# Shooting the Messenger: Diplomats Crushed by Wave of New Terrorism

## Abstract

The security of diplomats is a challenging endeavor that requires constant evaluation and increased resources. This thesis compares and contrasts the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras to determine trends in attacks against diplomatic targets and identifies a dangerous evolution in terrorist tactics that combines suicide bombers with armed assailants in which none of the attackers intend to survive. The Global Terrorism Database shows the number of attacks against diplomatic targets during the last 22 years of the Cold War (1970-1991) are roughly equal to the number in the first 23 years post-Cold War (1992-2015). There is, however, an increase in the number of casualties. Because of enhanced security measures, terrorists evolved and utilized larger amounts of explosives or more complex coordinated attacks that resulted in increased fatalities. The number of terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets have decreased, but the number of fatalities increased. Bombings/explosions remain the most common tactic, but armed assaults increased greatly since the end of the Cold War and is potentially explained by the “new terrorism” theory and Robert Pape’s theory on suicide terrorism.

## Subject Terms

Terrorism, Diplomacy, Diplomats, Security.
Shooting the Messenger:
Diplomats Crushed by Wave of New Terrorism

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U.S. Department of State

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes. (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy).

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Dedication

To the brave men and women who risk their lives every day in support of diplomacy.
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# Table of Contents

**Chapter 1: Introduction** ........................................................................... 1  
**Chapter 2: Definitions and Methods** .................................................... 4  
Diplomacy ......................................................................................... 4  
Terrorism ......................................................................................... 6  
Methodology .................................................................................... 8  
**Chapter 3: Literature Review** ........................................................... 11  
**Chapter 4: Data Analysis** ................................................................. 17  
Total Number of Attacks .................................................................. 17  
Attack Type ...................................................................................... 19  
Target Nationality .......................................................................... 19  
Location .......................................................................................... 22  
Suicide Attacks ............................................................................... 24  
**Chapter 5: Discussion** ................................................................... 27  
**Chapter 6: Conclusion** .................................................................. 34  
**Appendix: Summary of Complex Attacks** .................................... 37  
**Bibliography** ............................................................................... 44  
**Vitae** ............................................................................................. 48
Chapter 1: Introduction

The worldwide terrorism phenomenon of the past decade and a half has impacted most severely on our Western democratic societies. The brutal tactics of Terrorist groups, whether from the far left or the far right, have served to erode democratic institutions and civil liberties in many parts of the world... The dramatic worldwide increase in both the number and seriousness of terrorist attacks against diplomatic personnel and facilities during the past decade has adversely affected the conduct of diplomacy.¹

Diplomats have a dangerous job and have always put themselves in harm’s way to accomplish their mission. The rise of “New Terrorism”² and the use of large bombings or complex and coordinated attacks give the impression diplomats are sitting ducks waiting to be picked off by an increasingly sophisticated adversary. Security professionals have not, however, sat back and ignored the evolution of terrorism. Following most terrorist attacks, review boards convene to investigate lapses in security and often result in additional security upgrades or policy changes. The use of larger bombs and multipronged attacks are a response to counter these enhanced security measures. As a result, despite enhanced security, the perception remains that the current batch of transnational terrorist networks pose a greater threat to diplomats than ever before.

This perception raises several questions about the nature of the current terrorist threat to diplomats. Does this assertion hold if this threat is compared to the threat

¹ Frank Perez, Deputy Director, Office of Combating Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, speaking before the Conference on Terrorism sponsored by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales in Madrid, Spain on June 10, 1982.
diplomats faced from terrorists during the Cold War? Is there an increase in the amount of terrorist attacks on diplomats or diplomatic targets since the fall of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War? Has the trend towards more grandiose targeting resulted in higher casualty counts? Attacks on diplomats during the Cold War most often occurred in Latin America and Europe, predominately conducted by Leftist groups. Has the risk of these type of attacks gone away or do they just not receive the same attention as they did prior to the current focus on Islamic Fundamentalism?

