Society and the British Army: Implications for Fighting Spirit

A Monograph

by

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Society and the British Army: Implications for Fighting Spirit

Representing the British public, the British Army must balance a conceived need to be different from society with the imperative of maintaining recruiting levels, legitimacy, and funding. This relationship is further complicated by the evolution of societal culture, meaning the Army must concurrently change to maintain public support in these areas. Such change potentially threatens the Army’s ability to embody “fighting spirit,” a doctrinal term necessitating soldiers display initiative, courage, resilience, determination, and toughness.

This paper holds that, despite constant change and an enduring gap between society and the British Army, the Army’s embodiment of fighting spirit has remained relatively constant since World War II, a trend that is likely to continue in the future. The Army’s training and socialization effectively inculcate a fighting spirit in soldiers, although the context within which the Army fights alters its demonstrable characteristics. The main obstacle identified to fighting spirit is imposed externally, rather than internally, wherein societal change has generated public values misaligned with fighting spirit. This translates into risk aversion, increasingly constraining the Army’s fighting spirit through political limitations. This phenomenon is largely context dependent, and it will be important for the Army to influence societal, political, and media opinion if it is to avoid inappropriate limitations on its freedom of action in the future.

Society; British Army; Change; Culture; Army Culture; British Culture; Fighting Spirit; Civil-Military Gap.
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Abstract


Representing the British public, the British Army must balance a conceived need to be different from society with the imperative of maintaining recruiting levels, legitimacy, and funding. This relationship is further complicated by the evolution of societal culture, meaning the Army must concurrently change to maintain public support in these areas. Such change potentially threatens the Army’s ability to embody “fighting spirit,” a doctrinal term necessitating soldiers display initiative, courage, resilience, determination, and toughness.

This paper holds that, despite constant change and an enduring gap between society and the British Army, the Army’s embodiment of fighting spirit has remained relatively constant since World War II, a trend that is likely to continue in the future. The Army’s training and socialization effectively inculcate a fighting spirit in soldiers, although the context within which the Army fights alters its demonstrable characteristics. The main obstacle identified to fighting spirit is imposed externally, rather than internally, wherein societal change has generated public values misaligned with fighting spirit. This translates into risk aversion, increasingly constraining the Army’s fighting spirit through political limitations. This phenomenon is largely context dependent, and it will be important for the Army to influence societal, political, and media opinion if it is to avoid inappropriate limitations on its freedom of action in the future.
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Illustrations

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Introduction

Fighting is an attitude of mind, and the willingness to kill and be killed comes from a blend of faith, trust in the leadership, harsh discipline and compulsion...no other group is required to kill other human beings or deliberately sacrifice their lives for the nation.

—General Sir Michael Rose, *The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*

The Army, or more broadly the Armed Forces, holds a unique role in society wherein its members must be prepared to kill and be killed in defense of the United Kingdom’s interests.1 Society is vital to the Army’s ability to fulfil this role. Existing in a democracy, British society constitutes the Army’s recruiting base, provides legitimacy for the Army’s operations, and influences the levels of funding the government is willing and able to spend on the military. Ultimately, the British Army represents the British public.

This inextricable link raises the question as to the extent of the Army’s need to be different from society. Christopher Dandeker highlighted two opposing schools of thought in this argument, the “conservative and liberal positions.”2 Consistent with the conservative position, in his 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington held that a nation’s government must maintain “objective civilian control” of the military to maximize military professionalism. For this to work, governments must distribute political power between military and civilian groups in a way that encourages the emergence of appropriate attitudes and behaviors among military professionals.3 As Antony Beevor wrote, “One might well argue that the day the British soldier becomes a model of

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caring citizenship is the day that he can no longer be counted on to hold the pass against the thug and tyrant.”

According to Huntington, the opposite pole to objective civilian control is “subjective civilian control,” which “achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them mirror the state,” and thereby undermining the military’s ability to embody unique values. Huntington argued that civilian groups’ demands for officers to reflect their “interests and principles” often hinders the professionalization of the military. In the 1990s, Peter Bracken adopted a comparable argument regarding the British Army, considering the Army “damagingly out of step and time with wider social trends.” He argued,

“citizenship enjoys a moral imperative—justice demands that individuals have the right to exercise their citizenship…there are few more potent expressions of citizenship than the right to serve in a great institution of state, one established moreover to defend that state.”

His expectation that the Army should mirror society diminished the requirement for difference between the two, consistent with subjective civilian control.

A more pragmatic stance exists between these positions, acknowledging an inevitable interrelationship while accepting exceptionality in certain areas. Alan Hawley summarized this argument, writing, “the military must be brought within the purview of mainstream society and its developments so that the right degree of cross-fertilisation can be ensured.” This implies a balance is possible that benefits both the Army and society. The Army must overtly espouse an ethos that

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5 Huntington, 83.
6 Ibid., 85.
8 Huntington, 83
attracts recruits from society whilst retaining support amongst all segments of society. Failure to do so will negate the cross-fertilization to which Hawley refers. The ethos need not exactly mirror that of society, but it must resonate with society, meaning that the Army cannot conceive it in isolation.

In recent history, the British Army has shied away from Dandeker’s liberal position, espousing a need to be different based upon the unique demands placed on its members. At the heart of this argument is the assumption that British soldiers go to war motivated by relationships between comrades, so anything threatening this cohesion would adversely affect combat effectiveness. This argument holds that, although the Army and civilian society may at times be misaligned, it is for practical reasons.10

These arguments underline the inherent tension that exists between the society and the Army. Truly objective civilian control of the military is rare.11 Society therefore inevitably influences the values and ethos espoused by the Army, even if the Army does not mirror society exactly. Hew Strachan observed that it is often advisable for the Army to respond to external calls for change in certain areas to better align with society’s expectations and thereby improve recruitment and retention. He acknowledged this requires compromise but argued, “The Army cannot be as different from society as it might like for reasons that are as much to do with pragmatism as with political correctness.”12

If, therefore, the Army necessarily reflects society in certain respects, one must consider the dynamic relationship between the two resulting from the ever-changing character of society. This connotes the Army should change in conjunction with societal change if it is to retain its legitimacy and its recruiting base. These changes include shifts in attitude towards such things as equal

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11 Huntington, 85.
opportunities, blame and litigation, education, and technology, as well as values, all of which scholars have investigated in relation to their impact on the Army.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, in 1962 the British Army became an all-volunteer force, which changed the Army’s relationship with society.\textsuperscript{14} Historically, National Service meant the majority of young males gained some first-hand military experience, with the remainder of society likely to have regular contact with those in the military. Moreover, since 1952, the size of the military has steadily reduced year-on-year, which, when combined with a reduction in civilian exposure to the military has led to the identification of a “civil-military gap,” wherein society has less appreciation and understanding of the military.\textsuperscript{15} This widening gap, exacerbated by base closures increasing the Army’s physical remoteness from society, threatens the Army’s requisite funding, manning, and legitimation.

Constant societal change and a widening civil-military gap are therefore two key problems facing the Army as they seek to reflect employment and lifestyle opportunities consistent with modern societal expectations. Throughout any change, the Army must retain its ability to conduct its core purposes, described by Chief of the General Staff General Sir Nicholas Carter as “protecting the nation, fighting the country’s enemies, preventing conflict…and dealing with


disaster.”\textsuperscript{16} Despite the diversity of purposes, there is an inherent necessity to be prepared to fight—a task that inevitably includes killing and risking life. Carter addressed this point, emphasizing that “The Army’s combat ethos…must be sustained” despite change.\textsuperscript{17}

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) \textit{Land Operations} refers to this concept as “fighting spirit,” which it considers a constituent part of the British Army’s moral component. As defined in ADP \textit{Land Operations},

> Fighting spirit unifies all who serve in our armed forces. Comprising initiative, courage, resilience, determination and toughness, fighting spirit drives soldiers forward in the most arduous and adverse of conditions. Through fighting spirit, soldiers accept both the legal right and duty to apply lethal force, and also the potentially unlimited liability to lay down their lives in the service of the nation. Fighting spirit requires moral and physical fortitude. By testing fighting spirit in demanding training, it is hardened and made more resilient to the realities of potentially brutal land conflict.\textsuperscript{18}

The requirement to kill is particularly challenging. As Dave Grossman observed in his book, \textit{On Killing}, “there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow man.”\textsuperscript{19} The Army attempts to overcome this resistance through an intensive socialization process that supplants the socialization encountered by recruits earlier in civilian life.\textsuperscript{20} As Grossman noted, “With the proper conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and will kill.”\textsuperscript{21}

Despite this effort to overcome civilian socialization, it seems logical that the more societal values diverge from a propensity for fighting, killing, and sacrifice, the more difficult it will be to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Nicholas Carter, “Army Command Review–Next Steps,” GS/02/01/13 (January 26, 2015), 6.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Warfare Branch, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) \textit{Land Operations Pre-publication Edition} (Published online: October, 2016), 3-8.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Grossman, 4.
\end{itemize}
instill these qualities during the Army’s secondary socialization. Indeed, Christopher Coker posited that the modern warrior faces three challenges: modern warfare is not compatible with the historic notion of a “warrior myth;” civil society’s ever more pervasive judgment of warrior values undermines its prevalence; and modern technology, which threatens to “dispossess warriors of their sense of agency.” The Army’s training process must address these obstacles.

