PLANNING FOR REGIME CHANGE AND ITS AFTERMATH

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Art of War Scholars

by

ROBERT BEHRMAN, MAJOR, UNITED STATES ARMY
Ph.D.; Carnegie Mellon University; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 2014
M.S.; Carnegie Mellon University; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 2004
B.A.; University of Saint Thomas; Houston, Texas; 2001

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2017

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Planning for Regime Change and its Aftermath

The United States has used overt military power to change three countries’ governing regimes since 9/11–Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya–and U.S. policy at time of writing supports two more. Despite this experience, and the likely future need, the U.S. has no institutional concept of regime change. This thesis attempts to develop one. It conducts an extensive review of military doctrine, strategic theory, and the academic political science and international relations literature to identify relevant insights for a theory of regime change. It then develops a conceptual model of regime change based on these insights, and tests it against a case study of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from March 2003 to May 2006. This thesis finds that the conceptual model of regime change explains the political and military development of OIF and offers insights into how the situation led to civil war. It additionally finds direct insights into how to structure an operational approach for future regime changes, and offers recommendations for future interagency and military planning.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Robert Behrman

Thesis Title: Planning for Regime Change and its Aftermath

Approved by:

__________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Dean A. Nowowiejski, Ph.D.

__________________________, Member
Colonel Juan K. Ulloa, MMAS

__________________________, Member
LTC Christopher Johnson, M.A.

Accepted this 9th day of June 2017 by:

__________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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The United States has used overt military power to change three countries’ governing regimes since 9/11—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—and U.S. policy at time of writing supports two more. Despite this experience, and the likely future need, the U.S. has no institutional concept of regime change.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We, in the ages lying
In the buried past of the earth,
Built Nineveh with our sighing,
And Babel itself with our mirth;
And o'erthrew them with prophesying
To the old of the new world's worth;
For each age is a dream that is dying,
Or one that is coming to birth.

Ode, Arthur William Edgar O’Shaughnessy

I spent much of 2005 and 2006 in Mosul, over the ancient city of Nineveh, working on the Iraqi constitutional referendum and general election as a second lieutenant in way over his pay grade. Through the whole experience, I felt pulled between the feelings of “this is going downhill fast” and “but it still could work.” Afterwards—in quiet reflection and while planning for other tours—I’ve tried to find explanations of how we could have won in Iraq, but have only ended up with explanations of what doomed us to failure. Now, as a military strategist, I expect someday to plan another regime change. It would behoove me to figure out how to make it successful.

I’d like to thank Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, COL Juan Ulloa, and LTC Christopher Johnson for taking the time and personal effort to serve on my thesis committee, and the other CGSC staff, faculty, and students who have supported and encouraged this work. I’d like to extend additional thanks to ‘Dr. No’ for accepting me into the Art of War Scholars program, to Dr. James Martin for supporting it, and to the amazing cast of scholars and practitioners who have taught me and the other scholars through it.

Finally, I’d like to thank my wife Erin, for her support, encouragement, and discipline; and my sister Meaghan, for her dedication to Victor and Ginny.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>United States Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMC</td>
<td>Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Land Component Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Forces Iraq</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIRI</td>
<td>Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAL</td>
<td>Transitional Administrative Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Whenever an activity deals primarily with the same things again and again – with the same ends and the same means, even though there may be minor variations and in infinite diversity of combinations – these things are susceptible to rational study. 1

— Clausewitz, On War.

The United States and regime change

The United States has used overt military power to change three countries’ governing regimes since 9/11—the Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya. 2 In each case, the removal of the government was immediately successful or even easier than anticipated. In each case, the transition to a new government has been, in the main, unsuccessful.

These three operations are not anomalies of the 21st century—they fit into a much longer history of regime change. Since World War II the U.S. has changed at least 11 foreign regimes (including Germany and Japan). 3 Nor is regime change exclusive to the U.S.—there have been 107 foreign-imposed regime changes from 1821 to 2003, conducted by various countries. 4

Finally, the U.S. is likely to change foreign regimes again. At the time of writing, U.S. policy publicly supports regime change in Syria and North Korea. President Obama’s decision not to militarily intervene to change the Assad regime was intensely and publicly debated, 5 and we are revisiting that debate now. In addition, operations
directed to other purposes may result in regime change (such as occurred in Libya), or the U.S. may respond to regime change caused by other factors, such as foreign state failure.

In this research, ‘regime change’ is the deliberate replacement of the head of state or government of a foreign power with another. Despite thousands of years of history and hundreds of instances of experience with this, despite the subject’s central place in current policy debates, our doctrine and theories do not generally talk about it. Regime change remains an often used but little understood tool of U.S. foreign policy. Though we critique past regime changes and argue the merits of potential new ones, talking about a theory for regime change still seems illiberal, clandestine, or dangerous.

Background

This is, in part, because for much of U.S. history the imposition of regime change was illiberal and/or clandestine. It still can be either, and it remains dangerous. In broad strokes, there are four distinct periods of U.S. led regime change—the ‘Imperial era’, the World Wars, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era.7

The first era coincides with America’s rise as a world power, and interest in empire (Cuba, Panama, and the Philippines) or commerce (Hawaii, Nicaragua, and Honduras) motivated its interventions. Between 1893 and 1914 the U.S. acquired Hawaii;8 conquered Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines; engineered the secession of Panama; and overthrew the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras.9 These interventions were illiberal by modern standards10 and controversial in their own time. Some also included clandestine elements, though in an entirely different context than the institutionalized covert operation of the Cold War era—for example, the overthrows of
Hawaii and Honduras were carried out without the consent or knowledge of the President.

The World Wars brought about regime change through unconditional surrender. Following the First World War, the successor regimes were determined by treaty and international monitoring. Following the Second World War the successor regimes were systematically rebuilt by the victors. The occupation, reformation, and reconstruction of Germany and Japan are widely agreed to be the most successful, and costly, regime changes in modern history. They were the product of the most destructive war in history, and were critical to the emerging U.S. strategy for conducting the Cold War. The U.S. was also heavily involved in the stabilization of Italy, Korea, and the Philippines.

The Cold War era brought with it clandestine regime change, primarily through coups d’état or revolutions. This is because (1) the Cold War made avoiding direct confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union necessary; (2) the U.S. developed the capability to conduct clandestine regime change with the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and (3) the general fragility of states following decolonialization made much of the world vulnerable to these forms of overthrow. In this period, the U.S. overthrew or supported the overthrow of the governments of Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Grenada, and Afghanistan; attempted to overthrow the government of Cuba; and may have been involved in others. Over the same period, the Soviet Union conducted overt regime changes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan, and supported communist revolutions in other countries.

The post-Cold War era brought overt, sometimes even United Nations (U.N.) sanctioned, interventions to change foreign regimes. The U.S. overthrew the governments
of Panama, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya with overt military force, and the government of Haiti with the threat of force. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made the capability to conduct regime change part of the military force sizing construct, though later versions eliminated this requirement. The U.S. has justified these regime changes for reasons of human rights (Libya), illegitimacy (Panama and Haiti), self-defense (Afghanistan), and preemption of WMD proliferation (Iraq).

Scholars, journalists, and official histories have covered these interventions. Some have studied their implications as trends in U.S. policy, but most have confined themselves to studies of one or a few cases and identification of implications or lessons learned. Edward Luttwak’s *Coup d’État* is an exception, but it confines itself to the particular method in its topic. Save this limited exception, strategic theory and military doctrine are largely silent.

**The Problem**

The failure to address regime change as a strategic use of military force is a gap in U.S. policy and strategic thinking that ensures military planners contemplating regime change will have to figure out the essential strategy themselves. The overt regime changes of the 21st century extend beyond the purview of the CIA and the Department of State, and the military’s current track record in this is not great. Informed thinkers, including military planners, have spilled much ink and anguish trying to explain the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, but have not reached consensus on how to avoid it the next time.
Explanations for failure in these operations generally blame the decision-makers involved for ignorant policy or incompetent execution; the military for its focus on combat at the expense of stability or its unwillingness to adapt; or society for its aversion to U.S. nation building or its unwillingness to truly commit. These explanations are important, and led departments across the U.S. government to implement sweeping changes such as updates to doctrine and new interagency coordination mechanisms, but they do not address the fundamental problem of how to plan a successful regime change.

This gap is recognized—numerous masters’ theses from military education institutions address regime change from perspectives of capability for overthrow, capabilities or tasks required in its aftermath, policy implications, or historical examples. Other post 9/11 scholarship focused on historical occupations and constabulary forces, seeking to draw advice for ongoing operations from historical experience. This thesis considers something more basic—the nature of regime change, and the elements common to all foreign-imposed regime changes. In doing so, it seeks to develop a conceptual model of regime change that can be used to structure strategy and planning.

A quotation from Donald Rumsfeld in Ahmed Rashid’s *Descent into Chaos* inspired this thesis:

How ought security to evolve in [Afghanistan] depends on really two things . . . what the interim government decides they think ought to happen, what the warlord forces in the country decide they think ought to happen, and the interaction between those two. Rumsfeld said this in response to Hamid Karzai’s request to disarm the warlords. While this statement is an accurate assessment of what was likely in Afghanistan at the time (by
April 2002, U.S. attention had already turned to Iraq), it did not reflect U.S. policy towards Afghanistan. The Afghan constitution centralizes incredible power into the executive, and it was patently inconsistent to match that constitution with a security policy that decentralizes power. This idea—that the various elements of a strategic approach to regime change could be inconsistent—sparked subsidiary questions, such as “what are these elements?” “What are the effects of an inconsistent approach?” “What does a consistent approach look like?” This thesis starts to answer these, focusing on the first question.

**Research question**

This thesis primarily addresses the question, “What critical elements are common to operations that change foreign regimes?”

To address this question, this thesis also considers the secondary questions, “How do these elements relate to the planning and execution of military operations?” and “What does the planning and execution of OIF reveal about these elements in practice? Are there generalizable implications from that case?”

**Definitions**

This thesis defined regime change as the imposition of a change to the head of state or government of a foreign power. This usage is consistent with the term ‘foreign-imposed regime change’ used in the political science literature. This is slightly different than the term ‘rollback’, popular during the Cold War, which describes a strategic policy focusing on using regime change to reduce the number of countries under communist control. It is also slightly different than the more prosaic term ‘overthrow’, used in both
popular literature and unconventional warfare doctrine, as it implies the replacement of the overthrown regime with another.\textsuperscript{18} This thesis refers to a military operation to change a foreign regime as a ‘regime change operation,’ and the country or coalition that executes the operation as ‘the intervening power.’ The text will specify clearly when it talks about other forms of regime change such as elections.

This thesis generally uses the term ‘regime’ to refer to both the collection of individuals that control a state\textsuperscript{19} and the institutions of government.\textsuperscript{20} When it becomes necessary to distinguish the two, this thesis uses the term ‘government’ to refer to the institutions.

Part of the ambiguity in regime change stems from doctrinal terms that do not apply directly or change meaning in the context of regime change—the best example of this is ‘Host Nation (HN).’ This thesis identifies some of these terms in Chapters 2 and 3.

**Methodology**

This thesis proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews military doctrine, strategic theory, and academic literature to identify themes and concepts that regime changes have in common. From this review, the thesis develops six propositions that are useful for building a model of regime change. Second, it builds these propositions into a conceptual model of regime change and identifies the critical elements of regime change and their interactions. Third, it uses a case study to examine OIF through the lens of the conceptual model to determine whether the model is useful for understanding the operation and produces insights into how to improve regime changes.
Scope and limitations

This thesis focuses on the general study of foreign-imposed regime change and its implications for strategy. It does not advocate for or against a policy of regime change, and only considers the policy grounds for regime change insofar as their implications for strategy. Though it attempts to generalize to all kinds of regime change, the author’s experience and perspective tends to a focus on and bias towards U.S. military operations.

This research depends heavily on U.S. military doctrine and unclassified historical sources approved for public release. Regime change has a long history and its effects are highly public, so an abundance of secondary sources have dealt with it. This limitation specifically limits the ability to consider unconventional warfare in depth, as its source doctrine is not approved for public release.

This research limits its treatment of the OIF case study to the period from the planning for the invasion (starting 27 November 2001)21 to the seating of the permanent Iraqi government on 30 May 2006. The case study ends with the seating of the permanent government and the beginning of the civil war in Iraq because at this point the regime change has failed. At this point OIF became a different kind of operation—a counterinsurgency, not post-hostility stabilization.

Assumptions

Two assumptions drive the overall conduct of this research. First, I assume that the National Security Council (NSC), various interagency decision-making systems, the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the United Nations (U.N.) Charter and system, the Geneva Conventions and other major foundations of the law of land warfare, and the
structure of the Department of Defense mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act will remain largely the same as they are at time of writing. If this assumption does not hold—that is, if the above systems are changed substantially—then the applicability and validity of this analysis will be limited.

Second, I assume that the U.S. military will be required to plan or execute regime change in the future. If this assumption does not hold, the relevance of the following will be limited to how it helps understand other operations, such as counterinsurgency.

The utility of a study of regime change

An effective treatment of the decisions inherent in planning for a regime change operation is useful for three reasons:

First, military doctrine does not directly address the topic. As will be treated explicitly in the literature review, most doctrine shies away from explicitly dealing with regime change. Regime change requires specific decisions at the Presidential and cabinet levels and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational involvement. The only doctrine that deals with decisions at those levels is generalized to all types of military operations. Without clear conceptual foundations for understanding regime change, future planners must rely on their own study or research, experience, intuition, or genius to articulate and support the development of an operational approach.

Second, a conceptual understanding of regime change may be useful for planning other operations, such as those supporting or stabilizing a regime or those reacting to the unexpected collapse of a foreign regime or failure of a foreign state.
Third, the case study of OIF from the perspective of regime change can lead to greater insights into the lessons learned from that war. OIF was a large, brilliantly executed military campaign and a pivotal war in the history of American military interventions, but many of its lessons have been pigeonholed into stability doctrine or counterinsurgency, and U.S. policy has moved away from emphasizing these missions.\(^\text{23}\) Without understanding the requirements for stability and political reform after large scale combat operations—most of which lead to regime change—future U.S. interventions will continue to fail.\(^\text{24}\)

**Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter argues that the U.S. government should directly consider regime change and its implications for policy and doctrine. The world has long experience with foreign-imposed regime changes, and the U.S. at time of writing faces, and will continue to face, decisions about whether or not to execute regime change. This thesis attempts to build a conceptual framework for regime change relevant to government planning.

The next chapter starts the investigation by reviewing the literature on regime change. It focuses on various perspectives, including strategic theory, doctrine, history, and international relations and political science theories. The next chapter shows that these schools of thought contain sufficient insight to ground a theoretical understanding of regime change.


