U.S. AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY AND COUNTER/ANTI-CORRUPTION: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP OR ONE AT ODDS?

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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16 February 2016
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Biography

Lt Col Tony S. Lombardo is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He has held aircraft maintenance and logistics leadership positions in United States Air Forces in Europe, Air Combat Command, Pacific Air Force, Air Force Material Command, Air Education and Training Command, and United States Special Operations Command. He is qualified in three Air Force Specialty Codes to include aircraft maintenance, logistics readiness, and Regional Affairs Strategist. Lt Col Lombardo’s primary aircraft maintenance experience is on F-16s, F-15Cs, F-15Es, HH 60s, FB-111s, MQ-1s, and MQ-9s. His duties have taken him on numerous worldwide deployments in support of NATO, Sec Def, POTUS, Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, NORTHERN WATCH, NORTHERN GUARDIAN, ODYSSEY DAWN, ENDURING FREEDOM, RESOLUTE SUPPORT, and FREEDOM’s SENTINEL.
Abstract

The inherent belief that “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” are indeed “unalienable Rights” and should be spread through promoting democracy is rooted in American history and still a foundational tenet found in America’s National Security Strategy (NSS). The instrument of default, and often first choice, utilized to carry out America’s inherent beliefs has been the Department of Defense (DoD), in part, through Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) initiatives. Although the NSS clearly states America needs to continue to promote democratic values, it also caveats and stresses the importance of countering corruption in US BPC nations in a time when resources are finite and hard choices need to be made. Placing these caveats on building partner capacity has been difficult and challenging especially when many of DoD’s BPC initiatives occur in highly corrupt environments. This paper uses sub-Saharan Africa to analyze why counter/anti-corruption objectives are not a substantive part of DoD’s BPC portfolio despite the NSS counter/anti-corruption emphasis. Three primary reasons are analyzed: the lack of emphasis on counter/anti-corruption in DoD strategic and support documents, Africa is a “Seller’s Market,” and partners using extraversion as “Soft Extortion.” This paper utilizes DoD BPC experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa to provide a backdrop and specific examples to illustrate why counter/anti-corruption objectives are not a substantive part of DoD’s BPC portfolio. Finally, this paper concludes by addressing the negative consequences that have resulted due to the US and DoD’s lack of substantive efforts to enact counter/anti-corruption initiatives in BPC nations.
Introduction

As early as the 1600s, the United States’ first settlers believed in what was to become, for many, America’s special divine dispensation. In 1630, prior to arriving on the shores of New England while sailing aboard the Arbella, the Pilgrims were driven to believe they were destined to be a model for all humanity to follow. John Winthrop stated to the inbound Puritans, “for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us….”¹ He believed their new society would be an example for all others to follow and emulate.

Nearly 300 years later, towards the end of WWII, during his Fourth Inaugural Address President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expanded upon Winthrop’s vision. Roosevelt stated, “We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned that we must live as men, not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger…So we pray to Him now for the vision to see our way clearly, to see the way that leads to a better life for ourselves and for all our fellow men….”² In keeping with Winthrop’s belief, Roosevelt maintained the notion of divine forces leading the US to a better way of life, inevitably setting an example “for all fellow men.” However, he acknowledged it was not enough to be the example of a “city upon a hill” looking only inward as do “ostriches” or live like “dogs in a manger” content with their peaceful existence. Roosevelt was clear; the US’s well-being was tied to the well-being of other distant nations. Winthrop’s “city upon a hill” and now Roosevelt’s vision could only be obtained by exporting the virtues of democracy to far away nations. This would require America to build partners and their capacity to create, grow, and sustain democracy. The instrument most capable of doing so, more by


default than choice, has been the Department of Defense (DoD) due to its vast resources and reach beyond America’s shores.
Thesis

This research paper uses sub-Saharan Africa to analyze why counter/anti-corruption objectives are not a substantive part of the Department of Defense’s Building Partnership Capacity portfolio despite the National Security Strategy’s counter/anti-corruption emphasis.
Building Partnership Capacity

Same City, Same Approach

After September 11, 2001 President George W. Bush stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”

He, as President Roosevelt had done before, advocated for the spread of American values to far away nations by expanding development and “building the infrastructure of democracy.” America was galvanized by the September 11 attacks, forcing President Bush and all Americans to realize just how much American domestic security was inexplicably tied to the stability of other nations. Protecting the “city upon a hill” required building capacity in other nations with the intent of exporting American values and decreasing the chance of another attack in the US.