Diplomats cannot hold up in fortresses and limit travel and still be effective in promoting foreign policy. Striking the correct balance of security and freedom of movement is necessary. This thesis shows the frequency of attacks remains consistent between the two eras, but the lethality of attacks on diplomats is increasing. The increase in diplomatic security spending and security personnel is necessary to promote a safe and secure environment for the conduct of foreign policy, but so is an understanding of the complex nature of future attacks. Security professionals work hard to turn diplomatic facilities and personnel into hard targets, but most funding and major advancements are a response to successful attacks. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 was a product of the Inman Commission’s recommendations following the 1983 Beirut Bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Barracks. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) was a response to congressional scrutiny of embassy security following the 1998 attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

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At the same time, terrorist groups will continue to evolve their tactics to defeat physical security measures and cause casualties. The expectation that terrorism can be prevented or defeated is unrealistic. This does not mean attempts should not be made to minimize casualties and damage when attacks do occur.

This thesis will compares and contrasts the two periods to determine trends in attacks against diplomatic targets and show that the security of diplomats is still a challenging endeavor that requires constant evaluation and increased resources. It applies the concept of “new terrorism” to the problem of increased lethality against diplomats but acknowledges it does not apply universally. It also identifies a dangerous trend in the evolution of terrorist tactics, combining suicide bombers with armed assailters where none of the attackers intend to survive.

The rest of this thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter two provides background information on the history of Diplomacy and Terrorism, discusses previous research combining the two, and explains the methodology used to derive the data from the Global Terrorism Database. Chapter three explores the literature on this topic. Chapter four provides the data using a combination of written and graphical depictions. Chapter five shows how the concept of new terrorism can be used to understand the change in trends and validates the major trends but remains critical of others. Chapter six looks at a disturbing trend in the evolutions of tactics uses to target diplomatic facilities and makes recommendations.

\[^5\] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016, Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
Chapter 2: Definitions and Methods

09/17/2008: Between 0915 and 0930, suspected Al Qaeda militants disguised as security forces detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, fired rocket propelled grenades, rockets and firearms on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen. A suicide bomber also blew himself up... Six Yemeni police, four civilians, including an American civilian, and six attackers were killed while six others were wounded in the attack.¹

This chapter provides background information on diplomacy, terrorism, and the Global Terrorism Database. It also explains the methodology used to derive the data for comparison and analysis in Chapter Three.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy, in the grand sense, is the negotiations between nations and a diplomat is the person appointed by a government to conduct diplomacy or negotiations. Diplomacy has been practiced for millennia but its recognition in Europe begins with the city states of Ancient Greece.² Diplomats called heralds, after the Greek god Hermes who was known as Zeus’s messenger, were usually members of the ruling class and sent to conduct negotiations, after which they would return. They did not usually have these heralds permanently posted in other city states. As in other ancient civilizations, the Greeks held diplomats in high regard and saw them as a protected class.

There were, however, instances of their inviolability being ignored. Athenians and Spartans killed envoys of the Persian King Darius by casting them in a pit and a well. This was seen as a serious breach of decorum and many believed the subsequent Persian

invasion was divine retribution. In Mongol culture, killing an envoy was one of the greatest crimes; Genghis Khan and his sons were known to inflict vicious vengeance on anyone harming their emissaries. In one of the more well known instances, Genghis Khan destroyed the Khwarezmian Empire in the 13th century after the Shah killed Khan’s envoys.³

Although various rules concerning diplomatic rights were established in 17th century Europe, the formalized rights of diplomats we see today are codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. This special status afforded diplomatic missions and personnel is not only intended to protect them from harm, but also from prosecution. This is the diplomatic immunity many are familiar with by which a diplomat commits a crime and is expelled from the host nation rather than being arrested. The intention is for that diplomat to face punishment in their own country.

These documents do little to actually prevent attacks against diplomatic targets. They do put the onus of security on the receiving nation, yet issues arise when the receiving nation is incapable of or unwilling to provide for the security of diplomats. Historically, most attacks against diplomats were conducted by the state, but the last century saw an increasing frequency of non-state sponsored attacks.

