CULTURAL CHANGES REQUIRED IN THE ARMY TO TRULY

ACHIEVE A TOTAL FORCE

by

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Biography

LTC John Gobrick is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. An Army Reserve, Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officer, LTC Gobrick has held a variety of command and staff positions culminating in his last assignment prior to Air War College as Battalion Commander, Support Battalion, 196th Infantry Brigade, Fort Shafter, HI.
Abstract

This research paper uses a qualitative approach to argue that while efforts by senior leaders to incorporate the Army Reserve as a partner in an interdependent Total Force have been significant, no attempts have been made to address the underlying cultural differences between the components. In order to make long lasting changes to an organization, leaders must act now to address the underlying cultural differences between the two components and transform both to a shared culture. Otherwise, recent progress that has been achieved towards a Total Force could be destined to fail. This paper argues for implementing four recommendations to forge a common Army culture and institutionalize the progress that has already been made towards the Total Force concept.

The first recommendation is to increase marketing, recruitment, and leadership communication in the Army Reserve. This increase would emphasize the Army Reserve as an operational force and dispel the notion of a “weekend warrior”. This would build trust in the reserve components and provide reserve component Soldiers with realistic expectations of their service and help them to be better prepared when they are called to deploy.

The second recommendation is to reorganize the Title XI support to the Army Reserve by disestablishing the active Army’s training support structure and harvesting those positions into operational multicomponent units and embedded positions throughout the Army Reserve. The result would significantly increase the readiness of the Army Reserve and the development of a shared culture by moving personnel to where they can have the biggest impact on the unit while ensuring a cross pollination of both component’s cultures and experiences.
The third recommendation is to make Title XI support for the Army Reserve competitively selected. This would ensure that only the best were selected and foster an exchange of both component’s cultures and experiences to further achieve a shared culture.

The final recommendation is to re-implement the exchange of Command Selection List (CSL) designees for battalion and above commands between components. This would provide each designee a lasting understanding of the capabilities and unique challenges that each component faces. Furthermore, it exposes those with the most potential to move up to the general officer ranks in their respective component. Thus providing an enormous potential to drive change and institutionalize the Total Force concept.
As one total force, the active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve provide operating and generating forces to support the National Military Strategy and Army commitments worldwide. The Army will ensure that the total force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped and employed to support combatant commander requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives."

Honorable John M. McHugh,  
Secretary of the Army  
Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)

“Think multicomponent in everything we do.”

General Mark Milley  
Chief of Staff, Army

“The Army can’t meet its missions without the Army Reserve. Our culture is about service to the Army. We are one total force.”

Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley  
Chief, Army Reserve

The Army senior leadership’s intent for the Total Force concept in implementing the Army’s Force 2025 and beyond strategy to “ensure the future joint force can win in a complex world” is clear. The active Army, Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard will be employed as an integrated force.

Although the Total Force concept has been a goal since 1973, the Army has historically fallen short of achieving it. The active Army, as the dominant partner with the responsibility of distributing resources, has alternated between two approaches towards the Army Reserve; dismissing the capabilities and utility of Army Reserve units, or “trying to figure out how to enhance the operational readiness of these units through various strategies and providing more money for equipment and training”6. However, “deeply embedded assumptions”7 about the lack of utility of the Army Reserve always hindered attempts to fully integrate the components.
The extensive use of the Army Reserve in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts in the past 15 years has provided significant progress towards achieving the goal envisioned by the Army’s leadership. In Iraq and Afghanistan, both the active Army and Army Reserve embraced the Total Force concept and fought side by side successfully. This successful partnership proved that the Army Reserve was, and is, capable of executing its assigned missions and earned the trust of the active Army. As Lieutenant General Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve fittingly described, “Never before in the history of our Nation has the Army Reserve been more indispensable to the Army and the Joint Force.”

Despite the enormous progress, there is a danger that these advancements to fully achieve a Total Force could be lost. While the efforts by senior leaders to incorporate the Army Reserve as a partner in an interdependent Total Force has been significant, no attempts have been made to address the underlying cultural differences between the components. Edgar Schein, an organizational culture expert, pointed out that in order to make long lasting changes to an organization, leaders have to change the underlying culture. Otherwise, the recent progress that has been achieved towards a Total Force could be destined to fail.