Same City, Different Approach

President Barack Obama, in February 2015, clearly stated in his NSS that the US would continue to “focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and dangerous ideologies.”

He would continue to pursue the United States’ commitment in using its resources to spread democracy so Americans could benefit from an increased assurance of a secure homeland. The US would continue to be the shining “city upon a hill,” leading by example, and spreading democracy to other nations by building partner capacity.

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4 Ibid., 2.

However, President Obama’s approach to exporting American democracy by building partner capacity differed from President Bush’s. President Obama stated that, “Underpinning it all, we are upholding our enduring commitment to the advancement of democracy and human rights and building new coalitions to combat corruption and to support open governments and open societies.”

He made it clear that the US needed to include combatting corruption in its BPC objectives. President Bush’s NSS mentioned the need for governments to fight corruption, but said nothing of the US’s direct involvement in reducing or specifically focusing on counter/anti-corruption initiatives. President Obama’s 2010 and 2015 NSS approaches not only emphasized the need to address corruption, it also emphasized the need to actively combat it. President Obama used language such as “strategic intervention”, “institutionalize transparent practices”, “building new coalitions”, and “proven areas of need and impact” to describe ways the US planned to combat corruption.

Why Add Combatting Corruption to BPC?

Why the shift in policy? Why would the focus on combatting corruption take a more prominent place in the 2015 NSS approach to building partner capacity? The NSS provided several reasons. First, combating corruption would assist in strengthening governance in weak or failing states, making it more difficult for extremism to take root. The NSS states, “the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root…We prefer to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people. The focus of our efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service

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6 Ibid., intro.
delivery, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime….⁹ Second, the increased pressures of reducing government spending, ending sequestration, and making tough policy choices due to constrained resources amplified the need for the efficient use of American resources both domestic and internationally. To this point President Obama stated, “To advance these interests most effectively, we must pursue a comprehensive national security agenda, allocate resources accordingly, and work with the Congress to end sequestration. Even so, our resources will never be limitless. Policy tradeoffs and hard choices will need to be made.”¹⁰

The strategic shift to increase the focus on efficiency and reduction of corruption has gotten more attention through years of continuing media and government reports highlighting US tax payer dollars going to waste due to corruption tied to DoD BPC initiatives. A gross example of DoD BPC failure to prevent corruption was reported in October 2015. The US spent $43 million to construct a compressed natural gas (CNG) station in Sheberghan, Afghanistan when it should have only cost $306,000.¹¹ In this case, DoD spent 140 times as much as a CNG station cost in Pakistan, the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported. Worse yet, the SIGAR stated, “One of the most troubling aspects of this project is that the Department of Defense claims that it is unable to provide an explanation for the high cost of the project or to answer any other questions concerning its planning, implementation, or outcome.”¹²

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¹⁰ Ibid., 2.
¹² Ibid., 2.
Reasons US/DoD Does Not Target Corruption

Lack of Emphasis on Counter/Anti-Corruption in DoD Strategic/Support Documents

Although the 2015 NSS stresses the importance of fighting corruption as part of building partner capacity, subordinate strategic and policy guidance lack any substantive mention or focus concerning counter or anti-corruption objectives. There is a litany of DoD guidance that provide overarching and specific direction for the conduct of building partner capacity in one form or another, to include the National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Security Sector Assistance), DoD Instruction 3000.05 (Stability Operations), DoD Instruction 5000.68 (Security Force Assistance), and US Code 2282 (authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces). Nevertheless, all are drastically lacking requirements for, prioritization or mention of incorporating counter or anti-corruption measures within BPC operations.

