INDIA’S BRITISH ARMY:
THE HONORABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY’S LASTING MILITARY IMPACT

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General Studies

by

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India’s British Army: The Honorable East India Company’s Lasting Military Impact

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Given the disappointing results of U. S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to reach strategic goals through influence on those countries’ military elements of national power, it is logical to conclude that it is a mistake to impose western military doctrine in places which have developed free of western context. However, Great Britain met its strategic goals throughout the Indian subcontinent in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries by cultivating a privatized and indigenous military force there by way of the Honorable East India Company. In doing so, the Company achieved lasting effects in India which offer insight into how modern military advisors could improve efforts at security cooperation with foreign allies.

East India Company, Sepoy, Army, Lessons
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Given the disappointing results of U. S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to reach strategic goals through influence on those countries’ military elements of national power, it is logical to conclude that it is a mistake to impose western military doctrine in places which have developed free of western context. However, Great Britain met its strategic goals throughout the Indian subcontinent in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries by cultivating a privatized and indigenous military force there by way of the Honorable East India Company. In doing so, the Company achieved lasting effects in India which offer insight into how modern military advisors could improve efforts at security cooperation with foreign allies.
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>(H)EIC</td>
<td>East India Company, or Honorable East India Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCISFA</td>
<td>Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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# FIGURES

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[A] system which produces the martial energies adapted to seasons of danger and
daring, is not necessarily productive of those less-shining qualities which are
required for the business of ordinary government. The heroism that can win
empire has no natural affinity with the wisdom and virtue that improve and
consolidate it.

― Robert Grant, A View of the System and Merits of the
East-India College at Haileybury

Since 2001, the United States has not achieved its strategic goals in Afghanistan
and Iraq by failing to raise and train effective state militaries modeled after the American
element. Recurring crises in Afghanistan and Iraq painfully demonstrate that the
indigenous forces, which the U. S. trained and supported, cannot function without
continuous and unsustainable American intervention. The United States must be able to
intervene in areas of national concern and create enduring stability without exhausting
precious resources such as national will and the health of the force. The United States’
inability to install stand-alone security forces in areas of strategic national interest
indicates a need for a different approach to bring lasting stability to those regions. While
the U. S. military is well-practiced in generating, training, and advising a foreign security
force to operate like an American security force, years of disappointment in Afghanistan
and Iraq indicate that projecting an American image onto an indigenous force is not
enough.

In December of 2009, President Obama announced in a speech at the United
States Military Academy that the United States would begin its withdrawal from both
Afghanistan and Iraq, with plans to leave trained security forces to perform in place of American troops. Since that speech and the ensuing drawdown from Afghanistan, the Taliban and its affiliates have continuously demonstrated their ability to project decisive power in Kunduz and Helmand Provinces as well as execute spectacular attacks in the Afghan capital of Kabul. In July of 2016, President Obama acknowledged these setbacks and scaled back his original withdrawal plan. Originating from the anti-coalition Iraqi insurgency, Daesh has emerged in the wake of the United States’ exit from Iraq, running over the Iraqi Army while seizing swathes of Iraq and Syria in their dogmatic commitment to restore the Islamic caliphate. In these situations, the U. S.-emplaced security forces’ collapse necessitated a renewed American military commitment in Iraq and delegitimized the Afghan government upon which we have staked our interests.

Given such dismal results from the past 16 years of U. S. involvement, it could be concluded that it is a mistake for a well-developed country to presume that its military methods are a model ready for export to regions of concern. However, the British colonization of the Indian subcontinent between the 17th and 19th centuries provides a case in which a world power achieved its global strategy through privatized foreign policy and military force. Incorporated under British royal charter in the year 1600, the Honorable East India Company generated profits for its shareholders by harvesting and marketing India’s vast natural resources until the British government assumed direct control over India in 1858 (see figure 1). With the original intent of raising a security force to safeguard its agents in the field, the Company recruited and trained a private military force in the region that became the foundation upon which the Indian Army is
built today. The Company’s success in generating such an effective and enduring military paradigm in a completely foreign land is the basis of this research study.

Figure 1. A timeline of the East India Company’s critical events

*Source*: Created by author.

**Primary Research Question**

How can U. S. policy makers apply the East India Company’s model for using military means to achieve strategic ends in contemporary security cooperation efforts? Finding the answer to this question requires first answering three subordinate questions below.

**Secondary Research Questions**

1. What conditions had to be met before the East India Company gained influence in India?
2. What are the key characteristics of how the East India Company exerted influence in India?

3. How did British national interests affect the East India Company’s growth and conduct in India?

Assumptions

This work is based on several theoretical ideas or concepts which were necessary for continued research and analysis. They are clarified here for better understanding of how they framed this study.

1. The United States will continue to pursue strategic national interests through foreign military engagement and security cooperation.

2. Though contemporarily distasteful, the concept of colonization as practiced by the British in India can provide scalable lessons relevant to modern military intervention.

3. The agents of the East India Company encountered and bridged cultural and religious gaps which were as great or greater than that which American forces faced in 21st century Iraq and Afghanistan.

Definitions and Terms

The following definitions provide a common understanding of key terms which are prominent within the study of the East India Company’s influence on the Indian subcontinent.
Clive, Robert. An influential commander within the East India Company’s ground forces whose military campaigns in the region of Bengal propelled the Company’s expansion from commercial interests to overseas rule. Clive first acquired martial control over Bengal by defeating native Mughal forces at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 (Gardner 1971, 87). In 1765, Clive solidified this position by negotiating for the Company’s authority to collect taxes in the region (see Diwanis).

Court of Directors. A body of 24 stockholders within the East India Company that governed the Company’s policies and decisions (Bowen 2006, 118). As the EIC transitioned in the late 18th century from a body of commercial trade to controlling an empire in India, these directors became ministers of statecraft as much as they were managers of a commercial organization (Bowen 2006, 119).

Diwanis. A condition of “sub-rule” over the region within India’s Mughal Empire, bestowed by the Mughal Emperor upon Robert Clive on behalf of the East India Company at the Treaty of Allahabad in 1765 (Gardner 1971, 99). Diwanis over Bengal effectively gave the Company the native authority to tax all inhabitants of the region, with a monetary tribute as well as nominal authority paid to the Mughal Emperor (Gardner 1971, 99). This event serves as a turning point in its transition from trade to empire.

Military Engagement. The routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, 1-15).

Nawab. The ruler of a Muslim province or large tract of land (Lawford 1978, 330).
**Pitt’s India Act.** A Parliamentary action in 1784 that resulted in the joint
government over affairs in India between the British Crown and the East India Company.
This was the Crown’s formal recognition that the Company’s growth in India had
reached a point of national consequence (Bowen 2006, 73). It established a Board of
Control (or Board of Commissioners) made up of Crown-appointed officials who had the
power to influence the Company and its directors as they deemed necessary (Bowen
2006, 73).

**Plassey, Battle of, 1757.** This was a decisive victory for the East India Company’s
forces under Robert Clive’s command. The Company defeated the sitting Nawab of
Bengal as well as a French contingent allied with the Nawab. Clive then installed a co-
opted Nawab who would rubberstamp the Company’s policies and, therefore, establish
EIC primacy in the region of Bengal (Frazier 1897, 97-103). This acquisition portended
the East India Company’s transition from a corporation based in international trade to one
based in colonial rule.

**Presidency.** A geographic area of the Indian subcontinent controlled by the East
India Company; consisting of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal (Lawford 1978, 57).

**Security Cooperation.** All interactions with foreign defense establishments to
build defense relationships that promote specific U. S. security interests, develop allied
and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and
provide U. S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (Joint Chiefs
of Staff 2013, 1-15).

**Security Force Assistance.** Training, equipping, advising, and assisting a partner
country to enhance its capabilities and capacities (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, 1-17).
Sepoy. A common term for Indian soldiers employed by the armies of the East India Company.

Limitations

This research focuses on the actions and practices of the East India Company as a military proponent on the Indian subcontinent between 1600 and 1857, and its long-term effects in that region. As a limitation or potential weak point in this research, there is a lack of published personal accounts from native Indians who witnessed or participated in the military actions of the East India Company. As such, the available primary sources informing this study portray a distinctly British account of events.

