Binary Thinking in a Complex World: The Failure of NATO Deterrence since 1994 and Implications for the NATO Readiness Action Plan.

A Monograph

by

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# Abstract

Following the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, NATO announced that it would be deploying its forces to the Baltic NATO countries as a tangible military deterrent to a resurgent Russian threat to those countries and the Alliance. This announcement invoked parallels to the Cold War in both NATO’s conceptualization of Russia and the need to deter militarily, and the questioned NATO deterrent strategy and how it had failed to deter Russian attacks in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO relied on its nuclear-armed members to provide its nuclear deterrent, and its expansionist Partnership for Peace program to enhance its conventional deterrent. However, when viewed through the lens of Cross-Domain Deterrence theory, the Partnership for Peace program did not provide NATO with either the linkages or the bargaining leverage to deter Russia from attacking Georgia and Ukraine. Using the commonalities from these two NATO failures to deter Russia, can NATO rely on the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty, signaled with a token military force, to deter a Russian cross-domain coercive strategy in the NATO Baltic Countries? Or must it recognize its limitations as a political-military alliance as a deterrent and expand its linkages with other transnational organizations, such as the EU, to truly deter Russia?
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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Abstract


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After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO relied on its nuclear-armed members to provide its nuclear deterrent, and its expansionist Partnership for Peace program to enhance its conventional deterrent. However, when viewed through the lens of Cross-Domain Deterrence theory, the Partnership for Peace program did not provide NATO with either the linkages or the bargaining leverage to deter Russia from attacking Georgia and Ukraine. Using the commonalities from these two NATO failures to deter Russia, can NATO rely on the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty, signaled with a token military force, to deter a Russian cross domain coercive strategy in the NATO Baltic Countries? Or must it recognize its limitations as a political-military alliance as a deterrent and expand its linkages with other transnational organizations, such as the EU, to truly deter Russia?
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Acknowledgement

While a monograph such as this is a labor of love, it is written only for the satisfaction of the Author, and to the detriment of everything else in his or her life. The tension of delivering a coherent piece of work which will bear your name forever is borne not just by the SAMS student, but by the SAMS faculty, and most importantly, by the families and friends of both.

The main guidance on this project has been my Director, Dr. Bruce Stanley, whose driving timeline and direction has provided a much-needed focus and motivation during the production of this work. My thanks must also go to Emilie Simpson of Harvard University for taking the time to provide useful course corrections and insights into this work, which have been invaluable in both applying emerging theory correctly, and ensuring that my argument is logical and coherent.

The greatest burden of this particular monograph, however, has been borne by my wife, Pamela. Not just in her ruthless editing and corrections of the work, but most importantly in enduring the strains of Army and family life with such good grace and enthusiasm. I am awestruck and inspired by you in equal measure and quite simply, would not have completed this monograph without your encouragement, support and forbearance.
## Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Cross-Domain Deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDPS</td>
<td>Deterrence and Defensive Posture Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>NATO Assurance Measures</td>
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<td>NAT</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Council</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>PGM</td>
<td>Precision-Guided Munitions</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Readiness Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCRF</td>
<td>Security Council of the Russian Federation</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Introduction

Russian relations with NATO are experiencing a long-cherished moment of truth. NATO itself has taken the path of raising the stakes. There is a feeling the Alliance again needs “frontline states” to justify its own significance in the new conditions. It is not we that are subjecting the entire present European security architecture to test. It’s systemic defects are obvious, including above all NATO-centrism, which by definition negates the creation of a truly universal mechanism of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

—Sergay Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On August 7, 2008, the Georgian Armed Forces attacked Russian-backed separatists in the breakaway region of South Ossetia in an attempt to defeat the South Ossetian rebels and bring the area back under Georgian control.¹ In what became known as the Five-Day War, the Russian military intervened, defeated the Georgians, and occupied South Ossetia, Abkhazia and “large swathes of Georgian territory.”² The Russian intervention signaled a willingness to confront NATO expansion within the former republics of the Soviet Union and a failure of the NATO strategy of partnership and co-operation with Russia.³ Russia’s continuation of military intervention as an element of a confrontational foreign policy, evident in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the continued support for Ukrainian separatists, signaled a second failure of

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² Ruslan Pukhov and David M. Glantz, The Tanks of August (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010), 113.

NATO’s strategy, this time by attempting to deter Russia by seeking common ground, and has led to a renewal of great power politics in Europe.\(^4\)

This resurgence poses a particular problem for NATO and its members. The presence of significant minorities of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states, a perception of NATO indecisiveness, and a Russian belligerence towards NATO expansion into its former territories could provide the pretext for a Russian military operation against a NATO member in any of the five recognized domains (air, land, sea, space and cyber).\(^5\) Any Russian military action would have profound consequences for the Alliance as NATO’s ability to deter any country from attacking one of its member states is an essential component for survival of the Alliance in its current form. The triggering of Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) would truly test the commitment of all member states, and the US in particular. The opening quote by the Russian Foreign Minister lays out the Russian interpretation of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe and demonstrates their increasingly belligerent attitude towards the Alliance.

The Russian-Georgian War and the Russian annexation of Crimea each marked a failure of NATO deterrence strategy in regards to Russia. It also marked an evolution of Russia’s strategic and operational concepts for contesting and commanding all domains, which have allowed it to pursue its limited aims while not provoking a NATO military response. An understanding of how Russia behaved during these two crisis points will provide an insight into the modern interpretation of the concept of deterrence, if the current NATO strategy will be successful, how NATO Article Five has limited the character of the war that Russia can


prosecute, and how this has led to the adoption of cross domain coercive approach. The current conventional NATO deterrent strategy is the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP). RAP is designed to deter Russian interference in their ‘Near Abroad,’ but it is unclear if it is sufficient to deter possible future action in any domain.

The Russian intolerance of expansion into the former Soviet Union means the assessment revealed by this study provides a basis for understanding the contemporary application of deterrence in the NATO construct. Following both failures of NATO deterrent strategy, Russian policy makers, the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister respectively, proclaimed their willingness to confront NATO and that this would remain an enduring feature of their foreign policy.6 With the re-emergence of conventional deterrence as the NATO operational approach, understanding the utility of military deterrence in the context of Russia’s cross-domain coercive approach requires further study. This study adds to the understanding of how the Russian Federation has evolved its military strategy through its interaction with NATO, if it has been deterred or limited by NATO actions and how this dialectic could play out in light of the NATO RAP.

Critical to understanding this study are the terms strategy and deterrence. For a definition of strategy, this study uses Everett Dolman's definition of “a plan for attaining continuing advantage.”7 NATO's definition of deterrence will be used; that is “to dissuade would-be aggressors from acting against the interests of any Alliance member.”8

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8 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2010), 2–13.
Framing this study is Jon R. Lindsay’s and Erik Gartzke’s cross-domain deterrence theory (CDD), which states that “the use of threats in one domain, or some combination of different threats, to prevent actions in another domain that would change the status quo. More simply, CDD is the use of unlike means for the political ends of deterrence.”\textsuperscript{9} Dolman's strategy model will be the unifying concept. Dolman's model links the tactical, operational and military objects to support the political object, policy.\textsuperscript{10} By using Dolman's theory of strategy as a unifying concept, this study induced the Russian strategy and operational concept in Georgia and Ukraine. Furthermore, how the strategy and concept supported Russian policy can be analyzed, as can whether the current RAP would be successful in deterring the present Russian strategy.