The NMS recognizes only that violent extremist organizations (VEOs) spread corruption and undermine security and stability. Although building capacity is highlighted throughout the document under all three of the NMS’s national military objectives, it makes no other mention of corruption. The NMS does not incorporate counter/anti-corruption as a means to combat the spread of VEOs. The QDR follows suit, making only one mention of corrupt officials in Africa solely aimed at illustrating the exploitation that exists in fragile states. There is no other mention of counter or anti-corruption imperatives despite Secretary Hagel stating, “The QDR describes

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the tough choices we are making in a period of fiscal austerity….“\textsuperscript{14} Finally, Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Security Sector Assistance),\textsuperscript{15} DoD Instruction 3000.05 (Stability Operations),\textsuperscript{16} DoD Instruction 5000.68 (Security Force Assistance),\textsuperscript{17} and US Code 2282 (authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces)\textsuperscript{18} make no mention of counter or anti-corruption measures while planning or conducting BPC operations. The lack of focus or mention of counter or anti-corruption measures in NSS subordinate documents provides a root cause and catalyst for the lack of fiscal responsibility and stewardship involvement by DoD members tasked to conduct BPC operations.

Returning to the increased media attention on US resource management, the lack of counter and anti-corruption enforcement can lead to the perception for many Americans that foreign aid and BPC programs simply squander American tax dollars and put valuable programs further at risk. A 2011 Reuters public opinion poll found that 74\% of respondents surveyed felt that foreign aid needed to be cut.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, a 2013 Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that Americans’ believed that 28 percent of the US federal budget was actually spent on foreign


aid, when the actual amount was only 1 percent.\(^{20}\) Such misconceptions undoubtedly led to respondents feeling that US foreign aid needs to be cut. The Kaiser study also found that in developing countries “The [US] public sees corruption as the biggest barrier to progress….”\(^{21}\)

**A Focus on Africa: Don’t Do as I Say, Do What We Need**

In 2007, the DoD created the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in order to increase US involvement on the African continent. AFRICOM’s 2015 posture statement specifically states it is “working closely with allies and partners to build relationships and capacity vital to advancing our [US] national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and the promotion of universal values.”\(^{22}\) As part of its BPC efforts, AFRICOM fully acknowledges the role corruption plays on impeding the development of democratic institutions and its destabilizing and corrosive effect. Its posture statement specifically states, “To help our African partners address corruption, we must carefully tailor conditions for military assistance.”\(^{23}\)

Despite DoD and AFRICOM’s acknowledgements that combatting corruption is vital to BPC operations little is done to seriously address it. Interviews conducted for this research paper with AFRICOM, DoS, and DoD Joint Staff personnel indicated that counter/anti-corruption was important to them, yet it was not their most immediate focus. During an interview, an AFRICOM senior civilian official stated that counter/anti-corruption in BPC is primarily a

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\(^{21}\) Ibid., 10.


\(^{23}\) Ibid., 3.
foreign internal policing action and therefor in the DoS’s lane. By contrast, a DoS interviewee stated that since DoD executes the bulk of BPC operations, they are a more appropriate organization to talk to about counter/anti-corruption initiatives. The DoD Joint Staff interviewee stated that corruption is a serious issue, but it is just not a sexy topic. The reality for the DoD is that issues such as counter-terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and dozens of other more pressing national security challenges take priority over counter/anti-corruption initiatives. As a result, addressing corruption in BPC takes a backseat to more pressing priorities despite the infinite number of studies showing the ill effects of corruption on BPC operations.

So why would DoD not make counter/anti-corruption objectives a substantive part of their BPC portfolio in order to directly address the problem? Why does AFRICOM acknowledge corruption as a serious problem in Africa, yet choose to not actively pursue counter/anti-corruption measures? The next section explores three primary factors that drive why counter/anti-corruption objectives are not a substantive part of DoD’s BPC portfolio. These factors assist in explaining why the DoD does not do what it says in reference to their counter/anti-corruption actions.