To avoid reverting back to the days of the reluctant use of the Army Reserve, the active Army and Army Reserve need to act now and implement enduring cultural changes. Leaders must invest the time and effort to address the underlying cultural differences between the two components and transform both to a shared culture. This must happen if we truly want to have an operational Army Reserve and interdependent Total Force.
CULTURES OF THE ACTIVE ARMY AND ARMY RESERVE

Edgar Schein defines culture as “shared norms, values, and assumptions.”\(^{10}\) In other words, culture relates to rules about how things are done in an organization using a “common language, common knowledge and norms of behavior.”\(^{11}\) Culture is “less easily studied than defined.”\(^{12}\) Therefore, it is difficult to find concrete examples of the cultural barriers to a true Total Force. Because of this difficulty in finding these examples, especially for military organizations, I am forced to draw mainly from inferences which are based on my experiences and those of peers. In order for changes to take hold, it is imperative to understand the different cultural paradigms that exist in each organization.

The active Army and Army Reserve share many of the same cultural foundations. While not a comprehensive list, each places great importance on traditions, customs, esprit de corps, and personnel readiness. Both cherish and uphold the key values of leadership, duty, respect, selfless service, honesty, integrity and personal courage\(^{13}\). Finally, like most bureaucracies, when changes are proposed both share a tendency for “foot dragging, reluctance, and divisiveness.”\(^{14}\) Both are generally resistant to change.

While there are several differences in cultural norms between the components, I would like to highlight four distinct examples: (1) The Army Reserve paradigm of serving only one weekend a month and two weeks of Annual Training, (2) The impact of civilian military technicians on the Army Reserve military hierarchical power structure, (3) The tendency to over schedule training on a training schedule, and (4) The perception that the Army Reserve is less professional and capable than their active Army counterparts.

Even today, after 15 years of nearly continuous deployments and the increasing demands of an operational Army Reserve, there continues to be a culture that highlights Reserve duty as a
one weekend a month, two weeks a year commitment. This misrepresentation is prevalent not
only in the interactions of Soldiers who are currently members of the Army Reserve, but also
with prospective Soldiers. One just needs to look at the Army Reserve recruiting website and see
that the recruiting pitch highlights this predictable schedule while downplaying the reality of
deployments as part of the operational Army Reserve\textsuperscript{15}. In fact, each Army Reservist has
deployed on average 1.45 times during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), a number which does not include the significant amount of deployments within
the United States\textsuperscript{16}.

Another facet to the paradigm of duty in the Army Reserve is the balance that exists
between a civilian career and military training for a traditional Army Reservist. Maintaining the
balance between the two is a tension that impacts the service of the majority of Soldiers in the
Army Reserve. While technically protected by law from firing or discrimination due to their
Reserve commitment, Army Reserve Soldiers understand that some employers will apply
pressure to reduce their participation. Though the vast majority of employers throughout the past
15 years have been supportive of their employees’ deployments\textsuperscript{17}, the possibility of being passed
over for advancement or otherwise discriminated against by their primary source of income has
significant impact.

The next paradigm is the impact that civilian military technicians have on the Army
Reserve military hierarchical power structure. The fulltime staff in Army Reserve organizations
generally fall into four categories; Active Guard Reserve (AGR), Active Component (AC),
Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), and dual status Technicians. The dual status signifies
that as part of their civilian employment, technicians are required to have a simultaneous
membership in the Army Reserve, typically in the same unit. The vast majority of Army
Reserve organizations will never have AC Soldiers or DACs, so AGRs and technicians make up the overwhelming majority of full time staff in most Reserve units. Since AGRs move to new jobs and new duty locations at regular intervals and dual status technicians generally stay in the unit for much longer periods, technicians are relied upon to provide continuity and institutional memory for the organization. Furthermore, while there is “no DOD/DA policy, which outlines comparative or equivalent military rank to civilian grade structure for the purposes of day-to-day operational control of a unit,”\(^{18}\) generally technicians view their role as the representative of the commander and have day to day operational control of Army Reserve organizations.

