# US-Russian Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Environment

**Abstract**

While many are considering how the United States will fight the Russians, this monograph explores the history of US-Russian cooperation since the end of the Cold War and analyzes the acceptability of cooperation, the substance of cooperation, and the elements of cooperation for the year 2017 and beyond. The author addresses Cold War cooperation, but focuses on US-Russian cooperation under Presidents George H.W. Bush through Barack H. Obama. He answers three questions related to future cooperation: Should the United States cooperate with Russia? On what should the United States and Russia cooperate? What principles should guide United States cooperation with Russia? The author finds that despite an often tumultuous and increasingly adversarial relationship, cooperation has remained a consistent feature of US-Russian relations. Moreover, he identifies several features of Russian behavior and foreign policy—some in evidence during the tsarist period—which influence dealings with Russia today. As the author describes, cooperation since the Cold War has steadily deteriorated. Nevertheless, he concludes that both countries will continue to seek ways to cooperate. After forging a new relationship during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era and striving to preserve a troubled relationship during the third, the United States now must reinvent the relationship amid a significantly changed operating environment.

**Subject Terms**

Cooperation; Cold War; foreign relations; foreign policy; reset; NATO expansion; strategy; policy; planning; Europe; Syria; Iraq; Balkans; Afghanistan; US President; US Secretary of State

**Security Classification of:**

- **b. Abstract (U)**
- **c. This Page (U)**
- **19a. Name of Responsible Person (U)**

**Number of Pages:** (U)

**Phone Number:** (include area code)
Monograph Approval Page

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Abstract


At a time when many are considering how the United States will fight the Russians, this monograph explores, instead, the history of US-Russian cooperation in the post-Cold War era and analyzes the acceptability of US-Russian cooperation, the substance of US-Russian cooperation, and the elements of US-Russian cooperation for the year 2017 and beyond. The author begins by recounting the many examples of cooperation during the Cold War and continues with a summary of cooperation during the administrations of George H.W. Bush through Barack H. Obama. He proceeds to answer three questions related to the prospects of future cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation: Should the United States cooperate with Russia? On what should the United States and Russia cooperate? What principles should guide United States cooperation with Russia? Through his analysis, the author finds that despite the often tumultuous and increasingly adversarial relationship, cooperation has remained a consistent feature of US-Russian relations. Moreover, he identifies a number of characteristics of Russian behavior and foreign policy, some in evidence during the tsarist period, which continue to influence the United States’ dealings with Russia today. As the author describes, US-Russian cooperation since the end of the Cold War has steadily deteriorated to the point at which some now characterize the relationship as being even worse than it was during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the author concludes that both countries will continue to seek ways to cooperate, but after forging a new relationship during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era and striving to preserve a troubled relationship during the third, the United States now must reinvent the relationship amid a significantly changed operating environment.
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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Bilateral Presidential Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Campaign Support Plan</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>ERI</td>
<td>European Reassurance Initiative</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GIUK</td>
<td>Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Integrated Country Strategy</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>ISSG</td>
<td>International Syria Support Group</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JRS</td>
<td>Joint Regional Strategy</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti</td>
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<td>MCSCG</td>
<td>Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDN</td>
<td>Northern Distribution Network</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>Operating Environment</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>REFORGER</td>
<td>Return of Forces to Germany</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>Theater Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
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<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Introduction

World peace depended entirely upon the ability of the Russians and the Americans to continue and to perpetuate the cooperation and understanding which they had reached during the course of the war.

—Attributed to Marshal Zhukov shortly after the war with Germany in Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*

Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Only “stupid” people, or fools, would think that it is bad!

—President-elect Donald Trump, Twitter post

The origins of these two statements cannot be more different. The first comes from a high-ranking and widely regarded Soviet military officer speaking in Germany during the short intermission between the end of the war in Europe and the start of the Cold War. It reflects a hopefulness borne of strategic, operational, and sometimes tactical cooperation achieved to defeat a common enemy. The second comes from the 45th President-elect of the United States using a 21st century communication medium—Twitter. It responds, instead, to a pervasive pessimism, which has slowly developed over the course of almost three decades since the Cold War. Yet, despite their differences in origin, they are strikingly similar in context. That both statements champion closer US-Russian cooperation is clear. Less obvious are their similarities in timing. Each statement comes at a possible inflection point in US-Soviet/Russian relations, a brief period of uncertainty that could trend in one of two directions: upward in the spirit of increased or renewed cooperation or downward to a period of increasing hostility, or worse. The outcome of the first statement is all too familiar: a fifty-year period of hostility played out on a global stage. The outcome of the second is uncertain.

In 1948, reflecting on three years as US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith asked, “Are the Russians driven inexorably by their ancient heritage and their modern
anxieties toward the abyss of war and conquest, or as others believe, is the Kremlin’s ‘war scare’ campaign only feigned for reasons of politics, both internal and external?”1 Smith began his tenure in Moscow far more optimistically than his departing query suggests. Drawing on his own experiences working with the Soviets as allies during World War II, Ambassador Smith dismissed what he found to be the prevailing view of State Department officers at the time. On arrival, he recalled, “I was inclined to take a more optimistic view…It seemed to me that even if the extreme cordiality and confidence for which we hoped could not be attained, at least a measure of it was possible, and that this would be sufficient to insure long-term collaboration.”2 Ambassador Smith’s more pessimistic view only three years later suggests just a hint of frustration at an opportunity lost. His experience with US-Soviet relations at the dawn of the Cold War encapsulated, in just three years, the twenty-five years that have elapsed since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). What emerged in 1991 as a new US-Russia relationship characterized by optimism and “extreme cordiality and confidence” is today one of pessimism, mistrust, and uncertainty. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, recently characterized current US-Russian relations as “maybe even worse” than they were during the Cold War.3 Respecting the pitfalls of analogy, in many cases, today one can replace “Soviet” with “Russian” and “USSR” with “Russia” and find oneself revisiting the once-familiar challenges and uncertainties of the second half of the 20th century.4 The United States is asking the same questions

2 Ibid., 31.
4 This is not merely analogy. Smith argued that Soviet organizations reflected innate “Russianness,” not necessarily the principles of Marx or Engels. He wrote, “Organization on the basis of so-called Marxism Communism is purely Russian and was developed by Lenin and Stalin on the basis of age-old Czarist Russian traditions of despotic power and absolute control…It is very necessary to keep in mind when considering
in 2017 as Ambassador Smith asked in 1948. What are Russia’s aims and how does the United States ensure long-term collaboration with the Russian Federation on areas of mutual concern given Russia’s “ancient heritage,” “modern anxieties,” and “internal and external” politics?

Cooperation has always been a feature of US policy toward Russia. It remains so today, as evidenced in national security policy, national strategies, campaign plans, and a host of strategic guidance documents. Even during low points and periods of disagreement, maintaining communication and seeking common ground endured as goals of US-USSR relations. National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), one of the earliest statements of US policy and strategy for post-WWII relations with the USSR, referred to this imperative to cooperate: “At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of the policy of ‘containment’ that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the USSR.” The authors of NSC 68 justified its openness to negotiation for very pragmatic reasons:

In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet objectives and intentions that for all practical purposes communism today is Great Russianism.” Smith, 310. George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” to George C. Marshall in 1946 addressed a number of consistent features of the Russians and their rulers that date at least to the tsarist era. Among these is a “traditional and instinctive” sense of insecurity, which drives fears of foreign penetration in Russia’s internal affairs. These fears, in turn, have led to a “long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes.” George Kennan to George Marshall, telegram, February 22, 1946, Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, online materials, accessed March 21, 2017, trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf., 5-6.


Soviet Union begins to show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues. [Emphasis added]⁷

In other words, keep an open mind and cooperate on small issues if that is the most one can achieve, even if only in the interests of domestic politics or international approbation.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized the importance of cooperation in an April 1953 speech directed at the USSR and its leaders shortly after the death of Josef Stalin. His “Chance for Peace” speech listed three precepts that guided the US approach to world affairs. The second was, “No nation’s security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.” He reiterated earlier policies on negotiating with the USSR, affirming “the readiness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any genuine evidence of peaceful purpose.”⁸ Later that year, the Eisenhower Administration approved National Security Council Report 162/2 (NSC 162/2). It, too, included this aspect of the Truman Administration’s policy toward the USSR. To reduce the Soviet threat, NSC 162/2 stated, “The United States must also keep open the possibility of negotiating with the USSR…acceptable and enforceable agreements, whether limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues.”⁹ NSC 162/2 suggested that changes in the USSR over time could induce a willingness “to reach agreements acceptable to the United States and its allies, without necessarily abandoning its basic hostility to the non-Soviet world.”¹⁰

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⁷ Ibid., 45.


¹⁰ Ibid., para. 8.
During the Nixon Administration some twenty years later, the United States and the USSR codified their mutual desire to cooperate in the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Agreeing that reduced tensions and strengthened international security and cooperation depended on improved US-Soviet relations, the Basic Principles sought “mutual understanding and business-like cooperation” in a number of areas, including: international law, arms control, high level exchanges—even between legislative bodies—commercial and economic ties, maritime and air communications, science and technology, culture, and tourism.  

One can find practical examples of US-Soviet cooperation during every US presidential administration of the Cold War period; however, the history of US-Soviet cooperation during the Cold War is not the focus of this paper. While these examples illustrate—and in many cases, laid the foundation for—the element of cooperation as a recurring feature of US strategy, this paper is concerned with the prospects for US-Russia cooperation in the year 2017 and beyond: the outcome of the second of the two opening statements above. It examines the history of US-Russian cooperation during two periods of the post-Cold War era, and offers recommendations on how the United States can effectively cooperate with the Russian Federation in a third—the future. Relying on practical examples, the paper suggests the United States can contribute to the development of mutually beneficial relations with Russia.

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Cooperation during the George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-1993)

Examine US-Russia cooperation during the administration of President George H. W. Bush is important for three reasons. First, President Bush presided over the end of the Cold War and set the initial tone for post-Cold War relations. Thus, the George H. W. Bush Administration provides a logical starting point for assessing US-Russia cooperation in the post-Soviet era. Second, the success of early efforts to cooperate on a range of issues reveals useful principles to consider for any cooperative regime with the Russians. Third, many key leaders of the current and recent Russian Government such as Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Primakov, and Sergei Lavrov—while junior—were nevertheless present during the Bush Administration and their understanding—despite would-be “resets”—includes this history. These early efforts at cooperation must have
influenced in some measure, their own experiences with, and opinions toward, cooperating with the United States.