This study offers two hypotheses. Firstly, NATO's existence as a political-military alliance limits its ability to effectively deter the Russian cross-domain coercive strategy. Secondly, The Russian operational approach evolved in reaction to NATO strategy to allow it to use military means in non-nuclear NATO countries without invoking treaty obligations.

The answers to the following questions proved this studies hypotheses. Firstly, why did NATO’s strategy fail to deter Russian action in Georgia in 2008? Secondly, How did the Russian operational concepts evolve to bring about the failure of the NATO strategy in Ukraine in 2014 while avoiding war with NATO? And finally, has NATO’s reframing of its strategy and operational approach presented the opportunity to effectively deter Russia’s cross-domain coercive approach?

The principal limitation of this study is the lack of English-language primary sources to ascertain the Russian perspective. Therefore, the monograph relied on third-party translations and


\textsuperscript{10} Dolman, \textit{Pure Strategy}, 28.
secondary sources. The following delimitations were imposed to allow the study to distil the essence of the thesis; firstly, the limits of the date range examined will be January 10, 1994, the announcement of the Partnership for Peace program to July 9, 2016, the most recent NATO Summit. This timeframe takes into account the dialectic between NATO and Russian policy and the adaptations that have resulted. Secondly, when considering NATO policy and strategy, national strategies and contributions to or influence on the Alliance were discounted to limit the analysis to the output of NATO. Inherent to this study were the following assumptions; firstly, that the Russian operational concept in both Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014 are adaptations to NATO policy; and secondly, that applying a Western model of strategy does not impose a false basis for analysis and an overly ethnocentric viewpoint.

Following this introduction, this monograph will review the literature pertinent to the topic, outline the methodology that will be used within it, conduct a case study of the NATO deterrent strategy with regards to Russians and the resulting operational approaches between 1994 and 2016, and finally, draw the implications and conclusions from the study.
Literature Review

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO strategy has failed to deter Russian military activity in its partner countries. Moreover, there is little academic analysis on the evolution of both NATO and Russian strategy and operational approaches in relation to each other. While there is an extensive body of literature examining deterrence, the specific research surrounding post-Cold War deterrence is small but growing, as is that referring to the NATO RAP. This section will survey the broad theory of deterrence and strategy that will be used as a theoretical framework to demonstrate why NATO deterrence strategy failed in 2008 and 2014, and how Russian strategy and operational concepts evolved following these crises. It will then consider the conceptual and empirical evidence available on the 2008 Russian-Georgia War, 2014 Russian Annexation of Crimea, NATO strategy, and the current RAP concept. The review of the conceptual and empirical evidence will demonstrate the logic of using the 2008 and 2014 crisis points as a combined case study to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the RAP as a deterrent strategy and the NATO Assurance Measures (NAM) as an operational approach to achieve cross-domain deterrence. As posited by Carl von Clausewitz, “a working theory is an essential basis for criticism;” this section provides an understanding of the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical underpinnings of the study are critical for understanding the arguments herein. 11

As a theoretical basis, this study will use CDD theory to analyze how both the NATO strategy has been used to deter Russian military action and how the Russian strategy and the supporting operational concept has evolved to counter it. 12 CDD “is the use of threats in one domain, or some combination of different threats, to prevent actions in another domain that would


12 Lindsay and Gartzke, Cross-Domain Deterrence.
change the status quo.”13 It is this theory as an application of the means available to NATO that will assess deterrence as an operational approach within the military means discussed below.

Everret C. Dolman’s theory of strategy will be the unifying concept to identify how the tactical actions are ordered to satisfy policy ends.14 By using the four main components of Dolman’s theory of strategy (the political, military, operational, and the tactical objects), this study will categorize whether the 2008 Georgian war and 2014 annexation of Crimea was a failure of general or immediate deterrence concerning NATO strategy.15 In turn, by assessing the RAP as an instrument of CDD, this study will be able to judge whether military deterrence is the key factor, or whether the treaty obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) limit Russian policy aims regarding NATO’s Eastern members. This assessment will prove or disprove the two hypotheses offered by this study: Firstly, NATO’s existence as a political-military alliance limits its ability to effectively deter the Russian cross-domain coercive strategy; Secondly, the Russian operational approach evolved in reaction to NATO strategy to allow it to use military means in non-nuclear NATO countries without invoking treaty obligations.

There is a growing body of literature covering the conceptual element of deterrence in a contemporary context. In addition to Lindsay’s and Gartzke’s Cross-Domain Deterrence which provides the theoretical underpinnings, Max Manwaring’s Deterrence in the 21st century16 provide a conceptual foundation for deterrence theory since 1989 and Dmitry Adamsky’s Cross-

13 Lindsay and Gartzke, Cross-Domain Deterrence, 6.
14 Dolman, Pure Strategy.
15 Ibid., 28.
*Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy* provide a conceptual foundation for understanding cross-domain coercion. ¹⁷

*Deterrence in the 21st Century* is a collection of essays edited by US Army War College professor Max Mainwaring. ¹⁸ The book addresses what new policies are required to achieve deterrence against the myriad of state, non-state, and transnational nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union. There are three main themes; that the US is currently dependent on its nuclear weapons as its prime deterrent and that the US must shift its paradigm of deterrence to include proactive preventative diplomacy and military means across domains. ¹⁹ The significant conclusions are the need for a broader deterrence policy that can respond to non-military threats and that the rise of trans-national terrorism and information war requires a cross domain deterrent and not a reliance on nuclear weapons. ²⁰ The conclusions of the book help this study by examining how nuclear and non-nuclear means are used to achieve deterrence. The study remains very US-centric, which is unsurprising given its intended audience. Therefore, the concepts and theories discussed within it have to be abstracted to apply to NATO. The book’s thesis is diametrically opposed to the first hypothesis and therefore provides a dissident framework within which to examine the evidence and therefore aids in inducing a genuine value of NATO's deterrence measures.

Adamsky’s *Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy* is a monograph published by the *Institut Français des Relations Internationales* as part of a series of

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¹⁸ Manwaring, *Deterrence in the 21st Century*.

¹⁹ Ibid., 132.

²⁰ Ibid., 3.
monographs relating to the contemporary use of nuclear weapons. The monograph examines the Russian perception of strategic and operational coercion, in particular under the umbrella of nuclear weapons, and how those concepts have evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union under the umbrella of nuclear weapons. As such, the study has three main themes: firstly, that the nuclear component is an inseparable part of understanding Russian strategic and operational thinking be understood in the context of a holistic coercive approach; secondly, that the current Russian cross-domain coercion approach is an integrated whole of non-nuclear, informational, and nuclear types of deterrence and coercion; and finally, the Russian cross domain concept contains a holistic informational phase which skilfully merges military and non-military capabilities across all domains. The major conclusion of the study is that cross-domain coercion operates under the umbrella of Russian nuclear weapons and aims to manipulate the adversary’s perception, to maneuver its decision-making process, and to influence its strategic behavior while minimizing the scale of kinetic force use. The paper contributes to both of this study’s hypotheses, and therefore adds a further theoretical lens through which to view the evolution of Russian coercive strategy and the accompanying operational approach. In turn, this will enable RAP’s and NAM’s ability to deter across domains to be ascertained, not just in the traditional military domain.

