DECISION-GRADE: READINESS, MISSION IMPACTS, AND CLASSIFIED DATA IN THE DEFENSE BUDGETING PROCESS

by

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PREFACE

This effort started in 2010 while working munitions requirements US Forces Korea (USFK) in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States had non-releasable data showing how and why the United States procured the pre-positioned munitions to defend against North Korean attack. Thus, we could not tell our Korean counterparts what munitions the US expected them to procure, and the ROK government was supposed to do their own analysis because classification issues prevented coordination. This was the realization over-classifying information could actually damage national security occurred. Eventually, USFK succeeded getting 99% of the same, previously US only data, releasable to our ROK military counterparts for the first time ever.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Richard Smith, for facilitating equal amounts of encouragement and push-back, turning this paper from an op-ed article into a respectable research effort. In addition, I would like to thank my boss, Lt Col Christopher McCrea, for his understanding and flexibility to let me work on this and our boss, Dr. Diaz being a reader. Without their support, this paper would not exist. Above all, I profess my undying gratitude to my eternally patient wife and soulmate:

I Love You Chicky!
ABSTRACT

In 1961, the Department of Defense (DOD) instituted the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system standardizing budgeting within the Services. One of the primary operating assumptions of the day was the existence of a single enemy, the Soviet Union. In late 1992, the Soviet Union dissolved and so did the single primary enemy justifying the DOD’s budget. The DOD switched to a classified multiple regional scenario concept described in the now declassified 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG, then and today, comprises the main bridge from planning to programming within the DOD budget. The DPG outlines the conflicts justifying the defense budget. Overnight, public knowledge of the sole Soviet Union adversary switched to a select few cleared DOD personnel with knowledge of the new set of regional adversaries. Analysis shows the Services must communicate in non-specific readiness terms to avoid releasing classified information, to include adversary names, in unclassified PPBE documents, in open Congressional testimony, and to uncleared personnel within the DOD. The end result provides ‘what’ the Services want to purchase, but not ‘why’ or ‘for what reason’ with regard to mission impacts.

This research provides suggestions to improve the venerable PPBE system by investigating ‘how does’ and ‘how should’ the DOD use planning guidance and readiness to explain its budget to Congress. Through a thorough overview of the intersection among the PPBE process, classified information, and readiness reporting, this effort analyzes the impact of overclassification and redefines readiness to provide decision-grade analysis to Congress.
Section 1: Introduction

Assess the advantages in taking advice, then structure your forces accordingly, to supplement extraordinary tactics. The one who figures on victory at headquarters before even doing battle is the one who has the most strategic factors on his side.

-Sun Tzu
Art of War

The Fiscal Year 16 (FY16) Department of Defense (DOD) top line budget is a $585B Congressional submission containing thousands of individual purchases and outlays assembled by all the Services and associated Joint agencies\(^1\). If the DOD were a country, it would rank 21st in the world between Switzerland and Sweden\(^2\) in terms of GDP. The $3,999B President’s Budget (PB) contains a $474B deficit, and reducing the DOD budget by 81% would balance the budget. This results in constant pressure by Congress and the American public to reduce defense spending. While no one suggests reducing the DOD budget by 81%, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) does contain universal budget cuts or sequestration, which reduced pay and working hours for most federal government employees over several weeks in 2014\(^3\). The DOD cannot expect Congress to go through every line of the budget to determine impacts to/from proposed cuts. As a result, the DOD must provide solid analysis and decision options to defend spending $585B of taxpayer money.

Federal law mandates an annual PB submission every January, which includes the DOD budget. From the date of PB submission, Congress has until next FY starting on 1 October of the same year to pass a budget. This annual cycle severely limits the amount of time the DOD has to respond to Congressional inquiry and the Services have to prepare for hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Regardless of the budget’s complexity and ambitious schedule, the American Taxpayer still demands the DOD and the AF field a superior military in the most fiscally efficient manner possible.
The Services frequently use the broad term ‘readiness’ to justify proposed budget impacts, both good and bad. In other words, increased funding to a desired area typically ‘increases readiness’ while proposed cuts typically ‘decrease readiness’. For example, the FY16 Air Force Budget Overview states “the BBA [2015 Balanced Budget Act] helped stop the decline in readiness levels, recovery is not a short-term fix and will take years to fully rebuild. To recover readiness to the required levels, the Air Force must … adequately fund readiness programs such as flying hours, weapon system sustainment (WSS), ranges and simulators”. 4 Unfortunately, the DOD and Services either incompletely or never define degree of increase/decrease with regard to mission success and the exact definition of readiness used in their budget submissions. Consequently, Congress, independent researchers, and even personnel within the DOD must personally interpret the degree of readiness impacts to planned and ongoing operations, force sizing, research, development, and procurement. Potential reasons for not defining readiness explicitly include:

- Not wanting to reveal classified information through actual mission impacts
- Individual staffer or approving senior leader assumes personal definition is universally accepted
- Lack of analytical support to quantify the level of increase or decrease in readiness

None of these reasons imply willful negligence or lack of desire by the DOD and the Services to provide the best possible decision-grade analysis to Congress. For example, one of the key directives of the Secretary of the Air Force is to “make every dollar count.” 5 To explore these reasons and recommend improvements, this research posits the following question:

How does and how should the DOD use planning guidance and readiness to explain its budget to Congress?
Section 2: Philosophy and Background

You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.

-Donald Rumsfeld

December 2004 Speech to Troops in Kuwait

The above quote was then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s response when asked by Army Specialist Thomas Wilson, “Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up-armor our vehicles? And why don’t we have those resources readily available to us?”6 The immediate counter-question ‘Why don’t we have the Army we want?’ became a focused public and media debate. Why was the Army not ready for the post-Iraqi invasion insurgency? For the American public, this seemed like an unkind statement at the expense of soldiers’ lives and their families. Reporter Fred Kaplan pointed out this is only true if you are surprise attacked, not in a war of your choosing.7 Why did the military not predict this? Rumsfeld spoke the truth of warfare: the DOD can report full operational capability to fight scenarios X and Y, but be incapable of fighting unknown or lower priority scenario Z. Fighting scenario Z requires rapid re-tooling of forces designed to fight other conflicts. Unfortunately, this re-tooling is far from instantaneous, typically taking months and years, not days and weeks.8 The DOD budget process should do a better job of planning and purchasing the military Americans expect, not “want or wish to have at a later time.”9

To answer the “How does” portion of the research question in Section 1, this section critically examines three traditionally isolated systems within the Defense Department: planning to budgeting, military readiness definitions and reporting, and classified information. These are three very large, complicated, and emotionally charged topics, each worthy of their own thesis. However, there exists a series of problems only observable through sequential review and cross-examination of all three. The goal here is not to provide history for history’s sake or duplicate a
training class, but to provide a review sufficient to frame the discussion and illuminate the underlying problems.

**DOD Planning to Budgeting Overview**

**Before Goldwater-Nichols – 1986**

The DOD budget stems from 68 years of processes, procedures, and precedents arising from The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. The NSA established the National Military Establishment (now DOD), the position of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The NSA gave the SECDEF four primary duties:

1. “Establish general policies and programs for the national Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein”
2. “Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies”
3. “Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research”
4. “Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies”

These provisions appeared to give the SECDEF wide control over the military departments and their budgets. However, the NSA simultaneously eroded control by stating the military departments “shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries” and the four “powers and duties” above conferred to the SECDEF “shall be retained by each of their respective services.” The NSA did not clarify if the SECDEF’s National Military Establishment controlled the executive department status of the Services, thereby limiting the SECDEF’s authority.

The NSA Amendments of 1949 clarified the SECDEF’s authority over the Services, but still maintained each Service as autonomous and independently responsible for coordinating
input into any Joint plan and producing the budget required to succeed. The chain of command ran from “The President, through the Secretary of Defense, through the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] to the service chief of staff [sic] to the unified commander.” As a result, Services competed amongst themselves for operational missions. For example, this arrangement devolved the proven concept of centralized allocation of airpower in World War II to five independent air forces during the Vietnam War, “Naval, Air Force fighters, Marine, Air Force bombers and the Vietnamese Air Force.” De-confliction vice integration was the goal. Even within the Air Force, the bombers in Strategic Air Command competed with the fighters in Tactical Air Command for targets.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed Ford executive Robert S. McNamara to Secretary of Defense. As a process analyst by trade, McNamara identified the Services did not have a standardized method to come up with a budget. As a result, he, along with DOD Comptroller and former RAND analyst Charles J. Hitch, fundamentally changed and standardized how the DOD formulated the budget with the development of the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS). The goal was to come up with a budget based on objective analysis to the maximum extent possible and to avoid the previous system of arbitrary budget ceilings not related to the mission. The PPBS was introduced as a cost-saving measure in FY62 to combat what former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor told Congress in 1960, “it is not an exaggeration to say that we do not know what kind and how much defense we are buying with any specific budget.” The three major changes in the PPBS from the previous system were the inclusion of the Programming phase illustrating how the plans become grouped into functions and mission sets; the inclusion of five-year projections; and the emphasis on cost-effectiveness and cost alternatives. The Programming change was the largest, and forced the
Services to show how they were translating plans into units and weapon line items. This phase
gave the SECDEF and the President the power to make objective decisions on troop levels,
weapons development, and procurement. The PPBS was so successful, President Johnson tried
mandating it for all federal agencies.

   At the time, the PPBS implementation came with plenty of controversy within the DOD.
Ironically, the Service with the most PPBS issues was the same one that originally funded the
RAND studies with the underlying ideas, the Air Force. Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF)
Eugene Zuckert and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Charles LeMay stated McNamara’s
proposed cuts would reduce the Air Force as a credible threat to the enemy. On the same memo,
McNamara wrote in the margins of Zukert and LeMay’s memo, “After repeated requests the AF
has failed to supply any quantitative analysis of the deficiency in the force we propose or any
such analysis in support of the AF recommendations.” While SecAF Zuckert did not resign,
both the Navy and Army secretaries did resign because of the FY63 budget preparations.
Zuckert ultimately accepted the need to provide better analysis to the SECDEF to defend the Air
Force’s position.