Scope and Delimitations

The East India Company and its competitors influenced India as it is known today in far more ways than any one research study can adequately address. Therefore, as a delimitation, this study will focus on the Company’s military enterprises. Through the lens of its military exploits, this study will necessarily address the Company’s influence on the region’s politics, economy, society, infrastructure, and information. While Portugal, Denmark, Holland, and France all contended with Great Britain through their own imperial trading companies on the Indian subcontinent, this work does not address those competitors because none achieved the permanent military legacy of the Honorable East India Company.

Conclusion

After the first two decades of the 21st century, the United States’ efforts to build military capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan have not achieved a lasting impact in either
nation. There is no indication that continuing in the same manner will produce a measurably different result in the years to come. Conversely, the East India Company and its privatized military force did achieve a legacy on the Indian subcontinent throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries that still echoes today. Through the results of research into historic texts and modern scholarly works about the East India Company, this project communicates how the Company’s military influence in India may be instructive to modern security cooperation efforts. Chapter 2’s literature review outlines the body of research that underpins this study. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology employed. Chapter 4 organizes the relevant data into three general themes that answer the secondary research questions, and Chapter 5 offers conclusions and recommendations that answer the primary research question.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The Company’s servants and their agents, have taken into their own hands the whole of that Trade, which they have carried on in a capacity before unknown, for they have traded not only as Merchants, but as Sovereigns.

— Robert Clive, *Speech Made in the House of Commons, 1772*.

Before presenting any data or analysis addressing the primary research question, it is important to acknowledge the existing background of expertise from which this study draws its conclusions. While discussing the referenced works, this chapter’s literature review outlines three patterns that emerged from the research conducted. Those three patterns comprise the unique environment that the Company had to create before becoming prominent, the key aspects of how the Company operated within that environment, and the linkage between the Company’s private undertakings in India and national interests in Britain. Grouping the literature into these patterns will aid in understanding this study’s methodology and overall argument.

Necessary Conditions

The first pattern to emerge from the sampled literature concerns steps the Company’s employees and military officers took to set the necessary conditions for the Company’s eventual prominence. Put another way, a few prerequisite accomplishments allowed the Company to have the placement and access necessary to eventually become an imperial power in India. An unsurprising condition common to all the referenced works was a strong rapport between the Company officers and their Indian hosts. The
Security Force Assistance Planner’s Guide, published by the Joint Center for
International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), outlines techniques for advisors to
build rapport with their host nation partners, all of which are challenges to contemporary
advisors who operate within curtailed deployment timeframes. When viewed through the
lens of a British officer of the East India Company, those same techniques seemed
assuredly attainable given the vast duration of a Company deployment to India. In the era
of the East India Company, simply traveling to the Indian subcontinent required a lengthy
and dangerous sea voyage. Historian Brian Gardner detailed how the inherent difficulties
of global travel during the East India Company’s era made a trip to India into a semi-
permanent endeavor.

Along similar lines, loyalty emerged as another necessary condition for the
Company’s success. Lorenzo Crowell’s doctoral thesis provides a useful account of how
the Company provided long-term compensation for native soldiers and their families after
a career in good standing or death in service to the Company. The memoirs of Colonel
George Malleson, a career officer in the Bengal Army, confirmed that the Company’s
pension system played a key role in securing the loyalty of Indian soldiers who had more
in common with the Company’s enemies than their British counterparts.

Key Characteristics

The next emerging pattern deals with how the Company exerted its influence.
This pattern outlines the key aspects of how the Company operated that are most relevant
to the primary research question. In various scholarly journal publications, historians
Kaushik Roy, and Randolph G. S. Cooper, and G. J. Bryant provide overviews of the
Company’s effective synthesis of Indian practices and techniques with the European
principles by which the Company’s army fought. This organizational adaptability ranged from adopting Indian cavalry solutions to integrating the region’s incumbent systems for resupply and sustainment. In his *Washington Post* piece about the beleaguered Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), journalist Tim Craig offered a modern contrast to the East India Company’s organizational approach.

Several of the referenced works revealed the extent to which the Company went to prepare its military officers and civil employees for the challenges of a career in India. Historic records pertaining to the Company from the 19th century portray the system of academic institutions in Britain and India that the Company retained. These documents included the transcript of a prominent speech from a Member of Parliament, internal Company records, and personal accounts of graduates. These works showed the Company’s military academy at Addiscombe, its civil service preparatory school at Haileybury, and its regionally focused facilities throughout India as notable measures of the Company’s depth of preparation. A search for a modern American comparison revealed the U. S. Army’s plan to open the Military Advisor Training Academy in late 2017 as well as programs resident within the Joint Readiness Training Center.

G. J. Bryant, once again, discussed how the Company overcame the challenges of raising a westernized force in India by integrating the indigenous military labor market to comprise the bulk of its force in all three Presidencies. Bryant recounted the reliance on Sepoys to fill the ranks of each Presidency’s army, under the stipulation of rigorous training to high standards provided by a small contingency of British military experts. Additionally, a preserved record from within the Madras Army depicted the limited
extent to which the Company promoted Sepoys into its corps of commissioned and non-commissioned officers for service in tandem with a European counterpart.

The researched literature showed that, following its rise to power in Bengal, the Company attempted to preserve the perception that the defeated Moghuls were still in charge in order to minimize turbulence among the native population. Regardless of the motives behind the preference for masked influence, the available research indicated that leaders such as Robert Clive strove to preserve the region’s organic policy apparatus whenever possible. This tactic and the Company’s actions therein comprise another key characteristic of the Company’s influence that addresses the primary research question. Records of correspondence between senior Company officials afield in India and the London-based Court of Directors conveyed this sentiment, and historian H. V. Bowen further clarified with his own analysis. Furthermore, in his exploration of India’s economic history, Dietmar Rothemund relayed an instructive example of British legal experts integrating their practices with local tradition in order to retain authoritative recognition from the native population on behalf of the Company. Finally, the United States’ hapless model of De-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi army in post-invasion 2003 reinforced the veiled approach to policy as a key characteristic of how the Company exercised influence in India.

Influence from Home

The final pattern explained how British national interests influenced the Company’s actions in India. Because efforts in security cooperation typically exist to advance the national interests of the participating states, it is important to understand the relationship between the East India Company and its vested stakeholders in Britain.
Contributing literature indicated that commerce and mutual prosperity made up the basis of the relationship between the Company and British national interests. In *The Business of Empire*, H. V. Bowen established that the vigorous commercial interchange between Crown and Company served as the vehicle through which the British government obliquely influenced the Company’s affairs in India as they pertained to British policy. Randolph G. S. Cooper’s work dovetailed with Bowen’s message by highlighting the operational autonomy the Company enjoyed throughout its military engagements. Cooper attributed the Company’s long leash in India to the fact that the British government’s chief concerns for the company were financial in nature, and that military affairs were relevant to the British government and people only insofar as they affected commerce.

Concurrently to the Company’s hegemonic rise in India, the British government was directly administering to its colonial interests in North America. India and the American colonies represent two vastly different strategies to British global expansion. Comparing the two models underlines the potential advantages of privatized foreign policy that may also be applicable to modern efforts at security cooperation. Arguments in scholarly journals by historians Ian Christie and Peter Thomas, along with the academic research of Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Canfield, all helped to characterize the public liabilities King George and British Parliament accepted in order directly control British interests in North America as the American Revolution fomented. Conversely, records of a petition in the House of Commons from 1783 suggested that, aside from revenue paid against the earnings it disclosed, the East India Company waged a military conquest in India with minimal publicity.
Conclusion

The purpose of this literature review was to uncover the prominent trends within this study’s research that informed the forthcoming presentation and analysis of data, as well as the final conclusions and recommendations. As a result of the research conducted, three overarching patterns are evident among the data gathered. First, the Company’s efforts to set its operating environment in India with committed European cadre and Indian soldiers stood out. Once installed in India, the ways in which the Company faced a unique set of problems are of particular interest. Finally, the relationship between the Company and its parent nation as business partners provided a foundation for further insight. In detailing the research methodology driving this project, chapter 3 explains how this study will use the data gathered to answer the primary and secondary research questions.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
To answer the primary research question, “How can U. S. policy makers apply the East India Company’s model for using military means to achieve strategic ends in contemporary security cooperation efforts?” as well as the secondary research questions, this study will consist of a qualitative content analysis of historic records of the East India Company’s actions as well as scholarly works previously published. As a research methodology, content analysis involves analyzing various texts to make useful conclusions (White and Marsh 2006, 26-27). Based that broad foundation, this study will follow the procedure of sampling relevant data, unitizing the data, coding the data, and providing results.

