. It may be true that Army leaders acknowledge the need for leaders to adapt their leadership styles in regards to their unique operational environments; however, Army leaders appear to be more concerned with leaders winning wars, rather than on creating comfortable leader-led relationships and work environments.

Motivation is a common technique leaders use to help ensure success over a challenge or adversary. Everyone has seen a coach or team captain use motivation to rally their teammates or peers to overcome a challenge. The leadership theory that encompasses motivation as a core concept is the Transformational Theory, which the primary researcher will review next.

**Transformational Leadership Theory**

The third prominent leadership theory is the Transformational Leadership Theory. The Transformational Leadership Theory was propagated by leadership theorists in the 1980s and is based on the transformational effect that leaders and followers experience in a given system. Followers of this theory believe that leaders address followers’ deep human needs in order to intrinsically motivate the followers to go above and beyond

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29 Pires da Cruz, Nunes, and Pinheiro, 23.

30 Ibid., 185.
traditional expectations of success. A study by Sebastian Schuh, Xin-an Zhang, and Peng Tian investigated the Transformational Leadership Theory, and produced findings that supported the idea that leaders applying transformational leadership can be equally delitarius to their organizations, if their leadership actions focus more on authoritative versus moral actions. This is likely due in part to the theoretical idea that a motivational synergy is created between the leader and the led, morally elevating both parties, resulting in a better collective good for everyone involved.

Conversely, the study provided evidence to support the idea that a leader’s ingenuine or improper execution of the Transformational Leadership theory, by say a purely self-interested or superficial leader, may actually diminish followers’ commitment. This study supports the idea that the Transformational Leadership Theory may not necessarily be a reliable leadership theory in all cases. Having a leadership theory that may be unreliable, or relies on leaders to genuinely apply the theory’s moral tenets consistently, might not be the best leadership model for the Army. The unknown factors associated with Army leaders’ upbringing and/or the diverse personal-social norms of the all-volunteer force, could possibly make depending on the Transformational

31 Pires da Cruz, Nunes, and Pinheiro, 185.
33 Northouse, 87.
34 Schuh, Zhang, and Tian, 636.
Leadership Theory as a leadership model for the Army unreliable or even counter productive.

Again, the observation that a robust leadership development system exists in the Army, supports the conclusion that Army leaders do not predominately subscribe to a leadership theory like the Transformational Theory. Simultaneously, these same observations support the idea that Army leaders may believe in a leader development theory that relies on a leader’s ability to develop their leadership skills. A popular leadership theory that supports just such a skills-focused theory is the Skills Approach Theory. The primary researcher will review the Skills Approach Theory in the following subsection.

Skills Approach Theory

The final popular leadership theory is the Skills Approach Theory developed in the 1950s.35 The Skills Approach Theory differs from the previously reviewed leadership theories in that subscribers focus on a leader’s knowledge and skills in order to ensure success. Additionally, followers of the Skills Approach Theory fundamentally believe the idea that leaders can improve their leadership skills over time.36 The Skills Approach Theory came back into the theoretical forefront starting in the 1990s, due to an increasingly complex situational environment, one for which other leadership theorists struggled to provide effective solutions.37 Believers of the Skills Approach Theory define

35 Northouse, 43.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
leadership skills as a mix of leader attributes, personality traits, competencies, or quantifiable skills that all have the capacity for development.\textsuperscript{38} Such beliefs would logically drive the followers of this theory to develop systems and processes in order to help leaders develop their attributes, personality traits, and competencies.

Indeed, a study by John Washbush and Christine Clements investigated new and dynamic ways to improve leader development, methods that might be otherwise considered contrary to established leader development models.\textsuperscript{39} The two researchers provided findings that supported the idea that leaders’ skills are best developed by practical execution.\textsuperscript{40} Of most significance, Washbush and Clements provided findings and recommendations for eleven actions that they deemed were essential for leaders to apply, in order to improve leader development systems and institutions.\textsuperscript{41} Figure 2 provides these eleven essential recommendations.

\textsuperscript{38} Northhouse, 48.


\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
1. Require that students thoughtfully identify and articulate a sense of personal vision and mission by determining what is important to them and what goals they must achieve to view their lives as successful.

2. Clearly distinguish leadership from position incumbency and give far greater attention to non-positional leadership perspectives that are already part of the established literature.

3. Promote a positive integrated understanding of leadership and management as complementary organizational activities.

4. Identify and describe the importance of key components of organizational influence including diagnostic skills, vision rooted in insight, communication skill, and evidence of commitment to the common endeavor.

5. Encourage and coach students in developing personal competencies of influence through supervised practice and constructive feedback from both instructor and peers.

6. Develop and implement methods that will require students to perform processes designed to promote self-awareness and establish a basis for self-assessment.

7. Incorporate course activities that encourage team building and development of a sense of shared purpose by developing and using group experiences of substance.

8. Actively promote the concept that leadership can only result when one has the willingness, courage, and ability to intervene for the sake of influencing others.

9. Provide students with opportunities to seek, identify, and act on opportunities to attempt influence.

10. Require that students do written and oral self-evaluation of their behaviors and effectiveness when they have attempted influence.

11. Within the context of ethical behavior, caution students repeatedly that leadership has both the power to effect good and the potential to create disaster.

Figure 2. Washbush’s and Clements’ Essential Recommendations to Improve Leader Development


The eleven essential recommendations provided by Washbush and Clement are significant because they represent a purposely creative attempt by two civilian leader development researchers to think outside the boundaries of establish leader development
dogma in order to possibly improve leader development. The eleven essential recommendations offered by the researchers could possibly provide innovative insights into how to better execute competency-based, Skills Approach theory-type, leader development systems. As already alluded to, the Army has just such leader development systems, and the primary researcher will review these structures further in this chapter.

The Army’s Theory

As previously identified, the primary researcher recognized the existence of robust leader development systems within the Army. The primary researcher will review these in detail later in this chapter. In turn, the primary researcher also recognized that the presence of these systems supports the idea that Army leaders likely subscribe to a leadership theory like the Skills Approach Theory, that recognizes a leader’s ability to develop and improve their leadership skills. Through the course of the literature review, the primary researcher found supporting evidence that the Skills Approach Theory is the civilian leadership theory that appears to most closely support the existence of these Army leader development systems. The primary researcher will continue to review these similarities further in this chapter in the sub-sections concerning Army doctrine.

The primary researcher found the similarities between the Skills Approach Theory and the ALRM to be very compelling. This is an area that the primary researcher will specifically focus on, in order to help address SRQ1—what is the ALRM? One might wonder if leaders of other federal organizations, which fulfill similar roles as the Army, display signs of ascribing to similar competency-based, Skills Approach Theory-like, leadership theories. The primary researcher addresses this question in the next subsection.
Other Military and Federal Services’ Leadership Theories

It is logical to question if similar leadership theories are being applied by similar federal organizations. Addressing this question provides the readers with a deeper understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM, and helps to provide the reader with additional theoretical context, regarding competency-based leadership theories and their possible application by organizational leaders across an ever-broadening spectrum of domains of application.

It is logical for one to reason that similar operational domains, such as the other branches of the U.S. military, could possibly result in leadership challenges that could be successfully addressed by leaders’ adherence to the same general, competency-based leadership theory. Jeffrey D. Horey and Dr. Jon J. Fallesen conducted just such a study.

Through their study, Horey and Fallesen observed that competency based leadership models have been very popular for several decades; however, the specific competencies within each model often differ substantially. They concluded that the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and federal service leaders had pretty similar leadership models, with about 50 percent of each model’s competencies shared across the board. Additionally, the researchers used what looked appeared to be a very official looking table of leadership competencies to highlight two key conclusions about competency-based leadership models. First, that competency-based leadership

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43 Ibid., 9.
models conceptually resonate with leaders, and secondly, that competency-based models are usually universally understood and accepted as logical methods to improve performance.\textsuperscript{44} As it turned out, the official-looking table they first presented in their study was in fact simply a list of desired classroom behaviors for school children.\textsuperscript{45} This did not detract from the fact that the model presented competencies that most people could appreciate and embrace as beneficial to leaders.

The study by Horey and Fallesen provided evidence that supports the idea that leaders of other branches of the U.S. military and civilian government also follow competency-based, Skills Approach Theory-like, leadership models. This helped build a better contextual understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM, and how the ALRM shares commonalities with both other branches of the U.S. military, and with civilian leadership outside of the military domain. What follows are some general conclusions regarding the review of leading civilian leadership theories.

**Theoretical Conclusions**

In the previous sub-section on civilian leadership theories, the primary researcher reviewed four of the most popular civilian leadership theories. The primary researcher selectively chose to review only these four prominent leadership theories because they are generally accepted as some of the top leadership theories ascribed to today. The primary researcher’s review of these civilian leadership theories enabled the reader to develop a deeper understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM?

\textsuperscript{44} Horey and Fallesen, 1.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
Additionally, the primary researcher provided details that help the reader conceptualize the ALRM within a broader civilian and cross-military context. The primary researcher’s historical review of civilian leadership theories allowed the reader to better understand how leadership theory has evolved over time, and which of these civilian theories may have been adopted by Army leaders into Army doctrine. Conceptually linking the ALRM with established civilian leadership theories is important because it ties together military and civilian domains, which supports the idea that advancements in either domain could be applied to the other, synergistically. This could ultimately help the primary researcher better address the primary research question: how can Army leaders leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?

To assist in solving this problem, the primary researcher used two qualitative models to visualize and analyze the effectiveness and forces involved within the junior infantry officer development system. What follows is a review of these two qualitative models.

Qualitative Visualization Models

The primary researcher will now review the two models used to qualitatively visualize and analyze the junior infantry officer development system. The two models used are the scaled Venn diagram and Force Field Analysis. It is important to understand these models because the primary researcher used them as key tools to help the reader visualize the current functionality ALDM, and the driving and resisting forces within the junior infantry officer development system. The primary researcher used a scaled Venn
diagram as a sense making model, in order to depict the primary researcher’s qualitative assessment of the current functionality of the ALDM and ALRM to help Army leaders to develop junior infantry officers. The researcher used a Force Field Analysis diagram to visualize the forces within the junior officer leader development system. Then, the primary researcher used these models to facilitate analysis, conclusions, and recommendations to exploit driving forces, and mitigate resisting forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system to improve overall effectiveness of the models.

**Venn Diagram**

A Venn diagram is a graphic tool used to aid understanding how items in particular systems or data sets relate to one another. The primary researcher reviewed the Venn diagram first because the scaled Venn diagram used in this study is simply a slight variation of a regular Venn diagram. Understanding how a normal Venn diagram functions will help the reader to understand the scaled Venn diagrams used throughout this study.

A Venn diagram consists of two or more overlapping circles. The circles represent the data sets, or sub-systems, being studied. Each circle contains unique data for that particular field, called regions. The different regions are placed on top of one another, and the resultant overlapping zone, called an intersection, represents the data that conforms simultaneously to both regions’ criteria.46 Figure 3 displays a Venn diagram

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with its intersection highlighted. Figure 4 shows the combination of all data sets, otherwise labeled the union.

Figure 3. Venn Diagram with Intersection Highlighted

*Source:* Created by author.
Visualization of the intersection and the remaining non-overlapping regions helps researchers and audiences understand a system better. What follows next a review of scaled Venn diagrams, which the researcher created and manipulated to help visualize the functionality of the ALDM to assist leaders in developing junior infantry officers.

**Scaled Venn Diagram**

A scaled Venn diagram is very similar to a regular Venn diagram, except that the respective areas of the diagram’s regions can be manipulated so that each region’s area...
becomes proportional to the numerical value of elements it represents. Manipulating the area of each region helps provide another element of visual clarity regarding the systems. Scaled Venn diagrams help researchers add additional clarity by highlighting similarities, differences, and relationships between data sets holistically. The primary researcher conducted qualitative analysis for this study and did not use exact mathematical calculations in order to determine the exact areas of each circle region. Figure 5 depicts a generic scaled Venn diagram.

Figure 5. Scaled Venn Diagram with Intersection Highlighted

Source: Created by author.

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47 Chow and Ruskey, 467.
Note in the figure above, the circles are not the same size and the intersection is not evenly shaped. These inequalities represent discrepancies in the system or data that the scaled Venn diagram represents. The primary researcher used this type of model to show how each of the three domains of the ALRM currently function to help Army leaders to develop junior infantry officers. A more detailed description of the specific scaled Venn diagram used by the primary researcher in this study is located in chapter 3.

Although the scaled Venn diagram is informative in describing the Army leader development situation as a sense making model, a change management model was needed to help depict how the current situation could be changed. What follows next is the primary researcher’s review of Force Field Analysis.

**Force Field Analysis**

The second visualization tool used by the primary researcher was Force Field Analysis. The primary researcher used this analytical model to visualize the forces within the junior officer leader development system, facilitate analysis in chapter 4, and findings and recommendations to exploit and/or mitigate these forces to improve junior infantry officer leader development systems in chapter 5.

Force Field Analysis is an analytical methodology developed by Kurt Lewin that describes the behavior of systems.48 Force Field Analysis helps researchers and readers visualize systems as the resultant outcome of various internal and external forces for

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Lewin defines the two opposing forces within systems as restraining and driving forces. Restraining forces keep systems the same. Driving forces work to change a system. If driving forces are stronger than restraining forces, the system will change. If the forces are equal, or if the restraining forces are stronger than the driving forces, then the system will not change. Lewin defines an unchanging system as one in equilibrium. Figure 6 is a generic example of a Force Field Analysis diagram, consisting of restraining and driving forces. These forces are depicted in the figure as arrows arrayed in opposite orientations, centered on a vertical plane.

Figure 6. Force Field Analysis Example

49 Ibid.
50 Brown, 129.
51 Ibid.
Visualization Tools Conclusions

Understanding these two analytical tools is important to the reader because the primary researcher uses both of them as the key models to facilitate and frame analysis, findings, and recommendations. The primary researcher will manipulate an original scaled Venn diagram as a meaning making model in order to help build reader understanding of the ALDM. The researcher will use Force Field Analysis as a change model to identify, analyze, and then propose findings and recommendations in order to leverage or mitigate driving and restraining forces to improve junior infantry officer leader development. This helps the primary researcher address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains? The primary researcher will also use these two models to help address the primary research question: how can the Army leverage existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM three domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?

Having reviewed the civilian theoretical leadership context and the two tools used to visualize and facilitate analysis of the junior infantry officer development system, the primary researcher will now progress into the second conceptual ring of the Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure figure presented earlier in this chapter.
Army Leadership Doctrine

The primary researcher reviewed the Army’s leadership doctrine in the passages ahead. The information and details provided by the primary researcher in this section helps the reader build a more detailed oriented understanding of both SRQ1—what is the ALRM, and SRQ2—what is the ALDM? The researcher provides specific details and explanations of each piece of Army doctrinal literature. These sometimes dry, but important details and explanations will allow the researcher to make meaning of and identify driving and restraining forces through qualitative analysis in chapter 4. The primary researcher will then apply these same details in a change model in chapter 5.

As previously mentioned, the primary researcher conceptually grouped Army doctrine within the second circle of the Army Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure figure presented at the beginning of this chapter. This second circle, titled Army doctrine, represents official Army literature, through which Army leaders and doctrine writers consolidated and canonized leading civilian leadership theories for an Army audience. Although components of several leading civilian theories may be present in Army doctrine, the primary researcher’s previous review of the Skills Approach Theory, provided evidence that Army leader and leader development doctrine most closely resembles the Skills Approach Theory’s competency-based idea. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the primary researcher reviewed this topic in detail in the following passages.

Army leadership doctrine is a sub-set of Army Doctrine 2015. Army Doctrine 2015 is a truncated, four-tiered manual hierarchy consisting of Army Doctrine
Army doctrine intends to provide a common framework across the Army in order to increase understanding and effectiveness. What follows is the primary researcher’s analysis of five pieces of Army leadership doctrine.

1. ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*
2. ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*
3. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*
4. FM 6-22, *Leader Development*
5. ATP 6-22.1, *The Counseling Process*

**ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders***

ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, is an important piece of Army leader development doctrine. ADRP 7-0 provides basic Army doctrine concepts that set the written foundation for the Army leader development systems. In turn, these doctrinal foundational concepts provided guiding principles that help Army leaders drive junior infantry officer development systems and actions. ADRP 7-0 is significant among other pieces of Army doctrine because it is the first piece of Army doctrine that visually depicts the ALDM, shown in figure 7.54

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53 HQDA, AFP 1-01, 1-3.

Figure 7. ALDM


The ADRP 7-0 visualization of the ALDM above shows how Army leaders are supposed to develop subordinate Army leaders, as the result of training, education, and experience, executed through the three development domains, supported by the Army
Capstone Concept.\textsuperscript{55} ADRP 7-0 goes on to provide details about how Army leaders are supposed to execute the ALDM in order to develop other Army leaders. The author of ADRP 7-0 provides commentary that acknowledges that dedicated training time for an individual’s professional education at official Army schools is limited, and as a result, Army leaders will likely rely on the operational and self-development domains to meet the majority of Army leaders’ development requirements.\textsuperscript{56} ADRP 7-0 provides details that clearly support the idea that a unit commander is the central and most important player within the leader development system. The unit commander drives the Army operations process, through the Military Decision Making Process, which ultimately results in any action a unit or organization does or does not do.\textsuperscript{57} Further, ADRP 7-0 lists seven specific Army leader development principles that commanders and units should employ in order to establish effective leader development plans and efforts within unit training plans.\textsuperscript{58} Figure 8 lists these seven principles.

\textsuperscript{55} HQDA, ADRP 7-0, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 3-1 to 3-6.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 2-4 and 3-5.
Figure 8. Seven Army Leader Development Principles


In all, ADRP 7-0 is a useful piece of Army leader development literature and is certainly a contributing force within the junior infantry officer development system, most notably because it provides the first doctrinal commentary and graphics of the ALDM, and it repeatedly provides details that establish unit commanders as the most important power players within Army leader development systems. It also introduced the seven Army principles of leader development, and provided telling narrative statements that highlight time as a critical limiting factor inhibiting leader development, particularly within the institutional domain. ADRP 7-also has some weaknesses. It does not provide the details necessary to truly empower leaders to create exceptional leader development programs. It is possible that ADRP 7-0 could be more useful, and a stronger force within the junior infantry officer development system if it included more specific details and explanations about how leaders could actually develop and execute leader development programs at the unit level. The next manual the primary researcher reviewed is ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership.*
ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*

ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, is the capstone of four manuals within the 6-22 numbered series of doctrinal publications. It contains details regarding Army leadership in general terms. The author of ADP 6-22 defines Army leaders as: “anyone who . . . inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals . . . leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue action, focus thinking and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.”

According to Ms. Judith M.R. Price, a primary contributing author for current Army leader and leadership doctrine at the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “the Army’s Leadership model, the Army Leadership Requirements Model is a competency-based model.” Ms. Price is an authoritative resource regarding Army leadership and leader development doctrine. Ms. Price is a subject matter expert on these topics, having personally supervised the development, evolution, and publication of the ADP 6-22, ADRP 6-22, and FM 6-22 manuals at Fort Leavenworth. She has a wealth of personal knowledge regarding the history and development of the current Army leadership and leader development doctrines.

Through a personal interview with Ms. Price, the primary researcher confirmed that the ALRM is conceptually based on the Skills Approach Theory reviewed earlier in

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this chapter.\textsuperscript{61} The primary researcher used the information from the interview with Ms. Price to bridge the contextual gaps between civilian and Army leadership theories. Ms. Price’s personally connection to Army doctrine was critical, since the primary researcher observed through the course of this literature review, that Army manuals do not contain any in-text references that specifically refer to any civilian leadership theories by name. Ms. Price was the essential primary resource that linked the ALRM competency-based model with the civilian Skills Approach Theory.\textsuperscript{62} This information was key to fully answering SRQ1—what is the ALRM?

ADP 6-22 contains details regarding the components of leadership, types of leadership, and introduces the ALRM within the context of Army doctrine.\textsuperscript{63} The ALRM “conveys the expectations that the Army (leadership) wants (subordinate Army) leaders to meet . . . and is useful for aligning leader development activities and personnel management practices and systems.”\textsuperscript{64} The ALRM defines two sets of leader requirements, attributes and competencies, that Army leaders identified as necessary qualities all Army leaders need to effectively display in order to be successful leaders. Attributes are “what Leaders should be and know,” and competencies are what “the Army requires Leaders to do.”\textsuperscript{65} Figure 9 depicts the ALRM found in ADP 6-22.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Price.

\textsuperscript{63} HQDA, ADP 6-22, i.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 1-5.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 5.
In addition to the figure above, ADP 6-22 provided additional details and narratives that support the idea that Army leaders believe that individual Army leaders and their abilities to perform known leadership related competencies, are dynamic and developable. Army doctrine contains policies and details that fundamentally support the theory that leaders can be developed through specific, deliberate, and known methods. These methods include, but are not limited to: “evaluation reports, academic evaluation reports, 360 degree assessments,” learning opportunities, “meaningful and honest

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66 HQDA, ADP 6-22, 7.
feedback, and multiple practice opportunities.”\(^{67}\) This theme is a commonly repeated idea throughout ADRP 6-22 and supports the idea that Army leaders likely subscribe to a leadership theory that reinforces the belief that leaders can be trained and improve their leader competencies. The evidence supports that this concept is central to the ALRM competency-based system. This is because believing leaders can be developed, in accordance with the set of ALRM attributes and competencies, requires that Army leaders have a plan and or system to develop these Army leaders. The presence of just such a system in the Army further reinforces the idea that Army leaders subscribe to a leadership theory that allows leaders to be developed as a central tenet.

Conversely, if Army leaders subscribed to another leading leadership theory, say the Great Man or Trait Theories, then Army leaders would not have any reason to spend time establishing dedicated leader development systems and structures in order to develop leaders within the force. As reviewed earlier in this chapter, an individual that follows in the Great Man Theory would believe that leaders simply exist, or do not exist, and that leaders cannot be developed from scratch. Similarly, Army leaders who believed in the Great Man Theory would probably believe that officers commission into the Army with a static set of innate leader capabilities.

In reality, the evidence supports the observation that the Army has well-organized leader development systems and structures, and Army doctrine does contain details that clearly reinforces the idea that Army leaders support a competency-based, Skills

\(^{67}\) HQDA, ADP 6-22, 9.
Approach Theory-like leadership theory. This is fundamental in building leaders from citizen-to-soldier.