Just as are there are many suitable dates and events to mark the start of the Cold War, there are a number of candidates for the appropriate starting point of this study on US-Russia cooperation after the Cold War. Those who believe the Cold War began with the development of the atomic bomb in 1945 may consider the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as a useful starting point as, from their point of view, this agreement marked the end of the Cold War. Since this is a study of US-Russia cooperation, some may recommend, instead, the Russian Congress’ June 1990 Declaration on the Sovereignty of Russia or the December 1991, Belovezha Accords which dissolved the USSR and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—a commonwealth which included Russia.13 Because the text of joint declarations and other official communications developed between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation have set policy, still others may select the February 1, 1992, Joint Declaration between President George H. W. Bush and President Boris Yeltsin announcing “A New Era” and the end of our status as enemies.14 To some, Gorbachev’s Christmas Day, 1991 phone call to President Bush (part of which was televised on Nightline) is a poignant starting point. During the call, Gorbachev announced the end of the Soviet Union and his own peaceful transition of power to

13 Signed December 8, 1991 among the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, the Belovezha Accords announced the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the end of the USSR. On December 21, the remaining Soviet Republics except for Georgia and the Baltic States met to ratify the dissolution of the USSR and to join the CIS. Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2014), 164. See also Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Times Books, 1994), 111-115.

his successor.\footnote{Referenced in David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 13-14. See also George H. W. Bush’s own recollection in George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, \textit{A World Transformed} (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 559-561, and George W. Bush’s description of this conversation in George W. Bush, \textit{41: A Portrait of My Father} (New York: Crown, 2014), 213-214.} Gorbachev, himself, suggested the December 1989 Malta Summit with President Bush “had drawn the curtain on the Cold War.”\footnote{Mikhail Gorbachev, \textit{Memoirs}, translated by Georges Peronansky and Tatjana Varsavsky (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 516.} These are all useful. However, at the risk of being cliché, the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 is perhaps most appropriate for three reasons. First, it remains the dominant symbol of the end of the Cold War. Second, there are several important examples of US-Russia cooperation during the years 1990 and 1991 that established or reinforced useful principles for future cooperation. Third, and most importantly, it was an event on which President Bush would base the \textit{tone} of his administration’s approach to the Russians.

When the Berlin Wall fell, Bush told his aides, “I’m not going to dance on the wall.”\footnote{Halberstam, 10.} Many in his administration sought a victory celebration akin to VE-Day or VJ-Day. Even earlier, during the new administration’s strategic review, some advocated patience, even delay, in reaching out to a dying Soviet Union. “Why should we hurry,” they asked, “if the Soviet Union is anyway heading for destabilization and breakup? Let the fruit ripen and fall into our lap.”\footnote{Gorbachev revealed his knowledge of this recommendation to Secretary of State James Baker during his May 1989 visit to Moscow—the first such meeting between Gorbachev and the Bush Administration. Gorbachev was especially anxious over the results of Bush’s strategic review and greatly concerned by the new administration’s delay in reaching out to the Soviet leadership. Gorbachev, 501.} Bush, however, recognized both the promise of post-Cold War cooperation and the vulnerability of his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev. According to journalist David Halberstam,

\begin{quote}
Bush put a primacy on personal relationships, and by then he had begun to forge one with Mikhail Gorbachev and was obviously unwilling to do anything that would make things more difficult for his new ally. The more Bush celebrated, the more vulnerable Gorbachev
\end{quote}
and the other more democratically inclined figures in the Soviet Union were likely to be. Celebrating was like gloating and Bush would not gloat.\textsuperscript{19}

The year 1989 also was the year of Tiananmen Square and protests across Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Bush recognized that his response to any of these events could provoke an aggressive response and undermine the thaw that was proceeding within the Soviet Union. To reassure Gorbachev, Bush reached out to him and asked to meet. Gorbachev accepted and the summit meeting which took place in Malta that December confirmed the two leaders’ desire for improved relations. Bush and Gorbachev discussed a broad range of topics including: investment, chemical weapons, conventional weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, strategic arms reductions, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe and the Baltics, and Soviet policy toward Central America and Cuba. Bush specifically sought Gorbachev’s unique access and the Soviet Union’s position as primary benefactor to influence Fidel Castro. (Gorbachev revealed in his memoirs that before this summit, Fidel Castro privately asked if he could help Cuba normalize relations with the United States.) In return for an economic aid package, Bush urged Gorbachev to continue his peaceful approach to events in Central and Eastern Europe. Both leaders agreed that the Malta summit was a success, but Gorbachev was far more effusive in his recollection of its significance:

> In Malta President Bush and I had outlined a long-term agenda for the development of Soviet-American relations... It was obvious that the Malta summit represented far more than a mere stopover on the road of Soviet-American rapprochement. Indeed, it had allowed us to establish a personal rapport, both between Mr. Bush and me and between our foreign ministers—just in time to avoid being caught unprepared by the developments in Eastern Europe and in Germany in particular.\textsuperscript{20}

Bush and Gorbachev met again six months later in Washington, DC and Camp David. While Gorbachev remembers the Washington agenda as extremely “crowded” and the atmosphere

\textsuperscript{19} Halberstam, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{20} Gorbachev, 537.
tense, he found the relaxed setting of Camp David more conducive to the type of dialogue that characterized the Malta meetings. Indeed, the Washington-Camp David summit concluded with three significant outcomes. First, returning to Bush’s Malta discussions on Cuba, Gorbachev agreed to approach Castro regarding Cuban involvement in Nicaragua and El Salvador. This access to US adversaries would remain a key benefit of closer cooperation between the two countries. Second, the two leaders issued a joint declaration on Ethiopia and agreed to the first-ever joint humanitarian operation between the United States and Soviet Union under which Soviet aircraft would deliver US food aid. Finally, Bush ceded his position on Lithuania (a sticking point during the Washington engagement) and agreed to approve a substantial trade agreement with the Soviet Union.21

Although criticized as “Reaganism minus the passion for freedom,” Bush’s policy of humility in victory and collaborative approach to the Soviet Union paid off. The Soviets did not suppress the upheaval occurring across Central and Eastern Europe, as did the Chinese after Tiananmen Square, Germany was reunified, and Gorbachev—despite a coup attempt—remained in power until the peaceful transition to Boris Yeltsin.22

In addition to securing from the Soviet Union peaceful acceptance of the revolutions on its doorstep, the United States successfully enjoined the Soviets to support the resolution of conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. Reminiscing on his own experience during the Bush Administration, Colin Powell recalled “our old enemy” cooperating to achieve peaceful settlements in Angola, Namibia, and the Iran-Iraq War.23 During the Persian Gulf War, Soviet diplomacy reinforced the West’s resolve and encouraged Iraqi leaders to abide by United Nations Security Council

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21 Ibid., 542.
22 Bush, 41, 195-196. See also “repentance, or humility, on the part of the victor” as one of three jus post bellum criteria cited in Doug McCready, “Ending the War Right: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition,” Journal of Military Ethics 8, no. 1, (2009), 71.
Resolution (UNSCR) 660 and remove Iraq’s troops from Kuwait. As they did with Cuba, the Soviets enjoyed access to Iraqi leaders that the United States did not and used this access repeatedly throughout 1990 and 1991 in meetings in Baghdad, Moscow and elsewhere to promote the West’s goals. According to Gorbachev, the Iraqi leadership had miscalculated and was “behind the times”:

They clung to the idea, which had taken root in the confrontational era, that in the event of a crisis in this part of the world the United States and the Soviet Union would inevitably wind up on opposite sides of the barricades. This is where Baghdad made its biggest mistake. Events in the Persian Gulf marked a watershed for the superpowers: for the first time they acted in concert to solve a regional crisis.24

Russia’s support of US actions in the Middle East would never be as overt or sincere as it seemed during the build-up to the Persian Gulf War; however, the United States would revisit the unique access Russia enjoys with a number of regional actors in the years ahead.

As important as cooperation on global affairs was to the parties of those conflicts and to US-Soviet relations in general, the United States and the USSR achieved lasting cooperation on two key arms control agreements during the latter half of the Bush Administration: the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I). Bush inherited from President Reagan a work plan for both, jointly approved in January 1989 by leaders from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Signed in Paris in November 1990, the CFE Treaty focused on conventional hardware situated between the Atlantic and the Urals, capping various categories of military equipment, establishing milestones, and setting provisions for compliance inspections. It declared “the end of the era of division and confrontation” and despite its rather symbolic value given the conventional force reductions already underway, the CFE Treaty “represented greater progress toward limiting conventional forces than anything else to that point.”25 Building on the

24 Gorbachev, 552.

momentum achieved by the CFE agreement, Bush sought to reinvigorate the unfinished START agreement. Signed on July 31, 1991 as the first agreement to mandate the reduction of offensive strategic arms, rather than merely limit or slow their growth, the START I Treaty reflects two important principles to consider for successful US-Russia cooperation. First, it illustrates the utility of engagement at multiple levels. Bush authorized two sets of negotiations: formal talks in Geneva, and parallel “back-channel” talks between Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Multilateral communication mechanisms remain a feature of the official structure for US-Russia cooperation. Second, one of the reasons the Soviets agreed to revisit START negotiations was that the United States agreed to decouple Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from an offensive arms control agreement. Downgrading SDI to a research and development project, Bush had removed “a source of intense friction in Soviet-American relations and made it easier to negotiate a START agreement.”26 This, too, highlights two important considerations for US-Russia cooperation: deconstruct major issues into manageable parts, and—like Bush’s Camp David concession over Lithuania—concede where one can in order to keep the dialogue open.

Bush shared many of the signal achievements in US-Soviet cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev. However, in the final year of the Bush presidency, the United States’ partner was no longer the USSR, but Russia, and its new president Boris Yeltsin. Bush pursued the same close personal friendship he enjoyed with Gorbachev and on February 1, 1992, he and Yeltsin released a joint declaration announcing “a new era.” The joint declaration announced six principles to guide US-Russian relations. The declaration characterized the new relationship as one of “friendship and partnership” and agreed to reduce strategic arsenals and promote shared interests of democracy,

26 Ibid., 496.
human rights, respect for borders, rule of law, free trade, investment, and economic cooperation. It pledged to “work actively together” on a range of issues including: weapons of mass destruction and associated technology, advanced conventional arms, regional conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, and the environment. As Bush turned his attention to a troubled reelection campaign, implementation of this new relationship would begin in earnest under his successor, President William J. Clinton.

Cooperation during the William J. Clinton Administration (1993-2001)

President Clinton acknowledged the new era in his First Inaugural Address: “Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the cold war assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom, but threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues.” The Balkans would soon reflect some of those “ancient hatreds” and some shadows of the cold war would persist during his administration. Indeed, NATO intervention in Kosovo and US policy toward Central and Eastern Europe dominated US-Russia relations during the Clinton Administration. Nevertheless, the period is also notable for the cooperation achieved on Haiti, Iraq, and nuclear weapons; for the development of mechanisms to enable closer cooperation; and for the transition of Russian leadership from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. Throughout the eight years of the Clinton Administration, US engagement with Russia also revealed a number of features of Russian behavior, which continue to characterize the relationship today. Finally, viewed in hindsight, one

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can identify within this period a number of missteps that—along with Russia’s reaction to Kosovo—contributed to an overall degradation in the relationship in subsequent years.

