The Customer Metaphor and the Defense Intelligence Agency

A Monograph

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**Abstract**
It is common in the intelligence community for agencies to refer to the policymakers and war fighters who use intelligence as their customers. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which was founded in 1961 over the resistance of the armed services and the Joint Staff, adopted and extended this metaphor as part of its bureaucratic survival strategy. DIA looked to the business world’s customer orientation paradigm for ways to focus the agency on satisfying the needs of policymakers in order to justify independence and resources. Yet a comparison between business literature and intelligence theory shows that the customer metaphor is in many ways highly inappropriate for the profession of intelligence. The profit motive inherent in the term customer means that intelligence leaders who use it as a metaphor highlight the cynical aspects of bureaucratic politics, with negative consequences for the agency’s credibility. Moreover, referring to intelligence users as customers connotes meanings that distort the subtle relationship between intelligence and policy. The mantra of customer orientation is to adopt the customer’s mindset as the business’s own, but the primary value of intelligence is the maintenance of an unbiased perspective independent of politics. Exercising the

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It is common in the intelligence community for agencies to refer to the policymakers and war fighters who use intelligence as their customers. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which was founded in 1961 over the resistance of the armed services and the Joint Staff, adopted and extended this metaphor as part of its bureaucratic survival strategy. DIA looked to the business world’s customer orientation paradigm for ways to focus the agency on satisfying the needs of policymakers in order to justify independence and resources. Yet a comparison between business literature and intelligence theory shows that the customer metaphor is in many ways highly inappropriate for the profession of intelligence.

The profit motive inherent in the term customer means that intelligence leaders who use it as a metaphor highlight the cynical aspects of bureaucratic politics, with negative consequences for the agency’s credibility. Moreover, referring to intelligence users as customers connotes meanings that distort the subtle relationship between intelligence and policy. The mantra of customer orientation is to adopt the customer’s mindset as the business’s own, but the primary value of intelligence is the maintenance of an unbiased perspective independent of politics. Excising the word customer from the vernacular of DIA would be a simple but important step to improve the professionalism of the agency’s analytic cadre.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CRM</td>
<td>Customer Relationship Management</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
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<td>Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
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Introduction: The Customer Metaphor and the Defense Intelligence Agency

Let me tell you about these intelligence guys. When I was growing up in Texas we had a cow named Bessie. I’d go out early and milk her. I’d get her in the stanchion, seat myself and squeeze out a pail of fresh milk. One day I’d worked hard and gotten a full pail of milk, but I wasn’t paying attention, and old Bessie swung her shit-smeared tail through the bucket of milk. Now, you know that’s what these intelligence guys do. You work hard and get a good program or policy going, and they swing a shit-smeared tail through it.

―President Lyndon Johnson

The relationship between intelligence analysts and the policymakers and warfighters who use intelligence is subtle and contradictory. On the one hand, analysts and their managers seek to establish close relationships with intelligence users in order to understand their requirements and tailor the analytic effort to be as relevant as possible to their decision making. On the other hand, intelligence professionals jealously guard their independence from policy, believing that their credibility and objectivity depend on a strict separation between the two spheres. Likewise, policymakers and warfighters value timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence in order to make decisions, and thus consistently seek more intelligence support. Yet they are likely to consider a formal intelligence assessment merely one out of many potential sources of information, and to discount it or try to change it if it conflicts with what they otherwise believe.

Conceptualizing and communicating this relationship is a fundamental job for the leadership of an intelligence agency. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) acknowledges the importance of the relationship with the intelligence user in its mission statement: “DIA is first in all-source defense intelligence to prevent strategic surprise and deliver a decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, and policymakers. We deploy globally alongside warfighters and
interagency partners to defend America’s national security interests.”¹ DIA’s “Strategic Statement” in the same document continues this theme, but refers to the “warfighters, defense planners, and policymakers” simply as DIA’s “customers.”

The use of the word *customer* in strategy and policy documents is not merely a matter of abbreviation, but a metaphor. Because the experiences of producing and receiving intelligence analysis are relatively uncommon, calling intelligence users customers helps describe those experiences in terms of more common ones. Linguists George Lackoff and Mark Johnson, in their 1980 book *Metaphors We Live By*, asserted “metaphors allow us to understand one domain of experience in terms of another.”² Metaphors in turn structure or even create reality, by highlighting some features of an experience while suppressing others, entailing related concepts, sanctioning actions, justifying inferences, and helping set goals.³

Yale history professor and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran Sherman Kent used metaphor in the same manner to explain intelligence analysis in his 1949 book *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. The operations of a national intelligence organization were a wholly new phenomenon in American public life since the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was formed in 1947, and they needed explaining. Kent used three metaphors to describe strategic intelligence organizations: a university faculty, a metropolitan newspaper, and a business. Like a university faculty, an intelligence organization must have talented personnel,

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³ Ibid., 141-143.
freedom of inquiry, and quiet libraries for working. Like a newspaper, the organization must have reporters, editors, deadlines, “hot sources” and speedy and sure communications to ensure timely and accurate delivery of information about events in the world. Finally, Kent wrote that like a business, “intelligence can be thought of…as an organization involved in the manufacture of a product (knowledge) out of raw materials (all manner of data) and labor…it must be packaged in a multitude of ways to suit the diversities of consumer demand.”

In the decades since Kent published his book, his third metaphor of intelligence as a business, with policy makers as customers, has gained primacy in the professional discourse of intelligence analysis. The CIA statement of “Vision, Mission, Ethos, and Challenges” lists “[fulfilling] our global mission to give customers decision advantage” as one of the agency’s five key challenges. Likewise, the National Security Agency (NSA) ends its website entry “About NSA” with the boast “our customers know they can count on us to provide what they need, when they need it, wherever they need it.” Even the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper tends to use the customer metaphor to describe intelligence, as he did in an October 2015 address on the intelligence profession, saying “we constantly work to get better, to be more precise and be more responsive to our customers, including ‘Intelligence Customer

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4 Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 74-76. Although contemporary marketing literature differentiates between customer as the person who buys a product and consumer as the person who ultimately uses it, Sherman Kent uses the terms as synonyms, and this monograph will also.


Number One,’ the President.”7 One tries in vain to find similar references to intelligence
organizations as university faculties or metropolitan newspapers.

Like its sister agencies, DIA has embraced the agency-as-business and intelligence user-
as-customer metaphors, and the agency’s publicly available strategic documents show the degree
to which they have structured the agency’s reality.8 In DIA’s strategic statement for 2012-2017,
published in 2011 when Lieutenant General Ron Burgess was director, DIA leaders pledged to
“apply performance management to maximize individual, team, and organizational performance
to ensure DIA services and products are timely and relevant to customer needs…based on
measureable outcomes.”9 The detailed description of performance management is replete with
business jargon, emphasizing streamlined processes, reduced redundancy, and performance
accountability with the goal of improving products and services. Managers are to be held
accountable for increasing efficiency while adapting “to the dynamic requirements of customers
informed by DIA fiscal realities.”10

7 James Clapper, “The Ethos and Profession of Intelligence” (remarks delivered at
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., October 27, 2015), accessed January 16,
interviews-2015/1278-remarks-as-delivered-by-dni-clapper-at-the-ethos-and-profession-of-
intelligence.

8 In order to remain unclassified, this research relies heavily on DIA’s official
publications, including historical documents released by the DIA History Office and DIA’s
publicly available strategy documents. The use of these documents assumes that the analysts and
managers of the agency read and internalize their language, but this is a reasonable assumption
since these documents are the official guidance for agency operations. Even if working-level
analysts are not all familiar with these strategic documents, one can assume that the managers
who do pay attention to policy statements repeat those documents’ language in their guidance to
subordinates, who internalize it second hand.


