ARMED DETERRENCE: COUNTERING SOFT TARGET ATTACKS

by

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Biography

COL John Bowman is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. Commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer upon his graduation from the University of Central Florida with a degree in Criminal Justice, COL Bowman served in various leadership positions while serving with the 1st Infantry Division, the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, the 18th Field Artillery Brigade (ABN), the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT). COL Bowman’s combat deployments include two deployments to Iraq and two deployments to Afghanistan, where on his last tour he commanded the 4th Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment in Regional Command – East.
Abstract

The continued rise of self-radicalized lone-wolf terrorist attacks and mass shootings by mentally unstable individuals presents significant security challenges for military personnel serving outside of DoD facilities and at geographically separated units that offer no security. The recent attack on a recruiting center in Chattanooga, TN highlights this concern and raises the question of whether arming additional military members is a prudent force protection measure to counter this emerging threat. The overall intent of this paper is to argue that arming select military members with an “open carry” firearms policy is a prudent force protection measure for Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments because it provides a visual “deterrent” against soft target attacks. Further, if perceptual deterrence should fail, an “open carry” firearms policy is most often the only viable means to stop (deny) an active shooter in order to safeguard the lives of military personnel. This paper uses a qualitative approach to argue that the benefits of arming ROTC Cadre with an open carry firearms policy outweigh the perceived risks of implementation. Presenting an in depth analysis of the postulated threat, the author synthesizes the problem by first examining current terrorist trends and active shooters events, to include their motivations. The paper then exposes the hazards affecting ROTC detachments due to their unique “soft target” nature. Four recommendations emerge from this paper, which provide several policy recommendations and considerations for full implementation. The first recommendation involves overhauling DoD Directive 5210.56 in order to address non-DoD owned or leased facilities. The second recommendation proposes that each DoD Component should draft measures to arm ROTC Cadre with an “open carry” firearms policy. The third recommendation suggests that further research is needed to determine which state(s) and local (university) laws enable or prevent implementation. Finally, the fourth recommendation advises
that a Federal / DoD standardized identification card should be developed for DoD personnel that are engaged in security functions outside of DoD owned or leased facilities.
Introduction

With the recent attack of a recruiting center and Navy Reserve Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee there has been increasing Congressional and public support for arming military personnel serving outside of Department of Defense (DoD) facilities and at geographically separated units that offer no security. With over 17,430 such geographically separated military sites across the United States, these fatal shootings by a Kuwaiti-born American citizen quickly heightened concerns of troops nationwide.¹ This incident also sparked the politically sensitive question of whether arming service members is a rational and prudent force protection measure for those military members whose work place is in civilian communities. Within a month of the shootings, multiple lawmakers in both the House and the Senate urged for the repeal of current restrictions allowing military members to carry firearms.² Additionally, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered all military service chiefs to immediately review and develop action plans to improve the security and the force protection of DoD personnel against this evolving threat. In his DoD memo released on October 2, 2015, the Secretary of Defense noted that current Defense Department policy authorizes the arming of additional “qualified DoD personnel (not regularly engaged in law enforcement activities) based on the threat and the immediate need to protect DoD assets and lives.”³

This paper will analyze the postulated threat from both rational and non-rational actors and use Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) as a case study to examine security and policy challenges. It will then examine the deterrent effect against “soft target” attacks by implementing an “open carry” firearms policy and answer why arming select military members is a prudent means to increase force protection across ROTC detachments nationally. This
research evaluates the perceived risks of implementing this measure and identifies the Federal, State, and DoD laws and policies governing this decision.

**Thesis**

The continued rise of self-radicalized lone-wolf terrorist attacks and mass shootings by mentally unstable individuals presents significant security challenges for military personnel serving outside of DoD facilities and at geographically separated units that offer no security. Arming select military members with an “open carry” firearms policy is a prudent force protection measure for Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments because it provides a visual “deterrent” against soft target attacks. If perceptual deterrence should fail, an “open carry” firearms policy is most often the only viable means to stop (deny) an active shooter in order to safeguard the lives of military personnel.

**Examining the Postulated Threat**

**Increased Threat**

Terrorist organizations and mentally unstable active shooters remain a viable threat to military service members serving within the US homeland and there is an increasing amount of data which shows that these threats are not only persistent, but they are on the rise. Alarmingly, while the majority of events in the US are attributed to some form of mental illness, trend lines show a significant rise in self-radicalized lone wolf attacks. “Lone wolves by their definition display a variety of backgrounds with a wide spectrum of ideologies and motivations: from Islamists to right wing extremists, and from confused suicidal psychopaths to dedicated and mentally healthy persons.”