\(^2\) Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Odyssey Dawn, respectively. The author is an OIF veteran.
3 The challenge of defining regime change reflects the overall lack of understanding of the subject. The various definitions and related concepts are discussed in chapter 2. Downes and Monten’s definition, used in the following data, is “the forcible or coerced removal of the effective leader of one state—which remains formally sovereign afterward—by the government of another state.” P. 109, Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” *International Security* 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 90–131.

4 See appendix A to Downes and Monten, above. The appendix is available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/ISEC_a_00117. Repeat offenders include the U.S., U.K. France, Soviet Union, and others.

5 See Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” *The Atlantic*, 2016 for an excellent treatment on both the reasons for intervention and the reasons Obama ultimately decided not to. These arguments will be revisited in chapter three.

6 Illiberal, here, in the formal sense of the liberal international order, not the political persuasion.

7 This construction borrows heavily from Stephen Kinzer, who refers to them as ‘the Imperial Era’, ‘Covert Action’, and ‘Invasions.’ The world wars are outside the scope of his book; this thesis includes them because they are counted in other treatments of regime change (such as Downes and Monten), and are singularly relevant to the military experience. See Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2006).

8 I use the term ‘acquired’ because the dethroning of Queen Liliuokalani does not fit neatly into any conceptual framework for regime change—it is something between a coup, an abdication, and an intervention. For a brief treatment of the overthrow, see Kinzer (Ibid.). For a deeper and entertaining treatment see Kinzer, above and Sarah Vowell, *Unfamiliar Fishes*, Audiobook (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011).

9 Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow*. Note, Downes and Monten also count a U.S. regime change in the Dominican Republic in this period. See Downes and Monten, “Forced to Be Free?”

10 Though, in context, the modern liberal international order did not exist yet, and would not be until President Wilson that we even tried.


13 The author examined 46 relevant theses from various professional military education institutions. Some of them have specific relevance to this paper, and are cited separately where relevant. Others generally separate into various trends – either arguing for a standing capacity or method for regime change, such as decapitation, arguing for a policy of regime change to a specific country, or critiquing a specific country’s regime change.

14 For example, see Louis DiMarco, “Restoring Order: The U.S. Army Experience with Occupation Operations, 1865-1952” (Diss., Kansas State University, 2010).


19 This is the term ‘essential selectorate’ in political incentive theory. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 7–8.


Using various criteria, including if it was a declared war or congressionally authorized, and based on a subjective reduction of U.S. history of armed intervention, this counts 10 U.S. large scale combat interventions: The War of 1812, the Mexican War, the U.S. Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the First and Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Of these 10, 6 resulted in regime change (Mexican War, U.S. Civil War, Spanish-American War, both World Wars, and Operation Iraqi Freedom). Also see Richard F. Grimmett, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2009” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 27, 2010).
States that rise unexpectedly . . . cannot leave their foundations . . . fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless . . . those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS. 


The introduction showed that despite extensive practical history and public discussion of regime change there are no comprehensive treatments of the subject. This chapter will show how separate threads of thought in military doctrine, strategic theory, and the academic political science and international relations literature provide insights into the nature of regime change. It sets up the next chapter, which will weave those threads into a model of regime change. This chapter is organized by theme, not by school of thought. It proceeds by talking about the strategic uses of regime change, methods for regime change, the aftermath of regime change, and then finishes up discussing theories that can be used to consider the success or failure of regime changes.

**Regime change—What is it good for?**

If war is ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’, what is regime change? Are we attempting to compel our enemy to do something we want by changing its leadership, or are we attempting to change the nature of the enemy? This question is useful for exploring strategic theories relevant to regime change, but is ultimately unsatisfying. The answer is both: Regime change can be a means to an end or an end itself, or even an unintended consequence of war. Ultimately, regardless of its original intent, the endstate of regime change is determined by the nature of the successor regime.
Regime change as a means

In Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war, the disarmament of the enemy—the defeat of his army, capture of his capital, and neutralization of alliances—is primary means for any sort of war. In this concept, regime change is almost an afterthought. Once defeat has been achieved, the victor can impose such conditions as it desires, including replacement of the regime. This concept was taken further in the idea popularized by John Warden’s “The Enemy as a System” that the enemy’s command and control system, including “a civilian at the seat of government”, is an element of the enemy military capability. In this concept, capturing or killing the enemy’s leader (thereby changing the regime) is a decisive instrument to the defeat of the enemy. Historically, strikes against the ‘command ring’ in Warden’s model were attempted in both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, but were not successful.

Regime change can also be a means to more limited ends. International law may require regime change in the case of genocide or atrocity if the accused regime fails to stop the proscribed action or lesser measures are unlikely to work. This was invoked as the reason for Operation Odyssey Dawn, the 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya that resulted in the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, though it was unclear if regime change was within the original intent or the authorizing U.N. resolution. Robert Litwak’s Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 argues that the use, or threat of, regime change is an option to for WMD counter-proliferation along with containment or engagement. This, and the threat of WMD proliferation to terrorists, was the argument for preemptive intervention to remove Saddam Hussein. Lesser methods were deemed inadequate, because the threat derived from ‘the nature of the regime itself.’
Regime change as an end

The overthrow of governments does not have to seek a greater end, it can just be oriented towards the ‘conquest of political power itself.’\(^{11}\) This is the central goal of insurgency and revolutionary warfare\(^{12}\) and of the coup d’état,\(^{13}\) which organize to replace the head of state from outside of or within the government, respectively. This paper treats them in more detail in the following section on methods of regime change.

Powerful states sometimes employ regime change to gain geopolitical advantage. Luttwak argues that this was the policy of the Roman Empire in the Julio-Claudian era (31 BCE to 68 CE), which extended empire through a system of client states and dependencies.\(^{14}\) Leaders who broke with other states were replaced—often by force of arms\(^{15}\)—to preserve empire without direct Roman responsibility for garrisoning it. Flashing forward almost two thousand years, an offensive strategy of ‘rollback’—overthrowing communist regimes, especially in Eastern Europe—was considered as a way of combating Soviet expansion.\(^{16}\)

Regime change as an effect

Finally, regime change can be an unintended consequence of military operations. The classic example of this is the Franco-Prussian War—the unexpected capture of Napoleon III at Sedan led to the overthrow of the French government and the shelling of Paris.\(^{17}\) Similarly, the collapse of the Russian and German governments in World War I led to revolutionary regime change and foreign-mediated occupation, respectively. Following World War II, the collapse of the German and Japanese empires led to power vacuums in Korea and Vietnam that required additional U.S., British, and French efforts to stabilize.
Implications for a model of regime change

The important point of this section is that, whether the regime change is the ultimate objective, a step on the way, or a consequence, once it occurs the outcome of the operation is determined by nature of the successor regime. If regime change is an instrument to a separate policy—for example, ending genocide or stopping attempts at proliferation—then the successor regime must be willing to preserve the desired outcome. If regime change is the objective, then the successor regime is the endstate. Finally, if regime change is a consequence (anticipated or not) of other operations then the loss of the government forces a reassessment of options considering the changed circumstances. Each of these situations have direct parallels in operational design and planning—whether regime change is part of the operation plan, a sequel, or a branch—that will be explored in the next chapter. Rephrased as a single sentence, this leads to the proposition, “The difference between the original regime and the intent for the successor regime defines the strategic problem for regime change.”

How does a state change a foreign regime?

Having established what regime change is, we now address the literature on how to do it. Operations that change foreign regimes can occur across the range of military operations. The literature tends to focus more on the lower-end of the range, but all are relevant. Of the three U.S. 21st century regime changes, the overthrows of the Taliban and Qaddafi were conducted through limited contingency operations and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein occurred through large-scale combat operations. At the lowest end, the coup d’état remains the most common means of overthrow.
This section describes methods of regime change from the lowest to the highest end of the conflict continuum: From the coup d’état, to insurgency and unconventional warfare, to large scale combat operations. It then discusses two special cases—abdication and decapitation. It shows two important things—that the nature of the original regime affects the method of overthrow, and that the method of overthrow sets conditions for the successor regime.

The Coup d’état

Edward Luttwak’s 1968 book *Coup d’état: A practical handbook*, and its two subsequent revisions (in 1979 and 2016) is the most comprehensive theoretical treatment of regime change to date. It focuses on a single method of overthrow—its namesake—from the point of view of independent plotters, and tracks that from shaping to execution. While much of the book is specific to the chosen method, and assumes a coup plotted without major power support, it is instructive for both thinking about regime change in general and coups supported by foreign powers.

First, the coup operates by seizing control within the state. The method of overthrow, in this case, is a third party within the apparatus of the original regime. The nature of that third party, and its political and/or private desires, is likely to shape the nature of the successor regime.

Second, there are only certain kinds of states that can be seized by a coup. It relies on the institutions of the state and/or co-opted elements of its political apparatus. It is only possible in states with limited political participation, no habitual respect for legitimate governance, and a defined political center of power.
Third, the success of the coup is based on neutralizing potential opposition to the successor regime, not on the overthrow of the original regime. Even if the original regime is successfully deposed, the coup fails if the plotters are killed in a counter-coup. Other research highlights the risk—the riskiest time for new governments is in the first six months after overthrow. Because of this, the coup can only make limited political or structural reforms to the state until its power base is well stabilized, as doing so would invite precisely the kind of opposition it is most vulnerable to.

Fourth, Luttwak offers a general idea of the types of political and social forces that would oppose a coup. Though he goes into detail about typical military, police, and intelligence organizations in the types of country that are prone to coups, the basic types of political opposition are those groups that are immediately capable of opposing the coup, those groups that require time to organize or assemble before they can exert oppositions, and those groups willing to “wait and see.”

Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare

The theoretical and practical literature on insurgency—the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region—is also highly relevant to the study of foreign-imposed regime change.

The foundational theoretical work in insurgency is based on the communist ideas of revolutionary warfare, especially those of Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, and Võ Nguyên Giáp. These theories center around the organization of resistance outside of the political system, from building a cohesive rural movement, the use of guerilla warfare to force expansion, or serving as a focal point to unify resisting parties. In each case, victory in the final phase occurs when the revolutionary regime seizes control of the state.
Abu Bakr Naji’s *Management of Savagery*\(^{32}\) provides an Islamist take on insurgency theory, which varies from the communist model. Naji’s theory revolves around specifically targeting the apparatus of state control to create a ‘region of savagery’, in which the Islamist insurgency can develop—that is, using guerilla actions or terrorism to set conditions for political organization.\(^{33}\) In this, it provides a template, akin to Guevara’s *focos*,\(^{34}\) for understanding how violence can be used to foster insurgent aims before a clear political organization or agenda has been established. Naji’s work is also important for this study as it articulates Al Qaeda in Iraq’s strategy during the OIF case study.\(^{35}\)

Insurgency carried out through the organization and support of a foreign power is referred to in U.S. doctrine as Unconventional Warfare (UW). JP 3-05 defines UW as:

> operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.\(^{36}\) [Emphasis added]

UW has its own doctrine\(^{37}\) and specialized capabilities. UW doctrine focuses more on the operational method (operations through third parties in a denied area) than the task (coercion, disruption, or overthrow); and though it identifies some policy and strategic considerations for UW\(^{38}\) the strategic and policy decisions for UW are the purview of higher guidance.\(^{39}\) Importantly, because the method of overthrow in UW is a politically organized third party, the nature of the successor regime will be determined primarily by that third party. Achieving the desired endstate requires either shared interests between the U.S. and the third party, the ability to control the third party, or ambivalence about what happens after overthrow.
Large Scale Combat Operations

There is no separate doctrine for large-scale combat operations—all the capstone concepts and doctrinal publications are written to apply at this level. These publications focus on common principles of design and planning at the operational level of war, regardless of the purpose of the operation. They do not provide information on specific types of operation. Capstone doctrine does not mention regime change directly—in fact, the only place in capstone doctrine that mentions regime change as a potential objective of military operations is Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-2: Campaigning, which discusses it in the context of strategies of annihilation and erosion.

Notwithstanding this gap, two important concepts in capstone doctrine shape our understanding of regime change: The elements of operational design and the joint operational model/joint phasing construct. Both concepts deal with the conclusion of the operation. The elements of operational design frame the conclusion of an operation in terms of end state and termination criteria. There are two end states. First, the ‘national strategic end state’, which is left undefined. Second, the ‘military end state,’ “beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives.” The joint operational model provides a clearer image of the conclusion of large-scale combat operations, even though it is not intended to. This model concludes operations based on a transition to the legitimate civil authority. It says that this transition is ‘consistent with termination criteria’, but makes clear that the transition is the actual act that concludes the operation.
When applied to regime change, these concepts become confusing because doctrine uses the term ‘host nation’ to apply both pre- and post-overthrow. Host nation consent and participation drives fundamental concepts meant to shape and bound planning—when and how the civil authority becomes legitimate,\textsuperscript{47} when the military element of national power becomes secondary, or when support to the civil authority should change from being part of the operation to a sequel. In a regime change, these are now shaped and created by U.S. or coalition activity, and must be part of the plan instead.

U.S. military doctrine also does not specify the method of overthrow for large-scale combat operations. Fortunately, Clausewitz does:

1. Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant, 2. Seizure of his capital if it is not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional, and political activity, 3. Delivery of an affective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he.\textsuperscript{48}

We can rephrase this, without some of the caveats and using the insights from other methods, as: (1) Destruction of the significant opposing forces, (2) Capture of the centers of administrative and political power, and (3) Isolation from foreign support.

Abdication and Decapitation

Two remaining concepts, abdication and decapitation, deserve mention in this chapter, as they reflect rare or theoretical cases of regime change.

The first, abdication, is regime change through the voluntary cession of authority over the state.\textsuperscript{49} Of the U.S. regime changes, the overthrows of Queen Liliuokalani in 1893,\textsuperscript{50} José Santos Zelaya in 1909\textsuperscript{51} and Raul Cedras in 1994\textsuperscript{52} involved voluntary abdication in the face of direct military intervention. Depending on who the original regime abdicates to (a local party or foreign occupation) it can be treated as either a coup
d’état or occupation of the center of power, both with important and different implications for the successor regime.