10 Ibid.
The inclusion of the clause about DIA’s fiscal realities is the first clue that metaphors derived from the business world are an inappropriate reference for an intelligence agency. In a true business, fiscal constraints are not imposed from without but are a function of the business’s success or failure in achieving its primary goal of maximizing shareholder value. Increased customer demand for goods or services is in fact a primary solution for fiscal challenges, rather than a problem to be solved creatively in the face of resource shortfalls. While an intelligence agency can use increased demand for its services to help justify its budget request to Congress, it cannot raise prices or seek outside investors to increase operating capital. Therefore, as much as DIA might look to the business world for strategies to improve its management practices, it exists in a world where normal microeconomic processes do not apply.

The question that guides this research is not whether business metaphors perfectly reflect the reality of DIA’s operations, but whether they are appropriate at all given the agency’s purpose and identity. DIA’s values and culture derive from principles that are unique to public service in general and the intelligence profession in particular. While treating intelligence users as valued customers makes sense from the standpoint of a bureaucratic entity fighting for relevance, doing so begs the question of how well the metaphor fits with the values of the intelligence profession. The importance and sensitivity of national security intelligence require strict standards of professional conduct. The stewardship of the profession is a critical obligation for DIA, and sets the agency apart from most private sector businesses. In consequence, any language that undermines those professional standards must be avoided.

In the private sector, satisfying customer demands is the best way to ensure profitability. The importance of doing so has led firms since the mid-20th century to adopt a customer

orientation, which means considering the perspective of the customer in every aspect of the business, not just advertising. Business thinkers see this approach as providing mutual benefits for all parties in a transaction, but critics contend that the profit motive prevents firms from ever truly identifying with their customers. Research on popular views of marketing shows the critical perspective is increasingly common in the public.

DIA cannot rely on audiences thinking only in terms of the positive aspects of customer when the agency uses it as a metaphor for policy makers and warfighters. For most Americans, the experience of being a customer can be considered what Lackoff and Johnson call a “basic domain of experience.” Such an experience is common enough within a culture that it provides a consistent palate of images that are called to mind when the basic domain is referenced as a metaphor for another domain. The power of metaphorical language is that it can create new meaning, as the listener extends the metaphor by considering how the properties of the basic domain apply to the target. This is an inevitable process, and so the question of the appropriateness of the customer metaphor for DIA must take into account all the meanings associated with the experience of serving customers and being a customer. Even if agency managers only intend to reference the earnest, positive connotations of customer, the nature of metaphorical language ensures that the term will also refer to the more cynical, profit-driven meanings.

This research relies on literature from several disciplines to explore the appropriateness of the customer metaphor for DIA. It draws on marketing theory and professional publications to define the meaning of customer orientation in the business world, tracing its development from the time of DIA’s founding in 1961 to the present. Next, it presents a history of the agency drawn from primary-source documents published by the DIA History Office and an excellent

12 Lackoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 117.
thesis by Elizabeth Jeszensky. In 1992, Jeszensky conducted interviews with a number of former
DIA directors and other senior officers to supplement the scant secondary literature available
about the agency’s history. Her resulting thesis is a valuable resource. This section also draws on
James Q. Wilson’s theory of bureaucratic politics to make sense of the historical record,
contextualizing the actions of DIA’s early leaders in terms of bureaucratic survival strategy.

Finally, this research relies on the academic and professional literature of the
intelligence community (IC) to establish the outlines of the relationship between intelligence and
policy worlds. This literature consists of books and articles written by a mix of academics, think-
tank researchers, and current and former intelligence officers—or individuals who have spent
time in each role. Much of this literature is focused on dissecting perceived intelligence failures
and recommending reforms in organization and practice to improve future outcomes. Almost
none of the literature is focused on semantic issues, although semantics is a critical aspect of
organizational culture and could be an important part of a program for improving the
performance of agencies like DIA. This monograph is an attempt to address this gap in the
current research.

The customer metaphor reflects DIA’s struggle to survive and thrive in the national
security bureaucracy, but it is antithetical to the values of the intelligence profession. Using
DIA’s published strategic and historical documents, this research shows that the metaphor is
embedded in the agency’s history and its struggle to find a permanent place in the government.
Nevertheless, referring to intelligence users as customers connotes meanings that are
inappropriate to the subtle relationship between analysts and users. In order to discover those
meanings, the next section will explore the marketing literature that defines customer
orientation, as well as some of the critical reactions that developed in symbiosis with marketing
concepts.

Competing Images of Customer Orientation

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Nationwide Insurance is currently conducting an advertising campaign centered around the slogan “Nationwide is on your side.” In a commercial called “Impersonal,” a man encounters indifferent customer service at a bank, a supermarket, and a coffee shop while a voice-over intones “It happens so often, you almost get used to it.” He crashes his car, and when the Nationwide insurance agent arrives and tells him “Relax, we’ve got this,” he is so relieved at the company’s good service that he hugs the agent! The commercial ends with the voice-over warmly telling viewers that “being put first takes some getting used to.”

This commercial illustrates the dualistic nature of customer orientation in the private sector. Companies want the public and their employees to believe that customer satisfaction is their first priority, since consumer spending is a critical driver of corporate success. Consumers, on the other hand, are increasingly conditioned by experience or by critical journalism and scholarship to believe that companies are impersonal entities who see them only as a source of revenue. Using the word customer as a metaphor necessarily brings to mind both images, and so this section of the monograph will chart the entwined development of both earnest and cynical meanings of customer orientation in order to understand the range of connotations inherent in the term.

The First (Earnest) Image of Customer Orientation

In the business world, concern for customer satisfaction migrated from the domain of marketing departments to a core management function during the first half of the 20th century. According to business historian Robert Bartels, writing in 1962, the rise of marketing represented a sea change in which businesses replaced their sole focus on seller interests in a

transaction with a concern for consumer interests and what he called a primary service motive.\textsuperscript{14}

In the process, business leaders increasingly saw marketing as good not only for the company but also for the consumer, whose quality of life improved when products were designed and sold with his needs foremost in mind. This earnest image of marketing, which has persisted through changes in management culture to today, is doubtless what Defense Secretary Robert McNamara had in mind in 1961 when he directed that “the Defense Intelligence Agency [would] service all consumers of defense intelligence in the Department of Defense and other government agencies.”\textsuperscript{15}

Standard marketing history locates the beginnings of modern marketing in the 1950s, when the marketing concept overtook sales as a guide to corporate distribution practices.\textsuperscript{16} As business professor Peter F. Drucker wrote in 1954, “marketing … is the whole business seen from the point of view of its final result, that is from the customer's point of view. Concern and responsibility for marketing must therefore permeate all areas of the enterprise.”\textsuperscript{17} For this reason, the marketing concept is also known as customer orientation.\textsuperscript{18} Marketers in the 1950s—

\begin{itemize}
  \item Bartels, \textit{A History of Marketing Thought}, 180.
\end{itemize}
in cooperation with government regulators—linked customer orientation to the necessity of maintaining public support for the capitalist system. According to historian Matthew Hilton, spreading a new standard of living based on manufactured goods to as much of the population as possible was a key part of the postwar domestic consensus. In this way, marketing was not just pro-consumer, it was pro-American.