   Despite the PPBS success, this did not encourage the Services to initiate joint planning or
budgeting activities without Presidential, SECDEF, or Congressional intervention. One of the
collaboration hindrances was the unanimous consensus system of voting within the JCS with the
Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) as a non-voting mediator. The intent here was to promote
collaboration and jointness by ensuring the Services work together and collectively agree. In
reality, if one Service Chief wanted to hold up an operational plan to further his Service’s
agenda, he could by simply refusing to agree; often to gain support for an unrelated acquisition
program. In a closed session of the 1982 House Armed Services Committee, CJCS General
David Jones stated, “The system is broken. I have tried to reform it from inside, but I cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate necessary reforms.” Two very public failures in the early 1980s highlighted this lack of inter-Service coordination: Operation Eagle Claw rescue of US hostages in Iran (lack of joint training) and Operation Urgent Fury invasion of Grenada (incompatible communications equipment). The American public was outraged that the world’s best equipped and most expensive military had so much difficulty conducting two small-scale operations. The combination of all of these events proved the catalyst for reform leading up to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA).

From Goldwater-Nichols – 1986 to present

The GNA fixed many of the operational issues associated with the DOD. Changes included elevating the Chairman over the JCS, establishing joint geographic and functional Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) with full operational control (OPCON) over forces assigned to them, removed all OPCON from the Services, made the joint tour of duty a requirement for general/flag officer rank, and re-emphasized the need for strategic plans. Currently the Services only possess administrative control (ADCON) over service members under the ‘organize, train, and equip’ mission. Each Service becomes a force provider who deploys units to the COCOM, who then orders these units into conflict. Each COCOM may make operationally focused requests during contingency planning independent of budget constraints. The Services must accept, alter or deny these requests based on administrative (i.e. not enough personnel or equipment) and fiscal constraints. JP 1-02 defines this split into two chains of command, administrative from the President through the SECDEF to the Services and operational from the President through SECDEF to the COCOMS. This is the dual chain of command set up by the GNA with the President and SECDEF at the top of both, with the
Chairman providing senior military advice and facilitating communication between the SECDEF and COCOMs, but whose authority lies outside the this chain of command.

The GNA further strengthened joint operations, but retained the SECDEF’s latitude to decide how to organize the DOD budget. US code (USC) title 10, chapter 9 “Defense Budget Matters”\(^27\) simply sets the data standards for the SECDEF and a deadline to meet the Presidential budget submission by “the first Monday in February of each year.”\(^28\) This latitude included extending the practice of the Services producing budgets separately to the present. Today, the SECDEF still uses the evolved version of former SECDEF McNamara’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), now called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system.\(^29\) Although not mandating the PPBE system, Congress emphasized the planning phase by mandating the President produce a National Security Strategy (NSS)\(^30\), the Chairman produce a National Military Strategy (NMS)\(^31\), and the Secretary of Defense produces detailed planning guidance\(^32\) intending these three documents provide the strategic planning necessary.
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

The PPBE begins (Figure 1) from a macro-government planning point with the President’s NSS specifying the threat to the nation now and into the future. Each published NSS generates an update of the increasingly more specific NMS by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both of these unclassified strategic planning documents come together with classified data and intelligence to produce the joint Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)\(^1\), circled in green, with an annex containing multiple enemy threat scenarios (known as Illustrative Planning Scenarios [IPS] or just Scenarios). The 1992 DPG extract (Figure 2) highlights the linkage between the three documents.

\(^1\) Since 1992, the DOD has renamed and reallocated the DPG to the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG), Guidance of the Development Employment of Force (GDF), and Defense Planning / Programming Guidance (DPPG). However, this research recognizes the document fulfills the same function regardless of name and therefore will stay with the original name, Defense Planning Guidance or DPG, to reduce reader confusion. For the same reasons, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS), Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS), and word ‘scenario’ all refer to the scenarios attached to the DPG, often as a DPG appendix or annex.
These Scenarios in the DPG annex outline the NSS and NMS threat in sufficient detail to allow Service programming of forces against the outlined threat. As the declassified 1992 draft DPG Annex A specifies:

“These scenarios are illustrative, not predictive or exhaustive. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats in regions of vital interest to the US, and corresponding achievable military objectives.

... This scenario set is to be used as an analytical tool for the formulation and assessment of defense programs. ... The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set.

... This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment. Subsequent to its publication as guidance for formulation and assessment of the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or emerging requirements for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the data presented in this set should be updated for future applications until superseded by the next DPG scenario set. However, strategic concepts and assumptions presented in this scenario set should generally be retained in any scenarios developed for other applications.”

For 1992, the largest reported Scenario involved a simultaneous, immediate response to both an Iraqi re-invasion of Kuwait and North Korea attacking South Korea with a potential resurgent
Russia. Scenarios like these are hypothetical, used for force planning only, not to generate real world operational plans (OPLANs). COCOMs operate in the Execution portion of the PPBE and therefore receive separate Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) from the SECDEF directing which OPLANs to develop. World events can rapidly change OPLANs and if the Scenarios were constantly changing, this could cause significant problems with the PPBE cycle. This decoupling from real-world events allows the DOD to analyze how to incorporate future weapon systems, such as the F-35, into the DOD arsenal. Once approved by the SECDEF, the DOD distributes the classified DPG with the Scenarios so the Services may begin programming according to processes integral to each Service.

The SECDEF controls the entire PPBE process from start to finish, including three key Service decision reviews for programming, budgeting, and major budget issues. Throughout the process, the JCS Chairman provides military advice to the SECDEF. Following the path in Figure 1, the programming review requires each Service Secretary and Chief of Staff to explain to the SECDEF how they plan to execute the SECDEF-approved DPG scenarios. The SECDEF then makes decisions and provides direction if the Service misinterpreted the DPG. Approval of programming leads to budgeting, and a similar SECDEF review. Again, the SECDEF makes decisions and provides direction. Then the SECDEF allows the Service Secretaries to present their final case for one to two ‘major budget issues(s)’ they feel the DOD should include, but did not. After the SECDEF approval, the DOD Comptroller inserts the DOD budget into the President’s Budget (PB). Once incorporated into the PB, the DOD budget is outside the SECDEF’s control after submission to Congress. Then the SECDEF and the Service Secretaries must defend this budget during public Congressional hearings, closed-door briefings, and staff requests for information and analysis. Finally, after the President signs the budget, the SECDEF
may, at his discretion, produce an unclassified version of the DPG entitled the National Defense Strategy (NDS), a practice started by Secretary of Defense Cheney in 1993.38

**Military Readiness, “Blood, Treasure, & Time”**39

"When everyone agrees that something is vital in principle, but they are not sure what that something is in practice, the stage is set for controversy."

-Dr. Richard K. Betts, Brookings Institution

_Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences_

**United States Readiness History**

Ultimately, the budget process described above funds servicemembers and equipment to defend the United States, and the military calls the ability to defend the United States readiness. From the end of the Revolutionary War to World War II, the United States maintained a state of unreadiness in peacetime. The War of 1812, The Civil War, WW I, WW II, and The Korean War all followed the same pattern of a small standing military that struggled to gain competency for approximately one to three years.40 This pattern was: Congress declared war; the US military drafted vast multitudes of untrained civilians; and contracts went out to companies requesting military weapons, uniforms, and equipment not normally sold in peacetime. The modern military-industrial complex did not exist, so delays of up to a year for retooling were common for these contracts. Meanwhile, the small cadre of active duty forces had to train the draftees, but commanders in combat demanded these experienced, well trained Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, and Airmen deploy to the front lines. Those doing the training often were forced to simulate weaponry that was sent to the front lines and production delays precluded replacements. For example, during WW II, stovepipes simulated cannons and flour bags simulated grenades.41 The military would then send these improperly trained soldiers into battle to face high casualty numbers when compared to conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Figure 3).
If high casualties during war are the cost of unreadiness, what is the benefit? The benefit is low cost and rapid generation of (poorly trained) forces, represented as ‘cheap and fast’ on the simplified model of readiness (Figure 4). Maintaining a standing army in peacetime is expensive, especially when the threat of conflict is low. Unlike the other functions of government, militaries do not perform their primary function and therefore are less useful in peacetime. With the introduction of the all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War, the US went from ‘cheap and fast’ to ‘fast and few casualties’, and as quality of equipment and forces increased, casualties decreased. The decisive 1990-1991 Gulf War victory showed the world the effectiveness of the ‘fast and few casualties’ readiness model, and showed the American public how few US casualties result from paying for such a force.
The Chairman’s (Current) Readiness System

CJCS Guide 3401, CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System, provides an excellent overview of current US military readiness reporting. Drawing from Dr. Betts’ book *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences*, the guide defines readiness as “The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS” and “To better understand readiness, one must consider the question ‘Ready for what?’” In terms of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, this guide lives in the Execution phase assessing both current operations and the ability to execute combatant commander operational plans. The future readiness impact of Programming changes to include force structure re-alignment such as the Army going from divisions to brigade combat teams or future weapon systems are beyond the scope of the Chairman’s Readiness System. Since Programming is a staff function, a guide written for operational units excludes such info.

The DOD utilizes two primary readiness reporting systems for current planning. The first is the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) with origins in 1968 as the Forces Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT). GSORTS evaluates the ability of a military unit to perform its assigned tasks through assessment of four specific categories, “Personnel (P-level), Equipment and Supplies on hand (S-level), Equipment Condition (R-level),
and Training (T-level).” Each of these levels range from 1 to 5 with 1 as the highest readiness and 5 as the lowest, which the commander assesses into an overall Capability (C-level). This results in GSORTS measuring the unit’s readiness to execute its assigned tasks, but GSORTS “does not attempt to measure the ability of units to carry out the [real-world] missions assigned to them.” Because of GSORTS limitations, the DOD established the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). At the strategic headquarters level, DRRS evaluates the ability of DOD units to accomplish current and planned combatant commander tasks worldwide.

Combined, these two systems provide an accurate status report of the US Military’s capacity to accomplish missions. However, as both GSORTS and DRRS focus on current COCOM plans and operations, neither assess the DPG scenarios on which the DOD’s future budget and systems are based.