‘Decapitation’—strikes to kill the foreign head of state—is another method that has discussed as a possible tool for regime change. Its apparent ease—regime change with minimum troop commitment or bloodshed—has led to numerous theses from professional military education institutions exploring its benefits.53 Historically, the U.S. attempted a decapitation strike on Saddam Hussein immediately before the commencement of OIF,54 and risked decapitation when it targeted Libyan command and control centers near Quaddaffi’s residence during Operation El Dorado Canyon.55 Neither of these strikes decapitated the regime, and it is unclear what the result would be had they been successful. In the case of Iraq, plans for the early collapse of the regime still required invasion and the capture of Baghdad.56 In other cases, decapitation seems to set conditions for either legitimate succession or one of the other methods mentioned above (coup d’état or insurgency). In this sense, decapitation sets the conditions for other types of regime change, but is not regime change itself.57

Implications for a model of regime change

There are three basic methods for foreign imposed regime change—support to a third party within the regime (such as a coup), support to a third party outside of the regime (such as unconventional warfare), or through the capture of the seat of power (through large-scale combat operations). The feasibility of two of these is highly dependent on the vulnerabilities of the original regime: A coup requires weak institutions and a vulnerable state, while UW requires amenable and capable guerrillas. The feasibility of large-scale combat operations depends on other, purely military calculations
that are well-understood in military doctrine. This can be restated as a single proposition, “The nature of the original regime influences the available methods of overthrow.”

Two of these methods also imply the nature of the successor regime. The regime following a coup is composed of the plotters and those they have co-opted; the regime following a successful insurgency is composed of the insurgents. Each method involves forming a coherent political organization and either defeating or neutralizing certain organs of state control. Capturing the seat of power provides more options to determine the nature of the successor, but may have also destroyed more of the state and its institutions. This will be explored in more detail in the next section. For now, we can leave it with the more basic proposition, “The method of overthrow sets conditions for the restoration of state control and political reforms.”

**What happens after overthrow?**

Most of the literature on regime change deals with the overthrow of the original regime, but this is only half the story. By definition, a successor regime follows the overthrow of the original regime, and faces unique challenges and competition. This section deals with the literature on those challenges, which is ambiguous. Part of this is because of the idea teed up above—the coup d’état or revolution implies the nature of the successor regime. For large-scale combat operations, the literature on the aftermath of these operations views the tasks after overthrow as a qualitatively different kind of operation. This section addresses the implications of each in turn.
After the coup or revolution

As already mentioned, the normative literature on the coup or revolution already implies the successor regime—the coup plotters and the members of the original regime that they have co-opted, or the revolutionaries. The theories for each of these contain both specific guidance for activities after the overthrow and advice on methods to conduct the overthrow designed to avoid potential challenges.

Luttwak addresses this for the coup as the need to ‘stabilize the masses’ ‘so that physical coercion will no longer be needed in order to secure compliance.’59 In the immediate aftermath of the coup this is accomplished through population and communication controls, but in the longer term this ‘can only be gained by political accommodation.’60 Since the coup requires a country with few political centers and weak institutions, this is a bounded task. Political reforms needed to legitimize the successor regime are instead directed towards foreign governments to seek recognition.61

Revolutionary doctrine is more circumspect about what happens following overthrow, in part because the most widely cited theories of insurgency were written by practitioners either during or immediately after the insurgency, before the outcome was decided.62 Post-overthrow writings of both Mao and Guevara speak to the need to develop administrative cadres for running cities, both for technical progress and keeping political unity.63 Guevara also discusses how the revolutionary government addressed serious political challenges from its own coalition following overthrow.64

Early preparation for political competition after overthrow figures heavily in theories of both the coup and revolution. The coup attempts to mitigate it through diplomacy beforehand, speed in execution, then consolidation an active support base
afterwards. Insurgencies establish their active base of support before overthrow. Revolutionary doctrine is more circumspect about consolidation, since it involves competition within the active base of support. In practice, this competition led to infighting in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Guevara’s ouster.

After overthrow through large-scale combat

Despite the experience of OIF, and the changes to doctrine that ensued, no current U.S. military doctrine comprehensively addresses the challenges of regime change through large scale combat operations. Doctrine that did was published over 70 years ago: FMFRP 12-15: *Small Wars Manual* (1940) dealt with interventions, including regime change, in “the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory.” U.S. Army FM 27-5: *Civil Affairs/Military Government* (1947) established that the purpose of military government was to “establish control, enable further military operations, and promote U.S. policy objectives.”

The current lack of directly relevant doctrine is, in part, due to timing. Doctrine prior OIF addressed experiences from Panama to Kosovo as “operations other than war.” The next major revision occurred after OIF had devolved into civil war, and reflected a focus on that challenge. This lack is also an artifact of inconsistent policy. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24 gave the Department of Defense (DoD) responsibility for planning reconstruction in Iraq, and DoD Directive 3000.5 (November 2005/reissued 2009) established that stability operations are a core principle to be treated as equally important as combat operations. Nearly simultaneously, NSPD 44 (December 2005) made the U.S. Department of State (DoS) responsible for leading and planning stabilization and reconstruction. The tension in these roles and
responsibilities continues to this day—JP 3-07 Stability states that “stabilization is usually the responsibility of the HN, DoS, and the United States Agency for International Development,” but the responsible DoS office has never been properly resourced for the task.

That office, the DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, publishes or sponsors guidance for post-conflict stabilization, but this guidance is not specific to the context of regime change. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix (ETM) is a detailed list of stability tasks, but it is no longer maintained. This document is still referred to in the current JP 3-07, and forms the cornerstone of ATP 3-07.5 Stability Techniques. These tasks are intended to help analyze requirements for stabilization. This bureau also promotes the non-authoritative Guidelines for Stabilization and Reconstruction, which links the actions in the ETM to host-nation outcomes indicative of stable states. These will be addressed in the following section.

JP 3-07 is the most relevant doctrine for the aftermath of regime change. The August 2016 version incorporated an appendix on transitional government, including transitional military authority, which the U.S. government may be legally responsible to install under the law of war when “enemy government has failed completely or has been deposed by US forces.” This appendix describes the authority and responsibilities of the transitional authority, but provides limited guidance for planning it.

The ‘failed states framework’ in JP 3-07 offers other insight into the aftermath of regime change. Immediately following overthrow the country has “the remnants of a government due to collapse or regime change”—the definition of a failed state. In this context “everyone present . . . has the potential to influence the course of events.”
JP describes six broad categories of actors in this milieu—adversaries, enemies, belligerents, neutrals, friendlies, and opportunists.\textsuperscript{84} While these categories provide a basis for understanding the political forces that shape the aftermath of regime change, they categorize solely based on intentions regarding friendly forces or the host nation government. A separate construct in JP 3-24 for understanding the preconditions of an insurgency—based on opportunity, means, and motive—also provides insight into the challenges after overthrow.\textsuperscript{85} The next chapter will use these two constructs and Luttwak’s categories from above to describe competition in the aftermath.

Other U.S. military doctrine is relevant to aspects of regime change, but does not address the essential characteristics. Counterinsurgency doctrine\textsuperscript{86} deals with a type of challenge to the successor regime (insurgency), but as the next two chapters will argue successful regime changes should endeavor to prevent insurgencies from forming. In addition to those already mentioned, JP 3-22 \textit{Foreign Internal Defense} provides guidance relevant to supporting state security structures.\textsuperscript{87} JP 2-01.3 \textit{Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment} provides in depth list of assessable factors relevant to understanding the political situation and participants, but does not provide a framework for analyzing that information.\textsuperscript{88} JP 3-07.3 \textit{Peace Operations} provides guidance for types of United Nations or multinational operations that may be conducted in the context of a regime change,\textsuperscript{89} but in the case of unilateral peacebuilding after overthrow it generally mirrors stability doctrine.\textsuperscript{90} Finally, Civil Military Operations doctrine, despite inheriting the legacy of military government, only mentions it in one sentence as part of the ‘Support to Civil Administration” function.\textsuperscript{91} It provides no other relevant guidance for regime change that is not also covered in the manuals above.
Implications for a model of regime change

The treatment of the aftermath of the coup or revolution reinforce the proposition stated above, “The method of overthrow sets conditions for the restoration of state control and political reforms.” They do so by minimizing political competition in the aftermath through diplomacy, speed, or political consolidation. Doctrine for the aftermath of overthrow through capture of the seat of power does not address setting conditions, but reinforces the notion of competition. This idea merits the proposition, “Overthrow of the original regime sets off a competition to determine the nature of the successor regime.”

What makes a regime change successful?

The preceding three sections traced the regime change from inception to the aftermath of overthrow. Having established that the endstate of regime change depends on the nature of the successor regime, and that overthrow initiates a competition to determine the nature of the successor regime, this section returns to the original problem: How does the intervening power make a successor regime that meets its endstate goals? It proceeds by considering two theories of state behavior, and then critiquing the current theory of success in U.S. military doctrine.

Theories of state behavior

Since the success of a regime change is based on the nature of the successor regime, a plan for success relies on some model (implicit or explicit) on how the intervening power’s actions can shape that nature. Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow’s *Essence of Decision* discusses three categories of models of state behavior: (1) The
‘rational actor model’, which analogizes the state as a person; (2) the ‘organizational behavior model’, which analogizes the state as a machine composed of processes; and (3) the ‘governmental politics model’, which analogizes the state as a group of people bargaining with each other.93 ‘Rational actor’ models are not applicable to regime change (since the intervention changes the internal workings of the regime), but other theories from the ‘organizational behavior’ or ‘governmental politics’ perspectives offer important insights.

The liberal, institutional theory of state success

The institutional theory of political science resembles the ‘organizational behavior’ model above insofar as it asserts that state behavior is significantly affected by its political institutions, though the institutional theory has a longer history. Two recent works focus this theory on high-level institutions common to successful states—Why Nations Fail by Acemoglu and Robinson, and Francis Fukuyama’s two volume series on Political Order.94 Both relate the behavior of successful states to basic liberal institutions—inclusive or exclusive political and economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson); or ‘the state,’ ‘the rule of law,’ and a ‘accountable government’ (Fukuyama). Of the two, Fukuyama’s formulation is both more rigorous and more valuable. It asserts that states with these basic institutions are more successful and experience greater sustained growth and development.95

These institutional theories of state success deliberately focus on fundamental institutions and view success in the long term. Institutional development is a long-term process driven by repeated interactions—instututions are even defined as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior.” One of the foundational works in the institutional
theories, Samuel Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies*, argues that a transition through an authoritarian period can be useful to consolidate state power and public order and allow other institutional development.96 Fukuyama’s theory moderates this position, conceptually separating the basic institutions and recognizing that they interact to foster development.

U.S. government doctrine on stability and counterinsurgency draws heavily on institutional theories of state success. The USIP *Guiding Principles* mentioned above measure progress in stabilization and reconstruction in terms of the development of state institutions. These principles are reflected in both Joint and Army stability doctrine. The implication of this focus institutions is, ‘If you build it, they will come’—that is, if a state can develop the necessary institutions for success then it will be stable, regardless of the intents or actions of the members of its government.

**Political theory of state behavior**

The theory of political incentives seeks to address a slightly different problem—instead of focusing on what makes states successful, it explains leaders’ behavior in terms of what keeps them in power. This is a ‘governmental politics’ type of model, focusing on the behavior of the leader. It is best described in two books, *The Logic of Political Survival* and *The Dictator’s Handbook*.97

In the basic theory, the relationship between the size of the population that participates in the political process (the nominal selectorate), the size of the population that can affect the outcome of the political process (the real selectorate), and the population whose support allows the leader to stay in office (the winning coalition) explains the nature of the regime.98 Political leaders stay in power by focusing their
support on the real selectorate and the winning coalition, and maximize their influence by reducing the size of the winning coalition.\textsuperscript{99} States with small winning coalitions are more likely to see corruption and private rewards to coalition members; states with large winning coalitions are likely to see programmatic policies that support the coalition members (because there are too many individuals to bribe or suborn).\textsuperscript{100}

The description of the winning coalition comports closely with Luttwak’s description of the centers of power that enable or prevent coups, and data show that states with smaller winning coalitions are more vulnerable to coups.\textsuperscript{101} The most important notion here is that leaders are beholden to the coalition that keeps them in power, and will act affirmatively to support their interests. To the extent that this coalition includes militia or security services, these services’ interests will affect leaders’ policy choices. Numerous case studies show that strong or corrupt security institutions in weak states or states currently at war can distort policy or prevent reform.\textsuperscript{102}

Legitimacy vs. political settlement

Military doctrine focuses on a more limited, and far more ambiguous, concept for state success—the notion of legitimacy: “Because ultimately, stability results from government effectiveness and perceptions of its legitimacy by the people it represents.”\textsuperscript{103} This argument echoes the ‘accountable government’ pillar of liberal institutional theory.

However, the concept of legitimacy verges into incoherence when applied to regime change. JP 3-07 punts the essential question (emphasis added):

Consent is essential to the legitimacy of the mission. The legitimacy of the mission may be called into question if it lacks the consent of the HN or an internationally recognized mandate. \textit{Locals rarely perceive unilateral missions to}
impose regime change as legitimate, even in cases where that regime significantly threatens national or international security or willfully creates conditions that foment humanitarian crises. Military leaders must consider this dynamic in the analysis of the local context and when planning operations.104

This statement makes several vast assumptions. One, that locals would perceive a multilateral operation as legitimate; and two, that the legitimacy of the successor regime depends on the legitimacy of the operation that overthrew the original regime.

This leads to several conceptual problems. First, the term ‘legitimacy’ as used in doctrine conflates the legitimacy of the operation itself, the legitimacy of U.S. forces behavior in the operation, and the legitimacy of the host nation government.105 The guidance to commanders focuses more on the former two concepts than the latter. 106 Second, doctrine assumes that military stability operations support legitimate governments. It does not address how military forces create legitimacy when the military operation is responsible for creating (or replacing) the government.107

JP 3-07 also offers the concept of political settlement, which is more useful for understanding the roots of legitimacy in regime change. Doctrine does not emphasize the political settlement as much as legitimacy, but it is mentioned in important places.108 Most instructively, JP 3-07 states that, “The objective of a stabilization effort is to achieve and maintain a workable political settlement among the elements of the HN society,” and that, “The structures of a state are the result of a political settlement forged by a common understanding among elites and the communities they represent.”109

The concept of the political settlement is useful for regime change because it is something that U.S. forces can affect. Legitimacy is a broad concept that, when applied to the successor regime, reflects institutionalized acceptance of the government over time.110 The political settlement is an event or process where specific parties express that
consent. A robust political settlement that is maintained over time can become legitimate; and U.S. forces can take specific actions to support or maintain that settlement.

Implications for a model of regime change

Both the liberal institutional theory and the theory of political incentives acknowledge that the means the state uses to wield and retain power and its political structure are fundamentally linked. In the case of liberal institutional theory, this is the need to maintain a strong central state (the means of power) in addition to rule of law and accountable government (political structure). In the case of the theory of political incentives, this is because the leaders’ dependence on the willing coalition determines his or her political objectives. Both lenses justify the proposition that, “The efforts to restore state control and achieve political reform interact with each other.”