The pro-marketing consensus was so firmly entrenched by 1962 that Bartels could claim without a hint of irony that “marketing thought,” along with government regulation and the consumer advocacy movement, had created an altruistic attitude among businesses in the United States. “The responsibility of business to customers,” he wrote, “has been epitomized by such sayings as ‘consumption is the end of production and distribution,’ and ‘The customer is always right,’ and ‘The consumer is King.’ Marketing…has made these concepts practical.” Nothing illustrated marketing’s practicality more than its linkages to the rational strategic planning techniques that were the cutting edge of 1960’s management. In that era, marketing was about quantifying demand across market segments and tailoring business processes to meet it and increase it. The Ford Motor Company, with Robert McNamara as chief executive officer, led


20 Bartels, A History of Marketing Thought, 209.

this charge. Ford blamed the 1957 flop of the Edsel on early marketing’s unscientific approach and sponsored reforms in business schools to modernize the field.22

Under the influence of the strategic planning paradigm, business schools through the 1960s and 1970s considered marketing a resource optimization problem. According to business professor Frederick Webster, marketing in the 60’s and 70s meant “allocating resources until marginal returns were equal across spending opportunities. If only the analyst could accurately estimate the demand curve, [he] could optimize each of the four Ps.”23 The four Ps—price, product, promotion, and place—form what is known as the marketing mix. The marketing mix is still the subject of basic marketing education, but the four Ps’ orientation on the business itself are also a symbol of the discipline’s drift from its customer-centric roots.24 Companies recognized this drift in the 1980s in the midst of the economic upheavals of oil shock, stagflation, foreign competition, and the boom in mergers, acquisitions, and vertical integration. As a result, they shifted their marketing focus from efficiency in product distribution to the management of relationships with customers.25


Customer Relationship Management (CRM) has since emerged as the dominant paradigm in contemporary marketing thought.26 Webster, who first defined CRM in 1992, wrote that in the new era, “customers become partners, and the firm must make long-term commitments to maintaining those relationships through quality, service, and innovation.”27 Using ever more powerful analytic tools and the increasing amount of data customers themselves produce through information technology, marketing organizations strive to personalize the experience of each customer in order to deliver exactly the product, service, and relationship he or she desires. According to a 2014 article in *Harvard Business Review*, companies spend $11 billion annually on CRM software in order to realize Drucker’s 1954 vision of customer needs forming the very foundation of business strategy.28 The idealists of the CRM approach believe the relationship mindset and powerful analytics will allow companies first to offer customers their desired relationship, and then to draw them ever closer into more valuable long-term partnerships.

When intelligence managers invoke the customer metaphor today, the CRM paradigm is what they have in mind. For example, consider the language used by Major General Michael Flynn in his highly influential 2010 article “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Work in Afghanistan.” Referring to the largely one-way information flow from soldiers on the


ground in Afghanistan to counterinsurgency analysts at headquarters and in Washington, the future DIA director wrote that “for [the soldiers], the relationship feels like all ‘give’ with little or nothing in return.”

As a solution, he proposed that “specially trained analysts must be empowered to methodically identify everyone who collects valuable information, visit them in the field, build mutually beneficial relationships with them, and bring back information to share with everyone who needs it.”

Those analysts would work in designated information centers, where they will “take whatever steps are necessary to convey information to customers.”

Thus modern management thought is reflected in some contemporary intelligence literature, which extends the customer metaphor to emphasize blurring the lines between producers and consumers and building mutually beneficial relationships between all parts of a networked organization. From this perspective, customer seems like a perfectly appropriate way to describe intelligence users. Yet, this idealized image of the relationship between a firm and its customers is not the only one that comes to mind when the word customer is used as a metaphor. A second, cynical image also exists, in which the relationship is transactional at best and manipulative at worst.

The Second (Cynical) Image of Customer Orientation

The idealist vision of customer orientation is not without its detractors. Customers who do not want a relationship with a firm often feel they are being manipulated by marketing, a


30 Ibid., 17.

31 Ibid., 19.
perspective echoed by postmodernist detractors who doubt the altruistic intentions of businesses. This cynical reaction to customer orientation developed in the American population in symbiosis with the marketing concept. In its most extreme form, the second image of the business-customer relationship is transactional, shallow, and one-sided, with businesses willing to say or do anything to part people from their money. To the cynics, the increasingly sophisticated methods by which companies now sense and respond to customer demands are nothing but increasingly sophisticated methods of manipulation. Managers in DIA who invoke the customer metaphor with the first image in mind, like their private-sector marketing counterparts, risk reminding employees and intelligence users of the second image, as well.

Consumer skepticism about businesses’ intentions grew in sophistication along with marketing techniques. This phenomenon began in the 1930s, with consumer rights’ groups battling marketers in Congressional hearings over product labeling. It reached new heights of popularity with the 1957 publication of Vance Packard’s book *The Hidden Persuaders*. A New York Times bestseller, the book highlighted the use of data-driven motivational research, which aimed to discover and exploit the psychological needs of consumers. Examples of ads in which fake doctors touted the health benefits of filtered cigarettes gave critics plenty of material with


which to paint companies as crass manipulators and customer orientation as a cynical ploy meant to generate demand, not just ensure demand is satisfied.34

Meanwhile, anti-consumerism bloomed in popular fiction and music. Works like the 1955 novel *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*, which was made into a 1956 film starring Gregory Peck, depicted marketing executives as dissatisfied sellouts struggling to find meaning at work or at home.35 The suburban home of the novel’s protagonist reappeared as a symbol for the bland monotony of manufactured life in works like the 1964 folk song “Little Boxes,” which portrayed suburbanites leaving their “ticky tacky” houses to become “doctors and lawyers and business executives” who are “all the same.”36 Given McNamara’s disregard for the anti-war sentiment of many of these same voices, it is unlikely he took countercultural critiques of the marketing concept very seriously when he was secretary of defense. DIA leadership does not necessarily have that same luxury today.

Since the rise of postmodernism, critiques of marketing’s manipulative power have grown in salience in popular culture. Wharton professor Edward Herman’s and MIT linguist Noam Chomsky’s 1988 book *Manufacturing Consent* alleged that governments and corporations use advertising to control news and other media in order to form public opinion in support of


established power interests. Benjamin Barber’s 1992 book *Jihad vs McWorld* predicted bloody wars of tribalization across the globe as disaffected nationalist and religious groups react to the pressures of globalized commerce. In 1999, Naomi Klein published *No Label*, taking marketers to task for using a veneer of corporate social responsibility to cover up capitalism’s worst abuses. Klein’s work became a rallying point for anti-globalization protesters, for instance at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings. All the aforementioned books were bestsellers, and each author remains a fixture of American cultural life.

Marketers have recognized the cynical trend in public reactions to their campaigns. Dr. Jagdesh Sheth, a marketing professor at Emory University renowned for his work on CRM and consumer behavior, said as much in his 2006 book *Does Marketing Need Reform? Fresh Perspectives on the Future*, co-edited with Dr. Rajendra Sisodia. Sheth concluded that “the side effects of marketing today overwhelm its intended main effects. It seems that the more a customer is marketed to, the more frustrated and irritated he or she becomes, and the more manipulated and helpless he or she feels.” The book cites a 2004 study by a marketing firm that found since 1964 the percentage of those holding a negative opinion towards advertising had risen from 14 percent to 36 percent, and those holding a positive opinion dropped from 41


percent to 28 percent. Since that book was published, customers have found a way of tuning out advertising, at least online. A 2015 study by online advertisers PageFair and Adobe found that 45 million US internet users installed software to block advertising online, costing an estimated $10.7 billion in lost revenue for marketing firms. Of those surveyed who did not use adblocking software, 50% said they would consider doing so out of concern for how companies misuse their personal data. This is a direct effect of CRM personalization efforts.

The Two Images of Customer Orientation

As the marketing concept and the critiques level against it have evolved since the 1950s, there has formed a mirror image in which the virtues touted by earnest marketers are recast as vices by cynical observers. Marketers’ quest to discover and cater to the desires of individuals in increasingly segmented categories has led to the widespread adoption of CRM as a philosophy and a tool. Savvy consumers have in turn grown increasingly aware of marketing techniques and wary about companies’ claims. The two images of customer orientation that have grown out of this interaction are summarized in the table below:

Table 1: The Two Images of Customer Orientation

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<th>The First (Earnest) Image</th>
<th>The Second (Cynical) Image</th>
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Marketing theorists have responded to these critiques by reminding their readers that the foundational premise of customer orientation means that managers must advocate for customer needs within the business at the same time as they advocate the business to customers.\(^43\) Managers who maintain their focus on customer needs and desires in the face of pressure to seek short-term increases in value for the firm will be rewarded with customer loyalty, higher morale, a looser regulatory climate, and consistently higher profits.\(^44\) The organizational benefits—specifically, profit—of customer orientation are naturally the reason why firms adopt the marketing concept.\(^45\) As the next section of the monograph will demonstrate, DIA’s adoption of the customer metaphor in 1961 and the agency’s continued use of it today are manifestations of the same desire to meet organizational goals by focusing on meeting the needs and desires of intelligence users.