The preceding background frames the problem for investigation. Societal change necessitates change in the Army in order that it maintains legitimacy, funding, and recruitment. This will affect the Army’s espoused values and ethos and therefore potentially influences the prevalence of fighting spirit. In turn, reduced fighting spirit could damage the Army’s ability to conduct one of its core purposes, fighting the country’s enemies, undermining its operational effectiveness. This problem raises the question investigated herein: what does the British Army’s relationship with society mean for the future of fighting spirit in the force?

Based on the assumption that historic patterns of societal and Army change can help anticipate future change, this paper examines three significant areas in answering this question. It establishes a start-state for society and the Army in 1945, the point from which subsequent change is considered; it considers societal change from 1945 to present, determining congruent change in

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22 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann argued in their book, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, that socialization occurs across two main phases: primary and secondary socialization. These socializations instill people’s senses of reality. Primary socialization, which occurs early in life is the stronger of the two, ascribing individuals’ perceptions of objective reality. Secondary socialization occurs later in life and seeks to socialize individuals into particular environments and institutions, seeking to align individuals’ beliefs to those inculcated in that institution. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Open Road Media, 1966), 129-46.

23 Coker considers agency in this sense to be the human “consciousness,” affording humanity “the ability to choose its own fate.” Coker, *The Warrior Ethos*, 8-11.

24 This assumption is grounded in John Lewis Gaddis’ theory of continuities through time. He identified continuities to be recurring phenomena that “show up so frequently in the past, we can reasonably expect them to continue to do so in the future.” John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30.
the Army and identifying patterns of fighting spirit in wars during the same period; and, using identified patterns of change, anticipates a likely future for fighting spirit.

The period since World War II serves as the timeframe for analysis because it follows a large-scale mobilization for war and precedes the abolishment of National Service, a significant decrease in the Army’s force numbers, and many notable societal changes. These changes were wide-ranging—no single study could possibly account for them all. Selected by their relevance and prevalence in existing studies, this paper focuses on changing diversity, tolerance and discrimination, individual freedom and autonomy, deference, aversion to violence and killing, litigation culture, and fitness. In the absence of explicit links between a given societal change and its effect on the prevalence of fighting spirit, continuities identified through the period of analysis enabled inferences about possible future change, which appear in the conclusion.

In 2016, ADP Land Operations replaced the doctrinal term, “warrior spirit,” with “fighting spirit.” Concurrently, Carter described life in modern British society as, “no longer an era of change,” but “a change of era,” highlighting the level of change afoot. Despite extensive literature considering civil-military relations and fighting spirit, no known research examines the specifics of the doctrinal term alongside the British Army’s current change initiative. Therefore, obstacles to

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25 For evidence in the reduction in size of the military since World War II, see “Army Cuts: How Have UK Armed Forces Personnel Numbers Changed Over Time?” Guardian Data Blog.

26 Gaddis, 30.


28 The author has identified no studies examining the doctrinal concept of “fighting spirit.” Studies often refer to similar ideas, which overlap with the doctrinal definition, albeit sometimes referred to by different names, such as “warrior spirit” and “warrior ethos.” Examples of such studies include: Patrick Mileham, “Fighting Spirit: Has it a Future?” in Strachan, ed., The British Army, Manpower and Society, 242-57; Sean McKnight, “The Best and the Worst of It: Why Are the British So Good at Fighting?” Military Illustrated (February 1996): 45-47; Michael Rose, “Sustaining the Will to Fight in the British Army,” The Officer (January—February 1998): 40-41; Christopher Coker, “The Unhappy Warrior,” RUSI 150, no. 4 (December 2005): 13-16; Coker, The Warrior Ethos.
fighting spirit identified in the ensuing analysis could justify reevaluation of the Army’s approach to change.

This paper holds that, despite constant change and an enduring gap between society and the British Army, the Army’s embodiment of fighting spirit has remained relatively constant since WWII, a trend that is likely to continue in the future. The Army’s training and socialization effectively inculcate a fighting spirit in soldiers, although the context within which the Army fights alters its demonstrable characteristics. The main obstacle identified to fighting spirit is imposed externally, rather than internally, wherein societal change has generated public values misaligned with fighting spirit. This translates into risk aversion, increasingly constraining the Army’s fighting spirit through political limitations. This phenomenon is largely context dependent, and it will be important for the Army to influence societal, political, and media opinion if it is to avoid inappropriate limitations on its freedom of action in the future.

Methodology

A review of existing literature establishes the details of British Army and societal change since WWII. To determine whether societal and Army change has affected the prevalence of fighting spirit, the assessable criteria derive from the ADP *Land Operations*’ definition of fighting spirit. These criteria are, “initiative, courage, resilience, determination and toughness.” Indicators of its embodiment include endurance “in the most arduous and adverse of conditions,” and acceptance of “both the legal right and duty to apply lethal force, and also the potentially unlimited liability to lay down [one’s life] in the service of the nation.”

This paper also incorporates elements of Grossman’s situational variables that facilitate killing behavior. These are: demands of authority, group absolution, the predisposition of the killer,

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29 Warfare Branch, ADP *Land Operations*, 3-8.
the total distance from the killer, and the target attractiveness of the victim.\textsuperscript{30} Each comprises various subcomponents and these supplement the analysis where applicable. Of note, this paper equates cohesiveness among teams with group absolutism because, as Grossman holds, it is the “powerful sense of accountability to his comrades on the battlefield” that often motivates a soldier to kill.\textsuperscript{31}

Thus, the analysis of literature leads to the identification and categorization of evidence of both doctrinal traits and Grossman’s situational variants. In turn, these highlight the development of trends over time. One such trend, patterns of change since WWII, emerges from the following analysis and forms the basis for inferences about likely future trends of fighting spirit in the British Army.

Society, The Army, and Fighting Spirit at the end of World War II

Following years of economic depression and war, in 1945 the British public looked forward to the future.\textsuperscript{32} Much of the population had experienced first-hand the realities of war, and the conscript Army was the second largest it has ever been.\textsuperscript{33} While the British people ended the war victorious, ungenerous accounts of the British Army in combat from 1939 to 1945 often portrayed it as ineffective, with tea-obsessed soldiers led by officers whose ego far surpassed their skill. This soon led to the emergence in Britain of a powerful counter narrative regarding the heroic fighting spirit of British soldiers and their leaders.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} Grossman, 188.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 149.
\textsuperscript{34} Antony Beevor, “The British Tommy Would Only Fight After Frequent Cuppa Breaks and the SS were Sadistic Fanatics: Britain’s Leading War Historian Tackles the Greatest Myths of WW2,” \textit{Mail Online}, June 14, 2014, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/event/article-2656189/WW2-
As Michael Paris observed, “it was hardly surprising that war weariness was widespread” in 1945—the war had caused the deaths of 383,000 British service personnel and 60,000 civilians.\textsuperscript{35} The public hoped to return to “normality,” but the war had shaped their expectations.\textsuperscript{36} For example, the war had affirmed the value of women in the workplace, and society, united against a common threat, saw merit in sacrificing individual freedoms to the state to ensure their long-term protection.\textsuperscript{37} James noted how, against this backdrop, the newly elected Labour Party implemented the Beveridge Plan, promising to “maintain [the] union of national willpower and government wisdom to build the economy, sustain full employment and create a welfare state.”\textsuperscript{38} Although popular, this plan assumed women would simply return to the home after the war.\textsuperscript{39} Signs of inequality within post-war society were not limited to gender. Homosexuality remained illegal, racial tension divided the nation, and wartime unity soon gave way to division into social classes based on education levels and other factors.\textsuperscript{40} This post-war society was intimately familiar with the conscript military, with over five million men and women having served in the British military during the war, three and a half million of who served in the Army.\textsuperscript{41}


\textsuperscript{37} Noakes, 133-34; James, 609-10, 616, 665; Lewis A. Coser, \textit{Functions of Social Conflict} (New York: The Free Press, 1956), 93-94.

\textsuperscript{38} James, 706.

\textsuperscript{39} Noakes, 133-34.

\textsuperscript{40} James, 665-84, 719.