One of the earliest examples of cooperating with Russia during the Clinton Administration involved the use of force in Haiti, which Russia ultimately supported. However, securing Russia’s vote on a United Nations Security Council Resolution demonstrated the “gamesmanship” and qualified support the United States would encounter in its pursuit of Russian cooperation.\(^29\)

Consider Madeleine Albright’s remarks on cooperating with Russia over Haiti while serving as President Clinton’s US Ambassador to the United Nations:

>The Russians didn’t much care about what we did in Haiti, but they were determined to play a little diplomatic poker. Moscow’s ambassador, Yuli Vorontsov, presented me with a series of questions about our mission, hinting that Russia’s backing on Haiti would depend on US support for Russian proposals in Georgia.\(^30\)\n
Russia would respect the United States right to act in its sphere of interest if the United States would respect Russia’s right to act within its own. In the end, Russia did support the Resolution, but only after making Albright’s life “as miserable as possible.”\(^31\)

The United States also was able to secure Russia’s support for the return of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to Iraq. The West’s imposition of sanctions on Iraq affected Russia in that Iraq owed money from past transactions. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov explained, “Without sanctions, the Iraqis would sell oil and pay us; with sanctions, they sell oil and use the sanctions as an excuse not to pay us.”\(^32\) The United States and Russia had a shared interest in achieving a diplomatic solution: the United States sought the

\(^{29}\) To be fair, DoD policy for cooperation with the Russian Federation (RF) emphasizes the same principle of reciprocity. The DoD Instruction is classified.

\(^{30}\) Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax, 2003), 158.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 159.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 275.
return of UN inspectors; Russia sought repayment for past debts. Leveraging Russia’s close ties to Saddam Hussein that Primakov developed during his years with the KGB, Russia used its unique access to broker a deal, whereby Saddam did allow the return of UNSCOM inspectors unconditionally. As evidenced during the Bush Administration, access to state and non-state actors with whom the United States does not enjoy the same close ties remains a benefit of a closer US-Russia relationship.

In June 1993, President Clinton announced US policy toward Central and Eastern Europe. The policy outlined four principles; the last of which addressed NATO enlargement. The President called for NATO enlargement to occur gradually through an “open and deliberate process” to “reassure Moscow that NATO’s enlargement to the east would be a step toward Russia, not against it [Emphasis added].”33 To implement this policy, President Clinton successfully promoted establishing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, while General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), proposed the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In an effort to preserve and strengthen NATO in a post-Cold War Europe, PfP invited emerging democracies and states from the former Soviet Union—including Russia—to participate in military training exercises with NATO countries in a meaningful role.34 Although President Yeltsin’s subsequent and surprising announcement that Russia had no objection to Poland joining NATO clouded Russia’s early response (both the Russian foreign and defense ministers earnestly tried to get him to backtrack), overall, Russian reaction to NATO expansion was overwhelmingly negative. Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state and close advisor to the president during the Clinton Administration, recalls his Russian counterpart referring to NATO itself as a “four-letter word,” and

33 Ibid., 167.
34 Ibid., 168.
NATO expansion as “Mission Impossible,” and an issue that would “blow up the circuits” of US-Russian relations.35

Any goodwill generated by the United States and NATO’s positive outreach toward Russia diminished in the wake of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Kosovo marked an inflection point in the relationship, not the nadir, but a low point nonetheless which the Russians would cite repeatedly in the years to come. Often overshadowed by Putin’s fears of the Color Revolutions, Russia’s concern over external involvement in its own internal affairs is longstanding.36 Secretary of State Albright correctly inferred the true meaning of Russia’s resistance to NATO’s position toward Kosovo: “My own feeling was that Russia’s position was shaped less by solidarity with their fellow Slavs than by the possibility that international action there would serve as a precedent for outside intervention in Russia, where Chechen separatists regularly clashed with the Army.”37

Nevertheless, in the early days of planning for Kosovo, there was room for compromise and for Russia to play a key role in resolving the crisis. After a series of informal meetings between Secretary Albright and her counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (one of which occurred at the Bolshoi Theater during a performance of *La Traviata*), Ivanov spoke out against air strikes, but admitted, “We do, however, share your desire for a political settlement, and perhaps the


36 See Barbara Jelavich, *St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974* (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1974), 104, and commentary on the “greatest danger” to the reign of Tsar Nicholas I: “the possibility that the center of the continent might unite under general theories that might ultimately lead to the destruction of the tsarist autocracy and the defeat of the Russian state.” Tsar Alexander II shared this fear. Jelavich wrote that despite some reforms in the 1860s and 1870s, “Russia remained an autocracy and the support of conservative, legitimate governments was to become again…a determining consideration of foreign policy.” Ibid., 127.

37 Albright, 382. The analogy of Chechnya fueled these fears. During a phone conversation with Secretary Albright, Ivanov remarked, “Madeleine, don’t you understand we have many Kosovos in Russia?” Quoted in Talbott, 301.
threat of force is needed to achieve that. I do not see why we cannot try to work together.” Ivanov did join the other members of the Contact Group—the trans-Atlantic Balkans task force comprised of the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy—in presenting the ultimatum to Milosevic. One of the three architects and mediators of the February 1999, Peace Talks at Rambouillet, France was Russian Ambassador Boris Mayorski. Lending credence to Albright’s suspicion that Russia’s position on Kosovo was based less on Slavic solidarity, Ivanov commented on Belgrade’s rejection of peace after his March 1999 trip to Yugoslavia where he had found “only idiots who are ready to go to war.”

Despite Belgrade’s rejection of peace terms, NATO’s decision to compel Milosevic through an air campaign enraged Russia. When informed by Vice President Gore that NATO bombing was about to begin, Primakov—enroute to the United States—ordered his plane to return to Moscow. Russia’s reaction was troubling: some Russian and Belorussian military units indicated a willingness to fight on Serbia’s side; Yeltsin threatened to retarget nuclear missiles toward NATO and accused NATO of bringing the world to the brink of global war; Russian nationalists and Communists exploited events in Kosovo to their advantage; and Yeltsin faced the threat of impeachment. Secretary Albright recognized that Russia remained the key to an acceptable outcome, yet could get nowhere “because the Russians were so angry.” When she expressed her hope that differences over Kosovo would not jeopardize cooperation on other matters, Ivanov responded that there was no avoiding it. Albright recounted, “We talked to them through many channels, but whether it was Clinton-Yeltsin, Gore-Primakov, or Ivanov and I, the Russian message

38 Albright, 397.
39 Ibid., 405.
40 Ibid., 413.
41 Ibid.
to us was the same, even if the decibel levels varied: we had screwed up big time.”42 Adding insult to injury, NATO hosted representatives from every republic of the former USSR except Russia at its April 1999, 50th Anniversary Summit Meeting in Washington, DC.43

As bleak as the relationship appeared in early 1999, there always was room to cooperate. This too remains a feature of US-Russia relations: cooperation often presents a way to emerge from the low points of the relationship. Whether driven by frustration or personal survival, Yeltsin reached out to President Clinton.44 Yeltsin suggested Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin collaborate on a solution. Their proposed solution (begrudgingly accepted by Milosevic once it became clear he had lost Russia’s backing) ultimately would involve NATO, the European Union (EU), the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and a neutral third party in President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland. This illustrates another feature of successful cooperation with Russia: acknowledge Russia’s preference for multinational and multilateral solutions to crises. Although putting “all these elements in motion and in the proper order required a complicated diplomatic dance,” implementation of the solution suggests a model for future multilateral cooperation with Russia.45 Under the scheme adopted by the parties, NATO would maintain order in Kosovo as the Serbs withdrew, the UN would authorize

42 Ibid.

43 Halberstam reported that Western leaders originally hoped to get a senior Russian representative to attend the summit to demonstrate NATO’s desire for a larger partnership, but that the Kosovo bombing ended that hope. See Halberstam, 275. Strobe Talbott described a dinner conversation between State Department officials and Yuli Vorontsov, then-Russian ambassador to the United States in January of that year. When asked if President Yeltsin might attend the NATO summit, Vorontsov snapped, “No he won’t. I think it’s more likely that my president will attend the Senate’s trial of your president”—a trial which had begun just days before. Talbott, 294.

44 Albright explained, “Throughout this dialogue, the Russians were frustrated by the weak hand they had to play. Their military options were few, their dependence on the West was growing, their domestic politics were toxic…Every day of NATO bombing was a bad day for Yeltsin, whom hard-liners blamed for cozying up to the Americans and getting nothing in return [Emphasis added].” Albright, 414.

a peacekeeping operation (PKO) and take charge of civil administration, the EU would coordinate reconstruction, and the OSCE would help organize elections and train police.

A final point on Kosovo illustrates another feature of US-Russia cooperation: Russia’s uncanny ability to muddle otherwise positive developments—a positive followed by a negative. Two examples demonstrate this feature of Russian behavior. First, even after positive negotiations with Chernomyrdin, when NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy, Chernomyrdin flew to China and called the bombing an act of aggression. Second, during implementation of the cease-fire, Russian troops entered Kosovo hailed as heroes by the Serbs. Occupying Pristina Airport, Russia pledged to add more troops if NATO entered before there was agreement on Russia’s role. Albright remembered this episode in surreal frustration: “I thought to myself, ‘Either I am dreaming or this is the worst movie I have ever seen. In one day we had gone from celebrating victory to a farcical Cold War encore.’”

Despite frustrations and setbacks, US-Russian cooperation during the Clinton Administration profited greatly from often warm, personal relationships; constant and meaningful engagement at many levels; and from both formal and informal mechanisms established to realize the benefits of both. Observing the budding friendship between Yeltsin and Clinton toward the end of the Vancouver summit, Yuri (Georgi) Mamedov, a widely respected diplomat in the Russian Foreign Ministry, remarked to Strobe Talbott, his US counterpart, “Don’t underestimate the importance of their chemistry. If they set the tone and direction, we can solve the problems.” Mamedov and Talbott maintained extremely close relations throughout the Clinton Administration.

46 Ibid., 423. Yeltsin established this feature of US-Russian relations early in his dealings with the Clinton Administration. During the April 1993 Vancouver summit, Yeltsin appealed to Clinton—in private—for US assistance in building housing for Russian officers and their families withdrawn from the Baltics. President Clinton agreed and then, according to Talbott, “with that piece of business requiring American magnanimity out of the way, Yeltsin went on the attack” berating Clinton mostly on Cold War legislation that still treated Russia as a communist country. Talbott, 63.
both informally and through structured mechanisms such as the Strategic Stability Group, which they established as an “early warning mechanism for scanning the horizon and thinking about the big picture.” Agreeing to meet several times a year, this body quickly became a device for crisis management as well. Vice-President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin formalized their own high-level engagements and christened them the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC). The GCC met six times (and planned a seventh meeting), achieving results on a range of topics as diverse as energy cooperation, pollution in the Arctic, space exploration, and women’s health. At the department and ministry level, US Secretary of Defense William Perry kept a strong working relationship with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev.