**DIA’s Use of the Customer Metaphor is a Consequence of Bureaucratic Imperatives**


\(^{45}\) Borna and Stearns, “The Philosopher is Not Always Right,” 40.
A fundamental principle of intelligence work is that intelligence can only make a difference to national security if decision makers pay attention to it. Intelligence professionals cannot ensure that intelligence users will take their work seriously, but they can make that outcome more likely by making their analysis as relevant and timely as possible. Doing so requires an intimate knowledge of policy makers and the decisions they face. Sherman Kent recognized the importance and sensitivity of this question in 1949, when he wrote “intelligence cannot serve if it does not know the doers’ minds; it cannot serve if it has not their confidence; it cannot serve unless it can have the kind of guidance any professional man must have from his client.”46 For this reason, analytic managers in particular spend a great deal of time studying policy debates and the decision makers engaged in them in order to make their work as relevant as possible.47 In the process, the most successful managers become “expert bureaucratic in­fighters—mainly against other IC agencies and competing parts of their own organizations.”48

At the organizational level, leaders must prove the agency’s value to the national security establishment in order to survive the vicissitudes of federal budgeting, IC reform, and military restructuring. Agency leaders do so by cultivating relationships with policymakers to convert them into constituents who will support the agency in budget battles and other power struggles. According to organization theorist James Q. Wilson, finding a constituency is key to a successful government executive’s strategy.49 Wilson observes that these executives’ external

46 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 182.


orientation—the time spent “currying favor and placating critics”—differentiates them from their private-sector counterparts and often leads them into conflict with subordinates in their agencies who are less conscious of the power dynamics at play. This outward-looking dynamic is analogous to the customer orientation prescribed by the marketing concept, and has been the key driver of DIA’s embrace of the customer metaphor.

DIA Struggled to Find a Place in the Bureaucracy

DIA is especially sensitive to the pressure to find a constituency, because the agency was founded over the objections of the military services and had to compete with them and with other intelligence agencies for bureaucratic survival. At its founding, the agency’s key constituent was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and so DIA’s first leaders adopted McNamara’s management practices as their own. The focus of these practices was on strategic planning and gaining efficiency, and thus so was DIA’s. Within a decade of its founding, it was clear that the expected efficiency gains had not materialized, so the agency’s leadership adopted a renewed customer orientation in order to prove the organization’s value. The end of the Cold War and the information technology revolution have since made the need for customer orientation even more acute, as relevant data are today likely to be unclassified and immediately available to policy makers to discover on their own. DIA now has to compete for the attention of decision makers not only against other all-source intelligence agencies like CIA or State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but against other sources of information such as news media, think tanks, and lobbyists.

50 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 205.

DIA’s foundational documents show the degree to which McNamara’s efficiency-minded understanding of government management shaped the new agency. In the 8 February 1961 memo to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Lyman Lemnitzer that directed DIA’s establishment, McNamara directed that “provision should be made for identification of total intelligence and counterintelligence costs in the Department of Defense irrespective of where such expenditures might be made.”

A 5 July 1961 memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick to the service secretaries and CJCS stated that although “the principle objectives” of DIA’s establishment were increasing the overall capacity and unity of effort in DOD intelligence, “certainly not of lesser importance are the objectives of obtaining a more efficient allocation of scarce intelligence resources, more effective management of all DOD intelligence activities, and the elimination of all duplicating facilities, organizations, and tasks.”

Likewise, the implementing directive of 1 August 1961 named as a responsibility of the new agency “to achieve the maximum economy and efficiency in the conduct and management of all Department of Defense intelligence activities.”

This focus on integration and prioritization was a direct echo of McNamara’s work in the private sector and for the military during World War II. As historian Lawrence Freedman notes, McNamara considered his work for the Army Air Corps, Ford Motor Company, and the Defense Department as parts of a unified project, in which he and his “Whiz Kids” would show that centralized planning guided by rigorous analysis could increase efficiency and guide


strategic decision making in any organization. His establishment of DIA was small part of his larger struggle to bring rational planning to the Department of Defense, which he saw as marked by inefficiency and uncertain effectiveness caused by the parochial interests of multiple services with their own budgets and uncoordinated strategic priorities.

McNamara’s management of the Defense Department—and especially the war in Vietnam—was a target of intensive criticism beginning even before he left office. In Freedman’s words, “it became a truism that McNamara’s methods were inappropriate for fighting a war, especially one as politically complex as Vietnam, and failure here sullied his reputation forever.” Rational planning as an organizational management technique is far from entirely discredited in business or government, however. DIA’s current strategic plan pays homage to the secretary who founded the agency when it states “DIA will use all relevant data to evaluate and invest in programs that yield output tied to strategic objectives.” The missing element in the 1960s conception of rational planning was the acknowledgement that human involvement in strategy limited its potential rationality. Among those human effects that McNamara and DIA’s early leadership underestimated was the desire among government and military executives to maintain maximum autonomy, which Wilson refers to as turf.

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58 Rosenzweig, “Robert S. McNamara,” 93.


60 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 180.
The turf battles engulfed DIA from the moment General Lemnitzer received the February 1961 memo. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stridently opposed the creation of a unified military intelligence organization, arguing that the mission impacts of not having tailored intelligence support for each service would outweigh any efficiency gains DIA could achieve. After much back-and-forth, the services and the secretary agreed that DIA would report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) through the JCS, and would be responsible for the review and coordination all DOD intelligence functions, including those belonging to the military departments, in addition to the control of intelligence resources assigned directly to DIA. “Review and coordination” of the military departments’ intelligence activities was a weakened version of the original formulation “coordinate and supervise,” and of course involved no budgetary authority.

The military services’ fight to retain autonomy over intelligence functions was a replay on a smaller scale of their 1940’s fight to remain independent, which Wilson uses as his primary example of executives’ defense of turf. The hallmark of this tendency is a reasonable desire to control mission-essential capabilities rather than rely on other entities, in order to ensure they are available exactly how and when they are needed. Intelligence support was just such a mission-essential capability. The result for DIA was, in Elizabeth Jeszensky’s words, a “frustrating


64 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 185-188.
evolution” in which the agency was a constant target of criticism and repeatedly faced disbandment over its inability to achieve the efficiency gains its founders envisioned. Gilbert Fitzhugh, chairman of the 1970 “Blue Ribbon Defense Panel” report prepared for President Richard Nixon, for instance, found that the intelligence staffs of each service had grown since the establishment of DIA.

Customer Orientation: the Key to Cultivating a Constituency

More damning than DIA’s failure to achieve efficiencies was its failure to provide useful intelligence input to policy makers whom the agency nominally supported. According to the 1976 report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee), “Secretaries of Defense and other key DOD officials have frequently looked to other intelligence sources rather than to DIA. For example, Robert McNamara relied heavily on the CIA; Melvin Laird sought analyses from the Defense Department’s Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering; and James Schlesinger used a special Net Assessment Group.”

Lacking the statutory authority to improve strategic planning or budgetary efficiency in defense intelligence, DIA focused instead on improving its customer service, especially for its primary bureaucratic constituency in OSD. This process actually began as early as 1969, when


67 Quoted in Fain, et al, The Intelligence Community, 138.
DIA engaged RAND Corporation to conduct a study to help improve the agency’s “consumer relations.” According to Jeszensky’s interviews with intelligence officers who worked at DIA at the time, RAND found that the agency “did not do a good job selling itself” or understanding its customers’ needs. The think tank helped DIA leaders refine its understanding of what products each intelligence user needed, much in the same way that marketing firms help companies understand and sell to various market segments.