**Africa is a “Seller’s Market”**

Further contributing to the lack of emphasis on anti-counter corruption initiatives by DoD in BPC programs is the inherent fear that African nations will turn to peer competitors if the US makes funds less fungible or scrutinizes corruption in African partner nations. The US needs Africa more than Africa needs the US when it comes to partnering, making BPC a “Seller’s

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24 Interview with senior civilian official from United States Africa Command, 5 November 2015.
25 Interview with civilian from Department of State, 2 November 2015.
26 Interview with civilian from the Department of Defense Joint Staff, 26 October 2015.
Market.” The European Union (EU), China, and Russia are actively advancing their own interests in Africa with few to no strings attached to their funding and capacity building, placing little emphasis on counter/anti-corruption measures.  

Although the US committed $892 million towards the development of African peacekeeping capacity and institution strengthening from 2009 to 2014, the US has followed suite with its peer competitors and not placed emphasis on counter/anti-corruption measures. The US has also not made corruption a topic of discussion in BPC initiatives. By pushing counter/anti-corruption measures in African BPC nations, such as Uganda, the US may risk the partnership and have the BPC nation turn to a peer competitor who is less judgmental of internal affairs of state.

The EU, China, and Russia are investing billions of dollars in sub-Saharan Africa, much of it focused on BPC. The EU is heavily investing in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) through the Africa Peace Facility fund which pays all AMISOM salaries. AMISOM is an African Union (AU) mission mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia in order to provide security fostering stability and the ability to provide humanitarian aid activities. In October of 2015, the EU pledged an additional €165 million in funding to support the fight against the terrorist group, al-Shabab, in Somalia. The EU’s latest pledge makes it the

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14th financial agreement signed between the AU and the EU in support of AMISOM since 2007.³³ Although the EU is the largest donor of development assistance to Africa, spending over €18.5 billion in 2012, its Development Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, has warned “that tying investment on the continent to democratic reforms risked backfiring if viewed as neo-colonialism.”³⁴ EU capacity building is more focused on working with partners that are ready for assistance, being ever mindful of the colonial stigmatism attached to many EU states.

China is also ambitiously spreading its partnering influence in sub-Saharan Africa without placing strings on its financial contribution. Shortly after becoming China’s president in 2013, President Xi Jinping renewed China’s offer of $20 billion of loans to Africa between 2013 and 2015 stating that China’s assistance to Africa would have no political strings attached.³⁵ He reiterated China’s stance in 2015 at the Asian African Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia stating, “the world's richer countries have a responsibility to fulfill their commitments to developing nations without demanding political concessions.”³⁶ China has been true to its word. In May 2015, Djibouti’s president stated he had discussed with China the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti.³⁷ Chinese military officials continue to court the African nation, paying a visit in November 2015 and announcing a trade deal worth $200 million with Djibouti. This is on the heels of the nearly 600 million dollars in infrastructure funding China provided to Djibouti.³⁸ In August 2015, China announced that it was donating military equipment to Uganda worth

³³ Solomon, “AU Gets More EU in al-Shabaab Offensive”.

³⁴ EUbusiness Ltd, "EU Aid to Africa Comes as Carrot, not Stick: Commissioner".

³⁵ Thomson Reuters, "China's Xi Tells Africa He Seeks Relationship of Equals", 1.


approximately $5.5 million to support Uganda’s peacekeeping operations in AMISOM. China’s donation to the Ugandan military was the largest by the Chinese in years. General Jeje Odongo, Uganda's defense minister stated, “in the past 10 years, China has…greatly contributing to Kampala's efforts to professionalize the army and develop the country.” China has made it clear that it will continue to be a major contributor in Africa without attaching strings.

Although not as aggressive as China, Russia has also increased its focus on Africa. The former US ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, David Shinn, made clear that Russia’s interest in Africa is strictly economic and unlike during the Cold War era, ideology has nothing to do with their interest in Africa. In 2011, Russia struck a deal with Uganda to supply its military with six Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets worth $744 million. In December 2011, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Russia accounted for 11% of the major arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, Russia wrote off $20 billion in African debt. Most recently in March 2015, Uganda's Oil Ministry announced that RT Global Resources, a Russian company, will be building a $3 billion oil refinery in Africa intertwining Russian interests and influence into the African continent. Russia, much like China, is courting Africa without attaching politics or ideology to their engagement strategy.