Terrorism

Terrorism can be traced back as far as the 1st century CE and the Sicarii/Zealots, but the term comes from the French Revolution and was used to describe the actions of the Jacobin Club. Although the term is used often, neither the international community nor scholars can agree on a standard definition of terrorism. In fact, much is written about the difficulty establishing a consensus. Most modern definitions include elements of unlawful violence for political objectives. A major sticking point for the definition is whether it only applies to non-state actors or whether a government can be guilty of using terrorism. This thesis uses the Global Terrorism Database's criteria for terrorism which is discussed more in the methodology section.

David Rapoport is credited with the wave theory of modern terrorism. It posits that modern terrorism began with the anarchist movements of the late 19th century and into the early 20th century. The second wave began in the 1920s and last until the 1960s. It is marked by the rise of nationalist liberation/anti-colonial groups. The third wave is made of leftist/Marxist groups beginning in the 1960s and lasted until the 1980s. There are some who believe this wave lasted until the end of the Cold War. The current, or fourth wave, began in the early 1980s and is marked by the rise of religious fanaticism. It

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
was spurred on by the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the eventual end of the Cold War because the Soviet Union no longer held its religious minorities in check. By describing the eras as waves, it allows for overlap as surely many of these types of groups still exist.  

The concept of New Terrorism came in vogue in the late 1990s to describe the rise of Al-Qaeda. New Terrorism theorists view the early 1990s as the start of the era for several possible reasons that include: globalization; the First Gulf War; the US intervention in Somalia; and 24hr cable news. There is no universal definition of “New Terrorism” but Peter Neumann describes the difference between old and new by focusing on terrorist groups’ structure, aim, and method. Old terrorism was hierarchical, Nationalistic and/or Marxist, and focused on legitimate targets with rules of engagement. New terrorism is transnationally networked, religiously inspired, and focused on mass casualties against civilians with excessive violence. Much like debates over Mary Kaldor’s New War, not everyone agrees with the concept. Martha Crenshaw argued that not only was new terrorism not new, old terrorism still exists. Regardless of whether it was a poor choice of words to describe it, something changed. The bombs became larger and the tactics were, and still are, evolving and spreading rapidly. 

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9 Ibid. 46-73.  
12 Ibid., 29  
Methodology

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is open-source and includes information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2015. It is made available by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a collaboration between the Department of Homeland Security and the University of Maryland. This thesis utilizes the GTD to fill in information gaps identified in the existing literature and to show the trends in tactics, target nationality, and the location of terrorist attacks against diplomats. Identifying this information is useful to the formulation of security policies to counter what is perceived to be an ever increasing threat. Along with these trends, this thesis identifies whether there has been an increase in attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities, whether there is an increase in the number of casualties from these attacks, and works to identify possible explanations.

The author divided the GTD into two eras to compare the frequency of terrorist attacks on diplomatic targets, the number of casualties, the location of the attacks, and the nationality of the victims. This first era begins in 1970, which is the GTD’s first year of data, and ends in 1991, the first Gulf War and the end of the Cold War. The second era runs from 1992 until 2015.¹⁵ The comparable date ranges provide for sizable data comparisons for descriptive statistical analysis, and is used to conduct a comparative analysis of the two eras to show trends in attacks against diplomatic targets by focusing on casualties, form of attack, nationality, and location.

Because this thesis relies on GTD data, it uses GTD’s criteria for determining a terrorist act and its definition of diplomatic targets. Data in the GTD from 1970 to 1997

¹⁵ As of writing this, GTD data ends at 2015 and because of a clerical error it is missing all data from the year 1993.
met the following definition created by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS):

"the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." 16

Data from 1998 to 2007 had to be an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor, and meet two out of three following criteria: aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; intent to coerce, or intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law. Data after 2007 allows for the user to select from criteria to match their own personal definition of terrorism. Using the broad GTD criteria allows for a larger sample size, but was also driven in part by the inability of the international community to agree on a common definition of terrorism, as mentioned before. 17

Particularly relevant to this study, the GTD lists diplomatic targets as attacks "carried out against foreign missions, including embassies, consulates, etc. This value includes cultural centers that have diplomatic functions, and attacks against diplomatic staff and their families (when the relationship is relevant to the motive of the attack) and property. The United Nations is a diplomatic target." To allow for the largest sample size, this thesis uses all entries in the GTD that list the target as “diplomatic.” 18

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16 GTD Methodology.