The various internal and external efforts to improve DIA’s effectiveness led to the issuance in 1977 of a revised DOD Directive 5105.21, which contained a mission statement and a more specific list of responsibilities. The new mission statement makes the agency’s customer orientation clear: “The mission of the DIA is to satisfy, or to ensure the satisfaction of, the foreign intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD components and other authorized recipients, and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence.” The list of responsibilities was notable for the absence of any reference to efficiency; the word duplication appeared only in terms of making copies of imagery.

One of Jeszensky’s interviews demonstrates how DIA executives used customer orientation and to help find a constituency. Lt. Gen. James Williams, DIA director from 1981 to 1986, decided to shift the agency’s priority from support for OSD to support for the JCS. He explained his decision in part as a function of his closer personal relationship with the Chairman

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69 Ibid., 83.
than the SECDEF, but also in terms of bureaucratic imperatives. His primary reason was that the influence of the unified and specified commands had grown within the military in 1980s, so Williams felt that increasing his support to the uniformed command structure would increase DIA’s influence, as well. After passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act further increased the power of the JCS and defined DIA as a “combat support agency,” DIA leadership gave even higher priority to meeting the operational requirements of the military commands.71

DIA leaders struggled to find the right balance of support for OSD and JCS throughout the 1980s. Tellingly, they referred to this challenge as a “customer relations problem.”72 The challenge of prioritizing customers serves to underscore the degree to which the agency had embraced the customer orientation. Support for intelligence users, rather than efficiency or rational planning, became the primary justification for agency management decisions in the 1980s, and remains so today. DIA was rewarded for its bureaucratic finesse in 1992, when DIA became directly responsible for managing the General Defense Intelligence Program budget.73

That DIA’s efforts to embrace a customer orientation were effective in gaining a strong constituency is evident in another Congressional commission report on intelligence reform. The 1996 Aspin-Brown Commission report stated the following about DIA:

Substantive analytical support for the Secretary [of Defense], his staff, and the Unified Commands is provided principally by the Defense Intelligence Agency


73 Ibid., 103-104 and 123-124. Under the 1977 directive, the DIA director chaired the board that managed the General Defense Intelligence Program. The staff charged with planning and programming GDIP was independent of DIA, however, and answered to the Services, the JCS, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. The 1992 reform abolished this separate staff, bringing direct management of the GDIP budget to DIA itself.
(DIA), whose Director is appointed by, and reports to, the Secretary…. Today, DIA supports the Secretary and his staff by providing substantive intelligence support for the execution of many of their key functions, from decisions regarding the use of military force, to major acquisition decisions, and to their dealings with foreign counterparts.  

The Customer Metaphor Makes Bureaucrats Appear Cynical

Like many private-sector firms, DIA has faced criticism from those in the public and the government who think customer orientation is a cynical ploy. The agency’s awkward positioning between the JCS and OSD put it at the epicenter of fights over Soviet capabilities and the related struggles for resources among the services and between the military and civilian leadership in the Executive and Legislative branches. In a 1970 article for The Washington Journal entitled “The Culture of Bureaucracy, DIA: Intelligence to Please,” former DIA and CIA analyst Patrick McGarvey recounted how when he worked for the agency, the armed services’ leadership would routinely request DIA emphasize or de-emphasize certain aspects of intelligence reporting in support of parochial interests. DIA’s managers, who were mostly military officers, would comply, and would often even self-censor production in anticipation of those desires. The implication of the article was that by striving to please the agency’s bureaucratic constituency, DIA officers skewed their analysis. McGarvey’s proffered solution was to make DIA a completely civilian organization that answered only to OSD. He neglected the question of whether doing so would simply make the agency beholden to the policy priorities of the civilian defense leadership instead of the military.


These criticisms echo the typical charges leveled against bureaucratic organizations, particularly those who make and implement foreign policy. The most reasonable of those critics, like Morton Halperin, describe individuals doing their best to advance the country’s national security interests, but who are nonetheless influenced mightily by personal and organizational biases in their perception of those interests.76 Less generous observers are inclined to accuse government executives of working to increase their own power and that of their agencies by seeking influence regardless of the consequences for the country.77

The cynical connotations of customer orientation in the private sector, described in the previous chapter, have the potential to increase listeners’ tendency to attribute cynical bureaucratic motives to leaders who use the customer metaphor to describe DIA operations. The popular understanding of marketing differs from the academic concept, by emphasizing companies’ efforts to convince customers to buy products rather than companies’ work to discover and meet customer needs. Likewise, the cynical understanding of bureaucratic politics emphasizes executives’ efforts to increase their personal power, rather than their need to cultivate a constituency in order to fulfill their earnest organizational mission.

Marketing apologists in the private sector respond to accusations of cynicism by emphasizing firms’ reliance on customer goodwill and reminding managers they need to make an earnest effort to put customer desires first in order to ensure the long-term health of their

76 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), 16. For an example of these struggles over intelligence and procurement, see the anti ballistic missile systems fights of 1966-67 that form the opening and closing vignettes of Halperin’s work.

77 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 115. Wilson calls this the typical accusation leveled at bureaucrats, and refutes it in his examination of the constraints and conflicts inherent in government management.
business. Marketing guru Alan Mitchell made such as argument in a 2001 article in *Marketing Week*, in which he wrote that to counter public distrust, companies had to “reverse the flow of information at the heart of marketing,” by re-defining marketing’s purpose as listening to customers, not talking to them. Doing so “demands that corporations cede their monopoly control over marketing, to give consumers even more power.”78 As the next section demonstrates, the values of objectivity and policy independence that are central to the intelligence profession make such an approach wholly inappropriate for DIA.

**The Customer Metaphor Distorts the Policy/Intelligence Relationship**

It is clear that DIA leaders would want to avoid the negative associations of the customer metaphor. Even the earnest image of customer orientation, however, can be problematic for the intelligence profession. This is because adopting a customer orientation threatens the red line that separates the spheres of policy and intelligence. Intelligence theory and doctrine posit a separation is necessary to insulate intelligence officers from policy maker demands that they reach particular conclusions, and to prevent intelligence officers from advocating particular policies.79 Transgressions of the red line, called *politicization* in professional literature, damage the credibility of intelligence analysis and reduce its value. By encouraging analysts to adopt an ever closer identification with the needs and desires of intelligence users, the customer orientation muddles the separation that prevents politicization.


Sherman Kent outlined the need for this separation in *Strategic Intelligence* in 1949. In the ideal relationship, he wrote, “intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be too close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgment.”\(^{80}\) If intelligence analysis is not independent from policy, he goes on to explain, it loses its usefulness to the policymaker except as an echo chamber for decisions already made. Manhattan Project physicist John Huizenga, who was called to testify before the Church Committee in 1976, summed up the conventional wisdom about the balance intelligence and policy must strike: “If the policy-intelligence relationship is to work, there must be mutual respect, trust, civility, and also a certain distance. Intelligence people must provide honest and best judgments and avoid intrusion on decisionmaking or attempts to influence it. Policymakers must assume the integrity of the intelligence provided and avoid attempts to get materials suited to their taste.”\(^{81}\)

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has codified the need for intelligence officers to remain objective in official guidance statements, particularly Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203: *Analytic Tradecraft*. This document establishes the official standards according to which analysts perform their duties and managers evaluate output. One of the five analytic standards established in ICD 203 reads “Independent of political consideration: Analytic assessments must not be distorted by, nor shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint. Analytic judgments must not be influenced by force of preference for a particular policy.”\(^{82}\)

\(^{80}\) Kent, *Strategic Intelligence*, 180.

\(^{81}\) Quoted in Fain, et al, *The Intelligence Community*, 249.