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In August 2015, researchers from the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) released a comprehensive study which assessed the Islamic State’s (IS) commitment to attacking the West.\(^5\) (Note – Also known as ISIS, ISIL, etc. for the purposes of this paper, these groups will be called IS.) While al-Qaida remains a viable threat with declared intentions of destroying the United States, researchers Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser show that IS has now surpassed al-Qaida as the main provider of inspiration for plots in the West.\(^6\) The authors suggest that this is attributed to retaliation from America’s involvement in the Iraqi-Syrian theatre, with the number of plots increasing shortly after the US-led airstrikes in autumn of 2014.\(^7\) Of the 69 plots directed against the West in this four and a half-year study, they found that 30 of the plots had an IS connection and 79% of those IS plots occurred from July 2014 through June 2015.\(^8\)

Consistent with current State Department and FBI threat warnings, this study highlights the growing concern for “sympathizer plots” or “lone-wolf terrorist” style attacks within the US homeland. IS thus far is operating within a decentralized attack strategy based on encouraging followers to attack while not seeking out leadership-directed plots.\(^9\) The data suggests that the number of “low-involvement plots” has increased significantly in recent months after two years of no such plots. In September 2014, IS spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani issued the first call for sympathizer attacks in the West and since this calling there has been a total of 21 IS connected sympathizer plots. Averaging two sympathizer attacks per month since Abu Muhammed’s calling for individual jihad, this gives reason for extreme vigilance as we look into the future.\(^10\)

The November 13, 2015 massacre in Paris carried out by nine terrorist armed with AK-47 assault rifles and suicide vests provides a grim preview of this increasing trend and the carnage
that IS sympathizers can unleash. This coordinated attack on a concert hall, a soccer stadium, and restaurant and bars left 130 dead and hundreds more wounded. With a clear focus on striking soft targets, it is important to note that the mastermind behind the coordinated attacks also planned to attack schools.\textsuperscript{11} Less than one month later, two IS supporter’s armed with assault rifles gunned down 14 people at a holiday party for the environmental health department in San Bernardino, California.\textsuperscript{12} While law enforcement officials do not believe that IS directed or ordered this attack, the attackers are believed to have been self-radicalized and inspired by IS.\textsuperscript{13}

Equally disturbing is the significant rise in the number of mass shootings or “active shooter” attacks occurring within the United States. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines an active shooter “as an individual(s) actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. Implicit in this definition is that the subject’s criminal actions involve the use of firearms.”\textsuperscript{14} Reports show that there were close to 200 mass shootings in the US between 1982 and 2012. Strikingly, 160 of these attacks occurred after the year 2000 and raised significantly more between 2013 and 2014.\textsuperscript{15} While reports suggest that up to 60% of mass shooters since 1970 displayed symptoms including acute paranoia, delusions, and depression before committing their act, these style of attacks remain a formidable threat to ROTC detachments.\textsuperscript{16} This is further evidenced by the fact that 70% of these attacks occurred in a business or educational environment.\textsuperscript{17} Whether either classified as a rational or non-rational actor, the data identifies that the commonality between the two is that the most prevalent threat facing ROTC detachments is from a “lone wolf” style of attack.
Lone Wolf Target Selection and the Threat to Campus ROTC

North Eastern University Boston, MA researcher Michael Becker published research findings in 2014 to help provide a rational prediction by explaining lone wolf target selection. Analyzing 84 lone wolf attacks in the United States between 1940 and 2012, Becker found that about 60% percent targeted civilian targets, while government targets were selected 32% of the time, and military targets accounted for around 7% of attacks. It is important to note that while ideology plays a very important factor in attackers selecting targets that are considered “enemies”, lone wolves are weak relative to terrorist groups and most often select targets that are less hardened and more feasible to attack. Becker concluded in his findings that lone wolves select targets based on four principles: their targets are likely to correspond with the “enemy” designated by their ideology, they are likely to use firearms as the means of attack because of...
logistical constraints, targets are likely to be located in areas that are familiar to them, and they are likely to attack civilian targets because they offer greater operational success because of their weakness. This data points to the heightened security risks facing military service members serving off military installations.