The massive scale of WWII ensured that the war touched every citizen in one way or another; therefore, after the war the nation understood its army as well as it ever had, enabling citizens, military leaders, and historians to gauge its predisposition for fighting spirit. Despite stunning displays of toughness and resilience in the face of significant hardship, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, criticized the generation’s combat performance, observing that “the trouble with our British lads is that they are not killers by instinct.”42 Some historians echoed such observations. While James regarded the British victory at El Alamein as the turning point for British morale in the war, Stephen Ambrose argued that the lack of “killer instinct” led to an ineffective pursuit of the defeated Afrika Corps.43 Moreover, as the end of war approached, soldiers became increasingly reluctant to risk their lives. Beevor noted a study of the British in Italy, which showed that only the minority of men in any engagement fought, while others fled.44 Furthermore, military authorities saw draftees as less deferential than previous generations and more aware of their legal and moral rights.45

Imbuing collectivist values, the postwar public was tired of war and willing to entrust the government to bring about societal change. Although some citizens aspired to improve equality, attitudes towards gender, sexuality, race, and class appear antiquated by today’s standards. Large numbers of the public had experienced some form of interaction with the Army during WWII and, in 1945, the conscript Army was the second-largest it has ever been. Thus, the British Army after WWII was closely aligned with the public it served, and the Army’s performance during the war

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42 In one example of the conditions soldiers endured, James described, “the extremes of heat and cold, flies, mosquitoes, the irregularity and inadequacy of rations, and memories of a chilling sense of vulnerability.” James, 696; Alan Brooke, quoted in James, 694.


44 Beevor, “The British Tommy.”

45 James, 687.
indicates that this post-war army lacked fighting spirit—a state of affairs that provides the start-state for the ensuing analysis.

**The Impact of Societal Change on Fighting Spirit from 1945 to Present**

In 1971, Ronald Inglehart hypothesized that a fundamental shift was taking place in the culture of advanced industrial societies like Britain, altering the values prioritized in those societies. He reaffirmed this hypothesis in his 2005 paper, “Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006,” based on the premise that the prolonged prosperity and security in Western post-industrial societies had led recent generations to value self-expression values over survival values. He argued that this change happened slowly, embedding in culture through socialization between generations, and resulted in societies that tolerate diversity and anti-discrimination movements, pursue individual freedom and autonomy, and shun deference to authority, signaling a shift away from traditional political, religious, moral, and social norms.46 Aside from Inglehart’s anticipated cultural changes, studies have noted increasing societal aversion to violence, a growing litigation culture, and decreasing levels of fitness in society, which warrant consideration given their bearing on the Army. This section investigates whether change in these areas has occurred in British society since WWII, how this change has influenced the Army, what theoretical implications it holds for fighting spirit, and whether any change in fighting spirit is apparent in wars fought by the British Army since 1945.

**Diversity, Tolerance, and Discrimination**

In assessing British society’s changing predilection for tolerance of diversity and anti-discrimination, three key areas warrant attention given their centrality to ongoing discourse within

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the Army—race, gender, and sexuality. Legislative and behavioral changes in these areas support Inglehart’s claims, with society growing increasingly tolerant of minority populations from each demographic, espousing ever-greater levels of equality. The Army has mirrored these changes, albeit at a slower pace than society, often requiring societal intervention to drive change. Despite theorists’ predictions, no discernable evidence exists that this change has undermined fighting spirit in war.

Legislation has served as the foundation of increasing social diversity and equality since WWII. In 1945, the coming immigration boom had yet to start, society remained heavily patriarchal, and homosexuality was illegal. Beginning in 1948, a series of acts, combined with Britain joining the European Economic Community, facilitated increased immigration and paved the way for a shift in ethnic demographic.47 The non-UK born population of England and Wales quadrupled between 1951 and 2011, and the share of immigrants in the United Kingdom’s working-age population increased from just over seven percent in 1979 to approximately thirteen percent in 2007.48 As for gender equality, the rise of “second wave” feminism prompted the Sex


Discrimination Act 1975, which set the stage for equal rights for women, with the percentage of women comprising the British workforce rising from thirty-one percent in 1951 to almost half in 2016.\textsuperscript{49} Finally, it took until 1967 for the government to legalize homosexuality. Despite the Wolfenden Report’s recommendation to do so a decade earlier, the government sensed insufficient public support for such change in the interim.\textsuperscript{50} Since then, a series of laws have aligned the rights of homosexuals with those of heterosexuals regarding age of consent, adoption, and marriage.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite increasing diversity, discrimination in all areas was initially rife, and although domestic opinion gradually became more tolerant, there remains room for improvement. For example, race riots in the 1950s and 1980s revealed high levels of public angst, and despite passage of a series of anti-discrimination laws, significant change did not happen until approval of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, responding to “institutional racism” in the police, to affect what then-Home Secretary Jack Straw considered “deep-seated cultural change.”\textsuperscript{52} However, surging

\begin{itemize}
hate crime against immigrants following the 2016 Brexit vote indicates there is some way still to go.53 This is also the case in gender equality where, in 2016, Lanning et al. warned, “legalistic reforms and formal measures of gender equality…can be misleading.” Over half of modern tribunal cases involve sex discrimination and most women still feel societal pressure to put family before their careers.54

The Army’s attitudes towards race, gender, and sexuality followed a similar path, but invariably lagged behind the pace. Political pressure forced the 1986 introduction of ethnic monitoring in the Army, which showed ethnic minority representation increasing, rising from eight percent in 2006 to approximately ten percent by 2012.55 However, these figures still trail societal black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) proportions, leading the Prime Minister to dictate a


54 Lanning et al., 3; Women and Work: The Facts.

twenty percent representation target. BAME suspicion of the Army, identified by Edmunds and Forster, may provide an obstacle to this target, with Dandeker and Mason identifying that those joining tended to share the Army’s core values. Dandeker and Mason also noted that tough discipline can ostracize foreign and commonwealth soldiers, an important observation given that ADP Land Operations describes how discipline “underpins fighting spirit….It is the glue that holds soldiers together when threatened; it is the primary antidote to fear.” This makes their assertion that socialization can overcome this tension critically important to maintain fighting spirit.

Alongside increasing diversity, racial discrimination and prejudice in the Army have decreased. Vinen observed how during National Service, “the armed forces did not want to recruit large numbers of non-white soldiers,” and in 1996 Stuart Crawford noted continuing widespread racism in the Army. It took the threat of legal action following a 1996 formal investigation by the Commission on Racial Equality, a civilian body, to force the Army to change. Despite arguments that over-sensitivity to the minority might undermine cohesion and toughness, low levels of formal racial harassment and discrimination complaints in recent years suggest significant improvement.

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57 Edmunds and Forster, 57; Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, “How British Should the British Army be?” (Report Commissioned by Director of Army Personal Services (DAPS), The British Army, 2007), 40-41.
58 Dandeker and Mason, 41; ADP Land Operations, 3-9.
59 Dandeker and Mason, 34-35.
60 Vinen, 112; Crawford, 139-41.
Progress towards gender equality also lagged behind societal change. By the late 1990s, thirty percent of the Army remained closed to women. It was not until 2016 that the Army opened combat roles to women, signaling the end of female exclusion based on senior officers’ judgments about combat effectiveness. This likely contributed to a concurrent drop in sex discrimination complaints, although a 2015 report indicated that sexual harassment still undermines trust in the Army to some extent, an observation with the potential to stifle initiative required in fighting spirit given its reliance on trust.

As for sexuality equality, it took a European Court of Human Rights ruling to lift the ban on homosexuals in the Armed Forces in 2000, overturning an exemption from the Sexual Offenses Act 1967. Some senior officers still voiced discontent, arguing that the move threatened discipline and morale, the latter of which serves as a vital component of fighting spirit. However, although

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66 BBC, “Head to Head: Gays in the Military;” ADP Land Operations, 1A-1.
incidents of sexual orientation harassment still occasionally make the news, trends in service complaints indicate low levels of harassment and discrimination overall.\textsuperscript{67}

Increasing diversification of the force caused some to fear a reduction in trust and cohesion. However, a study into the integration of women into combat arms placed the onus on leaders to integrate diversity and manage group culture, emphasizing leadership as a facilitator of fighting spirit by fostering cohesion. Moreover, increased tolerance, noticeable by the reduction in bullying, harassment, and discrimination, will likely enhance trust and team cohesion within and between groups.\textsuperscript{68}

The Army’s performance in wars since 1945 shows little evidence that greater diversity decreases cohesion, perhaps because of the effect of the longstanding regimental system on cohesion in the British Army. In Korea, McInnes noted how, “The regimental system helped to sustain morale…and helped to promote a strong esprit de corps.” Accounts by various historians of the battles of Naktong River, Middlesex Hill, Kowang San, Maryang San, and Imjin River all indicate that this cohesion supported all aspects of fighting spirit.\textsuperscript{69} Ashley Cunningham-Boothe noted how, “those who opened up their hearts in the privacy of comradeship to proclaim inner fears


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and dread of battle…overcame such fears when the time came as, indeed, must all those who wear the soldier’s uniform, if they want to avoid the company of cowards.” 70 This observation is consistent with Grossman’s belief that group pressure is an important facilitator of killing—in Korea, the regimental system facilitated this phenomenon. 71