Regarding tactics, the GTD captures the general method of attack and often reflects the broad class of tactics used. It uses nine categories, which are defined below. Up to three attack types can be recorded for each incident. Typically, only one attack type is recorded for each incident unless the attack is comprised of a sequence of events. When multiple attack types may apply, the most appropriate value is determined based on the hierarchy below. For example, if an assassination is carried out through the use of an explosive, the Attack Type is coded as Assassination, not Bombing/Explosion.¹⁹

The data included into this thesis is derived from open source material so it does not contain threats or attacks that remain classified. It also does not include situations where security officials prevented an attack from happening. This information is often classified and therefore outside the scope of this thesis.

¹⁹ GTD Methodology.
Chapter 3: Literature Review

06/19/2013: Seven gunmen detonated an explosives-laden truck at the gates of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) compound and then proceeded to attack the campus, in Mogadishu City, Banaadir region, Somalia. At least 16 people were killed in the assault, including all of the gunmen. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the incident.¹

There are relatively few historical studies that specifically examine terrorism against diplomatic targets. The handful of studies available show the trends in tactics, target nationality, and the location of terrorist attacks against diplomats to compare this data to the present.

The early 1980s appeared to see a rise in these types of attacks. The Rand Corporation conducted several studies on the subject, most of which were authored by Brian M. Jenkins.² In 1982, Jenkins asserted that more than 25 percent of all international terrorist attacks were on diplomats, embassies, or consulates.³ The most common form of attack, at almost half of the total number of incidents, was bombing. Assassination attempts were the fastest growing tactic while kidnappings did not increase and only appeared popular in South American. Embassy seizures were common in the 1970s but tapered off in the 1980s. Jenkins infers this could be because of increased security measures or the increased willingness of governments to use force in place of concessions.⁴

Jenkin's research determined the U.S. was the highest targeted nationality in attacks against diplomats or diplomatic premises. He goes on to say terrorists were

¹ START GTD
³ Jenkins, Diplomats on the front line. 1.
⁴ Ibid. 3. Jenkins, Embassies Under Siege: 19-22.
conflicted as they felt the U.S. was the cause of the world’s problems but also one of the only nations powerful enough to help them attain their goals. Jenkins hypothesized that attacks against the U.S. were simultaneously punitive and attempted to garner U.S. support. Following the Americans, in rank order of most targeted states, were Turkey, Yugoslavia, France, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Turkish and Yugoslavian diplomats were targeted by minority ethnic groups seeking retaliation for their mistreatment in those countries. Seeing Communist countries that high on the list is somewhat surprising as the perception in Western societies is Communist states were more likely to be sponsors of terrorism than victims. On 30 September 1985, the Islamic Liberation Organization in Beirut kidnapped four Soviet diplomats and killed one before releasing the others a month later.  

Jenkins determined the majority of diplomatic attacks (29%) took place in Western Europe with Latin America and the Middle East coming in second and third. The United States was the country with the greatest number of attacks on its soil. Most of these attacks occurred in New York City, which is home to numerous diplomatic missions to the United Nations. After the U.S. was France, Lebanon, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Turkey, Columbia, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Jenkins makes the link that most of these were either Western democracies with free societies or Third World countries experiencing active guerilla struggles. If true, then the end of the Cold War, the subsequent spread of democracy, and the increase of

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7 Jenkins, Diplomats on the front line. 6-7.
countries facing insurgencies should create more permissive environments for terrorists to target diplomats or their facilities.

In 1988, Andrew Selth, a former Australian diplomat, provided further context to the Jenkins data. His book entitled, *Against Every Human Law: The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy*, lays out the history of diplomacy, the protections afforded personnel engaged in it, and the effect terrorism can have on it. Selth explained that the popularity of kidnappings in South America arose from the Brazilian government making concessions following the abduction of several Ambassadors. Selth determined that increased security measures drove terrorists to increase the frequency of attacks and focus on bombings and assassinations against more vulnerable targets. Selth observed that bombings became more destructive, citing the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut. Selth also points out that just as the U.S. being the symbol of capitalism made it a target, being the symbol of communism made the Soviet Union a target. Cuba was often targeted by anti-Castro groups, and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were both multi-ethnic states with unhappy minorities.