As the DOD requires all operational units to keep their unit’s data in the GSORTS and DRRS systems accurate and up-to-date, the philosophies behind GSORTS and DRRS reporting are often the first and perhaps only impressions of military readiness. As DRRS just became an official program in the FY99 budget, senior military leaders and civilian personnel whose last operational posting was prior to FY99 would only have a first impression of GSORTS, which only includes unit-focused readiness. In addition to the classified nature of SOR TS and DRRS, these first impressions might lead DOD budget personnel to report levels of training, flying hours, steaming days, and manning levels as readiness instead of the ability to execute combatant commander plans and DPG planning scenarios.
Readiness in the DOD FY16 Budget Submission

As mentioned in the introduction, the DOD uses term readiness extensively in DOD budget submission documents and in Congressional testimony. In the DOD FY16 budget request overview book, the word readiness is used 280 times and is the 6th most utilized word in the document. Clearly, the word readiness possesses a lot of significance in explaining how the budget is organized. When describing how to “manage enduring readiness”, the FY 16 budget overview describes the readiness impacts of the FY13 sequestration:

- “The Army produced just 2 of 43 active duty brigade combat teams fully ready”
- “The Navy’s average global presence was down about 10 percent from normal levels with fewer ships patrolling the waters.”
- “Only 50 percent of non-deployed Marine units were at acceptable readiness levels.”
- “The Air Force was forced to stand down 13 combat units for several months due to the FY 2013 sequester. All 13 squadrons that stood down under sequester are now fully executing their flying hours.”

While all of these statuses appear undesirable, the FY16 Budget Overview does not state what the Services are getting ready for or an assessment on how these actions impact the ability of the DOD to defend the United States. The Air Force, in particular, does not explain how executing flying hours translates to the planning scenarios and missions the force is based upon. In fact, the Comptroller’s only overall readiness assessment to Congress states, “A return to these sequester-level budgets would render the Services’ readiness recovery goals unachievable and
the defense strategy unexecutable.”55 This binary success or fail only gives Congress the option to accept the DOD FY16 budget in its entirety or accept the defense strategy failure.

**US Classification Information System**

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and associated Scenarios are classified documents, originating from the President’s NSS and Chairman’s NMS unclassified strategic documents. The concept of classifying information seeks to restrict unauthorized access to information, which could damage American security. Those with unauthorized access include the public (to include open Congressional hearings) and DOD personnel without security clearances (uncleared). Even DOD personnel with security clearances may have limited ability to access the DPG Scenarios due to lack of classified storage or access to the classified DOD computer network. Within the PPBE system, the unintended consequence of classified planning guidance scenarios occurs when uninformed or uncleared personnel assess impacts of Congressional budgetary changes. These assessments occur without full understanding of the planning inputs (DPG/DPS) to the PPBE programming phase. Likewise, analysts within research institutions and academia cannot inject new thought or discussions on the composition of these scenarios that shape the US military structure. Eliminating this barrier to information would enhance clarity and transparency to the PPBE process, but what makes documents like the DPG and DPS classified in the first place? Are both products overclassified? What level of damage to national security occurs if the DOD makes this information unclassified and possibly public?

The current classified information law originates from the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended, found in 18 U.S. Code Chapter 37.56 With this law, the President determines both the levels of classification and personnel who can access classified information through an Executive
Order (EO), currently EO 13526. This EO specifies the classification levels are Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential where “the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause” “exceptionally grave damage”, “serious damage”, and “damage” respectfully to national security. The President lays out eight different categories to classify information:

1. “military plans, weapons systems, or operations”
2. “foreign government information”
3. “intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology”
4. “foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources”
5. “scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security”
6. “United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities”
7. “vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security”
8. “the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.”

Categories 1 and 4 appear applicable to the DPG this is indeed a military plan containing foreign countries. Conversely, EO 13526 prohibits the following four reasons for classification:

1. “conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error”
2. “prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency”
3. “restrain competition”
4. “prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national security.”

The fourth prohibition ensures classified information must meet a certain national security need. For example, a renovation plan for a base dormitory on a known military installation is a military plan, but disclosure of this plan would not likely cause any one of the three levels of damage to national security warranting one of the three classification levels: Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. According to the EO, the level definition resides with the original classification authority (OCA), typically a high-ranking political appointee, senior executive staff, or a general or flag military officer. The OCA judges whether the information presented falls in one of the eight categories above, not under any prohibition, and limits classification length to not more
than 25 years. After the original classification, all other classification decisions are derivative of the OCA’s decision. For example, the OCA determines (originally classifies) the top speed of aircraft X in development is a classified number. A test engineer, without OCA authority, finds a profile that increases the top speed of aircraft X; therefore, the test engineer can derivatively classify the document based upon the OCA’s original classification.

Within the DOD, the OCAs are the SECDEF, Service Secretaries, and those who the SECDEF and Service Secretaries delegate this authority to in writing. To simplify guidance, OCAs should issue classification guides specifying what makes the information classified, at what classification level, and for how long. When making classification decisions, OCAs must adhere to EO 13526, ensure others have not classified this information specifically or in a published classification guide, and be able to defend the specific damage to national security in writing or a court of law. For declassification, Figure 6 shows the overarching DOD guidance. Automatic declassification occurs after 10 years after original classification unless the OCA specified a longer time period up to 25 years or a review determines the information remains classified according to the eight acceptable categories. Declassification does not, however, mean the data is releasable to the general public or even Congress without proper review through the military department or agency and then through the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (OSR). As shown in Appendix A, there are 20 separate DOD and higher regulations governing the release of unclassified information.
The 9/11 commission report renewed interest in the unintended consequences of too few people having access to critically important data. The 9/11 report cited the overclassification of data as a probable cause in not catching the airplane hijackers before the fatal attack. As Steven Aftergood with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) points out, nothing in EO 13526 forces an OCA to classify anything. The EO provides only the framework should the OCA deem classification necessary and defensible. Unfortunately, the personal incentives for overclassifying data greatly outweigh the collective benefit to the US national security as a whole. Recent high profile examples of former CIA Director David Petraeus pleading guilty to providing classified information to his biographer and the ongoing FBI probe of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s sending of classified email over an unclassified system highlight the very real consequences of mishandling classified material. Conversely, the US
has never prosecuted someone for overclassifying data; thus, providing more incentives for identifying information as classified. For example, take a 100-page unclassified report produced by the test engineer in the previous hypothetical example. If this engineer puts the top speed of aircraft X on one page, then the whole document requires proper classified handling procedures even though 99% of the pages are unclassified. Although, the engineer could separate the document into an unclassified report with a classified annex, this could potentially create more work with no negative impact on the engineer’s job performance or career. Worse, the engineer could accidentally release classified information and put his/her security clearance at risk. Thus, the entire document remains mostly overclassified.

The Reducing Over-Classification Act of 2010 tries to combat this phenomenon by requesting reports from Inspector Generals (IGs) of the Executive Agencies and provides these agencies with the ability to give financial incentives to OCAs for compliance. The DOD IG report stated there are no DOD financial incentives for classification and did not specify any plans to offer them. Likewise, the same report could find no incident among interviewed original and derivative classifiers where supervisors reprimanded personnel for over-classifying data, and slightly over a third knew of the process to request declassification. The debate then becomes whether the criminal and professional penalties for mistakenly declassifying material outweigh the financial rewards for avoiding overclassification if incentives become available. Ultimately, the IG report stated additional training and understanding could reduce the amount of overclassification in the future.
Section 3: Analysis of Issues

PPBE Reality and Issues

Defense Planning Guidance PPBE Feedback Loop

Ideally, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system’s rigid linear process provides DOD budget transparency from strategic planning to spending taxpayer dollars. Issues arise when Congress asserts its Constitutional oversight role by altering the budget to meet taxpayer expectations of military defense. Congress is not a part of the internal DOD PPBE process that developed the budget submission. If Congress makes alterations, the DOD is required to explain the impacts. At this stage, the linearity of the PPBE causes issues. What took the Services months of analysis and reviews through the SECDEF, the DOD must recreate in days, sometimes hours, to meet Congressional deadlines for impacts to proposed changes.

Figure 7: Proposed Congress – DOD feedback loop

To loosen PPBE process rigidity, the “President’s Budget to Congress” diagram, Figure 1 in Section 2, needs a feedback loop (Figure 7) from Congress to the DOD primarily through the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and associated Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS). Why the DPG? The DPG is the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS)
derived planning guidance outlined in overarching PPBE DOD Directive 7045.14. Any resulting Congressional change is not a request to change planning strategy, just a request to change the programming/budgeting phase, of which the DPG is the key document. Re-running the analysis of affected DPSs, the Defense Agency or Service(s) conducting the analysis can report readiness impacts to Congress under the ‘entity accomplishes task’ model described in the previous section. For example, “Budget change (1) delayed procurement of planned weapons system X, thereby delaying mission accomplishment in DPG scenario (a) and (b) resulting in a 3-month delay in mission accomplishment and a 15% increase in U.S. Force attrition.” The phrase decision-grade means an unbiased, objective, and realistic analysis outlining the risk and reward of making the decision presented. The DPG scenarios still get accomplished, but at the cost of time and casualties. Presuming the benefit is to save money, Congress will have to accept operational risk in return.

Unfortunately, there is no published indication Congress was receiving this level of decision-grade analysis. The FY16 Air Force budget document emphasizes restoring training flying hours, not the Air Force’s ability to execute its missions. The Air Force accomplishes missions to fly, fight, and win; the Air Force does not accomplish flying hours as the end goal. Further evidence stems from the Air Force annual request since FY13 to retire the A-10, and Congress’ annual rejection of the proposal. The three fiscal years between the first request and this research shows the Air Force apparently unable to produce congressionally acceptable decision-grade analysis that the F-35 could assume the A-10 close air support mission. During Senate Armed Services testimony in April 2014, Senator John McCain commented to Secretary of the Air Force Deborah James, “so far this committee has not received anything like a complete and comprehensive or detailed plan [regarding the divestiture of the A-10].”\textsuperscript{74} If any
congressional staffer or Member of Congress privately believed the Air Force was purposefully suppressing information, these concerns were validated when Air Combat Command Vice Commander Major General James Post addressed the February 2015 Red Flag attendees containing many A-10 pilots. He stated to the audience that talking to Congress about the A-10 was akin to treason, and was relieved of his position after the DOD IG investigation substantiated the complaint. Only in August 2015 did the Air Force agree to a fly-off between the A-10 and the F-35 in support of CAS. The Air Force must provide trade-off analyses focused on decision making so Congress is more inclined to make operationally-based budget decisions than politically-based decisions. As SecAF Zuckert discovered with McNamara, not producing the decision-grade analysis came at the cost of credibility.