40 Kester Kenn Klomegah, "Russia Eyes Africa to Boost Arms Sales", 2.
42 Klomegah, "Russia Eyes Africa to Boost Arms Sales", 2.
44 Hellyer, "Russia Returns to Africa Amid Increasing Isolation", 1.
Partners Using Extraversion as “Soft Extortion”

In addition to having peer competitors contribute to the US and DoD’s deemphasizing counter/anti-corruption measures in BPC programs, the very African nations the DoD partners with use “Soft Extortion” or extraversion tactics to amplify counter/anti-corruption inaction. Extraversion practices or “Soft Extortion” in Africa have been defined as “the extent to which African regimes instrumentalize their external relations and dependence for domestic benefits.”

Jean-Francois Bayart theorized over 20 years ago that “the leading actors in sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate for their difficulties in the autonomization of their power and in intensifying the exploitation of their dependents by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment.” The exercise of extraversive practices may not be overtly apparent in the US and DoD’s relationship with African nations, but examples are plenty.

The Case of Uganda

One prominent case of extraversive practice can be found in the Republic of Uganda. Uganda uses extraversion to manipulate US and DoD partnerships in a way that incentivizes continued BPC support while forcing the US and DoD to ignore or turn a blind eye to unpalatable or corrupt domestic policies and actions. Before discussing extraversion, it is useful to understand the influence of corruption on the Ugandan state and its society.

Uganda has been ranked amongst one of the most corrupt nations in the world according to Transparency International. In 2014, Uganda was ranked near the bottom of the corruption

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perception index, ranking 142 out of 175 countries. In addition, Uganda ranked 34 out of 47 when scored against other Sub-Saharan African nations.\textsuperscript{48} After having nearly two decades of opportunity to fight corruption, Uganda has made little to no progress. Corruption in Uganda under President Museveni spans the gambit, from low level or petty corruption to high level or grand corruption. On the national level, Ugandan grand corruption has permeated every facet of government. In 2012, Uganda’s Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) embezzled $12.7 million in funds badly needed to rebuild war torn northern Uganda.\textsuperscript{49} This was on heels of other large government scandals. In 2011, non-pension beneficiaries received $63 million from social security through a scam facilitated by the Ministry of Public Service.\textsuperscript{50} In 2010, $45 million was embezzled, directly depriving assistance to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. In 2006, $12 million was stolen from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization.\textsuperscript{51} Due to the deep rooted nature of corruption in Uganda’s political culture, it is not surprising there is a lack of political will to reduce corruption. A 2013 report by Human Rights Watch titled, “Letting the Big Fish Swim” concluded that since President Museveni took office, nearly 30 years ago, only one minister has ever been convicted of corruption and later his conviction was overturned after Museveni publically offered to pay the legal fees.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Allard K. Lowenstein, "Letting the Big Fish Swim; Failure to Prosecute High-Level Corruption in Uganda," Human Rights Watch, October 2013, \url{www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uganda1013_ForUpload_0.pdf}, 1.


\textsuperscript{52} Lowenstein, "Letting the Big Fish Swim; Failure to Prosecute High-Level Corruption in Uganda", 3.
Corruption in Uganda has impacted its entire society and is a direct impediment to the country’s economic development. The lack of economic development reduces public works and services and touches every strata of society. In 2012, of Uganda’s 36.3 million people, 37.8 percent were living on less than $1.25 a day. Despite rampant corruption, the US Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid to Uganda has increased: in 2012, Uganda received over $390 million from the US, yet just one year after the OPM scandal, it received over $450 million in aid.

Although Uganda is one of the most corrupt nations in Africa, the DoD considers Uganda as one of its strongest African BPC nations. Nevertheless, the DoD steers away from counter/anti-corruption objectives with Uganda. A primary factor is due to Uganda using its role in AMISOM as a means of extraversion or “Soft Extortion.” Since the creation of AMISOM in 2007, Uganda has taken a prominent role in the counterterrorism fight against al-Shabab. It was the first to deploy personnel to Somalia under AMISOM, has provided four Force Commanders, has deployed 12 battle groups, and remains the largest troop contributor comprising over 6,000 of the 10,000 personnel in the AMISOM mission. As the leading contributor to the mission, the Ugandan military benefited from $65 million from the US in 2007 to build its capacity, train, and deploy to Somalia. In essence, without Uganda the AMISOM mission would not be possible. Uganda’s continued support for AMISOM’s fight against al-Shabab and the

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stabilization of the region is vital to US counterterrorism efforts. Uganda supplies the troops and does the fighting while the DoD supplies the funding, training, and equipment.