Sampling
In sampling data, a researcher consults enough sources to present relevant patterns or phenomena (White and Marsh 2006, 36-37). The course of the research then flows from those identified patterns (White and Marsh 2006, 37). In this research project, the literature review in chapter 2 outlined the prevailing patterns that emerged from the data sampled. Those patterns involved the necessary conditions that the Company established to enable its longevity in India, the unique characteristics of the Company’s actions in India, and influence over Indian affairs from stakeholders at home.
Unitizing

In unitizing data, the researcher draws “relevant distinctions within an observational field” (Krippendorff 2013, 98). Breaking data into units results in “information-bearing instances” (Krippendorff 2013, 98) that are then ready for consideration. There are many different methods for unitizing data, but the method of thematic organization is best suited for this study’s qualitative analysis of the East India Company. For the purposes of this methodology, themes are freely generated narratives that, based on sampled data, convey a general idea or thought (Krippendorff 2013, 108). Building upon the patterns set forth in chapter 2’s literature review, chapter 4 of this thesis organizes the results of the research conducted into three general themes for consideration. Those themes are the level of commitment with which the Company and its forward agents invested in their work, the Company’s effective adaptation of European and Indian resources and methods, and the peculiar relationship between Company and Parliament that amounted to a privatized British foreign policy in India.

Commitment

Out of myriad conditions required for a private company to eventually preside over an empire, there are two that are most relevant to the primary research question because they characterize the depth of the Company’s commitment in India. Those conditions include the duration of a Company employee’s service abroad, and how the Company compelled loyalty from its native soldiers. The difficult realities of intercontinental travel during the Company’s era forced its expeditionary employees to relocate to India for significant periods of their lives, in contrast to the abbreviated rotations preferred by most deploying forces today. With that perspective in mind, this
theme isolates key advantages inherent to long-duration deployments. Lastly, extensive measures to secure the Sepoys’ genuine loyalty rather than contractual compliance offer insight into challenges that the United States has yet to overcome with its middle-eastern partners.

Adaptation

Framed within the concepts of Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, and Policy, this theme addresses how the Company adapted to complement its environment in India. Regarding Organization, research offers examples of effective adaptations of existing Indian solutions to the demands for horse-mounted cavalry and artillery, as well as the Company’s shrewd employment of a resident network of nomadic grain merchants. With respect to Training, the Company’s establishment of its own academic infrastructure for enabling its British employees to better interface with foreign cultures in India highlights a willingness to prepare that may be relevant today. In terms of Materiel, findings highlight the Presidency Armies’ industriousness in locally producing classes of supply it otherwise would have reached back to Britain to obtain while adopting locally optimal modes of transportation. From the standpoint of Personnel, this theme discusses how the Company integrated its European officers and leaders with Indian soldiers for hire, eventually training to reach a relative parity with contemporary European forces. Finally, the Company’s approach to Policy was, to the greatest extent possible, channeled through the existing political framework to minimize the impact of the Company’s ascension to power.
Privatized Foreign Policy

This theme addresses how British national interests affected the East India Company’s growth and conduct in India. The Company’s origin as a British merchant proved to be a useful screen from public scrutiny as the Company transformed into an agent of British foreign policy. This theme illuminates the symbiotic financial relationship between the Company and Parliament, and shows how this relationship proved to be a better model for colonization when compared with the troublesome circumstances of British efforts in North America.

Coding

In qualitative coding, a researcher develops questions that guide an inductive approach to the data (White and Marsh 2006, 37). For this project, the concept of coding applies to the previously stated secondary research questions. Specifically, chapter 4 will conclude by explaining how each of its three general themes answer one of the secondary research questions restated below.

1. What conditions had to be met before the East India Company gained influence in India?

2. What are the key characteristics of how the East India Company exerted influence in India?

3. How did British national interests affect the East India Company’s growth and conduct in India?
Providing Results

The secondary research questions all provide answers that serve as necessary building blocks in answering the primary research question. Chapter 5 concludes the project using chapter 4’s answers to directly address the primary research question, offering three overall recommendations. Chapter 5 will also include relevant comparisons to contemporary models.

Threats to Validity and Biases

Because this research project showcases the aspects of the East India Company that provide relevant lessons to modern efforts at Security Cooperation and military engagement, it is biased towards that which the East India Company did well. A comprehensive portrayal of the Company’s history would not be so complimentary. Although this study’s underlying research targeted instances that conveyed how the Company achieved synthesis with its Indian hosts, a critical researcher must acknowledge that the East India Company’s history is punctuated with cases of mutiny and conflict between the Sepoy armies and their English counterparts.

An overarching trend of dissonance between 1806 and 1856 within the Bengal and Madras Presidencies demonstrates this, beginning with a recorded mutiny at Vellore among the Indian soldiers of the Madras Army in 1806, which seems to have amounted to little more than a labor strike (Roy and Dasgupta 2006, 55). Much more seriously, the Revolt of 1857 was a year of overt warfare between the British contingent of the Bengal Army and their former Indian comrades (David 2006, 82-108). This revolt caused the British government to nationalize the East India Company in 1858. While these events are doubtlessly indicative of an imperfect system of engagement between the Company
and its indigenous soldiers, they do not invalidate the lessons that can be drawn from the more than 200 years of British to Indian engagement in the subcontinent.

**Conclusion**

The intent of this research methodology is to show how the East India Company’s influence on the Indian subcontinent can instruct modern efforts of military engagement and security cooperation. This study will accomplish that by sampling from relevant historic texts as well as historic works to create a body of data. Next, this study will unitize the gathered data into three basic themes. Those basic themes will then be coded against the secondary research questions in order to produce answers that are key to addressing the primary research question. With the secondary research questions answered, this study will conclude by applying those elemental answers towards the primary research question and offering three overall recommendations.
CHAPTER 4
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Company’s servants and their agents, have taken into their own hands the whole of that Trade, which they have carried on in a capacity before unknown, for they have traded not only as Merchants, but as Sovereigns.

— Robert Clive, *Speech Made in the House of Commons, 1772.*

In unitizing the gathered data, this chapter organizes the resulting research into three general themes that serve as an analytical basis for overall conclusions and recommendations. Those themes are the depth of commitment with which the EIC deployed its agents to India and employed them upon arrival, the Company’s comprehensive adaptation of Indian ideas, and the unique relationship between the Company and Parliament as trade in India expanded to hegemony. This chapter concludes by coding these themes into answers to each of the secondary research questions. By answering the secondary research questions, this chapter provides the necessary foundation for addressing the primary research question in chapter 5.

Commitment

Throughout the East India Company’s history, the concept of projecting British commercial power to the Indian subcontinent required a vast investment by both the Company and its forward agents. India-bound Company servants often devoted the working years of their lives to the subcontinent, with their tenure in India bookended by a long and uncertain transit by sea from one world to the other. Because of the relative permanence of what would contemporarily be considered a deployment to India,
employees and the Company itself were more inclined to account for Indian cultures, languages, and practices in their preparation before the voyage to India and they were more likely to embrace those concepts over the course of their duties abroad. The Honorable East India Company outlasted its competitors and counterparts from France, Portugal, and Denmark over the course of more than two centuries on the Indian subcontinent. One reason for this lies in how the Company secured the enduring loyalty of its native employees and soldiers. The Company’s overall commitment in terms of time and resources helps to describe the conditions that had to be met before the East India Company gained influence in India.

Periods of Life, Not Deployments

In *The East India Company: A History*, Brian Gardner amplifies this perspective with details of what it took to get to India by boat from the British Isles. While U. S. deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have, at their most arduous, spanned less than two years in length, a Company writer or military operative in the early 19th century understood that service in India meant a ten-year tour or longer (Gardner 1971,183). This obligation was due in part to the time and effort necessary to sail to India from London by way of Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Citing an East Indiamen sailor’s detailed accounts, Gardner further states that a round-trip voyage between London and Calcutta could be expected to last between 14 and 18 months under good conditions (Gardner 1971, 98), with one-way trips lasting as long as 11 months (Gardner 1971, 99).