\(^{82}\) Intelligence Community Directive 203: *Analytic Tradecraft*, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2, 2015, 2.
fact means advocating a customer’s viewpoint within an organization. Doing so in intelligence work means not being independent of political consideration, which by definition is politicization.

Even Good Politicization Should Respect the Red Line

Politicization is a common topic in intelligence literature, which typically stresses the need to avoid political influence on intelligence. Richard Betts provides an excellent summary of the range of arguments about the topic in his 2007 book *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American National Security*. Betts defines the popular understanding of the term as “top-down dictation of analytical conclusions to support preferred policy,” which is unambiguously bad. Nevertheless, Betts argues, the basic definition of politicization—“to bring within the realm of politics”—is not necessarily negative, since intelligence must reference the political realm in order to be relevant to policy makers. In this sense, “the presentation and packaging of assessments in ways that effectively engage policymakers’ concerns” is a benign, or even positive form of politicization.83 Not engaging in it means doing irrelevant work.

Betts calls the imperative to conduct analytic work in a way that is sensitive to policymakers’ needs the Gates model, after Robert Gates, the deputy director for analysis at the CIA under President Reagan and the director of central intelligence in the George H.W. Bush administration.84 Gates worked on the National Security Council Staff before joining the CIA, and found there that “CIA officers can describe in excruciating detail how foreign policy is made


84 Betts, *Enemies*, 76.
in every country in the world save one—the United States.” He directed analysts to engage in regular dialogue with policymakers in order to improve their assessments and make them more useful, despite the risk of encountering politicizing pressure, concluding intelligence officers should be able to see through policymakers' attempts to influence assessments and still profit from the information and insights they have to offer.

The Gates model is similar to an older model of intelligence-policy relations, described in 1949 by Wilmoore Kendall in a critique of Kent’s Strategic Intelligence. Kendall, Kent’s colleague at Yale and briefly an intelligence officer at the State Department and CIA, believed intelligence should deliberately support policy and dispense with Kent’s unrealistic expectations of total objectivity. Kendall believed the division between producers and consumers of intelligence in Kent’s model was a false dichotomy based on a misunderstanding of how policy is made and how the United States can influence world events, instead of just predicting them or reacting to them. According to Kendall, the most important role for intelligence analysts should be to influence the ways in which senior policymakers—especially those who are elected politicians or political appointees—understand the world and to help them consider and evaluate the range of options available to them to make U.S. foreign policy.

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87 Wilmoore Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” review of Strategic Intelligence, Sherman Kent, World Politics 1, no. 4 (Jul., 1949): 542-552, accessed March 7, 2016,
Kendall deliberately eschewed the red line, which he saw as unnaturally limiting analysts’ scope of inquiry and thus limiting the usefulness of intelligence. Gates saw this approach as problematic, because he observed that the skeptical nature of intelligence work was often a source of conflict with naturally optimistic policymakers. When analysts are invited to comment directly on policy, “there is sometimes a strong impulse on the part of intelligence officers to show that a policy or decision is misguided or wrong, to poke an analytical finger in the policy eye.”\textsuperscript{88} Policymakers of course resent this, and as a consequence marginalize intelligence agencies or try to intervene to shape their conclusions. Thus for Gates, maintaining the red line was critical to maintaining intelligence influence in the government. Following this logic, Gates ended his 1987 discussion of the policy/intelligence relationship by saying “we intend to ‘tell it as it is,’ avoiding bias as much as we can, or the politicization of our product… [Our products] can be used in whole or in part. They can be ignored, or torn up, or thrown away, but they may not be changed.”\textsuperscript{89}

Business ethicists have also addressed the need for a limit to customer orientation. Shaheen Borna and James Stearns provided a good summary of those arguments in their article “The Philosopher is Not Always Right.” The article was an answer to a critique alleging that the marketing concept leads to injustices when customers demand goods or services that are unethical, unprofitable, or contrary to professional or artistic standards. Borna and Stearns argued that the marketing concept is based on finding mutually satisfactory transactions between the buyer and seller. Their red line, although they do not use that term, separates transactions in which satisfying the customer also satisfies the material, ethical, and professional needs of the firm or artisan from those in which there is a mismatch. One example they used posited an

\textsuperscript{88} Gates, “The CIA and Foreign Policy.”

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
architect who finds it impossible to satisfy the conflicting demands of his married clients while staying true to his professional obligations. Borna and Stearns conclude the proper response to such situations is not to say the customer is wrong, but to decline the commission and find a new project.90

The Customer Metaphor Invites Subtle Politicization

As Gates’s article implies, intelligence officers tend to adopt a similar take it or leave it attitude to their work when they detect policymaker demands are pushing them beyond the red line’s limits of acceptable politicization. As Betts writes, qualifying his discussion of good politicization, “the irrevocable norm must be that policy interests, preferences, or decisions must never determine intelligence judgments.”91 Since intelligence agencies cannot follow the advice of Borna and Stearns and choose the customers with whom they must do business, the analog of rejecting a commission is producing analysis they know will be ignored or marginalized by policymakers when they realize that fully satisfying their customers would mean compromising their professional standards.

Intelligence agency leaders understandably want to avoid situations in which analysts produce work they know policymakers will ignore in the name of objectivity and independence. Therefore, contemporary analytic guidance describes a compromise in which analysts are to satisfy intelligence users to the maximum extent possible short of commenting directly on US policy or changing conclusions to make them match policymakers’ desired outcomes. This understanding of the relationship posits that analysts can do objective, independent work on topics chosen because of their relevance to policymaker concerns, then package that work in a

90 Borna and Stearns, “The Philosopher is Not Always Right,” 42-43.

91 Betts, Enemies, 75.
way calculated to appeal to audiences without impacting the fundamental analytic conclusions. The compromise relies on the customer metaphor with the understanding, like Borna and Stearns wrote, that some customer demands cannot or should not be satisfied.

This approach is codified in IC standards, such as ICD 208: Write for Maximum Utility. It states “utility is maximized when customers receive…information, intelligence and analyses in a form they can easily use and are able to share with appropriately cleared colleagues, subordinates, and superiors to facilitate mission accomplishment.” Analysts are to write “products tailored to best meet a customer's requirements,” and are reminded that “better knowledge of customers and their needs will translate into more focused, relevant, and usable intelligence.”92 ICD 208 directs analysts to tailor products’ organization and classification to be maximize their accessibility and usefulness. Read in light of ICD 203’s prohibition against “advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint,” this standard directs analysts to adopt a customer orientation for the purposes of focusing research and marketing finished work, but assumes analysts can put policy preferences out of mind when conducting the analysis itself.93

This approach is likely to succeed so long as customers’ improper demands are explicit, and explicitly stated. But such blatant politicization is rare, easy to detect, and easy to resist. The weaknesses of the customer metaphor reveal themselves in the face of more subtle forms of politicization, in which no individual tells an analyst what conclusions to reach, but the policy atmosphere in which she is operating makes unambiguously clear what sorts of assessments intelligence users want to receive. This type of politicization is most prevalent in situations


93 Intelligence Community Directive 203, 2.
where the facts that form the basis of analysis are open to multiple interpretations. It is easy to identify and resist policymaker pressure to make an assessment that is obviously wrong. It is more difficult for an analyst to resist adopting a policy-friendly interpretation of ambiguous facts, especially when unbiased analysis would show that the evidence does not support any conclusion with certainty. Adopting a customer orientation reinforces exactly this bias, because it leads an analyst to use the logic that “the customer is always right” unless she can prove otherwise.