Given that civilian targets are attacked more often because of their lower levels of protection and the higher ideological military and government targets are attacked much less because they are normally much more difficult to attack, ROTC detachments provide an ideological motivated lone wolf attacker with a “soft target” compatible to that of a civilian target, but with a higher ideological factor. In order to reduce this threat, it is prudent to
examine current DoD Antiterrorism (AT) and force protection measures and the unique “soft target” nature of college ROTC detachments.

**Analysis of Current DoD AT and Force Protection Measures**

**DoD Guidance and Policy**

The US Army’s Senior Leader’s Roles in AT (Primer) warns that suggesting terrorist attacks “will not happen to my command” or “terrorist will target a more high profile venue before they get to me,” can create vulnerability and a tempting target. The AT primer also places the responsibility for antiterrorism protective measures on our Senior Leader’s, who by their experience can recognize the need for change before the enemy evolves and the importance of keeping a protective terrorist off balance. The US Army’s field manual on antiterrorism establishes five principles (assess, detect, warn, defend, and recover) to assist leader’s at all levels in protecting the force from threats. While these principles are prudent and represent the characteristics of a successful AT plan for DoD facilities, the unique nature of ROTC detachments on college campuses presents several shortcomings in their ability to defend. More specifically, ROTC detachments are unable to ensure that physical security measures are multilayered and include the integration of the capabilities of detect, assess, delay or deny, communicate, and respond to threats.

**ROTC Force Protection Measures**

ROTC detachments are confronted with unique security challenges because they are not located on DoD owned or leased facilities. Rather, they are granted use of college campus facilities on behalf of individual university presidents. While this support is essential to sustaining ROTC programs, it severely limits the level of active or passive antiterrorism measures that ROTC leadership can employ to deter or defend against an attack. One study
noted, “The main vulnerability of a school is that there are no military defenses or personnel on site to defend against possible attacks.”

There are currently over 2,300 Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine ROTC programs located at colleges and universities throughout the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. With the growing number of campus attacks in recent years, universities are well aware of this threat and are actively pursuing to increase both their awareness and counter measures. Unfortunately, the “openness” of college campuses presents a soft target by its very nature and are extremely difficult to defend against an attack, even for schools that employ armed campus police. As of 2013, a survey by Campus Safety Magazine reported that one in four campus police departments were not prepared to respond to an active shooter, with another 46 percent of departments claiming that they are understaffed.

Standard campus protocol in the event of an “active shooter” attack is for students and faculty to barricade themselves inside the class rooms, hoping to reduce the number of targets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>#Attakers</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sandy Hook Elementary, Newtown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rifle/Pistols</td>
<td>26 killed (20 children/6 adults)/2 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Holmes, Theater, Aurora</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rifle, Shotgun, Handgun, Tear-gas</td>
<td>12 killed/70 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anders Breivik, Oslo, Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rifle, IED</td>
<td>77 killed (69 by rifle/8 by IED), 33 injured (33 by rifle/203 by IED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai, India (2008)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Automatic Weapons, Grenades</td>
<td>173 killed/308 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Tech (2007)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Handguns</td>
<td>33 killed/23 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beslan School, Russia (2004)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Automatic Weapons, IEDs, RPGs</td>
<td>1100 hostages; 385 killed (including 186 children)/100+ injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Sniper (2002)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>10 killed/3 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairchild AFB (1994)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>5 killed/22 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbine (April 1999)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Handguns, Shotguns, 99 small IEDs</td>
<td>15 killed/24 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killeen Ruby’s Cafeteria (Oct 1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hand-guns</td>
<td>23 killed/20 injured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.** Notable Soft Target Attacks. (Air Force Incident Management Course, Security Forces Briefing, Col Shannon W. Caudill, 2015.)
Applicable Case Studies

In 2014, the FBI released a comprehensive case study of 160 active shooter events in the United States which occurred between 2000 and 2013. While this study is not focused solely on college campuses, the data does highlight that attacks occurring in educational facilities account for some of the highest casualty rates. The study draws out three important factors which help to further define the problem facing ROTC detachments. First, armed security was not present in 150 of the 160 attacks. Second, 69% of the attacks ended in 5 minutes or less, with 23 attacks ending in 2 minutes or less. Finally, at least 107 (66.9%) of attacks ended before police could arrive and engage the shooter(s). It is clear that these style of attacks are against soft targets, occur very quickly and before local authorities can respond, and end with victims having to make life and death decisions.