The political incentive theory also reinforces the value of the political settlement concept. The political structure of the successor regime is not the result of support to legitimate institutions, as those institutions were fundamentally damaged by the overthrow of the government. Instead, the structure of the successor regime is formed by active agents in the society competing to determine how political power is distributed. This process leads to a resolution in the form of a political settlement, and that forms the last proposition, “The political settlement of the competition determines the nature of the successor regime.”

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter set up four thematic questions about regime change: (1) “Why do it?”; (2) “How to overthrow the foreign regime?”, (3) “What happens after overthrow?”,
and (4) “What makes it successful?”. It then described how separate threads of thought in military doctrine, strategic theory, and the academic political science and international relations literature approach each of them. This chapter then boiled down these threads to a series of propositions that describe regime change:

1. The difference between the original regime and the intent for the successor regime defines the strategic problem for regime change.

2. The nature of the original regime influences the available methods of overthrow.

3. The method of overthrow sets conditions for the restoration of state control and political reforms.

4. Overthrow of the original regime sets off a competition to determine the nature of the successor regime.

5. The efforts to restore state control and achieve political reform interact with each other.

6. The political settlement of the competition determines the nature of the successor regime.

The next chapter builds a conceptual model of regime change using the elements and relationships described in these propositions.

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3 Ibid., 77, 589.


10 Bush, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks by the President on Iraq.”


Luttwak cites the specific example of the king of Armenia during Nero’s rule – Roman campaigns dethroned a Parthian-supported Armenian king and replaced him with Tiridates. Ibid. Location 533.


Lt Col David Mueller gives an example of this in the decision to occupy Damascus after its abandonment by Ottoman civil government. See David A. Mueller, “Civil Order and Governance as a Military Responsibility” (Research Report, Air War College University, 2016).

The new JP 3-0 (Jan 2017) emphasizes the idea of the ‘conflict continuum’ alongside the ‘range of military operations’ This thesis uses the definition of range of military operations is given in JP 1-0 (March 2013), which is still consistent with, but less emphasized in, the new JP. CJCS, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 2017; CJCS, JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. 

37

Ibid., pt. 506.


Ibid., pt. 572.


Ibid., pts. 1105–1116.


Ibid., 40–43.

Naji specifically invokes ‘leftist movements in Central and South America as non-Islamic precedents for his theory. Ibid., 34–35.
35 This is one of the central arguments of the first section of Joby Warrick’s *Black Flags*. See Joby Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS* (New York: Doubleday, 2015).


40 See the following:


The new CJCS 3-0 weakened the description of the Joint Phasing Concept, replacing it with the Joint Operation Model. CJCS 5-0 still retains the old concept. The formal numbering of phases (phase III as dominate, phase IV as stabilize, etc.) has been replaced with ‘dominate activities’ and ‘stabilize activities’, arranged in time and purpose to fit the needs of the operation. In the description of large scale combat operations (Chapter VIII) the phases in the new manual still mirror the old. CJCS, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 2011; CJCS, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 2017; CJCS, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

CJCS, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 5.

CJCS, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 2017, V-28 to V-29. See also CJCS, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. p. III-41 through III-44. Note that the descriptions for the two models are markedly different, and the phasing model in JP 3-0 specifically describes termination and end state in different terms than JP 5-0.


Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 596.

The term historically has referred to monarchies, but it fits our usage for authority over the regime. Victoria Neufeldt and David B. Guralnik, eds., Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd ed (New York: Macmillan, 1997).


Kinzer, Overthrow.


For three typical examples, see the following. Each generally leaves the question of the successor regime – or, in fact, any considerations after decapitation is accomplished – either unanswered (Irvin and Miles) or handwaved away (Scott). Victor D. Irvin, “Political Assassination, the Strategic Precision Weapon of Choice” (Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College, 2002); Paul J. Scott, “Your Turn to Run Your Country Just Ended: Global-Reach Regime Replacement” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007), CARL Digital Library (SAMS Monographs), accessed 18 May 2017, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll3/id/1247; William D. Miles, “Decapitation: A Case for a Better Guillotine” (Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College, 2007).

Weinberger’s article makes a nuanced point that, though they did not know Qaddafi’s location during El Dorado Canyon it would have been legitimate to strike him. It gives the strong implication that doing so would have been a beneficial, but unintended effect, but does not say so outright. Judy Endicott, “Raid on Libya: Operation ELDORADO CANYON,” in \textit{Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations 1947-1997}, ed. A. Timothy Warnock (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000), 145–56; Caspar W. Weinberger, “When Can We Target the Leaders?” \textit{Strategic Review}, Spring 2001, 21–24.


This is also the logical consequence of effective strikes on leadership in John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” \textit{Airpower Journal} 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995). See also Robert C. Hood, “Campaign Planning: Considerations for Attacking National Command and Control” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994).


Luttwak, \textit{Coup D’etat}, 3253.

Ibid., pt. 3334.

Ibid., 3381.

Mao’s theory of protracted war was written in the early stages of the resistance to the Japanese. Tse-Tung, FMFRP 12-18, \textit{Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare}. Che’s theories of guerilla warfare were written between the Cuban revolution and his later misadventures in the Congo and Bolivia. See Guevara, “Guerilla Warfare: A Method”; Freedman, \textit{Strategy}, 401. Giáp’s work was written in the brief interbellum between the French and U.S. wars in Vietnam. Giáp, \textit{People’s War, People’s Army}. 


67 UW doctrine, despite dealing explicitly with regime change, is excluded here for three reasons. First, it has already been mentioned above in the insurgency section, and comports with that logic. Second, UW doctrine explicitly avoids large-scale combat. Third, its distribution restrictions (For Official Use Only) prevent its implications from being explored in this chapter. Nothing in UW doctrine invalidates the following arguments. CJCS, JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare.


69 HQDA, FM 27-5, Civil Affairs/Military Government.


71 Ibid., 263–69.


82 Ibid., I-7-I-8.

83 Ibid., III-15.


88 See also its Army equivalent, ATP 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, which provides even more detail. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014); Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015).


90 Ibid., IV-1.


92 For another treatment of this idea of competition, see Manfred K Rotermund, The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999). He describes peace, especially in post-hostilities context, as a competition between various layers of society.

93 Allison and Zelikow’s models are not meant to explain regime change, but they do offer some insight into thinking about regimes in general, and how to design a successor regime that might be successful. See Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).


95 Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 469.


97 Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook.

98 Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 41–43.

100 Ibid., 11–12.


104 Ibid., I-16.

105 Ibid., I-14.

106 Ibid., I-17–I-18.

107 Doctrine engages in a variety of circular arguments about this point. JP 3-07 establishes the components of legitimacy as consent, mandate, manner, and expectations, but defines these factors as characteristics of the operation or acts of U.S forces. See pp. I-16 – I-17.

108 JP 3-07 is the only doctrine to emphasize a political settlement. The term does not appear in JP 3-24 or JP 5-0. JP 3-0 and ADRP 3-07 only mention it in terms of peacekeeping.


110 Ibid., I-15.

111 The relevant paragraph from JP 3-07 deserves to be quoted here: “Instability is the symptom of a political crisis rooted in how political power is distributed and wielded, and by whom. In this respect, political power is not confined to what may be considered legitimate spheres of influence, but includes all types of activity that aim to increase influence and share of resources, while constraining that of another. Such disagreements over political power are often driven by dynamics at both the elite and grassroots levels of its indigenous society. Ibid., I-4.”
CHAPTER 3
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF REGIME CHANGE

Overthrowing governments is not easy. The government will not only be protected by the professional defences of the state—the armed forces, the police and the security agencies—but it will also be supported by a whole range of political forces... Their interaction—and mutual opposition—results in a particular balance of forces which the government in some way represents.¹
— Luttwak, Coup d’Etat.

The last chapter established that military doctrine, strategic theory, and the academic political science and international relations literature provide all the basic elements of a model of regime change, but there is no comprehensive model. This chapter attempts to develop one. It starts with a general introduction to the model, then goes into a more detailed explanation of the elements of the model and their relationships. Finally, it discusses some ways to use the model for planning.

The basic model

The basic model of regime change depicted on the next page intends to put words and concepts to things that are common to all imposed regime changes. It describes regime change from the point of view of the intervening power, and focuses on strategic and operational level elements relevant to developing an operational approach and operational design. It shows what major elements occur during a regime change, and how the decision or execution of each element can affect subsequent elements. It is a descriptive model, not a normative model; and it attempts to be broadly applicable to a variety of possible regime changes.
Figure 1. The basic conceptual model of regime change

*Source:* Created by author.

Figure 1 reads from left to right, roughly sequentially over time. Boxes indicate major concepts in regime change; arrows indicate their relationships. Six basic propositions describe the model, and the explanation in the following section uses those propositions to explore its nuances.

**Six basic propositions**

1. The difference between the original regime and the intent for the successor regime defines the strategic problem for regime change.

2. The nature of the original regime influences the available methods of overthrow.

3. The method of overthrow sets conditions for the restoration of state control and political reforms.
4. Overthrow of the original regime sets off a competition to determine the nature of the successor regime.

5. The efforts to restore state control and achieve political reform interact with each other.

6. The political settlement of the competition determines the nature of the successor regime.

**Building the model**

This section goes through each of the basic propositions and shows how it contributes to the conceptual model of regime change.

**Proposition 1: The strategic problem for regime change**

The difference between the original regime and the intent for the successor regime defines the strategic problem for regime change.

This proposition deals with conditions before and after the regime change. It resembles the ‘environment frame’ from ATP 5-01 *Army Design Methodology*, and the similarity is instructive. By this logic, the regime change is the operational approach.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 2. Proposition 1: The strategic problem for regime change

*Source:* Created by author.
The ‘original regime’ is the government or leadership of the state under consideration before the intervention. The successor regime is the government that exists at the end of the intervention. The nature of the original regime and the successor regime are characterized by their relations with other states, the political base of the regime, and the state’s institutions. Regime change is an approach to shaping the nature of the successor regime by changing the original regime.

Any regime change will affect all three parts of the original regime, but can be more or less intrusive. At the most intrusive, the intervening power determines the foreign policy of the successor regime, reshapes the political constituencies that it is based on, and changes basic institutions. At the least intrusive a new head of state is installed who derives his or her support from the same constituencies, adopts the foreign policy of the original regime (at least until recognized by the United Nations), and seeks to minimize changes to social and political institutions. All regime changes, however, break at least one institution—the habit of obedience to the original regime. Long-term success, regardless of other goals, requires rebuilding this institution.

Proposition 2: The nature of the original regime influences the method of overthrow

The first, and most distinct, step in regime change is the overthrow of the original regime. There are three primary ways to bring this about: (1) Through a third party inside the original regime (for example, the plotters of a coup); (2) through a third party outside the original regime (for example, through UW); or (3) through the direct capture of the seat of power (for example, through military intervention). Abdication and decapitation
are special cases that enable regime change through one of the other means. Figure 3, below, depicts the relationship between the original regime and the method of overthrow.

![Figure 3. Proposition 2: Effects of the original regime on the method of overthrow](image)

*Source:* Created by author.

Overthrow through a third party within the state involves an organized movement of members of the original regime to capture, kill, or force the abdication of the head of state and inner circle of the original regime and assert control over the state. The most common form of this is the coup, which was discussed extensively in the previous chapter. This method of overthrow has several advantages, as it can retain many of the state institutions and can subvert or co-opt some of the original regime’s base of support. The greatest challenges to the intervening power are organizing the internal third party, which requires the ability to recruit and organize within the state system, and protecting the successor regime from competition in the immediate aftermath of overthrow. The intervening power can support the internal third party through logistics, communication, and funding or by neutralizing portions of the original regime that could not be subverted.
Overthrow through a third party outside of the state involves a political organization outside of the original regime that either captures the seat of power or secures sufficient political support to force the abdication of the original regime. The most common form of this method is insurgency or UW. This method requires a substantial organization, usually with a military or guerilla arm. This has both advantages and disadvantages—the third party has already established an active base of support, but that base shapes its actions after overthrow. This method of overthrow results in more radical changes to the original regime, as it results in major changes to the regime’s power base and fundamentally changes any institutions of legitimate succession. UW doctrine describes how the intervening power employs this method.

In the final case, the intervening power can overthrow the government through direct capture of the seat of power. This case involves a direct military intervention that destroys or neutralizes the armed forces of the original regime and occupies the political and administrative centers of the state. The intervening power must still occupy those centers even following abdication or decapitation, though those circumstances may make occupation much simpler. The difficulty of this method depends on the relative power of the states involved. It can be relatively straightforward, as in Operation Just Cause, or require major combat forces, as in OIF. The primary advantage of this method is that it does not depend on a third party to carry it out. This method can be more or less intrusive—the intervening power has wide latitude to change or retain power groups or institutions in the state, according to its policy.

In each case, the nature of the original regime strongly affects the feasibility and suitability of the method of overthrow. A third party within the state is only feasible if it
can be organized and if it can subvert or co-opt sufficient elements of the state, and it is only suitable for limited changes to the nature of the original regime. A third party outside of the state is only feasible if the movement has sufficient physical and/or political space to organize, and is not suitable if the policy of the intervening power is at odds with the policy of the third party. If the original regime has a broad base of support, strong control over political organization, and/or effective control of its territory, the intervening power may not be able to support a credible third-party opposition. Direct capture of the seat of power is suitable for expansive policy aims (and some limited ones), but is only feasible if the intervening power has significant advantages in relative military capability.

Proposition 3: The method of overthrow sets conditions for restoring state control and political reform

Following overthrow, the regime change has two major, simultaneous tasks—restoring control of the state and executing political reforms. Restoring state control involves those actions necessary to control the population, territory, and resources of the state. These goal of these actions is ensuring that the successor regime can execute its own domestic policy. Specific actions and steps for restoring state control are well covered in U.S. military and government doctrine, what is more important here are the organizations that carry it out. States employ a wide variety of organizations to ensure control, including legitimate military and police forces, partisan armed forces, and various security and intelligence services. The fact of overthrow is a fundamental failure of these organizations, either because of their unwillingness or inability to stop it. In the
aftermath, the successor regime must either rebuild or replace these institutions to ensure its own capability to govern.

Figure 4. Proposition 3: Effects of the original regime on the method of overthrow

*Source:* Created by author.

The specific method and circumstances of overthrow shape the means available to restore control. In the case of a direct capture of the seat of power, these organizations were likely destroyed, crippled, or marginalized by the intervening power. In the aftermath, the successor regime may rely on the forces of the intervening power (for example, through a military authority), may rebuild new forces, or use partisan and allied forces. Following a successful insurgency or revolution, the partisan forces of the insurgent or revolutionary party themselves become responsible for control of the state. Following the coup, the successor regime tries as hard as possible to retain the loyalty
and organization of the original regime’s armed forces. Finally, in some cases, third party forces such as a U.N. peacemaking or peacebuilding intervention may become responsible.