What Policymakers Want is Not Always What They Need

Some of the more regrettable intelligence failures in US history have come about in part because analysts have satisfied customer demand in the face of ambiguous reporting. Two retired intelligence officers described cases like this in their accounts of work during the Vietnam War and Iraq War. George W. Allen worked for the Army, DIA, and CIA as an Indochina specialist from 1949 to 1968.94 His 2001 memoir None So Blind collects the experiences he used as the basis for the undergraduate and graduate intelligence courses he taught at DIA’s Defense Intelligence College.95 In a similar work published in 2011 entitled Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia Paul Pillar uses his experiences at the intelligence/policy nexus during the beginning of the Iraq war to show that politicization of intelligence is more pervasive and more insidious than most observers recognize.96


95 The Defense Intelligence College is now the National Intelligence University.

Both Allen and Pillar argue that, in highly charged and controversial policy environments like those surrounding the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, intelligence that runs counter to policymakers’ established mindsets has virtually no influence on decisions. They both also catalogue instances in which intelligence assessments were misused or influenced by policymakers in ways that fell short of overt dictation of conclusions. These vignettes demonstrate how treating policymakers like customers of a business increases the pressure on analysts and their managers to give in to the sort of improper politicization abhorred by intelligence theorists and proscribed by official policy.

In 1966, Allen led the development of a detailed method of evaluating the progress of pacification efforts in the Vietnamese countryside. Called the Hamlet Evaluation System, it allowed analysts to score each of the thousands of hamlets according to eighteen evaluation criteria in order to estimate the results of the pacification program. Since the scores were largely qualitative, Allen believed the system was most useful for identifying trends over time, rather than providing an absolute measure of winning or losing. Policymakers, with whom the Hamlet Evaluation System was immediately popular, saw things differently. Allen wrote that high-level decision makers in Washington most often asked for the monthly average score for the entire country, and would celebrate minute changes in the average, which was calculated to three decimal points, as vindication of the program and proof that their approach was

97 Allen, *None So Blind*, 221. Hamlets are sub-village communities that are the basic political units in Vietnam.

98 Ibid., 226. He even hoped that improvements in computing would allow the CIA to correlate the results of his system with reports on what tactical actions the US and Vietnamese governments were taking in each hamlet in order to better understand which interventions were effective. He was denied the necessary funding (approximately $400,000) because nobody in the government could imagine a use for such a system after the war ended.
succeeding. This regardless of the fact that the aggregate score was “essentially meaningless,” since “the Viet Cong might well overrun a hundred hamlets at one end of the country during the month, but this could be offset [in the aggregate score] by marginal improvements in several thousand other hamlets.”

Even more disturbing was a request Allen received in 1967 from National Security Advisor Walt Whitman Rostow for a compilation of data points showing progress in the pacification campaign. Allen objected, because his assessment of the overall campaign was that it was falling short in some parts of the country. Rostow replied that President Johnson needed this data to present to congressmen in support of the war effort, but Allen refused to provide it. Realizing that he had “jeopardized both [his] career and the agency’s carefully nurtured reputation for responsiveness,” he alerted CIA director Richard Helms about the exchange, and said he would resign if forced to comply with the request. Meanwhile, Rostow requested the same product from another analytic office in CIA and received it, along with a cover memo from Helms caveating that the summary excluded negative reporting. Rostow replaced that memo with a note exclaiming “at last, Mr. President, a useful assessment from the CIA.”

These incidents would not have upset Allen if he had adopted a true customer orientation, since they resulted in increased demand for CIA’s services and satisfaction with the agency from its most important constituency in the White House. He could also have chosen to believe he was still living up to his professional obligations by providing the requested

99 Ibid., 224.

100 Paul Pillar also cites this episode in Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, pg. 130-132.

101 Allen, None So Blind, 237.
information, since in neither case did policymakers ask him to falsify information or directly alter his conclusions. This would have been a cynical understanding of the role of intelligence, but he would not have been the only one to adopt it after living through the intelligence struggles of the Vietnam War. In a forward to a 2006 book on the acrimonious fights over order of battle analysis in Vietnam, journalist and intelligence expert Thomas Powers wrote that “on big questions of policy an intelligence agency is not like a weather bureau, whose only task is to predict the weather as accurately as possible. On big questions an intelligence agency functions more like a law firm, which crafts its arguments to serve its client, and the CIA’s client is the president.”

Another commentary on the Vietnam War shows what such behavior as Powers describes looks like in practice. Patrick McGarvey, whose critique of DIA’s bureaucratic pathologies is cited above, summarized DIA’s efforts to track the strength of enemy forces in Vietnam.

From 1964…until late 1966 or early 1967, the generals in Saigon worked to build up U.S. troop strength. Therefore, they wanted every bit of evidence brought to the fore that could show that infiltration was increasing. DIA obliged… In 1967 a second period began. The high priests in Saigon decided we were “winning.” Then the paramount interest became to show the enemy’s reduced capability to recruit and a slowdown in infiltration due to our bombing. The tone and emphasis of reports from the field changed radically, and so did those put out by DIA.

McGarvey assured readers that he was not accusing anyone of suppressing evidence, simply of emphasizing some facts over others, much like a lawyer would do for a client.


103 McGarvey, 71-2.
Paul Pillar’s description of the role of national intelligence in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War bears a striking similarity to the policy/ intelligence relationship Allen describes. Allen’s account is in fact a key source of evidence bolstering Pillar’s argument that so-called intelligence failures prior to the Iraq invasion show generalizable aspects of the phenomenon of intelligence misuse. As Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill told an interviewer about National Security Council meetings on Iraq beginning in February 2001, “from the beginning, we were building the case against Hussein and looking at how we could take him out and change Iraq into a new country.” With this mindset, the role of the Intelligence Community was clear: find the evidence that would help the case to remove Saddam Hussein.

The most important part of this case—at least in view of gaining and maintaining public support for the war—was the infamous weapons of mass destruction (WMD) estimate, completed in October 2002 at the request of Democratic senators on the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence. Pillar, who as the national intelligence officer for the Middle East was intimately involved with the crafting of the estimate, pointed out that the effort to determine the nature of Iraq’s unconventional weapons program was much more complex than the binary yes/no question of whether Saddam had WMD. The term WMD encompasses “nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as delivery systems. The intelligence community was called on to make multiple judgments about multiple programs.” Many of these judgments,


105 Pillar, *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 35-36. As Pillar points out, October 2002 was long after the administration had decided to invade Iraq and begun efforts to sell the war to the public.

accounting for denial and deception efforts, sketchy collection, the natural opacity of the future, and the need to find consensus among the dozens of analysts in multiple agencies, were little better than coin tosses. Since it was widely understood throughout Washington which results would help the president and which would help his political rivals, there can be no doubt that the policy wind affected those coins in flight.107

As multiple studies of the WMD estimate have shown, policymakers did not need to directly request favorable judgments from the IC, because analysts were already in agreement with the administration that Iraq probably had an ongoing unconventional weapons program. Betts, for instance, wrote that given the evidence available, “no responsible analyst could have concluded in 2002 that Iraq did not have stocks of chemical and biological weapons concealed.”108 The effects of politicization were felt more in terms of what the intelligence officers at the time did not do, which was to examine their underlying assumptions, work hard to falsify their conclusions, and accurately characterize their uncertainty in their final products.109

Former deputy director of the CIA Richard Kerr, hired by Langley in 2003-04 to conduct a postmortem of the agency’s intelligence work on Iraq, came to a similar conclusion about analysts’ failure to re-examine their assumptions about the WMD programs. He located the source of this breakdown in quality control in the post-Cold War shift within the IC from long-term to short-term analysis and from broad-based regional analytic efforts to more

107 Ibid.

108 Betts, Enemies, 115-116; also cited in Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 159-160.
specialized technical centers. The analytic community shifted this way in response to demand signals from policymakers, who wanted intelligence support for their immediate policy concerns. Crisis situations, he noted, reinforce these trends, because the demand accelerates while the timelines shorten. “The result of this narrowly focused and piecemeal intelligence flow,” he wrote, “is that it neither fosters continuity of analysis nor provides a context within which to place seemingly unrelated information. In the case of Iraq, national intelligence did not provide a comprehensive picture of how the country functioned as a whole.”