The Nation’s most tragic active shooter attack occurred on April 16, 2007 at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University where thirty-two people were killed and another 17 were wounded by a lone gunman. In this incident, it took police two-and-a-half hours to form a response team to enter the building which ended with the shooter committing suicide. Because of this incident, police departments now direct that the first responders on the scene immediately enter the building in order to engage the attacker. However, even with the modified tactic of immediate response by local authorities, the lone active shooter is still able to inflict mass casualties in the time it takes armed police to arrive at the scene.

Effects of Open Carry Firearms Policy

Perceptual Deterrence

At its core, deterrence theory is centered on the premise that an adversary’s behavior can be altered if he can be convinced that the costs of an undesirable action are greater than the
rewards.\textsuperscript{30} DoD Joint Publication 1-02, \textit{Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms} defines deterrence as “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.”\textsuperscript{31} From a criminologist perspective, perceptual deterrence then proposes that the greater the perceived “certainty” of punishment, the less likely crime will occur. Likewise, the greater the perceived “severity” of punishment, the less likely crime will occur.\textsuperscript{32} To determine the perceptual deterrence effects of an open carry firearms policy against soft target attacks, we must understand the adversary’s motives and decision making process.

RAND researchers Davis and Jenkins argue that “even hardened terrorists dislike operational risk and may be deterred by uncertainty and risk. Terrorist may be willing to give their lives, but not in futile attacks. Thus, the better defensive measures can help to deter or deflect, even if they are decidedly imperfect.”\textsuperscript{33} Because of the inherent weak nature of lone wolf attackers, additional research documents the fact that any alteration of the expected return due to armed security at the target site may likely deter individuals from pursuing their goals. In essence, the risk of operational failure is as much importance, and possibly more so, than the intended ideological motivation.\textsuperscript{34} John Lott, the president of the Crime Prevention Research Center and former chief economist for the United States Sentencing Commission, draws direct correlation between terrorist and criminals when assessing the deterrent effect of an open carry firearms policy.

“Criminals and terrorist can strike anywhere and at any time, that gives them a huge strategic advantage.”\textsuperscript{35} Lott further argues that when an attacker sees someone openly carrying a gun, the attacker basically has three choices to make. First, the attacker continues the attack as planned. Second, the attacker decides to wait for a more opportune moment to attack. Or third,
the attacker decides to select another target. Based on Lott’s research, the later appears to be the most prevalent option and points not only to the deterrent effect of open carry, but also to its displacement value. With all but two of the mass shootings in the United States since 1950 occurring in locations without armed security, Lott points to three recent attacks as examples of the attackers rational thought to achieve operational success and the deterrent nature of open carry.

Elliot Rodger, a college student at Santa Barbara City College in California killed six people and wounded 13 others in May 2014 in what he called his “Day of Retribution”. Although he committed suicide prior to the police responding, he left a 141 page “Manifesto” explaining that he ruled out targets that would likely cut his killing spree short. Lott also sites that Justin Bourque thought along similar lines in June 2014 when he killed three people in Moncton, Canada. “Prior to the shooting, Bourque took to Facebook to make fun of gun bans. He posted pictures of defenseless victims explaining to gunmen that they weren’t allowed to be carrying firearms.” Finally, Lott provides the example of the Aurora, Colorado massacre which occurred in a movie theatre during the premier of “The Dark Knight” movie. Even though the killer lived within a twenty minute drive of seven theatres showing this film, he chose to attack the one theatre that posted signs banning handguns. As the evidence suggests, the preponderance of attackers involved in what most deem as a non-rational attack still display rational thought in their target selection in order to achieve operational success. Even for a terrorist, a failed attack is worse than no attack at all. While perceptual deterrence involves the state of mind to deter an attack, the fact is that not all attackers may be persuaded. The added value of an “open carry” firearms policy is that if perceptual deterrence should fail, qualified ROTC leadership are in immediate position to “deny” the attack.
Increased Force Protection

Deterrence by denial seeks to deny an attacker from achieving his primary objective through largely defensive measures. Based on the soft target nature of ROTC detachments, armed deterrence is likely the only viable means to stop an attack if perceptual deterrence should fail. Also referred to as “denial of opportunity”, armed deterrence is achieved at the tactical level and is a prudent strategy for increasing force protection of soft targets. “At the operational level, the goal is “denial of capability” – restricting access to resources terrorists require to conduct an attack.”

Because ROTC detachments by their very nature are unable to deny a potential adversary’s “capability” to attack, efforts to deny the attackers “opportunity” to achieve operational success is paramount for increased force protection.