Although Uganda and the DoD seem to be partners in the counterterrorism fight, the Ugandan government is gaining other benefits besides building its military capacity and moving towards the stabilization of the region. Considering Uganda has not had a peaceful transition of power since 1962 and the military has been used as a mechanism to transfer power, the AMISOM mission is a perfect tool to keep the military employed and not sitting idle in Uganda. John Njoroge, a journalist who writes for Kampala's Daily Monitor newspaper stated, “President Museveni has been in power for almost 26 years and his popularity is waning. Military officers are already getting restless. From the government's point of view, better for them [the Ugandan military] to be fighting in Somalia.”

Uganda’s strategic extraversive involvement in AMISOM has enabled Uganda to leverage its support for US and DoD interests. In return it receives special dispensation, an increased tolerance for, and allowance of activities such as corruption without scrutiny or substantive actions to counter or change their behavior. The US has made symbolic attempts to address its displeasure with Uganda’s “bad behavior.” In the 2015 NSS, without ever mentioning Uganda, the US highlights that “political elites in authoritarian states, and even in some with more democratic traditions, are acting to restrict space for civil society.” The NSS points out actions such as passing laws targeting the [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] LGBT community and denying political opposition groups freedom to assemble, both of which


undermine citizens’ rights.† These examples directly refer to Uganda’s attempt to pass an anti-LGBT law in 2014 and President Museveni’s crackdown on political opposition groups as Uganda’s 2016 presidential election draws closer. Yet as long as Uganda continues to advance US and DoD objectives in the fight against al-Shabab and the ‘war on terror,’ the DoD has no true incentive to address “domestic issues” and emphasize counter/anti-corruption measures. The US and DoD fear Uganda and other African nations will turn to other partners and cease cooperating in the counterterrorism fight. Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert, professors of African politics, stated in their study on extraversion and Africa that western donors ignore many of the internal issues in Uganda partly because of its support in the ‘war on terror.’†

Consequences

Inherent Avoidance

Due to the US’s lack of emphasis on counter/anti-corruption in DoD strategic and support documents, Africa being a “Seller’s Market,” and African partners using extraversion as “Soft Extortion,” DoD BPC and counter/anti-corruption have resulted in both a symbiotic relationship and one at odds. This uncomfortable dichotomy has led to several consequences. The first consequence is the inherent avoidance of counter/anti-corruption pursuits in BPC initiatives for fear of alienating the partner nation. DoD BPC programs hinge on cooperation with partners, not confrontation or conflict with partners. AFRICOM’s 2015 Theater Cooperation Policy on engagement illustrates this approach. It states that Subordinate Commanders and other key AFRICOM officials who meet with key officials or senior leaders from partner nations will ensure “the purpose of all USAFRICOM engagements is to strengthen partnerships and facilitate

execution of other levers and means associated with those levers. [Commander] CCDR views engagements as part of his sustaining effort.”

In essence, broaching topics such as counter/anti-corruption would run counter to “strengthening partnerships” and place the overall mission at risk.

**Lack of Experience to Address**

The inherent BPC counter/anti-corruption avoidance perpetuates a lack of training, education, and experience in the counter/anti-corruption discipline. In a 2014 study by DoD’s own Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division (JCOA), the study repeatedly cited how the lack of training, education, and experience dealing with corruption by the military countered the US goal to legitimize the Afghan government. In addition, the study found that US headquarter personnel responsible for counter/anti-corruption initiatives lacked expertise and felt that there was no existing Service counter corruption training. One officer in an interview stated, “The military is not set up to fight corruption—we don’t know how to do it.”

JCOA’s recommendations highlighted the requirement for DoD to train and address corruption through actions such as education and training for senior leaders, personnel assigned to BPC programs, and joint exercises.