Once established in India, however, prospects of entrepreneurial trade presented Company employees with compelling reasons to establish roots there. In his research of private trade among Company employees in India between the years 1746 and 1756,
economics professor Santhi Hejeebu found that entrepreneurial profits were highest among employees in their sixth through 15th years abroad (Hejeebu 2005, 512). The Company sanctioned this perquisite under a private trade clause that allowed employees in India to engage in their own personal commercial enterprise under the Company’s “privileges and protection” (Hejeebu 2005, 503). The privileges and protection of this trade clause made it possible for employees to utilize the Company’s warehouses and secured bases as a venue for their own entrepreneurial endeavors in the region (Hejeebu 2005, 503), thereby alleviating significant overhead costs that unaffiliated businesses would have paid from their own profit margin.

Loyalty

In his doctoral thesis, Lorenzo Crowell gives an in-depth look at the measures the Madras Army took to compel loyalty from its Indian soldiers. Though Dr. Crowell’s work focused on the actions of the Madras Presidency’s army during one campaign in 1832, it is instructive of how a cadre of alien military officers united a force otherwise divided by race, nationality, language, and religion behind the Company’s colors. Like their European counterparts in the Company’s armed forces, Sepoys and Indian officers received a pension at half pay after 22 years of service, with two-thirds and sometimes even full pay awarded for exceptional or extended service (Crowell 1982, 95). Under the 1785 Recruit and Pension Boys program, the Madras Army operated an orphanage to care for surviving children of its Sepoys killed in service to the Company and also recruited the Sepoy orphans and sons of retired Sepoys from an early age (Crowell 1982, 102). Additionally, heirs of Indian officers and Sepoys killed in action received pensions of their own from the Madras administration, with female and male heirs over 50
compensated for life, children until the age of 18, and adults between 18 and 50 for 12 years following their soldier’s death (Crowell 1982, 106; Bryant 2000, 14).

The account of a career officer from the Bengal Army suggests a similar incentive program in that Presidency. Writing in 1857, Colonel George Malleson describes a pension program within the Bengal Presidency on a “large and liberal scale” that compensated Sepoys who could no longer perform as soldiers after 15 years of service (Malleson 1857, 8). Equally important, Bengal’s pension fund provided for surviving family members following a Sepoy’s death in the line of duty (Malleson 1857, 8). The Company’s military leaders in Madras and Bengal employed their pension concept with their eyes open to the reality that the “estimation of the benefits accruing from it was fixed so firmly in the minds of the Sepoys, that that single consideration would weigh against all temptations to mutiny or revolt” (Malleson 1857, 8-9).

Adaptability

Though the East India Company was indeed a British corporation that existed for purely British interests, one factor contributing to its extended tenure on the Indian subcontinent was its ability to synthesize the cultures, practices, and resources of its British and Indian roots. Rather than an insistence on the adoption of European principles, the Company’s agents seem to have selectively promoted indigenous solutions when sensible, while integrating essential elements of European warfare and commerce. It is useful to frame the Company’s adaptation in India within the realms of Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, and Policy.
Organization

The East India Company was by no means the first or only foreign entity to cultivate a westernized military organization on the Indian subcontinent, and there is extensive scholarly work chronicling the efforts of the Company’s predecessors and competitors from France, Holland, and Portugal. Because of that existing resident knowledge in the western ways of war in India at the time of the East India Company’s rise, Company planners were able to negotiate locally for “off the shelf” solutions when assembling a European fighting force (Roy 2005, 690). To swiftly build a mounted cavalry capability commensurate with standard European expectations of the time, Company buyers negotiated with native mercenary groups or independent merchants (Cooper 2005, 540). Historian Randolf G. S. Cooper outlines Arthur Wellesley’s practice as Governor-General in 1803 of hiring Maratha cavalry and Field Artillery units for service in Company ranks (Cooper 2005, 541). Kaushik Roy elaborates on the Company’s cavalry adaptation when he explains that many British scouts and their horses were simply unable to sustain long-duration cavalry operations in India’s climate, and so it was common for the Company to recruit irregular cavalry forces from upper class Muslim castes with equestrian heritage (Roy 2005, 687).

This practice of hiring military labor often included the risks of paying recently defeated enemies to change sides, but it also supported the local military markets and overall stability (Cooper 2005, 542). Cooper also discusses the Company’s reliance on the “Indian bazaar” system, in which Company logisticians contracted with native merchants to utilize the indigenous transportation network to feed and supply their army (Cooper 2005, 541). That network included brinjarries, which were nomadic grain
merchants capable of moving with the Company’s forces and facilitating their sustainment (Bryant 1985, 468).

Figure 2. The East India Company’s Administrative Structure.

Training

In his 1826 speech to the Court of Directors, Member of Parliament Robert Grant quoted his contemporary, Richard Wellesley, in his remarks on the Company’s need for a specific preparatory college for its writers and clerks serving in India. Wellesley stated that Company servants in India were increasingly expected to “discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces . . . . Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world; with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles offered by an unfavourable climate, a foreign language, the peculiar usages and laws of India, and the manners of its inhabitants” (Grant 1826, 42). With that sentiment in mind, Wellesley founded the Calcutta College in 1800 (Auber 1826, 165). Wellesley’s intent for the Calcutta College was to endow Company writers arriving from Britain with a working knowledge of civic literature and the ability to converse in the languages native to the Bengal Presidency (Auber 1826, 166). Sparked by Wellesley’s influence, the Court of Directors permitted similar institutions for the Madras Presidency in 1808 (Auber 1826, 166) and the Bombay Presidency in 1812 (Auber 1826, 167). Generally, these institutions taught EIC employees indigenous languages such as Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Tamil, and Telugu (Crowell 1982, 108) and cultural practices of the subcontinent as well as a traditional array of mathematics, law, politics, and philosophy (Bowen 2006, 215).

As Richard Wellesley brought formal schooling to Company employees already in India, the Court of Directors recognized the benefit of formally educating its civil employees in Britain prior to their departure. To that end, the Company’s directors established the East India College at Haileybury in 1805 (Auber 1826, 167). Students at
Haileybury completed four terms of study (Auber 1826, 168) that normally lasted two years (Auber 1826, 165). Haileybury’s curriculum educated students in subjects that included legal practices, history, politics, economics, and Indian languages (Grant 1826, 42). To advance between terms and to graduate, students demonstrated their knowledge in public examinations administered by professors (Grant 1826, 42-58). By 1810, senior officials within the Company characterized Haileybury as the foundation of the civil employees’ academic preparation for service in India, while the colleges of each Presidency in India amplified that education with a sharper regional focus (Grant 1826, 30).

The members of the Court of Directors were always aware of their need of properly educated military officers, especially in the Artillery and Engineer ranks of the Company’s forces. Between 1765 and 1809, the Company negotiated with the British Crown to either recruit graduates of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich or procure a select few appointments for “Gentlemen Cadets” of the East India Company to attend Woolwich at the Company’s expense (Vibart 1894, 1-2). This reciprocity between the Company and Royal Military Academy sufficed until the Company’s military growth in India demanded more professional officers than Woolwich could spare. As a counterpart to Woolwich, the East India Company Military Seminary at Addiscombe began educating the Company’s cadets in January of 1809 (Vibart 1894, 9).

Colonel Henry Vibart was an 1857 graduate of Addiscombe and completed his career with the Madras Engineers in 1891. During his life, he published a memoir about the Seminary that offers useful insight into how the East India Company prepared its military officers. Until its closure in 1861, Addiscombe was the Company’s main
commissioning source and training venue for its officers of the Artillery, Engineer, and Infantry cohorts (Vibart 1894, 315). Cadets at Addiscombe began their studies between the ages of 14 and 16, and graduated after they completed four academic terms over the course of two years (Vibart 1894, 17).

The Company’s military college focused its curriculum on the mathematical and scientific disciplines its engineers and artillery officers would need in the field, but also devoted effort to teaching languages spoken on the Indian subcontinent. Overall subjects included geometry, statics and dynamics, trigonometry, drafting, swordsmanship, and hindustani, the generalized term referring to the Urdu and Hindi languages (Vibart 1894, 59-60). In his memoirs, Vibart recounted the public examinations that cadets completed in order to advance to the next term or graduate, similar to Haileybury’s model. In these exams, cadets demonstrated their knowledge of the coursework through practical exercises and oral examinations in Indian languages (Vibart 1894, 41, 51).