There are two key works that provide empirical evidence that supports analysis to prove or disprove both the hypotheses. The first, written by a variety of American and European academics that provides the key Western interpretation of the war is *The Guns of August 2008:*

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21 Adamsky, *Cross-Domain Coercion.*

22 Ibid., 10.

23 Ibid., 8.
The book looks at the problem of Western understanding of Russian policy during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. In answering this difficulty, the book concludes that the war was part of a wider policy to extend Russia's influence in the region and that tactical actions were the final component of a multi-dimensional strategy. As such, the book provides a Western lens on the full spectrum of the conflict at the policy and strategic levels before, during and after the war. While the book does not explicitly address either of the hypotheses, it enables the determination of the policy and military objects, as interpreted by the West during the 2008 war. By determining these objects, the book contributes to the study by providing the context within which to understand the tactical actions of the Russian military in the Five Day War and therefore aids in inducing the operational art from the period.

The second, Elizabeth A. Wood’s, *Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine* provides a chronology of the road to war in Ukraine from a Russian perspective through the lens of foreign policy. The problem that the book addresses is determining what motivated Russia to annex Crimea in 2014 and why it continues to support its proxies in Eastern Ukraine. There are two central themes of the book; that Russian resurgence was inevitable once it possessed the economic means and that Russian cultural links to Ukraine define relations between the two states. It draws two main findings; firstly that domestic politics drives Russian foreign policy, and secondly, that the annexation of Crimea provided cover for a politics crack down and to restore his popularity and dominant position. In examining this issue, the study has one major flaw; it views the road to war in the Ukraine through a Russian lens, and as such ignores the impact of

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26 Wood et al. *Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine*, 133.
decisions made by Ukraine, the EU, and significantly for this study, NATO and how those
decisions interact with Russian foreign policy. This flaw discounts the evolution of Russian
policy in light of real world events. The book contributes to the study by providing the Russian
foreign policy and economic context for Russia’s war in Ukraine. While this does not address
either hypothesis, it enables NATO policy and strategy to be placed in the wider conceptual
framework to determine why it failed to deter Russian military action.

Empirical evidence addressing the second hypothesis is slim. However in 2016,
the RAND Corporation published “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics.”27 The study addresses the problem of the shape and
probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states by examining the
following themes: geography, force ratios, and the NATO strategy options. 28 This study goes
some way to answering the second hypothesis, with the primary assumption of a particular
Russian operational approach. The RAND study will contribute to this thesis as it demonstrates
the basis of the how NATO would counter a Russian combined arms attack and the force ratios of
combat power that would be required to change the character of the war the Russians would fight
in the Baltics which allows the inference of how to achieve deterrence.

The conceptual themes of the literature of this subject capture how deterrence theory has
evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union and how conventional and nuclear means are used
to achieve deterrence across varying domains. CDD theory provides the basis for using deterrence
as an operational concept with the construct of the NATO RAP. The empirical evidence provides
an interpretation of how NATO failed to deter Russian military action in Georgia in 2008 and

27 David A. Shlapak, Michael W. Johnson, and Rand Corporation, Reinforcing Deterrence on
NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2016).

28 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence, 1.
Ukraine in 2014 from both the Russian and Western viewpoint. The RAND study demonstrates how the NATO RAP and NAM would be used to defeat a Russian invasion of the NATO Baltic states, which in turn allows the deterrence measures required to be determined. However, these disparate elements have not been combined to demonstrate how effective the RAP will be in deterring further Russian military action.
Methodology

This section will introduce the methodology that this study will use, present the case study, restate the research questions, outline where the evidence will be drawn from and finally detail the evaluation criteria.

Structured, focused analysis will be the methodology used in this study. The two characteristics of this methodology are the focus and the structure. The study is structured by “asking a set of standardized, general questions of each case,”29 which will be discussed below, and focused by undertaking it with “a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective.”30 Using CDD allowed the study to focus its interpretation of Russian and NATO strategy as a cross-domain approach.31 This methodology enabled the study to draw on and assess the effectiveness of NATO strategy since 1994, the interaction between NATO strategy on its Russian counterpart, and why it has failed to deter Russian military aggression in Georgia and Ukraine. As posited by Clausewitz, “One can, after all, not condemn a method without being able to suggest a better alternative,” the aim of using this methodology is to assess if NATO's current deterrence model as an operational approach will be effective.32

NATO strategy since 1994 provided the case study for this research paper. Particularly, the failures attributed to it, namely the Russia-Georgia Five Day War and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, provide focus points as to why the strategies of ‘Partnership for Peace’33 and

30 Ibid., 70.
31 Lindsay and Gartzke, Cross-Domain Deterrence.
32 Clausewitz, On War, 161.
33 NATO, Partnership for Peace:
the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept failed to deter Russian actions.\textsuperscript{34} The findings from the analysis of the two crisis points can be compared to the current NATO operational approach to deterrence, the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP), and induce its effectiveness. By using Deterrence theory, and in particular the principles of CDD theory,\textsuperscript{35} to evaluate NATO strategy, and Dolman’s theory of strategy as the unifying model, this study was able to assess the credibility of the RAP concept.\textsuperscript{36}

Three research questions drove this study’s research: Firstly, why did NATO’s strategy fail to deter Russian action in Georgia in 2008? Secondly, How did the Russian operational concepts evolve to bring about the failure of the NATO strategy in Ukraine in 2014 while avoiding war with NATO? And finally, has NATO reframing of its strategy & operational approach presented the opportunity to effectively to deter Russia’s cross-domain coercive approach? It was expected that the research will find that while the nuclear-armed members of NATO have limited Russian aggression towards the Alliance members, Russian strategy and its operational concept has evolved to allow it to pursue limited policy aims without invoking a military response. In turn, while the RAP is an effective military deterrent, does not serve to fully Russian interference in the NATO Baltic in the informational, economic, political and cyber domains.

This study drew the evidence mainly from secondary sources. The limited primary source material is due to open source availability and comprised mainly NATO policy documents, such

\textsuperscript{34} NATO, \textit{2010 Strategic Concept}.

\textsuperscript{35} Lindsay and Gartzke, \textit{Cross-Domain Deterrence}.

\textsuperscript{36} Dolman, \textit{Pure Strategy}.
as the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, and the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), and NATO Assurance Measures (NAM) concept documents. Western academic studies provided the bulk of the secondary empirical sources, such as *The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia* and *Roots of Russia's war in Ukraine*.

As CDD theory provides the framework for this study, it used the supporting questions of CDD theory as the evaluation criteria. The study used the answers to these questions to judge NATO strategy as effective within the unifying concept of Dolman’s framework of strategy. The supporting questions are shown in Table 1:

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37 NATO, *2010 Strategic Concept*.


39 Ibid.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Supporting Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>How do bargaining dynamics differ among various combinations of strong and weak actors?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How does crisis stability and instability vary with mixes of capabilities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are asymmetric capabilities escalatory or de-escalatory?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linkages</td>
<td>How does interdependence promote or shift advantages of offense relative to defense?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does interdependence create incentives to move first or show restraint?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do actors shift their advantages across interdependent domains?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>How effective are alliance and wedge strategies in a cross-domain world?  Adam's Thesis?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do multi-polar cross-domain interactions affect the frequency and intensity of war?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where and when in a complex political geography should we expect cross-domain conflict to escalate, even to nuclear war?</td>
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Table 1: Components of Cross Domain Deterrence.