**Defining Readiness**

**Current Readiness Theory Model – What does ready mean?**

What does the term ‘readiness’ mean? Take a single required Task X and single Entity A within an organization in Figure 8. If Entity A is ready to do Task X, then Entity A is trained, equipped, and available to do Task X. This implies a future time construct because actually doing Task X is execution, not preparation. The ‘-ness’ part of readiness is the assessment on how ready Entity A is to begin Task X within a certain time frame. Ideally, the organization gives this assessment within a range (i.e. 1-100 or A-Z), not a binary yes/no to solicit organization leadership guidance. These levels of readiness depend on whether Entity A resourcing meets Task X capability. Assuming fully resourcing Entity A is expensive in terms of money, those in charge of Entity A resourcing can choose to under-resource to save money, simultaneously assuming risk for this decision. The consequences of under-resourcing Entity A effect its ability to accomplish Task X. Consequences to Task X include increased time to start,
increased task duration, lower quality, and depending on the task, increased probability of injury, death, and equipment loss. At some point, resources can become so low accomplishment of Task X is questionable. Failing to use assessments or using erroneous assessments to measure these impacts can lead to a chain of regrettable decisions, avoidable through proper assessment in terms of risk.

![Figure 8: Simple Readiness Example (Ready for What?)](image)

Readiness assessment becomes more complicated when the number of entities and tasks within an organization increase. Figure 9 shows such a scenario with entities A through C and tasks W through Z. Each entity has a different skill set with some overlap that must work together to accomplish the tasks. The organization did not assign Task W to any entity and this represents the task required of the entities in the future, but not currently resourced. Reasons for not resourcing Task W include low prioritization, infrequent need, or the task itself is unknown to the overarching organization. As in the single entity/task example, resources are constrained; thus, under-resourcing affects task accomplishment. In this example, lowering the resourcing of one entity can put more of the burden on the other two entities.
The question becomes, If Entity A and Entity B report 100% resourcing and Entity C reports 50% resourcing for tasks X through Z then how ready is the organization as a whole? There are two ways to conduct the assessment: focus on the entities or on the tasks. Below are the potential reported impacts:

- **Entity-based**
  - Entity A: Fully resourced, Tasks X and Z 100% ready
  - Entity B: Fully resourced, Tasks X, Y, and Z 100% ready
  - Entity C: 50% resourced, Task Y and Z readiness lowered, extent unknown. Request full restoration of resources to accomplish tasks.

- **Task-based**
  - Task W: Not resourced, so not assessed.
  - Task X: Entity A/B at 100%, so not affected by Entity C readiness.
  - Task Y: Due to Entity C having less than expected resources, Entity A and C must coordinate. The joint readiness assessment states a 2 week buildup delay before task start and 20% likelihood for equipment loss. Increasing Entity C funding to 75% resourcing would reduce this to a 5 day buildup delay and 5% likelihood for equipment loss.
  - Task Z: Due to Entity C having less than expected resources, Entity A, B, and C must coordinate. The joint readiness assessment provides three options with different levels of schedule risk and quality of task accomplishment.
The entity-based assessment shows Task Y and Task Z both at 100% and less than 100% depending on which entity was reporting. Entity C knows receiving 50% of its resources affects assigned future tasks Y and Z, but does not want to guess the level of impact because entities A and B are involved and organization leadership only asked Entity C to provide its readiness. Thus, the only recommended options to leadership are to restore resourcing to 100% or assume an unknown level of risk in tasks Y and Z.

The task-based assessment focuses on assessing task accomplishment by requiring the entities to coordinate. While Task X is fully resourced, Task Y assessments come with predicted outcomes for decision makers to choose. Additionally, the organization admits the focus is not on Task W (if known) and does not resource explicitly for this task. Clearly, the task-based assessment provides superior options or decision-grade risk analysis for organization decision makers whereas the entity-based analysis the risk is largely unknown.

The Role of Time in Readiness – Current vs. Structural

In the entity accomplishes task model, there is always the question of “Ready for when?” What is the sufficient amount of time to give an entity before starting the task? An Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) on full alert and ready for action within hours consumes vast amounts of fuel, ammunition, and equipment maintenance. A Reserve BCT requiring six months to get to the same level of alertness, but costs 25% of the full alert BCT. Choosing the right force structure depends entirely on the assigned task. Only through proper entity-task analysis can leadership make an informed decision.

The equipment budget is finite, so the question becomes how to define “Ready of what?” Do Services procure weapons systems to fight today or defer this money into researching future, more capable weapons systems? Pursuing the future weapon system will reduce both the
quantity and quality of forces if a conflict breaks out today. For example, crews transitioning from the A-10 to the F-35 require a certain amount of training time before they become operationally deployable. During this period, the Air Force has fewer forces available than assigned. On the other hand, buying current weapon systems at the expense of future weapon system increases the risk the DOD will lose the technical warfighting edge. Assuming the budget is finite, the decision between current and future weapons requires civilians and officers in the DOD to produce comparative, decision-grade analysis for DOD senior leaders and elected officials.

**Overclassification: Defense Planning Guidance and Scenarios Analysis**

In general, how severely is data overclassified? Statistically, the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) at the National Archives collects data across the US Government for the President. Of the pages reviewed under a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR), ISOO declassified 92% of them at least partially (Figure 10). MDRs occur when a particular researcher, individual, or agency requests a specific document examined for declassification. The problem with MDRs is the push-pull problem where an uncleared researcher must know of classified information first to ask for declassification.
Figure 10: FY96-FY14 Disposition of MDR Requests

The National Security Archive at George Washington University publishes a “Dubious Secrets” web series documenting the differing declassification standards in the US government. These duplicate declassifications occur during an MDR because the requester was either unaware of the previous declassification or the document was in an automatic declassification review based on classification date. Theoretically, the amount of previously classified information increases as time passes. Figure 11 shows two versions of the exact same National Security Decision Memorandum 16: the 1989 full declassification and the 2008 declassification excising the planning guidance. This memo and others on the National Security Archives implies organizations apply declassification inconsistently with varying standards.
One particularly interesting classification decision involved 41st President, George H. W. Bush. On 8 August 1990, six days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush gave a public Oval Office address announcing military mobilization plans into Saudi Arabia along with key objectives, to include protecting access to oil. His staff then reformatted this speech into the 20 August 1990 National Security Directive (NSD) 45 and marked it Secret, indicating release of this information would cause “serious damage” to U.S. national security. On 11 September 1990, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the televised world to dictate US policy deemed Secret in NSD 45. Did President Bush “reasonably cause” “serious damage” by leaking classified information or was the information not classified to begin with? Assessing the potential damage, history shows this disclosure actually strengthened the US resolve to remove
Iraq from Kuwait by getting a Congressional resolution approving military action, which ultimately resulted in military success.

The 1992 New York Times DPG Leak Damage Analysis

On 17 Feb 1992, the New York Times (NYT) published an article detailing the Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) for the Services to plan their forces. As mentioned in the budget overview, the largest scenario included a simultaneous two-region war scenario against Iraq and North Korea while protecting against a resurgent, expansionist Russia. Additional scenarios included a military coup in the Philippines, a “narco-terrorist” plot against the Panamanian government, and an “adversarial rival” emerging in the late 1990s. Consistent with the concept of a budgetary-focused scenario versus real-world contingency-focused scenario, the scenarios were “illustrative” and “not predictive” of real world events.

On 8 March 1992, the same reporter published excerpts and analysis of the leaked 18 February draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999. This document was an unfinished draft for the upcoming Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle and was marked SECRET. Classified leaks tend to generate headlines and national debate, and this was no different. This was the first post-Cold War and post-Gulf War DPG where “officials had the daunting task of devising what essentially would be an entirely new framework for U.S. defense policy.” Accordingly, “The document was provided to The New York Times by an official who believes this post-cold-war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain.” The publicity focused on the goal to increase the size of the military and to prevent new rivals, both economic and military, from arising. The US should remain the sole superpower. Controversial DPG content included highlighting the need for “Persian Gulf oil” and to “maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from
even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” Given these plans and scenarios, this research examines whether or not the DOD overclassified the DPG and associated scenarios by comparing them to the unclassified strategy and level of damage to national security once leaked.

President Bush’s overarching NSS theme was a post-Cold War, post-Soviet “new world order … to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals.” The US military’s role had shifted as 45 years of US military readiness and planning defined by curtailing Communist expansionism with the immediate threat of nuclear war was no longer applicable. Instead of the Soviet Union and in a post-Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm world, President Bush determined the US military should base force structure on regional conflicts (Figure 12).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell incorporated this into the NMS, recommending a two simultaneous regional conflict structure (Figure 13). Additionally, Chairman Powell recognized the US frequently does not end up using the forces based upon the programmed and budgeted rationale.
The 18 Feb DPG draft takes this same information and upgrades the classification to CONFIDENTIAL in an overall SECRET/NOFORN document (Figure 14).

The language regarding force structuring found in both the unclassified NMS and NSS becomes classified Confidential requiring Secret level clearance to view. However, since this was a draft DPG, revisions were expected. After the 8 March NYT article on 18 Feb draft, the DOD upgraded the security of the 26 March DPG draft to SECRET/NOFORN/CLOSE HOLD in its entirety.
In the memo with the 26 March draft, Mr. Scooter Libby presented SECDEF Cheney with three options: (1) keep the DPG classified, (2) “sanitize” and separate the DPG into mostly unclassified guidance as currently written (Figure 15) with a classified memo, or (3) do a substantial rewrite for public consumption and distribution also with a classified memo. All three options keep the DPG scenarios fully classified. Eventually, SECDEF Cheney chose option (3) and published the first unclassified DPG as the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January 1993 (Figure 16).