To signify the public examinations’ importance to the Company, the Chairman and Court of Directors typically attended, and a cadet’s performance determined his posting and assignment (Vibart 1894, 43, 51). The more qualified cadets typically became engineers or artillery officers (Vibart 1894, 51). Graduates of Addiscombe faced further academic challenges in India as well. The Court of Directors mandated that officers abroad validate their proficiency in Indian languages to be appointed to higher paying staff jobs (Crowell 1982, 107). Albert Hervey, a Company officer and Addiscombe graduate, described in his own memoirs of undergoing a Hindustani examination shortly after reporting to the Madras Native Infantry in 1833 (Allen 1988, 25). Hervey goes on to say that his regiment rewarded him for his language proficiency
by immediately placing him in command of one of his regiment’s companies (Allen 1988, 25).

Materiel

With specific tribute to Robert Clive, historian Kaushik Roy explains the Company’s technique of producing its artillery and munitions in India through the existing indigenous economy, while crediting Clive once again with securing the necessary protection of local leaders for such enterprises (Roy 2005, 684). “The Indian powers never managed to produce iron guns in adequate quantities. On the other hand, systematization of the production of artillery and munitions and of its supply to the Company’s forces was secured by establishing . . . western-style arsenals. These factories utilized raw materials from the subcontinent to produce military stores” (Roy 2005, 684). Roy’s research shows that every major Company operation incidentally employed networks of indigenous contractors for procuring and transporting various classes of supply (Roy 2005, 687).

In a Company publication written in 1810 as a guide for India-bound employees, Captain Thomas Williamson commented about the merits of employing native livestock in the terrain for which they are uniquely suited. “The advantages attendant upon an elephant, are . . . that he can travel in swampy districts where no other animal could proceed at all. . . . On the other hand, a camel will travel on those dry soils which destroy an elephant’s feet . . . he is more patient under heat, and the absence both of fodder and of water; his prime cost is considerably less” (Williamson 1810; 445). In his description of how to float timber for riverine transport, Williamson also provides an example of the
Company’s shrewd adoption of local practices rather than imposing the techniques more natural to Europeans (Williamson 1810, 64).

Personnel

The East India Company faced significant challenges when assembling its army in India. While directors and their trusted agents abroad desired a modern force in keeping with the current state of European warfare, manning that force with European soldiers or mercenaries was prohibitively costly and unrealistic (Bryant 2000, 1). As a result, the Company forged the bulk of its army from India’s military labor market and interspersed a select few European officers and non-commissioned officers in positions of command and senior leadership. While initial advantages of recruiting locally included cheaper labor and fighters who were naturally accustomed to India’s challenging climate (Bryant 2000, 5), the Company’s military leaders lacked the budgetary authorization from their London-based directors to field armies of equal size to Indian adversaries (Bryant 2000, 5). Therefore, the Company focused on producing a force that was numerically smaller in nearly every engagement, but also more professionally trained and qualitatively superior (Bryant 2000, 5).

Historian G. J. Bryant offers a perspective on the Company’s efforts to raise an indigenous army that is relevant to modern efforts at security cooperation. Bryant begins by explaining a resonant parallel between the Company’s model and that of American campaigns of the 21st century. While the employment of mercenaries was common during the Company’s era, the case of the Sepoy armies was unique because the Sepoys were fighting in native lands against people of their own race and background on behalf of a foreign contingent of westerners (Bryant 2000, 3). The Company’s military cadre
acknowledged that it was not sufficient to only provide the Sepoys with British weapons and uniforms; rather, the cadre strove to instill in the Sepoys a sense of military professionalism and a military code of law intended to precede tribal or religious practices (Bryant 2000, 6). Bryant provides a contextual understanding of the Company’s recruitment of local military force from its beginning in the early 17th century, stating that British interest in a standing army went only so far as to secure various vital infrastructure such as factories. This passive concept of defense expanded to its better-known height of three standing Presidential Armies (see Figure 2) composed of approximately 100,000 Indian soldiers and 10,000 Europeans during Clive’s influence in the mid-18th century to early 19th century (Bryant 2000, 3).

Precise accounts of how each Presidency’s army organized its formations down to the small unit level are inconsistent, but the curator of the Madras Record Office published a text in 1922 about the Madras Army that is also generally representative of the other Presidencies. In this account, Henry Dodwell recorded that between 1750 and 1760, the Madras Army was composed of six battalions of Sepoys serving under a total of three European captains (presumably two battalions per captain) with two ensigns and three sergeants major per battalion (Dodwell 1922, 9).

In addition to the small cadre of European officers, both Dodwell and Bryant offer research that shows the prominence of Sepoys gaining officer’s commissions or being promoted as non-commissioned officers based on their merits. In one such example, both the Bengal and Madras Armies placed European officers in command of battalions of 800-900 men, but those officers commanded in tandem with an Indian co-commander (Bryant 2000, 20). During the 1760s, 1770s and 1780s, the Company changed its policy
by allocating more European officers to the Sepoy battalions to approximately 11 per battalion, which generally put a European officer in command of each company (Bryant 2000, 25). Lastly, despite similar practices among European competitors, the East India Company seems to have provided compelling incentive for the Sepoys’ allegiance, which was more reliable pay (Dodwell 1922, 12) albeit at half the rate of their British counterparts (Bryant 2000, 6).

Policy

As a body of London-based merchants and traders, the East India Company was initially unprepared to manage the vast empire that fell under its control following Clive’s acquisition of the Diwanis that granted the Company native authority over the Indian region of Bengal. Bowen describes the “dual system” of government that Robert Clive installed to govern Bengal while transferring its natural wealth to London (Bowen 2006, 195). Clive’s system relied as much as possible on existing methods and authority so as to minimize the shock among the Company’s newest subjects (Clive 1765, 24-25). This approach was well aligned with the Court of Directors’ wishes, as evidenced by correspondence between Company’s Select Committee in Bengal and the Court in 1766.

We observe the account you give of the office and power of the King’s Dewan. . . . This description is not the office we wish to execute. The experience we have already had...convinces us how unfit an Englishman is to conduct the collection of revenues and follow the subtle native through all his arts to conceal the real value of his country to perplex and to elude the payments. We therefore entirely approve of your preserving the ancient form of government. (Srinivasachari 1962, 184)

Dietmar Rothemund provides another instance of the British concept of transparent influence when he characterizes the Company’s imposition of a legal system in Clive’s newly acquired Bengal. Rothemund extolls British legal scholar Sir William
Jones, who arrived in Calcutta in 1784 as a judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta (Rothemund 2010, 18). This court was originally designed to preside over legal matters between Europeans in India, but Clive’s acquisition of Diwanis over Bengal incidentally made Jones’ court the ruling body over all of Bengal’s subjects (Rothemund 2010, 18). Already conversant in the Arabic and Persian languages, Jones learned Sanskrit while in India because it is the ancient language that articulates Hindu law (Rothemund 2010, 18). With this understanding of Hindu jurisprudence, Jones worked with Hindu scholars in capturing this scripture in the Court’s legal vernacular that the British judges then used to decide cases between Bengali natives (Rothemund 2010, 18).
Privatized Foreign Policy

Figure 3. The East India Company’s Administrative Structure

Source: H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press, 2006), 186-187. NOTE: This illustrates the hierarchical relationship of the East India Company’s efforts at home and in India, with ministerial oversight both in London and abroad. Of note, Pitt’s India Act created the Secret Committee, which served as a direct channel for Parliament’s messages to EIC leaders in India as well as policy dictums to the Court of Directors.

From its inception in 1600 through the first half of the 18th century, the East India Company was an independent merchant that operated on a charter from the English monarchy. As the Company’s holdings broadened from the realm of profitable commerce in the 17th century to sanctioned colonial expansion in the 18th century (see Figure 2), the Company became increasingly like “an agency of imperial government that was obliged to serve national interests as well as its own narrower corporate concerns”
The Business of Empire, by H. V. Bowen, characterizes how the Company’s affairs in India became increasingly intertwined with the Parliament’s ministerial interests. Bowen details three lines of intervention taken by Parliament to install greater government control over the Company. The first two changed how the Court of Directors elected its members and increased ministerial oversight of how those directors dispensed the Company’s funds (Bowen 2006, 70-71).