In summary, NATO strategy and its failings in 2008 and 2014 are topics that can be systematically analyzed using the structured focus comparison methodology. In so doing, it produced evidence and deductions to evaluate the RAP and judge its effectiveness. The case study that follows demonstrated why NATO strategy failed, how Russian Strategy and operational concepts have evolved, and induce the effectiveness of RAP and NAM as deterrents to a cross-domain coercive strategy and operational approach respectively.
Case Study

The following case study examines the failure of NATO deterrent strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As such, it consists of three parts. The first part examines the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program until its failure to deter the 2008 Russia – Georgia War, the second part analyzes the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept up to its inability to deter the 2014 Russian annexation of the Crimea, and the final part considers NATO’s current deterrent strategy and operational approach as a counter to their Russian coercive counterparts. The first two parts of the case study will assess the deterrence capabilities of PfP, the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defensive Posture Statement (DDPS). The third part will use the capabilities, linkages, and nature of the actors involved to assess both current strategy and the operational interpretation of it. As a whole, the case study demonstrates the application and evolution of strategy by both NATO and Russia through the lens of Dolman, and the validity of the thesis. The thesis states that the Russian-Georgian War and the Russian annexation of Crimea each marked a crisis and a failure of NATO deterrence strategy in regards to Russia and the Russian Federation's evolution of the strategic and operational concepts for contesting and commanding all mediums have allowed it to pursue its limited aims while not provoking a NATO military response.

This section begins with a short overview of the context and crisis points underlying the period from NATO’s adoption of the PfP strategy in 1994 to the enactment of the 2015 NATO RAP strategy before answering the structured focus questions outlined in the preceding methodology section.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both Russia and NATO reframed their approach and policy in relation to each other. As such, Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and in 1994, became an original member of the PfP program. In 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act set the conditions for a mutually beneficial relationship between the two actors, which led to the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. From a NATO perspective, this was a phase of accommodating its former adversary, while creating the conditions for a favorable transition of influence in Eastern Europe in its favor. The NATO 'Open Door' policy reflected this context, expanding on Article Ten of the NAT. The ‘Open Door’ policy encouraged the “membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.”

In turn, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept sought to exploit the early successes of the open door policy and a weakened Russia. The concept broke down deterrence into two components, crisis management, and partnerships. Therefore, PfP formed the backbone of

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NATO deterrent strategy until 2010. The PfP strategy continued to further the ‘Open Door’
policy aim. The objectives of this strategy were to produce the following conditions in the
program members: “facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting
processes; ensuring democratic control of defence forces; maintenance of the capability and
readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority
of the UN [United Nations] and/or the responsibility of the CSCE [Commission on Security and
Co-operation in Europe]; the development of cooperative military relations with NATO.”

Russian policy recognized NATO’s ambition, reflected in their ‘Near Abroad Defense
and Security Policy,’ which aimed at “the curtailment and regulation of armed conflicts around
Russia and the guarantee of strict observations of human and minority rights, especially of
Russians” and highlighted the “fear of encirclement by NATO.” In the lead up to 2008,
Russia’s military strategy was to: “Communicate to Georgia and the West that Russia will not
tolerate the encirclement caused by NATO enlargement; communicate to other countries,
particularly CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states that Russia will not accept
regional challenges that compromise its perceived sphere of influence; stem further enlargement
of NATO by affecting Georgia's military readiness for MAP [Membership Action Plan] status;
and force specific [European Union] EU countries to make a decision between further NATO
expansion and natural gas sales from Russia, even if only through tacit threats of the possibility of
cutting off delivery.”

47 NATO, Partnership for Peace.
48 Wynne Russell, “Russian Relations with the ‘Near Abroad,” In Russian Foreign Policy Since
49 Mike Bowker, “Russian Policy toward Central and Eastern Europe,” In Russian Foreign Policy
50 Brian J. Ellison, “Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War,” Demokratizatsiya: The
The failure of PfP to deter the Russia-Georgia War in 2008 provides the first crisis point and failure of NATO deterrent strategy in this case study. Between August 7 and August 12, 2008, Russia and Georgia fought a conventional war over the secessionist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian narrative portrays the war as a reaction to surprise Georgian attack on the South Ossetian capital, Tshinvali, and an ensuing genocide of 2,000 ethnic Russians.\textsuperscript{51} However, the Western interpretation of the immediate causes of the war differs significantly; the Georgian decision to go to war was a reaction to Russian military intervention on behalf of the South Ossetian rebels.\textsuperscript{52} Regardless, when viewed through a policy and strategy lens, the causes of the war can be traced to a failure of NATO to deter Russia. NATO held its twentieth alliance summit in Bucharest between April 2-4, 2008, four months before the beginning of the war. Overhanging the summit were two issues: Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the possibility of both Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. Russia viewed NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 as meddling in its traditional sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{53} As such, when the Russian Duma discussed Kosovar independence, they concluded that Kosovo should remain a province of Serbia and the standard interpretation of international law should preside over Kosovo as a frozen conflict.\textsuperscript{54} Despite this, backed by the EU and NATO, Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. In turn, this provided both precedent in international law and the pretext for Russian military intervention in the two breakaway countries and for them to declare their independence.


\textsuperscript{52} Ronald D. Asmus, \textit{A Little War That Changed the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West} (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009), 20.

\textsuperscript{53} Asmus, \textit{A Little War}, 102.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 101.
Kosovar independence exacerbated the issue of a Georgian MAP, which played directly into the fears laid out in Russian foreign policy. While NATO did not offer Georgia a MAP at the 2008 NATO Summit, the Summit Communiqué stated: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall become members of NATO if they so desire.”55 This declaration in particular, and the PfP strategy generally, not only failed to deter Russia but emboldened it to fight a war with Georgia to prevent a perceived encirclement by NATO.56

Following the Russia-Georgia War, having checked NATO expansion in Georgia and not incurred a military response, Russia reframed its foreign policy, taking a more aggressive stance in regards to NATO policy aims in their ‘Near Abroad,’ “Russia maintains a negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion and to the approaching of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders, in general, as to actions that violate the principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe.”57 Specifically, in relation to Ukraine, which would provide the second crisis point of NATO strategy, it aimed to “build up relations with Ukraine as a priority partner within the CIS and contribute to its participation in an extended integration processes.”58

Russian military strategy in the 2008 war highlighted areas for improvement. In 2010 the Ministry of Defense published a new military strategy, the 2010 Russian Military Doctrine; a first for the Russian Federation. The two central themes of the doctrine were “calls for the use of

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56 Asmus, A Little War, 132.


58 Ibid.
force to protect the interests of Russian citizens abroad” and that “violations of the principles of international law should be defined as acts of aggression.”59 These principles reflect the evolution of Russian military strategy, incorporating the desire to check NATO expansion.

After the 2008 Russia-Georgian War, recognizing the failure of its strategy to deter Russia, NATO reframed its policy towards Russia as the ‘New Beginning,’ the principles of which were threefold; first, reinforce practical cooperation with Russia, second, rejuvenate the NATO-Russia Council, and finally, find common security challenges to serve as a firm basis for future cooperation.60 To dovetail with this, NATO also published the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the foundation of which was collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.61 In 2012, NATO also published a revised DDPS, which described nuclear weapons as the “core component of NATO’s overall capabilities” and conventional forces as having “important roles to play in fostering cooperative security, including through cooperation and contacts with the armed forces of partner countries.”62 The DDPS underlined NATO’s reliance on the three nuclear-armed members of NATO (the US, UK, and France) to underpin its deterrent capability and its conventional military means. At no point did NATO revise its linkages to its PfP partners, rather DDPS and 2010 Strategic Concept reinforced the importance on NATO membership rather than partnership. This revised approach by NATO, itself a reaction to the


61 NATO, *2010 Strategic Concept*.

failure of the previous policy and strategy to deter Russia in 2008, failed in 2014 when Russia annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea.