Lastly, ADP 6-22 provides additional details that conceptually link the ALRM theoretical principles and definitions reviewed above, with several other key elements of how Army leaders operate, the levels of Army leadership, and special leadership considerations in figure 10. This figure depicts how the ALRM is vertically nested with other Army leadership levels of command and systems, in order to help Army leaders achieve nine specific outcomes. This figure adds clarity to the Army leader development theory, and allows the reader to better understand how Army leadership doctrine supports Army leaders in developing leaders, conducting daily operations, and in accomplishing other mission critical tasks.
Figure 10. Underlying Logic of Army Leadership


Understanding ADP 6-22 is critical for the reader to comprehend junior infantry officer leader development within the broader civilian leadership theory context the researcher covered earlier in this chapter. ADP 6-22 is the over-arching doctrinal umbrella for the field of Army leadership and Army leader development, and it provides
the foundational details and concepts that help the reader understand what Army leaders likely believe about leader development. Through these details, the reader can clearly identify the ALRM as a competency-based theory, based on the Skills Approach Theory, and that Army leaders most likely ascribe to the idea that Army leaders can be developed through deliberate efforts. This is critical because it provides a requirement for Army leaders to establish and sustain a formal leader development system, responsible for developing all Army leaders, including junior infantry officers. This understanding helps answer SRQ1—what is the ALRM, SRQ2—what is the ALDM, and what is the importance of both the ALRM and ALDM in developing junior infantry officers?

ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*

What follows is a complete review of ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*. In this section, the primary researcher specifically focused on the ALRM core competency of Develops, as well as the supporting competencies of Prepares Self and Develops Others. ADRP 6-22 provides more specific details that help the reader gain a deeper understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM, and SRQ2—what is the ALDM?

Structurally, ADRP 6-22 is broken into four main sections: Army leadership basics, Army leader attributes, Army leader competencies, and leadership at strategic levels. The first section of ADRP 6-22 provides additional details that develop and expand on the conceptual information in ADP 6-22. This section presents more specific details regarding Army leaders’ fundamental beliefs about leadership development and

their reliance on the ALRM as the primary tool to help them develop future Army leaders.\textsuperscript{69} ADRP 6-22 contains details regarding the three different leadership levels where Army leaders function, and provides details and unique considerations for each of these three levels. The three levels of Army leadership in ascending order are: direct, organizational, and strategic leadership.\textsuperscript{70} Junior infantry officers execute leadership of “individuals, small groups, and have a task oriented perspective,” and therefore fall into the direct leadership category.\textsuperscript{71} Understanding what leadership level junior infantry officers fall into is important because it can be used by Army leaders to focus junior infantry officer leader development efforts and competency expectations. This understanding is important because it allows Army leaders to recognize that junior infantry officers may have different developmental needs than other levels of infantry officers, and that these needs may need to be addressed in various ways, with different resources and methods.

The second part of ADRP 6-22 provides details focused on the ALRM leader attributes. Part two contains detailed narrative explanations for Army Values, Warrior Ethos, within the context of the ALRM attribute of Character.\textsuperscript{72} Additionally, part two provides details regarding explanations of the other ALRM attributes, Presence and

\textsuperscript{69} HQDA, ADRP 6-22, 1-5.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 2-5.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 2-4.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 3-1 to 3-7.
This section of ADRP 6-22 allows the reader to better understand the particular leader development needs for junior infantry officers relating to these specifically defined leader attributes. This can also help Army leaders focus their development efforts and resources.

The third part of ADRP 6-22 is the most important. That is because it provides additional details regarding the ALRM competency of Develops. The Develop competency is important to junior infantry officer development because it includes two sub-competencies of Prepares Self and Develops Others, which are explained at length.

The manual provides detailed, yet clear, behavior tables, listing numerous specific descriptions of what Army leaders’ behaviors should look like during execution (see figures 11 and 12).

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73 HQDA, ADRP 6-22, 4-1 to 5-5.

74 Ibid., 7-1.
Figure 11. ALRM Develops Sub-competency Prepares Self

Leaders encourage and support others to grow as individuals and teams. They facilitate the achievement of organizational goals through helping others to develop. They prepare others to assume new positions elsewhere in the organization, making the organization more versatile and productive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assesses developmental needs of others</th>
<th>Determines strengths and weaknesses of subordinates under different conditions.</th>
<th>Evaluates subordinates in a fair and consistent manner.</th>
<th>Assesses tasks and subordinate motivation to consider methods of improving work assignments, when job enrichment would be useful, methods of cross-training on tasks and methods of accomplishing missions.</th>
<th>Designs ways to challenge subordinates to improve weaknesses and sustain strengths.</th>
<th>Encourages subordinates to improve processes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counsels, coaches and mentors</td>
<td>Improves subordinate’s understanding and proficiency.</td>
<td>Uses experience and knowledge to improve future performance.</td>
<td>Counsels, coaches and mentors subordinates, subordinate leaders, and others.</td>
<td>Maintains awareness of existing individual and organizational development programs and removes barriers to development.</td>
<td>Supports opportunities for self-development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitates ongoing development</td>
<td>Maintain awareness of existing individual and organizational development programs and removes barriers to development.</td>
<td>Supports opportunities for self-development.</td>
<td>Arranges training opportunities to help subordinates improve self-awareness, confidence, and competence.</td>
<td>Encourages subordinates to pursue institutional learning opportunities.</td>
<td>Provide subordinates information about institutional training and career progression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builds team or group skills and processes</td>
<td>Presents challenging assignments for team or group interaction.</td>
<td>Provides resources and support for realistic, mission-oriented training.</td>
<td>Sustains and improves the relationships among team or group members.</td>
<td>Provides feedback on team processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These tables are critical to the junior infantry officer development system because they provide exceptional details regarding what Army leaders consider effective subordinate and self-development actions. These tables clearly provide infantry leaders with examples of what Army leaders likely expect out of subordinate leaders’ leader...
development actions. These tables are written in such a way that the reader can easily conceptualize how one is expected to manifest abstract ALRM concepts like Prepares Self and Develops Others, within the military environment. These practical examples of ALRM competencies help the reader better understand what the ALRM is, and how it can be used by Army leaders to help develop junior infantry officers. This supports answering SRQ1—what is the ALRM?

In all, ADRP 6-22 is important to the junior infantry officer development system because it clearly depicts the conceptual doctrinal beliefs and characteristics of Army leadership doctrine first established in ADP 6-22 and ADP 7-0. ADRP 6-22’s extended narrative explanations of concepts, definitions, and simple behavior tables develop reader understanding of the ALRM. This is important because it helps Army leaders to develop real world systems and programs to address these competencies. ADRP 6-22 also adds essential supporting details and narratives that further depict the ALRM as a competency-based system of learned and developable leader attributes and competencies. This helps answer SQR1—what is the ALRM? The doctrinal fundamentals and details presented in ADRP 6-22 apply directly to the junior infantry officer development system, and are likely strong forces within it. If this is true, this piece of literature could possibly be leveraged to address the primary research question and improve junior officer leader development and competency.

What follows next is the review of an even more detailed leader development manual than all three of the previous resources. FM 6-22 continues the detailed descriptions proved in ADRP 6-22, but expands on each area of that manual in even more depth and detail.
FM 6-22, *Leader Development*

FM 6-22, *Leader Development*, has the potential to be a strong driving force within the junior infantry officer leader development system. The content and structure of the manual follows the trend established in ADRP 6-22, in that FM 6-22 provides more details than the preceding doctrinal manuals. The extensive amount of detail presented in FM 6-22 is what sets it apart from the other doctrinal resources covered in this chapter. FM 6-22 provides Army leaders with an exceptional tool to help them conduct junior infantry officer leader development. FM 6-22 provides Army leaders with a plethora of practical examples of how they can actually execute junior infantry officer leader development. Army leaders can use this practical knowledge, applied through the ALRM competency of Develops, to better develop junior infantry officers. This more in-depth practical understanding of the ALRM reinforces the readers understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM? This deeper understanding facilitates the reader’s ability to deduce ways that the ALRM could be used to increase junior infantry officer leader development and competency.

FM 6-22 is organized into seven chapters, and each directly applies to junior infantry officer leader development. Chapter 7 provides details that specifically addresses the key leader competency of Develops and sub-competencies of Prepares Self and Develops Others. The primary researcher first touched on these key areas of leader development in the section on ADRP 6-22 above. The primary researcher established that

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76 Ibid., 7-38, 7-46.
these specific competencies and sub-competencies are important doctrinal concepts that help Army leaders drive leader development within the self and organizational development domains.

Chapter 7 of FM 6-22 contains details that continue to expand on the doctrinal concepts Prepares Self and Develops Others, providing even more specifics and practical examples of these concepts. Where ADRP 6-22 provided a few good narrative sections and a single behavior table to describe abstract Army leadership concepts, FM 6-22 contains a massive thirteen pages of detail-packed tables on these two concepts alone. This extensive level of detail is mirrored throughout the rest of the manual’s chapters, for all other areas of the ALRM requirements, and many other Army leader development concepts. The manual’s author focused on providing numerous actionable methods and examples for each concept.

Taken as a whole, FM 6-22 has the potential to be one of the most important pieces of Army leader development doctrine, and a very strong force within the junior infantry officer development system. FM 6-22’s extensive, yet easy to read and comprehend content and structure makes this piece of doctrine very important to junior infantry officer development. It increases the reader’s understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM? Again, if this is true, this piece of literature could possibly be leveraged to address the primary research question and improve junior officer leader development and competency. In addition to FM 6-22’s valuable ALRM-wide competencies, ATP 6-22.1

77 HQDA, FM 6-22, 7-38 to 7-50.
provides a more focused scope of information, related to just one leader competence, Develops.

A**TP 6-22, The Counseling Process**

ATP 6-22.1 *The Counseling Process*, is very similar in detail to FM 6-22. It is also highly likely that it could be a strong force within the junior infantry officer development system. As such, ATP 6-22.1 helps provide the reader with further understanding of SRQ1—what is the ALRM?

ATP 6-22 is an efficient, twenty-eight page document. The author clearly designed it as a step-by-step user guide intended to increase the quality of leader counselling.78 The document is structured in a checklist style, which provides clear, detailed ways to implement Army leadership doctrine into leader development actions, through the proper execution of leader to subordinate counselling. ATP 6-22 has the potential to be a strong force within the junior infantry officer development system, due to the centrality of developmental counselling across all three ALDM domains. Any resource that can improve the effectiveness of developmental counselling is a powerful force in the ALDM system. ATP 6-22 has all of this valuable information and the ability to educate leaders at all levels in order to be better developmental counselors.

Up until this point, the primary researcher has reviewed civilian leadership theories and concepts rooted in Army doctrine. However, the primary researcher will now transition to reviewing two leadership strategies. Army leadership strategies fulfill a key

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gap, helping Army leaders to physically implement these theories, concepts, and practical examples though real-world institutions, policies, and administrative systems.

Army Leader Development Strategies

As alluded to briefly above, Army leader development strategies fulfill an important niche in the junior infantry officer development system. Army leader development strategies act as the critical link between civilian theory, Army doctrine, and the actual implementation of leader development actions and efforts executed across the three ALDM developmental domains. The two leader development strategies that are important to the junior infantry officer development are the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) and the Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS). In this section, the primary researcher intended to provided information about Army leader development strategies, in order to address SRQ2—what is the ALDM, and SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? This combined added understanding will also allow the reader to internally develop and evaluate solutions to the researcher’s primary research question: how can the Army leverage existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM three domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development? The primary researcher will review the higher-ranking Army strategy, the ALDS, next.

Army Leader Development Strategy

The ALDS is a critical Army document regarding the development of junior infantry officers. Similar to ADRP 7-0 and ADP 6-22, the ALDS contains narrative and a
few details that provide senior Army leaders with an over-arching framework for all
Army leader development actions and programs. The ALDS supports this intent by
presenting details and descriptions of the operational environment in which soldiers must
operate, providing strategic vision, an ends ways and means strategy construct, general
lines of effort, and detailed strategies for each Army component, including officers.79 The
ALDS is very user friendly, through the author’s use of clear language, and the
documents relative brevity; the ALDS filled only a dozen or so easy to read pages.80 The
author of the ALDS clearly synchronizes the key Army leader development doctrinal
concepts, like the ALDM and ALRM, within an ends, ways, and means construct, and
then integrates these concepts into three clear lines of effort depicted in figure 13.81

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79 HQDA, ALDS, 2.

80 Ibid., 1-13.

81 Ibid., 7-8.
In the figure above, one can see how the ALDM three domains are fully integrated across the three lines of effort: Training, Education, and Experience. This figure highlights the ALDM domains as integral areas that Army leaders must rely on in order to develop leaders and achieve success through unified land operations. The figure also provides the reader visual clarity about what developmental actions or events should take place in each specific developmental intersection between each ALDM domain and each of the three ways leaders develop.

Additionally, the ALDS provides three key concepts regarding Army leader development. First, the ALDS highlights the operational domain as ultimately responsible for the majority of leader development actions. This implies that units and organizational leaders spend a significant amount of time and effort planning and executing deliberate leader development within their organizations. This statement dismisses a leader development fallacy that Army leaders come to their units fully trained.

Second, the ALDS provides details that indicate that the self-development domain can act as a catchall development solution for any leader development gaps that may result from gaps or inadequacies of the other two domains. This concept is important

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82 HQDA, ALDS, 11.
83 Ibid.
because the ALDS describes self-development as a three-tiered system consisting of mandatory structured self-development, recommended guided self-development, and personal self-development. This is significant to the junior infantry officers development because this portion of the ALDS provides details about a seemingly well-formed and important self-development system; except, there is a problem.

The issue with the self-development portion of the ALDS is that it is not being executed the way it is described. According to Mr. James Beck, two of the three types of self-development, mandatory structured self-development and guided self-development, are currently not being conducted. Mr. Beck is the Program Manager, Mid-Grade Learning Continuum Common Core, Common Curriculum Development Division of Army University, located at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth. Mr. Beck is personally responsible for coordinating with all of the other Army branch directorates in order to develop two sets of structured self-development distance learning programs. Mr. Beck is directly responsible for the Army-wide, officer core competency learning self-assessment and remedial instruction lessons. Each warfighting function Center of Excellence is responsible for developing its own warfighting function-specific learning self-assessment and remedial instruction lessons. According to Mr. Beck, TRADOC TASKORD IN516896, Subject: Implementation of the Mid-Grade Learning Continuum for 2015, mandated that these tasks were to be accomplished no later than October of 2015. To date, the software company that was awarded Mr. Beck’s Army-

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84 Ibid.

wide material contract has yet to deliver a functioning product. The development point of contact for the infantry material proponent, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE), has not reported any progress to Mr. Beck to date, and could not be reached by the primary researcher for comment. Similar issues currently plague the guided self-development products.  

The fact that two of the three intended types of self-development described in the ALDS are not functional, means that there is only one type of self-development, personal self-development, taking place in the Army today. This has significant implications for the amount of leader development Army leaders should reasonably expect to achieve, as a result of the self-development domain as a whole. Additionally, the personal self-development sub-area has the fewest built-in forcing functions or leader-controls to help ensure maximum leader development is achieved.

Despite these shortfalls, the personal self-development sub-area is the only self-development sub-area currently available to any Army officer, including junior infantry officers. This evidence suggests that it is unlikely that personal self-development is capable of effectively supporting both Army leaders’ leader development requirements, and junior infantry officers’ specific needs to proactively develop in preparation for future assignments. The primary researcher will review the analysis and implications of this situation more in chapter 4.

Lastly, the ALDS provided a generic visual timeline for officers’ careers. Figure 14 depicts this information. This is important to the junior infantry officer development

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86 Beck.
system because it helps provided Army, infantry leaders, and Army Human Resource
Command career managers with standardized officer career timeline guidance. This
guidance ensures officers’ careers are properly synchronized across the institutional and
operational domains, for promotions, and for key duty assignments.

![Figure 14. ALDS Generic Officer Career Timeline](source)


Of note, the reader can see in figure 14 that the ALDS generic officer timeline is
designed to be complimented by structured and guided self-development efforts (shown
within the yellow horizontal row in the figure above). This figure reinforces the ALDS
narrative explanation of the self-development domain, however, the evidence provided by
Mr. Beck, indicates that there is a substantial discrepancy between how Army leaders
designed officer self-development to occur, and how it is actually being executed.

In all, the ALDS provides a clear linkage between leadership theory, Army
document, and leader development execution across the Army. This document also helps
the reader better understand SRQ2—what is the ALDM, and SRQ3—what are the
Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry
officer development? However, the evidence also suggests that some major components, like the self-development domain, are not being executed as described in the ALDS. This will likely have an impact on the ALDS functionality and force field analysis in chapter 4. What follows next is the primary researcher’s review of the MLDS, the Army development strategy that specifically focuses infantry leaders’ infantry-specific leader development intent and guidance.

**Maneuver Leader Development Strategy**

The second Army leader development strategy effecting junior infantry officer leader development is the MLDS. This document is developed by the MCOE, and expands on the ALDS to better address the unique development needs of infantry officers, and other maneuver leaders. The MLDS is intended to synchronize and facilitate all maneuver leader development, across all ALDM domains. To this end, the MLDS defines General Learning Outcomes and Maneuver Learning Outcomes. General Learning Outcomes are learning objectives that apply to all leaders and Maneuver Learning Outcomes are learning objectives for infantry, and other maneuver leaders, at each Army rank. These objectives provide detailed lists of general and infantry-centric ALRM competencies that infantry officers are expected to master, nine pages for

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88 Ibid., ii.

89 Ibid., 1-3.
lieutenants and five pages for captains, respectively. These lists provided the specific, quantifiable information needed by junior infantry officers and their superiors in order to most effectively focus operational and self-development programs. These lists are key tools to allow leaders to initiate valuable leader development dialogs and learning environments during operational counselling and to focus leader development effort in general.

The MLDS continues its structural pattern of user-friendly leader development information in three detailed sections, each specifically dedicated to providing information that help infantry leaders better understand officer development across the three ALDM domains. Of note, the MLDS contains detailed leader development objectives for both lieutenants and captains across all three ALDM domains. Additionally, the ALDS provides an extensive list of digital, multi-media, and doctrinal resources to assist infantry leaders in facilitating development via the self-development domain, twenty-four recommendations in all.

Two possible shortcomings of the MLDS is its length. At just over 130 pages, the document is somewhat lengthy to read. In fact, the primary researcher did not encounter any individuals, including infantry officers, who had ever heard of the MLDS. This is

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90 Ibid., 2-19 to 2-31.
91 MCOE, MLDS, 3-2 to 3-22.
92 Ibid, 4-6 to 4-9.
93 Ibid, 3-15 to 2-20.
potentially noteworthy because this could significantly negate the value of MLDS in facilitating operational leaders’ leader development efforts.

Taken as a whole, the MLDS is likely a resisting force within the junior infantry officer leader development system. The MLDS helps the infantry leaders and the reader develop a better nested understanding of infantry-specific development objectives and methods, within the larger context of higher ranking ALDS. It supports clarity by providing detailed development objects for infantry officers, across all ALDM domains and career assignments. The MLDS helps the reader address SRQ2—what is the ALDM and SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer development?

Army Leader Development Strategy Conclusions

In all, the two Army leader development strategies the primary researcher reviewed continued to build clarity and understanding regarding SRQ2—what is the ALDM, and SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer development? The reader should reflect on this new understanding within the larger context of Army doctrine, and over-arching civilian leadership theories. It is important for the reader to recognize that the theories, concepts, and strategies build on one another, and each new literature source becomes more and more detailed. In the next two sections of this study, the primary researcher reviewed the middle area of the Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure figure presented earlier in this chapter, titled Application. As the title implies, these pieces of literature help Army leaders apply all of the theories, Army doctrine, and strategies reviewed by the researcher up to this point.
Army Administrative Systems and Army Regulations

Army administrative systems and ARs are important literature resources regarding junior infantry officer development because they provide specific details and information that assist Army, infantry, and Army human resource leaders to practically apply all of the theories, doctrine, and strategies reviewed by the primary researcher so far. All of the literature resources reviewed in this section provide information that helps Army leaders and the reader to gain a deeper understanding of SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer development? Gaining this deeper understanding is important because it will support the primary researcher’s analysis in chapter 4, and conclusions and recommendation to the primary research question: how can the Army leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development, in Chapter 5. It is likely that many, if not all, of the administrative systems and regulations that the primary researcher reviewed in this section may be identified as driving or restraining forces within the junior infantry officer development system in chapter 4.

Army administrative systems and ARs are critical components in the ALDM system, and have the potential to be strong forces within the junior infantry officer development system. They are the written documents that physically spell out what actions Army personnel must do or not do. The author will review the following Army systems and administrative regulations. The thesis will review Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAMs) and ARs, each in numerical order. Of note, according to Ms. Price, ARs and differ from DA PAMs in that ARs require compliance by Army
personnel, whereas DA PAMs simply provide approved official guidance about how Army personnel can or should act or apply Army doctrine.\textsuperscript{94} This is an important distinction that the primary researcher will elaborate on further in chapters 4 and 5.

1. DA PAM 350-58, 	extit{Army Leader Development Program}

2. DA PAM 600-3, 	extit{Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management}

3. AR 1-201, 	extit{Army Inspection Policy}

4. AR 350-1, 	extit{Army Training and Leader Development}

5. AR 600-20, 	extit{Army Command Policy}

6. AR 600-100, 	extit{Army Leadership}

7. AR 623-3, 	extit{Evaluation Reporting System}

8. AR 600-89, 	extit{General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Program}

DA PAM 350-58, 	extit{Army Leader Development Program}, is a short but complicated document. It introduces the term Army Leader Development Process (ALDP), the Army-level system of systems, designed to develop, implement, manage, and evaluate all Army leader development efforts.\textsuperscript{95} The ALDP is a very complex system, potentially presenting

\textsuperscript{94} Price.