Gates’s 1987 article shows this is not simply a post-1989 concern, however. “One of the CIA’s greatest concerns over the years,” he wrote, “has been the unwillingness or inability of most policymakers to spend much time on longer-range issues—looking ahead several steps—or in helping to guide or direct the agency’s long-term efforts. For many years the CIA has struggled, largely in vain, to get policy officials to devote time to intelligence issues other than those directly related to a crisis.”

Gates and Kerr illustrate the central problem for intelligence officers of treating policymakers like customers. Namely, what policymakers need is not always what they want. Robert Jervis, whose 2010 article “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash” is the source of President’s Johnson’s quote at the beginning of this monograph, is fond of saying “policymakers


111 Betts, Enemies, 73.

112 Ibid., 52-3.

113 Gates, “The CIA and Foreign Policy.”
say they need and want good intelligence. They do need it, but often they do not like it, and are
prone to believe that when intelligence is not out to get them, it is incompetent.\textsuperscript{114} He described
the difference in intelligence professionals’ understanding of support to policy, which is
providing accurate and relevant information, with policymaker’s desire for “analysis that
reinforces policies and rallies others to the cause.”\textsuperscript{115} The best intelligence typically emphasizes
uncertainty, alternatives, and contingencies, thereby decreasing the simplicity and certainty that
policymakers desire, especially when it comes to drumming up support in the public.

Former CIA deputy director John McLaughlin described this difference between
intelligence and policy spheres as a cultural divide, in which policymakers’ essentially optimistic
outlook conflicts with the skepticism drilled into analysts in the name of methodological rigor.\textsuperscript{116}
Policymakers’ optimism is a necessary function of their role, which is to work to implement the
ideological program on which they, or the politicians who appointed them, were elected. Even in
the face of doubts about a program, they are charged by the very nature of their work to maintain
a positive outlook by searching for any available signs that their policy is or will be successful.
Intelligence officers recognize this mindset as confirmation bias, and number it among the
cognitive traps they must avoid. If analysts are encouraged to think of policymakers as their
customers and adopt a businesslike customer orientation in order to serve them better, they will


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} John McLaughlin, “Serving the National Policymaker,” in George and Bruce, eds., \textit{Analyzing Intelligence}, 72.
be liable to adopting the same mindset as policymakers and their value to national security will
decrease as a result.

**Conclusion: Making Sense of Intelligence Work Without the Customer Metaphor**

When faced with evidence of politicization of intelligence, agency leaders look to
improving analytic tradecraft practices as a remedy.\(^{117}\) Robert Gates displayed the typical pattern
in the wake of the contentious Senate hearings for his confirmation as director of central
intelligence in 1991. In those hearings, senators accused Gates of politicizing intelligence
assessments in support of the Reagan administration’s worldview. Once confirmed, Gates put
particular emphasis on analytic rigor in the CIA, establishing formal standards and a training
program to ensure analysts and managers took specific steps to identify and eliminate bias,
faulty reasoning, and unclear argumentation.\(^{118}\)

The entire Intelligence Community made a similar renewed commitment to analytic
tradecraft after the investigation into the Iraq WMD estimate blamed poor analytic practices—in
particular a failure to critically examine assumptions—for the estimate’s mistaken conclusions.
In 2010 Robert Cardillo, then DIA’s deputy director for analysis, wrote that the promulgation of
ICD 203 *Analytic Tradecraft* in response to the WMD investigation was the beginning of a
deliberate cultural change in the analytic community towards more rigorous work and more
accountability.\(^{119}\) The persistence of the customer metaphor, because of its connotations of


\(^{119}\) Robert Cardillo, “Intelligence Community Reform: A Cultural Evolution,” *Studies in Intelligence* 54, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2010).
cynical business practices and its distortion of the intelligence/policy relationship, undermines leaders’ efforts to shape the practice of analytic tradecraft.

In the business world, one of the most important functions of management is ensuring the firm maintains a customer orientation. Contemporary business literature defines customer orientation as meeting the customer’s needs and desires to the greatest extent possible within the bounds of profitability. This is an attractive metaphor for DIA’s managers, who have had to cultivate a constituency within the government in order for the agency to survive as a bureaucratic entity. The link between marketing and profitability in the private sector, however, can make customer orientation appear crass and manipulative. Intelligence leaders risk the transference of these cynical interpretations to their organizations when they adopt the language of customer orientation. Moreover, even in its most earnest connotations, the customer metaphor distorts the relationship between intelligence producers and users by encouraging analysts to adopt the mindset of the policymakers they serve rather than maintaining independence of judgment.

Of course it is possible for analysts to produce objective, well-reasoned intelligence analysis while thinking of users as customers. Given the metaphor’s persistence since the time of Sherman Kent, it is clearly not preventing all good intelligence work. Nevertheless, if the metaphor does more to obscure the realities of intelligence work than to illuminate them, as is argued above, it should be jettisoned. Leaders have an obligation to help their subordinates understand their work by deliberately embedding their beliefs, values, and assumptions in the

120 Borna and Stearns, “The Philosopher is Not Always Right.”
organization’s culture. The customer metaphor, being at odds with the values of the intelligence profession and the vision of DIA’s leadership, impedes this process.

DIA’s current organizational vision, found in the agency strategic plan, is powerful in part because it avoids the customer metaphor, instead calling on agency’s employees to do excellent work in the name of patriotism and professional pride. DIA’s vision is:

One Defense Intelligence Team of highly skilled, agile, and accountable professionals, equipped with leading-edge training and technology, strengthened by partnerships, and able to adapt operationally to provide all-source defense intelligence, whenever and wherever required, in support of the warfighter and the Nation.

Similarly, DIA’s values statement in the strategic plan eschews language derived from the business world, instead emphasizing professionalism and service. DIA’s values are:

Teamwork: Partnering at all levels and across organizational boundaries for mission accomplishment.
Integrity: Adherence to the highest legal and ethical principles in our responsibilities.
Excellence: Unrivaled defense intelligence expertise.
Service: Putting the welfare of the Nation and commitment to our mission before oneself.

DIA’s vision and values statements reflect the factors that motivate people to enter civil service. These values, according to research by the economist Paul Volcker, include a sense of mission, the ability to make a difference in the world, and the opportunity to perform

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challenging, fascinating work with similarly motivated colleagues. They are important motivators for intelligence and national security professionals, in particular. As an analyst told National Intelligence Council Chairman Gregory Treverton, “if I’d wanted to sell shoes, I’d have done that. I became an analyst because I wanted to reflect, not hawk my wares in downtown Washington.” The references to customers in the rest of the strategic statement, on the other hand, undermine these ideals by tying DIA’s work to the cynical bureaucratic motives of increasing personal and organizational power. Excising the word customer from documents like the strategic statement is the first step to eliminating the distortions of the metaphor.

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to evaluate alternative language that could replace the customer metaphor. The research does however indicate that there is value in using a mix of metaphors, and being explicit about what they illuminate and what they obscure about the intelligence profession. This is the approach Kent took in 1947, with his three metaphors of a university, a metropolitan newspaper, and a business. Intelligence officer Stephen Marrin suggests an even more deliberate process of using analogic reasoning to discover and adapt wisdom and best practices from other professions, such as medicine.

Abandoning the customer metaphor is a semantic question, but in a profession built around language, semantics are critical. Since ferreting out nuances of meaning from statements by foreign sources is the fundamental task of intelligence analysis, analysts will be highly


sensitive to the language their own leadership uses to make sense of their jobs. As senior intelligence officer and educator David Moore argued in his 2011 book *Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution*, semantics matter “because the terms we use within the Intelligence Community shape and reflect our practice.”\(^{127}\) Let that language reflect the excellence to which the community aspires, rather than the bureaucratic realities with which it must contend.

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