Political reforms are the actions following overthrow to build an active base of support for the successor regime and execute its domestic policy. The overthrow of the original regime fundamentally changes the distribution of power and authority in the state, and some organization or group of organizations will assert political authority in the aftermath. This paper refers to this authority, and the actions it takes, under the catch-all heading of political reforms. Like restoring state control, there are numerous techniques or methods for accomplishing political reforms, many of which are described in the same stability doctrine mentioned above. The goal of these political reforms is to shape the nature of the successor regime. In this case, as well, the authority that carries out the political reforms matters.

The method of overthrow affects this by setting the initial political conditions. In the case of overthrow through a third party (such as insurgency or coup), that third party is the center of the subsequent political authority. This usually results in either an interim government or transition directly to the successor regime. In the case of overthrow through large-scale combat, the nature of the combat itself may affect the political environment—for example, the population may be dependent on the intervening power for basic needs and war damage may affect some regions more than others. This can result in almost immediate handover to a local interim government (also referred to as a provisional government), a separate third party such as an international mandate, or direct rule through a transitional military authority or interim civil authority. The success or
failure of this handover does not depend on the success or failure of the military operation, it depends on the capability of the transitional regime to operate in the conditions that the military operation sets.

Proposition 4: Overthrow of the original regime sets off a competition to determine the nature of the successor regime

The intervening power does not shape the successor regime in a vacuum. As mentioned before, the overthrow of the original regime fundamentally changes the distribution of power and authority in the state, and other organizations will compete with the intervening power, its allies, and each other for both control and political power. This competition is inevitable, since the regime change itself (no matter how precise or minimally intrusive) breaks the institution of obedience to the prior regime.

Figure 5. Proposition 4: Effects of the original regime on the method of overthrow

Source: Created by author.
The organizations that have the means and the motive to shape the successor regime participate in this competition. This returns to the JP 3-24 ‘opportunity, means, and motive’ construct, adapted here for our purposes. The overthrow provides the opportunity to shape the political development of the new state and challenge its control.

Groups with different political visions for the successor regime have the motive to compete. This includes groups seeking to gain influence in the successor regime, those seeking to overthrow or control the successor regime, those seeking to limit the authority of the successor regime over them (nullification), or those seeking to leave it altogether (secession). Spoilers—organizations interested in preventing a political settlement (either on specific terms or at all)—are a special case of actor, as their political influence can be outsized relative to their capability.

Groups that can affect the outcome of the competition are relevant, and attempt to do so according to their means. This includes direct opposition to the control of the regime, political organization and activity, or both simultaneously. Methods of challenging state control range from overt acts such as direct or guerilla attacks on the organs of state control (police, army, etc.), to covert acts such as intimidation to force non-cooperation with the governing regime. These methods have the effect of reducing the successor regime’s ability to exert authority. Methods of challenging political reform also include overt acts such as organization and campaigning, to covert acts such as corruption and symbolic assassination. The groups that are both capable and willing to challenge the regime through these methods are the relevant competitors. There is also a time dimension to the assessment of relevance—those who are immediately capable and
willing, those capable but not-yet willing, and those who are willing but not yet capable—which reflects their readiness.¹¹

Proposition 5: The efforts to restore state control and achieve political reform interact with each other

Restoring state control and political reform cannot be planned separately. Though these two activities can be conceptually separated, and are often executed with different forces and authorities, actions taken to one end effect the other. In addition, some actions, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, affect both state control and political reform directly.

Figure 6. Proposition 5: Linkage between restoring state control and political reform

Source: Created by author.
Political reforms shape the support available for the current regime versus the support available for its competition. Political reforms can affect the challenges for state control by assisting certain groups competing for state control, or strengthening or weakening groups relative to the groups that dominate the regime. This is the fundamental premise of population-centric counterinsurgency, and is extensively treated in doctrine and other literature on counterinsurgency.

The other direction is less recognized. The development of the mechanisms of state control, and their actions, empower some groups and populations and suppress others. In addition, the organs of state control exert their own political influence, to the extent that they are necessary for the stability of the regime. Actions to support specific security organizations, or actions to establish control over populations and groups, affect the political environment.

Finally, some actions taken by the successor regime simultaneously affect both the political environment and state control. The classic example of this is disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. It is central to asserting state control, but it fundamentally changes the capabilities of at least one of the competitors in the aftermath of overthrow. These actions are often critical to both establishing a political settlement and asserting control, and reflect the need for centralized planning of the political and administrative aspects.

Proposition 6: The political settlement of the competition determines the nature of the successor regime

The previous proposition established that political reforms and state control are linked—because of the conditions they set—and the fourth proposition sets up a
competition for control in the aftermath of overthrow that challenges these efforts. This proposition speaks to the outcome of this competition: A political settlement.

Figure 7. Proposition 6: Determining the nature of the successor regime

*Source:* Created by author.

The most important features of this political settlement are who participates and how it affects them. The political settlement—whether formal or informal, tacit or explicit—results in a distribution of power and sets grounds for future dispute resolution. The competition for control and political power sets the terms for this agreement: For example, military operations to assert state control limit the political power of the target population, the choice to participate in or boycott the settlement can affect the process, and political reforms can give competitive advantages to particular groups.
Ultimately, the outcome of this political settlement is the successor regime. The nature of the successor regime, defined by the same three variables as in proposition one, depends on both the details and the durability of the settlement. The settlement directly influences the power base of the successor regime by determining which organizations get power and which organizations participate. The settlement can also shape the international relations of the successor regime—foreign powers may mediate or monitor the political settlement, back certain groups, or participate directly. Finally, the settlement can shape the institutional development of the successor regime. A robust political settlement can turn into an institutionalized political process, if maintained over time; and the political settlement can choose which institutions of the original regime to maintain.

Using the model for planning

The previous section took six propositions about regime change, depicted them as a concept sketch and fleshed out the implications and nuances of it, and then called it a model. This section addresses how military planners can use that model to consider regime change. It considers how to design a regime change operation based on two different hypothetical initial statements of objective.

Planning backwards from the successor regime

What if we need to plan a regime change with a clear political objective for the successor regime? Examples of this include Japan (1945), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994). Does the model help develop an operational approach to addressing this problem?
The planner who has a clearly stated political objective first translates that objective into an endstate. Proposition 1 argues that endstate reflects the intended nature of the successor regime. The planner envisions a realistic structure for the successor regime that will be able to sustain the political objective. This can be as simple as replacing one political figure with another, or as complicated as changing fundamental institutions in the society.

Second, having envisioned that endstate in terms of the successor regime, Proposition 6 says that the way to get there is through a political settlement (or multiple settlements, see below). The planner then envisions how that political settlement occurs:
“Which parties participate, and how will they participate?” “What is the form of the settlement—formal or informal? Tacit or explicit? Ratified by elections?”

Third, with a political settlement envisioned, the planner can now determine how to structure the actions taken to assert control and political reform. Efforts to restore control can neutralize spoilers, exclude groups from participation, or prevent political organizations from challenging the results of the settlement with force. Political reforms can encourage parties to participate in the settlement, strengthen parties that need to gain influence, or weaken other parties.

In this scenario, the decisive operation is the first political settlement following regime change. The overthrow itself is not the decisive operation, as the overthrow cannot accomplish the mission. The military endstate for this operation is determined by the expected phase-zero military relationship with the successor regime upon operation termination.¹⁴

With a good plan, this sort of intervention can promise victory much faster than other interventions. This was the case in Grenada and Panama, where the intervention restored successor regimes were still largely formed after their overthrow. This is also the case for coups, where a small number of people can overthrow a government with a clear political settlement envisioned. But it is not a guarantee of quick and easy victory for instance, even though the U.S. understood the successor regime it wanted in Japan, remaking Japanese society afterwards took extensive effort. It also requires significant effort to generate the ‘good plan’, including understanding the political environment, developing parties that are rapidly able to assume leadership of the government, and determining the capabilities needed to maintain control of the country.
Planning forward from overthrow

What if military planners need to plan for a regime change with a stated objective of overthrow, but without clear guidance for the desired nature of the successor regime? Examples of this include Germany (1918), Germany (1945), and Afghanistan (2001). Germany after the Second World War is the best example of this. Initial steps to prepare for the aftermath of overthrow began before the U.S. even entered, even though U.S. victory was not certain until after the Battle of the Bulge. The U.S. objective for the successor regime would not begin to solidify until the Berlin Airlift and the start of the Cold War.

Figure 9. Forward planning from overthrow

Source: Created by author.
In this scenario, the stated political objective is overthrow, and it (correctly) dominates the planning process. Planners start with developing an operational approach to overthrow, operating with general principles applicable to the type of operation and targeted state. Proposition 2 states that the nature of the original regime affects the method of overthrow, which holds true in our examples. Germany in the Second World War could only be defeated through large scale combat operations; Afghanistan in 2001 could be overthrown through UW.

Second, the planners focus on preventing challenges to state control in the aftermath. This requires a plan to assert control over the state and plans (both political and military) to prevent the organization of armed opposition and achieve any specified war aims. In Germany, this plan included military government and de-Nazification; in Afghanistan, this involved paying the warlords and hunting Osama Bin Laden while the political process took shape.

The objective of these actions in the aftermath is to retain options for some future political settlement. This third step seeks to prevent other parties from forcing a political settlement on their terms, and to maintain policy options for future operations or a future political settlement.\textsuperscript{15} As such, its primary task is the maintenance of control over the country, preventing armed opposition from organizing, and/or rolling back armed challengers that still exist (either by disarming them, defeating them, or bringing them into an emerging political process). The U.S. is unlikely to institute a policy that forbids peaceful political organization or speech in occupied territory, but it may implement other controls, such as controls to foreign financing or policies like lustration.\textsuperscript{16}
Notwithstanding, the decisive operation in this scenario is either the specific act that overthrows the enemy regime or the assertion of control over the country, if the former does not lead to the latter. The military end state is then the point at which military force is no longer necessary to ensure the political process, or the transition to a future operation (whichever comes first).

Multiple transitions

The model, as described above, depicts overthrow, followed by one transitional regime, which leads to the successor regime. In practice, there may be one or more transitional regimes and multiple political settlements that lead to the successor regime. Different types of regime have different political and military capabilities. For example, lustration (described above) conducted by an occupation government is a generally acknowledged war aim; lustration conducted by an elected government can be viewed as political purges conducted against its rivals. Similarly, military occupation forces have a fundamentally different relationship with the local population than do domestic security forces or partisan militia. The nature of the transitional regime may inspire different sorts of resistance or challenges—a foreign occupation will inspire different countervailing forces than a leftist insurgency or a group of military plotters.

Doctrine reinforces this concept in the strangest place. ATP 3-07.5 (a document intended for unit-level leaders) introduces the concept of multiple successor regimes following overthrow—see the figure below.
Figure 10. Multiple transitional regimes and phases


Figure 11 (below) translates this graphic into the model developed throughout this chapter.

Figure 11. Multiple transitional regimes and phases

*Source:* Created by author
Planners can use the idea of multiple transitional regimes to structure the initial occupation and political reforms, and to sequence the effects of transitions. Intermediate transitions may be political settlements, including formal settlements such as elections and constitutional referendum. Elections may be interim political settlements that lead to the basis of the country, or they may be largely ineffectual at settlement. In either case they tend to install a new government and instill in it some legitimacy, from having been voted into office.

**Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter took the six propositions identified in the second chapter and builds them into a conceptual model of regime change. Then it develops the elements and relationships in each proposition, and discusses three ways to apply the model to operational planning. The next chapter will take this model, and attempt to fit OIF into it. The results will inform whether or not the model works for explaining OIF and useful for producing theory.

1 Luttwak, *Coup D’Etât, a Practical Handbook*, 57.


3 Decapitation, in this method, does not suffice because the original regime still exists. The third party still either force a referendum or abdication in the aftermath of decapitation, or capture the seat of power in the ensuing vacuum.


In U.S. army doctrine, these are primarily described under the stability task ‘establish civil security’, though the subtask ‘establish public order and safety’ from ‘establish civil control.’ Certain tasks in the Department of State matrix and principles, related primarily to ‘safe and secure environment’, also cover restoring state control. See Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Post Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix”; HQDA, ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques; United States Institute of Peace and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.

Many of the tasks deal directly with political reforms, such as reestablishing justice systems or supporting human rights and gender inclusion. Other tasks deal with development, but have important political implications. Development will be addressed later in this chapter. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Post Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix”; HQDA, ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques; United States Institute of Peace and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.

Direct rule is the case when the intervening power determines the domestic policy of the state.

This is a modified version of the ‘insurgent goals’ from JP 3-24, slightly reoriented to apply not just to insurgents but any political actors in the regime. See CJCS, JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, II-9-II-10.


This is key to Luttwak’s assessment of potential opposition to a coup – see the sections in the last chapter. This readiness can be thought of and analyzed like military readiness – capability over time. Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 27–28.

This is the primary purpose of peace operations, described in CJCS, JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

We will approach the argument of whether OIF was an example of this in the next section.

CJCS, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, III-44.

According to historical doctrine, the need to enable subsequent operations and implement national policy is the point of post-conflict civil affairs and military government. HQDA, FM 27-5, Civil Affairs/Military Government, sec. 5.
16 Lustration ‘class of individuals from public employment, political participation, and the enjoyment of other civil rights based on involvement with a prior regime.’ United States Institute of Peace and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 7–83.
CHAPTER 4
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM CASE STUDY

History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the post hostilities activities. ¹

OIF is an exemplary case for the study of regime change. It (alongside the campaigns against Germany and Japan in the Second World War)² is the only regime change the U.S. has executed through major combat operations; most the combat occurred after the defeat of the Iraqi military and overthrow of the regime; and it failed to achieve its desired end. Much ink and anguish has been shed explaining that failure, and though ultimate explanations differ the expert consensus on the proximal cause converges on the inadequate planning for the aftermath of decisive operations.

This chapter takes a different approach to analyzing OIF. It attempts to describe OIF in terms of the conceptual model developed in the previous chapter, to see if (1) the model is effective at describing what was planned and what occurred, and (2) the model offers any insights into the results. The chapter proceeds with a short section describing the method and sources used, then devotes the bulk of the chapter to describing OIF according to the model, and finishes with an assessment of the operation in terms of model.