\textsuperscript{95} Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 350-58, 	extit{Army Leader Development} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 1.
difficulties for Army leaders in its application. As figure 15 depicts, the ALDP has multiple organizations and leaders working in multiple directions simultaneously. Many of the key players in the system are high-ranking Army officials, whom are overly burdened with competing demands on their time and energy. Additionally, the large number of coordinating agencies and systems, thirteen in all, provides evidence that supports the idea that the ALDP may be overly complex, and may increase the possibilities for decreased efficiency and resistance to change.

**Figure 15. ALDP Model**

DA PAM 350-58 provides details that further established the ALDM as the official Army leader development system, encompassing training, education, and experience as central pillars of leader development, across the three developmental domains. This reinforces the ALDM figure the primary researcher found in ADRP 7-0. The DA PAM goes on to provide details on the specific duties and responsibilities for all of the key senior Army leaders, including: Secretary of the Army; Chief of Staff Army; Army Staff; Assistant Secretary of the Army; Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7; Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Deputy Chief of Staff G1; action officers; lead agents, Council of Colonels, and The Army Leader Development Forum. These individuals, staffs, and forums work together within ALDP. The ALDP could be characterized as bureaucratic and process-oriented. Figures 16, 17, and 18 display the complex ALDP set of systems-of-systems and processes for approval, removal, and prioritization of Army leader development programs.

96 HQDA, DA PAM 350-58, 1-2.

97 HQDA, DA PAM 350-58, 2-4.
Figure 16. ALDP Deliberate Formal Solution Process


Figure 17. ALDP Initiative Removal Process

After reviewing the three figures above, the reader may begin to conclude that the ALDP is a complex web of sequential and parallel processes. In fact, the figures above depict seventeen steps and twenty-seven decision points. This may be particularly true when considering that these are the exact steps and process that every leader development program must pass through in order to finally make it out into the Army operating force in order to assist in the development of junior infantry officers.

In all, DA PAM 350-58 is important for one major reason. It provides specific details that help the reader more clearly visualize and understand the complexity of ALDP, which is an Army administrative system. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? It helps the reader understand the number and
position of the various high-ranking officials involved in the system, and how the system’s structure may possibly represent barriers to efficiency and unity of effort across the Army leader development system. The primary researcher will now review the second DA PAM.

DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*

DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, is a detailed and lengthy document regarding junior infantry officer development. Chapters 1-6, and 8 all provide specific details about officer development that are very important to the development of junior infantry officers. These chapters provided many details that help the reader and Army leaders conceptually link Army leader development doctrine, including the ALDM and ALRM, with officer development, through the practical application of Army administrative systems. This is accomplished by providing details about the OER, officer promotion system, duty assignment practices, and career opportunities, all of which directly impact junior infantry officer leader development. Chapters 1 and 8 are the most important. The author will review each of the seven chapters in sequence.

Chapter 1 of DA PAM 600-3, “Introduction,” provides details that help explain the purpose and applicability of the DA-PAM as an individual officer self-development

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99 HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 5.
guide, as well as a useful resource for mentors and supervisors alike. Its author specifically recommends that all officers read the pamphlet in its entirety, due to the pamphlet’s comprehensive coverage of all Army branches.\(^\text{100}\) The pamphlet describes the legal roots and evolution of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) and describes how these legal benchmarks influenced today’s officer management system. This historical and legal context is important for the reader and Army leaders to understand because it provides context and perspective regarding the Army officer development and management systems as evolutionary products of ongoing analysis and revisions, dating back to at least 1972.\(^\text{101}\) This is important to recognize because the laws and policies explained in DA PAM 600-3 are established constraints on the junior infantry officer development system. One must be aware of all existing constraints in order to allow the development of suitable, feasible, and acceptable solutions to improve the junior infantry officer development system.

Chapter 2 of DA PAM 600-3, “Officer Leader Development,” provides details that highlight the importance of the individual leader being developed, ALDM, and the ALRM competencies.\(^\text{102}\) It provides details that emphasize the Multi Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) as an integral tool to support self-awareness and self-development, as well as the theoretical premise that leaders can be developed.\(^\text{103}\) The

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{102}\) HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 5.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., 6.
MSAF is a digital program that allows leaders to seek and receive performance feedback from peers, superiors, and subordinates. The chapter closes by describing the various stages of the Officer Education System (OES) consisting of: entry-level training, Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) A, BOLC B, or Direct Commissioned Officer Course, and the Captains Career Course. BOLC A is pre-commissioning instruction, either Reserve Officer Training Corps or United States Military Academy. BOLC Direct Commissioned Officer Course was previously known as Officer Candidate School, and BOLC B is post-commissioning branch-specific instruction. This section describes the baseline set of skills each junior officer develops at each level of institutional development.

This information is important because it is one of the few pieces of literature that clearly explains how and what each step and component of the ALDM is supposed to support officer leader development. This knowledge is important in order to properly develop and synchronize individual and unit-level junior infantry officer leader development plans.

Chapter 3 of DA PAM 600-3, “Officer Personnel Management System and Career Management (OPMS),” provides details regarding the OPMS, OER, and defines the three types of assignments and the self-development domain. The OPMS is an administrative system that functions to acquire, develop, utilize, sustain, promote, and transition officers in accordance with law, policy, budgetary constraints, and the needs of the Army. This

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104 Ibid., 7.

105 HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 8-9.
chapter also provides details that explain the administrative requirements for senior
leaders from each Army branch to determine how the ALDM three domains will:
combine and integrate both Army-wide and branch-specific developmental requirements,
define branch-specific ALRM competencies, and develop a consistent branch-specific
leader development model and timeline.\footnote{Ibid., 9.} This supports the information presented by
Mr. Beck earlier in this chapter.

Chapter 3 also includes details about the OER. It specifically provides details that
highlight the OER as a particularly important administrative system, one that provides
critical officer-specific performance information to senior Army leaders, which is used to
drive officer career progression, stagnation, or elimination.\footnote{Ibid., 10.} The chapter also contains
specifics that describe the four types of assignments an officer can have.

The four types of officer assignments are: KD, development, and broadening. DA
PAM 600-3 defines KD assignments as specific assignments, identified by senior leaders
from each Army branch that every officer within that branch must complete in order to
continue service in that branch. A developmental position is any other non-KD
assignment, but one that is still generally related to the officer’s branch. Broadening
assignments are normally outside an officer’s specific branch, but help develop the
officer for wider service. Broadening assignments include functional or institutional,
academia and civilian enterprise, and joint or multinational assignments.\footnote{HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 12.} Broadening
assignments within TRADOC are crucially important to the Army because they infuse real world knowledge into the next generation of officers, and should reward officers with preferential career opportunities.\textsuperscript{109} This is important information because it further explains the generic officer career timeline figure provided in the ALDS. This in turn provides junior infantry leaders and the reader with clarity regarding how a leader’s assignments career and progression should integrate and synchronize across all domains, in order to maximize that leader’s development.

Chapter 3 ends by providing details that encourage officers to pursue the self-development domain. It specifically lists a five-year individual development plan, Army Career Tracker (ACT), mentors, and active dialog with raters and human resources personnel managers about career timelines, guidance, and future duty assignments as valuable administrative leader development tools.\textsuperscript{110} This is reviewed further in the section below that specifically focuses on chapter 8 of DA PAM 600-3.

In all, chapter 3 contains details that help explain OPMS, the importance of the OER, defines the three types of assignments, and provides several examples to exploit the self-development domain. This information gave clarity to the reader on each of these administrative systems.

Chapter 4 of DA PAM 600-3, “Officer Education,” provides additional details that explain the sequence and methodology of officer development, within the

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 23-24.
institutional domain, throughout an officer’s career. The chapter describes the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, provides more detail about BOLC B, and stresses the importance of counselling. This helps Army leaders and the reader understand how the institutional domain is regulated and accessed by leaders. This is important because leaders cannot be effectively developed through an ALDM domain if they do not know how to access it.

Chapter 5 of DA PAM 600-3, “Officer Promotions,” provides details that help explain the physical officer promotion process, including clarification on promotion board member instructions. This information is important because it helps build trust between junior infantry officers and senior Army leaders. The information provided in this chapter helps junior officers understand that the promotion system is impartial and fair. This helps dispel rumors of professional favoritism by senior Army leaders. Dispelling such myths through education is important to leader development because it re-enforces a leader’s belief in developing their ALRM competencies in order to achieve professional success.

Chapter 6, “Officer Evaluation System,” provides more details regarding the OER than in chapter 3. Chapter 6 contains details regarding all the applicable administrative forms including: Department of the Army (DA) Form 67-10 series, and Academic Evaluation Report (AER), DA Form 1059, and clearly provides evidence that indicates

111 HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 24.
113 Ibid., 35 and 37.
that these forms are the primary methods that leaders can employ in order to communicate an evaluated officer’s performance and potential to Army Human Resources Command. This chapter also includes commentary explanations that lead the reader to conclude that these administrative DA forms can be used by leaders to facilitate junior infantry officer leader development through counselling. This chapter is significant, not only because it provides information about administrative forms, but that these forms are vertically nested with the doctrinal principles and techniques the researcher reviewed in the section regarding ATP 6-22.1. This represents a continuity link between doctrinally-based leader development through counselling, and administrative systems and processes.

Chapter 8 of DA PAM 600-3, “Infantry Branch,” is the portion of the DA PAM that is most applicable to junior infantry officer leader development. Chapter 8 provides detailed lists and narratives that explain the specific leader requirements, attributes, and competencies, that senior Army leaders desire infantry officers to display. These details provide individual infantry officers and their superiors important competency-based goals that both groups can apply to better focus their leader development efforts. These details can help leaders limit ambiguity and confusion between leaders and subordinates during leader development counselling interactions and can increase the efficient use of development time, energy, and efforts. It is likely that the primary researcher will identify and analyze this piece of literature as a force in chapter 4.

114 HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 38.
115 Ibid.
Chapter 8 of DA PAM 600-3 provides a clear definition for the purpose of the infantry officer development system. This purpose is to support “development of agile, adaptable, physically and mentally tough infantry officers with a solid foundation in the core warfighting skills required to close with and destroy the enemy in close combat.” This purpose is unique in that it focuses on core infantry warfighting skills, versus the broadening concepts reviewed in chapter 3 of the manual. Although infantry officers do have a requirement to professionally develop in support of wider service, this definition supports the idea that infantry leader development efforts should be more focused on core infantry skills.

Chapter 8 of DA PAM 600-3 provides details and narratives that support the idea that senior infantry leaders at least acknowledge the inherent leader development challenges infantry officers face in order to lead in the various infantry fighting formations. It specifically lists eight skill sets that require dedicated professional development actions: air assault, Bradley leader, mortar unit officer, parachutist, Ranger, Ranger/parachutist, pathfinder, and Jumpmaster, which demand dedicated professional development. The chapter also provides information about the specific leader competencies junior infantry officers need to develop during specific times in their careers. This development guidance is organized in accordance with each successive officer rank and by each developmental domain. This section provides evidence that

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116 HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 55.
117 Ibid., 56.
118 HQDA, DA PAM 600-3, 57-58.
helps the reader understand how these competencies are necessary in order to enable the current infantry career model that reflects Army leaders’ intent to develop infantry officers across multiple infantry formation types.\textsuperscript{119} Details are provided that support the assertion that infantry officers are required to be both proficient in combined arms maneuver and able to effectively employ both vehicular and non-vehicular units.\textsuperscript{120} This guidance was published by the Infantry Branch Commandant, Major General John M. Moyne, in the year 2000, who wrote that infantry officers, particularly in the ranks of captain and below, will be re-assigned from a vehicular to a non-vehicular fighting formation after each successive duty assignment, in accordance with the vehicular/non-vehicular assignment imperative.\textsuperscript{121} This assignment policy is still being followed by Infantry Branch today.\textsuperscript{122}

Chapter 8 is important to this study for one simple reason; it provides infantry officers and the reader with specific competency-based leader development goals on which to focus. This allows leaders to conserve effort and resources while maximizing leader development.

Taken as a whole, DA PAM 600-3 is an important piece of administrative literature. It provides junior infantry officers and the reader with a thorough understanding of several administrative systems that impact junior infantry officer leader

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 61.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 56.

\textsuperscript{121} Le Moyne, 3.

development. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? DA PAM 600-3 clearly defines the purpose of the infantry officer development system, and clearly displays how Army leader development doctrine is applied through Army administrative systems. It provided focus for infantry officers by including clear lists of infantry officer-specific competencies, required during each rank of an infantry officer’s career. In this way, this DA PAM provided additional clarity about how to apply and execute ALDS, MLDS, and ALRM through the ALDM. This knowledge is important to efficiently and effectively guide junior infantry officer development programs and effort towards a synchronized and coordinated development end state. DA PAM 600-3 is a likely force within the junior infantry officer development system that the primary researcher will analyze in chapter 4.

Now that purpose and competency-based goals for infantry officer development have been reviewed, the primary researcher will now review an administrative document that provides leaders information about how to inspect application of Army leader development efforts and programs. The remaining six pieces of literature in this section are ARs. The reader should remember from the beginning of this section that ARs differ from DA PAMs in that ARs require compliance by Army personnel, whereas DA PAMs simply provide approved official guidance about how Army personnel can or should act or apply Army doctrine.

AR 1-201, *Army Inspection Policy*

AR 1-201, *Army Inspection Policy*. This AR provides details about the Army inspection program regarding leader development programs. In particular, it provides
details related to the unit commander’s roles in unit and subordinate unit leader
development programs. AR 1-201 includes specific details that help the reader
understand Army inspection policies, purposes, key players, types of inspections, and
provides example memorandums, schedules, and other tools to facilitate Army
inspections. AR 1-201 provides evidence that emphasizes the commanders’ roles and
responsibilities to inspect unit leadership and leader development programs as part of
their unit Initial Command Inspections and Subsequent Command Inspections. These
passages specifically state that unit commanders must execute at least one inspection per
year of a subordinate unit’s leadership and leader development programs. The unit
commander must be directly involved in the inspection, ensuring that the commander has
an intimate understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the subordinate unit’s
leader development program. Additionally, AR 1-201 requires that all inspections are
executed in accordance with the five principles of Army inspections (purposeful,
coordinated, focused on feedback, constructive, followed up, and corrective actions
taken), and that they encompass the five elements of Army inspections (measure
performance against a standard, determine the magnitude of the problem, seek the root

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123 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 1-

124 Ibid., 27.

125 Ibid., 7 - 8.

126 Ibid., 7.
causes of problems, determine solutions, assign responsibility to appropriate individuals).127

In all, AR 1-201 is important to junior infantry officer leader development because it clearly defines and enforces the linkage between the Army command inspections and unit level leader development programs. Command inspection regulations helps to ensure command inspection programs exist at the unit level. In turn, these command inspection programs work as forcing functions to ensure leader development programs exist and function properly within subordinate units, in accordance with Army doctrine and the chain of command’s intent. This increases the likelihood that leaders are directly involved in unit leader development programs at all levels, and it helps ensure that unit goals and individual professional development are synchronized vertically within units. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? What follows next is the primary researcher’s review of a very important AR, which also requires unit commanders to be personally involved in various other administrative actions and systems.

AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*

AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, is an important, but lengthy regulation regarding junior infantry officer development and other Army programs. Like other ARs, AR 350-1 provides regulatory directives that are universally binding to all Army personnel, requiring an exception to policy waiver submitted to, and approved by,
the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, or his delegated authority, in order to authorize deviation from the provisions listed in the AR.\textsuperscript{128} AR 350-1 applies to the Active Army and other Department of the Army organizations.\textsuperscript{129} It details specific requirements and actions that unit leaders and commanders must execute in support of Army leader development. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? AR 350-1 has several dedicated sections in chapters 1, 3, 4, and 7 that provide details that apply to junior officer leader development. The primary researcher will review each of these chapters sequentially.

Chapter 1 of AR 350-1 contains details regarding Army training, the three ALDM leader development domains, and the ALDP.\textsuperscript{130} The AR states that unit commanders have only two training priorities, training directed mission tasks and developing leaders in accordance with three domains of the ALDM and other Army leader development doctrine.\textsuperscript{131} The chapter contains descriptions that further explain leader development in terms of each development domain. It describes how and what each domain should impact and individual officer’s leader development. Of note, AR 350-1 provides details that indicate that the leaders within the institutional domain are tasked with producing all

\textsuperscript{128} HQDA, AR 1-201, i.

\textsuperscript{129} Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, \textit{Army Training and Leader Development} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), i.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., ii.

\textsuperscript{131} HQDA, AR 350-1, 2.
products needed by leaders located within the other two domains in order to facilitate leader development.\textsuperscript{132} This supports the line of reasoning that leaders from institutional training organizations could be leveraged by leaders in the operational domain in order to help supply leader development resources. This could be an important force within the junior officer leader development system.

Additionally, Chapter 1 of AR 350-1 provides descriptions of the self-development domain, describing it as a synergistic domain that compliments and builds on the leader development results from the other two domains. Self-development is further defined as three sub-areas: structured, guided, and personal self-development. This passage mirrors details provided in the ALDS. As the titles imply, the three types of self-development can be characterized by their high-to-low-levels of supervisor involvement, respectively.\textsuperscript{133}

Of particular note, there is no mention of any mandatory structured self-development for junior infantry officers as described in the ALDS and by Mr. Beck. However, AR 350-1 does mandate that all subordinates receive initial counselling, and create or update their online ACT profile and Individual Development Plan (IDP) within the first thirty days of unit assignment. Additionally, leaders must provide regular performance and IDP-focused counselling, and ensure that subordinate leaders update their ACT profiles at least annually, and have ample digital or physical access to all the

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 4.
necessary self-development resources. The primary researcher learned from an interview with Mr. Beck that the discrepancy between the self-development requirements listed in the ALDS and AR 350-1 were known to Army leaders, but that they had not reached a final decision about adding the self-development requirements to the regulation.

Chapter 1 of AR 350-1 is significant because it provides clarity regarding the commander’s responsibility to be personally involved in their subordinate leaders’ development. It provides directives that mandate the use of specific leader development products, like the IDP, and requires the use of the website ACT as the Army’s Leader Development Knowledge Management Program of record. Additionally, chapter 1’s descriptions of the three sub-divisions of the self-development domain implies that leaders should develop IDPs with their subordinate leaders that take full advantage of all three sub-divisions. Although the AR is currently not proscriptive in this regard, building a comprehensive IDP across all three self-development sub-areas would likely better support a leader’s self-development, and is nested with the ALDS and ATP 6-22.1.

Chapter 3 of AR 350-1 contains details regarding the institutional domain and Army school system, including officer training. This chapter provides descriptions and

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134 HQDA, AR 350-1, 7.
135 Ibid.
136 Beck.
137 HQDA, AR 350-1, iii-iv.
evidence that supports the linkages between officer development in the institutional domain, technical and tactical competency, officer promotions, and career opportunities. The institutional domain is described as having specific professional military education opportunities and requirements associated with each stage of an infantry officer’s career, and focuses primarily on developing leader competencies in the art and science of warfighting.\textsuperscript{138} The AR defines Army Ranger training as “voluntary” for infantry officers, despite also providing statements that applaud Ranger School for its exceptional opportunities for additional infantry-centric training.\textsuperscript{139}

As a whole, chapter 3 of AR 350-1 is significant because it provides clarity about the role that the institutional domain plays in leader development. This includes the specific institutional education infantry officers should receive during their careers. Knowing this information allows infantry leaders to synchronize development objectives for the other two domains, in order to maximize on or mitigate development strengths or shortfalls. Additionally, chapter 3 of AR 350-1 provides details that illuminate two possible weaknesses in the regulation. First is the fact that structured and guided self-development actions are missing entirely from the regulation. Second is the fact that attendance at and graduation from Ranger School is only “voluntary.”\textsuperscript{140} The primary researcher will analyze these two potential weaknesses further in the section below that reviews chapter 4 or AR 350-1.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 66.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 86.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 87.
Chapter 4 of AR 350-1 includes details and descriptions that help the reader understand officer professional development within the organization domain, at the unit level.\textsuperscript{141} This chapter provides clear evidence that highlights the unit commander’s role in shaping an effective climate, which best facilitates learning and leader development. The commander accomplishes this through personal actions and leader competencies, effective training management, and application of leader development doctrine. Again, chapter 4 provides evidence of another potential weakness regarding voluntary leader development. The author of AR 350-1 uses language that “recommends,” but does not “require,” individual leaders to continually pursue self-development, such as professional academic study, history, news media, and seeking new and developmental experiences.\textsuperscript{142} This type of voluntary wording has potential impacts on the effectiveness of the self-development domain to effectively function to help leaders improve junior officer leader development.

Overall, chapter 4 of AR 350-1 is important because it provides details and descriptions that support the central role of unit commanders in synchronizing the self-development and organizational development domains. It also provides details that help the reader identify a potential weakness within the AR, through the author’s use of word choice, recommending, but not mandating specific self-development requirements.

\textsuperscript{141} HQDA, AR 350-1, vi.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 111.
Lastly, chapter 7 of AR 350-1 provides details and descriptions that help leaders and the reader understand the Army Distributed Learning Program (ADLP). Leaders of this Army program respond to the Army staff directives, are regulated by TRADOC, and are the proponent for institutional development initiatives that are provided through distance learning (DL). There are eight factors that branch proponent school leaders use to help them decide if an institutional development initiative should take place via DL, consisting of: mission critical tasks, initiatives to reduce death or injury, current and emerging Army training priorities, suitability for DL, impact on unit training throughput, ability to reuse developed products, cost versus training value, and availability of existing training materials.

The information contained in chapter 7 of AR 350-1 is important to the study of developing junior infantry officers because it provides understanding about the ADLP and DL. The DL domain enables leader development by presenting leaders with an alternate way to access the institutional development domain. This chapter provides evidence that DL is an established Army program of record, with clearly set selection criteria. Army leaders may be able to leverage DL as an important resource in order to improve overall junior infantry officer leader development. The primary researcher will address this idea further in chapters 4 and 5.

143 HQDA, AR 350-1, viii.
144 Ibid., 134.
145 Ibid.
In all, AR 350-1 is one of the most important ARs regarding Army and junior infantry officer leader development. Its Army-wide applicability and requirement for Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 approval for any exceptions to policy, means that AR 350-1 is likely a strong force within the leader development system. Its details and descriptions represent both strengths and weaknesses, providing sufficient details regarding leader development in some areas, but showing deficiencies through the author’s use of voluntary versus mandatory leader participation in various self-development actions, such as Ranger School. Lastly, AR 350-1 helps leaders and the reader understand the ADLP and DL training programs. This evidence helps identify the ADLP as an existing program of record, and points to DL as a potentially powerful tool to support junior infantry officer development through the institutional development domain. All of these details help directly address SRQ3—what are the Army administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development. What follows next is the review of AR 600-20, which is another example of an AR that provides evidence that unit commanders are central players in junior infantry officer development.