ROTC Case Study

Even the most devout gun control activist find necessity in arming law enforcement officers and military personnel who are properly trained to carry out their duties in an official capacity. That being said, a central argument is the perceived risks of harming innocent bystanders when firearms are used in a defensive measure. While this risk can never be completely eliminated, statistics show that these incidents are extremely low. A study by the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) revealed that less than 2 percent of gun fatalities involved a person accidently shooting someone by mistake. This also coincides with the argument that there is an increased risk of an attacker confiscating the firearm and using it against the defender. Again, statistics show that this is extremely rare with less than 0.2 percent of incidents occurring in the civilian sector and less than 0.002 percent of incidents involving law enforcement officers. Never less, implementation of this policy entails that ROTC cadre are trained and certified on their service firearm.
DoD Directive 5210.56, *Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities* establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for carrying of firearms and the use of force by DoD personnel. While engaged in a security role to safeguard Government personnel (ROTC Cadre and Cadets) within ROTC facilities on college campuses, ROTC Cadre would be required to meet similar certification standards as DoD Law Enforcement Officers. This entails satisfactory completion of DoD Component-approved training every 12 months, including firearms familiarization (classroom academic), live-fire qualification, and use-of-force training. Because of the dispersed nature of ROTC detachments, live-fire qualification for ROTC Cadre would need to be coordinated with the nearest military installation that can provide co-use of range and support personnel.

**Storage of ROTC Firearms**

The second risk factor pertaining to this decision is determining the appropriate method for ROTC cadre to store and safeguard their government issued M9 service pistols and ammunition. For larger universities that have campus police departments located on the university grounds, a preferred option would be to utilize the police department’s secured facility to store government equipment. This provides both accountability and 24/7 monitoring to prevent loss, theft, and unauthorized use of firearms and ammunition. This complies with DoD Directive 5210.56 which directs that personnel shall return firearms to a designated armory or secure storage area for accountability and safekeeping upon completion of their official duties. For universities without campus police departments, the DoD Directive does provide provisions which authorize DoD personnel to carry and retain a Government-issued firearm off DoD property for situations that warrant action to protect DoD assets or person’s lives. The directive
further states that this authorization shall be for as long as the situation or threat exists. DoD Components shall provide a safety-lock device and instructions for its proper use, to include prescribing physical security and compensatory measures.

**Loss of Campus ROTC Program Support**

The third and probably most problematic risk to implementing this measure is the possible loss of ROTC support from select colleges and universities. Regardless of the State laws and some university policies which do provide provisions for arming military members, introducing an “open carry” firearms policy for ROTC Cadre does carry the risk of creating public criticism against this measure. If not implemented correctly, it is possible that any measures to introduce firearms into public universities may incite strong and sometimes powerful “gun control” activists to an already politically sensitive issue.

**Policies and Laws Governing Implementation**

**Federal Statute and DoD Regulations**

The regulations governing the decision to arm ROTC Cadre for security purposes are well established within current Federal law and DoD Directives. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes DoD Directive 5210.56 which establishes clear authority to DoD components for implementation of this measure. This is based on section 1585 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) which states “under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, civilian officers and employees of the Department of Defense may carry firearms or other appropriate weapons while assigned investigative duties or such other duties as the Secretary may prescribe.” Aside from specific DoD Component authorization, the only applicable Federal law is the 1968 Gun Control Act and subsequent 1996 Lautenberg Amendment. This law prohibits anyone convicted of a felony, a domestic violence
misdemeanor, or subject to a domestic violence protective order to ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms or ammunition. There is no exception for law enforcement or military personnel with qualifying convictions.45

**State Laws and University Policies**

Unfortunately, because ROTC detachments are not located on DoD owned or leased facilities, the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.56 becomes less clear in its authority when challenged by State(s) and / or local university policies. While there is no single source data which clearly delineates the state laws which may challenge the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.56, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) tracks and maintains all legislative actions concerning guns on college campuses. While the verbiage between “concealed” and “open” carry is often delineated, it remains unclear which states or universities would oppose the arming of qualified ROTC Cadre for security purposes. By analyzing the current legislation governing “concealed” carry on college campuses, we can clearly see the wide disparity between perceived State and / or University rights governing this matter.