More interestingly, Bowen’s third line of intervention deals with Parliament’s realization that the East India Company was independently forming and executing British foreign policy in India.

When the Seven Years War ended in 1763, ministers continued to keep a vigilant watch on any signs of French attempts to recover their greatly weakened position in Bengal, and they were swift to intervene when alerted about possible dangers. In the light of events since 1756, they also began to address the problem of whether a private trading company should still be permitted to wage war and make peace with sovereign powers in India. This was a matter of some importance because ministers feared that Crown forces might be dragged into unwelcome and expensive future conflicts in support of the Company. (Bowen 2006, 72)

This concern ultimately inspired the India Act of 1784, in which Parliament installed a Board of Control within the East India Company’s corporate hierarchy (see figure 1). As an authoritative body acting on state interests, this board had the power to “superintend, direct, and control, all acts, operations, and concerns, which in any wise related to the civil or military government or revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies” (Bowen 2006, 73).

Financial Interdependence

Financially, the Company and the British government were so thickly knotted with each other that the Company was, in modern parlance, too big to fail. Randolf G. S.
Cooper characterized the Company’s assured financial position when he wrote, “A financially guaranteed means of military recovery turned the East India Company into the superior war-machine: globalized British forces could contain, and then destabilize, an Indian state by staging a series of wars without interference by the home government” (Cooper 2005, 542). Bowen’s research extensively covers the two-way flow of loans between the British government and the Company. Throughout the Company’s profitable years of the 17th and 18th centuries, directors extended millions of pounds’ sterling to the English state to relieve financial pressures of the Nine Years’ War in 1698 and the War of Austrian Succession in 1744 (Bowen 2006, 30), as well as throughout the Seven Years War until 1767 (Bowen 2006, 35).

Conversely, Bowen also describes the Company’s reliance on credit from the Bank of England, citing advances summing to just under £1.5 million between 1710 and 1745 (Bowen 2006, 34), and approximately £5.5 million between 1769 and 1772 (Bowen 2006, 35). In 1772, a financial crisis started by the failure of a major bank forced the Company to accept a government bailout in exchange for mandated reforms (Bowen 2006, 36). Outside of credit, the Company’s business provided varying but always significant commercial stimulus to the British economy. During a time of brisk returns due to booming advances in Bengal, Bowen found that business resulted in a “material benefit” to the British public of approximately £2.7 million to £2.8 million per year between 1767 and 1787 (Bowen 2006, 40).

Two Contrasting Approaches to Hegemony

The connection between the East India Company and the British government during the last half of the 18th century stands in stark contrast to that of the British
government and its colonial enterprises on the North American continent during the same
timeframe. This contrast is instructive in understanding how the Company sustained such
a long tenure in India before being nationalized under the British crown in 1858. As
historian Ian Christie argued, the driving force behind British colonial efforts in both
regions of the world was the perpetual competition with its chief rival, France, for
influence across the globe (Christie 1977, 212). While a royal charter entrusted British
prevalence in India to the Company during the Seven Years War, Parliament and the
Crown took a different approach in the American colonies. In North America, Britain
pursued trade dominance by directly governing the Colonies and collecting commercial
revenue through taxation (Christie 1977, 209). The direct approach in North America
gave Parliament and King George III more authority, especially in comparison to the
previously described Board of Control arranged by Pitt’s India Act of 1784. With direct
control came greater risk, however, as the events leading to the American Revolution
would portend.

The British government directly funded the costs that accompanied its imperial
control over the North American colonies. Historian Peter Thomas’ account of the
expenses associated with sustaining the British Army in North America between 1763
and 1775 is a fair indicator for comparison against the East India Company’s endeavors
during the same timeframe. According to Thomas’ calculations, the average annual cost
of maintaining the British Army during this 13-year window was £383,174 (Thomas
1988, 515) totaling to a sum of approximately five million pounds. The Exchequer
covered this cost in the same way that it generated revenue from colonial commerce in
North America: by acts of Parliament that taxed trade (Christie 1977, 210). By resisting
taxation as they did after 1763, American colonists questioned Parliament’s authority in North America and, therefore, directly challenged Britain’s sovereignty and vital national interest of trade supremacy in the region (Christie 1977, 209). King George III’s response to his rebellious American colonies highlights the aforementioned liability of the British model in North America, as the task of forcing compliance out of militant colonists now rested at the British government’s feet. The annual military costs from this period were, by themselves, seen as a loathsome burden by the British taxpayers (Thomas 1988, 516). Eventually, even British Governors in the Colonies would publicly complain (Canfield 2012, 13). By committing costly troops to a festering war, the British government mortgaged its national will in a way that was not necessary via the East India Company’s model of privatized foreign policy.

This same timeframe of 1763-1775 covered the East India Company’s transition from trade to empire. Once again, Robert Clive secured in 1765 the legal right for the Company to tax the indigenous people of Bengal when the Moghul emperor conferred Diwanis upon him at the Treaty of Allahabad. Such gains came with significant costs, as records from debates in the House of Commons indicate. On March 5, 1783, Sir Henry Fletcher, one of the Company’s directors, petitioned the House of Commons regarding unresolved financial discrepancies between the Exchequer and the Company dating from the 1760s.

In his debate, Fletcher claimed that the Company absorbed a cost of just over £5 million for the overall campaign in Bengal that resulted in Clive’s Diwanis and the Company’s rise to governance over that region (Cobbett 1814, 574). Referring to Parliament’s right to benefit from the Company’s revenues per royal charter, Fletcher
stated, “as to so much respected the mere Indian wars, which produced the cession of territories and revenues, the petitioners conceive it must be allowed, that if the Company in obtaining the revenues, acted as agents to the state, they ought to be reimbursed their expences [sic] as agents” (Cobbett 1814, 574). He went on to argue that instead of the compensation for which he petitioned that day, Parliament required an annual tax of £400,000 on the Company’s Bengal-based profits that amounted to over £2 million paid by the year 1772 (Cobbett 1814, 574-575). Recalling H. V. Bowen’s work, research shows that because of payments like the one Henry Fletcher protested, the Company’s taxed revenue during this same timeframe resulted in a material benefit to the British public of just over £2.7 million per year, notwithstanding the incidental perk of ejecting the French from India.

Conclusion

This chapter organized the researched data into three overall themes that help to understand how the Honorable East India Company’s history can provide useful insight into contemporary efforts at security cooperation. Each of those themes assist in answering one of the secondary research questions restated below.

1. What conditions had to be met before the East India Company gained influence in India?

2. What are the key characteristics of how the East India Company exerted influence in India?

3. How did British national interests affect the East India Company’s growth and conduct in India?
To gain influence in India, the research indicates two requisite conditions to which the Company made a full commitment. First, the Company needed employees willing to dedicate the working years of their lives to service abroad in India. This meant that Company officers and civil servants performed in the same capacity for a much longer duration than what is expected of most modern security cooperation advisors. Second, Company leaders recognized their need to create a bond with the Sepoys that superseded the conventions of family, culture, and religion. The Company’s pension system and all of its trappings met this need across all the Presidencies.

Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, and Policy are all characteristics of how the East India Company, a British merchant corporation, adapted to thrive in India and exert imperial influence. The Company met its organizational needs by tapping into the Indian military market’s solutions for sustaining and developing its forces. Leaders like Arthur Wellesley recognized the cultural and linguistic gulf between the Company’s British employees and their Indian counterparts. Therefore, the Company maintained resident academic institutions that were uniquely tailored to train military officers and civil employees to meet the challenges awaiting them in India. The Company’s preference for locally procuring materiel solutions contributed to its natural integration into the Indian economy. Forced to operate within its shareholders’ scrupulous budgetary constraints, the Company recruited indigenous personnel to comprise the bulk of its private military force. While contracted European officers filled the most prominent positions, the formations behind them in training and in combat were nearly all Indian soldiers. Lastly, the Company’s policymakers masked their efforts in India behind accepted fixtures of governance to achieve minimal impact on the local population.
As a purveyor of British foreign policy, the Company was unique because its relationship with the British government and people was based in commerce. In scattered and overlapping instances throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the Company and the British government depended upon each other financially. Therefore, the Court of Directors accepted operational risks in India knowing that they were tacitly underwritten by the British crown. At the same time, the commercial nature of the Company’s relationship with its parent nation allowed for prolonged and costly military campaigns to go largely unnoticed by the public, minimizing the Company’s reliance on fleeting resources like national will and support.