**AR 600-20, Army Command Policy**

A superficial review of AR 600-20 *Army Command Policy*, might cause the reader to think that the AR has little value or application to improving junior infantry officer leader development. This might be because the AR initially appears to lack any information that the reader could apply to the field in question. However, this first impression would be premature. In actuality, AR 600-20 provides commentary and
details that help the reader understand the commander’s key central role in the leader
development of junior infantry officers.

The primary researcher identified details that support the conclusion that the unit
commander holds overall responsibility for all unit actions or shortfalls. Additionally,
AR 600-20 contains specific directives that require unit commanders to provide sustained
and continued counselling to subordinate leaders. The AR also presents evidence that
commanders have the proscribed responsibility to supervise their subordinate leader’s
leader development programs. These details support the application of the doctrinal
publication, ATP 6-22.1, The Counselling Process, and reinforce AR 1-201, Army
Inspection Policy.

In all, AR 600-20 is important to the junior infantry officer development system
because it provides the reader with a positive example of an AR directly enforcing the
application of Army leader development doctrine and an example of two ARs reinforcing
the central idea that the commander fulfills a key role in supporting leader development.
This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices,
regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? What
follows is a review of AR 600-100, which explains Army senior leaders’ roles regarding
the Army leader development systems.

146 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 600-

147 Ibid., 6.

148 Ibid., 7.
AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*

AR 600-100, *Army Leadership* provides details and descriptions that help the reader understand which key Army leaders are involved in the Army leader development system, what their roles and functions are, and how the system functions as a whole. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

AR 600-100 includes a clear definition the term Army leadership and details that help the reader to better understand which Army organizational leaders are responsible for the execution of each area of Army leader development.\(^{149}\) AR 600-100 provides evidence that specifies that the Deputy Chief of Staff (G1) is responsible for Army leadership policy, Deputy Chief of Staff (G3/5/7) is responsible for leadership development, and that TRADOC/Combined Arms Center is responsible for synchronizing all leadership and leader development policy efforts.\(^{150}\) AR 600-100 contains details and evidence that highlight the importance of the ALRM core competencies.\(^{151}\) The AR provides details and descriptions that help the reader understand Army leaders in terms of “Pentathletes,” or leaders who are versatile, total-package warrior scholars.\(^{152}\) Additionally, AR 600-100 includes details and narratives

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\(^{150}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{151}\) Ibid., 3.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 1.
that emphasize the importance and value of mandatory counselling, coaching, and voluntary mentoring to develop subordinate leaders.\textsuperscript{153}

As a whole, AR 600-100 is an important piece of regulatory literature because it helps the reader understand the clear duties and responsibilities for Army G1, G3/5/7 and TRADOC/Combined Arms Center regarding Army leader development. This likely supports the conclusion that these three groups of organizational leaders, and their subordinate staff organizations, are key forces within the ALDM system. AR 600-100 provides evidence that supports the importance of leader development counselling and coaching as key tools already available to facilitate leader development, and helps the reader understand Army leaders as Pentathletes. Similar to AR 350-1, AR 600-100 contains details and descriptions that represent strengths and weaknesses in the AR. In some areas, AR 600-100 provides valuable details and specific proscriptive guidance regarding leader development. However, in other areas, the use of non-binding statements and recommendations limit the AR’s usefulness to help Army leaders drive positive leader development. The use of non-binding commentary regarding known effective leader development tools, like Ranger School and mentorship, means that Army leaders are effectively left to their own devices to develop junior infantry officers. The information and details provided by AR 600-100 directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development. What follows next is the primary researcher’s review of the AR governing Army leader’s evaluation and reporting system.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 5-6.
AR 623-3, *Evaluation Reporting System*

AR 623-3, *Evaluation Reporting System* provides regulatory directives and how-to explanations regarding the two Army administrative officer performance documents. As the primary researcher reviewed earlier in this chapter, these administrative performance reports are key methods for commanders to inform senior Army leaders about an officer’s achievement and potential. Additionally, these forms represent the administrative system that facilitates leaders’ implementation of Army doctrine found in ATP 6-22.1. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

AR 623-3 contains specific details and descriptions that inform and direct Army leaders’ actions when completing evaluations for officers. The regulation provides explanations of the two administrative evaluation forms, the DA Form 67-10 series OER and the DA Form 1059 AER.¹⁵⁴ These reports are used by leaders in the institutional and operational domains, respectively, to evaluate an officer’s performance and potential.¹⁵⁵ As previously reviewed by the researcher, the OER is a very important way of educating the Department of the Army promotion boards about an officer’s performance and potential. Understandably, OERs can likely have a huge impact on an officer’s career progression and success. In addition to an evaluation tool, the OER can be used for another purpose.

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¹⁵⁴ HQDA, AR 623-3, 3.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
The second way an OER can be applied regarding junior infantry officer leader development, is through deliberate leader-to-subordinate counselling.\footnote{Ibid., 4.} AR 623-3 provides detailed explanations of the various duties and responsibilities of rated officers, raters, and senior raters within the context of the OER and counselling.\footnote{HQDA, AR 623-3, 34, 39.} The most important parts of these passages in AR 623-3 explain a rater’s responsibility to inspect the rated officer’s DA Form 67-10-1A (OER Support Form) at the beginning, end, and during intermediate quarterly counselling sessions.\footnote{Ibid., 19.} Additionally, the rater must provide the rated officer with copies of both the rater’s and senior rater’s DA 67-10-1A.\footnote{Ibid., 34.} These two requirements help the rated officer and the rater to fully understand duty expectations and responsibilities. This information is important because it helps ensure shared understanding and unity of effort between the rater and rated officer. This helps leaders ensure that leader development goals nest within higher commanders’ intents, one and two levels up.

AR 623-3 also includes details and explanations that direct raters to electronically check a box on the digital OER, certifying that the rated officer completed the MSAF self-evaluation in accordance with AR 350-1 requirements.\footnote{Ibid., 36.} Most significantly, AR 623-3 provides explanations and statements that direct raters to evaluate an officer’s
performance in terms of, and in accordance with, the ALRM six competencies and attributes.\textsuperscript{161} This is significant because these written requirements provide a regulatory link between the Army’s leadership and leader development doctrine and junior infantry officer performance evaluations. This requirement supports the idea that all Army leaders need to be intimately familiar with this doctrine, and in effect, it requires superiors to develop their subordinate leaders within the canon of Army leader development doctrine and the ALRM competencies.

Taken as a whole, AR 623-3 is certainly a force regarding junior infantry officer leader development. It is significant to the development of junior infantry officers because it provides proscriptive regulatory actions, binding timelines, and administrative requirements to counsel, develop, and evaluate infantry officers in accordance with the ALRM competencies. AR 623-3 is also important because it provides Army leaders with a regulatory link between Army leadership and leader development doctrine and junior infantry officer development, through OER and AER performance evaluations. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

The last AR the primary researcher reviewed is AR 600-89. Unlike the proscriptive ARs reviewed by the researcher up to this point, AR 600-89 is a purely positive AR. It provides details and explanations for an Army awards program that Army leaders can use to reward junior officers for exceptional leadership.

\textit{AR 600-89, General Douglas MacArthur}

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 35.
Leadership Award Program

AR 600-89, *General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Program*, is a short, twelve-page regulation that provides details and descriptions of the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award (GDMLA) program. This award program exists due to the coordination between the Department of the Army and the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation in order to recognize and reward company grade officers for exceptional leadership.162 All second lieutenants through captains assigned to a field unit who display exceptional leadership, technical and tactical competency, and pass minimum Army physical fitness and height/weight standards are eligible for this award.163 The AR provides details that direct unit leaders to nominate eligible candidates from all units across the Army, to publicize awardees in local newspapers and across the entire Army, and provides funding for awardees to attend award ceremonies.164 Additionally, AR 600-89 delegates authority to each nominating command to develop additional nomination criteria that expand on the minimum requirements of the baseline GDMLA.165 Almost all Army commands are allocated one nomination and up to thirteen Active Duty officers can receive the GDMLA, an official memorandum of commendation from the Army.

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163 Ibid., 2.

164 Ibid., 3-4.

165 Ibid., 3.
Chief of Staff, and attend an awards ceremony hosted by the Army Chief of Staff at the Pentagon each year.\footnote{Ibid., 1-3.}

AR 600-89 is important to the junior infantry officer development system because it is an established administrative system that helps Army leaders to increase leader motivation, awareness, and a sense of competition regarding junior infantry officer development. AR 600-89 supports this end state by providing regulatory-based justification and funding guidance for an administrative system to officially recognize exceptionally performing junior grade infantry officers. Any reader familiar with competitive sports would likely agree that adding competition and recognition to a system almost always increases performance levels and motivation. The open-ended wording used in the AR, regarding nomination criteria, provides infantry branch leaders an opportunity to exploit this established administrative system by developing additional nomination criteria that could serve as a catalyst to support junior infantry officer leader development efforts. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? What follows next is a brief summary of how Army administrative systems and ARs are significant to this study.

Army Administrative Systems and Army Regulations Conclusions

The primary researcher provided evidence that supported how these two types of literature resources functioned as final important linkages between the Army leader...
development doctrine and its application by Army leaders. Readers should note, that ARs differ from DA PAMs in that ARs require compliance by Army personnel, whereas DA PAMs simply provide approved official guidance about how Army personnel can or should act or apply Army doctrine. In the case of junior infantry officer leader development, ARs require Army leaders to apply the doctrinal concepts of the ALDM, ALRM, through administrative systems like the OER, AER, and developmental counselling. At the end of this section, the primary researcher provided evidence that shows that ARs can also be positively focused, providing regulatory guidance and justification to allocate Army resources, in order to facilitate junior infantry officer leader development through both administrative and social rewards.

The literature reviewed by the researcher in this section helped the reader gain a better understanding of SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? The primary researcher will draw on this deeper reader understanding during the analysis in chapter 4, and conclusions and recommendation to the primary research question: how can the Army leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development, in chapter 5.

What follows next is somewhat of a shift in focus. The primary researcher will now qualitatively review four official Army websites. These websites assist junior infantry officer leader development through digital media, in support of the institutional and self-development domains.
Official Army Websites and Digital Media

The primary researcher will now qualitatively review the official Army websites and digital media related to junior infantry officer development. These websites will provide the reader with insights into the institutional leader development curriculum. These insights will allow the reader to better understand which ALRM competencies are currently being developed in junior infantry officers through the institutional domain. The information, descriptions, and commentary provided by the primary researcher in this section directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

Additionally, reviewing these websites will support a qualitative assessment of Army knowledge management systems for junior infantry officer development. The primary researcher will accomplish this by reviewing each of the websites based on content, site format, and each site’s synchronization with other junior infantry officer development resources previously reviewed in this thesis, by means of active URL links.

The primary researcher’s review of these three assessment areas will ultimately help provide the reader with a deeper understanding of junior infantry officer leader development within the institutional domain. In turn, the reader’s deeper understanding of this material will allow the reader to better appreciate the primary researcher’s analysis in chapter 4, and conclusions and recommendation to the primary research question, -- how can the Army leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development, in chapter 5. The websites that are reviewed in this chapter are listed below in order.

1. IBOLC website
2. MCCC website

3. Maneuver Self Study Program website

4. Warrior University website

IBOLC Website

In regard to content, the IBOLC website provides the viewer with only a few leader development resources. It has a tab containing a four-page PowerPoint presentation that includes descriptions and figures that help the viewer generally understand what topics will be taught during the course. Figure 19 depicts the IBLOC course curriculum. From this graphic, the primary researcher made three observations.\textsuperscript{167}

Figure 19. FY 2016 IBOLC 17-week Course Curriculum


First is the observation that 65 percent of the training weeks take place in the field and are overwhelmingly focused on light infantry skills. The primary researcher knows from personal experience as an IBOLC instructor, that the green colored regions of this figure represent training events that take place in a field environment, and the tan sections
take place in a classroom setting. With this in mind, the primary researcher made two key observations, regarding the IBOLC curriculum figure above.168

The second observation is closely related to the first point, and is that the topic of Army leadership development only appears one time during the entire 17-week course, and that this single leadership development training event is scheduled to be taught in the field during Week 4—Land Navigation. The reader should agree by now that the study of Army leadership and leader development doctrine is a very literature-intensive field of study. This type of study is not well suited to a field environment. This evidence likely supports the deduction that Army leader development training is not an important leader development priority taught during IBOLC.169

The primary researcher’s third observation references the professional reading lists posted on the webpage. All four of the lists from the MCOE, Chief of Infantry, and IBOLC proponents appear to be somewhat dated, from 2011, 2009, and 2015 respectively. Although books often stay applicable over time, the fact that these reading lists have not been updated could suggest that the site is either not regularly updated, or that the website’s content may not be correctly synchronized with the current senior Army leaders’ intents, doctrine, or the ALDS or MLDS170

In regards to website format, the IBOLC website is pretty basic, but more extensive than the MCCC site, which the primary researcher will review later in this

168 MCOE, IBOLC.

169 Ibid.

170 MCOE, IBOLC.
The site’s format is straightforward, with multiple subject tabs. The tabs are easy to read and logically organized. This makes the website structurally user friendly.\textsuperscript{171}

Regarding synchronization with the other junior infantry officer development resources, the IBOLC website provides the viewer active links to several other MCOE courses, (Airborne, Stryker and Bradley Leader) but the link to PlatoonLeader.mil is not active. The IBOLC site is linked to the Maneuver Self Study Program website. The link connects the user directly to the homepage, offering great access to fundamental infantry leader development doctrine and supporting resources.\textsuperscript{172}

In all, the IBOLC website provides some limited details and information that could support some junior infantry officer leader development. However, if one imagined themselves as a cadet, prospective infantry officer, or a newly commissioned infantry officer, one might comment that the IBOLC website lacks a satisfactory number of digital development products, or links to the various self-development multimedia resources highlighted in the MLDS, or Army doctrine. The website may not be as useful a tool for Army leaders to support junior infantry officer leader development as it could be. Additionally, the review of the IBOLC course curriculum provides evidence that supports the idea that IBOLC leaders do not place a high value on teaching newly commissioned infantry officers about Army leadership development doctrine and that IBOLC’s course material and training recourses are predominately focused on supporting light infantry training. This information helps address SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

Having completed a review of the IBOLC website focused on supporting the second lieutenant infantry officer, the primary researcher will review the MCCC website. This website focuses on supporting junior infantry officers as junior Captains.

MCCC Website

With regard to content, the MCCC website provides very few details or descriptions that are of any value in developing junior infantry officer leader development. Unlike the IBOLC page, the MCCC website does not contain any meaningful course curriculum information. In fact, the course outline tab only contains a generic, six-sentence long paragraph about the course. The only leader development information on the MCCC site is a copy of the entrance exam study guide. This does provide good focus for self-development in preparation for the MCCC, however, the reader would probably agree that the MCCC website lacks any meaningful tools or resources that one might expect from one of the only two institutional development schools for junior infantry officers.¹⁷³

In regards to site structure, the MCCC website does not include or provide any significant structures or website links to any other leader development resources reviewed by the researcher in this study. The structure of the site is clear, consisting of a few well-labeled tabs. However, it appears to the primary researcher that the MCCC

website’s clear structure does not help support any meaningful junior infantry officer leader development.\textsuperscript{174}

In regards to site synchronization, several of the website links listed on the MCCC website, like the link to support for graduate reach back, were disabled. The only website link located on the MCCC webpage that could assist leaders with conducting junior infantry officer leader development is the Maneuver Self Study Program website. However, a deeper review of this link revealed evidence that led the primary researcher to believe that the Maneuver Self Study Program link was only listed on the MCCC webpage in order to support pre-MCCC log-in confirmation, and not intended to facilitate a junior infantry officer’s self-development efforts.\textsuperscript{175}

In all, the MCCC website lacks valuable course curriculum information, leader development information and resources, and any significant media links to any of the many previously reviewed leader development resources. These deficiencies possibly indicate a general lack of instructor interest or effort regarding the website. This evidence possibly indicates that the MCCC website is not functioning as well as it could to support junior infantry officer leader development. This information helps address SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

\textsuperscript{174} MCOE, MCCC.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
What follows is the primary researcher’s review of the only leader development site that both the IBOLC and MCCC websites contained links to. This website is the Maneuver Self Study Program.

Maneuver Self-Study Program Website

The Maneuver Self Study Program website contains active webpage links to eight other developmental topic areas, including leader development and Maneuver Warfare (Profession of Arms). The leader development tab on this site provides the viewer with details that help explain the ALDM. The website also contains additional content that provides resources and explanations that support junior infantry officer leader development through an executable personal self-development strategy.176

Regarding website structure and synchronization, the Maneuver Self Study Program website is straightforward. The site is logical, and all of the tabs and links function properly. With regards to synchronization with the other junior infantry officer development resources, the website is effective at supporting junior infantry officer leader development. It provides the viewer with active links to most of the Army leader development doctrine, as well as links to articles, books, and videos that are all great leader development resources 177

The Maneuver Self Study Program website is an effective junior infantry officer leader development resource. The site’s logical formatting allows the user to easily navigate the page and access a wide and deep array of maneuver leader development

176 MCOE, “Maneuver Self Study Program.”
177 Ibid.
resources. This website is probably an effective example of what the IBOLC and MCCC sites should look like. Lastly, the website’s active hyperlinks multiply the site’s utility as a one-stop-shop self-development resource. This directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? The primary researcher will now review the final Army website.

Warrior University Website

The fourth and final website the primary researcher reviewed for this section is the Warrior University website. This website contains a huge amount of leader development information, spanning all branches of the Army, and is likely an effective tool leaders can used to support junior infantry officer leader development.

Regarding content, the website’s Training and Education tab links the user to a second page, where one can view many other additional leader development topic areas, including a dedicated link for the infantry Profession. There are so many areas and sub-areas listed on the website that the primary researcher was not able to fully investigate every single website link. This website contains so much data and information that the primary researcher will likely recommend in chapter 5 of this study that additional future dedicated studies be conducted regarding this and other websites’ abilities to support junior infantry officer leader development further through the digital and multi-media domains.178

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The Warrior University website’s structure is complicated. The website uses small text, and a seemingly random arrangement of major topic areas that presented the primary researcher with confusion and some frustration. Within tabs, files and topic areas are often simply organized alphabetically, and not by topic. This is true to such an extent that one might possibly conclude that the website’s structure might actually decrease the site’s value to leaders as a leader development tool. ¹⁷⁹

Similarly, the website’s synchronization with other development resources is extensive. However, as just stated above, the site’s complicated structure and vast quantity of content, might actually reduce the usefulness of the site as a leader development tool. ¹⁸⁰

Overall, Warrior University is an effective junior infantry officer development resource. This site provides large quantities of leader development information. However, the evidence collected during the review of this website support the possibility it could be improved by simplifying the structure, and improving its organization. As it is now, the Warrior University website is not a very user-friendly tool to facilitate junior infantry officer development, even though it contains a lot of great information. The evidence and commentary provided by the primary researcher in this section directly addresses SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development?

Official Army Websites and

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.
¹⁸⁰ Ibid.
Digital Media Conclusions

Official Army websites and digital media represent an important information domain, a domain that is developing and expanding day by day. Web-based leader development resources have the potential to provide Army leaders, and junior infantry officers seeking professional development, with a vast array of beneficial leader development resources.

However, as highlighted in the primary researcher’s review of the four websites above, the simple fact that an official Army website exists online, does not guarantee that it will be an effective tool to support junior infantry officer leader development. The IBOLC and MCCC websites are prime examples. The IBOLC and MCCC websites are highly accessible through a simple web-search, and yet the two sites are relatively ineffective leader development resources because they do not contain the proper amount or type of content, structure, or synchronization with other leader development resources.

Conversely, the primary researcher’s review of the Warrior University website provides evidence of a completely different type. In the case of the Warrior University website, too much information can sometimes be viewed negatively. The primary researcher highlighted evidence that supported the idea that too much information, or information that is poorly organized can sometimes be just as deleterious to a leader’s ability to effectively apply that information to support leader development as not providing the information in the first place.

Over all, the four official Army websites reviewed by the researcher in this section helped the reader gain a better understanding of SRQ3––what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer
leader development? The primary researcher will conduct further analysis regarding these websites in chapter 4, and provide conclusions and recommendation to the primary research question: how can the Army leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development, in chapter 5.

The primary researcher will now transition the focus of this study from reviewing literature resources that explain and apply leader development theories, Army doctrine, and Army administrative or regulatory concepts and applications. Next, the primary researcher will focus on reviewing several existing civilian and military research studies that provide evidence that supports the idea that leader development is a widespread problem that challenges leaders across many different work environments and leadership domains.

Existing Primary Army Leader Development Research

The primary researcher will now review findings from existing primary research studies, journals, and white papers. The primary researcher’s review will focus most on presenting evidence that supports the idea that leader development is a common problem facing organizational leaders, inside the Army and across other civilian environments and organizations. The evidence presented by the primary researcher in this section helped address the primary researcher’s problem statement: infantry officers, captain and below, often lack critical technical, tactical, and leader skills, resulting in increased numbers of marginally performing leaders in charge of soldiers on a regular basis. This is due to the ineffectiveness of the ALDM to develop leaders through the military’s institutional, operational organizations, and self-development domains. This will help the reader build
a deeper understanding and context regarding leader development, and it increases the significance of this study, not just to Army leaders, but to any leader interested in finding solutions to leader development problems.

To accomplish this, the primary researcher will first focus heavily on reviewing the 2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), in order to provide details and evidence that support the idea that leader development is a problem for Army leaders. Next, the primary researcher will review the findings from several professional journals and white papers that will help the reader understand that leader development is an issue, which impacts many diverse organizations from federal civil service, to medical doctors, to leaders in Nigeria.