The presence of group cohesion was again apparent in 1982 during the Falklands War. As Major General Jonathan Shaw, a Parachute Regiment platoon commander during the Falklands War, expressed,

I have always felt indebted to the conditioning we underwent before the battle, the three weeks of deprivation and misery we endured getting to Mount Longdon….I cannot say how I might have reacted had we had to fight on the beach landing, fresh from the Canberra. But the 21 days on the island, particularly the physical hardships of the march across it, without any supporting logistics and in soaking, near freezing conditions, had bound us together in a spirit of mutual support that I have never witnessed before or since. The survival of the tribe became more important than the survival of the individual….The requirement to kill became a tribal necessity. 72

Shaw also credited the British Army’s tight-knit regimental system as contributing to the “creation of the passion that overrides our aversion to killing.” 73 Holmes further emphasized the centrality of such cohesion to fighting spirit in the Falklands War, identifying how a “compelling need to live up to the regiment’s proud traditions created powerful anxiety on the eve of the landings,” and for many soldiers “the greatest fear was not of being killed or wounded, but of ‘bottling out,’ of showing cowardice.” 74 Holmes, quoting Major Chris Keeble, 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment’s Second-in-Command during the conflict, wrote, “you had to fire…because you wanted to be part of that aggression, and firing was how you showed it.” 75

73 Ibid., 9.
75 Ibid., 325.
Most recently, interviews of gallantry award winners in Afghanistan highlighted the continued prevalence of group cohesion in facilitating fighting spirit. For example, Captain Scarlett and Lance Corporals Martin and Leakey, recipients of awards for valorous actions in combat, all referenced the importance of, and their reliance upon, their comrades in battle. Highlighting the continued relevance of the regimental system’s role in generating cohesion, LCpl Leakey stated, “The only thing I was really scared of was letting [the regiment] down.” Such examples indicate that cohesion in war abounds despite diversification of the Army, thereby supporting fighting spirit.

Greater diversity also has the potential to reduce soldiers’ cultural distance from the enemy, highlighting Grossman’s assertion that greater cultural distance makes killing easier by dehumanizing adversaries. As the Army grows in ethnic and cultural diversity, it becomes less likely that the Army will face ethnically and culturally unfamiliar opponents, making it harder to draw upon racial disassociation to facilitate killing. Grossman noted that, in these instances, other emotional distances—moral, social, and mechanical—will generate the willingness to kill.

Despite this possibility, there is little evidence to suggest a reduced cultural distance has negatively influenced fighting spirit in soldiers. In most wars, there has been some effort to depersonalize killing. Holmes noted that, in war, “language both depersonalises the enemy and cloaks the act of killing in euphemisms.” He observed how, “In the Falklands, Argentinians were never killed: they were ‘taken out’ or ‘wasted’….The Argentinians were either the frankly derisive

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77 Describing the relevance of cultural distance, Grossman described how “It is so much easier to kill someone if they look distinctly different from you. If your propaganda machine can convince your soldiers that their opponents are not really human but are ‘inferior forms of life,’ then their natural resistance to killing their own species will be reduced.” Grossman, 161.

78 Grossman, 161-64.
‘spicks’ or the more neutral ‘Argies.’” However, this cultural distancing was far from absolute. Holmes noted how British forces were subjected to no official hate propaganda, and little of the Argie bashing of the popular press rubbed off on them. As far as most of them were concerned, the Argentinians were cyphers....A soldier in 2 Para admitted that he had ‘always hated them,’ until ‘you saw what sad creatures they were when you went through a position.’ Another thought they were nothing more nor less than Figure 11 [man-shaped] targets: they were on the position being attacked, so would have to be disposed of. A platoon commander in 3 Para was more philosophical. ‘The poor buggers were there because they’d been sent there,’ he said. ‘Those guys had been rubber dicked.’

This attitude indicates some dehumanization, although little animosity. Despite this, the level of fighting spirit and willingness to kill remained high. Most recently, the “Operation Herrick Campaign Study” asserted that “The fighting spirit of [the current] generation of British forces was tested and proven” in Afghanistan, further attesting that greater diversity and tolerance has done little to diminish the Army’s fighting spirit.

Individual Freedom, Autonomy, and Individualism

Inglehart’s theory suggested a shift from the British societal collectivism of WWII, towards greater individualism in 2005. In 2010, Geert Hofstede et al. categorized Great Britain as strongly individualist, meaning individuals tend to look after themselves rather than being socialized into strong, cohesive groups. Anticipated traits include individual ownership of resources, the tendency for individual interests to prevail over group interests, and employees pursuing employers’ interests only if they coincide with their self-interest.

79 Holmes, 364.
80 Ibid., 371; Shaw, 8.
James noted a shift towards individual ownership of resources immediately following the war, when the number of licensed cars rose from under 8,000 in 1945 to almost 12,000 in 1946. By 2015, this figure reached 25.8 million.\(^3\) Average house occupancy provides another metric, decreasing from 3.1 to 2.4 people between 1961 and 2001.\(^4\) Although collectivist sentiment still exists, public attitude changes also indicate increasing societal individualism, with an increasing proportion of the public explaining the causes of poverty in individualistic terms, rather than societal terms, between 1983 and 2011.\(^5\) Each of these trends indicates a growing societal preference for individual freedom and autonomy. This is not to claim that the rise of individualism started after WWII—it merely highlights society’s increasing individualism since 1945.

In 1997, Stephen Deakin identified a tension in the Army between rising diversity and required Army values, including collectivism, writing that,

> An effective army like the British one accepts some diversity, but within a tightly bounded community that insists on much conformity. In such an organisation, individualism, self-interest, tension and conflict, especially if they are given precedence, are viewed as disloyal, whereas uniformity, cohesion, trust and team work are seen as vital to success.\(^6\)

In a separate paper, he noted how the Army produced the 1993 British Army Discipline and Standards Paper in response to fears that changing societal values were undermining Army cohesion and operational effectiveness.\(^7\) The introduction of individual rooms, increased recruitment in branches offering transferable skills over others, and the pursuit of self-development

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\(^6\) Deakin, “The British Army and Homosexuality,” 132.

\(^7\) Deakin, “The British Military,” 30.
Through education all indicate rising individualism in the Army. Furthermore, the abolishment of National Service in 1962 made military service a fundamentally individual choice. However, Joseph Soeters identified the British Army as less individualist than wider society, indicating both the importance and effectiveness of socialization during training, and the readiness of enlistees to accept collectivist values.

Various frictions have developed amid increasing individualism within the Army. The Afghanistan war, for example, required the reinforcement of combat arm units with numerous specialists, including fire support teams, counter-IED specialists and intelligence analysts. These came from outside the regimental tribe with which they deployed, making early integration during training critical, both to understand their capabilities and to build relationships. It led Richard Streatfield, a company commander in Afghanistan in 2009, to write,

> It is curious that we form battalions to promote professional efficiency and morale and then break them up at very short notice, thereby undoing all that good. The quicker the British Army finds a way to preserve but get over its ‘regimental traditions’ and starts building structures that can live and fight together, the better.

This tension led King to propose that, “the basis of cohesion has become more competence-based and impersonal than by personal familiarity.” The reliance of soldiers on each other’s individual, niche skills generated “a task-based ‘quick’ cohesion” that apparently transcended regimental

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89 Soeters’ study suffered from some self-identified limitations, including its focus on student officers only. However, he asserted that “Student officers…seem to be representative military men and women, perhaps more than older and lower-rank military personnel.” Joseph L. Soeters, “Value Orientations in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Study,” *Armed Forces and Society* (Fall 1997), 17, 26.


91 Directorate Land Warfare, 5-1_13, 5-7_5-7_6.

allegiances. This is not to suggest that the regimental system does not remain important for cohesion, but it helps explain the retention of cohesion in the face of greater individualism.

The increased pursuit of individual freedom and autonomy within the Army had a positive effect on the embodiment of initiative. In 1989, mission command entered the British Army’s operational doctrine. This command philosophy demands that subordinates use their initiative, something Dianne Langford observed requires a degree of individualism. Following WWII, Field Marshal Montgomery stifled hopes of centralized intent and decentralized execution inherent in mission command, and by the 1960s, a bipolar approach to command emerged. The British Army of the Rhine enacted tight centralized command, whereas the British and Commonwealth forces that deployed further afield developed theater-specific doctrine emphasizing decentralization and necessitating initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. It was, however, the varied performance of the 1982 Falklands task force that set the stage for the implementation of the Bagnall reforms, which inculcated mission command into doctrine.