The Clinton years concluded with an event that has shaped US-Russian relations for subsequent administrations: the transition of power from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. In January 2000, Secretary of State Albright was the first senior US official to meet Putin after he became acting president. This first meeting affirmed certain features of Russian behavior described above. Greeting Albright upon her arrival at the Kremlin, a smiling Putin questioned her about the hot air balloon pins she was wearing. Albright replied that they represented rising hopes in Russia. In the midst of this pleasant exchange, Putin suddenly turned to the camera and with a stern look stated, “The US is conducting a policy of pressure against us in Chechnya.” A positive followed by a negative. Despite these theatrics—another feature of Russian behavior, especially during the Putin era—Albright encountered a serious, but hopeful Putin with whom the United States shared common interests. Putin acknowledged his country’s need for help and pledged to cooperate with

47 Talbott, 69.
48 See Talbott, 142-143 for a summary of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commissions (GCC).
49 Albright, 438.
50 Vladimir Putin’s affinity for theatrics continued during the Bush Administration. Unimpressed with President Bush’s Scottish terrier, Barney, when Bush visited Putin’s dacha Putin introduced his new
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He expressed a desire for foreign investment in Russia and committed to reforming Russia’s tax code. He described the shared threat of Central Asian extremists and terrorists, but cautioned prophetically, “Do not try to squeeze Russia out of this region, or you will end up with another Iran or Afghanistan.” Putin closed by expressing, rather colorfully, his commitment to find a home for Russia in the West: “Sure, I like Chinese food, it’s fun to use chopsticks, and I’ve been doing judo for a long time, but this is just exotic stuff. It’s not our mentality, which is European. Russia has to be firmly part of the West.”

Cooperation during the George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)

United States-Russia relations during the Administration of George W. Bush exhibited some of the strongest examples of cooperation thus far, yet experienced some marked lows and the beginnings of a downward shift in the relationship that continues today. Notable examples of US-Russian cooperation included such areas as strategic offensive weapons reduction, Afghanistan and counterterrorism in general, Iran, North Korea, and to a lesser extent, Iraq. The United States and Russia codified much of this cooperation in the 2008 Strategic Framework Declaration and through
dog, Koni, a large black Labrador, as “Bigger, stronger, and faster than Barney.” George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), 433. Condoleezza Rice also was the victim of Putin’s theatrics. During a May 2004 meeting during the Ukrainian crisis, Putin showed Rice his newly refurbished office. Unexpectedly, from a side room emerged Viktor Yanukovych whom Putin introduced with, “Oh, please meet Viktor, he is a candidate for President of Ukraine.” Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Random House, 2011), 358. A somewhat darker theater occurred during the Georgian crisis. Stopping in Russia for a meeting with Putin, Secretary Rice waited for two hours only to have him change the meeting venue to his dacha. There, Rice found not just Putin, but his entire national security council celebrating Medvedev’s birthday with special reserve Georgian wine and off-color jokes about Georgia. Rice, 531. Walter Bedell Smith doubtless would equate these Russian theatrics with the “petty annoyances and pinpricks” he first encountered from the Soviets at the Potsdam Conference. Smith, 24.

51 Albright, 439.
52 Ibid., 440.
a series of Joint Statements from their two presidents. Another characteristic of this period was
the strong personal relationship that developed between Presidents Putin and Bush. Contributors to
a worsening of relations during the George W. Bush Administration include Putin’s reaction to the
Color Revolutions, NATO expansion into Russia’s “near abroad,” the United States’ pursuit of a
Europe-based missile defense capability, and Russia’s 2008 intervention in Georgia.

Like the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the attacks of September 11, 2001
are infamous in the collective memory of the United States. In the context of US-Russian relations,
however, 9/11 and the cooperation it engendered probably represent the high-water mark of US-
Russian cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to contact
the United States on the day of the attacks and the first to offer his nation’s support. In the minutes
following the attacks, Condoleezza Rice, an expert on US-USSR relations then serving as President
Bush’s National Security Advisor, recalled the Cold War danger of raising US alert levels without
first informing the Soviets. From a secure facility, Rice called the Kremlin and spoke with President
Putin. She learned he had been trying to reach President Bush, who was at that time being
evacuated from the capital. Putin acknowledged the change in alert posture, decreased Russia’s own
alert level, cancelled all military exercises, and asked, “Is there anything else we can do?”

President Bush expanded upon Putin’s early offers of support in the weeks after 9/11:

On September 22, I called Putin from Camp David. In a long Saturday-morning
conversation, he agreed to open Russian airspace to American military planes and use his
influence with the former Soviet republics to help get our troops into Afghanistan. I

53 The US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration of April 6, 2008 issued at Sochi, Russia,
followed the Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 announcing a “New Relationship,” and the May 24, 2002
Joint Declaration pledging closer cooperation between the two nations. The Framework described five areas
of cooperation: Promoting Security, Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Combating
Global Terrorism, Strategic Economic Cooperation, and Combating Climate Change. Kissinger remarked to
Condoleezza Rice that he would have “loved to have had a document like that.” Rice, 678. Access the

54 Rice, 75.
suspected he would be worried about Russia being encircled, but he was more concerned about the terrorist problem in his neighborhood. He even ordered Russian generals to brief their American counterparts on their experience during their Afghanistan invasion of the 1980s.55

Putin carried through on his pledges of support and throughout the Bush Administration, US-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and counter-terrorism in general “was indeed good.”56 Condoleezza Rice was “convinced that after 9/11 Putin saw the struggle against terrorism as the new epicenter of Russia’s relationship with the United States, one in which there would be shared principles, strategy, and tactics.”57 Unfortunately, Putin’s vision for cooperation and desire to correlate the US approach to counter-terrorism in the global war on terror with his own approach in Chechnya conflicted with the United States’ emphasis on democracy and the Freedom Agenda as the ultimate solution to the scourge of terrorism.58 In the end, Bush’s comments on Russian encirclement were prescient: as the US presence in Central Asia matured, Moscow grew wary and Putin began speaking of the encirclement of Russia by an aggressive United States.

Iran was another area on which the United States and Russia found common ground. In early 2005, then-Secretary of State Rice encountered a Europe increasingly concerned over Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Putin offered to provide Iran with nuclear fuel enriched in Russia. When Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected the offer, President Bush considered three options: US negotiations directly with Iran, multilateral diplomacy with both “carrots and sticks,” or a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The President discussed the

56 Rice, 93.
57 Ibid.
58 See Bush, Decision Points, 396-7. The Freedom Agenda was the fourth prong of the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine: “Advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear.” Of note, implementation required supporting fledging governments like Georgia and Ukraine while also maintaining strategic relationships with nations like Russia.
options with his National Security Council and “consulted closely with Vladimir Putin, Angela
Merkel, and Tony Blair.” These leaders—and China—agreed to support sanctions and the P5+1
regime was born. The P5+1 as a forum for US-Russia cooperation endured, even after the
relationship soured. At a 2008 P5+1 meeting in Berlin, Secretary Rice and her Russian counterpart,
Sergei Lavrov, agreed to draft text for a UNSCR against Iran. Earlier in 2007 at a UN General
Assembly meeting, the United States sought Russia’s assistance in establishing a US Interest
Section in Teheran, asking Lavrov if Putin could get a message to Iranian leaders. Rice recalled that
Lavrov was “very excited and wanted to discuss it with the Iranians right away.” Putin followed
through, but was rebuffed and the Russians grew increasingly frustrated themselves with the
Iranians. Russia’s own frustrations are important to remember. Even as US-Russian relations
soured, Rice admitted, “From that time forward, it would be more difficult to get Beijing’s
agreement to penalties against Iran than Moscow’s.” Collaboration on Iran affirmed a number of
features of US-Russian cooperation. First, Russia exhibited once again its preference for multi-
lateral solutions. Second, despite the tenor of its relationship with the United States at the time,
Russia was willing to cooperate on and area of mutual concern. Third, Russia enjoys access to
actors that the United States does not. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, Russia wants to be
seen as, and treated as, a great power on the international scene.

59 Ibid., 417.
60 The P5+1 group includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany.
61 Rice, 626.
62 Ibid., 627.
63 On Russian exceptionalism as “an attitude often traced to Byzantium, which Russia claims as an
inheritance,” see Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern,”
Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016): 2-9.
United States-Russian cooperation over North Korea resembled that over Iran in that it, too, relied upon a multi-lateral mechanism: the Six-Party Talks (SPT).\(^{64}\) Originally conceived to prevent North Korea from playing the parties off on one another, the parties soon realized that its charter could expand to provide a venue for cooperation on a range of issues. Secretary Rice explained, “It could become a security forum where the parties of Northeast Asia dealt with nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and ultimately even security disputes among themselves.”\(^{65}\) This realization led to language in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, which anticipated the establishment of a “peace and security mechanism” once the nuclear issues were resolved. The Kremlin was especially interested in the prospects for peace and security this mechanism allowed.\(^{66}\)

United States-Russian relations in the context of the Iraq War are important to note for the missed opportunities, first, to restore relations over a decision on which the two nations disagreed; and second, to secure greater support for the post-invasion counterinsurgency fight and rebuilding of Iraq. France, Russia, and Germany opposed the United States’ decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Sometime during the transition from major combat operations to counterinsurgency, the United States considered how to rebuild relations with these three nations. Rice recalled that the President was “particularly concerned about the Russians, whom he saw as at least having been

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\(^{64}\) The Six-Party Talks are a series of multilateral negotiations attended by China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States whose purpose is to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program.

\(^{65}\) Rice, 523.

straightforward about their opposition.” As an indicator of Russia’s perceived importance vis-à-vis the others, Rice joked that the President should, “Punish France, forgive Russia, and ignore Germany.”67 Bush sent Rice to Moscow to relay his desire to improve relations, to which Putin declared the same. Putin also emphasized that Washington needed to understand Russia’s economic interests in Iraq, not only the large debt Saddam Hussein still owed to Russia, but also its pending oil contracts. That Washington ignored Putin’s message and, instead, offered lucrative contracts only to those countries who had supported the war was a significant misstep and squandered an opportunity to restore relations with Russia and secure its support during the increasingly challenged rebuilding of Iraq.