2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership

The primary researcher will review the 2014 CASAL survey, applying an increased emphasis on Army leaders’ ALRM competencies of Prepares Self and Develops Others. This is because these two ALRM leader competencies are central to developing junior infantry officers. This applies through an individual officer’s self-development efforts, or through a commander’s subordinate leader development efforts. These leader development efforts can take place through training, coaching, counselling, and/or OERs. The reader knows this based on the primary researcher’s extensive and detailed qualitative review of the other literature resources in this chapter.

The 2014 CASAL survey is the most recent installment of an official effort by Army leaders to research and analyze Army leader performance. The 2014 CASAL survey analyzed responses from 16,796 Active Duty leaders, sergeant through colonel,
with data and findings collected annually since 2005.\textsuperscript{181} This qualifies the CASAL as statistically significant primary research. These qualities make the 2014 CASAL a very useful resource for the primary researcher to qualitatively evaluate the effectiveness of the ALDM effectiveness at developing junior infantry officers.

The CASAL survey provides findings that support the statement that ALRM requirements, consisting of leader attributes and competencies, display a statistically significant association with a leader’s effectiveness or unit’s success.\textsuperscript{182} This provides evidence that supports the idea that the ALRM is an effective leadership model, within the ALDM system, in helping units and leaders succeed.

The CASAL also reports effectiveness percentages regarding all three domains of the ALDM. The CASAL provides data and findings that support the idea that none of the ALDM domains are currently functioning at 100 percent effectiveness. In fact, the CASAL evidence supports the finding that the institutional domain is not as effective as it could be, at only 74 percent overall and only 62 percent of Active Duty leaders reporting their most recent institutional schooling experience as effective at developing them for future career requirements.\textsuperscript{183} Likewise, the CASAL provides evidence and findings that leader self-development domain was currently only 74 percent effective, and that the


\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., v-vi.

\textsuperscript{183} Riley et al., vii.
operational domain only 79 percent effective at developing Army leaders. These percentages reflect the commentary found in the ALDS and MLDS that the operational domain is responsible for developing leaders the most. These percentages are significant because they provide the reader evidence that supports the idea that Army leader development does not occur equally across the three domains of the ALDM. More importantly, these findings also suggest that there is a problem with leader development in the Army.

Regarding junior infantry officer development, the percentages above also support the idea that Army leaders are not effective at developing their subordinate leaders. This means junior infantry officer development is also being negatively impacted. Indeed, the CASAL provides evidence and findings that support the idea that less than 66 percent of leaders describe their immediate supervisors as effective at developing others. This evidence supports the idea that Army leaders are not effectively displaying the ALRM leader competency of Develops, particularly Develops Self and Develops Others.

The CASAL survey provides evidence that supports a negative trend regarding counselling, with 22 percent of leaders never, or almost never being counselled, 21 percent of leaders only being counselled during rating times, 56 percent of leaders were only counselled semi-annually, and only 50 percent of the leaders who were counselled reported that this counselling satisfactorily met their leader development needs. This is

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184 Ibid., vii, vi.
185 Riley et al., vii.
186 Riley et al., viii.
significant, particularly when viewed in the context that counselling, because leader-to-
subordinate counselling was a key development tool repeatedly identified within Army leader development doctrine, and repeatedly mandated by ARs. This evidence supports the idea that there is a potential problem with developmental counselling, leaders’ abilities to effectively execute the ALRM leader competency of Develops Others, and that there is potentially a problem with leader development across the Army as a whole.

The CASAL presents evidence and findings that support the idea that two other leader development tools, the MSAF self-assessment and mentorship, are not being effectively employed by leaders. The CASAL provides findings that suggest that MSAF assessment participation is only at 80 percent and that only 50 percent of Army leaders have a mentor. These percentages support the idea that two more important leader development tools, previously identified through the primary researcher’s literature review as important key leader development tools are not being applied effectively. Additionally, the CASAL survey included findings to support the idea that the MSAF only results in positive leader development outcomes for 53 percent of those who actually participated in the survey.

These percentages are significant for three reasons. First, MSAF participation, a mandatory administrative system, is not being executed in accordance with AR 350-1’s 100 percent requirement. Secondly, there might be something wrong with the MSAF itself that causes the survey’s low leader development effectiveness. Lastly, the

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187 Ibid., viii, x.
188 Ibid., x.
percentages might suggest that voluntary wording in ARs, as previously identified in this study, may contribute to only 50 percent participation in mentorship programs. This is important because finding solutions to these problems could help improve junior infantry officer leader development, and leader development across the Army.

In all, the CASAL provides the primary researcher with a scholarly source of statistically significant primary research data and findings. It contains insights about the effectiveness of the three ALDM domains to develop leaders, and it provides evidence that supports the ideas that the ALDM domains perform dynamically, and that leader development occurs below optimal effectiveness, theoretically 100 percent effectiveness is possible across all three domains. The CASAL data and findings also possibly support the ideas that the sub-optimal effectiveness of the Army leaders to develop junior leaders, through the ALDM domains, could in some way be connected with Army leaders’ reported ineffective application of established leader development tools, such as counselling, mentorship, or the MSAF.

The information and commentary provided by the primary researcher and the CASAL in the section above should have helped the reader to develop a deeper appreciation for the challenges Army leaders face, regarding leader development. This understanding should in turn allow the reader to more fully appreciate the primary researcher’s problem statement: infantry officers, captain and below, often lack critical technical, tactical, and leader skills, resulting in increased numbers of marginally performing leaders in charge of soldiers on a regular basis. This is due to the ineffectiveness of the ALDM to develop leaders through the military’s institutional, operational organizations, and self-development domains. The results and findings
provided in the CASAL should motivate Army leaders and the reader to seek solutions to improve both junior infantry officer development, and leader development in general.

Now that the review of leader development issues within a purely Army context is complete, the primary researcher will now review several examples of how leaders from organizations, inside and outside of the Army, often face similar leader development problems as those described in the CASAL survey.

**Leader Development Research in the Army and Beyond**

The ideas and findings about leader development presented in the CASAL are not recent, nor are they challenges isolated to the Army operational domain. Leader development has been, and will probably continue to be, a problem inside and outside of the Army for quite some time. Appreciating and understanding leader development challenges within an enduring, cross-domain, cross-echelon, and trans-national context is important because it helps put the researcher’s primary research question in perspective. The leader development problems Army leaders face today are similar to leader development problems faced by many other organizations. Acknowledging these shared commonalities should hopefully motivate the reader and Army leaders to synergistically seek out, develop, and embrace potential solutions for both inside and outside of the Army.

The 2005 study by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Gehler for the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, provides evidence that senior Army
leaders were interested in a detailed review of the OES as early as 2004.\textsuperscript{189} Gehler researched junior officer leader development, focusing on the institutional development domain, and Captain Career Courses in particular. Through his study, Gehler included descriptions and commentary that supports the idea that Army leaders must transform junior officer leader development institutions and content in order to develop more agile and adaptive leaders.\textsuperscript{190} Gehler provides descriptions of an ever-evolving operational environment that potentially makes current OES models ineffective.\textsuperscript{191} This study is significant because it supports the idea that junior officer leader development is not a new problem. It supports the idea that Army leaders have identified the issue of junior officer leader development as a problem since at least 2004.

This study is also important because it provides creative ideas about how to address the leader development issue, not the least of which is that organizational leaders must have the courage and willingness to change or adapt current Army systems in order to possibly address the junior officer leader development issue.\textsuperscript{192}

Similarly, a 2003 study by Colonel Michael W. Guillot, provides details and narratives that support the idea that strategic leaders have similarly recognized that

\textsuperscript{189} LTC Christopher P. Gehler, “Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2005), v.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 7-8.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 12.
unique characteristics in their operational environment affect strategic level leadership.\textsuperscript{193} Despite the understandable differences in operational environments and job descriptions, Guillot presents details and descriptions of a leader development model, similar in many ways to the ALRM competency-based model, which he suggests is effective at meeting the leader development needs of strategic level leaders.\textsuperscript{194} The model Guillot proposes employs leader development tools consisting of: self-assessments, regular re-assessments, individual development plans, formal schooling, and consistent pursuit of personal self-development opportunities.\textsuperscript{195}

This study is significant because provides evidence and findings that show that leader development challenges do not just exist at the junior infantry officer level, but also at the strategic leader level. Additionally, the study includes details that support the idea that even at drastically different levels of responsibility, many of the same leader development tools and methods are shared.

Additionally, a 2011 RAND Corporation study of civilian and military medical professional leader development, provides the reader with a cross-discipline example of organizational leaders struggling to combat problems regarding professional leader development.\textsuperscript{196} This study contains evidence to support the idea that leader development


\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{196} Sheila N. Kirby, Julie A. Marsh, Jennifer S. McCombs, Harry J. Thie, Nailing Xia, and Jerry M. Sollinger, \textit{Developing Custodians of Care: Military Medical Leadership} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, February 2011), 1.
issues are not isolated to just junior infantry officers or combat-focused disciplines. The RAND research analyzed the similarities and differences between military and civilian medical healthcare professionals, and how these two groups conduct leader development. The RAND study provided details and findings that support the idea that military and civilian medical professionals share many of the same leader development problems with each other. This study also suggests that military medical leader development could benefit greatly from adopting effective civilian medical leader development tools, including: 360-degree feedback, recognize the importance of mentoring as evaluations, consider formal mentorship and coaching training, and willingness to re-evaluate and change the currently established leader development programs.197

This study is significant because it provides details and findings that support the idea that different professional domains outside combat forces and outside the Army, still encounter similar leadership development problems. This study also highlights the benefits of looking outside one’s own operational discipline to help find solutions to common problems. Lastly, the RAND research is important because it presents findings that confirm that many of the civilian leader development tools recommended to improve the military leader development system, are already integrated into the Army leader development system. This provides evidence that these common tools are effective in developing leaders.

Along this same line of inquiry, The Center for Creative Leadership conducted two leadership comparison studies, of two different operational domains. The first study

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197 Kirby et al., 3.
compared leaders in the military domain with leaders in the civilian leadership domain. The results of this research provided details that supported the idea that the two leadership domains shared many common challenges, with both domains’ leaders reporting subordinate leader development as their top personal leadership challenge.\textsuperscript{198} This study is significant because it shows evidence from both the military and civilian operational domains that supports the idea that junior leadership development is a major issue within each of their respective domains.

Similar to these findings, a second study by the Center for Creative Leadership provided results that show that leaders from both non-military domains share the same top seven leadership challenges.\textsuperscript{199} This study also presented somewhat unique results, regarding leader development, providing details and findings that showed that leaders in the public sector were almost twice as concerned with developing leaders as their federal government counterparts.\textsuperscript{200}

This second Center for Creative Leadership study is significant because it includes details and findings that support the idea that non-military domains still share many of the same leadership challenges. Additionally, the disparity between the public


\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 4.
sector leaders’ concerns about leader development as compared to the federal government leaders’ rating, supports the idea that the public sector leader development could benefit from applying effective lessons learned from the federal government domain. Again, this type of evidence supports the idea the cross-domain knowledge sharing could help improve leader development efforts in different domains and disciplines.

The last study the primary researcher will review in this chapter is from a Ph.D. at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Similar to the primary researcher in this study, the author of the Nigerian-based study investigated the Great Man and competency-based leadership theories. Additionally, the author provided details and findings regarding the challenges his national leadership faces while struggling to lead Nigeria to economic success. While the specific social and economic conditions of the operational environment are drastically different from those pertaining to the other studies above, the study’s author provides descriptions and explanations that support the idea that the leadership challenges that his nation’s leaders face could possibly be overcome by the effective application of a competency-based leadership model. This example presents evidence that supports the idea that a competency-based leadership model, not unlike the

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202 Ibid., 25.

203 Ibid., 29-30.
ALRM, might be effective at addressing leadership and leader needs of a very different domain than that of the Army.

This study is significant because it provides evidence to support the idea that the leadership problems are not just an Army, military, or public sector problem, but they are a global problem. This supports the idea that collaboration and seeking solutions to problems from other, seemingly unrelated domains, may still be effective in another domain.

These examples provided evidence and findings that support the idea that leader development challenges are common and share many similarities across disciplines and operational domains. This is particularly well supported regarding the problem of leader development. Likewise, the challenge of leader development is not a new discovery. Leader development challenges apply to junior and strategic level leaders, and challenge leaders and organizations across the Army, the medical profession, public sector leaders, federal government leaders, and spans the globe. What follows are some general conclusions and themes the primary researcher would like to highlight from this chapter.

Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, the primary researcher provided detailed reviews of various leadership theories and analytical models, Army leadership and leader development doctrine, Army leader development strategies, DA PAMs and ARs, institutional education websites, and primary research from the CASAL, and other journal articles.

To accomplish this qualitative literature review, the primary researcher applied the target-like Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure in figure 1 at the beginning
of this chapter. This analytical model used three concentric circles to group the various literature resources into three topic-focused groupings.

The literature reviewed as part of the outer ring consisted of various resources that helped the reader develop a broader theoretical context of leadership theories, and assisted the primary researcher to address SRQ1—what is the ALRM? These resources also helped the reader better understand how the study of junior infantry officer leader development can tie in with a civilian leadership and leadership development context.

The literature reviewed as part of the middle ring consisted of the Army doctrine that applies to the development of junior infantry officers. These sources helped the researcher address SRQ1—what is the ALRM, and SRQ2—what is the ALDM?

The sources reviewed as part of the third and final inner circle represented literature resources that allow Army leaders to apply all of the theories and concepts provided from the sources in the two outer rings. These resources helped the primary researcher address SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? The information reviewed in these resources may also allow the primary researcher to address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains, later in chapter 4.

Through the primary researcher’s qualitative literature review, the reader should have developed a sound working knowledge of all the pertinent literature sources and information that relate to the study of junior officer leader development in the Army. It
was important to develop this deeper understanding in order to fully appreciate the analysis and findings in chapters 4 and 5.

**Themes**

Additionally, the primary researcher identified four themes in the course of preparing the qualitative literature review presented in this chapter. These themes are:

**Theme 1. Confusion about leadership theories:** There appears to potentially be conflict or confusion between what Army leaders within the junior infantry officer leader development system individually believe about junior infantry officer leader development, and what is published in Army leader and leadership literature. The evidence found in the literature supports the Skills Approach Theory, but holistic-observations by the primary researcher suggest that many Army leaders may in fact support the Great Man Theory.

**Theme 2. The centrality of unit commanders:** At every echelon, unit commanders are the central, and most important actor involved in developing, executing, supervising, and revising junior infantry officer development systems and outcomes.

**Theme 3. Complexity of the established Army leader development system:** The Army leader development system is a robust system of systems. This may be true to such an extent that these systems of systems, supported by numerous supporting literature documents, may actually represent a barrier to unit level leaders reading, understanding, and effectively applying this information and systems.

**Theme 4. Centrality of feedback mechanisms:** There are many established leader development tools already in existence. The leader development tools which appear to
likely support leader development the best are all types of feed-back mechanisms to the developing leader, consisting of: counselling, the OER, and the MSAF.

The researcher will keep these four themes in mind and transition to dedicated qualitative analysis in chapter 4. The analysis the primary researcher will conduct in chapter 4 will help address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains? In chapter 5, the primary researcher will transition from analysis and present consolidated answers to all four SRQs and the primary research question: how can the Army leverage existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?

For now, the primary researcher will transition to chapter 3 and explain the qualitative analysis methodology used to conduct this study.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to complete this study, the primary researcher conducted a qualitative literature review methodology and several semi-structured interviews in order to obtain expert information about the literature resources. The primary researcher reviewed leading civilian leadership theories, Army doctrine, Army leader development strategies, administrative systems and regulations, Army institutional school websites and curriculum, pre-existing Army primary leadership research data, and several non-military studies that provided information regarding challenges with leader development across domains and disciplines. Some of the semi-structured interview data was collected through email and is cited that way, and other data was collected via face-to-face interview and cited that way. Both means are semi-structured interviews but are not subject to human protections review because they are part of the literature review and not part of a group of human participants who were being studied. The semi-structured interviews only allowed the primary researcher to obtain expert literature.

The primary researcher selected the literature resources for this survey in several ways. First, the primary researcher conducted a general survey of civilian leadership theories. The primary researcher spoke with several leadership theory subject matter experts within the Army’s Command and General Staff College Leadership Department, Army leadership doctrine writers, and surveyed internet resources. After completing this general survey, the primary researcher used judgement to narrow the list of leadership theories to be reviewed in this study to the four that appear in chapter 2.
Second, the primary researcher selected the Army doctrine, DA PAMs, and ARs by reviewing and cross-referencing the reference listings in each Army publication. The primary researcher then surveyed each possible resource, then selected only those that applied directly to the problem statement and research questions.

Third, the primary researcher selected the two websites connected with the two primary junior infantry officer institutional schools, IBOLC and MCCC. A survey of these websites, and the MCOE website, helped the primary researcher identify the two other websites the researcher reviewed in chapter 1, the Maneuver Self Study Program and the Warrior University websites.

Fourth, the primary researcher selected the CASAL survey based on previous interactions and survey actions with Command and General Staff College instructors and Army leadership doctrine writers. The CASAL survey was also selected because of its established reputation as an enduring scholarly study concerning Army leadership topics. Likewise, the additional journal articles that the primary researcher selected to review, were also recommended by CGSC Distance Learning Leadership Department instructors. These additional studies helped the primary researcher to provide parallels concerning leader development issues in domains and disciplines outside the Army domain. This in turn helped the primary researcher increase the significance and applicability of the findings of this study.

To accomplish the qualitative literature review, the primary researcher developed a target-like Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure in figure 1 at the beginning of chapter 2. This analytical model used three concentric circles to sort the various literature resources into three topic-focused groupings consisting of Theoretical Context,
Army Doctrine, and Application. A detailed explanation of this model was provided at the beginning of chapter 2.

As a result of this qualitative literature review, the primary researcher worked to address the four SRQs, in order to help provide the reader with a deeper working knowledge of all the pertinent sources and information that relate to the study of junior officer leader development in the Army. It was important to develop this deeper understanding in order to fully appreciate the primary researcher’s analysis and findings in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

Additionally, the primary researcher used the qualitative literature review to identify themes within the Army’s leader development system. The primary researcher will apply these themes to support qualitative analysis in chapter 4, which will help address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains?

It should be noted, that the primary researcher was the primary data collection means. Additionally, the primary researcher is an Active Duty infantry officer, with over ten years of Active Duty commissioned officer experience. The primary researcher also brought this personal experience into play when conducting the qualitative literature review methodology. The primary researcher’s experience also contributed to the findings and recommendations.

Next, the primary researcher used a scaled Venn diagram and Force Field Analysis to visualize and provide meaning to these themes, as they related to junior infantry officer development. The primary researcher then conducted qualitative analysis of these two qualitative visualization models in order to draw conclusions and propose
solutions to the primary research question. The primary researcher concluded this study with propositions for future study and research regarding junior infantry officer leader development in chapter 5. Figure 20 visualizes the primary researcher’s methodology.

![Figure 20. Thesis Research Methodology Visualization](source.png)

Source: Created by author.

In the figure above, the reader can see that the model is labeled to the side, by chapter. These labels help the reader understand in which chapter each of the actions depicted in the figure takes place. Starting at the top of the figure, the reader can see that chapter 1 consists of all of the primary researcher’s narrative descriptions and reviews of the literature resources that helped establish the background and context for this study.

Next, chapter 2 is where the qualitative literature review and semi-structured interviews take place. Again, refer to the beginning of chapter 2 for a detailed explanation.
of the Qualitative Literature Review Source Structure figure and supporting qualitative literature review methodology.

Next, the chapter 4 portion of the figure shows how this chapter consists of two steps. The first step is to visualize the effectiveness of the current ALDM to develop junior grade infantry officers. This step applies a scaled Venn diagram, called the Leader Development Meter (LDM). A detailed explanation of the LDM appears later in this chapter. The second step of the qualitative analysis takes place in chapter 4 and consists of a Force Field Analysis. Here, the primary researcher identifies driving and restraining forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system. A more detailed description of this step appears later in this chapter.

The last step, implications, conclusions, and recommendations, appears in chapter 5. Here, the primary researcher will consolidate the findings regarding each of the four SRQs and present solutions to the primary research question. The reader can see by the horizontal arrows that the primary researcher will present these recommendations in terms of the three ALDM domains, as well as in regard to any applicable Army literature or website resources. In the paragraphs that follow, the primary researcher explains this methodology of the LDM and Force Field Analysis in more detail.

Chapter 2 provided a detailed description of both Venn and scaled Venn diagrams. The primary researcher used a scaled Venn diagram to help visualize the ALDM system. This model helped the primary researcher to visually depict the leader development gaps that Army leaders experience in their efforts to develop junior infantry officers, in terms of the ALDM domains. The primary researcher developed an original scaled Venn diagram to best visualize the qualitative understanding of the current
functionality of the ALDM to develop junior infantry officer leaders. A description of the LDM follows.

The original Scaled Venn diagram the primary researcher developed to support this study was titled the LDM. The LDM is a dynamic visualization tool that purposely resembles the image of the ALDM from Army doctrine reviewed earlier in this study. Figures 21 and 22 depict the ALDM and LDM. The intersection area of the LDM, where all three domain regions over-lap, represents a junior infantry officer’s over-all level of development and competency, as a result of their professional development from the ALDM.

The figures below show the LDM and ALDM for comparison purposes. The ALDM and LDM look very similar in design. The ALDM figure shows the components the Army leader development system and how they relate to each other, but it is not a dynamic visualization model like the LDM. Again, the LDM is a scaled Venn diagram and its regions vary in area in order to conceptually depict the current performance of junior infantry officer leader development.
Figure 21. ALDM

The scaled size of each domain region conceptually qualitatively represents the amount of professional development for which that domain is responsible. As leader development occurs within each domain, the circles grow proportionally. If development from a domain is low, then that circle remains relatively small. If development from that domain increases, the size of the circle increases. The domain circle where the most development occurs is the largest, conversely for the smallest circle.

Figure 22. LDM-Balanced

Source: Created by author.
In an ideal operational environment, Army leaders would execute leader development across all domains of the ALDM equally, producing a well-balanced, competent junior infantry officer. If Army leaders executed leader development efforts across the ALDM domains at different levels of effectiveness, a disproportionate leader development system results. This results in a junior infantry officer with development gaps and reduced competency.