According to the NCSL, there are 19 states that currently ban carrying a concealed weapon on a college campus.46 In 23 states the decision to ban or allow concealed carry weapons on campuses is made by each college or university individually.47 Lastly, there are currently eight states in which the State(s) Supreme Court ruled in favor of allowing the carrying of concealed weapons on public postsecondary campuses.48

It is important to note that within the 23 states that have the authority to make this decision, several colleges still provide provisions for faculty and active military to carry firearms even though it is banned for students.
Table 3. State Ban on Concealed Weapons (19)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Ban on Concealed Weapons (19)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wyoming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University Decision (23)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Allows Concealed Weapons (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. State Laws for Concealed Weapons on College Campuses. (National Conference of State Legislatures, “Guns on Campus Overview”, 5 October 2015).

Recommendations and Conclusion

The increased security threats from both rational and non-rational actors require us to re-examine the available force protection measures for ROTC Detachments. Even though the United States Military Academy at West Point is on a military installation with military police protection, the current superintendent Lt. Gen Robert Caslen recently shared these concerns - “You want to know the threat that keeps me up at night? It’s a Chattanooga shooter or a Boston bomber—a lone wolf. If you get a shooter that all of a sudden gets inside our cadet area, that’s a significant threat.” Whether the attackers are defined as rational or non-rational, evidence shows that the number of attacks is on the rise and the threat of homegrown “lone wolf” attacks will remain a viable threat for the foreseeable future.

- **First recommendation:** DoD Directive 5210.56 and SECDEF Memo dated 2 October 2015 does not provide clarity and / or limits authority of this provision to DoD owned or leased facilities. In the SECDEF’s guiding principles to augment
security, the verbiage is specific in that the decision to arm additional military personnel and / or civilian employees applies to DoD owned or leased facilities or installations only. This verbiage should be expanded to include ROTC Detachments that do not occupy DoD owned or leased facilities within the constraints of current State and local laws;

- **Second recommendation:** Each DoD Component should draft measures to arm ROTC Cadre with an “open carry” firearms policy in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.56. This policy should address the unique security challenges of ROTC detachments and define the regulatory procedures for training and certification, qualification, and the storage and safeguard of government issued firearms and ammunition. In accordance with SECDEF Memo signed 2 October 2015, these recommendations shall be forwarded through the joint reporting structure overseen by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

- **Third Recommendation:** Further research is warranted to determine which state(s) and local (University) laws enable or prevent implementation of this measure. This shall provide definitive guidance to DoD Components for implementation of this measure and provide greater clarity towards formulation of desired Federal Statute(s) which would enable full implementation. Based on these findings, complementing research is desired to ascertain the perceived risk and impact of decreased ROTC support by individual state colleges and universities; and

- **Fourth recommendation:** A Federal / DoD standardized identification card should be developed for DoD personnel that are engaged in security functions
outside of DoD owned or leased facilities. This measure will aid identifying those personnel who meet all qualifications and have been authorized to carry firearms in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.56. Currently, a similar identification card exists under the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), which is governed by DoD Directive 5525.12 and 5525.15. LEOSA is a United States federal law, which allows qualified law enforcement officers to carry a concealed firearm in any jurisdiction in the United States, regardless of state and local laws.  

![LEOSA Identification Card](https://www.afsf.lackland.af.mil/


In closing, arming our nations ROTC Cadre on college universities is a prudent force protection measure to deter and safeguard military members from violent actors. As the data shows, arming ROTC Cadre with an “open carry” policy will increase force protection of ROTC personnel on college campuses by providing a deterrent effect against attack. We can also see that if deterrence should fail, this policy provides ROTC Cadre with the only viable means to deny the attackers ability to inflict mass casualties on military personnel prior to local law
enforcement response. While this policy does contain some inherent risks if implemented, it is believed that if managed properly, the risks are negligible compared to that of inaction.
Notes

1 Col Gary Dorman, Chief, Environmental PPBE, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Environment, Safety & Occupational Health), Pentagon, to Lt Col Troy Austin, e-mail, subject: Updated Off-Installation Facilities List, 5 January 2016.


3 Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, memorandum, subject: Force Protection Efforts Following the Chattanooga Shootings, 2 October 2015.


5 Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser. “Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August 2015): 14-30.

6 Ibid., 19.

7 Ibid., 16.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 14.

10 Ibid., 27.


13 Ibid.


16 Ibid., 240.


19 Ibid., 962.

20 United States Army. “Senior Leader’s Roles in Antiterrorism (Primer)”.

21 Ibid., 5.


26 Ibid., 8.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 9.
29 Ibid., 28.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 296-297.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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