While disagreements over a Europe-based US missile defense system would persist, the biggest contributors to a worsening of relations between the United States and Russia were the Color Revolutions on Russia’s periphery and Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the revolution in Kyrgyzstan combined with the NATO accession in 2004 of the Baltic States to awaken some of Russia’s “ancient heritage” and “modern anxieties” Ambassador Smith observed in 1948.68 An example of Russia’s “ancient heritage” is the “urge for geographical security that has been a constant factor throughout Russian history.”69 Putin’s fears of outside intervention in Russia’s own domestic political affairs are a clear reflection of its “modern anxieties.” Together, these concerns contributed to the feeling of encirclement President Bush surmised in 2001. Putin hinted at these concerns during his address to the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy. In a speech noted as an inflection point in Russia’s view of the world, Putin chastised the United States for “imposing” its

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67 Rice, 213.
68 Smith, 307.
69 Ibid., 312.
own “economic, political, cultural, and educational policies” on other nations, which can be taken as a veiled reference to US support of the Color Revolutions and an indictment of Bush’s Freedom Agenda. In his speech, Putin also condemned NATO for placing “frontline forces on our borders,” referred to NATO expansion as “a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust,” and asked, “Against whom is this expansion intended?”

In her memoirs, Secretary Rice explained the significant impact the loss of Ukraine in 1991 had on the Russian psyche. The birthplace of the Cyrillic alphabet, losing Ukraine, she said, was like the United States losing the states formed from the 13 original colonies, not just Texas or California as some have described. The Orange Revolution and the further reduction in Russia’s influence only exacerbated the loss. As damaging as the realignment of Ukraine was to Russia, it was Russia’s ultimate reaction to Georgia’s Rose Revolution—incursion in August 2008—which provided the nadir of US-Russian relations during the Bush Administration. Bush labeled it as such, calling it “the low point in our relationship.” Rice explained that she and Sergei Lavrov “were usually able to work our way through and make progress on an issue—at least until the Georgian War, when our relationship broke almost irreparably.”

While there were some overtures to cooperate on the Georgian crisis—Lavrov approached Rice attempting to negotiate; Admiral Mike Mullen, CJCS, established a link with the Russian chief of staff to prevent miscalculation—the effects of Russia’s incursion were far-reaching. NATO suspended the NATO-Russia Council indefinitely and openly declared its support to Georgia; the EU, IMF, and Asian Development Bank all pledged financial support of Georgia; the OSCE offered

71 Bush, Decision Points, 433.
72 Rice, 359.
to provide observers; the United States signed a missile defense agreement with Poland; and the Russian stock market plummeted. Still, this did not stop cooperation altogether. The United States and Russia did agree to a UNSCR on Iran (if only to signal the international community that the Georgian War had not caused the United States and Russia to abandon cooperation on all issues), and did work together through the final months of the Bush Administration, but the relationship had suffered.

Secretary Rice’s September 2008 address at the German Marshall Fund adequately summarized the status of US-Russian relations at the end of the Bush Administration, which had begun in a spirit of hopeful cooperation. In sometimes scathing language, Rice traced the history of the relationship’s decline and analyzed its causes while dismissing Russia’s own justifications for the same. She championed the world’s reaction to events in Georgia, and denounced Russia’s path toward increasing aggression abroad and authoritarianism at home. She put Russia’s leaders on notice that they cannot “have it both ways—drawing benefits from international norms, and markets, and institutions, while challenging their very foundation.” She cautioned, “There is no third way. A 19th century Russia and a 21st century Russia cannot operate in the world side by side.” Resigned to the relationship that existed on the eve of the Obama Administration, Rice closed with a vision for meaningful cooperation in the future:

We will continue, by necessity, to pursue our areas of common concern with Russia. But it would be a real shame if our relationship were never anything more than that—for the best and deepest relationships among states are those that share not only interest, but goals, and aspirations, and values and dreams…Whether Russia’s leaders overcome their nostalgia for another time and reconcile themselves to the sources of power and the exercise of power in the 21st century—still remains to be seen.73


President Barack Obama inherited a US-Russian relationship at the beginning of his administration that lacked the optimism of the three preceding administrations. President Clinton entered office praising George H. W. Bush for his efforts to forge a new relationship with a post-Soviet Russia, and encouraged by the affability of his Russian counterpart, President Boris Yeltsin. Similarly, President George W. Bush looked forward to building a strong personal bond with his new counterpart in President Vladimir Putin. While there was indeed, a glimmer of hope for renewed cooperation in the emergence of a new Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, President Obama encountered a bilateral relationship grown tense due to the Iraq War, Russia’s incursion into Georgia, and the increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia. To these tensions, Russia would add new ones, namely, its seizure of Crimea, intervention in Ukraine, and an increasing role in Syria’s civil war. Nevertheless, Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton agreed that if the United States wanted progress on key issues such as nuclear arms control, sanctions against Iran, and access to Afghanistan’s northern border, the two countries needed to cooperate.

Secretary Clinton’s recipe for managing relations with the Russians was to “work with them on specific issues when possible, and rally other nations to work with us to prevent or limit their negative behavior when needed.” President Obama and Secretary Clinton adopted a pragmatic approach toward Russia that included three elements: cooperating on specific areas where our interests aligned, remaining firm where our interests diverged, and engaging with the

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Russian people themselves. Vice President Biden previewed this approach, subsequently referred to as the “reset,” at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009:

The United States rejects the notion that NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss, or that Russia’s strength is NATO’s weakness. The last few years have seen a dangerous drift in relations between Russia and the members of our Alliance. It is time—to paraphrase President Obama—it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia.

Biden went on to outline areas on which the United States and Russia can and should work together. He enlisted Russia’s cooperation to defeat the “common enemy” of the Taliban and al Qaeda, to secure loose nuclear weapons and materials, to restore verification procedures in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and reduce even further the two nations’ nuclear arsenals. He acknowledged that the United States and Russia will not agree on everything, but warned Russia, “We will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence.” He concluded the two nations can disagree yet still work together where interests coincide.

Soon after announcing the reset, President Obama first met his new Russian counterpart President Medvedev in London in April 2009. This first meeting laid the groundwork for a personal friendship and realization of the kind of cooperation the United States sought at the February Munich Conference. Despite disagreements on missile defense and Georgia, the two Presidents discussed a new treaty to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and agreed to continued cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran, counter-terrorism, and trade. Medvedev called his country’s experience in Afghanistan “pitiful” and offered to allow the United States to transfer lethal cargo

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76 Ibid., 231.


78 Ibid. Biden ends this paragraph on working together where our interests coincide with the assertion, “And they coincide in many places” but does not elaborate on what those places are.
through Russian territory. He confirmed the United States’ estimate of Iranian nuclear capability and voiced his own concern with nuclear proliferation and instability on Russia’s southern flank. In return, Obama pledged to pursue a new nuclear arms treaty and support Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).  

This early London meeting yielded important results. A few months later, in July 2009, the two presidents announced the establishment of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) whose purpose was “identifying areas of cooperation and pursuing joint projects and actions that strengthen strategic stability, international security, economic well-being, and the development of ties between the Russian and American people.” Presidents Obama and Medvedev did sign a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010 and Russia did support the imposition of stronger sanctions against both Iran and North Korea. Russia opened the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) into Afghanistan and supported UN backing for a no-fly zone in Libya by abstaining in a crucial vote. The two nations expanded cooperation on counterterrorism and the United States supported Russia’s entry into the WTO. Medvedev expressed interest in collaborating on a high-tech corridor in Russia modelled on California’s Silicon Valley.

79 Clinton, 232-3.

80 Mission Statement of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC), accessed August 22, 2016 at: http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bpc.html. Temporarily suspended following Russian actions in Ukraine, and its US funding diverted to support Ukraine, the BPC has a comprehensive charter. It is organized with a steering group and working groups for: space cooperation, science and technology, rule of law, nuclear energy and nuclear security, military technical cooperation, military cooperation, innovation, health, environment, energy, emergency situations, education, culture, sports and media; defense relations; cyber; counterterrorism; counternarcotics; business development and economic relations; arms control and international security; and agriculture. See US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/usrussiabilat/.

81 Russia’s expansion of the NDN into Afghanistan is not the munificent act it may seem. Russia has used the United States presence in Central Asia to expand its own military footprint and increase its influence over the Central Asian states in order to diminish their ties to Washington. See Clinton, 238.

82 Clinton, 234-5.
Although prospects for expanded cooperation may have appeared hopeful during the early years of the Obama Administration, in Clinton’s words, “A cool wind was blowing in from the east.”\textsuperscript{83} In September 2011, Medvedev announced he would not seek reelection. In the fall of that year Putin wrote an essay for a Russian newspaper in which he revealed plans to regain influence in the former Soviet republics and establish “a powerful supra-national union capable of becoming a pole in the modern world” which would “change the geographical and geo-economic configuration of the entire continent.”\textsuperscript{84} In May 2012, Putin reclaimed his position as President following a constitutional amendment and parliamentary elections tainted by reports of fraud and protests, which Putin blamed on Secretary Clinton: “She set the tone for some actors in our country and gave them a signal.”\textsuperscript{85} With Putin’s (formal) return to power, Russia grew less helpful and more assertive. It cracked down on non-governmental organizations (NGO) and Russian citizens at home. It leveraged its energy resources to punish and coerce its European neighbors. In 2013, Putin granted asylum to National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden.\textsuperscript{86} Russia illegally annexed Crimea in March 2014 and was expelled from the G-8. Since then, Russia has enabled an insurgency in eastern Ukraine.\textsuperscript{87} Throughout this period, Russia’s support to the Assad regime in

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 236.

\textsuperscript{84} Quoted in Clinton, 239.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 235.

\textsuperscript{86} Edward Snowden was a contracted systems administrator working for the National Security Agency (NSA) at its facility in Oahu, Hawaii. In June 2013, he leaked tens of thousands of top-secret documents to three journalists before fleeing to Hong Kong and then to Russia where he was granted asylum. The leaks revealed not only the details of the agency’s foreign intelligence operations, but also a massive domestic data mining effort, which earned him the acclaim of some who saw him not as a traitor, but as a whistleblower. See Fred Kaplan, \textit{Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 228-234.

\textsuperscript{87} Russia’s behavior under Putin is the realization of Strobe Talbott’s rather prescient fears as expressed in a March 9, 1993 memo to President Clinton: “Nor do we want to see the rise of a new dictatorship that represses its own subjects, threatens its neighbors and requires the United States and its allies to return to a Cold War footing.” Talbott, 52.
Syria and presence in the Middle East expanded significantly. The deterioration in US-Russian relations prompted Secretary of Clinton to recommend the President chart a “new course” in US-Russian cooperation. In a January 2013 memo just before she departed the State Department, Clinton cautioned against abandoning collaboration on Iran or Afghanistan, but recommended, “We should hit the pause button on new efforts. Don’t appear too eager to work together.”