The LDM helps the reader qualitatively visualize this disproportional state of one or more of the three domain regions, circles, being larger or smaller than the others. As this disproportional system evolves, the shape and size of the leader competency, intersection area is distorted. Although over-all leader competency may increase, leader competency is not developed to the fullest potential possible. Leader development only reaches its fullest potential when all three domains develop equally.

The LDM-Balanced figure above visualizes the ALDM in an ideal state of execution. In an ideal state, the LDM shows balanced leader development across all three ALDM domains, and a large, equally-proportional intersection area for leader competency. The intersection area is dramatically increased in size and shape, proportionate to each other region.

Conversely, the LDM-Unbalanced figure below shows the ALDM in a non-ideal state. This is represented by domain circles of varied sizes, and an irregularly shaped intersection area. These size and shape irregularities indicate gaps and disproportionalities in a junior infantry officer’s leader development caused by inequalities and disproportionalities in the ALDM system. Gaps in the ALDM result in less than ideal junior infantry officer leader Development and competency.
In the figure above, the self-development domain is underperforming. The self-development circle is smaller than the other circles, and the overall leader competency intersection area is decreased in size and irregularly shaped.

The primary researcher interpreted the ALDM as a closed system of developmental domains, grouping all possible sources of development into at least one of the development domains. Therefore, one can see that all development gaps must be attributed to, or a component of, at least one of the development domains.

*Source:* Created by author.
The primary researcher will apply the LDM in chapter 4 as a meaning making model by drawing on the deep understanding of junior infantry officer development system gained through the qualitative literature conducted in chapter 2, particularly the effectiveness percentages from the 2014 CASAL survey, and ten years of personal and professional experience as an Active Duty infantry officer. The primary researcher will apply this qualitative judgement, understanding from the literature resources, and professional experience to qualitatively manipulate the relative size of each LDM circle. The primary researcher is conducting qualitative analysis through the LDM, so no quantitative mathematical calculations will be applied to compute and adjust the LDM circle sizes. However, the primary researcher does apply simple mathematics to help guide the qualitative judgment. This is not quantitative statistical analysis. It is simply a way to logically and consistently apply the deep understanding the primary researcher gained through the qualitative literature review process in chapter 2. To this end, the primary researcher does rely on the 2014 CASAL survey’s effectiveness percentages, the nine types of infantry formations, and the IBOLC course curriculum when making these qualitative adjustments to the LDM.

At the end of this first step, the qualitatively manipulated LDM will help the reader visualize the primary researcher’s assessment of the current junior infantry officer leader development system to develop junior infantry officers. This visualization will provide meaning and understanding of the effectiveness of the current leader development environment. Additionally, the LDM will help the primary researcher start to hypothesize the solution to SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-
development domains? The primary researcher will then transition to Force Field Analysis in order to ultimately address this question.

The primary researcher will now transition to the second step within the qualitative analysis phase. In this second step, the primary researcher qualitatively analyzed the literature resources reviewed in chapter 2 using Force Field Analysis. The primary researcher will accomplish this by drawing on the deep understanding of the literature reviewed as part of chapter 2, professional experiences, and qualitative judgement to evaluate each resource as either a driving or restraining force to either improve or impede junior infantry officer leader development.

Once all of the literature is assessed in terms of driving and restraining forces, the primary researcher will construct the final Force Field analysis diagram by populating it with each of these forces. Driving forces will be on the left, and restraining forces on the right. The driving forces are represented by horizontal arrows pointing to the right, and restraining forces are represented by horizontal arrows pointing to the left. Figure 24 depicts the Force Field Analysis.
Figure 24. LDM Force Field Analysis Figure Example

*Source:* Created by author.

The primary researcher will use the LDM Force Field Analysis figure as a change model to identify, analyze, and help propose findings and recommendations in order to leverage or mitigate driving and restraining forces to improve junior infantry officer leader development.

This will allow the primary researcher to address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organization, and self-development domains? Additionally, the primary researcher will use the LDM and the LDM Force Field Analysis models in chapter 5 to help address the
primary research question: how can the Army leverage existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the three ALDM domains, in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance? The primary researcher will move on to chapter 4 and begin conducting qualitative analysis using the methodology and models described in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Leader Development Meter Analysis

The primary researcher used the LDM to conduct qualitative analysis of the junior infantry officer leader development system in order to visualize the relative effectiveness of each domain to facilitate the development of junior infantry officers. In turn, the primary researcher used the LDM to help visualize the qualitative assessment of the overall effectiveness of the ALDM to facilitate junior infantry officer development. To accomplish this, the primary researcher drew on the deep understanding gained during chapter 2, and by qualitatively assessing and combining the literature resources to draw new meaning and understanding of the junior infantry officer leader development system.

The primary researcher already conducted a detailed qualitative literature review in chapter 2. This review helped develop a deep understanding of the supporting literature resources and the junior infantry officer leader development system. Next, the primary researcher drew on his deep understanding of the junior infantry officer leader development system and assessed the ALDM, domain-by-domain, starting with the self-development domain.

After careful and deliberate consideration, the primary researcher concluded that there were two literature resources that provided significant qualitative evidence regarding the effectiveness of the ALDM self-development domain. These literature resources were the ALDS and the 2014 CASAL. The primary researcher qualitatively analyzed the ALDS first.
The ALDS was one of the two literature resources that directly addressed ALDM domain effectiveness because of the details it provided about the self-development domain. The ALDS described the self-development domain as consisting of three sub-areas; structured, guided, and personal self-development. This supports the idea that each of these three sub-areas could be visualized as contributing 33 percent effectiveness to the overall effectiveness of the self-development domain. The primary researcher’s semi-structured interview with Mr. Beck provided expert details and information that two of the three sub-areas of the self-development domain, consisting of structured and guided self-development, are not currently functioning. This lack of functionality is due to the failure of the civilian software contractor to deliver the web-based DL training aids.

The primary researcher applied the facts above and related them to percentages of effectiveness. In accordance with this analysis, the primary researcher concluded that approximately 66 percent of the self-development domain’s potential effectiveness, the percentage associated with the non-functioning structured and guided self-development sub-areas, is not being applied. Therefore, the primary researcher concluded that there was only one sub-area, personal self-development, actively contributing to the effectiveness of the self-development domain. Likewise, the primary researcher concluded that the personal self-development sub-area could theoretically only provide approximately 33 percent effectiveness.

The second significant literature resource that provided evidence to this analysis is the 2014 CASAL survey. The 2014 CASAL provided findings to suggest that 74 percent of surveyed leaders reported self-development was effective at developing each
respondent. Based on the information provided in the ALDS and from the semi-structured interviews with Mr. Beck, the primary researcher concluded that the 74 percent effectiveness reported in the 2014 CASAL was actually the effectiveness of the personal self-development sub-area alone. This was because the other two sub-areas were known to be entirely non-functional, and contributed 0 percent effectiveness to the self-development domain.

The primary researcher qualitatively combined these two percentages of effectiveness by multiplying 74 percent and 33 percent. From this qualitative analysis, the primary researcher concluded that the personal self-development sub-area was assessed as operating with approximately 24 percent effectiveness. Therefore, the primary researcher qualitatively assessed the over-all effectiveness of the self-development domain was also 24 percent. Table 2 displays the qualitative analysis.
### Table 2. Self-development Qualitative Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-development Domain Qualitative Effectiveness</th>
<th>ALDS 100% Effectiveness possible</th>
<th>Qualitative Literature Review Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structured self-development 33%</td>
<td>0% Web-based resources not online</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided self-development 33%</td>
<td>0% Web-based resources not online</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal self-development 33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 CASAL 100% Effectiveness possible</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative effectiveness of personal self-development sub-area</td>
<td>33% x 74% = 24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total qualitative effectiveness of self-development domain</td>
<td>(Structured + Guided + Personal sub-areas)</td>
<td>0% + 0% + 24% = 24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

Next, the primary researcher analyzed the institutional domain. After careful consideration, the primary researcher selected the IBOLC course curriculum, the 2014 CASAL, and the list of nine different types of infantry unit formations as the resources used to guide the qualitative analysis.

Of the nine types of infantry formations, light, wheeled, tracked, air mobile, airborne, mortar, anti-armor, Ranger, and reconnaissance, the IBOLC curriculum only prepares junior infantry officers for five formations (light, air mobile, airborne, Ranger, and reconnaissance). The primary researcher applied basic math, dividing 5 by 9, and qualitatively assessed that IBOLC was 56 percent effective at developing junior infantry officers. The primary researcher qualitatively adjusted this finding further to account for
additional institutional development new infantry officers regularly receive at Fort
Benning prior to being assigned to their first unit of assignment, adjusting the 5 to a 6
(Bradley Leader Course, Stryker Leader Course, Air Assault School, Airborne School) or
67 percent. Additionally, the primary researcher qualitatively adjusted this value further
from a 6 to a 7, adjusting for development exposure of one more infantry formation type
during an officer’s attendance at the MCCC. With these qualitative adjustments reflected,
the new effectiveness of the institutional domain improved to approximately 78 percent
effectiveness. Next, the primary researcher combined this figure with the 2014 CASAL
survey data.

Concerning the 2014 CASAL, evidence was presented that supported the idea that
only 62 percent of respondents reported they were effectively developed through the
institutional domain. The primary researcher applied basic math to qualitatively combine
these effectiveness ratings (78 percent times 62 percent), supported by the qualitative
literature review, which yielded an over-all effectiveness of approximately 48 percent.
Table 3 displays the qualitative analysis.
### Table 3. Institutional Qualitative Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Domain Qualitative Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IBOLC initial effectiveness (5 of 9 infantry formations developed)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IBOLC adjusted for development of 1 more additional infantry formation (6 of 9)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness adjusted for development of 1 additional formation type at MCCC (7 of 9)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014 CASAL 100% Effectiveness possible</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total qualitative effectiveness of institutional domain</strong> (adjusted IBOLC and MCCC x CASAL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

Next, the primary researcher analyzed the operational domain. After careful consideration, the primary researcher selected the 2014 CASAL as the best literature resource to guide the qualitative analysis of this domain. The 2014 CASAL provided evidence and findings that supported the idea that 79 percent of respondents reported that they were effectively developed through the operational domain. This percentage was supported by the primary researcher’s personal qualitative assessment of effectiveness. No table is necessary since the primary researcher did not adjust the CASAL percentages.

Lastly, the primary researcher combined the three qualitative percentages reviewed above and populated the LDM-Manipulated diagram. The primary researcher
then compared the LDM-Balanced with the LDM-Manipulated. Figure 25 depicts the two LDMs side-by-side.

![Figure 25. LDM-Balanced and LDM-Manipulated Side-by-side Comparison](image)

Source: Created by author.

The figure above provided the reader with the primary researcher’s qualitative visualization of the current leader development effectiveness of the ALDM three domains. This figure helped the primary researcher start to visualize several conclusions. First, one should note how the LDM-Manipulated figure is decreased in over-all size, compared to the LDM-Balanced. This supports the idea that the ALDM is not functioning at 100 percent effectiveness. Second, the intersection area highlighted in blue, representing over-all leader competency, is un-even in shape and greatly reduced in area. This supports that idea that leader development does not occur in equal amounts within each domain. Additionally, these two observations support the conclusions that the
ALDM may not be functioning as effectively as possible, and that there is evidence to support the finding that the self-development domain is the domain displaying the least developmental effectiveness. This might suggest that the self-development domain may be a barrier to effective junior infantry officer leader development. This may support the recommendation that action should be prioritized to improve the self-development domain first, in order to improve overall junior infantry officer leader development.

The primary researcher will now transition to the second step of the qualitative analysis phase, Force Field Analysis.

**Force Field Analysis**

The primary researcher conducted a qualitative analysis of the literature resources reviewed in chapter 2 using Force Field Analysis. To accomplish this, the primary researcher applied qualitative judgement, drawing on ten years of professional experience, and a deep understanding gained through the qualitative literature review. The primary researcher then assessed each literature resource as either a driving or restraining force within the junior infantry officer leader development system, and populated each of these forces into a Force Field Analysis figure.

**Leading Civilian Leadership Theories**

**Great Man/Trait Theory**

The Great Man Theory does not support the idea that leaders can be developed. The theory supports the idea that leaders are simply born with innate leadership gifts. This does not support leader development in the Army. Leaders who believe in this theory are not likely to invest personal or organizational resources into leader
development programs. Therefore, the Great Man Theory is assessed as a restraining force hindering junior infantry officer leader development.

**Contingency Theory**

The Contingency Theory focuses on a leader’s ability to adjust to their given operational environment. The primary researcher appreciated the idea that leaders sometimes need to adjust their methods and leadership style to fit different environments. Therefore, this is probably an applicable theory for the operational environment in which junior infantry officers commonly operate. The Contingency Theory’s leader flexibility could also benefit learning environments, where subordinate leaders need more of a coaching style to develop their leadership skills. Likewise, positive counselling interactions that focus on an individual leader’s professional development, would also likely benefit from a leader that can adjust their leadership style to various different environments. This would also allow an officer conducting a positive counselling to adjust their style to create a more relaxed learning environment, as opposed to the intentionally stressful environment normally associated with negative counselling or formal evaluation events. Both of these situations support leader development. Therefore, the Contingency Theory was assessed as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**Transformational Theory**

The Transformational Theory supports the idea that leaders address followers’ fundamental human needs in order to intrinsically motivate followers to exceed normal expectations and achieve high levels of success. This theory is closely linked with leaders
displaying moral behaviors, reinforcing group motivation through personal example. This is an admirable theory, one that would also benefit Army leaders who are likely to face moral trauma in combat environments. Additionally, the modern news media environment often negatively exploits reports of immoral actions, in combat or otherwise. The idea that organizations could be guided and motivated based on sound moral beliefs is a positive one. Therefore, the primary researcher assessed the Transformational Theory as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**Skills Approach Theory**

The Skills Approach Theory supports the idea that leaders can develop specific leadership skills, which over time can allow a leader to evolve and develop into a better leader. This theory provides definitions and fundamental concepts that supports leader development. Additionally, the Skills Approach Theory is the civilian leadership theory that Ms. Price, the expert Army doctrine author introduced earlier in this study, stated was the civilian leadership theory that the ALRM was most closely related to. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed the Skills Approach Theory as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**Army Doctrine**

**ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders**

ADRP 7-0 is a useful leader development resource for Army leaders. It includes effective commentary and graphics that provides important clarity regarding the design, structure, and intended functionality of the ALDM. It also presents important evidence that supports the theme that the commander is the central leader development figure. It
also introduced the seven Army principles of leader development. Therefore, the primary researcher assessed ADRP 7-0 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership***

ADP 6-22 is a critical piece of Army literature. It is the underlying doctrinal foundation for the field of Army leadership and Army leader development. ADP 6-22 provides the foundational details and concepts that help establish the ALRM as a competency-based, Skills Approach Theory-like, leadership model. This is critical to establish within Army doctrine, because once established in doctrine, it helps provide a requirement and justification for Army leaders to develop and sustain a formal leader development system. Therefore, the primary researcher assessed ADP 6-22 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership***

Very similar to ADP 6-22, ADRP 6-22 simply adds additional details and specifics regarding the ALRM competency-based model. This manual provides excellent leader development information to leaders, providing clarity regarding the ALRM and leader development in the form of easy to read tables and narratives. As such, the primary researcher assessed ADRP 6-22 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**FM 6-22, *Leader Development***

FM 6-22 is quite possibly one of the best leader development tools. It contains many pages of user-friendly tables and charts that help Army leaders visualize and
understand what the ALRM leader attributes and competencies look like in real life. This is absolutely critical to the application of the ALRM, particularly in clarifying terms and definitions of successful behaviors during counselling, on OERs, and during leader development events. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed FM 6-22 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**ATP 6-22.1, *The Counseling Process***

ATP 6-22.1 is another exceptional leader development tool. Like FM 6-22, ATP 6-22.1 provides many specific details and practical examples that can help leaders execute counselling more effectively. Additionally, because the feedback was a central theme the primary researcher identified in chapter 2, there is increased justification that Army leaders should seek ways to leverage this useful leader development tool more. Therefore, the primary researcher assessed ATP 6-22.1 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**Army Leader Development Strategies**

**ALDS**

The ALDS is a very important piece of Army leader development literature. In addition to providing ample amounts of details and narrative descriptions about how the leaders are supposed to be developed, the ALDS also contains an essential framework for the self-development domain. The primary researcher’s recent analysis of the LDM-Manipulated figure, provided evidence that supported the idea that the self-development domain was not functioning ideally, and that it was currently the least effective development domain. The ALDS is important in this regard because it presented an
official written description of how the self-development domain is supposed to function. Additionally, evidence offered by Mr. Beck supported the finding that two key self-development sub-areas are not currently functioning. The ALDS provides Army and civilian leaders the official justification needed to cut through bureaucratic red tape, in order to properly field the two well-intentioned, yet non-functioning, self-development sub-areas. As such, the primary researcher assessed the ALDS as a driving force. Unfortunately, the primary researcher also observed that very few Army leaders know about the ALDS, likely reducing its ability to drive leader development more effectively. The same is true for the MLDS, which is assessed next.

MLDS

The MLDS is a valuable tool in helping focus junior infantry officer leader development. The MLDS detailed sets of specific technical and tactical competency skills that define what each junior infantry officer needs know at particular times in their career. This makes it a very useful document. This guidance provides a leader development program road-map. Unit commanders and other infantry leaders can use this tool to help guide leader development efforts and economize limited resources. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed the MLDS as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development. Similar to the ALDS, the primary researcher observed that very few Army leaders know about the MLDS, likely reducing its ability to drive leader development as well.
DA PAM 350-58, *Army Leader Development Program*

DA PAM 350-58 provided enlightening details, definitions, and explanations regarding the Army Leader Development Process (ALDP). This DA PAM is useful in understanding this seemingly overly complex, system-of-systems. However, the fact that the ALDP consists of so many specific regimented systems and steps, and the fact that it is composed almost entirely of high-ranking senior Army leaders, supports the conclusion that the ALDP has an overly complex organization, and is likely slow to change. This is due to a lack of unity of command inherent in such a committee-based, process-focused organizational structures. Therefore, the primary researcher assessed that the ALDP is a barrier to efficiently adapting or adopting new leader development initiatives or ideas. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed DA PAM 350-58 as a restraining force, hindering junior infantry officer leader development.

DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*

DA PAM 600-3 is a very important officer leader development resource. It provides many detailed narratives that describe the entire officer development system. The DA PAM presents career timeline guidance and explains what exact assignments and skills an officer needs to master at different points of their career. Additionally, chapter 8 provides infantry officer-specific career guidance and details. These details are important for both raters and rated infantry officers because they help guide both groups in their respective leader development actions. DA PAM 600-3’s only weakness is that it is not an AR. It is simply a source of important official career management guidance, and is not
a binding regulation. This is a key distinction. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed that DA PAM 600-3 is a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development, however, it is a driving force that could and should be strengthened.

**AR 1-201, *Army Inspection Policy***

AR 1-201 is a useful tool for Army leaders looking to improve junior infantry officer leader development. This AR outlines many proscriptive requirements that mandate the commander’s direct personal involvement in inspecting subordinate leader development programs at least once a year. This is useful because it works as a forcing function to improve unit leader development programs. It facilitates this function by requiring unit commanders, who may not be well versed in, or who may not be personally interested in leader development, to get out of their comfort zone and get down into their subordinate unit locations to inspect subordinate unit leader development programs. Because of these reasons, the primary researcher assessed AR 1-201 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development. Additionally, this resource supports the theme that the commander is a central player in the leader development system.

**AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development***

AR 350-1 is one of the most important ARs regarding Army and junior infantry officer leader development. This is due to the AR’s Army-wide applicability, and requirement for Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 approval for any exceptions to policy. AR 350-1 helps leaders understand the ADLP and DL training programs. These programs represent potential opportunities that could be leveraged to improve junior infantry
officer leader development. For example, AR 350-1 mandates leaders to use the MSAF self-assessment program, the ACT career development website, and to develop and conduct re-occurring developmental counselling regarding a subordinate’s IDP. However, AR 350-1 is also weakened through the author’s use of voluntary versus mandatory leader participation in several leader development actions, such as an infantry officer’s voluntary attendance and graduation of Ranger School. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed AR 350-1 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development. Additionally, the primary researcher noted that AR 350-1 could and should be adjusted to use only more proscriptive language, in order to require leaders to use more of the existing leader development tools.

AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*

AR 600-20 is an important force within the junior infantry officer leader development system because it provides Army leaders with a positive example of an AR that directly reinforces the application of Army leader development doctrine. The AR specifically requires the commander to use counselling as a development tool. It also supports the theme that the commander is an essential player to improve leader development programs and systems. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed AR 600-20 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*

AR 600-100 is an enlightened literature resource regarding leader development. The document provides clear explanations and descriptions of senior Army leaders’ duties and responsibilities, regarding leader development. This includes particularly
important leaders like the Deputy Chief of Staff (G1), Deputy Chief of Staff (G3/5/7), and TRADOC / Combined Arms Center (CAC). This information is critical for any leader who is interested in proposing changes to the current leader development system. It is essential that change agents understand the systems and structures they are trying to change, in order to allow them to create the most suitable, feasible, and acceptable solutions. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed AR 600-100 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development. This also addressed the theme of complexity within the leader development system.

AR 623-3, *Evaluation Reporting System*

AR 623-3 is one of the most important pieces of Army literature regarding leader development. This is because it provides the specific requirements to use the OER, which includes evaluation areas mirroring the ALRM six leader competencies and attributes. It also requires raters to be directly involved with leader evaluations, and establishes a digitally integrated box-checks on the OER for the MSAF. This established the OER as one of the most useful tools for facilitating counselling and leader development. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed both the manual, OER, counselling, and the MSAF as key driving forces supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

AR 600-89, *General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Program*

AR 600-89 is a useful tool to support leader development because it provides the regulatory justification for an existing approved awards system. This awards system is specifically designed to recognize and motivate junior officers to seek leadership improvement and excellence. The AR provides purpose, direction, and motivation for
junior infantry officers to excel. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed AR 600-89 as a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

Official Army Websites

IBOLC Website

IBOLC website is only marginally beneficial in assisting junior infantry officer leader development, especially considering that the site is probably the first Army website prospective infantry cadets and recently commissioned infantry officers visit. It lacks a large number of digital products or links to self-development multimedia resources highlighted in the MLDS. The website is truly a missed junior infantry officer leader development opportunity. For these reasons, the primary researcher assessed the IBOLC website as a restraining force, hindering junior infantry officer leader development.