Method and Sources

OIF was a well-documented and observed war. There are numerous secondary sources available on the conduct of the war, from comprehensive accounts by journalists, official and commissioned histories of the war, and numerous memoirs from both
primary decisionmakers and participants. In addition, the planning for OIF spawned healthy and public academic discussion on potential problems, and a significant body of literature has developed on lessons learned and alternatives.³

For many of the early decisions through the Coalition Provisional Authority, primary source materials have been declassified and made available. For documents related to initial decision-making, the CIA electronic reading room and George Washington University National Security Archive have large collections of declassified primary source material. This paper bases its description of the planning on copies of OPLAN 1003V and COBRA II (the CENTCOM and JFLCC plans for OIF) and interviews with the JFLCC planning team lead.⁴ This paper also relies heavily on Stefan Talmon’s collection of the documents of the CPA for primary source material.

The Model of OIF

The following sections build a model of OIF from initial conditions to the installation of the first national government in June 2006. This period covers the major decisions that the model of regime change is meant to convey, including the development of the operational approach and transitions from direct, to indirect, to sovereign rule. Unfortunately, it does not end with the successful conclusion of operations—the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askariyya mosque in Samarra initiated the civil war in Iraq, and in the year following this the U.S. shifted to a counterinsurgency mission.

Pre-9/11 and the nature of the original regime

President George H.W. Bush issued the first, famously ambiguous, statement of a U.S. regime change policy towards Iraq when he stated (in the waning days of the first
Gulf War) that “there's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” Ultimately, the U.S. decided against directly overthrowing or supporting overthrow through Kurdish or Shi’a rebellion in order to maintain Iraq as a buffer against Iran.

Figure 12. U.S. regime change policy towards Iraq viewed as Proposition 1

Source: Created by author.

In 1998 the Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which set regime change in Iraq as U.S. policy. Though the Clinton administration did not actively pursue regime change in Iraq through force—Operation Desert Fox (1998) was intended to degrade Iraqi WMD capability—the goals and justification for regime
change articulated by the next administration would largely mirror those of the Iraq Liberation Act.9 The figure above describes the arguments made for regime change based on the nature of the Saddam regime and U.S. objectives for the successor regime.

The differences between the original regime and the successor regime have two major implications. The first is demographic. Any Iraqi government elected by universal suffrage would be installed by a Shi’a-dominated electorate. This could be a government dominated by a Shi’a sectarian bloc, or a government under an ideological coalition that could capture significant portions of the Shi’a vote. Neither existed in the original regime, and creating either would drastically change the government’s political base.

The second issue is the tension between Kurdish desires for autonomy and central state power. Granting the Kurds substantial autonomy weakens the successor regime’s authority over other political groups. Separating Kurdistan from Iraq would create substantial problems with Turkey, and weakening Kurdish autonomy would endanger the cooperative relationship with the KRG and potentially provoke a backlash.

Nature of the Saddam regime and implications for overthrow

By the time the George W. Bush began planning the overthrow of the Hussein regime conditions had largely been set. The U.S. maintained no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, and had close relations with the de facto autonomous Kurds, but limited influence in the Shi’a population. Saddam’s defenses focused on internal threats, and included multiple, compartmented layers of regime security. Iraq’s oil wealth and the preexisting international sanctions system (the ‘Oil-for-food’ program) allowed the regime to maintain its political base without developing widespread support or a robust domestic economy. Instead, developed welfare and pension systems kept Iraqis
employed. The only strong and widespread national institutions were the regular, conscripted army and the Ba’ath party.

The figure below describes the elements of the original regime and their implications for overthrow.

![Image of a diagram showing the nature of the Saddam regime and its implications for overthrow.]

**Figure 13. Implications of the regime for overthrow viewed through Proposition 2**

*Source: Created by author.*

The nature of the original regime had three clear implications for overthrow. The CIA determined that the internal security of the regime made organizing a coup impossible.\(^{10}\) Though the Kurds were organized and capable, they could not (and did not wish to) govern Iraq. The Shi’a population was unable to organize inside Iraq, but had
significant organized exile communities in Iran and Syria. The western exile community had largely been away from Iraq for more than 30 years and had no power base inside the country. The regime’s concentration of power in its inner circle and the poor morale of its army made overthrow through capturing the seat of power straightforward.

Developing the approach to overthrow

Early (pre-9/11) planning included development of a concept for organizing a Shi’a movement inside Iraq to overthrow the regime. The ‘Chalabi/Downing’ plan was an initial concept that explored how a third party could be used to overthrow the regime by protecting an area around Basra where Shi’a forces could organize and then supporting those forces against the regime. Figure 11 (below) compares the options.

![Diagram comparing two methods for overthrow through Proposition 3](source: Created by author.)
The ‘Chalabi/Downing’ plan was not seriously considered after 9/11, though its original proponents and aspects of the idea (including Free Iraqi Forces) would influence decisions throughout the rest of the period covered in this paper. Its only noteworthy advantage was giving the successor regime time in-country to organize a political base.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated military planning in November 2001. His initial planning guidance was to threaten Baghdad with ground forces, decapitate the regime, and install a provisional government. Previous military successes and the recent success in Afghanistan led to confidence that a small invasion force could overthrow the Iraqi regime.

The concept of overthrow in Cobra II

The plans that were eventually executed were OPLAN 1003V, the CENTCOM plan, and OPLAN Cobra II, the JFLCC plan for large-scale combat operations to overthrow the Saddam regime. Cobra II clearly identified the decisive operation as the isolation of Baghdad and the defeat of the Special Republican Guard, but it was unclear on exactly how that would lead to the overthrow of the government. The concept for phase IV stated this would expose the regime to an internal coup against the government surrounded in Baghdad, a popular uprising, or direct attack by coalition forces. However, these methods did not appear as tasks to specific units. The actual action that overthrew the regime was a specified task to V Corps to ‘seize key terrain and facilities in and around Baghdad to deny their use by the regime.’ Figure 15, below, depicts that concept.
Cobra II and the associated U.S. government planning made several important assumptions about the challenges after overthrow. First, planners assumed that the Iraqi population would require substantial humanitarian assistance due to war damage and/or WMD. Second, after overthrow, the occupation would be able to use elements of the Iraqi government and military. Third, that Washington’s intent was for leadership of the Iraqi government to transition to Iraqis as soon as possible, and that the U.S. role was to guarantee the political process, not its ultimate outcome. The planners accepted some significant risks: First, there were not enough forces to secure the borders, leaving Kurdistan and western Iraq largely to their own authority. Second, units were to stabilize

**Figure 15.** Concept of overthrow in Cobra II viewed through Proposition 3

*Source:* Created by author.
areas as they went through rather than hold forces in place.\textsuperscript{22} Third, units prepared to focus on immediate humanitarian assistance and displaced persons rather civil control.

**Executing the Overthrow, 19 March—22 May 2003**

Cobra II was successful. Combat operations began 19 March 2003, and overthrow occurred when the centers of power were seized in Baghdad on 10 April and Tikrit on 14 April.\textsuperscript{23} GEN Franks declared the end of decisive operations and created the CPA two days later.\textsuperscript{24} President Bush announced Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as the head of the CPA on 6 May, and the U.N. recognized direct U.S. occupation of Iraq on 22 May.\textsuperscript{25}

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**Figure 16.** Situation at 22 May 2003, viewed through Proposition 4

*Source:* Created by author.

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Figure 16 describes the conditions set by the overthrow. The execution of the invasion, inevitably, did not turn out exactly as planned. The decision to bypass major urban areas undercut the plan to conduct ‘rolling stabilization’. Instead, the areas bypassed were neither stabilized nor controlled. The Iraqi military forces, instead of fighting or surrendering, deserted. These two factors ensured that U.S. forces were out of their planned locations for stabilization, were unprepared to assert control where they were located, and could not count on local forces to provide order.26

The greatest challenge to the original concept was the change in policy direction from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to the CPA. ORHA’s planning, though tentative, had used a relatively consistent concept and set of assumptions to guide planning. The installation of Ambassador Bremer at the head of the CPA provided both authoritative direction for U.S. policy in Iraq and an entirely different concept of operations than what had been planned. CPA orders 1 and 2 (de-Ba’athification and dismantling of Iraqi security institutions, respectively) intended to demonstrate substantial political change by proscribing national institutions associated with the original regime.27 These invalidated ORHA assumptions of political proscription on a case-by-case basis and the ability to count on military forces.28 Even more importantly, the policy of direct rule directly contradicted assurances made by ORHA to local and expatriate parties, which undermined faith in U.S. political intentions and left the future political process for independence unclear.29

The planners anticipated direct challenges from former regime elements and terrorists, and operations against each continued during the period from overthrow to the CPA. Planners also anticipated (and allocated forces to prevent) Kurdish occupation and
control of Mosul and Kirkuk. The plan did not anticipate political challenges from Shi’a parties, nor did the Shi’a parties choose to challenge the U.S. forces in the immediate aftermath of occupation. Instead, planners focused on outreach and symbolic acts to encourage Shi’a participation. The plan also did not anticipate significant political challenges to the democratization agenda or the paroxysm of looting that would engulf the country. In the end, the looting caused more damage than the invasion, especially to government offices and industries.\textsuperscript{30} This looting included military stores and weapon caches distributed in cities to support regime militia\textsuperscript{31}—combined with widespread desertion, this ensured the availability of sufficient personnel and arms to organize political militia.\textsuperscript{32} By the end of 2003 militia were far stronger than government forces, and even expatriate parties had militia.\textsuperscript{33}

The CPA’s execution of state building, 16 May-28 June 2003

This section does not begin with a depiction of what the CPA planned to do through its year of existence because the CPA did not start with a plan.\textsuperscript{34} Ambassador Bremer was appointed in late April 2003 (after the original regime had been overthrown), but did not take over in Iraq until 16 May 2003. His late appointment and policy decisions invalidated prior planning efforts, and the CPA had no control over military efforts to finish establishing control of the country. Figure 16 describes the problem he faced. Figure 17 describes the U.S. actions to resolve it and the competition they faced.
The coalition expended the most effort to restore state control where it was directly challenged—from the beginning, military efforts focused on the Sunni Triangle, including Samarra, Fallujah, Tikrit, and Baghdad. The coalition was constantly challenged in each of these areas, and it would never establish firm control over Fallujah for the duration of the CPA. In other areas, coalition forces generally focused on
widespread searches to locate former regime elements (including Saddam) and elements of the anticipated Ba’athist resistance. Military forces in Nineveh Province and Kirkuk established local government, but were primarily able to do so with the assistance of the eminently capable Kurdish peshmerga. Outside of these areas, Shi’a political organizations established both firm political control and security.

The CPA undertook substantial economic reforms, including an effective monetary policy, regaining the ability to pay salaries, and a wide variety of market-based reforms. These reforms were intended to be radical—using the fiat occupying power to establish reforms that an elected government could not. The CPA executed other reforms through a Governing Council (GC) it appointed with limited local feedback, to lend its actions an ‘Iraqi face’. The de-Ba’athification order was the most distinct of these—though it was created by CPA fiat, it was handed to an unelected Shi’a partisan for implementation. Most importantly, the CPA planned a long-term path to Iraqi sovereignty, through a transitional law, constitutional process, leading to general elections. As part of this, it limited efforts to organize local provincial councils in order to reduce Shi’a Islamist parties’ influence. The combination of ongoing security operations in the Sunni Triangle and political reforms targeting the former regime fell heavily on the Sunni population, marginalizing them from the political process.

A variety of actors challenged both the CPA’s control from the start. Widespread looting destroyed basic infrastructure of state control, possibly intentionally. Over time, the CPA inability to re-establish civil security provided freedom of movement to insurgents and the ability to conduct political intimidation and attacks under the cover of rampant crime, including the assassination of a member of the governing council.
insurgents waged a constant, low-level insurgency throughout the Sunni Triangle that gained strength over time. Sadr’s militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) was established, organized, and asserted control of Shi’a religious sites in Najaf and Karbala. As mentioned above, the CPA and military were never able to fully address these challenges, which would boil over in April 2004 (discussed below).

The more consequential challenge was to the CPA’s political vision. Kurdish political parties, Sadrists, and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) began dominating local government without directly confronting the CPA’s authority. This assertion of political power and control without physical challenge was not countered by military forces. Al Qaeda in Iraq directly confronted the CPA’s political vision through terrorism. The August 2003 bombings of the Jordanian Embassy, UN mission, and assassination of the head of SCIRI directly challenged the collation vision of a political settlement. This behavior did not have an alternate political settlement in mind—it is a perfect example of successful spoiler behavior (see Chapter 3).

Conditions for handover to the interim government

The tensions in Iraq ‘boiled over’ in April 2004, with the nearly-simultaneous Sunni uprising in Fallujah and Sadrist uprisings in Najaf, Karbala, al-Kut, and Baghdad. Though coalition military operations contained both uprisings rapidly—leading to an encircled stalemate in Fallujah and a compromise with the militarily suppressed JAM—they had profound political and security consequences. Figure 15 describes the situation for state control, political process, and competition during the final days of the CPA.
The CPA was formally dissolved on 30 June 2004, after transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on 28 June in accordance with a plan described in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546. The transfer itself was a muted affair. It incorporated no elections or public celebration, and the U.S. determined the Prime Minister (Iyad Allawi) and retained de facto control of both Iraqi security and domestic policy—UNSCR 1546 gave the commander of the multinational forces, not the IIG, authority for Iraq’s security. Allawi was selected on his willingness to continue the CPA’s security policies, including defeating both the Sunni insurgency and al-Sadr. By the model, this would be a 3rd party interim government with an Iraqi façade.
The IIG governed according to the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was a document primarily drafted by the CPA but ratified by the governing council and approved by the U.N. The negotiations, including CPA pressure to meet a signing deadline for the TAL, resulted in an extremely controversial proposition—Article 61C allowed for any constitution to be rejected by a two-thirds vote of any three provinces. This article gave the Kurds a veto on any potential constitution. UNSCR 1546 and the TAL also established deadlines for transitional and general elections in January 2005 and December 2005, respectively.

The IIG faced two active insurgencies from the beginning—the growing Sunni insurgency, centered in Fallujah; and the incipient threat of Moqtada al-Sadr and JAM, centered in Najaf. The IIG also faced a growing threat from foreign fighters and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which at this point became more integrated with the Sunni insurgency. The IIG also faced substantial political competition from Shi’a parties, especially SCIRI. By summer 2004, SCIRI’s Badr corps had 15,000 militiamen, to the New Iraqi Army’s 3,000. Disarmament and demobilization efforts of these militia were developed in the waning days of the CPA, but never fully implemented. These parties’ opposition to disarmament stemmed from suspicion of other parties not involved with disarmament, such as JAM and the Peshmerga, not specific opposition to the CPA. All the Shi’a parties pressed for broad-based democratization and direct elections based on the overwhelming majority of the population they represented.