Attempts to cooperate with Russia over Syria have encountered resistance. Instead of cooperation, the United States has found only obstructionism, superficial agreement and support, and no follow-through on commitments made. Partly this is due to the fallout from Russia’s abstention in the UN vote authorizing a no-fly zone in Libya, which the Russians viewed as a pretext for the West’s military intervention. As a result, they have been reluctant to support similar measures against Assad whom they favor to a much greater degree than they did Qaddafi. Russian intransigence over Syria also reflects its own interests. The United States and Russia may share goals of stability in Syria and defeat of the Islamic State and other violent extremists in the region, but this is where they end. As they do in the former Soviet republics of Eastern Europe, and now in Central Asia, US and Russian interests collide in Syria. Russia’s interest in the region dates at least to the era of the Russian Tsars, notably to the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji signed on July 21, 1774, which among other things gave Russia the right to intervene and speak on behalf of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire. Culturally, the Russian Orthodox Church shares ties with Syria’s Orthodox Christians. Russia’s interest in Syria also recalls its role in post-World War I

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88 Clinton, 244.

89 See Jelavich, 20. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji features prominently in Tsarist Russian foreign policy as described by Jelavich in the first half of her book.
geopolitics vis-à-vis Turkey and Persia (Iran). More recently, Russia’s policy toward Syria evokes the Soviet Union’s Cold War patronage of Syria and other Arab states aligned against Israel and its western backers. Geographically, Syria (and now Sevastopol, Crimea) provides Russia with a long-desired warm-water port. Nevertheless, as in earlier examples of US-Russian cooperation during periods of strident disagreement, the United States and Russia have been able to find common ground on certain issues, even in Syria.

While there was some progress on a sanctions regime against Assad (in 2012 Russia agreed to a UNSCR “statement” in lieu of a full “resolution”) the eventual plan collapsed due to Russian non-support. The better example of “in-crisis cooperation” with Russia surrounds the agreement over the removal of Assad’s chemical weapons. Secretary Kerry broached the idea at a 2013 press conference in London. When asked how Assad could prevent military action, Kerry suggested, “He could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week—turn it over, all of it without delay and allow a full accounting.” The Russians interpreted this off-hand remark as a serious diplomatic overture and approached Washington. With its own large Muslim population, Russia shared an interest in keeping chemical weapons out of the hands of extremists. Clinton, no longer Secretary of State, but still close to the President, was realistic: “This wouldn’t end the civil war or do much to help civilians caught in the crossfire, but it would remove a serious threat to Syrian civilians, neighbors including Israel, and the United States itself.” More importantly, she observed, “Maybe cooperation on chemical weapons would create

90 See David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), especially Part XI: Russia Returns to the Middle East.
91 Quoted in Clinton, 467.
92 Ibid., 468.
momentum for broader progress." This reinforces the all-important imperative to keep the door to
Russia open: to cooperate where we can, even during periods of intense disagreement. The United
States embraced Russia’s overture and delayed a Congressional vote on military action against
Syria in order to allow diplomacy to work. In the end, it did work. Secretary Kerry and Russian
Foreign Minister Lavrov successfully negotiated an agreement to remove Syria’s chemical weapons
through the UN Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This also affirmed the
utility of cooperating with the Russians through multilateral mechanisms.

The Obama Administration began with the hopeful “reset” in US-Russian relations and the
promise of a new President in Dmitri Medvedev. However, it ended much as the George W. Bush
Administration ended: with an increasingly strained US-Russian relationship, but one characterized
far more by acrimony, accusations, the severing of routine means of communication, and perhaps
most worrisome, military forces operating in close proximity to one another. Although delivered
almost a year before President Obama departed office, Secretary of State Kerry’s remarks—and
Prime Minister Medvedev’s own critique of relations with the west—at the 2016 Munich Security
Conference compared to Vice President Biden’s remarks at the 2009 conference provide an
interesting frame to the downward trajectory of US-Russian cooperation experienced during the
Obama Administration. At the 2009 conference, Biden ended his speech by reaching out to Russia,
seeking the now well-known reset in US-Russian relations. At the 2016 conference, Kerry began by
summoning “the courage and the resolve in defending liberty and in pursuing peace” that brought
people through the Cold War. He pledged “unwavering support for a democratic Ukraine,” credited
the Europeans for their stand against “Russia’s repeated aggression,” and called on Europe to
“stand united, both in sustaining sanctions for as long as they are necessary and in providing needed

93 Ibid.
assistance to Ukraine.” He was firm in his condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, clearly articulating the path toward sanctions relief. In doing so, he invoked international law and the UN—two institutions Russia repeatedly claims the United States ignores. Before turning to the Middle East and the threat of violent extremism, which occupied the bulk of his speech, Kerry left Russia with a tangible reminder of US commitment to European security. He announced the United States’ planned fourfold increase in support to the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) from $790 million to $3.4 billion—an initiative designed to provide a “more visible and more tangible” military presence in Central and Eastern Europe.94 Secretary Kerry’s concluding remarks on Syria did reference the establishment of the 20-plus member International Syria Support Group (ISSG), which includes Russia, and inferred areas on which Russian cooperation might be helpful, but clearly, Russia is now part of the problem, not the solution. In contrast to Biden’s 2009 remarks, Kerry’s 2016 speech ended not with outreach to Russia, but with outreach to a “transatlantic community” that may or may not include Russia. One is left with the rather pessimistic impression that US-Russian cooperation is frozen, and that it is Russia, which much instigate a thaw.95


95 The allusion to the Cold War is deliberate. Secretary Clinton summarized her assessment of US-Russian relations at the end of her tenure as Secretary of State: “Unfortunately, as of now, Russia under Putin remains frozen between the past they can’t let go of and the future they can’t bring themselves to embrace.” Clinton, 245.
Reinventing the Relationship: Prospects for Future Cooperation with the Russian Federation

In June 2016, Michael McFaul, Director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and former US Ambassador to Russia, testified before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee on US policy toward Putin’s Russia. He stated, “As someone who lived in the Soviet Union, I find the current level of vitriol against the United States and the West more generally even worse than during the Cold War days [Emphasis added].”

Medvedev’s earlier comments at the February 2016 Munich Security Conference (see footnote above) attest to this. At the March 2016 European Strategy Conference and Workshops, panelists resurrected long-forgotten Cold War acronyms and concepts such as REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany), the G-I-UK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) gap, convoy operations across the North Atlantic, and Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons. In the final years of the Obama Administration, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford spoke openly about the United States’ “4+1” adversaries, one of which is Russia. In November 2016, the Joint Staff published a new classified National Military Strategy—the first such strategy to be classified since 1989—to address in clearer terms US military strategy toward the key challenges now facing the United States. The year 2016 ended with claims of Russian interference in the United States 2016 Presidential election. In January 2017, as part of a long-anticipated response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, a US Army armored brigade combat team of

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97 Author’s notes, 2016 European Strategy Conference and Workshops, Ramstein Airbase, Germany, March 2016.
3,500 soldiers arrived in Poland to welcome greetings of “We have waited for you for a long
time.”98 The US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission has all but ceased, as has the NATO-
Russia Council. Something is different. US-Russian relations in 2017—and the prospects for cooperation—are not what they were in 1989, 1993, 2001, or 2009. United States Presidential administrations in the post-Cold War era began hopeful of closer US-Russian cooperation, but usually ended having seen the relationship deteriorate in some measure. The Obama-Trump transition is no different, yet the United States and Russia do seem to be on the precipice of another Cold War. What, therefore, are the prospects for continued cooperation? To answer this requires asking three additional questions: Should the United States cooperate with Russia? On what should the United States and Russia cooperate? What principles should guide the United States cooperation with Russia?

The Acceptability of US-Russia Cooperation: Should the United States Cooperate with Russia?

Despite the dismal nature of US-Russian relations twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, most agree that the United States should continue to find ways to cooperate with Russia. In former-Ambassador McFaul’s June 2016 testimony he suggested, “When opportunities to cooperate with Russia arise on issues of mutual benefit, we should pursue them, and not link cooperation on these issues to progress on other issues of disagreement.” He recommended the United States “stay the course” and prescribed six ways of doing this; number five was “Work with the Russian government on issues of mutual interests.”99

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99 McFaul testimony.
testified in his Senate confirmation hearing that “Where cooperation with Russia based on common interests is possible, such as reducing the global threat of terrorism, we ought to explore these options.” Further, he acknowledged the need for “open and frank dialogue with Russia regarding its ambitions, so that we know how to chart our own course.”

Secretary of Defense-designate James Mattis echoed the need for dialogue with Russia during his own nomination hearing: “We find ourselves embracing the dual reality of seeking engagement and cooperation where we can, yet defending our interests where we must.”

Looking toward the next four to eight years, even the 2016 Republican and Democratic Party platforms acknowledged the preference for dialogue and cooperation with Russia. The Republican platform declared, “For the people of Russia, we affirm our respect and our determination to maintain a friendship beyond the reach of those who wish to divide us. We have common imperatives: Ending terrorism, combating nuclear proliferation, promoting trade, and more.”

The Democratic platform stated, “We will make it clear to Putin that we are prepared to cooperate with him when it is in our interest…but we will not hesitate to stand up to Russian aggression.”

In the military sphere, recent strategic guidance documents affirm the reality of cooperation. The July 2016 *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035* understands that “Countries and political groups simultaneously cooperate and compete based on their relative power, capabilities, interests, and ideals [Emphasis added].” In addition, the JOE envisions future

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Joint Force missions might include “working with competitor states—potentially China, Russia, Iran, and others—in order to shape and influence their initiatives.” The 2016 United States European Command Theater Strategy states, “Although the United States and its allies and partners desire cooperation with Russia to address shared security concerns, continued Russian aggression…will constrain such efforts.” To support USEUCOM’s theater priority to “Deter Russian Aggression,” USEUCOM nevertheless leaves open the door to cooperate with Russia when it is in US interest to do so.

That dialogue can defuse tensions and prevent miscommunication is clear. That cooperation between two great powers can potentially resolve some of the world’s greatest challenges also is clear. Fred Ikle in his Every War Must End offered another reason why states should negotiate even as adversaries. In the section entitled “Negotiating while Fighting” Ikle suggests, “The more that negotiation with the enemy is presented officially as something that is natural—indeed desirable—in the midst of a war, the less will the civilian population and the troops respond to the opening of talks by questioning of rejecting a continued war effort.” The same applies to allies and partners: the more cooperation and dialogue are accepted facets of the US-Russian relationship the less allies and partners will perceive “US accommodation of competing great powers” as a sign of US unreliability.

105 Headquarters, United States European Command, United States European Command Theater Strategy (October 2015), 2.
106 Ibid., 4.
107 Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 86. In this section, Ikle also offers a number of reasons why governments oppose negotiations with an enemy. He provides several examples of wartime negotiations including the two Finnish-Soviet Wars, the Indian-Pakistani War, the Greek Civil War, the Korean War, World War I, World War II, and the Algerian War.
108 JOE, 6.
The Substance of US-Russia Cooperation: On What Should the United States and Russia Cooperate?