Figures 12 through 16 illustrates how the same unclassified data becomes classified as it flows one PPBS document to another, and then declassified in the NDS after the federal budget is signed. Admittedly, this is only one planning topic of many in the 1992 budget cycle and a single example does not constitute a trend. Appendix C illustrates the 1992 draft DPG repeatedly classifying ideas, verbiage, and concepts from the unclassified NSS, NMS, and NDS. An analysis of the documents shows the August 1991 NSS was the most direct document addressing controversial items as willingness to intervene militarily to secure Middle East oil and concern about Japan and Germany becoming economic competitors. These are the exact same
controversies highlighted in the NYT articles as DOD secret planning when the DOD was actually following the President’s strategy.

**Defense Planning Scenario: Identifying the Regional Conflicts**

The same agency that requested the MDR declassification for the 1992 DPG received only the DPS introduction without the scenarios or country names. Searching the National Archives, the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) fully excised the scenarios outright, to include not mentioning the adversary country names of Iraq and North Korea as reported by the NYT and noted in former SECDEF Cheney’s official biography. ISCAP cited 5 USC § 552, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 5, Deliberate Process Privilege, and EO 13256 1.4(a), military plans, weapons systems, or operations, as reasons for excising this information. In other words, ISCAP withheld the document to protect the deliberative, decision-making process (FOIA 5) and to prevent “cause serious damage to national security” (EO 13256).

This declassification response implies the 1992 DPSs are still at least partially in use as of the 2008 ISCAP and DOD excise decision. Former SECDEF Robert Gates’ June 2008 NDS supports this assessment by stating the following:

“Rogue states such as Iran and North Korea similarly threaten international order. … Iran and North Korea continue to exert coercive pressure in their respective regions, where each seek to challenge or reduce U.S. influence. Responding to and, as necessary, defeating these, and potentially other, rogue states will remain a major challenge. We must maintain the capabilities required to defeat state adversaries, including those armed with nuclear weapons.”

“China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused on a Taiwan Strait conflict, but which could have application in other contingencies. The Department will respond to China’s expanding military power, and to the uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging. This approach tailors investment of substantial, but not infinite, resources in ways that favor key enduring U.S. strategic advantages. At the same time, we will continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to China if necessary.”
“In addition, Russia’s retreat from democracy and its increasing economic and political intimidation of its neighbors give cause for concern. We do not expect Russia to revert to outright global military confrontation, but the risk of miscalculation or conflict arising out of economic coercion has increased.”

As with the 1993 NDS, this research maintains the latest NDS from 2008 is the unclassified, reworded version of the classified DPG produced between 2006 and 2008. The 2008 NDS states it is the “capstone document” that “flows from the [2006] NSS” and provides “a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence.” While not explicitly linked to the DPG, the 2008 NDS’s timeline, author, and content calling for the development of forces fit the purpose of the DPG. Through one-hundred percent deductive reasoning of unclassified sources, the DPG scenarios in 2008 were likely a combination of Iran (Iraq’s replacement from 1992), North Korea, a Chinese scenario focused on the Taiwanese Strait, and a minor security scenario involving Russia based upon the verbiage quoted above. The repeated grouping of Iran and North Korea indicates this is a continuation of the same two major regional conflict planning guidance started in 1992. Given the unchanging nature of these long-standing issues between 2008 and 2015, a reasonable assumption dictates these same scenarios are in use today.

**Damage to National Security Evaluation**

If the DOD stated US forces planned, programmed, and budgeted against Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia, what would the “severe damage to national security” evaluation entail? Recalling from earlier, this only determines the need for making information classified, not to make publically releasable, which is an entirely separate process. Organizations within the US Government can still process and maintain non-public controlled unclassified information (CUI) per EO 13556 with lower processing costs and wider distribution. Despite the high amount of guidance regarding classified information handling, no instruction, directive, or
manual exists stating how to objectively assess damage. Likewise, RAND in its search found no objective assessment criteria either, and therefore developed the following four questions to assess damage:

1. “Does classification decrease the amount of information going to potential state and nonstate adversaries?”
2. “Does the additional information adversaries would have if it is not classified affect what adversaries know (and are such changes meaningful and helpful in the sense that the additional information moves them closer to, rather than farther from, the truth)?”
3. “How likely is this change in knowledge to affect possible adversary decisions (and again, does it do so in ways that help the adversary)?”
4. “Would the decisions the adversary makes based on such knowledge damage U.S. national security?”

Note that if one lone researcher can deduce the likely form of the DPG scenarios using unclassified Internet-based sources, then all four of these countries with dedicated intelligence staffs could as well.

For North Korea and Iran, stating the US actively programs and budgets forces against them is most likely known or assumed by them. Both countries are openly adversarial to the US (Figure 17) while the US publically labels them part of the “Axis of Evil”, condemns their nuclear ambitions, and actively stations US forces within short-notice striking distance. For these reasons, questions 1 and 2 are “no” for Iran and North Korea. The second part of question 2 might result in adversary countermeasure miscalculation because the DPSs are not necessarily reflective of current COCOM OPLANs, and an approved DPS is not a directive to a COCOM to change planning. This would move both countries further from the ground truth. The separation of budgeting scenarios and real-world operational plans may change internal North Korean and Iranian decisions (question 3), but any decision made would not effectively translate to revealing any actual operational planning damaging national security (question 4). Thus, telling North Korea and Iran the DOD bases part of its budget on countering their aggression would not damage US national security.
Assessing the damage of China and Russia becomes more difficult because the US has
diplomatic relations with both countries, whereas with Iran and North Korea, it does not. Since
President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the US and China have since aligned themselves
economically, but not politically or militarily, to include the Taiwan issue. Maintaining
Taiwan as a democracy aligns with all published National Security Strategies. The Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 states the US “shall maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social
or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” Essentially, US law dictates the US will
program forces to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Therefore, the DOD classifying
intentions to follow US Law in the DPS will not decrease the amount of information (Question
1) and will not add additional information (Question 2). China desires to absorb Taiwan into the
PRC regardless of US policy (Question 3), and publically affirming the US programs and
budgets forces to defend Taiwan can only further deter China from military action and strengthen
US national security’s resolve to protect democracy (Question 4). The US stating they back their
laws and values with proper military support does not cause “serious damage to national security.”  

The 2008 NDS “cause for concern” with Russia has come to fruition with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, successful expansionism in western Ukraine in 2015, and air strikes in Syria in 2015. The 2015 NSS states the US will provide “dramatic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression.” Having a DPG scenario state the US programs and budget forces for the NSS stated goal does not tell Russia anything new. Like North Korea, Iran, and China, stating the DOD actually plans to deter Russia’s aggression in accordance with the NSS provides the strategic communication to increase national security, not decrease. This admission shows the US is willing to spend public funds to counter Russia’s words and actions.
Section 4: Recommendations

1) Unclassified Defense Planning Guidance and Scenarios

Declassification Warrant

The US classifies information to prevent damage to US national security, especially with adversaries and terrorist organizations. This is unambiguously desirable for intelligence information, military operations, and sensitive technical data to ensure the US maintains a strategic, operational, and tactical advantage. As Napoleon infamously stated, “When the enemy is making a false movement we must take good care not to interrupt him.”

At the same time, classifying information, by definition, presents an opportunity cost for the US government in terms of reduced internal and public debate. When a classified process must influence an unclassified process, information quality suffers. This is clearly seen with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, and the reliance on the classified Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) from the SECDEF. The DOD and Services use the term readiness as a proxy for mission impacts because stating the ability to execute the DPG scenarios would reveal classified information, to include the country names the programming is based upon. Data from GSORTS categories (Personnel, Equipment and Supplies on hand, Equipment Condition, and Training) serves as an additional proxy in annual budget submissions for DPG mission success. Although GSORTS is classified, Services aggregate this data to a level meeting the Original Classification Authority’s criteria for public release into annual budget submission documents. These show Congress what the Services plan to do with the requested funds, but does not evaluate ‘for what mission?’ or ‘why?’

The answer to Specialist Wilson’s question to Secretary Rumsfeld about why vehicle up-armor kits were not available is straightforward: the DPG planning scenarios underpinning
the DOD budget did not include a counter-insurgency scenario expecting Improvised Explosive Devices. This represents unplanned for Task (Mission) W from the readiness model in Figure 9, so the Army and Marines executed the Global War on Terror based upon forces planned, programmed, and budgeted for Missions X though Z. The Army and Marines were experiencing the standard one to three year re-tooling delay the US experienced in all major conflicts up to World War II. As Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” Missions X through Z most likely represented regional encounters with Iran, North Korea, and China based upon the similarity analysis between the 1992 DPG and 2008 National Defense Strategy.

Keeping the DPG scenarios classified represents a lost opportunity for the DOD to strategically engage Congress, the American Taxpayer, and the international community with the DOD’s priorities. When the Service Secretaries and Military Chiefs testify before the House and Senate service committees, classification restrictions prevents presenting DPG based decision-grade analysis when asked a question from a member of Congress. Although closed-door sessions do allow classified discussion with Congress, this also cuts off the Taxpayers from understanding how the military is planned, programming, and budgeting. Perhaps a public and academic discussion in the 1990s about the importance buying a military capable of counter-insurgency would have produced a better-equipped military for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Knowing about the existence of classified information is difficult, especially someone does not have the need to know or physical access even if a personnel security clearance is in place. This occurred during the 1992 DPG leaks when the DOD refused to give the Senate Armed Services the DPG documents. Chairman Senator Sam Nunn noted, “the refusal put senators in the awkward position of making decisions on military spending without the same
information available to The New York Times.” If Senators with Constitutionally mandated budget oversight have difficulty acquiring access, imagine the availability to an action officer producing PPBE documents at the mostly unclassified Planning and Budgeting at the beginning and end of the process.

**Recommendation 1, Alternative 1: Declassify Existing/Future DPGs**

As discussed previously, a review of unclassified sources reveals Iraq, North Korea, and China comprise the main 1992 DPG scenarios, and the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) appears to substitute Iraq with Iran and keep China and North Korea in the mix. Additionally, the 1992 cross reference in Appendix C from NSS to NDS illustrates the how the DPG mistakenly classifies unclassified data. Today, as in 1992, all three countries are building up their forces and the only country US has diplomatic relations with is China. However, the Taiwan Defense Act of 1979 obligates the US for defense of Taiwan if China attacks or invades Taiwan. As a result, stating the DOD purchases and plans for this event is akin to classifying a law. Declaring North Korea and Iran as military adversaries tells these countries nothing new as we actively station US forces near each country’s border.