Unit commanders in the Army Reserve are generally part time reservists and rely on the full time staff to manage the unit’s day to day operations. The dynamic of a full time technician can significantly impact the typical hierarchical leadership structure of Army Reserve units. If an AGR Soldier is not performing to standard, the fix is relatively simple. The unit commander or staff supervisor has authority over them by virtue of their position and rank. When technicians are not performing to standard, the solution is often not so straightforward. This is especially true when coupled with a technician who has substantial longevity in a unit and a common misperception that you cannot fire them\(^ {19} \). Another facet to this dilemma is dealing with a Soldier that happens to have an influential position for their civilian technician job elsewhere in the organization. For example, a battalion S1\(^ {20} \) officer, who is generally part time, dealing with a substandard Soldier in his section who also happens to be the battalion supervisory staff administrator (SSA) who, in their civilian capacity, is the commander’s day to day representative.

For Reserve leaders, being part time and attempting to balance military priorities with their civilian responsibilities while confronting a subordinate technician who is at the unit day to
day can be quite challenging. The majority of technicians are dedicated professionals who adhere
to a commander’s intent. However, this is not always the case and those unit commanders either
have to expend a significant portion of time, which they may not have due to their civilian job
responsibilities, to address the discrepancy or abdicate their authority.

One example of the impact technicians can have on the military hierarchical power
structure was during my tenure as the commander of a training support battalion. My battalion
provided training support and assistance to Army Reserve units within our area of responsibility.
One unit had a company that was struggling. This company had a crucial mission that was
essential to an entire theater. The G3\textsuperscript{21} of the command requested that I focus my efforts on this
unit. I discovered the unit’s issues revolved mainly around a weak company commander. He
was neither effective in articulating his intent nor in leading his unit and he wasn’t motivated to
improve. Attempts to spur improvement were to no avail. The battalion commander, a TPU\textsuperscript{22}
Soldier, concurred with the poor assessment and conveyed similar concerns. The unit was two
years behind in its training glide path and the battalion commander considered relieving the
company commander. However, the battalion commander decided not to relieve him and to let
him ride out his remaining one year. He stated that his decision was largely based on the fact
that the company commander had a senior technician position in the G1. The battalion
commander felt that the company commander could use his civilian position to cause him trouble
should he relieve him from command.

The next difference in cultural norms between the components is the tendency in the
Army Reserve to pack in as many events as possible during battle assemblies and annual
trainings.\textsuperscript{23} This is done in an attempt to try and maximize the limited training time that the
Army Reserve has available. The result is a very high pace of activity, or OPTEMPO\textsuperscript{24}, which
makes these events draining, especially for those in a leadership role. Units have only 39 training
days a year to accomplish nearly the same requirements as the active Army. The results express
themselves on unit training schedules where it is not uncommon to see units attempt to train on
multiple mission essential tasks during a battle assembly. Active army units, though not
unconstrained, tend to have additional time to lay out a more patient approach to training
management.

An example of this cultural norm to pack in events occurred during my deployment with
the 143rd TRANSCOM in 2005. During the daily Battle Update Briefs (BUB) with the
commanding general, the chief of staff, an Army Reservist, would often schedule multiple events
(recognitions, award ceremonies, etc.) either immediately preceding or immediately following
the brief. It was very evident that the deputy commander, an active Army officer, was not fond
of these events taking place during the BUB. He pulled the chief of staff aside and confronted
him with his concerns that the appropriate time to schedule these events was as a separate
engagement. These two colonel’s heatedly discussed the issue but weren’t coming to a
resolution. Finally, the G3, who was also an Army Reservist but had substantial active
component time, told them that they were talking past each other because they came from two
separate cultures. He went on to explain that the cultural background and formative development
of the chief of staff’s career was to maximize every bit of time and seize every available
opportunity in a battle assembly. The active component simply didn’t have this experience to
shape their development so were much less likely to pack multiple tasks into an event.

The final cultural norm is the perception that the Army Reserve is less capable or
professional than their active Army counterpart. When this perception manifests itself from the
active Army it is often as an, “I do this every day so I know better” attitude. Though not the
intent, Title XI\textsuperscript{25} training support from active Army Training Support organizations like First Army, reinforces this perception. They “advise, assist, and train”\textsuperscript{26} Army Reserve units. However, their role as outside advisors and trainers lends credence to the perception that Army Reserve units are less capable which permeates throughout the Army. I have personally experienced this negative perception of being less capable than my active Army counterparts several times during my career.