Each of the secondary research questions answered above contribute to the foundation necessary to adequately address the primary research question. Chapter 5 answers the primary research question within the established framework of Commitment, Adaptability, and Privatized Foreign Policy. From those conclusions, the next chapter offers three recommendations for future consideration.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A rationally ordered system of officials continues to function smoothly after the enemy has occupied the area; he merely needs to change the top officials. This body of officials continues to operate because it is to the vital interest of everyone concerned, including above all the enemy.

— Max Weber, Essays in Sociology

Introduction

How can U. S. policy makers apply the East India Company’s model for using military means to achieve strategic ends in contemporary security cooperation efforts? Based on the literature review as well as the data and analysis of the previous chapter, this chapter will answer this research question. Chapter 4 answered the secondary research questions within the general themes of Commitment, Adaptability, and Privatized Foreign Policy. Building on the findings within those themes, this chapter concludes with three overall recommendations. First, U.S. policymakers should consider establishing dedicated academic institutions to prepare advisors bound for Afghanistan and Iraq using models similar to the Company’s schools at Haileybury and Addiscombe. Second, privatizing the United States’ security cooperation efforts may allow a prolonged effort over many generations, similar to the Company’s tenure in India. Lastly, U. S. advisors should strive to minimize the expectation that foreign partners will readily adopt American or western methods as a replacement for historically entrenched methods of the host nation.
Commitment

To Company employees and soldiers relocating to India from Britain, service abroad was a semi-permanent move. Employing modern military advisors and trainers in a similar fashion would produce a continuity of personality that is not possible under the United States’ current practice of segmented rotations. Instead of redeploying after nine months to a year, advisors would have time to build meaningful relationships based on trust and familiarity with their counterparts. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance’s (JCISFA) Security Force Assistance Planner’s Guide mentions several techniques for establishing rapport with counterparts from allied nations.

Not surprisingly, these techniques include understanding and respecting the partner nation’s culture and religion (JCISFA 9-9 – 9-10), and the guide emphasizes that the advisor must dedicate effort to know as much as possible about the host nation’s “geography, history, dominant religions, political system, society, and culture” (JCISFA 9-9). This text advises that such efforts be made prior to an advisor’s deployment, not only to enable individual success but also to standardize military advisors for the U. S. Army’s current rotational deployment model. Adopting the East India Company’s example of longer-duration deployments would enable modern American advisors to cultivate rapport over a more gradual and tenured approach to these same techniques.

American advisors today will probably not generate an army of mercenaries on behalf of a partner nation, but experience in Iraq and Afghanistan does show that American advisors need more effective ways to build a foundation of good faith among indigenous soldiers. With that in mind, the Company’s methods for providing enduring financial support to its Sepoys and their surviving families are potentially relevant to
American efforts today. It would be difficult to apply the Company’s pension concept directly to contemporary security cooperation missions in which American military advisors work with a sovereign nation’s military service. Indirectly, however, it may be possible to improve similar programs already in practice within a partner nation’s military, or provide the right incentive for a partner nation to start one.

Adaptability

The Company’s sensible use of resident institutions such as the Indian bazaars and the already entrenched network of brinjarries is an organizational example that may be relevant to current advisors. By employing these existing and well known systems throughout its operations in India, Company leaders decreased the amount of adjustment necessary to build a westernized military force in India. A common problem with security cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq lies in building the necessary systems within the partnered organization for sustaining and maintaining the western equipment and tools acquired through foreign aid.

Advisors are frequently frustrated when their host nation counterparts use sustainment materiel and funds for purposes entirely separate from their original intent. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) involvement in Afghanistan has been chronically plagued by this type of problem, so much so that NATO employs the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), an American-funded multi-national team of military professionals who advise the Afghan security forces’ upper echelons of command in resource management (NATO 2017). CSTC-A lists several main functions as part of its mission statement. Most relevant to this research are its functions of Planning, Programming Budgeting, and Execution as well as
Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight. Through these two functions, CSTC-A attempts to teach senior Afghan security officials the skills necessary to raise and sustain an effective security force and establish the public’s trust in that force (NATO 2017).

CSTC-A faces an uphill battle, however, as journalist Tim Craig indicated in 2016. Craig’s piece discussed CSTC-A’s decision in May of 2016 to procure and directly provide uniforms and boots to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police through a hasty plan mostly funded by U. S. tax dollars (Craig 2016). Significantly, this measure circumvented existing Afghan supply channels in order to meet what CSTC-A advisors considered an immediate need that the Afghan government would have left unanswered. The article details the unrelenting corruption within the Afghan government that challenges western partners, with specific attention to CSTC-A’s assessment that a large percentage of imported military goods are diverted for the personal gain of the Afghan leaders trusted with access to the supply chain (Craig 2016). Craig’s article highlights some of the difficulties advisors face when attempting to convince their indigenous hosts to adopt entirely foreign systems and organizations. CSTC-A employs military officers from various NATO countries to advise senior Afghan officers in outfitting Afghanistan’s security forces according to the western models. Instead of advising, however, those advisors must sometimes step in and intervene to prevent abject failure.

A host nation military’s hesitance to adopt the force management systems intended to accompany western equipment and techniques causes a sustainment gap that can often only be solved by additional infusions of direct U. S. aid and replacement (Craig 2016). U. S. advisors understand that grafting American principles into the foreign
organizations of their counterparts is a difficult endeavor. With that in mind, The East India Company’s example of organizational adaptation may encourage advisors to hunt for ways to minimize the amount of western adjustment required in the organizations they are dedicated to improving.

In training its employees and officers for foreign service, The East India Company had the benefit of being able to narrowly focus its efforts to the Indian subcontinent. Because of that, the Company’s academic pipelines through Addiscombe, Haileybury, and its regional colleges offered in-depth preparation for the challenges of Indian cultures, languages, and practices. The United States’ cadre of military advisors must be prepared to operate in a variety of locations around the world, but their mission in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to stand out as lasting requirements that could merit a more narrowly focused line of effort. Therefore, the Company’s resident venues at Addiscombe, Haileybury, and throughout India are worth considering as models to emulate in preparing U. S. advisors bound for security cooperation missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U. S. Army has already committed to a specialized academy for training its advisors, as the following paragraphs will outline. Applying the Company’s idea of a specialized venue for the enduring missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, would be a meaningful step further in the right direction.

The U. S. Army will begin the United States’ latest effort at institutionalized Security Force Assistance in October of 2017, when the Military Advisor Training Academy begins training the United States’ first permanently assigned Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). Each SFAB will consist of senior military personnel and leaders with the experience and professionalism necessary to train their counterparts in
foreign militaries. The idea of assembling an experienced cadre of non-commissioned and commissioned officers to leverage their expertise for training is not new, as the U. S. Army has routinely formed similarly dedicated units out of its existing maneuver brigades throughout the United States’ involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st century (Budihas et al. 2017).

Instead of poaching the senior leaders of existing maneuver brigades, however, each SFAB will be an independent unit with the permanent mission to conduct security force assistance activities (Sheftik 2017). With plans for six SFABs in total, these dedicated brigades will eventually take on the bulk of the U. S. Army’s security force assistance missions (Sheftik 2017). To accomplish this, the Military Advisor Training Academy will spend approximately one year training the members of each SFAB in areas such as language, culturally specific skills, advisory skills for working with indigenous forces, developing training plans with indigenous leaders, and some tactical training (Sheftik 2017).

Today, the U. S. Department of Defense prepares its advisors to bridge language and culture gaps by enabling self-guided study and, to a limited extent, providing formal training with certified experts. JCISFA publishes literature that supports the integration of security force assistance capabilities into the United States’ warfighting efforts. JCISFA’s publications range from periodical newsletters to instructional pieces such as the Transition Team Handbook and Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance.

The U. S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) provides various programs of instruction in Security Force Assistance via 3rd Battalion, 353rd Armor
Regiment (3-353 AR). 3-353 AR is dedicated to training individuals and building unit
capacity to enable a Combatant Commander’s SFA requirements (JRTC Operations
Group, 2017). While not exclusive to any one service of the U. S. Department of Defense
(DoD), 3-353 AR primarily supports the U. S. Army’s SFA efforts with programs of
instruction ranging from three to ten days that are geared towards enabling soldiers to
serve as advisors.