Declassifying down to Controlled Unclassified Information per Executive Order 13556 does not equate to public release. The DOD still has control over who has access; declassification just determines release would not cause damage to national security. However, this does provide the Services access to more information to respond during testimony and communication with Congress. At the action officer level, document discovery and process visibility increases for personnel with predominately unclassified access. Efficiency and expediency increases as personnel who previously may have had to go to a different, secure location or building for DPG documents, now can reference them at their daily workstation.
Recommendation 1, Alternative 2: Unclassified DPG with Classified Annex

This alternative is the same rationale as the alternative 1, but with recognition some information could reveal classified intelligence, technical information, and military vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. Fortunately, the US already has a process for producing a separate classified budget and this should continue.\textsuperscript{129} This recommendation does not examine nor propose altering this process.

Using RAND’s declassification questionnaire checklist and assuming the US exclusively postures against known and probable adversaries, merely stating the adversary and scenario priority should not cause the DOD to classify the DPG. The unclassified President’s National Security Strategy and Chairman’s National Military Strategy regularly lists the countries of concern to national security, and these unclassified declarations allow the SECDEF to do likewise in the required DPG. The DOD should restrict the classified annex to the minimum to protect damage to national security to facilitate greater understanding within the DOD and between the DOD and Congress.

Recommendation 1, Alternative 3: Unclassified Notional Scenarios

If the DOD decides to keep the current or upcoming DPG and associated planning scenarios entirely classified, a switch to a notional scenario would facilitate the same process as the DPG scenarios are only “illustrative and not predictive”\textsuperscript{130}. The DOD regularly invents scenarios with fictional landmasses and adversaries for training. The main advantage of notional scenarios is the lack of preconceived notions against countries like Iran and North Korea leading to new and novel ideas. One recent example is contingency plan (CONPLAN) 8888, “Counter-Zombie Dominance”\textsuperscript{131} facilitating JOPES training facilitating the training of pandemic disease response and defense support to civil authorities. Likewise, the DOD could create a Red
(adversary) versus Blue (US) scenario with invented countries and landmasses, but with
equipment and tactics similar current adversaries set by the President. The advantage here is
plausible deniability where no country could get offended because the DOD would invent all
countries in the scenario, no matter how similar they are to the real world. However, this
alternative would require the DOD to educate Congress on the analytical validity of this concept
to gain confidence when authorizing and appropriating forces.

2) Analysis not ‘Readiness’

"How many flying hours, steaming days, or tank miles does it take to kill a
terrorist?"

-Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow, CSBA
November 2014 Defense One Article

Currently, budget documents focus on budget inputs, leading to reasonable, but illogical
questions like the one Mr. Harrison posits.132 The dependent variable in a DPG scenario is
degree of mission accomplishment, and the adversary in conflict determines the rate the US
military success in a campaign. While a fully trained and equipped military is desirable, the
immediate questions become, fully trained and equipped for what? for when? of what (mix of
equipment and personnel)?133 The scenario and associated adversary matters. Fortunately, the
DOD currently owns an excellent suite of campaign modeling tools allowing a Service to try
several different inputs to scenarios without actually sending service members into conflict (See
Appendix B for more explanation on campaign modeling). With these tools properly supported,
the DOD can rapidly explore multiple force structure options based upon different funding
levels. Then, in budgetary documentation and testimony, provide impacts such as logistical
delays showing the percent chance of running out of supply X, increased casualties, and amount
of equipment loss along with the overall level of mission success.
The decreasing percentage of Americans as veterans reflects in the decreasing number of veterans in Congress (Figure 18) increases the urgency for better analysis and burden for explanation on the DOD. Requiring Congress with decreasing veteran representation to analyze the link steaming days to levels of mission/DPG scenario success represents lost opportunity for the DOD to explain the rationale behind the submitted budget. This increases the chance of unnecessary Congressional misinterpretation, which ultimately affecting service members sent into combat. Congress deserves better rationale for what they are purchasing.
Conclusion

Robert Strange McNamara and Charles J. Hitch created an excellent system for producing an analytically based Defense Department budget from planning to programming to budgeting and then to execution, which is still in use today after 54 years. The robustness of the system is surprising given it survived the Vietnam War, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, and the end of the Soviet Union. This research deepened the respect for the PPBE system.

However, one primary PPBE assumption from the 1961 is no longer true. During the Cold War, Congress, the DOD, the American public could assume ‘readiness for what?’ was the Soviet Union whether or not the DOD mentioned the country name. Today, there is no longer a single adversary to base our force structure on; there are multiple. Thus, the DOD should use unclassified planning guidance and associated scenarios outlining the countries to plan, program, and budget against, and use robust analysis, not readiness statistics, to explain its budget to Congress.

Follow-on Research

If the DPG becomes declassified, recommend a examining the rationale behind using the term readiness in place of analysis in budgetary documentation. Currently the DPG hinders releasing impacts due to classification. Upon declassification, research may determine whether or not the emphasis on reporting outputs like flight hours is due to the classification level or lack of understanding and decision-grade analytical capability within the each Service and the DOD overall. Additional research should explore creating a DRRS system for the DPG scenarios during the congressional budgetary season each spring. Integrating with campaign modeling system could create such a system.
Appendix A: Information Release Process

Figure 19: Information Release Process
Appendix B: Campaign Modeling

Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.
-George E. Box, Legendary Statistician

Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces

How can the DOD fight a war without actually doing any fighting? Simple, use the existing operational-level computer models like the Synthetic Theater Operations Research Model (STORM) funded by the Air Force, Navy, Korea, United Kingdom, and France with the Joint Integrated Campaign Model (JICM) funded by the Army.

Operational models are used to predict the outcome of our regional conflicts against well-known adversaries such as Iran and North Korea. This outcome includes the overall campaign success or failure, friendly and enemy military casualties, equipment wear and attrition, and enemy penetration. In terms of scope, both COCOM operational plans and DPG scenarios fall in the operational level of the modeling hierarchy in Figure 20.
STORM, in particular, is verified and validated state-of-the art model that incorporates detailed items such as logistical resupply networks, munition miss distances, weather, intelligence platforms, unit proficiency, command and control procedures, and almost any type of planning variable and decision a combatant commander would have to make. Additionally, STORM is a stochastic model meaning each interaction, such as an air-to-air and air-to-ground engagement, comes with a probability of success or failure. With thousands of entities accomplishing thousands of missions, each run of the model produces different outcomes. For example, take a trade-off between using fighter aircraft A and fighter aircraft B in scenario C. Run the model 100 times with fighter A and 100 times with fighter B and no other changes. If friendly forces win 75 times with fighter A and 50 times with fighter B, then the DOD can report to Congress “fighter A is 25 percentage points more effective than fighter B in scenario C.”

The main issue with providing decision-grade analysis based on campaign modeling are short Congressional suspense. As Congress mandates an annual budget cycle, asking for more time is not practical, so the only option is to speed up the response process. As advanced and mature as these models are, databases contained in campaign level models run by the DOD are notoriously difficult to modify, and are computationally intensive. As the DOD funds STORM and JICM, the DOD can dictate software improvements to make database changes easier and faster through user interface changes and macro development. Additionally, the newer campaign models are multi-threaded meaning the speed at which they run is dependent on the number of processor cores the model has access. Within the last four decades, PCs and portable devices have expanded from single core to eight core processors, with speed doubling every 18 months. In fact, the Navy’s N81 analysis section cited this increase in multi-threaded computing power to drop their previous campaign model and fund the naval upgrade to STORM.
With enough processing power and user interface improvements, the DOD could provide more impact to Congress regarding mission success fewer amounts of less relevant, easier to compute data like percent manning and steaming days.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Theme</th>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>NMS</th>
<th>18 Feb Draft DPG (now declassified)</th>
<th>Jan 1993 NDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **New World Order**  | 13: "Those nations with whom we are bound by alliances will continue to be our closest partners in building a **new world order**." | 1: "The Cold War is over and a host of powerful forces is shaping a **new international order** with major implications for US national security policy and military strategy." | 2: 
"(S) The US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a **new order** that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests." | |
|                      | 25: "As we seek to build a **new world order** in the aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy we face is less an expansionist communism than it is instability itself. And, in the face of multiple and varied threats to stability, we will increasingly find our military strength a source of reassurance and a foundation for security, regionally and globally." |                                                                       |                                      |              |
| **Alliances**        | 12: "Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. The stable foundation of our security will continue to be a | 7: "Our forces deployed throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis- | 7: "(C) Our alliances will continue to provide an essential component of our national security structure. ... Unlike the period | |
|                      |                                                                       |                                                                      |                                      |              |

Appendix C: 1991-1993 NSS, NMS, DPG, & NDS Cross-Reference
common effort with peoples with whom we share fundamental moral and political values and security interests. "

response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas"

of the Cold War, however, the US will play a quantitively new role in these relationships -- the role of leader and galvanizer of the world community. As alliance partners acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the US will confidently be able to reduce its air, land, and naval force commitments overseas without incurring significant risks."

"(C) Nevertheless, the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a large or more formal collective response."

enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result."