The removal of the pro-Russian regime in Ukraine in the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution sparked a chain reaction that led to unmarked Russian troops seizing the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014, and it formally becoming part of Russia on March 18, 2014. Given that at the 2008 NATO conference, NATO offered Ukraine the possibility of becoming joining the Alliance, viewed through the lens of NATO strategy, it would appear that the 2014 Annexation of Crimea is another crisis point that marks a failure of NATO to deter Russian interference in a partner country.

In recognition of the failure of its policy and military strategy to deter Russian military aggression, the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration did not signal a change in policy, rather a revision of the strategic deterrent concept and the establishment of a strategy and an operational approach within the same policy framework. The resultant strategy is the RAP and its deterrent operational approach the NAM. “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan includes immediate reinforcement of NATO’s presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, which has been in place since May 2014 (“assurance measures”), and longer-term changes to NATO’s force posture (“adaptation measures”). Assurance Measures [are] immediate increased military presence and activity for assurance and deterrence in the eastern part of the Alliance. Adaptation Measures

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64 NATO, *NATO 2008 Bucharest Summit Communiqué*.

[are] changes to the Alliance’s long-term military posture and capabilities to enable it to respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise.”

The annexation of Crimea codified Russia's operational approach when dealing with the ‘Near Abroad’. In his 2013 article, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Chief of the Russian General Staff General Valery Gerasimov laid out the cross-domain operational approach later utilized during the annexation of the Crimea. In general terms, this operational approach seeks to incorporate traditionally non-military measures with military ones to create the conditions for the Russian Armed Forces to counter a potential military threat, within the Russian interpretation of international law and without provoking an international military response. This operational approach is one that the NAM seeks to deter, and by tracing the pattern of the evolution of how the policy and military strategy of both sides have framed their operational approaches within the framework of cross domain deterrence theory, this study can evaluate the prospective effectiveness of it.

When answering the focused, structured questions, as per the methodology, this study will assess the evidence through the principles of CDD theory. This case study will use the CDD evaluation questions within Dolman's framework to assess the strategy of both sides; in both 2008 and 2014, and evaluate the validity of NAM as a cross-domain deterrent.

The first structured question asked is why did NATO’s strategy fail to deter Russian action in Georgia in 2008? NATO strategy failed to deter the 2008 Russian-Georgian War because PfP did not offer a strong enough linkage between Georgia and NATO, and therefore access to sufficient NATO capabilities to convince Russia that NATO would respond militarily.

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66 NATO, NATO Readiness Action Plan Factsheet.

In going to war with Georgia in 2008, Russia aimed to achieve the following objects; politically, prevent NATO from offering Georgia a MAP, militarily, to bring about the failure of the Georgian state, and operationally, seize the contested regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to establish buffer zones to ensure Georgia cannot reincorporate them into Georgia entirely destroying the army and police forces.68 NATO’s policy aim was simple, namely, the continued stabilization of Europe through NATO expansion.69 By using PfP, not only as a deterrent but also as the mechanism to achieve its military object, NATO sought to deepen its cooperation with Georgia and bring about defense sector reform that would lead to membership.70

Following Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, the Georgian economy, energy sector, and its internal security remained dependent on Russia. The Georgian economy was dependent on Russia for around eighteen percent of its total exports (about US$150 million)71 Exploiting this dependence in the lengthy preamble to the 2008 war, Russia imposed economic sanctions in 2005, and following the implementations of sanctions, was not able to completely compensate for the lack of trade with Russia, leaving it with a US$3.3 billion trade deficit.72 Georgia also remained dependent on Russian peacekeeping forces for internal stability in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In South Ossetia, the 1992 ceasefire agreement established a Joint Control Commission (JCC), which deployed a joint Russian-


70 NATO, Partnership for Peace.


Georgian-North Ossetian 1,500-man joint peacekeeping force in the area.\(^73\) In South Abkhazia, the peacekeeping force was initially provided by UN military observers in August 1993, but the CIS deployed a largely Russian force of 3,000 peacekeepers.\(^74\) Until 2007, GAZPROM, the Russian state-owned energy company, was Georgia's primary gas supplier. Recognizing the Georgian energy dependence, GAZPROM increased the price per cubic meter almost four-fold between 2004 – 2007.\(^75\) Russia was also the primary export market for the excess Georgian electricity provided by the rehabilitated hydroelectricity industry; Georgia has been a net exporter of electricity since 2007 and Russia is also their main electricity export market.\(^76\) Until 2008, Georgian economic, energy and security dependence on Russia gave Russia the opportunity to use that dependence to its advantage to complement their offensive military strategy.

From the NATO perspective, PfP did not provide interdependence between Georgia and NATO and Georgia that could be used to their advantage defensively. As previously discussed, PfP does not establish the legitimacy for NATO to intervene militarily, even defensively, on behalf of a partner, thereby limiting the Georgian dependence on the Alliance. In a similar fashion, NATO also had a limited military dependency on Georgia. By 2008, Georgia had begun contributing troops to the NATO Kosovo mission (KFOR) as a non-member, but only 150 at the

\(^{73}\) Cory Welt, “Balancing the Balancer: Russia, the West, and Conflict Resolution in Georgia,” Special Issue on “The Volatile Caucasus,” Global Dialogue, Volume 7, Issue 3-4 (Summer/Autumn 2005), 1.

\(^{74}\) Welt, Balancing the Balancer, 2.


height of their contribution, just over 1% of the total KFOR force. When considering the 2008 NATO-Russia relationship regarding their capabilities, Russia possessed the bargaining advantage over NATO due to its status as a solely political-military alliance. The Russian advantage was brought sharply into focus following the NATO operation in Kosovo to protect ethnic Albanians from ethnic cleansing, which led the Kosovar declaration of independence. Kosovar independence presented the Russians with the diplomatic leverage to claim legitimacy in intervening in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to aid them in securing their independence, which then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recognized on November 5, 2008. While maintaining cordial diplomatic relations with the Alliance, the Russian Government used the recognition of the Kosovar independence as a basis for legitimacy in international law to pursue military operations in support of client breakaway states and their balance of national interests. This advantage allowed the Russian Federation to act militarily while claiming adherence to international precedent.

Regarding the capability to react to instability within the terms of the PfP, Russia again possessed the capability advantage. As part of the PfP, countries sign an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which aims to “bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms

77 Elene Gotsadze, Georgia in International Peacekeeping Missions, (Tbilisi: Information Center on NATO and EU, 2014), 7.


through which a partner country interacts with the Alliance, sharpening the focus of activities.”