On the first day of a training block on sustainment during resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE), the instructor pulled the two logisticians in the small group aside; me, an Army Reservist, and my active Army colleague. We were instructed to depict for the class the laydown of sustainment from the foxhole to the strategic industrial base. As a professional logistician, I knew the answer and verbally depicted the doctrinal answer that we should use. My colleague stated that I was wrong. When I protested, he replied, “I’m regular Army and do this every day. I know what I’m talking about.” He then proceeded to layout the incorrect version. When the instructor returned with the rest of the class, he dismissed the incorrect answer and demonstrated the exact formations that I had previously described. My colleague’s perception of Army Reservists was changed that day and he discovered that we are just as good as our active duty counterparts.

Surprisingly, it seems the perception that the active Army is better not only resides in the active Army about the Army Reserve, but also in the Army Reserve itself. Clearly, the message from the past 15 years regarding the Army Reserve being a vital and operational part of the professional Total Force has not gotten through to everyone. It can be overheard from Army Reserve Soldiers depicting their skills and those of the Army Reserve as less professional or not up to the standards.\textsuperscript{27} These perceptions of being less professional and just a “weekend warrior”
run deep and trace their roots back to the Revolutionary War. Probably the biggest contributor to the perception was the Vietnam War. President Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the Army Reserve significantly damaged its reputation because, as there was no danger of mobilizing, the Army Reserve became a safe haven for those wanting to avoid service in Vietnam. Despite multiple instances of the Army Reserve proving its worth these past 15 years, with the long institutional memory of the Army, the ghosts of the past are hard to stamp out.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER SERVICES

There are perhaps lessons to be learned from other service’s relationships with their Reserve components and their efforts toward achieving a shared culture. The Navy has made significant strides from the past where “Reservist” carried with it a negative connotation and in developing a “culture of the future.” Changes have been made to their forces so that now there “are no Naval Reserve requirements, there are only Navy requirements.” As a result, there now exists an overall integrated Navy culture.

While the Navy has been rather successful in integrating their two components into one culture, there may not be a practical application of their approach for the Army Reserve. The Naval Reserve component serves as a provider of individual augmentation to the active Navy whereas the Army Reserve’s focus is mainly to provide cohesive units to meet operational demands.

The Marine Corps has several lessons that could be useful to the Army in developing a shared culture. They portray an almost complete Total Force mindset, driven in part due to their fundamental core principle of “being a Marine matters more than what component one serves in.” As reinforcement to this mindset, the Marine Corps made “reserve integration” one of the
core competencies published in their foundational strategy for the Marine Corps. In contrast, while the active Army has inserted Total Force integration into the Army Operating Concept\textsuperscript{33}, it has not made the same level of commitment by making it a core competency.

The next factor towards a shared Marine culture is their Inspector- Instructor (I&I) initiative. Active Marines are embedded in reserve Marine units to serve as an organic part of the unit. This initiative has several lessons that could be of practical use for the Army. First, active duty Marines are competitively selected so that only the best serve in support of the Marine Reserves. Second, the active Marine provides his/her perspective and expertise to the reserve unit, and when he or she transfers to their next job the familiarity and experience of the reserve component is brought to his next duty station so that it can be cross pollinated\textsuperscript{34}.

The Air Force has also been successful in forging a common Air Force culture through the Future Total Force (FTF) concept, which combines force structure through the use of shared platforms\textsuperscript{35}. Though an individual platform focus may have limited utility for the Army, the use of combined units better known as Total Force Initiative (TFI) units does have potential. This is due to TFIs influence towards development of a shared culture by the broadening effects on its members from exposure to the other components. Another useful lesson in the Air Force’s successful transition to a total force culture is their reliance on their reserve components for entire segments of basic training. For example, most of the Air Force training for C–130 transport aircraft is conducted by the Arkansas Air National Guard.\textsuperscript{36}
RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following four recommendations are tangible advancements towards forging a shared culture and institutionalizing the progress that has already been made towards the Total Force concept.