"Our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. "

1: "In the Soviet Union, while we have seen a healthy retrenchment in foreign policy, we also see a continuing internal

2: "The inventory of conventional military equipment in Russia and the other nations which comprise the Commonwealth is

2: "(S) Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or
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<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>crisis, with a danger of violence overhanging the hopes for internal reform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>&quot;But Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant. The Soviet Union is and will remain a military superpower. Beyond its modernized strategic arsenal, the Soviet Union’s conventional forces west of the Urals will dwarf any other national force in Europe. ... Elements of the US.-Soviet relationship will remain competitive, and there is always the danger that confrontations will re-emerge.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>both vast and modern. The military potential inherent in this equipment will continue to be a major factor on the Eurasian landmass. Offsetting this capability in the near term is the economic and political turmoil in the republics which severely inhibits the maintenance and effective employment of this equipment on a global scale.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>&quot;(S)A limited objective attack against Western Europe appears beyond Russia’s capabilities without several years of reconstitution.&quot;</td>
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<td>20:</td>
<td>&quot;Should there be a re-emergence of a threat from the Soviet Union’s successor state, we should plan to defend against such a threat in Eastern Europe, should there be an alliance decision to do so.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>&quot;(S) We no longer have the Soviets fueling and exploiting low-intensity conflict to the detriment of US security.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:</td>
<td>&quot;The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome for the United States. At the same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that similar regimes in other successor republics could lead to spreading conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.
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<tr>
<td>5: &quot;the START Treaty signed at the Moscow Summit will significantly reduce US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.&quot;</td>
<td>6: &quot;One by one, the states of Central and Eastern Europe have begun to reclaim the European cultural and political tradition.&quot;</td>
<td>2: &quot;The United States is greatly encouraged by its evolving relationship with the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),&quot;</td>
<td>3: &quot;Any such political upheaval in or among the states of the former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or localized conflict.&quot;</td>
<td>4: &quot;We also must encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic structures.&quot;</td>
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<td>25: &quot;The modernization of our Triad of land-based missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-launched missiles will be vital to the effectiveness of our deterrent in the next century.&quot;</td>
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<td>26: &quot;NATO has unilaterally reduced thousands of nuclear weapons over the past decade, in addition to the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet weapons as called for in the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.&quot;</td>
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<td>a nuclear power with modern, diverse and survivable forces. There is the additional possibility of some nuclear capability in other republics and of proliferation to countries outside the Commonwealth.&quot;</td>
<td>leading quickly to global wary and perhaps escalating just as quickly to nuclear war.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO has unilaterally reduced thousands of nuclear weapons over the past decade, in addition to the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet weapons as called for in the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.&quot;</td>
<td>leading quickly to global wary and perhaps escalating just as quickly to nuclear war.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Republics or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
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56
that is their heritage. All Soviet forces are
gone from Czechoslovakia and
Hungary and withdrawals from
Germany and Poland are underway. The
military capability of the Soviet
forces still remaining in Eastern Europe is
rapidly diminishing and the
Warsaw Pact has been dissolved.

hostilities, rather than a concerted
strategic effort to marshal
capabilities for external
expansionism -- the ability to
project power beyond their borders.

political systems and free markets
so they too can join the
democratic “zone of peace.”

12: "The leaders of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have
stated their readiness
to eliminate strategic
offensive forces, while Russia is
significantly reducing its
force levels."

Ballistic Missile Defense

27: "we have redirected SDI to
pursue a system providing Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes
(GPALS). With adequate funding,
it will be possible to begin to deploy
systems that will better
protect our troops in the field from
ballistic-missile attack by the mid-
1995 and that will protect the
United States itself from such attacks
by the turn of the century."

20: "SDI efforts have been
refocused to develop and field a
global protection against limited
strikes (GPALS) on our deployed
forces, friends and allies, and the
United States."

32: "(S) Within a refocussed SDI
program, develop for deployment
defensive systems able to provide
the U.S., our forces overseas, and
our friends and allies global
protection against limited ballistic
missile strikes, whatever their
source. Also, pursue
complementary capability against
bombers and cruise missiles."

32: "(S) Ensure that strategic and
t heater defense systems, as well
as offensive and defensive

13: "The new technology
embodied in the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) program has
made ballistic missile defense
capability a realistic, achievable, and
affordable concept. We need to deploy
missile defenses not only to
protect ourselves and our forward
deployed forces, but also to have
the ability to extend
protection to others. "

57
Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United States remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every dimension — political, economic and military."

"We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security problems. But we remain the country to whom others turn when in distress."

While there is no longer a proximate threat of a global war, our superpower status carries with it the responsibility for leadership in the free world should the potential for global conflict emerge as it has three times in this century."

"(S) While the U.S. cannot become the world's "policeman," by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."

"Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs."

"Even in this time of downsizing, we must retain capable, military forces. For the world remains unpredictable and well-armed; causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends."

"But while we favor collective action to respond to threats and challenges in this new era, a collective response will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>2: &quot;extinguishing oil fires in Kuwait&quot;</td>
<td>7:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7: &quot;America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades, Today, there is no challenger to peaceful democratic order similar to that posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There are no significant hostile alliances.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2: Has positive remarks from King Faud regarding Gulf War</td>
<td>22:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>22: &quot;As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Europe / NATO</td>
<td>3: &quot;support Western Europe's historic march toward greater</td>
<td>9:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9: &quot;formal alliances such as NATO will continue to be fundamental to</td>
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<td>8: &quot;(U) We remain committed to maintaining our the strength of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>19: &quot;Our common security and European stability can be</td>
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economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance,"

6:"The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense of urgency, the question of responsibility-sharing — not only with respect to sharing the costs and risks of Gulf operations, but also with regard to sharing the costs of US. forces defending Europe and Japan."

American military strategy, the United States must be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition if we become involved in conflict where no formal security relationships exist. We must also retain the capability to operate independently, as our interests dictate."

the NATO alliance."

18:"NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure."

enhanced by the further development of a network of interlocking institutions that, in conjunction with NATO, constitute the emerging security architecture of Europe."

20: "In June 1992, the North Atlantic Council of NATO agreed to support CSCE peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis. In the former Yugoslavia, NATO has deployed its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to assist with UN sanctions, while NATO AWACS are helping to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina."

39: "(U) In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Europe and Japanese contributions.</th>
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<td>6: &quot;the emergence of Japan and Germany as economic and political leaders. The United States has long encouraged such a development ... But we frequently find ourselves competitors — sometimes even bitter competitors — in the economic arena. These frictions must be managed if we are to preserve the partnerships that have fostered reconciliation, reassurance, democracy and security in the postwar period. In this sense, ongoing trade negotiations now share some of the strategic importance we have traditionally attached to arms talks with the Soviet Union.&quot;</td>
<td>1: &quot;Our alliances, built during our struggle of Containment, are one of the great sources of our strength in this new era. They represent a democratic &quot;zone of peace.&quot;a community of democratic nations bound together by a web of political, economic, and security ties. This zone of peace offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective security institutions&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>16: &quot;Agreement by India and Pakistan to ban attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities also helped ease the tense nuclear rivalry in that part of the world.&quot;</td>
<td>22: &quot;We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: &quot;The dangers of intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and this year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear program under the Pressler Amendment. We will continue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to moderate their military</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22: &quot;We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>24: &quot;We should seek to maintain constructive, cooperative relations with India and Pakistan, strive to moderate tensions between them, and endeavor to eliminate nuclear arms programs on the subcontinent. In this regard, we should work in South Asia as elsewhere to have all countries adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place, their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Trends</td>
<td>Segment 1</td>
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|                | "regiona —
|                | tion."
|                | 16: "Agreement by
|                | India and Pakistan
|                | to ban attacks
|                | on each other’s
|                | nuclear facilities
|                | also helped ease
|                | the tense nuclear
|                | rivalry in that part
|                | of the world."
|                | South Asia and on
|                | the Indian
|                | Ocean."
|                | 22: "With regard
|                | to Pakistan, a
|                | constructive U.S.-
|                | Pakistani military
|                | relationship will
|                | be an important
|                | element in our
|                | strategy to
|                | promote stable
|                | security
|                | conditions in
|                | Southwest Asia
|                | and Central Asia.
|                | We should
|                | therefore
|                | endeavor to
|                | rebuild our
|                | military
|                | relationship given
|                | acceptable
|                | resolution of our
|                | nuclear concerns."
|                | International
|                | Atomic
|                | Energy Agency
|                | safeguards."
|                | 7: "regional
|                | disputes are less likely
|                | automatically to
|                | be perceived as
|                | part of a
|                | permanent —
|                | frequently
|                | dangerous, sometimes violent —
|                | global competition, thus
|                | allowing broader
|                | international cooperation in their
|                | resolution."
|                | 28: "Because
|                | regional crises are the
|                | 7: "The capability to
|                | respond to regional
|                | crises is one of the key
|                | demands of our
|                | strategy. Regional
|                | contingencies we
|                | might face are
|                | many and varied, and
|                | could arise on very
|                | short notice. US forces must
|                | therefore be able to
|                | respond rapidly to deter
|                | and, if necessary, to
|                | fight unilaterally or as
|                | part of a combined
|                | 3: "(C) Some regional powers,
|                | freed of their constraints of the
|                | Cold War, may feel more entitled
|                | for historical, cultural or other
|                | reasons to use of force to establish
|                | local hegemonies -- although the
|                | decisive nature of our victory in the
|                | Persian Gulf will hopefully
|                | discourage such actions."
|                | 4: "(C) It is clear
|                | that the DoD may
|                | 5: "We have shifted our
|                | defense planning from a focus on
|                | the global threat
|                | posed by the
|                | Soviet Union to a focus on the
|                | regional threats and challenges
|                | we are more likely to
|                | face in the future."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predominant military threat we will face in the future, their demands — along with our forward presence requirements — will be the primary determinant of the size and structure of our future forces.</th>
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<tr>
<td>effort. This response might range from a single discriminate strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional aggressor. Our strategy also recognizes that when the United States is responding to one substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to take advantage of our preoccupation. Thus, we can not reduce forces to a level which would leave us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19: "Forward presence forces are predominantly drawn from the active component of all services. For regional crises, our forces will also be drawn in large part from the active components, with essential support from the reserve components. If these crises become larger or be called upon during the FY 1994-1999 period to respond to regional challenges. ... In most cases, it is likely that the US will not be acting alone, but will be part of multinational coalitions, possibly under the auspices of the UN or other international organizations."
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>8: &quot;This drive gained momentum last year with the election of democratic governments in Nicaragua and Haiti,&quot; 8: &quot;The electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is especially noteworthy as it has led to the end of Soviet and Cuban military assistance&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>8: &quot;This drive gained momentum last year with the election of democratic governments in Nicaragua and Haiti,&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Panama | 4: "we used our neglected pool of General Purpose Forces until we could rebuild a warfighting force. Even in Panama and Desert Storm, we used General Purpose Forces" 8: "the restoration of democracy in Panama"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Cuba | 8: "The electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is especially noteworthy as it has led to the end of Soviet and Cuban military assistance."
| | 8: "Cuba remains a holdout in the hemisphere's transition to democracy but it is simply a matter of time before fundamental change occurs there, too. We will continue to press the Soviet Union to reduce its aid and presence in Cuba and we will enlist our friends in the hemisphere in pressing Cuba to accept the inevitable peacefully."
| | 3: "In the Western Hemisphere, Cuba remains as the last foothold of the failed communist experiment, a situation which will eventually succumb to the rising tide of democracy."
| | 24: "Cuba's growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the near term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation is likely to generate new challenges to U.S. policy. Consequently, our programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of Cuban contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel boatlift, a military provocation against the U.S. or an American ally, or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba."
| Mexico | 8: "work on trade and investment framework agreements and a Free Trade Agreement embracing both Mexico and Canada."
| Canada | 8: "work on trade and investment"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korea Peninsula</th>
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<tr>
<td>framework agreements and a Free Trade Agreement embracing both Mexico and Canada.</td>
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</table>