While this provides the basis for cooperation and is the start point for developing an application to join NATO, there are no defensive obligations contained within it and when viewed through the lens of international law, therefore limits the Alliance's capability to react to a PfP country in military crisis. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the NATO Heads of State stopped short of offering Georgia a MAP, the conditions of which, once satisfied, would lead to a defensive commitment under Article Five of the NAT. The prospect of Georgia joining NATO was viewed as a crisis by the Russian policy makers, as articulated by then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin after meeting with the political leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia four months before the war:

Putin shared the concern of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders about the likely adverse implications of Georgia's entry into NATO. Russia has conveyed its attitude towards the Georgian leadership's line on accelerated Atlantic integration to both the Georgian side and the alliance's members. Any attempts to exert political, economic and especially military pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are futile and counterproductive.

When viewed in light of the Kosovo precedent, this perceived crisis gave the Russian Federation the ability to react legitimately to the instability in Georgia with a variety of capabilities before Georgia could be offered a MAP, thereby providing NATO the capability to intervene.

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82 Asmus, *A Little War*, 135.


In the sphere of asymmetric capabilities, the Russian Federation possessed a quantitative and qualitative advantage over NATO, maintaining mainly escalation capability. The fact that Russia does not possess a noticeable de-escalation capability is moot regarding the Russian-Georgia War as NATO was unable to use any capability due to the restrictions of the NAT.85 As a political-military alliance, NATO has limited ability to use asymmetric measures in that paradigm, such as Special Operations Forces (SOF) or offensive cyber, and is limited to military measures. The Russian Federation, however, has the full suite of national power elements at its disposal. As well as the conventional military action, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war also contained detailed informational and cyber components and demonstrated “the first example of a cyber-based attack that coincided directly with a land, sea, and air invasion by one state against another.”86 Even if NATO possessed an asymmetric advantage over Russia, which many of its member countries do, the limitations of PfP and the NAT limits the ability to use them. There, in capability terms, is the prime reason PfP as a deterrent strategy failed to deter the 2008 Russian-Georgian War; the limitations of PfP regarding defensive obligations and the Russian capability to react to the perceived crisis both conventionally and asymmetrically.

The limited interdependence presented by PfP at the beginning of the 2008 War limited the requirement and ability for NATO to intervene defensively of Georgia’s behalf. Due to the transparent nature of NATO policy, this limited interdependence provided very little deterrence to Russia. When balanced against the complicated security, energy and economic interdependence between Russia and Georgia, Russia possessed the ability to shift the advantage of that interdependence in their favor, which in turn created the incentive to initiate conflict. In turn, by

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exploiting its coercive advantage, Russia achieved its policy aim and thwarted NATO policy ambition; at the time of writing, Georgia has still not been offered a MAP.

The second structured question is how did the Russian strategic and operational concepts evolve to bring about the failure of the NATO strategy in Ukraine in 2014 while avoiding war with NATO? To bring about the second failure of NATO strategy, the Russian Federation evolved its strategic and operational concepts into two key areas: First, it established a military strategy for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union; Second, it developed a cross-domain conceptual, operational approach that allows it to pursue its strategic objectives while recognizing the limitations of NATO’s partnership with Ukraine.

When considering if Russian seizure of Crimea presents a failure of NATO deterrence, it must be remembered that at the Bucharest Summit, the Alliance explicitly stated the intention to offer Ukraine membership. Therefore, following the failure of PfP to deter the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, and recognizing the possibility of Russian interference in Ukraine, NATO established the NATO-Ukraine Commission in 2009 which aimed to achieve the continued policy aim, NATO expansion and deepen political dialogue and cooperation. PfP continued to provide the mechanism to achieve the military object, a deepening of cooperation with Ukraine and defense sector reform that would lead to membership. However, despite this attempt to reinforce the partnership, NATO removed partnership as an element of its deterrence strategy. Instead, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept refocused its deterrence strategy as “an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities,” with “the supreme guarantee of the security of the

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87 NATO, NATO 2008 Bucharest Summit communique.


89 NATO, Partnership for Peace.
Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance.” This guarantee, however, was only limited to those already members of NATO, limiting the interaction with partners to “consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.”

In response to its nation-building mission in Afghanistan, in 2011 NATO adopted the comprehensive approach as its operational framework. The “comprehensive approach” that requires effective coordination and cooperation among national governmental departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and the private sector in any alliance or coalition throughout an entire operation.” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg repeated the resonance highlighted by Gerasimov in March 2015, when he stated “Hybrid is the dark reflection of our comprehensive approach. We use a combination of military and non-military means to stabilize countries. Others use it to destabilize them.”

Despite both Gerasimov and Stoltenberg highlighting the destabilizing potential of The Comprehensive Approach, it is not currently viewed by NATO as a viable deterrent framework. However, this approach recognizes how the character of war has evolved to include significant levels of non-military effort to compliment conventional and nuclear military forces and if utilized could contribute to cross domain deterrence or coercion. Concurrently, at the 2010 NATO Lisbon summit, NATO did establish a formal partnership between NATO and the European Union, “a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security

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90 NATO, 2010 Strategic Concept, 14.

91 Ibid., 27.


challenges.” While NATO does not recognize this as a deterrent capability, when considered in light of the NATO operational framework, this formal partnership could provide the means through which to achieve cross-domain deterrence.

Essentially NATO deterrence strategy had not evolved, rather it has regressed to a pre-1991 outlook. In an attempt to evolve its deterrence strategy, NATO reviewed its deterrence posture in 2012. The findings of the DDPS review were that “NATO's deterrence and defense posture review has confirmed that NATO must have the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against threats to the safety of its populations and the security of its territory, which is the Alliance's greatest responsibility. As outlined above, NATO has determined that, in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound.” The restating the important of nuclear weapons as a significant element of the DDPS limited Russia’s ability to expand its aims in Eastern Europe, certainly against NATO members. This binary perspective of deterrence, reliance on nuclear weapons, and the removal of partnership assurances provided in the 1999 Strategic Concept, did not give NATO bargaining leverage in relation to Russia or increase the interdependence between NATO and its the prospective members, particularly Ukraine, but it did limit Russia’s policy aims towards PfP countries. Therefore, PfP did not give NATO the capacity to legitimately respond to crisis instability within non-NATO countries.

Other than concede that PfP did not provide a deterrent capability, neither the NATO’s 2010 Strategy Concept or the 2012 DDPS did nothing to strengthen NATO’s deterrent ability in Ukraine. Given that PfP failed to deter an overt war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, it

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would have been logical for either NATO 2010 Strategic Concept or the DDPS to attempt to increase the linkages between Ukraine and NATO, especially as it had both the strategic partnership with the EU and the operational approach to doing so. The election of Viktor Yanukovych in February 2010 as President of Ukraine signaled an acceptance that NATO could not deter Russian activity and therefore membership was no longer in the Ukrainian balance of interests, as he sought to end Ukraine's NATO membership ambitions and mend relations with Russia.96 Following his removal during the Euromaidan protests in February 2014, the government of Petro Poroshenko echoed this stance.97 This inability by NATO to forge the linkages with Ukraine that would enable it to deter Russia was a direct reflection of the failure of its strategy to deter Russia in Georgia in 2008.

On February 5, 2010, the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) published Russian Military Doctrine 2010.98 This doctrine was essentially the codification of the military strategy that led Russia to intervene in Georgia in 2008. Russian Military Doctrine 2010 evolved in four key areas; as a reflection of policy, the use of force to protect Russian Citizens abroad, use of the Russian military in the ‘Near Abroad’ in the case of state-sponsored aggression contrary to international law, the promotion of a joint military policy within the CIS and the provision for pre-emptive nuclear strikes.99 In particular, the explicit expression of a nuclear first use strategy marked a restatement of the limiting effects that nuclear weapons had on the Cold War.100 These


100 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Malden, MA, Polity, 2004), 13.
codifications provided the Russian policymakers the capability to enhance their bargaining
dynamics, to respond to crisis instability, and the framework to build an operational approach to
using all the elements of national power in pursuit of limited aims.