When the British moved into Helmand province, Afghanistan, in 2006, mission command facilitated the establishment of “platoon houses” in Musa Qala, Sangin and Now Zad, enabling subunits to deploy with relative autonomy. As Dannat noted, this resulted in the British soldiers

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93 King, 353-357.
94 ADP Land Operations, 3-6; Dianne Langford, “In what Ways Can Education and Training be Used to ‘Bridge the Gap’ between the Attitudes and Culture of British Army Recruits and the Army’s Organisational Culture?” (Master’s diss., University of Bath, September 2006), 15.
“fighting for their lives in a series of Rorke’s Drift-type battles. Isolated enclaves were the sites of ferocious fighting against a determined enemy.”98 Underlining the reliance on junior soldiers’ initiative, Colonel Stuart Tootal, the Commanding Officer of 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, wrote of Corporal Bryan Budd, a posthumous recipient of the Victoria Cross, “His personal gallantry and decision to take the initiative to launch his section into the attack typified the professionalism and courage of Parachute Regiment junior commanders.”99

Deference

Since 1945, deference to authority has gradually declined. Between the 1980s and 2000s, trust in government eroded and, by 2016, the British press reported that trust in politicians had “slumped to an all-time low.”100 As Stuart Clayton observed, following society’s collective sacrifice during the World Wars, “ordinary people began to feel entitled to things which had been the preserve of their ‘betters’ in previous generations.” The resulting gap between expectations and reality caused frustration, from which proliferated a media-amplified rise in satire aimed at the political elite. This catalyzed a reduction in deference, which Clayton considered to be a “reflection

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98 Dannatt, 300.
99 Stuart Tootal, Danger Close: Commanding 3 PARA in Afghanistan (London: John Murray (Publishers), 2009), location 2972, Kindle.
of changes in British attitudes and behaviour.” Modern media reports describe a generational
decrease in deference, portraying today’s youth as lacking discipline and respect for authority.

Some studies have identified this same trend in the Army. Edmunds and Forster noted
greater challenges for authority in the Armed Forces, citing three key contributors—a greater
individual willingness to challenge authority, increased incidence of families speaking out, and the
rise of technology allowing issues to be taken outside the chain of command more easily. Such
change forebodes a challenge to authoritarian leadership techniques that rely on positional power,
which are less likely to be effective as deference decreases. This raises potential issues for leaders
given what Dandeker refers to as the Army’s “highly structured authority relations,” especially
when coupled with the tendency towards decentralization.

Army leaders must empower subordinates while retaining authority, respect, and trust
sufficient to ensure unquestioning obedience when necessary, particularly when orders risk lives or
require the use of lethal force. Janis Bragan Balda and Fernando Mora asserted that future
organizations must adopt new “organizational paradigms” to “develop a multigenerational
collaborative culture” that embraces the millennial generation. They held that leadership attitudes

101 Stuart Clayton, “Television and the Decline of Deference,” History Review, no. 68 (December
?sid=8986cec3-537f-423e-a232-acc9a6a275c9%40sessionmgr4008&vid=4&hid=4209&bdata=
JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZS1jc3JoaW5nZW50aWZpY2F0aW9uZC1kYXRhYXkgc2F0ZSB0YXNvdW50
YWxsaW5n#AN=55724493&db=t5h.

102 Examples of modern media reports include: Fiona McCrae and Paul Sims, “The Spoilt
Generation: Parents who Fail to Exert Authority Breeding Youngsters with no Respect for Anyone,” Daily
Jeff Randall, “No Respect, No Morals, No Trust—Welcome to Modern Britain,” Telegraph, November 5,
2009, accessed December 4, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeffrandall/6510223/No-
respect-no-morals-no-trust-welcome-to-modern-Britain.html.

103 For example: Edmunds and Forster, 70; Dandeker, 181.

104 Edmunds and Forster, 70.

105 Dandeker, 181.

106 Grossman identified the killer’s respect for authority figures and the legitimacy of the authority
figure’s authority as key elements of authority figures facilitating killing. Grossman, 144-45.
must change to accommodate subordinates’ increasing demands for constant “open, positive, respectful, and affirming” dialogue with their superiors. Moreover, leaders must “[earn] Millennials’ commitment and trust by serving the task, the organization, the relationship, and even the exchange, authentically.” Adding to the changing leadership paradigm, Chiara Ruffa, Christopher Dandeker, and Pascal Vennesson observed how, “The dispersion of military authority combines coercive and hierarchical elements typical of a military organization with ‘group consensus’ and persuasive forms of authority and it has led to the emergence of different leadership styles.”

The 2015 British Army Leadership Code encapsulated the Army’s understanding of current leadership requirements. It emphasized that “leaders must aspire to be Transformational… motivating and inspiring the team to achieve through shared Values, vision, trust and confidence.” However, it also acknowledged that some situations still called for transactional leadership, demanding that troops “Just do it!” Circumstances demanding directive leadership might entail killing and risk to life—as Grossman identified, during many historical “killing circumstances…it was the demand for killing actions from a leader that was the decisive factor.”

One might expect decreasing deference to denude trust between ranks, resulting in ill-disciplined subordinates who defy orders, but recent data indicate that self-discipline and trust in immediate commanders is increasing. Furthermore, the actions of soldiers in combat since WWII

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110 Grossman, 146.

indicate the limited effect of decreasing deference on fighting spirit. In Korea, in 1951, the Gloucester Regiment was ordered to hold the line despite the inherent sacrificial consequences.\textsuperscript{112} In response, their commanding officer, Colonel Carne, said,

\begin{quote}
I understand the position quite clearly. What I must make clear to you is that my command is no longer an effective fighting force. If it is required that we shall stay here, in spite of this, we shall continue to hold. But I wish to make known the nature of my position.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

Although this was an isolated event, and some instances of insubordination did occur in Korea, the acceptance of authority was clearly influential.\textsuperscript{114}

In the Falklands War, the positive influence of leadership was readily apparent. As Sean McKnight wrote, “fighting spirit was strengthened by the leadership supplied by British NCOs and commissioned officers, who…led by example.”\textsuperscript{115} The most famous instance of this was Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones’ single-handed effort to destroy a machine-gun position, for which he posthumously received the Victoria Cross. His orders to Major Farrar-Hockley prior to this act demonstrate the obedient followership embodied in the Army.\textsuperscript{116} Pinned down and with the attack on Goose Green faltering, Jones ordered Farrar-Hockley to attack a machine gun position on a ledge. Despite the exposed approach, Farrar-Hockley obediently gathered sixteen men and advanced, resulting in three deaths almost instantly in the unsuccessful attempt.\textsuperscript{117} Subsequently, at Mount Tumbledown, Major Kiszeley of 2nd Battalion, The Scots Guards, personally led a bayonet

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\textsuperscript{114} Hastings, \textit{The Korean War}, 219.

\textsuperscript{115} McKnight, 47.

\textsuperscript{116} Holmes, 347.

\textsuperscript{117} Hastings and Jenkins, 245.
\end{footnotes}
charge, overcoming the initial reluctance of his men to face overwhelming danger, thereby eliminating the possibility of disobedience.\textsuperscript{118}

This trend was equally apparent in Afghanistan. In one example, after becoming trapped by an ambush, Corporal Jones of 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, “ordered three of his men to fix bayonets before breaking cover and leading them across 80 metres of open ground raked by enemy fire.”\textsuperscript{119} Aside from the notable feat of leadership, courage and initiative shown by Jones, the unhesitant obedience of his subordinates in the face of extreme risk to life stands out. Frank Ledwidge further observed such obedience, writing,

I was told by one soldier that it was not uncommon for soldiers to vomit in fear before a patrol, knowing there was a significant chance that they might not return the same way they left. Knowing that and then going out and completing the patrol is raw courage of a quite remarkable kind.\textsuperscript{120}

Where soldiers disobeyed orders in combat, it was often to conduct courageous acts, suggesting that decreasing deference has not hampered fighting spirit. For example, Private Martin Bell was killed when he ran to help an injured comrade despite being ordered not to.\textsuperscript{121} In another case, Private Daniel Hellings defied orders by refusing to leave an alley after two comrades were injured, instead staying to uncover a number of improvised explosive devices by hand.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{118} Hastings and Jenkins, 303.


\textsuperscript{120} Ledwidge, 178.


Aversion to Violence and Killing

In 2009, Coker noted how “violence [was] no longer glorified except in films or computer games,” creating a situation where modern soldiers are venerated “because of the situations they faced, not their actions.”123 Grossman argued a similar point, noting how advances in everything from slaughterhouses and refrigeration units, to modern medicine and nursing homes, sheltered society from the realities of death. He remarked how “Western civilization seemed to have decided that killing, killing anything at all, was increasingly hidden, private, mysterious, frightening, and dirty.”124 Similarly, Coker asserted,

Death is seen not as central to war—death as sacrifice—but as a side effect of war. It has been instrumentalized as a risk to be avoided, which is profoundly at odds, of course, with the humanist message at the heart of the warrior tradition—i.e., that the warrior takes risks to make a difference, that he hazards all, including his life…125

An aversion to killing is antithetical to the application of lethal force and society’s embodiment of these beliefs is at odds with the Army’s role. Moreover, increased risk aversion runs counter to the notion of unlimited liability.