There are many suitable lists of topics or issues, on which the United States and Russia should cooperate. The 1972 Statement of Basic Principles concluded during the Nixon Administration, the 2008 US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration agreed to during the George W. Bush Administration, and the organization of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission established during the Obama Administration (all addressed elsewhere in this paper) each illustrated the broad range of activities on which these two nations can cooperate. With a few notable additions, another list of promising areas for cooperation will not look much different. Equally important, in fact, essential to developing such a list, is a process of examining and discovering shared interests. To be sure, many of these areas develop as the result of meetings at the presidential and secretarial/ministerial levels. Still, the planner can derive most of these candidates for cooperation through a process the United States Marine Corps labels “common objective analysis.”109 To develop a security cooperation plan for a partner nation, the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) teaches planners to cross-compare the objectives listed in a number of strategic guidance documents to determine where these interests coincide and, therefore, are the most likely objectives to pursue. Security cooperation planners review objectives as presented in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), theater campaign plan (TCP), Service campaign plan, service component command campaign support plan (CSP), US Ambassador’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), Department of State Regional Bureau.

Joint Regional Strategy (JRS), and the desires of the partner nation. Absent a joint declaration like
the one issued in 2008, one can use the same technique to derive the United States and Russia’s
shared interests.

The most obvious comparison is between the US and Russian national security strategies.
With the 2017 US Presidential transition, the suitability of the 2015 National Security Strategy—which
does state, “We will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of
common interests”—remains in doubt, as does the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy, if
President Putin determines the arrival of a new US President justifies a new Russian strategy.110
Comparing the interests, goals and objectives of a Trump NSS with a revised Putin NSS should
establish strategic level areas of cooperation. A second comparison could involve the respective
national military or defense strategies, specifically the lists of ends, goals, and priorities. One may
ask, “On which of these can the United States reasonably—and safely—cooperate with Russia?”
Protecting one’s homeland, safeguarding WMD materials and technology, and accessing the global
commons are commonly expressed goals declared by both nations. A third comparison involves the
statements of goals or charters of the international organizations to which the United States and
Russia both belong. The United States and Russia share membership in 62 international
organizations.111 If membership in these organizations implies acceptance of the organization’s
goals, and if the Russians truly are sincere in their preference for solutions through multilateral
mechanisms and international law, then reviewing the “ends” or goals of these organizations is a
suitable starting point from which to identify potential areas of cooperation on specific issues.

110 The White House, National Security Strategy (February 2015), 25.
111 As of December 2016, the United States is a member of 88 international organizations; the
Russian Federation is a member of 79. CIA World Factbook, “International Organization Participation,”
A less obvious source of cooperation guidance is *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035*. The JOE is useful for three reasons. First, it presents a twenty-year outlook on future conflict. As such, its scope transcends multiple US Presidential administrations. Second, it condenses a number of strategic futures studies, including: the National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends*, the Joint Staff’s *Joint Strategic Review*, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s *Joint Strategic Assessment*, each Service’s “deep futures” study, and several multinational studies such as NATO’s *Strategic Foresight Analysis* and the United Kingdom’s *Global Strategic Trends and Future Operating Environment* documents. Third, the current CJCS approved it, and, given the positive history between the new Secretary of Defense and General Dunford, it is reasonable to assume that it—like the NMS—will remain relevant through the initial years of a Trump presidency.

The JOE envisions Russia as a future competitor. While not usually identified by name, one can infer in the statements of adversary behavior that the adversary in question is, indeed, Russia. Still, the JOE “focuses more on how the United States might counter, mitigate, or avoid security challenges.” While the United States must counter Russian aggression, the words “mitigate” and “avoid” each suggest room for cooperation—even with adversaries. Importantly, the trends and contexts of future conflict presented in the JOE are global, and therefore, could apply equally to Russia. Consider the following trends from Russia’s point of view: “the establishment of regional nuclear deterrents,” “uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction,” “inability to contain infectious disease,” “cooperation/convergence among terrorist and criminal organizations,” “globalized criminal and terrorists networks,” and even “demand for food or water exceeding local

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112 See JOE, page 2 for complete list of contributing studies under Acknowledgments.

113 JOE, 2.
capacity to affordably deliver.” Similarly, Russia will experience the effects of the same contexts of “violent ideological competition,” “disrupted global commons,” and “shattered and reordered regions.” Two more contexts suggest additional reasons to cooperate. First, “a contest for cyberspace” will demand—finally—the development of international rules and norms such as a definition of cyberspace sovereignty, or what constitutes a cyberspace act of war. Moreover, there may be a need to establish structures and processes for cyberspace, similar to those in place during the Cold War to prevent miscalculation over the use of nuclear weapons. What does mutually assured destruction look like in cyberspace? As two of the globe’s most capable cyber actors, the United States and Russia share an interest in preventing the destruction of their information-dependent societies. Second, the context of “antagonistic geopolitical balancing” closely aligns with the trend, “intensification of warfare by proxy.” Proxy wars for which the United States and Russia are the opposing patrons will place our militaries in close proximity. Another aspect of this context is the competition that will occur (and has occurred in Baghdad, Iraq) between the United States and Russia to be a third party’s “partner of choice.” Both scenarios demand cooperation, if only at the tactical level to prevent miscommunication or escalation as was done when approaching forces met at the Elbe River in 1945.

114 See JOE, Section I pp 4-20. Food security seems an odd choice, however, President Eisenhower stated in his April 1953 “Chance for Peace” speech that “the peace we seek...can be fortified not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice.” In his 1999 “manifesto,” Vladimir Putin acknowledged his own country’s challenges in the delivery of food to its people, calling for “a modern agrarian policy.” Delivered on the eve of his ascendancy, this speech may be Putin at his best: proud of his country, yet sanguine about its shortcomings and need for external support. He provides a vision for Russia as a responsible and democratic member of the international community. One wonders if this Putin still exists, or if this more positive vision of Russia has been merely suppressed or supplanted altogether by the familiar authoritarian approach to Russian governance. Vladimir Putin, “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” (speech, December 30, 1999), accessed January 5, 2017, http://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm.

115 See JOE Section II, pp. 21-39 for its discussion of the contexts of future conflict.
Returning to the context of “violent ideological competition” one encounters a tantalizing reminder of how the fight against Islamic State might have benefited from closer US-Russia cooperation. The JOE explains,

Using an array of multimedia capabilities and broad access to the Internet, groups will be able to mobilize, connect, and coordinate over wider, non-contiguous areas. The same global information environment that allows ideas to be shared widely will also permit groups to form, plan, and conduct campaigns of violence more rapidly, over wider geographical areas, and in a more coherent and sustained way than is common today.\textsuperscript{116}

Moreover, “Adversary information operations will focus on evolving their messages, goals, aspirations, and objectives and adapting their narrative strategies to affect a variety of friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences.”\textsuperscript{117} The prevalence of information operations (IO) is a theme repeated throughout the JOE. Because Russia shares the same threat of violent ideological extremism, and because information warfare remains a key element of Russian strategy, it is unfortunate that the global counter-ISIS coalition has not yet found a way to leverage Russian IO capabilities in the fight. Secretary Kerry highlighted this aspect of the campaign in his February 2016 address in Munich, when he announced the recent opening of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center—with offices in a number of Arab states—“to help dispel extremist groups’ hateful lies in all forms of media.”\textsuperscript{118} Russia was noticeably absent from the list of participating states. In any analysis of shared goals or consideration of competitor strengths to offset US weaknesses in the interest of closer cooperation, one imperative must remain clear: avoid

\textsuperscript{116}JOE, 22.

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., 23.

cooperating in areas in which the United States maintains a competitive advantage vis-à-vis Russia.  


The history of US-Russia relations suggests eleven principles to guide the United States in its future cooperation with Russia:

1) Cooperate with Russia to defeat other adversaries’ designs. The United States should remain engaged with Russia through continued support of cooperative mechanisms already in place such as the Six-Party Talks for North Korea and the P5+1 talks for Iran. For each of the five “key challenges” outlined in the 2016 National Military Strategy (Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, violent extremist organizations), the United States should consider ways to cooperate with Russia to frustrate the strategies of the remaining four. Just as the Soviet Union and Russia have historically sought to exploit seams in western alliances, so, too, must the United States remain vigilant to the seams that exist or may develop even further between Russia and the United States’ other key challenges. The United States should seek to prevent a coalescence of these challenges: more worrisome than an aggressive Russia is a Russia aligned with Iran, North Korea, or China against the United States. Cooperating with Russia over issues of mutual concern may be a way to distance Russia from these other actors.

119 There is at least one other important consideration: In the pursuit of US goals, how complicit does the United States want to be in some rather unsavory Russian information operations characterized by disinformation, deception, and lies? The world witnessed Russia’s capacity for this recently in Crimea and Ukraine; however, “intrigue” was a pervasive feature of tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union’s propaganda machine was legendary. George Kennan described a Soviet Government marked by an “atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy” under which “possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite.” At root, he stated, “the very disrespect of Russians for objective truth—indeed, their disbelief in its existence—leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another.” Kennan, 7.
2) Deconstruct issues in order to identify those “sub-issues” on which the United States and Russia can move forward. The United States should be wary of pursuing an “all-or-nothing” approach to negotiations. In 1985, the United States and Russia reached an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) only after separating the INF talks from the broader agenda, which included also START and SDI. Related to this principle, the United States should consider conceding or deferring discussions on lesser priorities in order to realize gains on higher priority interests. For example, at the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt relegated talks on Poland to secondary status in order to secure Soviet support for a “world organization” (the UN).120

3) Engage on multiple levels. President George H. W. Bush emphasized this during the START I negotiations. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission during the Clinton Administration yielded powerful results on a broad range of topics, as did the Talbott-Mamedov Strategic Stability Group. The US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission established during the Obama Administration demonstrates this principle in the organization of its working groups. The DoD Instruction on US military cooperation with the Russian Federation establishes a similar structure of working groups and sub working groups from SecDef/Minister of Defense level down to Colonel/Captain level. In addition to engaging at multiple levels with the formal instruments of the Russian Government, the United States must appreciate the informal instruments of Russian policy-making and execution and consider whether, and how to approach these players. George Kennan identified this structural aspect of Soviet policy implementation as being conducted in two “planes”: “(one) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (two) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet

Government does not admit responsibility. [Emphasis added]”121 This informal sector of Russian governance is very much at play in Putin’s Russia today through his use of “curators” and a twenty-first century version of *sistema*—a complex approach toward decision-making and management that has characterized Russian politics and society for centuries.122

4) *Work through international organizations and other multilateral mechanisms.* Russia is quick to criticize the United States for ignoring international law or failing to resolve issues through international fora. The United States should call Russia’s bluff and hold them accountable to this.123 Where possible, the United States should approach Russia through one of the 62 international organizations to which they both belong. Alternatively, the United States can resolve an issue unilaterally or as part of a coalition or alliance up to a point at which it makes sense to enlist Russia’s cooperation through other international means (as occurred in Kosovo). Whenever invoking the UN as an element of US-Russian cooperation, the United States should be cautious and remember George Kennan’s warning in 1946 that “Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.”124

121 Kennan, 8.

122 See Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russian Politics under Putin: The System Will Outlast the Master,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016): 10-17. The author defines curators as “semiofficial figures through whom state governance flows…a political bureaucrat, a project manager authorized by the Kremlin to operate through personal agents.” Pavlovsky, 13. *Sistema* is “a style of exercising power that turns the country’s people into temporary operating resources.” Under *sistema*, “every level of society—businesses, social and ethnic groups, powerful clans, and even criminal gangs—is drafted into solving what the Kremlin labels ‘urgent state problems.’” Pavlovsky, 14.