MCCC Website

The MCCC website is a disappointing leader development resource. It lacks any valuable leader development information, and significant media links to any of the many previously reviewed development resources. These deficiencies could indicate a general lack of instructor interest, effort, or significant use of the site to facilitate infantry officer development. In all, the MCCC is a restraining force within the junior infantry officer development system.

Maneuver Self Study Program

The Maneuver Self Study Program website is a great leader development resource, capable of supporting junior infantry officer leader development. Its logical
formatting allows the user to easily navigate the page and access the wide, and deep array of maneuver leader development resources. This website is a good example of what the IBOLC and MCCC sites should look like. Lastly, the website’s active hyperlinks multiply the site’s utility as a one-stop shop self-development tool. In all, the Maneuver Self Study Program website is a strong driving force within the junior infantry officer development system.

**Warrior University**

Warrior University is a solid leader development resource. This site could be improved by simplifying the structure and organizing it by branch. As it is now, Warrior University is not a very user-friendly website to facilitate junior infantry officer development, though it contains a lot of great information. Additionally, the primary researcher believes that the website also suffers from lack of notoriety. All of these issues could be corrected and Warrior University has the potential to be one of the strongest driving forces in the junior infantry officer development system. For all of these reasons, Warrior University is a driving force supporting junior infantry officer leader development.

**LDM Force Field Analysis: Constructing the Diagram**

Having conducted a thorough qualitative analysis, and subsequently assessed each of these resources as either driving or restraining forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system, the primary researcher populated these forces onto the generic Force Field Analysis diagram presented in chapter 3. Once populated with the driving and restraining forces, the primary researcher labeled the Force Field Analysis
diagram as the LDM Force Field Analysis figure. Figure 26 depicts the forces the primary researcher identified through qualitative analysis.

Figure 26. LDM Force Field Analysis Figure

*Source:* Created by author.

**LDM Force Field Analysis Conclusions**

The reader can see in the LDM Force Field Analysis figure above that the driving forces on the left hand side, and the restraining forces on the right hand side represent a numerically unbalanced system. There are nineteen driving forces and only four restraining forces. The LDM Force Field Analysis figure was effective in addressing SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains?
The primary researcher was initially surprised by the results of the first Force Field Analysis iteration. As one might expect, the primary researcher concluded the 19:4 ratio of driving-to-restraining forces depicted in the LDM Force Field Analysis figure should result in an effective junior infantry officer leader development system. However, the findings from the 2014 CASAL and the primary researcher’s own qualitative analysis using the LDM Manipulated figure, provided evidence that the junior infantry officer leader development system is not performing at optimal levels.

Therefore, the primary researcher concluded that other conditions must exist within the junior infantry officer leader development system that are not accurately visualized by the current LDM Force Field Analysis figure. The primary researcher postulated that these un-accounted for conditions must have caused the CASAL data and two visualization models to differ so greatly. The primary researcher concluded that there were three conditions that helped explain the discrepancies between the LDM Force Field Analysis figure, LDM-Manipulated, and the 2014 CASAL.

The first condition that could support the observations of the data and models, was that one or more of the nineteen driving forces depicted in the LDM Force Field Analysis figure was relatively weak, as compared to the restraining forces. Since all nineteen of the driving forces were assessed as positive forces, capable of improving junior infantry officer leader development, the primary researcher concluded that this condition likely existed as the result of Army leaders’ improper application of the nineteen driving forces. Although the forces are still present in the system, they may therefore be displaying decreased, potentially even minimal, positive impacts on improving junior infantry officer development.
Conversely, the second condition that could support the observations of the data and models, was that one or more of the restraining forces was disproportionately strong. If this was the case, the numerical ratio of forces depicted in the Force Field Analysis diagram could be somewhat misleading. What would matter most within the system would be the relative comparison of force-strengths, not just the comparison of numbers of force-types.

Lastly, the primary researcher realized that the LDM Force Field Analysis figure failed to take into account the four major themes that the primary researcher identified in chapter 2. These themes, although not directly represented by physical literature or digital resources, had the potential to display the same force-like impacts on the junior infantry officer leader development system. The primary researcher re-examined and assessed these themes as likely powerful forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system. What follows next is the primary researcher’s qualitative assessment of the four major themes.

**Theme 1: Confusion about Leadership Theories**

As previously presented in chapter 2, the primary researcher observed that there appears to be a potentially significant conflict or confusion between what Army leaders believe about junior infantry officer leader development, and what is published in Army literature. It should be noted that the primary researcher did not find any references to the Great Man Theory manifested through current Army leadership and leader development doctrine or literature. However, through the course of the primary researcher’s career and many discussions with peers and commanders, the primary researcher assessed that there are probably a significant number of Army leaders that personally ascribe to the Great
Man Theory. The primary researcher observed that these types of Great Man Theory-believing leaders are predominately focused on assessing and evaluating subordinate leaders, but not providing the necessary teaching, coaching, or mentorship needed to appreciably develop a struggling junior infantry officer.

This observation stands in direct conflict with Army leadership and leader development doctrine and literature. This contradictory observation has the potential to represent a very powerful, un-acknowledged barrier to improving junior infantry officer development. Thus, confusion about leadership theories should be visualized as a strong restraining force within the junior infantry officer leader development system. This force encompasses and exacerbates the power of the Great Man Theory as a restraining force.

**Theme 2: The Centrality of Unit Commanders**

Throughout the literature review process, the primary researcher repeatedly identified unit commanders as the primary individual responsible for executing many administrative or regulatory actions like counselling, OER evaluations, or directing and inspecting unit leader development programs. Although the primary researcher correctly identified the supporting ARs and DA PAMs as driving forces, this incomplete analysis ignored the unit commander himself as the physical force that allowed each of the many literature documents to actually be executed. Therefore, unit commanders themselves should be visualized properly as key potential restraining or driving forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system.
Theme 3: Complexity of the Established Army Leader Development System

Like the reader, the primary researcher appreciated the sheer volume and complexity of the many literature resources reviewed in chapter 2. It should be noted that it was only through the process of this study, with the explicit intention to conduct a thorough and exhaustive literature review of the junior infantry officer leader development system, that the primary researcher was able to develop a deep understanding of this robust system of systems. The primary researcher does not believe the same is true for many Army leaders. As such, this robust leader development system of systems, supported by numerous documents, may actually represent a strong restraining force, possibly impeding unit level leaders from reading, understanding, and effectively applying this information to develop junior infantry officers.

Theme 4: Centrality of Feedback Mechanisms

As mentioned in theme 2, there are many commander-centric leader development tools. Of these, direct feedback mechanisms like counselling, OERs, AERs, mentorship, and the MSAF were repeatedly presented in the literature resources as very important and useful tools to develop leaders. This theme should also be added to the Force Field Analysis.

In summary, further analysis by the primary researcher identified three conditions that explain the initial apparent discontinuity between the LDM Force Field Analysis, the LDM-Manipulated figure, and the 2014 CASAL results. The LDM Force Field Analysis figure was qualitatively adjusted to more accurately and holistically represent the junior infantry officer leader development system. This new Force Field Analysis visualization can be characterized by how it depicted the relative weakness of driving forces as they
are currently being applied through Army leaders, the disproportionately low number but high strength of restraining forces, and the appropriate integration of the four themes identified by the primary researcher in chapter 2. Figure 27 depicts the adjusted qualitative Force Field Analysis.

![Figure 27. Qualitatively Adjusted LDM Force Field Analysis Figure](image)

*Source:* Created by author.

The qualitative adjustments made by the primary researcher in the figure above provided clarity is several ways.

First, the reader can see that the themes that the primary researcher identified in chapter 2 are strong background forces that facilitate each of the smaller, literature-based forces. Counterintuitively, these four themes should be thought of as applying on both...
sides of the diagram. This represents how each the themes simultaneously works to drive and restrain leader development, based on the effectiveness of Army leaders to apply the various published literature sources.

Secondly, the reader should see that themes 2 and 4 are in equilibrium, but that the restraining themes 1 and 3 display a strength advantage. In their restraining form, the primary researcher qualitatively assessed restraining 1 and 3 as over-powering their reciprocal driving force themes. The primary researcher assesses that this imbalance of themes 1 and 3, in favor of restraining, was the root for the primary researcher’s initial misunderstanding of the system. These two restraining themes allow the Great Man Theory and smaller restraining forces to effectively over-power all of the other nineteen driving forces, despite being numerically inferior. This imbalance results in the ineffectiveness of the current junior infantry officer development system.

The primary researcher’s second Force Field Analysis helped account for all of the literature forces more holistically, as well as the larger themes within the junior infantry officer leader development system. This analysis supports the idea that leaders interested in improving leader development in the junior infantry officer leader development system should tailor their proposed solutions in ways that both mitigate identified restraining forces, and leverage or seek to improve the effectiveness of the driving forces. Additionally, these leaders should focus their efforts on overcoming themes 1 and 3, which are currently superior restraining themes. Simultaneously, leaders should work to develop ways to tip the themes in equilibrium, themes 2 and 4, in favor of driving forces. Likewise, the primary researcher will take these conclusions into
consideration, when starting to develop possible solutions to the primary research question.

The primary researcher will continue to analyze and reflect on these themes and models in order to propose final conclusions to all four of the supporting research questions and help make recommendations to address the primary research question and proposals for future study in chapter 5. Next, however, the primary researcher discussed some of the difficulties that were encountered in the course of this study.

**Difficulties Encountered during this Study**

In the course of this study, the primary researcher encountered many challenges, but only the two most taxing challenges are reviewed here. The two challenges are similar and closely related to one another. What follows next is a focused review of these two difficulties.

The first challenge was the requirement to rely on existing Army research. Although the 2014 CASAL was an invaluable resource for the primary researcher, the survey was also somewhat limiting in that it only provided data and findings based on the questions developed by the CASAL designers. These were good questions, but they understandably did not specifically address the primary researcher’s questions. This made it difficult for the primary researcher to directly translate the data and findings from the 2014 CASAL into the original visualization models. This brings the reader to the second major issue.

The second major issue that the primary researcher faced during this study was in making logical qualitative judgements. At times, the primary researcher was internally-conflicted about how to justify or present sound qualitative models and findings. This
was because the primary researcher did not have original human-subject research survey data and did not want to transition the study to a quantitative methodology. As such, the primary researcher was required to find a way to conduct logical qualitative analysis, relying only on pre-existing survey data.

In chapter 3, the primary researcher overcame both of these challenges by using some basic math calculations as a method to better facilitate the qualitative analysis of the literature resources and CASAL data. Additionally, the primary researcher relied on a decade of personal and professional experiences as an Active Duty infantry officer, and his role as the principle data collection method, to help make informed, sound, qualitative judgements. Next, the primary researcher will review the analysis from this chapter and transition to chapter 5.

Conclusions

The primary researcher conducted a qualitative analysis of the literature resources reviewed in chapter 2. The findings of this qualitative analysis helped the primary researcher address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains? This qualitative analysis took place in two phases.

In the first phase, the primary researcher used the LDM to conduct a qualitative analysis of the junior infantry officer leader development system in order to visualize and make meaning of the system, in terms of leader development effectiveness. The primary researcher accomplished this by qualitatively analyzing the literature resources reviewed in chapter 2. The results of the LDM analysis supported the idea that the junior infantry leader development system is not functioning with ideal effectiveness. Also, the primary
researcher identified evidence that supported the idea that the self-development domain was the least effective leader development domain, followed by, institutional, and then the operational domain.

In the second phase of the qualitative analysis, the primary researcher conducted a Force Field Analysis. The primary researcher was initially confused by this first set of Force Field Analysis results, because they did not initially seem to support the other models, or the CASAL data. After more analysis, the primary researcher identified three conditions, including the four themes identified in chapter 2 used to qualitatively adjust the Force Field Analysis.

As a result of the analysis described in this chapter, the primary researcher developed a deeper understanding and clarity of the junior infantry officer leader development system. The primary researcher’s revised qualitative analysis found that themes 1 and 3—confusion about leadership theories and complexity of the established Army leader development system—were both stealthy, yet superior restraining forces. These foundational restraining forces likely exacerbated the restraining force of the Great Man Theory, and reduced the over-all effectiveness of the junior infantry officer leader development system. These themes and subsequent forces could be mitigated in order to improve junior infantry officer leader development.

The primary researcher also concluded that themes 2 and 4—the centrality of unit commanders and centrality of feedback mechanisms—were also forces within the system, but that both of these forces appeared to be in a state of equilibrium with their driving-force reciprocal. These two themes could be tipped in favor of driving forces in order to improve junior infantry officer leader development.
Together, the primary researcher’s qualitative analysis helped to identify barriers
to effective leader development, which in turn provided focus areas and
recommendations to help address the primary research question. The primary researcher
will apply these findings in chapter 5 in order to propose final conclusions to all four of
the supporting research questions and help make recommendations to address the primary
research question: how can Army leaders leverage the existing ALRM and administrative
practices, across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains in
order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?
CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Implications

Introduction

Through the course of this study, the primary researcher conducted a thorough investigation into the junior infantry officer leader development system. The purpose of this study was to answer the primary research question: how can Army leaders leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?

The primary researcher addressed this question by providing background information and context in chapter 1, and by applying a qualitative literature review and semi-structured interview methodology in chapter 2. Critical to this chapter was the primary researcher’s identification of four major themes found throughout the literature resources.

In chapter 3, the primary researcher described the research methodology used throughout this study. Critical to chapter 3 was the primary researcher’s description of the two qualitative visualization models used to help the reader visualize the current effectiveness of the junior infantry officer leader development system and the forces at work within the system. Additionally, the primary researcher established himself as the principle data collection and analysis mechanisms used to support this study. This is significant because these roles allowed the primary researcher to apply holistic
understanding of the literature, along with ten years of professional experience, to make informed qualitative assessments, conclusions, and recommendations.

The two qualitative visualization models the primary researcher used to analyze the data and findings presented in this study were a scaled Venn diagram (LDM) and Force Field Analysis (LDM Force Field Analysis figure). Additionally, the primary researcher applied the four themes identified in chapter 2 throughout the qualitative analysis processes. The primary researcher presented these results in chapter 4. What follows is a sequential presentation of the findings and conclusions regarding the following topic areas:

1. Implications of this study
2. Qualitative literature themes
3. LDM conclusions
4. LDM Force Field Analysis conclusions
5. Conclusions to the four SRQs
6. Recommendations to address the primary research question
7. Recommendations for future study

What follows next is the primary researcher’s review of the implications of this study.

Significance and Implications of this Study

The primary researcher identified four implications from this study. The primary researcher introduced the first two implications in chapter 1, and identified the second two implications as a result of this study. The significance of the first two implications are related to the idea that senior Army leaders are likely to be very interested in the findings and recommendations presented in this study. These findings and
recommendations have the potential to help senior Army leaders to address other important issues facing Army leaders today. The significance of the second two implications are related to better understanding the underlying challenges related to improving the junior infantry officer leader development system.

The first implication was that improving junior infantry officer leader development could improve the readiness of Army forces, which is the number one priority of Army Chief of Staff General Milley. This implication still applies, and the results of this study should be disseminated to the appropriate Army leaders for consideration.

The second implication of this study was that developing leaders directly addressed ARCIC leaders’ AWFC Ten. AWFCs are challenges that effect soldiers and Army leaders. This second implication reinforced the first implication in that another group of important senior Army leaders are interested in addressing the problem with leader development in the Army. ARCIC leaders are interested in increasing combat effectiveness through solving AWFC Ten, therefore, ARCIC leaders would probably also be interested in the primary researcher’s findings presented in this study.

The third implication of the findings presented by the primary researcher in this study was the identification of the four themes within the junior infantry officer leader development system. The identification of these four themes was significant because the evidence provided by the primary researcher’s qualitative Force Field Analysis supported the idea that the four themes were likely the root sources of power for all of the driving and restraining forces. The primary researcher concluded that leaders interested in improving the junior infantry officer development, or officer development in general,
should consider doing two things. First, leaders should acknowledge and appreciate that the four themes exist, and that they act as foundational forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system. Secondly, leaders should develop their proposed improvements to the Army leader development system nested within the context of these four themes, similar to Army lines of effort.

The fourth implication of the primary researcher’s findings presented in this study was probably the most significant, and probably the most controversial. This was because the fourth implication related to the Army Value of Duty.

The fourth implication the primary researcher identified was directly related to theme 1—confusion about leadership theories. The implication of theme 1 related to the possibility that some Army leaders appeared to be unwilling to display the Army Value of Duty, as indicated by evidence that some officers failed to develop junior officers in accordance with official Army doctrine, ARs, and administrative systems.

The primary researcher identified data from the 2014 CASAL, as well as the primary researcher’s professional observations, which supported the idea that some Army leaders, particularly unit commanders, may actually ascribe to the Great Man Theory. As such, the evidence the primary researcher observed supported the idea that some Army leaders may not be complying with the letter and/or intent of the competency-based, Skills Approach Theory-like, leadership theory presented in Army doctrine, ARs, and administrative systems.

This implication was particularly significant because it potentially represented a fundamental weakness within the Army officer corps, and provided concerning evidence that supported the idea that some Army officers may consciously disregard their duty to
abide by Army doctrine and administrative practices. If these Army officers were willing to disregard one portion of Army doctrine, then there is an increased possibility that may exist that these same officers may choose to disregard other Army doctrine or other senior Army leader guidance. If these Army leaders show a propensity to disregard published Army literature, in deference to their own personal beliefs, then Army leaders are likely to continue to face substantial restraining forces impeding junior infantry and officer leader development across the Army.

This concluded the primary researcher’s descriptions of the four major implications of the data and findings presented in this study. Next, the primary researcher reviewed and summarized the conclusions regarding the four themes described in chapters 2 and 4.

Qualitative Literature Themes

One of the primary researcher’s key findings reported in this study were the four themes identified through the course of the qualitative literature review and semi-structured interviews. The primary researcher noted in chapter 4 that these four themes were most likely the root sources of power that enabled each of the other, smaller, driving and restraining forces within the junior infantry officer leader development system. The primary researcher’s Force Field Analysis helped support the idea that the four themes could be visualized as simultaneous and inverse forces, and populated driving and restraining sides of the Force Field Analysis diagram. These themes functioned simultaneously and inversely to drive and restrain the system, and depended on how effectively Army leaders applied the Army leadership and leader development literature resources. The four themes that the primary researcher identified were:
Theme 1. Confusion about leadership theories.

Theme 2. The Centrality of unit commanders.

Theme 3. Complexity of the established Army leader development system.

Theme 4. Centrality of feedback mechanisms.

What follows next is a brief summary of the meaning and significance of each of the four themes.

Theme 1. Confusion about leadership theories: As just described above, the primary researcher observed that there appeared to be conflict or confusion between published Army literature, and what Army leaders’ behaviors indicated that they believed about junior infantry officer leader development. Although the primary researcher did not find any direct references to the Great Man Theory in current Army literature, professional experiences as an Active Duty infantry officer led to an assessment that there were probably a significant number of Army leaders that personally ascribed to the Great Man Theory.

This observation stood in direct conflict with Army leadership and leader development doctrine and literature. The primary researcher assessed that this was a very powerful restraining force, and a barrier to improving junior infantry officer development.

Theme 2. The centrality of unit commanders: The primary researcher identified repeatedly that unit commanders were the primary actors responsible for applying many administrative or regulatory actions to develop junior infantry officers. These actions included tools like counselling, OER evaluations, or directing and inspecting unit leader development programs. The primary researcher identified ARs and DA PAMs as
contributing driving forces, but deeper analysis concluded that the unit commander was the essential driving force necessary to physically apply and enforce junior infantry officer leader development actions and programs in the real world.

Theme 3. Complexity of the established Army leader development system: The primary researcher’s qualitative literature review highlighted this theme throughout chapter 2. The primary researcher was awed by the sheer volume and complexity of literature resources that existed, regarding junior infantry officer leader development. The primary researcher concluded that conducting the in depth qualitative literature and semi-structured interviews were essential to developing one’s deep understanding of the junior infantry officer leader development system. The primary researcher noted that the effectiveness of the system to develop junior infantry officers was likely significantly restrained by some Army leaders’ un-intentional professional ignorance regarding the Army leader development literature resources. As a result, the primary researcher concluded that it was likely that many of the existing leader development tools and systems were not being applied, or were ineffectively being applied by Army leaders.

Theme 4. Centrality of feedback mechanisms: The primary researcher observed that there were many existing Commander-centric leader development tools, such as: counselling, OERs, AERs, mentorship, and the MSAF. The primary researcher’s review of non-military findings also supported the idea that these tools were very effective, widely-accepted means to develop leaders.

In general, the primary researcher provided evidence in this study that supported the idea that the four themes listed above were the strong background forces that facilitated and magnified the power each of the smaller, literature-based forces.
Additionally, the primary researcher concluded that these forces were most accurately visualized as both simultaneously driving and restraining the junior infantry officer development system.

These four themes could be equated to military lines of effort in a campaign plan, and provide Army leaders with a direction to apply their efforts to improve junior infantry officer development. The primary researcher concluded that Army leaders that desire to improve junior infantry officer leader development should frame their proposed solutions within the context of the four themes. Army leaders should also work to mitigate restraining forces, while strengthening driving forces. Next, the primary researcher addressed the LDM analysis and conclusions, developed as a result of the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4.

LDM Conclusions

The primary researcher used a scaled Venn diagram, labeled the LDM and LDM-Manipulated, as a meaning making model. The primary researcher accomplished this by drawing on the deep understanding of the junior infantry officer development system, gained through the qualitative literature review, semi-structured interviews, and ten years of personal and professional experience as an Active Duty infantry officer. Figure 28 below depicted the results of the qualitative analysis.
The figure above helped the reader visualize several conclusions. First, one can see how the over-all size of the LDM-Manipulated figure, and the size of the blue-shaded leader competency area are both smaller compared to the LDM-Balanced figure. Second, the figure showed how the primary researcher qualitatively visualized each domain of the ALDM, by means of the LDM figures, as performing below their theoretical effectiveness of 100 percent. Third, the figure supported the idea that the ALDM may not be functioning as effectively as possible, and the self-development domain was the least effective development domain.