Infantry manning shortfalls since at least the 1990s potentially signal that jobs involving killing and death are opposed to the aspirations of the young in modern society.126 Regardless, soldiers still appear willing to enact their legal right and duty to apply lethal force when necessary. Bayonet charges in Korea, the Falklands, Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that soldiers remain prepared to kill in one of the most visceral manners possible, a proposition reinforced by various

123 Coker, “The Unhappy Warrior,” 13-16.
124 Grossman, xxxiii.
125 Coker, “The Unhappy Warrior,” 13; Hawley, 223.
works of history and media reports. In Korea, The Gloucesters’ unit citation noted how “Every yard of ground [they] surrendered was covered with enemy dead.” More recently, in Afghanistan, some have convincingly argued that the Army’s propensity for violence hindered mission success. As Ledwidge asserted,

“For the British infantry…the default overall tactical approach in…contact…is to close with and destroy the enemy, using overwhelming violence. That is as it should be, if the troops find themselves fighting battles as traditionally practised. In theatres such as Helmand, traditional responses can be exceedingly counterproductive. Here, it might be said, is where the problems really begin.”

Ledwidge’s argument highlighted tension between the Army’s production of soldiers willing to apply lethal force readily and the requirement to undertake operations other than high intensity conflict. As he noted, “There is also a…cultural issue: soldiers want to fight. This is in no way palatable for the cosseted civilian, but the bare reality is that fighting and killing is what infantrymen do.”

The evolution of this “cosseted civilian” and its influence on operations is apparent when considering British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Northern Ireland, and Afghanistan. Douglas Porch noted how, during the Malayan Emergency, the British sought to “decapitate the insurgency, isolate the militants from their support base, and instill a culture of fear and intimidation in the subject population,” an approach that caused Ledwidge to question the validity of the Army’s “minimum force philosophy.”

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128 General Order Number 286.

129 Ledwidge, 180.

130 Ibid.

By the late 1960s, when the Troubles in Northern Ireland erupted, this approach became socially and politically unacceptable. The enemy were no longer ethnically different, and as David Benest observed, “the media, local civic and religious leaders, together with a culture of human rights, now dominated the politics of peacekeeping.” This constrained the Army’s approach. The Army initially focused on applying non-lethal force but by January 1972 the situation had escalated, and Lieutenant Colonel Hicks, Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, The Coldstream Guards, wrote,

A situation of virtually open warfare now exists in Northern Ireland. Under these circumstances the current rules for opening fire are considered to be too restrictive….In LONDONDERRY the need to be able to open fire on persistent rioters is urgent.

By 1975, the Evelegh Study identified that, “What the troops lacked was not physical courage, or weapons, or will, but the legal confidence to do their duty and suppress disorder.” Political restrictions resulting from fighting a counterinsurgency on home turf, in the public eye, and against white people had curtailed the Army’s ability to enact fighting spirit.

By the time counterinsurgency returned overseas, to Iraq and Afghanistan, the freedoms previously permissible abroad during the Malayan Emergency were no longer palatable in Britain. As Ledwidge observed,

The huge schemes of social engineering carried out by the British and Malaya governments to win ‘hearts and minds’ and isolate the guerillas physically are simply not practically possible today: the levels of coercion required are unacceptable to Western liberal democracies.


132 Porch, 276; Benest, 128.
133 John Hicks, CO I COLDM GDS C2, dated 19 February 1972, quoted in Benest, 134.
135 Ledwidge, 161.
However, the British soldiers were almost too willing to kill. As one senior officer in Afghanistan remarked,

maybe it is seen to be easier to kill dark-skinned persons. My worry is the effect it is having on our capability to do this sort of operation. What would happen now if those guys were posted to Northern Ireland or anywhere else and responded in the way they do now in Afghanistan? Would the attitude be: ‘We killed a couple of kids, so what?’

Because of the risk to mission success in Afghanistan, the imposition of ever-tighter directives governing the use of force tempered the actions of soldiers.

This indicates a growing tension wherein society, through politics, constrains the Army by trying to restrain its willingness to use lethal force. As Gabriella Blum noted,

The goals of war, the rules of war, and the targets of war—are driven by a mix of strategic, political, moral, and legal forces, and it would be impossible to point at a clear trend of influence. In some cases, what began as sound military strategy found subsequent expression in law, and in others legal norms shaped public expectations about moral conduct, expectations that were subsequently translated into rules of engagement on the battlefield.

Although it is not possible to identify a clear, consistent trend, one can see society’s influence on the battlefield over time. The public’s increasing aversion to violence and killing and its increasing concern for human rights translate into restrictions that temper the Army’s instinct to use lethal force.

One caveat to this assertion stands out: Malaya, Northern Ireland, and Afghanistan were all counterinsurgency operations. It seems the context of the war, and the public’s access to

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136 Anonymous senior officer, quoted in Ledwidge, 185-86. Dannatt supports the opinion that the use of force was detrimental to mission success, writing, “the objective of winning hearts and minds became more remote as soldiers increasingly had to call in destructive heavy fire support from the air to resolve tactical problems on the ground.” Dannatt, 304.


information about it, influence society’s espousal of these beliefs. During the Falklands War, political will capitalized on initial public and media support for deploying the task force. As Hastings and Jenkins put it, this resulted in a populace and its military that were fully “committed to the recapture of the Falklands by whatever means necessary—‘without limitation.’” This sentiment saw the war cabinet agree to rules of engagement allowing “the widest possible latitude.”

The ensuing conflict lasted less than three months. James characterized it as “the last of the old wars in so far as the public relied on the voices and despatches of war correspondents and cohorts of armchair strategists.” War footage that might have generated anti-war sentiment reached Britain after the Argentine surrender. The victory boosted British morale, with Margaret Thatcher declaring, “We have ceased to be a nation in retreat,” and seeking to imbue elements of fighting spirit in the population. James observed that Thatcher’s “gung-ho mood matched the temper of the country during a war that was widely seen as a reversal of thirty years of international impotence.” This illustrates a process of feedback, wherein military performance at war influences society’s mindset.

Coker’s assertion that death has become “a risk to be avoided” raises another point of tension—if society’s increasing risk aversion infects the Army it could undermine fighting spirit. The performance of British soldiers since WWII indicates the existence of a historical continuity

139 Hastings and Jenkins, 122, 125, 135-36.
140 James, 756.
141 Hastings and Jenkins, 283.
143 James, 756.
wherein soldiers willingly risk their lives in battle. In battle at the Imjin River, Korea, the Gloucesters were, as recorded in the official history, “Completely surrounded by tremendous numbers,” yet fought on “Without thought of defeat or surrender.” Moreover, the gallantry-award-winning actions of Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones and Major John Kiszley in the Falklands, and Corporal Budd and Lance Corporal Leakey in Afghanistan provide but a sample of soldiers repeatedly accepting unlimited liability. Admittedly, soldiers did occasionally refuse to engage in combat, but such accounts are relatively rare.

Despite this trend, the “Operation Herrick Campaign Study” identified the deleterious effect that public aversion to casualties had on soldiers’ risk taking in Afghanistan, noting that “public opinion [began] to sentimentalise the role and loss of Service personnel while growing increasingly ambivalent of the cause for which they fought.”

From the acceptance—willing or otherwise—of significant risk in the early years, the strategic/operational risk appetite lowered as benefits of higher risk tactical activity became less attractive given the strategic impact of losses; the result was a tightening up of oversight and permissions.

145 General Order Number 286.
147 Vinen, 283; Hastings, “The Korean War,” 220; Hastings and Jenkins, 91; King, 368; Holmes, 319.
149 Directorate Land Warfare, xxxiii.
As Operation Herrick progressed, risk was delegated less and force protection increasingly shaped thinking. So significant was this effect on the Army, that the report concluded,

As a result of Operation HERRICK, political, media and public expectation on risk is set at a level that could constrain how we train and fight in the future (which is in itself creating risk)…The Army must influence the debate, win it, and rebalance the tolerance for risk. We must regain an offensive mindset.

Such risk aversion threatens the likelihood that soldiers will embrace unlimited liability and initiative.

These findings indicate that societal and political influence threaten fighting spirit. However, it is not certain that the situation will worsen. A 2014 study by Rachael Gribble et al. found “British public acceptance of military deaths or injuries was associated with both success and approval of missions.” Therefore, attitudes to casualties will vary based on broader public opinion, making it imperative that the Army “influence the debate [with society], win it, and rebalance the tolerance for risk.”

Litigation Culture

An increasingly litigious society also presents a source of risk aversion. Coker argued that an emerging focus on victimhood led to an increased societal sense of vulnerability whereby people dislike being put at risk, in turn creating a litigation culture in Britain. Eitan Shamir concurred, considering “the transformation of Britain into a litigation society,” the most important societal development for the Army. He described how “the government supports this fundamental change to

150 Directorate Land Warfare, 1-1_10, 2-1_2.
151 Ibid., 2-1_2.
153 Gribble et al., 12.
154 Directorate Land Warfare, 2-1_2.
encourage public self-reliance and accountability,” characteristics of a shift towards greater
dividualism. This increasingly litigious society holds implications for fighting spirit, with
increasing risk aversion, and litigation specifically, affecting the Army’s legal freedoms.