Within the framework of the Military Doctrine 2010, the Russian General Staff
developed a cross domain coercive operational approach. This conceptual approach was itself a
Russian interpretation of the US and NATO approach to warfare in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. However Gerasimov, in his February 2013 article, recognized that “each war represents
an isolated case, requiring an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique
character.” Therefore, this study does not propose that the cross-domain approach is a specific
type of warfare, such as hybrid war, rather it is a conceptual framework that evolved from the
contemporary character of warfare, and it allows an interpretation of Russian actions in Ukraine.
The key to this conceptual approach is the ratio of non-military to military means employed in the
approach 4:1, and the recognition that “the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and
strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons
in their effectiveness.”

There are six key military tenants of this operational approach; first, peacetime groups
of forces start military action (without war declaration or preparatory deployment); second,
highly maneuverable stand-off combat actions; third, destruction of military and state critical
infrastructure; fourth, mass fires of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), special operations,

101 Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January/February
2016): 32.

102 Bartles, Getting Gerasimov Right, 30-38.

103 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” Moscow’s Shadows
unmanned weapon systems, and of armed civilians in combat activities; fifth, the use of operational depth targets across all domains; and finally, employment of asymmetric and indirect methods in a unified informational sphere.104

Seven phases integrate the military and non-military means; first, the ‘informational-psychological struggle,’ paralyzing the adversary's decision-making ability. Second, the indirect actions in the political, economic, informational, and technological realms neutralize the adversary's military with little or no military support. Third, the combination of the non-military actions downgrades the adversary's ability to employ military force, prevents the adversary from initiating aggression. Fourth, these efforts are accompanied by a massive deception and disinformation campaign conceal the time, scope, scale, and the character of the attack. Fifth, subversion-reconnaissance activities conducted by SOF, precede the kinetic phase of the campaign. Sixth, the kinetic phase starts with space-aerial dominance aimed at destroying critical assets of civilian industrial-technological infrastructure and command and control centers of state force the state to capitulate. Concurrently, operating under no-fly zones, private military companies and armed opposition prepare an operational setup for the invasion. Finally, most of the campaign goals have been achieved, as the ability and will of the adversary to resist have been broken and have evaporated.105 Figure 1 depicts this combined approach.

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104 Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion, 23.
105 Ibid., 24.
Figure 1: Current Russian Operational Approach.


This phasing construct provides the Russian Federation with the full suite of cross domain coercion and deterrence capability. By organizing tactical actions in this manner, the Russian Federation increases its bargaining dynamic, strengthening its position through coalition formation within the target country, the imposition of economic sanctions, particularly through gas supplies, and through severing of diplomatic relations. Regarding crisis response, the mix of military and nonmilitary means allows either the creation of stability or the promotion of instability within a country, providing strategic options for the pursuit of limited aims in line with
national policy. However, a degree of interdependence must exist between Russia and the target state that would allow it to shift the advantage in their favor before starting offensive operations. The phasing model also equips Russian with both escalatory and de-escalatory measures; due to the balance of nonmilitary to military means, pressure can be applied or reduced across the spectrum short of employing military force, the final phase.

In 2014, Russia again sought to prevent NATO and the EU expanding into Ukraine.\textsuperscript{106} The political object that enabled it to achieve this was the reintegration of Crimea to Russia, achieved through the military object of securing the civil and military infrastructure though cross-domain attack.\textsuperscript{107} Russia and Ukraine had significant cultural, economic, and political linkages that gave it a bargaining advantage and allowed it to use its asymmetric capabilities to create a crisis that led to the annexation of Crimea. The Russian cultural links to the Crimea are founded in its sovereignty; it was part of Russia until it was gifted in 1954 to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.\textsuperscript{108} Even in 2001, the most recent Ukrainian census, 60\% of the population of Crimea were Russian.\textsuperscript{109} This cultural linkage provides a narrative basis for collation formation within the country, as well as a basis for political opposition. Building on its ethnic base, pro-Russian, groups such as the Russian Community of Crimea, the Crimean Cossack Union, and the Eurasian Youth Movement, led anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian riots in Crimea while petitioning Moscow to intervene on their behalf.\textsuperscript{110} The ability to use cultural ties to invent a crisis is a


\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 10 – 11.
crucial stage of the cross domain coercive strategy. In November 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych declined the EU association agreement, which would have paved the way for Ukrainian membership of the EU, and accepted a $15 billion aid package from Russia, as well a 67% discount on Russian-supplied energy.\footnote{Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Foreign Policy and Relations with the United States,” in Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, ed. Stephen K. Wegren, (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 249.} By accepting the Russian offer, it created a Ukrainian economic dependency on Russia, which it could use as a bargaining advantage. The cultural, political, and economic linkages enabled Russian to adapt the cross domain coercive approach, and represented the first three stages of the phasing construct, where NATO military deterrence could have been effective. These linkages cemented the superior Russian bargaining position, its ability to foment a crisis and for it to escalate its asymmetric advantage. This approach enabled the Russians to react to the crisis it created and annex the Crimea.

The third structured question is, has NATO’s reframing of its strategy and operational approach presented the opportunity to effectively to deter Russia’s cross domain coercive approach? The reframed NATO strategy and operational approach (RAP and NAM) does not present a credible deterrent to Russian cross-domain approach as it only deters in the military domain. The common causality for the failure of NATO deterrent strategy in 2008 and 2010 was the weak linkages offered by both PfP and the 2010 Strategic Concept between Georgia and Ukraine respectively. In the Baltics, the fact that all the countries concerned are NATO members nullifies this causality and therefore covered by the NAT, particularly in the case of cross-domain coercion, Article Four, when in their opinion “opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” and Article Five.\footnote{NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty.} While
this works in the short term, NATO should address its ability to offer a stronger coupling as part of any strategy revision.

Preemptively ascertaining Russia’s policy aim in respect to the Eastern NATO members is problematic; the current Russian Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia’s view of NATO as views “Russia maintains a negative attitude towards NATO's expansion and to the approaching of NATO military infrastructure to Russia's borders in general as to actions that violate the principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe.”113 This study has interpreted this as the policy aim, that is to continue to prevent NATO offensive infrastructure establishment in the Eastern Europe. Assuming that Russia were to apply a cross-domain coercive approach to attacking into the Baltics, then the military object would mirror that of Ukraine, the seizing of areas of significant Russian population and the operational object would also mirror the Ukraine in securing the civil and military infrastructure through a cross-domain attack. Given the limiting nature of Article Five and the nuclear armed NATO members, the operational object would unlikely be achieved by the Russian Armed Forces, rather locally sponsored proxies. However, given the effectiveness of crisis fomentation in both Georgia and Ukraine, these proxies could develop a situation in response to NATO infrastructure development where Russia aims to intervene to protect its citizens, an enduring element of the countries military doctrine, revised after the annexation of Crimea.114

Even twenty years after their independence, the Baltic countries remain almost entirely dependent on Russia for its energy requirements, and GAZPROM, the Russian energy supplier, is

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113 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*.

a major shareholder in the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian energy sectors.\textsuperscript{115} However, since 2008, with significant EU funding, all three countries have sought to break this strong interdependence by diversifying their energy imports and storage away from GAZPROM.\textsuperscript{116} In contrast, since independence, all three countries have diversified their economies, and as EU and Eurozone members, have established strong economic linkages away from Russia.\textsuperscript{117} Politically, none of the Baltic countries has a strong interdependence with Russia; however, while their raw numbers of Russian citizens is low (Estonia has the largest proportion at 1.7%), their concentration along the border with Belarus provides a regional political interdependence that Russia could use to its advantage.\textsuperscript{118} This limited interdependence provides a viable strategic context for the limited application of a cross domain coercive approach if Russia were to feel sufficiently threatened by NATO infrastructure development.