This supported the idea that the self-development domain may be the domain that represents the largest barrier to effective junior infantry officer leader development. In turn, this supported the idea that improving the effectiveness of the self-development domain should be a top priority for Army leaders, possibly justifying increased
apportionment of resources and emphasis ahead of the other two domains. Next, the primary researcher provided conclusions regarding the Force Field Analysis.

**LDM Force Field Analysis Conclusions**

The primary researcher used Force Field Analysis, through the LDM Force Field Analysis figure, used as a change model, to identify, analyze, and address SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains? The primary researcher conducted two iterations of Force Field Analysis, due to incomplete understanding and confusing results that resulted from the first iteration.

The first round of Force Field Analyses yielded confusing results, and represented an incomplete understanding of the forces within the junior infantry officer development system. Figure 29 depicts the primary researcher’s first Force Field Analysis. The primary researcher was initially confused by these results because they did not appear to explain why so many driving forces failed to overpower the relatively small number of restraining forces.
The primary researcher concluded that the issues with the first round of Force Field Analysis was that it failed to properly account the four major themes identified in chapter 2. The primary researcher applied this correction and visualized the system more accurately as depicted in figure 30.

Figure 29. LDM Force Field Analysis Figure

Source: Created by author.
The qualitative adjustments made by the primary researcher in the figure above provided clarity in three ways.

First, one can see that the four themes were visualized as superior background forces, forces that facilitated and magnified each of the smaller literature-based forces. Additionally, the researcher visualized the four themes as simultaneous and reciprocal, and applied them on both sides of the diagram. These simultaneous, yet inverse, relationships represented how each of the themes worked to drive and restrain leader development, based on the effectiveness of Army leaders to physically apply the published literature sources.
Secondly, the figure supported the idea that themes 2 and 4 were in equilibrium, and that the restraining versions of theme 1 and 3 were visualized as superior forces. The primary researcher concluded that the restraining version of themes 1 and 3 allowed the Great Man Theory, and smaller restraining forces, to effectively neutralize the numerical superiority of the other nineteen driving forces. The primary researcher concluded that this counter-intuitive balance of forces was likely one of the major root causes for the observed imbalances in leader development domains and reduced effectiveness of the current junior infantry officer development system.

Lastly, the primary researcher’s Force Field Analysis figures supported the idea that leaders interested in improving junior infantry officer leader development should tailor their proposed solutions in ways that simultaneously mitigate restraining forces, and strengthen driving forces. Efforts and actions should be applied to overcome restraining themes 1 and 3, while simultaneously leveraging themes 2 and 4 to become driving forces.

Next, the primary researcher sequentially addressed a summary of each of the SRQs. This provided the reader with a consolidated understanding of these four topic areas, and it allowed the reader to better appreciate the primary researcher’s final recommended solution to the primary research question.

Conclusions to Supporting Research Questions

The primary researcher applied an indirect approach to help address the primary research question: how can Army leaders leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-development domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance? The
primary researcher developed and addressed four SRQs to help answers the primary researcher question piece-by-piece. Next, the primary researcher provided a focused review of the individual SRQs.

SRQ1—what is the ALRM? Through the qualitative literature review and semi-structured interviews, the primary researcher concluded that the ALRM is the leadership theory officially described in Army doctrine and leader development strategies, and supported by various Army administrative systems and ARs. The ALRM is most likely a hybrid combination of several leading civilian leadership theories, but it is most closely based on the civilian leadership Skills Approach Theory. This theory supports the idea that leaders can be developed through deliberate efforts, by improving a leader’s skills, or requirements.

The ALRM was defined further in Army doctrine, which broke these requirements into three attributes and thee competencies, each consisting of several sub-areas. Attributes are what leaders should be and know, and competencies are what the leaders must be able to do. Figure 31 depicted the ALRM.
SRQ2—what is the ALDM? The ALDM is the official leader development model provided in Army Doctrine 2015. Army leaders use the ALDM to develop leaders through three conceptual domains: operational, institutional, and self-development. Operational development takes place in physical Army units, as opposed to the institutional domain that develops leaders through a series of formalized Army schools. The last domain is self-development. The self-development domain is further refined through the ALDS, and consists of structured, guided, and personal self-development sub-areas. Based on expert interviews, the primary researcher concluded that only one of these three sub-areas, personal self-development, is currently functioning. This was due
to the failure of civilian contract support to deliver mission critical software for the other two sub-areas.

Additionally, figure 32 depicts the ALDM, and shows how leader development is theoretically supported by the three pillars training, education, and experience, all of which are grounded on the *Army Capstone Concept* as a foundation.

![ALDM Diagram](image-url)

*Figure 32. ALDM*

SRQ3—what are the Army’s administrative practices, regulations, and strategies that govern junior infantry officer leader development? The primary researcher addressed this SRQ in detail in chapter 2. As a result, the primary researcher concluded that table 4 best accounts for all of the governing administrative practices, regulations, and strategies.

Table 4. Administrative Practices, Regulations, and Strategies that Govern Junior Infantry Officer Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Leadership Doctrine</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRP 7-0, <em>Training Units and Developing Leaders</em></td>
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<td>ADP 6-22, <em>Army Leadership</em></td>
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<td>ADRP 6-22, <em>Army Leadership</em></td>
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<td>FM 6-22, <em>Leader Development</em></td>
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<td>ATP 6-22.1, <em>The Counseling Process</em></td>
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<tr>
<th>Army Leader Development Strategies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army Leader Development Strategy</td>
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<td>Maneuver Leader Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<th>Army Administrative Systems and Army Regulations</th>
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<tr>
<td>DA PAM 350-58, <em>Army Leader Development Program</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DA PAM 600-3, <em>Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 1-201, <em>Army Inspection Policy</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 350-1, <em>Army Training and Leader Development</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 600-20, <em>Army Command Policy</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 600-100, <em>Army Leadership</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 623-3, <em>Evaluation Reporting System</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AR 600-89, <em>General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Program</em></td>
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<tr>
<th>Official Army Websites and Institutional Instruction</th>
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<tr>
<td>IBOLC website</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCCC website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maneuver Self Study Program website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warrior University website</td>
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*Source:* Created by author.
SRQ4—what are the barriers to effective junior infantry officer leader development across the ALDM institutional, organizational, and self-development domains? The primary researcher addressed this SRQ in chapter 4, through the LDM and Qualitatively Adjusted LDM Force Field Analysis figure. These figures, along with supporting descriptions and findings, were already presented in the preceding sub-sections of this chapter. Therefore, the primary researcher will not repeat these findings. The reader should reference the sub-section concerning the LDM Conclusions, Force Field Analysis Conclusions, or chapter 4 for these specific findings. With a firm understanding of each of these four SRQs, the primary researcher addressed the primary research question in the next section.

Recommendations

Recommendations Addressing the Primary Research Question

Introduction to Recommendations as an Operational Approach

The primary researcher addressed the primary research question and problem statement by developing an operational approach. The primary researcher’s problem statement and primary research question are below.

Problem statement: infantry officers, captain and below, often lack critical technical, tactical, and leader skills, resulting in increased numbers of marginally performing leaders in charge of soldiers on a regular basis. This is due to the ineffectiveness of the ALDM to develop leaders through the military’s institutional, operational organizations, and self-development domains.

Research question: how can Army leaders leverage the existing ALRM and administrative practices, across the ALDM institutional, operational, and self-
development domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance?

To develop this operational approach, the primary researcher relied on a deep understanding of the current operational environment and current junior infantry officer leader development, facilitated by the qualitative literature review and semi-structured interviews in chapter 2. The primary researcher used informed judgment and understanding, derived from the LDM, to help visualize the desired end state for the junior infantry officer leader development system. Next, the primary researcher applied the conclusions from the Force Field Analysis to identify barriers and restraining forces that needed to be overcome in order to reach the desired end state.

Lastly, the primary researcher applied the four major themes, deep personal understanding, and informed judgment to develop a holistic plan to transform the current state of the junior infantry leader development system into the desired end state. This required the primary researcher to recommend courses of action that could successfully overcome all of these barriers and restraining forces. The resulting product was the operational approach depicted in figure 33. What follows next are descriptions and explanations of the primary researcher’s operational approach and proposals for future study concerning this topic.

Recommendations as an Operational Approach

Figure 33 depicts the operational approach developed by the primary researcher. The operational approach figure below consists of many pieces of information, each with their own significance and source within this study. The primary researcher will explain each of them next.
Starting at the left side of the operational approach figure, one can see the familiar image of the LDM-Manipulated scaled Venn diagram from chapter 4. The primary researcher visualized the current effectiveness of the junior infantry officer leader development system through this figure. Of note, the reader can see the primary researcher assigned a priority ranking to each of the three ALDM domains. This ranking reflects the primary researcher’s LDM-Manipulated analysis, and prioritizes improvement efforts for each domain. The primary researcher listed the self-development domain first because it was assessed as the least effective development domain.

On the far right side of figure 33, one can see the familiar image of the LDM-Balanced figure from chapters 3 and 4. This figure depicts how the primary researcher...
visualized the desired end state effectiveness for the junior infantry officer leader development system. Note, the primary researcher added a brief narrative in bold text, describing some additional end state conditions. Also of note, the primary researcher added the three sub-areas of the self-development domain as described in the ALDS.

In the middle of the figure, one can see the four blue arrows, pointing from left to right, each dotted by a set of numbered circles. The blue arrows represent the four powerful underlying themes that the primary researcher identified in chapters 2 and 4. These four themes represent the lines of effort that the primary researcher recommends that Army leaders use to efficiently apportion their efforts and resources, in order to move from the current state to the desired end state. The primary researcher concluded that applying the four themes as lines of effort made the most sense, due to the findings of the Force Field Analysis in chapter 4. The primary researcher concluded that efforts to improve the junior infantry officer system should be made within the context of these four themes, and lines of effort best described this concept. Later in this chapter, the primary researcher will describe how these four lines of effort can be leveraged across all three of the ALDM domains.

The numbered white circles represent intermediate objectives that need to be accomplished in order to achieve the over-all end state. Each of the numbered objectives are summarized through brief text narratives located below the arrows. Note that several of the objectives are listed on multiple lines of effort. This represents the understanding that these objectives are achieved through multiple lines of effort, simultaneously, and synergistically. Efforts to achieve multiple objectives can apply to addressing other objectives simultaneously. This also supports a holistic mindset, where they entire junior
infantry officer leader development system is interconnected. What follows next is a description of how these four lines of effort and twelve objectives can be leveraged across all three of the ALDM domains in order to improve junior grade infantry officer leader development and performance.

The self-development domain is the primary researcher’s top priority for improvement. Objectives 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 all directly support the self-development domain, but objectives 8 and 9 are the most important. This is because these two objectives help the most to allow the three sub-areas of the self-development domain to become fully functional. Objective 9—update Army doctrine to reflect the ALDS description of structured, guided, and personal self-development, will allow leaders and subordinates to engage in more effective dialogs about these sub-areas, develop IDPs, and ensure that leader self-development takes place as designed. The most important action concerning this domain is objective 8—reduce contractor support, use DL and TRADOC instructors to develop content, facilitated by DL and Warrior University.

Objective 8 is the most important to improving the self-development domain, because it removes a major barrier, unnecessary civilian contractors, from the system. Evidence supports the idea that these civilian contractors have already caused the self-development domain to function at less than one-third capacity since 2015 when they were supposed to have delivered the on-line structured and guided self-development software. The primary researcher recommends removing these contractors entirely and using existing institutional domain instructors, Active Duty soldiers and officers, to develop the necessary course material and learning assessments now. This would maximize output and minimize new costs.
The instructors could be resourced from each of the various institutional and unit-run infantry skill school houses found around the Army. These instructors would be tasked an additional duty to develop detailed PowerPoint classes for each of the nine different types of infantry formations. These instructors would develop and proof the PowerPoint classes, and ensure they are uploaded into the Warrior University digital library. PowerPoint classes would be most effective because they can be downloaded and used off-line in austere environments, versus the live-streaming content currently being designed by the civilian contractors. Unit leaders would be used to correct lesson learning assessments. This would provide an additional opportunity for operational leaders to engage in mutually beneficial developmental dialogs and interactions between rater and subordinate, facilitating development further.

The negative impacts of this effort would probably be minimal, and would most likely be outweighed by the numerous benefits. This is because these schools probably have existing course material that would already fulfill this requirement. TRADOC leaders would synchronize the efforts, while DL leaders would provide assistance, supporting unity of command. The final digital library and knowledge management expertise would be facilitated and published through the Warrior University website.

The end result would be a complete digital library, logically organized, and titled in accordance with each of the nine types of infantry formations. This digital library would be linked to all institutional school websites under a common Infantry Leader Self-Development tab. This digital self-development library could simultaneously support the operational domain by providing operational unit leaders with ready-made products to
support their unit leader development programs. Next, the primary researcher will explain how the operational approach could be leveraged across the institutional domain.

The institutional domain is supported by at least three objectives, Objectives 5, 6, and 8. Of these three objectives, 5 and 8 are most important. The primary researcher just described objective 8 in detail, so will only re-state that objective 8 will leverage existing Active Duty soldiers to provide low-cost, high-quality, digital lesson materials in support of both the institutional and self-development domains. Objective 5—increase ALDM and ALRM instruction time at IBOLC and MCCC, particularly at all commander pre-command courses, is the most important objective concerning the institutional domain.

Objective 5 is critical to the institutional domain because the evidence reviewed throughout this study shows that unit commanders are the most important individuals in the junior infantry leader development system. Likewise, these commanders are educated through institutional schools, thus the quality of the education provided through these schools is almost equally important. By increasing the quantity and quality of leader instruction taught at institutional schools, Army leaders will better understand the Army leader development literature and be better prepared to apply it as platoon leaders and company commanders. As noted, instruction at pre-command courses of all levels is essential. Unit commanders drive individual and unit leader development programs. Without the proper education and indoctrination of Army leader development literature, unit commanders may fall back on their own personal leadership beliefs, possibly even the detrimental Great Man Theory.

Lastly, the operational domain is specifically supported by objectives 10, 11, and 12. As described above, the operational domain will also benefit from objective 8 and its
corresponding digitally-based, self-development library. All three of the objectives support the operational domain through operational commanders. Unit commanders are the individuals that are most responsible for applying both the letter and intent of objectives 10, 11, and 12. If unit commanders fail to properly conduct their counselling using ALRM terminology, IDPs, MSAF, and mentorship discussions, then much of the value and benefits of Army leader development literature and systems is lost. In fact, this is what the primary researcher concluded is currently occurring, and is probably one of the biggest problems within the junior infantry officer leader development system today.

The primary researcher acknowledges that the operational approach described above will not solve all of the problems concerning junior infantry officer leader development. Indeed, the primary researcher identified many areas that need additional emphasis, study, and/or corrective actions. Next, the primary researcher will describe five of these areas of future study.

Recommendations for Future Study

The primary researcher identified many interesting facts and pieces of evidence during the course of this study that could lead a researcher into several different topics of future study. However, the primary researcher developed a condensed list of the top five recommendations for future study regarding the topic of improving junior infantry officer leader development. What follows are brief descriptions of these five recommendations for future study.

The first recommendation for future study is focused on theme 1—confusion about leadership theories. The primary researcher recommends that Army leaders quantitatively study what percentage of Army leaders actually believe in the Skills
Approach Theory versus the Great Man Theory. A follow up question to support this study would be to research how many Army leaders believe developing subordinate leaders is a top priority, and if so, where do Army leaders rank leader development versus the competing priority to accomplish current operations. This study would be significant because it would help provide Army leaders with an objective idea of what other Army leaders really believe about Army leadership theories and leader development priorities. If Army leaders’ beliefs and priorities do not support current leader development literature and efforts, then Army leaders’ efforts to improve leader development systems will continue to struggle and resources will be wasted.

The second recommendation for future study is to research how many Army leaders have a deep understanding of Army leadership and leader development literature, particularly how Army doctrine is applied and enforced through ARs, DA PAMs, and other administrative systems. Again, a quantitative study would help provide senior Army leaders with an objective understanding of subordinate leaders’ understanding of Army leader development literature. This would in turn provide more clarity about whether problems with leader development exist because the literature is flawed, or if problems exist as more of a symptom of subordinate leader ignorance concerning Army leadership and leader development literature.

The third recommendation for future study is to investigate how Army leaders can better leverage multi-media resources to improve leader development. As described earlier, evidence shows that civilian contractors struggled to effectively support Army leader development with the timely delivery of software products. Additionally, the review of the four infantry-focused websites described in this study exposed the primary
researcher to many other internet-based training resources. Almost twenty sites are listed in the MLDS alone. The Warrior University website provides another large set of resources. Researchers should investigate this digital domain, specifically assessing knowledge management and ease of access. The reader may be aware of a common “three-click” rule some organizational leaders use to evaluate their websites. This theory, made popular in 2001 by Jeffrey Zeldman’s book, *Taking Your Talent to the Web: A Guide for the Transitioning Designer*, could be used to assess how easy and intuitive Army websites are to navigate. Researchers may also look to the Chaos Theory as the basis for this analysis as well.

The fourth recommendation for future study is to investigate if, and what type of incentives might be useful to help motivate Army leaders to more effectively support the letter and intent of the ALDM, ALRM, and other Army leader development literature resources. This study would be significant because motivating leaders of an all-volunteer force, in an era of persistent conflict, while faced with a lethal operational environment is a very valuable topic. Undoubtedly research regarding the motivation of Army leaders would have other widespread applicability beyond supporting junior infantry officer leader development. A study could also be done to assess how to leverage the Kotter Change Model to better gain more widespread support for the ALRM and ALDM.

The fifth and last recommendation for future study is to research how to improve the institutional domain’s effectiveness through its personal management system. Most

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people would agree that the value of an educational experience is often directly related to the quality of the instructor. Along this line of thought, researchers should study how Army leaders could increase the quality of institutional development by attracting the highest quality instructors. The primary researcher’s qualitative knowledge of this topic supports the idea that current assignment policies do not effectively incentivize IBOLC or MCCC instructor positions.

In fact, the primary researcher has seen some evidence that supports the idea that Project Warrior may actually be detrimental for an officer’s career. Project Warrior is a competitive program that selects high performing captains and assigns them to one of the Army’s major training centers, and then to a follow on assignment as a MCCC instructor. This may be due to the new OER profile system and the possible negative impacts that the 49 percent Most Qualified constraint may have on consolidated populations of top-performing officers. This may lead to Project Warrior participants’ major promotion board files artificially appearing weaker, as compared to non-Project Warrior participants who are often rated against lower performing peers than those in the Project Warrior rating pool.

This study could be expanded to review the non-commissioned officer (NCO) assignment policies. Currently, being assigned to IBOLC is not a good career progressing assignment for an NCO, like drill instructor or recruiter assignments are. Almost more important than selecting the right IBOLC officer instructors, selecting the right NCO instructors is a critical personnel assignment need.

NCO instructors are critical to junior infantry officer leader development because IBOLC NCOs most likely become the standard with which an officer will measure all
other NCOs, for the rest of that officer’s career. Unfortunately, the NCOs currently being
assigned to the IBOLC often create a terrible first impression in the minds of newly
commissioned infantry officers. These impressionable officers often make negative
judgments about the competency and quality of all NCOs, based on this poor, non-
representative sample. The findings of this study have impacts relating to trust between
officers and NCOs, which has rippling effects throughout the Army.

Conclusion

The primary researcher hopes that this study helped the reader develop a new and
deeper understanding of the junior infantry officer leader development system. The
primary researcher would like to reiterate the importance of the four themes within the
system, and the key roles they play in facilitating the application of junior infantry officer
leader development efforts and actions. Additionally, the primary researcher hopes that
the reader will think critically about the operational approach and findings described in
this study and apply them as effectively as possible in order to improve the competency
and combat effectiveness of all junior infantry officers.

The soldiers being led by junior infantry officers depend on their leaders’
competency for their very lives. Failure to properly develop junior infantry officers today,
will be paid for in combat by the blood of infantry soldiers tomorrow.
## APPENDIX A

### LITERATURE REVIEW RESOURCES AND SUPPORTED SRQS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>SRQ Supported</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading civilian leadership theories</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trait: Great Man Theory</td>
<td>Answer SRQ1-What is the ALRM?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingency Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transformational Leadership Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;For the Good or the Bad Interactive Effects of Transformational Leadership with Moral and Authoritarian Leadership Behaviors.&quot; Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 116, No. 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;From Where Will the Leaders Come?&quot; Journal of Education for Business, volume 69, Issue 4,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Leadership Competencies: Are we all saying the same thing?&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Qualitative visualization models used in this study</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Drawing Area-Proportional Venn and Euler Diagrams</td>
<td>Answer SRQ2-What is the ALDM?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venn Diagram</td>
<td>Answer SRQ4-What are barriers to effective junior Infantry Officer Leader development?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scaled Venn Diagram</td>
<td>Answer SRQ4-What are barriers to effective junior Infantry Officer Leader development?</td>
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<td>An experimental approach to organization Development (8th ed)</td>
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<td>Force Field Analysis</td>
<td>Answer Primary Research Question</td>
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<td><strong>Army Leadership Doctrine</strong></td>
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<td>ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders.</td>
<td>Answer SRQ1-What is the ALRM?</td>
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<td>ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership.</td>
<td>Answer SRQ2-What is the ALDM?</td>
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<td>FM 6-22, Leader Development.</td>
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<td><strong>Army Leader Development Strategies</strong></td>
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<td>Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS)</td>
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<td>Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS)</td>
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<td>DA PAM 350-58 Army Leader Development Program</td>
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<td>DA PAM 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management</td>
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<td>AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy</td>
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<td>AR 600-20 Army Command Policy</td>
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<td>AR 600-100 Army Leadership</td>
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<td>AR 623-3 Evaluation Reporting System</td>
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<td>AR 600-89 General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Program</td>
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<td><strong>Official Army websites and Institutional Instruction</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Existing Army and Civilian Leader Development Problem Research</strong></td>
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<td>June 2015 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL)</td>
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<td>Developing Cultures of Care: Military Medical Leadership,&quot; RAND Corporation</td>
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<td>Comparing Leadership Challenges Military vs. Civil Service.&quot; Center for Creative Leadership.</td>
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**Other Sources**