The first recommendation is to increase marketing, recruitment, and leadership communication in the Army Reserve. This increase would emphasize the Army Reserve as an operational force and dispel the notion of a “weekend warrior”. Dispelling the perception of Army Reserve Soldiers as “weekend warriors” will benefit the Army Reserve and active Army in two ways. First, it will provide the active Army with confidence that Army Reserve Soldiers are fully committed to being part of a required operational force. This will subsequently help the active Army build upon the trust they have in the Army Reserve. Second, providing Army Reserve Soldiers with realistic expectations of their service will help them to be better prepared when they are called to deploy.

Detractors may point out that the emphasis on being operational, rather than part time, could cause the Army Reserve to lose soldiers due to concerns of conflict with civilian employers. While it is not certain if this will occur in the future, our recent experiences after 9/11 indicate that there would be little effect. As Major General MacCarley, an Army Reservist who served as the deputy chief of staff for Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), pointed out “those who answered the call after 9/11 wanted to serve, and confirmed that commitment by unhesitatingly deploying overseas and, for the most part, stoically accepting the consequences of deployment upon their families and their civilian careers”.37

The next recommendation for making the Total Force concept a reality advocates a reorganization of the Title XI support to the Army Reserve by disestablishing the active Army’s
training support structure and harvesting those positions into operational multicomponent units and embedded positions throughout the Army Reserve. A significant shortcoming of the current approach of advising, assisting, and training for training support organizations is that there is no “skin in the game” for them. As advisors, they are not held accountable for the readiness of their partnered units and their role as an outsider from the active component is highlighted. Unfortunately, the recognition of this reality does not advance a shared culture but rather a hardening of the separate natures of the two components.

The manning of First Army, which consists of personnel from one army headquarters, two divisions, nine brigades, and forty-nine battalions, represents an enormous reservoir of expertise. These Active component Soldiers, if embedded throughout the Army Reserve force structure, would significantly increase the readiness of the Army Reserve and the development of a shared culture. Making these Soldiers part of the Army Reserve unit would provide for them an inherent motivation to make the unit as ready as possible. If deployed with the unit, their lives could depend on their efforts. Furthermore, by placing these Soldiers directly into units where they can make the most impact negates the need for the additional training support force structure. The reduction in this force structure, in light of reduced resources, has enormous potential for cost savings and increased readiness.

Detractors could argue that removing training support units in their advise and assist role would prove detrimental to the readiness of these units by removing the external feedback on their training. However, the capability for providing external feedback already resides in the organic force structure of the Army Reserve and would be further enhanced by the influx of additional AC Soldiers to the staffs of Army Reserve units. Furthermore, this organic force
structure provides an inherent mission command capability to ensure accountability and improvement in training readiness which currently isn’t provided by training support units.

The third recommendation for institutionalizing cultural integration is to make active Army Soldier assignments to Army Reserve or operational multicomponent units competitively selected. Using the Marine Corps I&I program as a successful model, ensuring that Title XI support was selected competitively would have the same effects. Like the Marine Corps, this would ensure that only the best qualified would serve in the Army Reserve. This would reduce the stigma of serving in the Army Reserve by changing the paradigm that an assignment to it was a career dead end. Also, like the above recommendation to embed additional Active component Soldiers throughout the Army Reserve force structure, this proposal would increase the exchange of both component’s cultures and experiences to further achieve a shared culture.

One possible argument against this recommendation could be the cost, both financial and bureaucratic, in administering a competitive selection process. However, any potential costs would be more than offset by the benefits of the increased quality and cross pollination between the two cultures that would occur if implemented.

The final recommendation is exchange of command selection list (CSL) designees for battalion and above commands to command in the other component. This is not a new idea. During the 1990’s this was a pilot program which sent active component commanders to reserve component units and vice versa but was discontinued. Major General Mark Graham, the first active Army colonel to command a National Guard brigade in peacetime is a successful example of this program. Another example is the most recent Chief of Staff of the United States Army Reserve Command, Major General Luis Visot, a traditional TPU Army Reservist.
Re-implementing this initiative would have several benefits. The first, as in my earlier recommendations, is that each component would gain the perspectives and experiences of the other which, in turn, would help foster the development of a shared culture. The proverbial ability to walk a mile in someone else’s shoes, especially in these key command positions, would provide a lasting understanding of the capabilities and unique challenges that each component faces. Commanders who were selected could then bring this understanding back to their respective component.