The transition from the CPA brought in both a new government and a new U.S. team to support that government. Starting 1 July 2004, GEN George Casey and
Ambassador John Negroponte took command of Multi-National Forces—Iraq (MNF-I) and presented credentials as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq respectively. The U.N. formed the IIG through several compromises, intending to mollify Sunni disenfranchisement and reduce Islamist roles. Figure 19 describes the evolution of the transitional governments.

Figure 19. Competition over the successor regime (Propositions 4 and 5)

*Source:* Created by author.
Because of the complexity of Figure 16 this section proceeds somewhat differently than the others. It focuses on the competition for control of the state, then proceeds to the interim governments in turn.

The competition for state control

MNF-I had a plan, based on NSPD -36, which set policy for the dissolution of the CPA and U.S. government efforts afterwards. The NSPD clarified military authority for security assistance and ended the duplicative efforts of CJTF-7 and the CPA. MNF-I’s headquarters itself represented an increase in the significance of the U.S. mission in Iraq. GEN Casey elevated the security force assistance component of that mission by creating Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) to generate the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). MNF-I executed a consistent strategy throughout this period, focusing on coalition military operations with an Iraqi face, politically supported by the Iraqi government, followed by ‘focused reconstruction efforts’.\(^56\) Reconstruction was viewed as a method to engender support for the Iraqi government following military engagements, and the embassy continued certain national-level development programs initiated by the CPA.\(^57\)

The first threat addressed by MNF-I was the unresolved Sadrist standoff in Najaf. Coalition military forces with ISF partners entered Najaf on 5 August, encircling the city and pushing back JAM forces to the Imam Ali mosque.\(^58\) The military was reluctant to enter the Shi’a shrine, and the IIG offered humiliating terms to Moqtada al-Sadr to surrender and demobilize. Grand Ayatollah Sistani engineered a political stunt that saved Sadr—accepting his ‘decision to leave the noble sanctuary and the shrine in the city of Najaf, lock the gates, and hand over the keys in a sealed envelope to representatives of
Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Various commentators interpret this battle differently—U.S. military commentators interpret as a decisive victory for MNF-I and the Iraqi Government, but commentators on the political effects note that the political benefits accrued mostly to Sistani and the Shi’a Islamist political leadership, to which the IIG was opposed.

The main threat to control, however, was the Sunni insurgency. MNF-I executed multiple operations to evict Sunni insurgents from Baghdad, Samarra, Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul, and Tal Afar. MNF-I operated each of these according to “the Najaf model”—including an Iraqi face and government support. These operations were largely successful—after each, the Sunni insurgents would scatter, and follow-on operations would track them.

MNSTC-I also invested heavily in securing the territory and population of Iraq, including investments in Iraqi police and border security. Border security efforts focused heavily on the borders with Jordan and Syria—lifelines for the Sunni insurgency. Operations in Rawah, Ramadi and Tal Afar (the major cities near the western border) also helped re-assert border security.

Political competition in the Iraqi Interim Government

The IIG had a tough job—it had to reassert control of the security situation it inherited from the CPA and demonstrate sufficient governing competence to get itself re-elected in six months. It focused heavily on reconstruction, but had similar or greater administration and capacity shortfalls than the CPA. Militia penetration of goods and services (especially in the Shi’a south and Basra), and rampant patronage and corruption at the ministerial level further diminished ruling capacity.
The TAL and UNSCR 1546 set conditions for overt political competition by outlining the electoral process. The Kurdish parties had been united and organized long prior to OIF, and always acted with a unity and cohesion that the other sects could not match. The Najaf operation did not remove al-Sadr as a political actor, instead it forced him to cooperate with other Shi’a parties under the hegemony of SCIRI and the guidance of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Ongoing military operations against the Sunni insurgency and the implacable resistance of AQI to the electoral process led to a near-total Sunni boycott of the elections (turnout in Anbar province was less than 2%).

Without Sunni participation, and with the Kurdish vote already spoken for, the choice in the first free and fair elections in Iraqi history was between a secular and cross-sectarian party represented by Iyad Allawi’s *Iraqiya* list, or between a Shi’a Islamist dominated list represented by SCIRI, Da’wa, and Moqtada al-Sadr. In the end, the Shi’a United Iraqi Alliance won 54% of the seats in parliament, and could dominate the next government without the consultation of other members.  

**Political competition in the Iraqi Transitional Government**

The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG), led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari, was elected on 30 January 2005 and formed and sworn-in on 3 May 2005. The ITG was primarily responsible for drafting of a constitution, which they had to accomplish by 15 August. The struggles of forming the first elected government of Iraq and the permanent constitution of Iraq dominated almost the entire lifespan of the ITG. The U.S. executed a heavy hand in the formation of the constitutional drafting committee, promoting greater representation of Sunni Arabs on the drafting committee and submitting a draft version of the constitution to the committee.  

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This is not to say they were the only concerns -the ITG was still responsible for governing the country, and it formed a cabinet and ministries of its own. It authorized the operations in Mosul, Tal Afar, Ramadi, and Rawah; and it executed substantial reorganizations of the security services. The ITG removed the technocrats and former regime elements of the IIG from the ministries and replacing them with members of their Shi’a Islamist power base. In the Ministry of Interior, this led to the widespread recruiting of members of the Badr Corps and JAM, and the creation of two Shi’a dominated special police brigades. These reforms wove Shi’a militia power into the framework of the legitimate government.

The January elections also elected provincial councils, and U.S. guidance directed development funds through these. The U.S. also established Provincial Reconstruction Teams and focused developments on those in Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Babil Provinces. These efforts were critical to the eventual success of the constitution—though Nineveh province rejected the constitution, it only did so by a 55% margin; not enough, combined with Anbar and Salah ad-Din, to trigger the ‘three-province two-thirds’ rule.

The Sunni learned from the January elections, and attempted to participate in the December 2005 elections as a unified bloc. Two major lists appealed to the Sunni vote—Tarek al-Hashimi’s Sunni-led Tawaffuq list, and Iyad Allawi’s non-sectarian Iraqiyya list. AQI rejected this conciliation, and carried out an intimidation campaign against Sunni participation, including the assassination of two of Tarek al-Hashimi’s brothers and his sister. AQI also violence also continued to target Shi’a populations.
The permanent Iraqi government and the civil war

The December elections were well-executed, and had amazing turnout, but did not substantially change the political settlement established in the January 2005 elections. They returned a smaller, but still dominant, Shi’a majority to parliament, but did not resolve any of the major issues between the sects. Profound rifts between the Islamist Shi’a represented by SCIRI, the nationalist Shi’a represented by al-Sadr, and the U.S. delayed the formation of the new government and resulted in the appointment of Nuri al-Maliki as prime minister over other better-known Shi’a politicians.

The bombing of the al-Askariyya mosque in Samarra in 2002 is universally recognized as a decisive point in the war. The destruction of the golden dome led to widespread and direct attacks on the Sunni population by Shi’a militia, many of whom operated as ISF. The Iraqi government’s response to the Shi’a-on-Sunni violence was lackluster because the sectarian death squads were drawn from Shi’a militia and ISF, and were part of the essential political coalition that supported the Iraqi government.

Assessment

This case study ends with the beginning of the civil war in Iraq because at this point the regime change has failed—in instead of building a free, stable, and democratic country the overthrow of the Saddam regime led to civil war. This does not imply that the civil war concluded the operation or determined the outcome—the ‘surge’ would be largely successful in stabilizing the country. Instead, it is at this point OIF became a different kind of operation—a counterinsurgency, not post-hostility stabilization. The purpose of a successful regime change is to build a viable successor regime, instead of opening the door for another political settlement through force of arms.
Figure 20, below, depicts an overview of OIF to May 2006 through the lens of the model developed in chapter 3. This perspective reveals three major points where the model reveals inconsistencies in planning and execution: (1) failure to decide in the early stages of planning and execution as to how Iraq would be administered, (2) inconsistency between the execution of security policy and political reforms, and (3) no clear vision of the political base of the successor regime.

Figure 20. Overview of OIF through the model—March 2003-May 2006
Source: Created by author.

This section addresses these three areas of inconsistency in turn and shows how using the model adds insight to the study of OIF.
Proposition 3—setting conditions for control and reform

The Bush administration never made a definitive choice of how Iraq would be secured and reformed. Instead, it indirectly chose policy by choosing people – the choice of Garner and ORHA in the planning phases and early execution implied a policy of rapid transition, the choice of Bremer and the CPA following overthrow implied a policy of direct rule. But the decision itself was never made, it was never translated into coordinated policy. If these decisions had been structured and formally approached, it could have looked like Figure 21, below:

Figure 21. Rapid transition to Iraqi authority vs. direct rule (Proposition 3)

*Source:* Created by author.
The “it’s all the CPA’s fault” explanation for failure in Iraq implies that, had the
U.S. decisively executed the ORHA plan to immediately appoint an interim civilian
authority composed of the expatriate parties who promoted the war we would have
avoided the ill-will engendered by the CPA. ORHA had the benefit of three months of
planning that the CPA did not, and the assumptions it planned under were more closely
coordinated with the military planners. However, ORHA was still desperately unprepared
for the aftermath of overthrow. The Iraqi expatriates ORHA would have empowered did
not share a coherent vision of postwar Iraq, which would have prevented moving towards
an effective political settlement and could have brought the sectarian divisions within that
country out far earlier.70

To execute ORHA’s strategy, the U.S. would have needed significantly more
postwar planning, including a pre-arranged governance plan among the exiles and staff
on hand to occupy the centers of power. U.S. military leaders would require plans for
partnering with Iraqi military leaders early in order to administer the country, and basic
guidelines for security requirements and military government for that period. More than
any of this, the U.S. would require massive amounts of cash on hand to pay salaries and
pensions until the Iraqi government stood up.

Had the U.S. decided, prior to invasion, to administer Iraq under direct rule
through the CPA, it would have required much more force. Specifically, the invasion
force would have been required to control and administer the country while the
occupation authority assumed control and executed its program. This would have
required far less military planning than administration through ORHA, as CENTCOM
OPLAN 1003-98 (the plan that General Franks cut down to form OPLAN 1003V) was
designed to do specifically that. With a coherent occupation plan in place prior to invasion, the CPA would have been well-prepared to assert effective control of the Sunni Triangle from the start and possibly prevent the emergence of al-Sadr’s JAM.

Proposition 5 – linking state control and political reform

Every commentator on Iraq acknowledges that the U.S. could have done more to prepare for the aftermath of overthrow. However, even after the June 28th transfer of sovereignty to the IIG, U.S. security policy and efforts to engineer a favorable political settlement were still inconsistent. Throughout the entire lead-up to the January 2005 elections, the U.S. embassy and the IIG were concerned with building an effective coalition that could prevent a Shi’a Islamist sweep of the elections. Iyad Allawi’s administration made coherent efforts to include Sunni in government, and to create a broad-based nationalist coalition.

However, the security policy focused on defeating the Sunni insurgents in Samarra and Fallujah, and (to a lesser extent) JAM in Najaf and Karbala. The differences between these two operations is significant–because the Shi’a political base was well organized, Shi’a leaders negotiated a peaceful settlement to the Najaf fight. This allowed coalition forces to shift to the Fallujah fight, but vastly increased the power of Shi’a Islamist parties political power that allowed coalition forces. Operations in Samarra and Fallujah systematically eradicated the insurgents in the towns and restored government control–there was no negotiated settlement or attempt to include the Sunni in the new government. Although the results were similar in that they removed the insurgent threat (General Casey said he applied the ‘Najaf model’ to Fallujah), politically they were completely different.
This could have been avoided by either using more force on the Shi’a or less on the Sunni. The government could have forced the surrender, disarmament, and humiliation of the Mahdi Army at Najaf (as many political leaders wanted), which would have embittered Sadr’s followers further but not appeared as favoritism to the Sunni. This policy would have significant risks, but would at least be consistent with the goal of asserting control. Or, the government could have initiated efforts to bring make Sunni parties more responsible for security in the government earlier through militia integration, waivers for de-Ba’athification, or other methods. These efforts would be integrated later through the Sunni Awakening, but that would rely on Sunni exasperation with AQI.

Proposition 6—determining the nature of the successor regime

But, neither of these occurred. The Shi’a majority gained strength and took control of the legitimate levers of power after the January elections. The Sunni insurgency metastasized from Fallujah to Ramadi, Bayji, Mosul, Tal Afar, and other cities, and the Sunni boycott left them excluded from the political process.

U.S. policy was one step behind the insurgency because the U.S. never articulated a vision for the successor regime. U.S. policy from the CPA until the seating of the permanent government focused on process instead of results. The CPA’s withdrawal was set on a timetable by domestic political pressure, not any condition on the ground. The focus on security and control for the January elections led to the political parties the U.S. controlled gaining power. Afterwards, U.S. support for the constitutional referendum and general elections guaranteed the primacy of a highly partisan, sectarian government with U.S. arms. When the general elections would return essentially the same coalition to power, and insurgency would change into full-blown sectarian civil war, instead of
supporting the policy of the legitimately elected government the U.S. would, one year later, fully upend the process with the Sunni awakening to force more inclusive settlement, after it had legitimated an unacceptable one through elections.

Political reform requires agency. The U.S. policy in OIF was unsuccessful because it failed to specify the political power base that could build the intended successor regime, and failed to set conditions for its success. Because of that, U.S. security actions were inconsistent with U.S. political objectives, and competing parties set the political agenda in Iraq. Additionally, Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s terror and bombing campaigns in Iraq are an example of effective spoiler behavior to prevent a political settlement.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter offers another explanation of U.S. performance in OIF—that our objectives were hamstrung by inconsistent security and political policies. This explanation does not exclude other ones—even if our policy was consistent, it is difficult to tell whether initial errors or poor execution would have led to the same result. However, the advantage of this lens is that it can be used before the operation starts, to guide planning beforehand.

This chapter applied the model developed in the third chapter to a case study of OIF, to see if (1) the model is effective at describing what was planned and executed, and (2) the model offers any new or different insights into the results. The bulk of this chapter is a description of OIF in terms of the model, which demonstrates its utility for depicting what occurred. Then, the chapter identifies three areas where, according to the model, decisions in planning or execution were inconsistent. Ultimately, this case study reveals
that the model is an effective tool for analyzing OIF, and supports the ideas that the
model is generalizable to other regime changes and that inconsistent planning and
execution can lead to the failure of the regime change.

of Iraq. Volume II, The Official Documents of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the
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2 The Second World War changed a lot of regimes. By Downes and Monten’s
data, 25 of the 117 regime changes since 1820 occurred during World War II, and these
data do not count the collapse of Japanese occupations in Korea and Indochina. This
paper leaves the subject of how to categorize those regime changes for future work; many
of them were thought of at the time as part of the larger campaigns against Germany and
Japan. See Appendix A to Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be
Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,”

3 The following lists the books consulted for this chapter.

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Counsellors (London, UK: House of Commons, July 2016), accessed 18 May 2017,

4 These OPLANS were provided as training versions with certain names and places sanitized. The author thanks Dr. Kevin Benson for his interview on 9 March 2017. U.S. Central Command, “OPLAN 1003V,” October 31, 2002; U.S. Army Central, “COBRA II.”