3-353 AR directs the Train, Advise, Assist, and Command (TAAC) course, the
Security Force Assistance (SFA) course, the Joint Security Force Assistance (JSFA)
course, and the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) course. The TAAC course is a three-
day program tailored for headquarters units at the Division level and higher. It provides
small-group instruction on best practices from JCISFA, the history of advising,
government, logistics, and judicial practices in the host nation, and force protection
(JRTC Operations Group, 2017).

The SFA course lasts from seven to ten days and is tailored for U. S. military
advisors who will interface directly with counterparts from an allied nation in Security
Force Assistance missions. This course uses role playing exercises with actors recruited
from the host nation to teach skills like cross-cultural relations, the use of an interpreter,
media engagements, and force protection. In addition, the SFA course also offers some
language training (JRTC Operations Group, 2017).

The RAF course trains soldiers on topics like cross-cultural relations, using an
interpreter, and human behavior while providing an overview of their unit’s aligned
region through role playing exercises with paid actors. The RAF course is a five-day
program (JRTC Operations Group, 2017).
Finally, the Joint Security Force Assistance course trains advisors from across the DoD who will serve in individual roles at the national level within allied nations. It is a seven-week course and focuses on similar topics as the SFA course, but in greater depth and with additional training focused on self-defense and survival skills (JRTC Operations Group, 2017).

When working to shape the policies of partnered nations, American policy makers may greatly enable U. S. military advisors abroad by emulating the East India Company’s approach to its unexpected responsibilities of governance in India. The Company sought to mask its influence within the existing apparatus of government to the greatest extent possible. Leaders like Robert Clive and William Jones wisely recognized that Bengal’s organic systems of governance were not, in and of themselves, obstacles to the Company’s influence over the region. Clive and Jones refrained from completely replacing systems such as Hindu jurisprudence with European models that were proven in Britain but not in India, and in doing so they minimized their responsibility to furnish new and better government from scratch.

To provide a modern contrast, U. S. advisors in Iraq would have benefitted from an operating environment unconstrained by the effects of De-Baathification and the decision to disband the Iraqi army. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 1, issued in May of 2003, banned all senior members of Iraq’s Baath Party from participating in their country’s post-Saddam government, as well as all Iraqi officials from among the top three layers of every government ministry (Pfiffner 2010, 78). De-Baathification sent the message across Iraq that Saddam’s influence had passed, but it also purged the country of valuable professionals who had been running universities,
hospitals, and vital infrastructure such as the power and communications networks (Pfiffner 2010, 79). As the current situation in Iraq shows, there is still not an effective replacement for the apparatus that the Coalition Provisional Authority chose to abolish in 2003, and the ensuing security vacuum has significantly added to the challenges that U. S. advisors face there.

Also in May of 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 came in quick succession. This order effectively disbanded all Iraqi military forces and halted American efforts at restoring Iraq’s military with experienced Iraqi officers and soldiers willing to serve in the post-Saddam era (Pfiffner 2010, 81). Rather than reconstituting a defeated army, CPA Order Number 2 required U. S. military advisors to build a new Iraqi force from scratch. Former soldiers who may have answered a recall to their units were instead unemployed, leaving a vast pool of military labor resentful to American influence (Pfiffner 2010, 82).

Privatized Foreign Policy

The Company’s role in British foreign policy suggests that prolonged efforts like security cooperation may be more likely to succeed when executed through private industry. The Company’s example shows that private enterprise may insulate a government from direct liability and minimize the public scrutiny that accompanies the continued drain of national resources. By keeping a chartered company between itself and colonization in India, the British government avoided the risks associated with directly collecting revenue and quelling challenges to its sovereignty. Instead, Parliament enjoyed annual royalties from the Company in addition to the Company’s overall contribution to the British economy.
In Henry Fletcher’s 1783 address to Parliament, he pointed to financial arrears of the 1760s resulting from the Company’s imperial acquisitions on behalf of the Crown. The fact that the Company’s costs in conquering an entire Indian province required redress in Parliament a full decade later indicates public indifference to the colonial expansion in India. The United States wisely attempts to distance its modern interests in security cooperation from any of the values attributed to concept of colonization. However, the United States’ unending commitments to security cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan evoke the American public’s outrage in ways similar to the British government’s experience during the American Revolution. The presidential election of 2016 may be the most recent indicator of American fatigue for both wars, as Donald Trump won on a platform that included minimizing the United States’ involvement in foreign wars (White House 2017).

**Recommendations to Decision Makers**

The conclusions above are the end result of the endeavor to answer this project’s research question. Not all conclusions easily apply towards improving the United States’ role in security cooperation. Therefore, three overall recommendations stand out. First, the United States should consider a dedicated training institution that specially prepares its military advisors bound for Iraq and Afghanistan through a model similar to the East India Company’s colleges at Haileybury, Addiscombe, and its regional locations throughout India. Second, using privately contracted military advisors in place of uniformed soldiers would offer key advantages currently unavailable through reliance on uniformed American service members. Third, the United States should consider embracing a host nation’s organic organizations and policies whenever possible instead
of insisting on the adoption of American or western models that are culturally incompatible with the host nation.

The Military Advisor Training Academy and its resultant SFABs will certainly be a step towards strengthening American security cooperation and military advisors. However, the previous 16 years have shown no indication that American obligations in Afghanistan and Iraq will cease any time soon. Accordingly, specialized training academies uniquely tailored for the enduring security cooperation demands in both of those countries would offer a measurable contribution towards success versus stalemate. The Company’s academies produced officers and officials with specialized training in the languages and cultural nuances that would make them successful in a completely foreign environment. Iraq and Afghanistan pose challenges that deserve a similar resolve, and The United States’ long-term investment since 2001 signifies a desire to have a lasting impact over the security and military capacity in both countries.

Conventional wisdom among American veterans who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan holds that deployments typically end just as a unit finally develops proficiency in its assigned role. With comprehensive unit rotations occurring as frequently as every nine months or one year, advisors on active duty cannot offer the host nation the same continuity of personality that contributed to the Company’s lasting legacy in India. With compensation commensurate to the monetary incentives the Company offered its soldiers and officials abroad, it may be possible to meet current U.S. demands for military advisors with privately contracted employees who would volunteer for long-duration deployments. Similar to Company employees who relocated to India, long-duration advisors would have less need of linguists to communicate with
partners and would have a vested interest in integrating the host nation’s culture and values. Finally, the previous years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq strongly indicate that there is no foreseeable end to U. S. involvement in either country. Acknowledging that both conflicts will likely require a prolonged American effort over generations, a greater reliance on private industry may decrease public scrutiny sufficiently to allow policymakers to meet those challenges with means that are adequate and not just politically expedient.

De-Baathification and the dismantling of the Iraqi Army are both instances that show that it is generally a mistake for an intervening nation to completely dismantle the organic infrastructure of the host nation. Perhaps less obviously, the challenges CSTC-A faces in Afghanistan offer another indication of this same mistake. Journalist Tim Craig’s piece about CSTC-A is one of several that outlines unsuccessful western attempts to ingrain the systems of resource management that thrive in NATO countries instead of nurturing a more Afghan approach to managing a force. In both cases, the United States did the opposite of the East India Company’s example of operating within the host nation’s organizations and policies whenever possible. Rather than continuing along a course of action that has not proven effective, the United States may have more success by identifying and, in some cases, settling for, the more indigenous approaches to common problems.

Recommendations for Future Research

Though this research primarily focused on the Honorable East India Company’s influence and legacy on the Indian subcontinent, its inspiration was the American military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. More specifically, the inspiration for this
research was the desire for a more promising way ahead for American efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With that in mind, the Pakistani government’s thinly veiled support of the Afghan Taliban and its associates throughout the modern conflict in Afghanistan may merit additional research as an empirical example of successful security cooperation with an Afghan force. Despite the political sensitivities which, for the most part, limit the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to the west side of the Durand Line, a critical study of how the Pakistani government guards its regional interests may reveal useful insight into a residential power’s opposing approach to the same problem.
REFERENCE LIST