In laying out the framework for Russia’s cross-domain coercive approach, Gerisomov has articulated that the first three phases do not require the deployment of military force. Therefore, through the lens of Article Four, this operational approach allows Russia to exploit the limited interdependence along the Belarusian boarder and interfere in the affairs of NATO members in the ‘Near Abroad’ undeterred by military deterrence and not invoke a policy response. This allows Russia significant escalatory and de-escalatory flexibility in crisis fomentation, allowing it to react to changes in the environment.


\textsuperscript{116} Grigas and Robinson, \textit{Post-Soviet Politics}, 43.


Military power is only effective in the fourth stage of the Russian cross-domain approach, and therefore by relying on a military strategy for deterrence, the diplomatic, informational and economic domains are not deterred. In the RAND study, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,” it concluded that NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. However, in its wargames “a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by air power, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities—could succeed to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states” and that it would “trigger a prolonged and serious war between Russia and a materially far wealthier and more powerful coalition, a war Moscow must fear it would be likely to lose.” It is therefore inferred that this is the minimum military force which could achieve deterrence in the military domain. In the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO announced that as part of the NAM, it would be stationing four multinational battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. When combined with the regular national armies of these countries, totaling 14 brigades, of which three are armored (Poland has three armored and six mechanized brigades, Lithuania has one

119 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence.

120 Ibid., 1.

121 Ibid., 2.

122 Ibid.


mechanized and two light brigades\textsuperscript{125}, Latvia has two infantry battalions\textsuperscript{126}, and Estonia has two infantry brigades).\textsuperscript{127} Therefore, in the military domain, NATO does possess the request combat power to deter a purely military attack into the NATO Baltic, if the Russian were to attack in a manner, and with the combat power, laid out in the RAND study. However, given that Russia's template for cross domain coercion does not operate purely in the military domain, the NATO RAP does not present a deterrent across the other domains in which the Russian's could operate to foment a military crisis.

This case study examined the failure of NATO deterrent strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As such, it consisted of three parts. The first part examined the PfP program until its failure to deter the 2008 Russia – Georgia War and found that the linkage between NATO and Georgia provided by PfP did not legitimate the NATO use of force in Georgia, and therefore did not provide a sufficiently strong deterrent. The second part analyzed the evolution of the Russian strategic and operational concepts, under the nuclear umbrella, to allow it to create a military crisis and allow it to respond legitimately. The final part analyzed RAP as a deterrent and found it to be insufficient to a deter cross domain coercive strategy. Having answered the three focused, structured questions, the next section will summarize the findings and analyze whether these findings support the two hypotheses posited in the introduction.


Conclusions

The aim of this research paper was to test the thesis that the Russian-Georgian War and the Russian annexation of Crimea each marked a crisis and a failure of NATO deterrence strategy in regards to Russia and the Russian Federation's evolution of the strategic and operational concepts for contesting and commanding all mediums have allowed it to pursue its limited aims while not provoking a NATO military response. To aid in the analysis, the study used the emerging theory of Cross-Domain Deterrence as a framework within which to conduct the analysis and Dolman's theory of strategy as the unifying concept The findings of this study are useful to NATO and national strategist, and operational planners as a mechanism to evaluate NATO responses to the perceived threat of Russian aggression. Having answered the three structured, focused questions, this section will now look at the findings from the case study, and the two hypotheses posited by this study to ascertain whether they have been proved or not.

This case study asked the following structured, focused questions of NATO deterrent strategy since 1994; why did NATO’s strategy fail to deter Russian action in Georgia in 2008?; how did the Russian strategic and operational concepts evolve to bring about the failure of the NATO strategy in Ukraine in 2014 while avoiding war with NATO? And has NATO reframing of its strategy & operational approach presented the opportunity to effectively to deter Russia’s cross domain coercive approach? The study found that NATO strategy failed to deter the 2008 Russian- Georussian War because PfP did not offer a strong enough linkage between Georgia and NATO and therefore access to sufficient NATO capabilities to convince Russia that NATO would respond militarily. Regarding NATO’s reframing of it’s strategy and operational, the study found that to bring about the second failure of NATO strategy, the Russian Federation evolved its strategic and operational concepts into two key areas; it established a military strategy for the first time, and it developed a cross-domain conceptual, operational approach that allows it to pursue its
strategic objectives while recognizing the limitations of NATO’s partnership with Ukraine. Finally, regarding RAP and NAM, the reframed NATO strategy does not present a credible deterrent to Russian cross-domain approach as it only deters in the military domain. Having answered these questions, the study will now analyze the hypotheses in light of the findings and derive the implications for future NATO deterrence.

The first hypothesis is that NATO's existence as a political-military alliance limits its ability to effectively deter the Russian cross domain coercive strategy. This hypothesis is supported. NATO’s military power is only effective in the fourth stage of the Russian cross-domain approach, and therefore by relying on a military strategy for deterrence, Russian actions in the diplomatic, informational and economic domains are not deterred.

The second hypothesis is that the Russian operational approach evolved in reaction to NATO strategy to allow it to use military means in non-nuclear NATO countries without invoking treaty obligations. This hypothesis is supported. By restating the important of nuclear weapons as a significant element of the DDPS, Russia’s ability to expand its aims in Eastern Europe, certainly against NATO members. The evolution of Russia’s cross domain coercive strategy is a reflection of both their ability to learn from their adversaries and also of the limiting nature nuclear weapons have had on their policy ambitions in Eastern Europe.

In investigating NATO’s deterrent strategy, this monograph has highlighted two potential for future studies within the framework of CDD. The following recommendations are in order of importance, in line with the findings of this study.

First, it would be a valuable addition to the field of deterrent study to understand how political-military alliances, such as NATO, can develop cross-domain coercive and deterrent strategies with political-economic unions, such as the EU. In the case of NATO and the EU, the findings from this further research would inform a more coherent and indeed cross domain response to a Russia's cross domain coercive strategy.
Secondly, the use of the NATO *Comprehensive Approach* as a cross domain deterrent and coercive operational approach is another area of study that would deepen the understanding of CDD theory. The findings of this study would allow both NATO and its member nations to develop a truly cross domain response as part of the NAM to comprehensively deter Russian aggression against the Baltic NATO members.

Ultimately, NATO’s ability to deter any country from attacking one of its member states is a key component to the survival of the Alliance in its current form as the triggering of Article Five of the NAT would truly test the commitment of all member states and the US in particular. Therefore understanding Russia's cross-domain coercive strategy and the limitations of a purely military response as a deterrent is a key component to ensuring the survival of the Alliance.
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