The second, and perhaps the most important benefit, is that these CSL officers have the most potential in their respective components to move up to the general officer ranks. This allows them to directly impact the policies of their respective components and provides an enormous potential to drive change and institutionalize the Total Force concept.

For example, MG Visot’s experience as a battalion commander of an Active component unit “set him up” for General Officer and helped tremendously to “develop, nurture, and establish relationships that facilitated the engagement” with AC units during his deployment during OIF. He stated that he was successful, in part, with AC units because of the trust and confidence that was built during his tenure as a battalion commander. “I was a known entity” and “the AC Soldiers knew who I was.” This was made possible because of the relationships he developed during his AC battalion command.

Finally, re-implementing the initiative would provide a tangible benchmark on the Army’s efforts toward the Total Force concept and further institutionalize the effort. While statements by the senior leadership of each component are clear on their seriousness towards achieving a Total Force, we only need to look back to the 1990’s, when shrinking budgets and
differing priorities led to an every man for himself mentality, to see how quickly changes can occur.

CONCLUSION:

The past 15 years has led to a better understanding and fostered a mutual trust between the active Army and Army Reserve through shared operational experiences. The enhanced reputation of the Army Reserve has “introduced a new paradigm of reliance…as an essential part of our national security architecture”45 and has led the Army Reserve to the highest level of capabilities and professionalism that I’ve seen in my 26 years of service. The statements by senior leadership to “think multi-component in everything we do”46 are positive and vital steps towards a truly integrated Total Force. However, without implementing the changes that would create an enduring shared culture between the Army Reserve and Active Component, we would remain an “unintegrated culture”47 doomng any lasting attempt to failure.

As resources become scarce, the active Army, who is the dominant partner, could shortchange an operational Army Reserve by diverting resources to itself. This could force the Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve which would lead again to a perception of the “weekend warrior” and reluctant use of the Army Reserve.

The risk of not changing is too great. The active Army cannot sustain major combat operations without the Army Reserve and allowing the hard fought gains towards the Total Force concept to atrophy could result in catastrophe. We cannot allow unanticipated contingencies to force our leadership to send under trained and under resourced units to fight. The risk is too high, not only for the potential for the United States to not achieve its objectives, but also the potential loss of America’s most precious commodity, the United States Soldier.
End Notes

5 Though the National Guard is a critical component of the Total Force and many of my conclusions and recommendations could apply to them, this paper will focus only on the Army Reserve and active Army on the changes necessary for lasting implementation of the Total Force. This is due to the narrow scope of this paper and the author’s expertise residing mainly in the Army Reserve.
15 http://www.goarmy.com/about/serving-in-the-army/serve-your-way/army-reserve.html
19 While it is technically possible to terminate Mil Techs, it has been my experience that many Army Reservists feel that, because of the time and paperwork involved, that it is not worth the effort.
20 The S1 “is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning human resources support (military and civilian). The G-1 (S-1) also serves as the senior adjutant general officer in the command.” At General Officer commands the position is known as the G1 or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Personnel, (ATTP 5-0.1, 14 Sept 2011, pg 2-6)
The G3, also known as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations “is the primary staff officer for integrating and synchronizing the organization’s operation as a whole for the commander. In addition to coordinating the activities of the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the operations officer ensures integration and synchronization across the planning horizons in current operations, future operations, and plans integrating cells.” (ATTP 5-0.1, 14 Sept 2011, pg 2-8)

TPU, or Troop Program Unit denotes that a Soldier is a part time traditional reservist, typically serving one weekend a month and two weeks annually.

Battle Assemblies or BA’s are the monthly training events normally conducted on the weekend. Annual Training or AT is the statutory 14 days of active duty every year. Both events are where soldiers train on improving their readiness in individual and collective tasks in order to prepare in case of mobilization.

OPTEMPO is an acronym for Operational tempo

Due to readiness problems identified for RC units during Desert Storm, Congress inserted provisions under Title XI into the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which directed the Active Component to provide support to the pre and post mobilization training of the RC.

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Currently there is only one operational multicomponent unit in the Army Reserve, the 377th Theater Sustainment Command located in New Orleans, LA. There are a few other multicomponent units such as the XVIII Corps Headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and, pursuant to HQDA EXORD 062-15 Corps and Division Multi-Component Unit (MCU) Headquarters Pilot Implementation, in mid-2015, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

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