123 Kennan in his Long Telegram to George C. Marshall was far less sanguine toward Russian respect of international institutions. Commenting on Russian perceptions of the newly formed United Nations Organization (UNO) and other such IGOs, Kennan posited, “Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an area in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued.” Kennan, 9.

124 Ibid.
5) Develop branch and sequel plans in order to realize quickly the benefits of unexpected cooperation. For strategies, crisis action plans, or deliberate plans whose ends could benefit from Russian cooperation, yet, are developed in an operating environment (OE) in which Russia is not a partner, planners should consider what would change if Russia were to reverse its position and pledge its support. What opportunities would this present? How could the United States leverage this goodwill quickly in order to retain the initiative? What structures or processes should be in place to capitalize on this sudden change in the OE?

6) Expect Russian “gamesmanship” and have a plan to mitigate its impact. The United States and its agents who engage members of the Russian Federation should expect to encounter Ambassador Smith’s “petty annoyances and pinpricks”—the gamesmanship, theatrics, and “one-upmanship” that have characterized the United States’ dealings with the Russians. Instead of being shocked and embarrassed by it, the United States should have a plan to mitigate its impact, quickly. Whether formally, informally, publically, or in private, the United States must communicate its displeasure and respond forcefully enough to preserve US prestige yet, not surrender the benefits of continued Russian cooperation. Such theatrics often reveal themselves in public settings, but usually are mere bluster playing to a domestic audience.125 Real progress occurs in private.

7) Maintain people-to-people exchanges and dialogue. This was a feature of the 1972 Basic Principles and the 2008 Strategic Declaration. Bedell Smith argued that the United States wartime relationship with the Soviets was not as strong as that experienced with the other allies simply because, “we had no informal opportunities to meet as friends and come to know each other.

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125 George Kennan observed in 1946, “Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia’s borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today. [Emphasis added]” Kennan, 5.
The personal relationships cultivated by Reagan-Gorbachev, Bush-Gorbachev, Clinton-Yeltsin, Bush-Putin, and Obama-Medvedev yielded important areas of cooperation. So too, did lower-level relationships such as those between Strobe Talbott and Yuri Mamedov, or Secretary of Defense William Perry and his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev. Even more important than these government-to-government relationships, in a Russian populace whose opinions of the United States increasingly are those of the central government, exchanges at the citizen level can help dispel negative perceptions of the United States. 127

8) Leverage Russia’s strengths in the interest of common goals. The United States should seek Russia’s cooperation on issues for which Russia has a critical capability that the United States lacks. The obvious example throughout recent history has been access. Russia maintains relations—in some cases, very long relations—with states and actors to whom the United States does not enjoy the same access. However, the critical capability could also be Russia’s geography, resources, or dominance in a certain manufacturing process or technology (such as rocket engines). This could be at the tactical, operational, or strategic level and involve any of the elements of national power.

9) Do not cooperate in areas in which the United States maintains a competitive advantage. Admittedly disingenuous in light of the previous principle, the United States should avoid cooperating with Russia when to provide a critical capability would risk diminishing the United States’ competitive advantage over Russia in the event Russia is an adversary. However, not every

126 Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, 23.

127 In 1946 George Kennan allowed that official Russia often was at variance with the “natural outlook” of the Russian people who are, “by and large, friendly to the outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor.” Kennan, 4.
US strength represents a competitive advantage and the United States should apply its strengths toward the accomplishment of shared goals as long as doing so does not jeopardize its security.

10) **Do not “dance on the wall.”** The United States must avoid hubris and gloating in its dealings with Russia. President George H. W. Bush set the right tone as the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, but perceptions remain in Russia that the United States was not always magnanimous in its Cold War “victory” over the USSR. This unnecessarily tarnished the new relationship from the beginning. The Russians are a proud people. The United States should recognize Russia’s sensitivity—especially regarding foreign intervention or “help”—and respect its longstanding desire for recognition as a great power. President Clinton’s assertion during discussions on NATO expansion that, “We’ve got to eat something, too” rightfully avoided such hubris and applied a measure of humility in the United States’ dealings with Russia.

11) **Engage in the spirit of reciprocity, but from a position of strength; do not be seen to be “running after” the Russians.** During the pre-World War II negotiations with the Soviet Union, US Ambassador to France and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union William C. Bullitt confided to British negotiators that he was convinced of the need for an agreement, but equally convinced “that we shall never reach it if we give them the impression that we are running after them.”

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128 In his memoirs of the turbulent events in Russia during the period August 1991 until October 1993, Boris Yeltsin commented on the emergence of people with a new (or, rather, old and repressed) outlook on the world. He observed, “They have the psychology of the *muzhik*, the sturdy Russian peasant, who does not expect anyone to help him and doesn’t rely on anyone…To put it bluntly, normal people—the kind of people who used to be crushed by the state—have begun to appear in our country.” Yeltsin, 146.

129 Talbott, 234. Talbott also recounted a conversation with President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland who warned, “You mustn’t overplay your hand with the Russians…Don’t make them feel punished or on probation.” Talbott, 261. Like Clinton, President George H. W. Bush was keen to this sentiment. In his first meeting with Gorbachev in Malta, Bush reassured the Soviet leader, “We are trying to present our proposals in such a way as to avoid creating the impression that America is ‘rescuing’ the Soviet Union.” Gorbachev, 511.

Department of Defense policy for cooperating with the Russian Federation emphasizes reciprocity, balance, and two-way productive engagement. Russia needs the United States more than the United States needs Russia. Gorbachev and Yeltsin each acknowledged this to their US counterparts in a pair of striking admissions. Early in the May 1990 Washington summit, Gorbachev conceded to President Bush, “I will be frank: we do not believe that a weakened United States playing a less important role in world affairs would be in our interests.” 131 Two years later, during a June 1992 exchange with President Clinton, Yeltsin affirmed, “What we want from the US is a model of leadership for others to follow.” 132 It is doubtful President Putin would echo the same sentiment today, at least not publicly. Whether stated or implicit, the United States should embrace its role as a world leader and negotiate with Russia from a position of strength. Major General John R. Deane, Commander of the US Military Mission to Moscow during World War II put it best, “Soviet officials are much happier, more amenable, and less suspicious when an adversary drives a hard bargain than when he succumbs easily to Soviet demands.” 133

Conclusion

Cooperation is an enduring feature of US-Russian relations. This is a surprising assertion to make considering the history of these two great powers has been primarily as adversaries, not partners. Despite deep ideological differences, massive defense expenditures designed to destroy each other, and limited wars conducted, in part, to defeat the other’s aims, the United States and its

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131 Gorbachev, 537.
132 Talbott, 32.
133 John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of American Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia* (London: John Murray, 1947), 197. George Kennan echoed this sentiment in his Long Telegram. Soviet power, he wrote, is “highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.” Kennan, 15-15½.
Soviet and Russian counterparts remained firm in their commitment to find ways to cooperate on something. If cooperation on big issues was out of reach, they found something smaller on which they could agree and on which they could demonstrate progress. Any such progress—even if it was only to talk and to keep a dialogue going—doubtless helped assuage the world’s abiding fear of superpower confrontation. The World War II strategy conferences and Cold War summits are clear evidence of this. To be sure, dialogue was a signal feature of US-Soviet cooperation during most of the Cold War and effectively established a “steady-state” for cooperative relations. However, in the latter years of the Cold War, the United States and the USSR realized far more tangible results of cooperation, especially in arms control, that—with the dissolution of the Soviet Union—opened the aperture to a broad range of issues and fields on which to cooperate. Cooperation in the post-Cold War era assumed a new purpose: not to prevent conflict, but to realize common interests and to effect positive change on the world stage. The Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations all achieved important success with their Russian counterparts on such areas as German reunification, Central and Eastern European democracy, trade, the Balkans, Haiti, Libya, Iraq, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs and other nuclear non-proliferation issues, Afghanistan, terrorism, and the environment, to name a few. Sometimes agreement was fleeting, and other times cooperation masked a national agenda; however, the record of US-Russian cooperation in scope and in the structures and mechanisms put in place to sustain such cooperation over the past twenty-five years has been impressive.

Now, that record is in question. Will it continue? In a very short span of time, beginning perhaps in 2008 with Russia’s incursion into Georgia, but accelerating rapidly with Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the US-Russian relationship is at a definitive low-point. For the Russian Prime Minister to openly question if he is living in 2016 or 1962, or for a former US Ambassador to Moscow to describe today’s vitriol against the United States to be worse than the days of the Cold
War, the relationship is at a very bad place, indeed. The return to “Russia as adversary” is in evidence across the US government. Strategies, plans, and concepts refer to Russia as an adversary, or at best, a competitor or “key challenge.” Cold War terminology is back in vogue. The National Military Strategy is once again classified. There is a palpable sense that the Services—too ready to discard the past fifteen years of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations—yearn for the familiar bi-polar world and the enemy they knew. Nevertheless, as dismal and “Cold War-esque” as the strategic discussions (and rhetoric) have become, one still can find a glimmer of hope: that obscure DoD instruction on cooperating with the Russian Federation, that one line in a campaign plan that allows dialogue, that as-yet-undefined, but still talked about element of US strategy that includes keeping the door open to Russia. The United States and Russia will find ways to cooperate. The relationship may not be as rosy as it was at the start of the new millennium, but the United States and Russia will maintain a relationship that includes some level of cooperation for two reasons. First, with an aggressive, resurgent, and scorned Russia once again ruled by an autocrat, and with military forces now operating in close proximity, cooperation and dialogue will help prevent escalation and conflict. Second, emerging security concerns and the nature of future conflict are global and, therefore, affect both parties to the relationship. Both face the scourge of violent extremist organizations. Neither the United States, nor Russia has a true friend in China, Iran, or North Korea. As Putin himself declared, “Russia has to be firmly part of the West.” Keeping in mind the recommended principles above, perhaps this statement of western orientation, bundled with Putin’s far less bellicose and more pleading content of his 1999 “manifesto” offers a suitable starting point from which to reinvent the US-Russian relationship for the foreseeable future.
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