6 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*.


9 Bolger, *Why We Lost*.


11 Ibid., 20–21.


15 U.S. Army Central, “COBRA II.”

16 Ibid., para. 3.b.(4)(a)1.

17 There is one task to ‘support JFSOCC/OGA operations within Baghdad to complete regime destruction,’ but this is a late stage task and clearly implies a passive role for V corps forces.

18 U.S. Army Central, “COBRA II,” para. 3.c.(1)(e).


21 Ibid., 790; Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq*, 48.

22 U.S. Army Central, “COBRA II,” para. 3.a(2)(c).


25 Wright and Reese, *On Point II*.

26 As a particularly instructive example, V corps was forced to use Tactical Psychological Operations teams to distribute governance edicts. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point*.


29 Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq*, 41–42, 45.

30 Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*. 
31 Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 103.

32 Ibid., 98.

33 Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq*, 315.

34 Ibid., 41.


36 Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 134.

37 Ibid., 139–40.

38 For example, tax reform in a country where monetary compensation is extraordinarily low and there is 40% adult unemployment. The basic system retained petroleum subsidies and the food program. Ibid., 125–26.


40 Sky, *The Unravelling*.

41 Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*.


43 Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq*, 43–44.

44 Every author who covers Iraq mentions the paroxysm of looting that followed overthrow. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 115–16. is the only one to assert that former regime elements may have used the looting to cover intentional acts to destroy government records or hamper the postwar reconstruction. The author assesses that this is possible, and likely in some cases (especially the intelligence services), but probably not uniform.

45 Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 624.


47 Sky, *The Unravelling*.


50 Ibid.

51 Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 284.

52 Ibid., 222; Sky, *The Unravelling*, pt. 1759.


57 Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 287.


64 Ibid., 348–3369.

65 Ibid., 388–93.

66 Ibid., 404–6.


69 Ibid., 440–41.

70 Dobbins engages in this speculation in his history of the CPA. See Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq*, 48.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.¹

— Clausewitz, *On War*

This thesis began with examples of U.S. and other countries’ operations to change foreign regimes and a quotation from Clausewitz implying that we have enough experience with regime change to understand it. The U.S. has executed some successful regime changes, such as Germany, Japan, Panama; and some with equivocal records, such as Iran, Guatemala, and Haiti. However, its record for the 21st century is 0 for 3.

Despite this, the U.S. government does not have an institutionalized understanding of regime change. Regime change fits squarely into a gap in U.S. military doctrine. The most relevant doctrine—stability, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense—all miss the mark. Stability doctrine regards how to fix instability, but regime change creates it. Counterinsurgency doctrine regards how to respond to a pre-existing insurgency, but a successful regime change prevents one from ever forming. In foreign internal defense, the nature of the defended state is the cause of the intervention; in regime change it is the result. Like the story of the blind men and the elephant, this doctrine describes part of the problem but cannot look at the whole.

This is a problem, because military planners are often confronted with the need to prepare for regime change. In addition to current U.S. policies for regime change, any plan for major combat operations must consider the implications in the likely event of a
regime change when the opposition is defeated. Having an institutionalized understanding of regime change is important for more than just the planners’ benefit—official doctrine helps facilitate policy development, interagency coordination, understanding of the capabilities and limits of military aspects of the operation, and recognition of areas where the military depends on other departments.

Summary of the argument

The first chapter argues that the U.S. government should directly consider regime change and its implications for policy and doctrine. The world has long experience with foreign-imposed regime changes, and the U.S. at time of writing faces, and will continue to face, decisions about whether to execute regime change. This thesis attempts to build a conceptual framework for regime change relevant to government planning.

The second chapter described how separate threads of thought in military doctrine, strategic theory, and the academic political science and international relations literature approach regime change. It approached this by addressing four thematic questions about regime change—‘why do it?’, ‘how to overthrow the foreign regime?’, ‘what happens after overthrow?’, and ‘what makes it successful?’—and then identified six propositions in those threads that can be used to establish a conceptual model of regime change.

The third chapter takes the six propositions identified in the second chapter and builds them into a conceptual model of regime change. Then it develops the elements and relationships in each proposition, and discusses how to use the model for planning.

The fourth chapter applies the model developed in the third to a case study of OIF, to see if (1) the model is effective at describing what was planned and executed, and
(2) the model offers any new or different insights into the results. The bulk of the fourth chapter is a description of OIF in terms of the model, which shows that the elements and relationships in the model can be used to faithfully represent what occurred during OIF. Then, the chapter identifies three areas where the model offers different insights into the conduct of operations in OIF, and supports the idea that the model may be generalized to studies of other regime changes.

Findings

This thesis centered on the primary research question “What critical elements are common to operations that change foreign regimes?” It also considered two secondary questions: “how do these elements relate to the planning and execution of military operations?” and “what does the planning and execution of OIF reveal about these elements in practice? Are there generalizable implications from that case?”

The process of researching and developing the conceptual model in this thesis led to findings related to each of these research questions. For the primary question, the six propositions that form the theoretical foundation of the conceptual model itself are common to all operations that change foreign regimes. These propositions are well-grounded in theory and consistent with the experience of OIF. More than that, they conceptually relate all types of regime change across the range of military operations.

The second research question led to the conceptual model itself, and two findings. First, the conceptual model is most useful for designing an operational approach. The conceptual model frames the problem, sets some basic criteria for phasing, implies two closely related lines of effort, describes the condition after overthrow as a system based
on the competition for influence, and provides some grounds for thinking about termination criteria.

Second, the elements identified above, in execution, led to a finding emphasizing the concept of a political settlement. The model depicts a process of competition between the new regime and other groups in the area, and the resolution of this competition is a political settlement. Though Joint stability doctrine mentions political settlement, it is only in that doctrine and does not extend to Army doctrine. Even with in JP 3-07, it does not receive the emphasis that the concept of legitimacy does. However, as chapter 2 argued, legitimacy is the result of a political settlement over time. The quality and robustness of the political settlement the new regime achieves after overthrow will result in the eventual legitimacy of the successor regime.

Finally, the case study revealed that the model is an appropriate framework for analyzing OIF, and offers an alternative explanation for the results of that operation. The case study analyzed OIF through the model of regime change, and found that the preparation for the aftermath was inconsistent with the policy that was executed; the political reforms and military operations after the restoration of sovereignty were aimed at different goals; and that the policy consistently failed to clearly identify the intended nature of the successor regime.

Recommendations

This thesis offers two major recommendations – first, distinguishing the concepts of legitimacy in operations from the legitimacy of the host nation governance; and second, explicitly addressing regime change through major combat operations in capstone doctrine.
Recommendation 1: Separate ‘political settlement’ from legitimacy in doctrine

U.S. military doctrine should formally separate the concept of legitimacy from the idea of the ‘host nation government’ and should instead emphasize the concept of the political settlement. This recommendation affects doctrine in three areas: the principles of Joint operations, operational design, and stability.

Recommendation 1a: Remove the concept of host nation legitimacy from the Joint Principle of legitimacy. As written, ‘legitimacy’ in Joint doctrine conflates three separate ideas – the authority to conduct the operation, the conduct of forces within the operation, and the nature of the host nation government. One of these things is not like the other—the first two are essential to just war theory, as *jus ad bello* and *jus in bello*. The third is a factor of the political state of the successor regime, which is an entirely separate concept. Joint doctrine can eliminate the confusion by simply eliminating the idea of host nation governance from the Joint principle of legitimacy, and adding the idea of a political settlement to reflect how U.S. forces support another government’s legitimacy.

Recommendation 1b: Add political settlement as an element of operational design. The concept of the political settlement is generalizable outside of regime change—to the extent that war is “diplomacy by other means” it is related to any operation with an endstate that changes relationships within or among states. Since the political support helps relate tactical actions to achieving strategic success, and helps develop and refine an operational approach, it merits consideration as a separate element of operational design in JP 5-0. Adding this concept as an element of operational design helps clarify how friendly diplomatic, informational, military, or economic objectives lead to endstate conditions based on other actors in the operational environment.
Recommendation 1c: Add ‘support to political settlement’ as a key stability task.

The idea of a political settlement also helps link certain together certain stability actions by their political effect. Army doctrine includes 5 key stability tasks. Of these, 3 are accounted for in the model – “establish civil control”, “establish civil security”, and “support to governance.” Acknowledging the mission to support a political settlement will greatly reduce the amount of overlap and inconsistency between these tasks and the phenomenon of regime change. For example, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is a fundamental military action that is linked to the Army stability task “establish civil security.” This misrepresents the real effect of the task, which supports a settlement between the government and the disarmed group. Adding ‘support to political outcome’ as a stability task better articulates the political effects of some military actions.

The most important objection to these two recommendations is one of emphasis—the legitimacy of the host nation government is important, and policy-makers may object that removing this concept from the Joint principle of legitimacy may weaken the emphasis on this point. Joint doctrine can retain this emphasis by discussing the legitimacy of the host nation government in the Joint principle of “objective”, which (as chapters 2 and 3 make clear) is where the legitimacy of the successor regime properly lies. By separating the concept of the legitimacy of U.S. operations from the objective of building legitimate governance, and by emphasizing the importance of U.S. support to a successful political settlement, Joint doctrine will properly place the focus on building legitimacy in the successor regime to what U.S. operations can directly affect.
Recommendation 2: Acknowledge regime change in capstone doctrine

Second, U.S. military doctrine should explicitly discuss regime change through major combat operations. As asserted in chapter 1, the international restrictions about regime change no longer apply fully – the U.S. has participated in U.N. operations to change foreign regimes, and has participated in unilateral operations. The U.N. explicitly authorized interventions to change the regimes of Haiti (1994) and Afghanistan (2001). None of these are secret – indeed, they were reported upon extensively prior to the moment of invasion. Acknowledging that regime change is a legitimate use of U.S. military force enables the U.S. to discuss requirements for forces, such as military government capabilities, needed to conduct it.

Joint doctrine is generally circumspect about the causes of any large-scale combat operations. Of the 16 examples of military operations and activities that JP 3-0 mentions, none pertain directly to the major military task of deterring or defeating enemy aggression, or the role of regime change in “collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” This circumspection is inconsistent with other U.S. doctrine, which mentions the task. Joint doctrine can address this by explicitly discussing the types and purposes of large-scale combat operations—including regime change—in JP 3-0, chapter V, “Joint operations across the conflict continuum.”

The major objection to this is one of policy – the current defense strategic guidance at time of writing states that U.S. military forces “will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations,” specifically referring to Iraq and Afghanistan. This guidance removes the explicit requirement from the 2006 QDR to size
forces to conduct a regime change. However, the same strategic guidance states that, to deter and defeat aggression, U.S. forces must be able to “secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.” This strategic guidance implies the possibility of responding to regime change—either in response to foreign aggression or defeat of the foreign power. It also presumes that the defeat of an enemy aggressor will either not require large-scale, prolonged stability operations or that U.S. forces will be prepared to grow to meet those challenges. A coherent understanding of regime change is important to understanding how to meet those mandates.

**For Future Work**

Three major ideas in this thesis should be developed further. First, future work should explore the implications of a perspective of regime change on stability doctrine more closely. This thesis has not discussed two major themes in stability doctrine—security and development. Security fits nicely in the conceptual bin “restore state control”, but the link between development and the successor regime needs further explanation. Development—improving people’s lives, fostering economic development, and other issues—plays into four of the five Army key stability tasks. But it is not clear how these efforts shape the nature of the successor regime, or how they relate to other efforts to restore state control or execute political reforms. Certain development efforts aim at institutionalizing political reforms into the successor regime. But there is also a very robust literature on the political effects of international development aid, including
the use of aid funds to reward or punish groups and the effects of corruption. Future work should examine these dynamics in terms of the model of regime change.

Second, the idea of the political settlement may be expanded to transitions and war termination. The conceptual model in chapter 3 depicted the political settlement as the conclusion of the regime change, but also showed the idea of multiple political settlements. This idea was demonstrated in chapter 4 with the series of transitional regimes that Iraq went through during OIF. This idea conceptually meshes with the Joint phasing model – following decisive action, there might be an interim regime in phase IV that transitions to a permanent government in phase V. However, the concept of political settlement does not directly mesh with the concepts of phases or transitions. Planners cannot undo a political settlement like they can move between phases of a joint operation, and political settlements involve more than the changes of command arrangements and priorities implied by transitions. Finally, the idea of a political settlement that transfers authority to a legitimate civil authority is central to some doctrinal depictions of the conclusion of Joint operations. Exploring the implications of the concept of political settlements to phasing, transitions, and war termination can offer valuable insights for Joint doctrine.

Third, to fully explore the experience of regime change the base of case studies should be expanded. The first step is expanding the case study of Operation Iraqi Freedom to include the Surge and Operation New Dawn. Though these are very different phases, characterized by counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense, respectively, a holistic view of the operation can offer a fuller view of how it proceeded and implications for how it could have been planned from the start. Comparing the Soviet and U.S. regime
changes in Afghanistan could offer insights into comparative approaches in the same country, recognizing that the former operation shaped the environment for the latter. Finally, a case study of Operation Just Cause would offer insights into a successful regime change using limited force.

Conclusion

Some officers of the author’s generation have the idea that the U.S. will never attempt OIF again. This is almost certainly true—for one thing, the experience of OIF will reverberate through the U.S. Army and military establishment for another generation of Soldiers and leaders. However, the U.S. remains likely to execute or respond to another regime change, and it is important to develop an institutional understanding of how to do so. Current Joint and Army doctrine lacks such an understanding. Capstone doctrine does not mention regime change; stability, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense doctrine assume conditions or goals that do not hold for regime change. More than that, doctrine retains a conceptual separation between the conduct of decisive operations and stabilization afterwards that limits planners’ tools to conceive of a regime change holistically.

This thesis developed a conceptual model of regime change—grounded in military doctrine, strategic theory, and the academic political science and international relations literature—that generates insights for how to apply operational art to operations that result in regime change. It then tests that model against a case study of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from March 2003 to May 2006. To the extent that this model helps future planners link the tactical components of a regime change to strategic success, it will help future operations avoid some of the pitfalls of OIF.
1 Clausewitz, *On War*.


13 Ibid., III-39, III-44.
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