9: "Regional hotspots tragically persist on the Korean peninsula and in Cambodia"  
9: "In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adventurism is on the ebb, even while its effects linger. This is placing new stresses on Vietnam, Cambodia and North Ko  
9: "On the Korean peninsula, we and the Republic of Korea seek to persuade North Korea of the benefit of confidence-building measures as a first step to lasting peace and reunification. We firmly believe that true stability can only be achieved through direct North-South talks. At the same time, the  

22: "Forces oriented toward the Pacific must be sufficient to demonstrate the United States will continue to be a military power and remain vitally interested in the region. The North Korean threat remains and still requires reinforcing US forces for the Korean peninsula. As South Korea continues to improve its military capabilities, we expect to be able to reduce our ground and air presence. Crisis response forces focused on the Pacific region include forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and CONUS. These include 1+ division, 1 fighter wing, and 5 carrier battle groups."  

21: "East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost sixteen percent of the world economy;"  
22: "We should continue to encourage Japan and South Korea in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats and responsibilities they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for US. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security."
United States remains committed to the security of the Republic of Korea as it continues to open its economic and political systems. We are increasingly concerned about North Korea's failure to observe its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and consider this to be the most pressing security issue on the peninsula."

"We have announced our intent to adjust military personnel levels in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Japan. This phase is designed to thin out existing force structure and reshape our security relationships. Before this phase ends in December '1992, over 15,000 U.S. personnel will be withdrawn."

68
| 1: "Our alliances, built during our struggle of Containment, are one of the great sources of our strength in this new era. They represent a democratic “zone of peace,” a community of democratic nations bound together by a web of political, economic, and security ties. This zone of peace offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective security institutions"

21: "East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost sixteen percent of the world economy;"

39: "(U) In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions."

22: "We plan to keep one aircraft carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group homeported in Japan and have developed new forward options not dependent upon our former bases in the Philippines. ... Air Forces can be reduced to 2 to 3 fighter wing equivalents in Korea and Japan."

6: "the emergence of Japan and Germany as economic and political leaders. The United States has long encouraged such a development ... But we frequently find ourselves competitors — sometimes even bitter competitors — in the economic arena. These frictions must be managed if we are to preserve the partnerships that have fostered reconciliation, reassurance, democracy and security in the postwar period. In this sense, ongoing trade negotiations now share some of the strategic importance we have traditionally attached to arms talks with the Soviet Union."

6: "The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense of urgency, the question of responsibility-sharing — not only with respect to sharing the costs and risks of Gulf

Japan

1: "(C) the integration of Germany and Japan into a US-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic “zone of peace.”"
operations, but also with regard to sharing the costs of US. forces defending Europe and Japan."

9: "Soviet Union's continued occupation of Japan's Northern Territories."

9: "As noted earlier, our alliance with Japan remains of enormous strategic importance. Our hope is to see the U.S.-Japan global partnership extend beyond its traditional confines and into fields like refugee relief, non-proliferation and the environment."

9: "Regional hotspots tragically persist on the Korean peninsula and in Cambodia."

9: "In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adventurism is on the ebb, even while its effects linger. This is placing new

| Cambodia | continue to encourage Japan and South Korea in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats and responsibilities they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for US. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security."

22: "the East Asia and Pacific region continues to be burdened by several legacies of the Cold War: ... the civil war in Cambodia."
stresses on Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea as Soviet military and economic aid declines and Moscow seeks to improve relations with Seoul, Tokyo and other capitals, "there is renewed hope for a settlement in Cambodia. Only through resolution of the conflict in Cambodia can there be the promise of our restoring normal relations with that beleaguered nation and with Vietnam."

9: "In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adventurism is on the ebb, even while its effects linger. This is placing new stresses on Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea as Soviet military and economic aid declines and Moscow seeks to improve relations with"

4: "Our recent wars were not fought by forces put in the structure because we saw the threat in time. For World War II, for Korea, and for Vietnam, we used our neglected pool of General Purpose Forces until we could rebuild a warfighting force."

21: "Asia is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own and those of our friends and allies."
Seoul, Tokyo and other capitals, "there is renewed hope for a settlement in Cambodia. Only through resolution of the conflict in Cambodia can there be the promise of our restoring normal relations with that beleaguered nation and with Vietnam."

9: "China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complex challenge as it proceeds inexorably toward major systemic change. China's inward focus and struggle to achieve stability will not preclude increasing interaction with its neighbors as trade and technology advance. Consultations and contact with China will be central features of our policy, lest we intensify the isolation that shields repression. Change is inevitable."

3: "Throughout the Pacific, the surge of democracy and economic growth and an accompanying improvement in the military capabilities of our friends and allies have eased the US security burden. China, one of the world's largest countries, is also one of the last bastions of communism."

21: "Asia is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own and those of our friends and allies."

21: "To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to..."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>9: &quot;The United States maintains strong, unofficial, substantive relations with Taiwan where rapid economic and political change is underway. One of our goals is to foster an environment in which Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of China can pursue a constructive and peaceful interchange across the Taiwan Strait.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21: &quot;To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>9: &quot;Even with the loss of Clark Air Base, we remain committed to helping the Philippines make a success of its new democracy and to fulfilling our legitimate defense function there as allies and equals&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22: &quot;We plan to keep one aircraft carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group homeported in Japan and have developed new forward options not dependent upon our former</td>
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<td>21: &quot;To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to</td>
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<td></td>
<td>22: &quot;25,000 troops were withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23: &quot;With regard to US. bases in Southeast Asia,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We have announced our intent to adjust military personnel levels in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Japan. This phase is designed to thin out existing force structure and reshape our security relationships. Before this phase ends in December'1992, over 15,000 U.S. personnel will be withdrawn.

bases in the Philippines.

continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.

we have withdrawn our forces from the Philippines, consistent with the desires of the Philippine government.

Australia retains its special position as a steadfast ally and key Pacific partner.

The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance relationship remains an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended because of New Zealand's failure to live up to its alliance obligations.

Australia

New Zealand

We look forward to the day
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle East &amp; SWA</th>
<th>when New Zealand will choose to resume its responsibilities to the ANZUS alliance and rejoin Australia and the United States in this important regional structure.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21: &quot;Today, almost a year after the defeat of Iraq, about 25,000 US servicemen and women remain in the Persian Gulf, many times our presence before Desert Shield. This heightened level of presence in the Gulf is not permanent -- it's there to reassure our friends, to chill our adversaries, and to discourage other adversaries from emerging.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22: &quot;In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23: &quot;we should seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and to the region's important sources of oil.&quot;</td>
<td>Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance relationship remains an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended because of New Zealand's failure to live up to its alliance obligations.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10: &quot;The reversal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a watershed event.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>10: &quot;We will continue the effort to bring about a comprehensive peace and true reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil Supply</strong></td>
<td><strong>Israel in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security. &quot;</strong></td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</table>
|               | 24: " The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to stability, as demonstrated once again timing the Persian Gulf."
|               | 21: "Security of oil supplies is enhanced by a supportive foreign policy and appropriate military capabilities. ... We will also maintain our capability to respond to requests to protect vital oil facilities, on land or at sea, while working to resolve the underlying political, social and economic tensions that could..."
<p>|               | 2:&quot;(S) Various types of US interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil&quot; |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31: &quot;Assuming there are no unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security environment, by mid-decade our force can be some 25 percent smaller than the force we maintained in the last days of the Cold War.&quot;</td>
<td>31: &quot;Assuming there are no unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security environment, by mid-decade our force can be some 25 percent smaller than the force we maintained in the last days of the Cold War.&quot;</td>
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<td>21: &quot;The corps is the fundamental Army unit capable of credible theater warfighting, possessing organic logistics, communications, and intelligence infrastructure. It can conduct combat operations in Europe, project viable power elsewhere, and support the arrival of reinforcing units from the CONUS should the continental situation change. A corps, with two divisions, is the minimum Army force suitable to serve this purpose. heightened.&quot;</td>
<td>21: &quot;Carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious forces provide meaningful forward presence and crisis response capabilities from the North Atlantic throughout the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. Providing stability and security in these densely travelled and potentially volatile seas,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33: &quot;(C) Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR&quot;</td>
<td>33: &quot;(S) Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33: &quot;(S) 12 carrier battle groups ... 13 Air wings. ... 150 major surface combatants and about 70 attack submarines.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>naval forces can establish and maintain control of open ocean and littoral areas, deliver forces by sea, land Marine amphibious forces, and support a land engagement with carrier air and cruise missiles. Two carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups (from both Atlantic and Pacific Forces) are required to support US interests throughout this region, providing the full range of naval subsurface, surface, and air power.</td>
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| Marine Corps |

| 31: "Assuming there are no unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security environment, by mid-decade our force can be some 25 percent smaller than the force we maintained in the last days of the Cold War." |

| 21: "Carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious forces provide meaningful forward presence and crisis response capabilities from the North Atlantic throughout the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. Providing stability and security in these densely travelled and potentially volatile seas, |

<p>| 33: &quot;(C) Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces including 6 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (1 AC/1 RC). Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.&quot; |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>21: &quot;Air Force fighter wings have the flexibility to meet the wide range of theater commander tasks. They can gain air superiority, suppress enemy defenses, and strike tactical and strategic targets with precision. In addition, the Air Force in Europe provides the core basing, command and control, and projection capabilities that are essential to support US interests in the region.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>control, and mobility infrastructure to facilitate the receipt of reinforcing units. Three to four wings are required to meet these forward presence demands.&quot;</td>
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</tbody>
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