Coker argued that “self-imposed limitations and risk aversion” had replaced the warrior
ethos, and that “Risk taking is now proscribed or ordered externally. Soldiers are now policed by
standards external to their own profession.” Research by Ekins et al. underlined the increasingly
pervasive influence of “judicial imperialism” on the military, noting,

Judicial developments have paved the way for a ‘spike’ in litigation: at the beginning of
2014, some 190 public law claims had been filed against the Ministry of Defence in
relation to British military action in Iraq; by the end of March 2015 this number is likely to
have grown to 1,230 public law claims. This is in addition to a further 1000 private law
claims... Their research described the likely impact of this trend as, “an excessive degree of caution which is
antithetical to the war-fighting ethos that is vital for success on the battlefield.” Aside from the
implications for accepting unlimited liability and initiative, this legally derived risk aversion has led
some to suggest soldiers will become increasingly reluctant to use lethal force for fear of legal
ramifications from getting it wrong.

In wars since 1945, soldiers have been willing to apply lethal force, and occasionally this
has conflicted with legality, particularly in counterinsurgencies. In Northern Ireland, the Evelegh
Study identified troops as lacking “the legal confidence to do their duty and suppress disorder” but,

156 Shamir, 168.
158 Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat, “Clearing the Fog of Law: Saving our
Armed Forces from Defeat by Judicial Diktat,” Policy Exchange, 2015, 7, accessed April 22, 2016,
159 Ibid.
160 Sean Rayment, “British Troops in Iraq are Afraid to Open Fire, Secret MoD Report Confirms,”
despite this, the Army often pushed legal and ethical boundaries. Internment without trial, the Bloody Sunday shootings, and alleged shoot-to-kill policies all raised questions about the Army’s commitment to rule of law. Writing of British counterinsurgency efforts between 1966 and 1976, Benest noted,

The paradox of all counter-insurgencies has been that no matter how many times the principle that terrorism must be defeated ‘within the rule of law’ is invoked, this has never been achievable without substantial changes to the law so as to permit a level of coercion that can allow a successful conclusion to the campaign.

Benest proposed that the “British approach” to counterinsurgency stemmed from “a deep antipathy to anything resembling military rule or martial law,” leading to “the legal liability of every soldier.” In Northern Ireland, this led to a 2016 announcement that hundreds of British soldiers were to be reinvestigated for “fatal incidents” during the Troubles, and two retired soldiers were charged with murder more than forty years after the alleged event. These revelations caused Ian

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161 Evelegh, in Benest, 138.


163 Benest, 118.

164 Ibid.

Paisley to condemn “the legal-aid rip-off which fuels so much of this,” and led many to believe the
government had let down the military.166

Blame culture became evermore evident during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2016,
Prime Minister Theresa May claimed, “we will never again—in any future conflict—let those
activist, left-wing human rights lawyers harangue and harass the bravest of the brave—the men and
women of Britain’s Armed Forces.”167 She made these remarks in response to a growing belief that
human rights lawyers were wrongly pursuing soldiers over false accusations of misconduct while
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.168 Indeed, in 2016 Phil Shiner, a leading human rights lawyer,
admitted nine allegations of acting without integrity after pursuing false torture and murder
allegations against soldiers.169

However, despite this fear of a blame culture limiting willingness to use appropriate lethal
force, the reality on the ground did not always match the perception. In 2011 Ledwidge wrote,

In Afghanistan, as matters stand, there is little oversight [of the use of indiscriminate lethal
force] and the practical likelihood of any form of real redress is vanishingly small—
unpalatable, but nonetheless true. Not a single prosecution has resulted from the many
dozens of civilian casualties inflicted by British forces.170

166 People who made accusatory remarks regarding the government letting down the Armed Forces

167 Theresa May, “The Good that Government Can Do,” (Speech, Conservative Party Conference at

168 Jason Groves, “Sort It Out! May Calls in Top Brass to Tell them Hounding of our Troops Must
End as Iraq Hero Colonel Tim Collins Warns our Boys Will Need a Union to Fight Human Rights Lawyers,”
3803045/Sort-calls-brass-tell-hounding-troops-end-Iraq-hero-warns-boys-need-union-fight-human-rights-
lawyers.html.

169 Michael Fallon, quoted in, Scott D’Arcy, “Top Human Rights Lawyer Faces Being Struck Off for
Bringing War Crimes Claims Against British Troops,” Independent, December 9, 2016, accessed, January,
british-troops-a7464826.html.

170 Ledwidge, 186.
Streatfield reinforced this observation, holding that, rather than being “too afraid to fire in the face of potential prosecution…[soldiers] were not afraid enough.”171 These assertions indicate that, despite an ever-increasing tension between a societal predilection for blame—which some have noted appearing in the military—and the military’s duty to apply lethal force, it has done little to dampen fighting spirit.172

Fitness

The trend of decreasing physical fitness in modern society could reduce availability of recruits capable of transforming into the tough, resilient soldiers demanded by fighting spirit. Obesity levels in Britain have risen steadily for many years, although researchers continue to debate the origins of this trend. Reaching unprecedented levels in recent years, Public Health England identified an increase in obesity rates among men, from 13.2 percent of the population in 1993 to 24.3 percent in 2014. Trends were similar for women, rising from 16.4 percent to 26.8 percent.173

Evidence indicates a concordant reduction in fitness levels in the Army. John Baynes identified the late 1980s as the point when, along with the “mental ignorance and aimlessness found in recruits of both sexes went physical unfitness.”174 Charles Arthur noted how, in 1995, the Army’s fitness tests changed to “allow for the growing number of overweight and unfit teenagers

171 Streatfield, 150, 200.
172 Edmunds and Forster identified how, “The capacity of the British military to control the ‘defence space’ is shrinking and increasingly penetrated by legal interventions and individual and societal demands.” Contributing to this, they noted, were individual and service family legal challenges against the Ministry of Defence. Edmunds and Forster, 20, 70-71.
who [were] applying to join."175 By 2009, a leaked memo conveyed concerns that a lack of fitness and poor attitudes to physical fitness were undermining the Army’s warrior ethos.176 Recent data indicated that this problem is worsening: just under ten percent of those undertaking the personal fitness assessment failed in 2013; by 2016 this figure rose to more than seventeen percent. Moreover, during the same period, reports found almost thirty-two thousand soldiers to be overweight.177

However, the Army’s performance in the arduous and unfamiliar conditions of the Falkland Islands, and more recently in Afghanistan, indicate an important historical continuity—the Army still consisted of tough, resilient soldiers even as society grew increasingly unfit. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests these qualities may have improved since the Korean War, where the regular non-commissioned officers’ performance was often disappointing.178 By the Falklands War, the Army was entirely professionalized, and displayed very high levels of fitness. A 1983 US Department of the Navy report asserted that “the major factors in the success of the British forces in the Falklands conflict were skill, stamina, and determination,” and soldiers’ performances “demonstrated an extremely high level of training”—a key part of fostering fighting spirit.179 Holmes considered

178 National Service officers often felt the regulars were “rooted in the routines of peacetime soldiering,” and some felt that regiments “had laid excessive emphasis on drill and not enough fitness, fieldcraft, shooting and signals.” Vinen, 289, 293, 304.
179 Department of the Navy, “Lessons of the Falklands: Summary Report” (February 1983), 53. This report was not the only one to cite the importance of British training. For example, King noted how “Chinese analysts argue that training was a critical advantage for British ground forces in all aspects of the war. The central lesson of the Falklands seems to be the importance of professionalism to current military operations especially in terms of training.” King, 423.
British forces’ marches “a prodigious feat” across “inhospitable terrain.” These difficult conditions also galvanized unit cohesion and prepared troops to kill, with Shaw crediting “the physical hardships of the march across [the island]” with generating a “spirit of mutual support that [he had] never witnessed before or since.”

In Afghanistan, the environment was also challenging, with extreme temperatures combined with the average dismounted close combat soldier carrying fifty-seven kilograms into combat. This led to the Army’s “soldier first” approach that emphasized high levels of fitness for all soldiers. Streatfield described the embodiment of this approach in his pre-deployment direction to his company,

We are going to get fit, very fit; fit enough to carry seventy pounds for three hours or more. By being this fit we are going to be able to compete physically with the enemy and the elements. Because where we are going to is at altitude. The air is thinner and the sun is hotter.

The “Operation Herrick Campaign Study’s” conclusion, that “We have an Army which is resilient, combat hardened and self-confident,” underlined the success of the “soldier first” approach in Afghanistan.