**Lack of Emphasis on BPC Measurement and Effectiveness**

Avoidance and lack of training, education, and counter/anti-corruption experience in BPC programs has also perpetuated anemic efforts in improving and implementing measurement and effectiveness mechanisms that provide transparency and accountability. In 2010, a senior

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64 Ibid., 15.

65 Ibid., 42.
national security analyst, Anthony H. Cordesman stated, “the U.S., other countries, the UN, and NGOs have poured money into Afghanistan with miserable fiscal controls…[with] an almost total lack of meaningful transparency, and no meaningful measures of their effectiveness or the level of corruption and waste in such spending.”

In 2014, the Government Accountability Office released a report indicating DoD’s need to establish mechanisms to evaluate BPC programs. In AFRICOM, despite the DoD’s acknowledgement that it needs to establish mechanisms to evaluate BPC program effectiveness, they have only one person assigned to their measurement and effectiveness (M &E) program. A senior AFRICOM military officer also stated that they (AFRICOM) need to improve their M & E program and that corruption is certainly a concern. However, based on AFRICOM’s limited resources, they feel they have to focus on immediate crises at hand, such as the spread of Ebola, terrorism, threat of coups, piracy, and humanitarian disasters.

**Short Term Gains at Expense of Long Term Stability/Objectives**

Finally, the lack of emphasis and vigorous enforcement of counter/anti-corruption measures by the US and DoD in BPC programs often results in short term gains at the expense of long term security and stability. Statements by high level AFRICOM leaders such as, “Poverty and corruption in many regions contribute to an insidious cycle of instability, conflict, environmental degradation, and disease that erodes Africans’ confidence in national institutions

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68 Interview with senior military official from United States Africa Command, 15 October 2015.

69 Interview with senior civilian official from United States Africa Command, 5 November 2015.
and governing capacity” make little impact if not followed by counter/anti-corruption measures. AFRICOM’s five immediate priorities all center around combating extremists, piracy, and personnel protection. AFRICOM’s BPC program ultimately failed in Mali when, in March 2012, Captain Amadou Sanogo, a US DoD trained Mali military leader led a coup against his own government. In Mali, AFRICOM specifically focused on short term tactically focused BPC efforts. Instead of addressing corruption and institution building, the US and DoD avoided it because they knew the Mali military and ministries were heavily corrupt and resistant to change. DoD’s focus on short term tactical, counterterrorism objectives versus a focus on root cause systemic issues, such as countering corruption, proved detrimental to the long term BPC peace and stability efforts in Mali.

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Conclusion

DoD BPC is a vital tool the US uses to promote democracy and spread American values in order to secure vital US interests at home and abroad. However, in a time when resources are finite and hard choices need to be made, it is important that American treasure is not wasted on BPC partners who use American resources for corrupt purposes. Unfortunately, addressing corruption with partner nations and building capacity has not been an easy task, as witnessed in Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa. The lack of emphasis on counter/anti-corruption objectives in DoD strategic and support documents, Africa being a “Seller’s Market,” and African partners using extraversion as “Soft Extortion” have all led DoD BPC and counter/anti-corruption efforts into a relationship that is both symbiotic and one at odds. This relationship has led to several consequences: 1) inherent BPC counter/anti-corruption avoidance; 2) lack of training, education, and experience in the counter/anti-corruption amongst DoD personnel; 3) anemic efforts in improving/implementing measurement and effectiveness mechanisms that provide transparency and accountability; 4) short term gains at the expense of long term security and stability. Recent experiences in Afghanistan have shown that the lack of focus on counter/anti-corruption measures is corrosive and counter to the very values and long term objectives the US and DoD aim to achieve through its BPC programs. The same can be seen in sub-Saharan Africa. Addressing corruption in DoD BPC programs is not enough if supporting documents, enforcement actions, and M&E mechanisms do not follow suit. Sub-Saharan Africa is ripe for implementing counter/anti-corruption BPC initiatives. The US and DoD must first develop a BPC strategy that truly incorporates the NSS’s emphasis on combatting corruption in order to make counter/anti-corruption objectives a more substantive part of its BPC portfolio.
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