Summary

Since 1945, society has become increasingly individualist, diverse, tolerant, averse to killing, and litigious, while deference and fitness levels have decreased. Except for an aversion to killing, which appears unaffected, the Army has undergone similar change, although its pace has

180 Holmes, 118.
181 Shaw, 8.
182 Dannatt, 300; Directorate Land Warfare, xxx, 2-1_25.
183 Directorate Land Warfare, xxx, 2-1_25.
184 Streatfield, 16.
185 Directorate Land Warfare, xxviii.
lagged behind that of society, ensuring a cultural gap remains between the two. Despite these changes, the Army has displayed a continuity of fighting spirit, which has increased since 1945, encouraging the internal embodiment of fighting spirit despite the apparently antithetical societal change. The recruitment of malleable individuals who share the Army’s core values, training, and socialization—which generates cohesion around the regimental system—are important factors in maintaining fighting spirit, a process assisted by the end to National Service in 1962. Although recent studies indicated that cohesive units are not entirely reliant on the regimental system, its influence clearly runs deep in the Army’s psyche.

However, society’s aversion to death and killing, increasing focus on human rights, and growing risk aversion constrains the Army’s ability to enact fighting spirit. In a democratic society like the United Kingdom, the government applies these constraints, at least in part, to accord with public sentiment. As Clausewitz observed, “the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration.”186 This is as it should be; Clausewitz further noted, “No other possibility exists…than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.”187 This means, however, that since WWII the Army’s freedom to enact fighting spirit has changed in accordance with varying public and political sentiment. The wars in the Falklands and Afghanistan exemplify how the context of, and events in wars provide feedback to society and politics, in turn affecting the policy limitations of the war. In the Falklands, a short, decisive war in which public access to information was limited resulted in buoyed public support; thus, fighting spirit permeated the population. By contrast, the Afghanistan war was long, indecisive, and fought in the British public’s eye, generating greater constraints for the Army.

187 Ibid., 607.
Clausewitz drew attention to this phenomenon with his “paradoxical trinity,” wherein the interplay of enmity, chance, and policy are fundamental to war’s nature. Clausewitz used the people, the army, and the government as examples of these elements, and this helps elucidate the findings of this paper, wherein their interaction influences the prevalence of fighting spirit in a given war.\textsuperscript{188} Although, according to Clausewitz, policy determines war’s character, the relationships between the elements of Clausewitz’s trinity make war “more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”\textsuperscript{189} Figure 1 depicts the relationship of society, politics, the Army, and war as it relates to fighting spirit.

![Figure 1. Fighting Spirit and the Interaction between Society, Politics, the Army, and War. Created by the Author.](Image)

### The Origins of Ongoing Culture Change

The Army is currently in a period of change, undoubtedly influenced by changing societal values. In 2015, Carter spoke of changing social demographics, and the Army’s need to incorporate

\textsuperscript{188} Clausewitz, 89.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 89, 606.
women more effectively and reduce incidents of bullying and harassment, highlighting the need to accommodate increasing societal diversity and tolerance.\textsuperscript{190} He also emphasized the increasing importance of “personal development,” and initiatives including the “Flexible Engagement System,” both of which embrace rising individualism.\textsuperscript{191} Furthermore, the introduction of the Army Leadership Code and the Command Sergeant Major structure highlight efforts to eradicate bad behavior and improve leadership—efforts that may help address the risk posed by decreasing deference.\textsuperscript{192}

The Army Command Plan (ACP) 2016, describing ten lines of operation for structural and wider-reaching changes, articulated these ideas.\textsuperscript{193} The most relevant line of effort in accommodating societal change was “maximizing talent,” through which “The Army recognises that a diverse and inclusive Army is one in which people from different regiments, services, nations and social backgrounds work effectively together…encouraging organisational inclusivity.”\textsuperscript{194} This requires the Army to be “recognised as an inclusive employer that respects difference, attracts talent from all areas of society, overtly embraces equality and always challenges unacceptable behavior.”\textsuperscript{195} The need to be “recognised” as inclusive underlines the Army’s cognizance of


\textsuperscript{191} Nicholas Carter, “Army Command Plan 2016,” (June, 2016), 4-5; Carter, “Chief of the General Staff Speech.” The Flexible Engagement System is an initiative that offers service personnel employment flexibility, allowing for such things as transition between full- and part-time work and protection from operational tours where needed. Mark Lancaster, announcement to the House of Commons, November 8, 2016, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, vol. 616 (November 8, 2016), col. 1485.


\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 3-10.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 4-23.
society, a message reinforced by a strategic narrative to “enhance the public's perception, awareness and understanding of the Army; improve the public's engagement with the Army; and maintain the Army's standing in the hearts of the nation.”

Moreover, it recognizes that future “failure to understand the utility of the Army or a significant blow to the Army’s reputation…may lead to further resource constraints and impact negatively on the Army’s recruiting and retention.”

However, one noticeable omission from the ACP 2016 was a narrative seeking to rebalance society’s risk tolerance, identified in the “Operation Herrick Campaign Study.” The ACP acknowledged the peacetime tension between the Army conducting realistic training and legislative constraints driven by society’s “high level of expectation that the Army will look after its people,” but prescribed nothing to address it in wartime. The advocated approach of being “risk aware, not risk averse” appears prudent, but failure to address the larger debate may lead to continued risk aversion in war.

Conclusion: The Future of Fighting Spirit

As well as the training that a soldier receives, there is also latent aggression—a beast that lurks in us all. If you deny this, you lack either experience or imagination. While it may be suppressed by civilisation, it cannot be removed entirely. It is testament to how much we have lost sight of who we truly are that violence shocks us so, and such strenuous efforts are made to condition us out of it...

Major General Jonathan Shaw, “The Soldier in Us All”

There is little to indicate that the pattern of post-1945 societal change will alter significantly in the near term, so it is likely the Army will continue to parallel societal change, maintaining a separation in values deemed fundamental to operational effectiveness. Therefore, the
Army is likely to continue to follow the same pattern of change, a pattern that has shown little evidence of reducing its fighting spirit. Consequently, the Army is likely to retain the innate fighting spirit that it has exhibited since 1945. However, the limiting factor is likely to be politically imposed policy constraints, driven in part by changing societal expectations.

These constraints are context dependent, but the media are likely to make future wars ever more visible to the public. Afghanistan demonstrated the potential constraint this poses to the military’s freedom of action and level of risk aversion, inhibiting the enactment of fighting spirit. It is necessary and right for government to place limits on the Army, given the military’s subservience to policy, but a societal aversion to killing and death—evidenced through an aversion to casualty tolerance—will have significant implications for the Army’s efforts to maintain fighting spirit. Therefore, the Army must heed the “Operation Herrick Campaign Study’s” recommendation to introduce, influence, and win a debate regarding the political, media, and public expectations of risk, rebalancing their risk tolerance if it is to avoid becoming overly constrained in future wars. Such a narrative is notably lacking from the ACP 16. This topic warrants future research to understand how the Army can best address this tension.

This paper’s assertion—that the Army will continue to inculcate a fighting spirit limited predominantly by societally influenced political policies—does not account for what John Lewis Gaddis called “contingencies.” Outlying, unforeseen events may disrupt the current trend. For example, a prolonged reversal of the United Kingdom’s prosperity, or an existential security threat could alter the values prioritized in society, undermining Inglehart’s hypothesis. It is also conceivable that a threshold for change exists, beyond which fighting spirit will diminish. In his book, The Logic of Failure, Dietrich Dörner noted that “some systems…are well buffered. They

201 Directorate Land Warfare, 2-1_2.
202 Gaddis, 30-31.
can absorb a lot of abuse. But at some point, too much is too much,” the result of which “is a sudden reversal in the direction of a development over time.”\textsuperscript{203} However, such events are inherently difficult to predict, and the evidence collected herein indicates a continuation of fighting spirit, limited predominantly by external constraint.

There remains one significant area for future research—investigating the same topic but with a broader scope. To meet space constraints, this study focused on certain key factors: diversity, individualism, deference, aversion to violence and killing, litigation, and fitness—but change has been significantly broader than this. Future studies might consider the effects of changing religious preferences, technology proliferation, and education standards, to name just a few possibilities. Moreover, an expansion of timeframe might highlight new factors, unseen since WWII.

Ultimately, the timeless criticism of younger generations by those preceding them is disingenuous.\textsuperscript{204} Each generation, in turn, has met the demands placed upon it, and there is little to indicate that this will change anytime soon. The Army’s selection, training, and socialization processes will prepare future generations of soldiers to embody fighting spirit, thereby protecting the nation and maintaining readiness to fight the country’s enemies. To avoid undue future constraints, the Army must rebalance the levels of political, social, and media risk acceptance regarding war.

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\textsuperscript{204} Examples of such criticism include General Sir Alan Brooke’s remark during WWII that, “The trouble with our British lads is that they are not killers by instinct,” and Baynes writing of the 1980s recruits’ “mental ignorance…aimlessness…[and] physical unfitness.” James, 694; John Baynes, 58.
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