In 2016, Justus Reid Weiner wrote an article focused on attacks against U.S. diplomats and diplomatic facilities in the 21st Century. Weiner did not focus on statistics but did list all of the attacks on U.S. diplomats since 2000. The tactics ranged from bombings, assassination attempts, violent demonstrations, indirect fire (i.e. mortars or rockets), and complex attacks that coordinated assault forces supported by vehicle

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9 Ibid. 20-21
10 Ibid. 24
11 Ibid. 27.
borne bombs or suicide bombers. These coordinated attacks are the most difficult to characterize because the current tactics fall into many of the categories used during the Cold War. Their complex nature also made it difficult to implement security counter measures that addressed all the threats simultaneously while still allowing for the effective conduct of diplomacy. Weiner’s data shows the majority of attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel or facilities since 2000 occurred in the Middle East or South Central Asia. Although a few attacks occurred in Latin American and Europe, there appears to be a regional shift in targeting U.S. diplomats and facilities. It is possible this shift is associated with the greater U.S. presence in these other regions.

Not all changes in terrorist targeting of diplomats is directed against states. A Princeton University policy workshop report points to a rise in the targeting of UN staff and facilities since Osama bin Laden singled out the UN for conspiring with the U.S. in 1996. The Princeton workshop report highlights the ability of transnational terrorist networks to ignore national and regional boundaries and share lessons learned amongst affiliates in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. The report pays particular attention to UN offices in Somalia and Mali and discusses how the UN’s affiliation with both host nation and member state military forces made them a more enticing target. It also discusses how UN officials continue to struggle to find the balance between security and effective diplomacy. They understand the need to prevent “bunkerization,” but also that continuing to work amongst the populace makes them more vulnerable.

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13 Weiner, War on American Diplomacy, 3-9.
15 Ibid.
Robert Pape is a scholar and former advisor to President Obama who wrote extensively about suicide terrorism. Although his books *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* and *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* are specifically about the broader issue of suicide terrorism, they may offer insight into attacks against diplomats. Pape’s theory is that there is "little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions... . Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland."¹⁶

With international coalitions conducting operations abroad, terrorist groups were able to blame many of their troubles on foreign intervention in what they viewed as occupation. This perception of occupation led to a spike in suicide terrorism against anyone seen as occupying forces.¹⁷ The terrorists saw diplomats as difficult targets to attack, but also knew a successful attack against them would garner massive news coverage and potentially coerce a government into making concessions. The suicide attacks against the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marines Barracks caused then President Ronald Reagan to remove the Marines from Lebanon.¹⁸ Osama bin Laden and other terrorist groups and leaders recognized this as an example of suicide bombings coercing a government into removing its troops from foreign soil, which contributed to the rise in

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¹⁸ Ibid., 204
suicide terrorism. It also led to the deadliest attack against a diplomatic target ever, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.

If Pape’s Theory on suicide terrorism can be applied it raises a question. Why did other suicide campaigns, i.e. Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Chechnya, not target diplomats? This is a valid critique but a possible explanation could simply be the lack of diplomatic targets or an abundance of other targets. For instance, one could also argue that the Tamil Tigers had no need to target foreign diplomats because the occupiers were their own government. The Tamil Tigers were able to target security forces and ruling government officials directly and were even successful in assassinating the current President of Sri Lanka at the time.

From the limited literature available on the subject, it would appear that terrorist attacks against diplomats during the Cold War were predominately conducted by Leftist/Marxist groups in Latin America, the U.S. and Western Europe. Identity politics existed as ethnic groups targeted Turkish and Yugoslav diplomats at a high rate. Following the end of the Cold War, the targeting of diplomats and diplomatic facilities shifted to the Middle East, South Central Asia, and Africa. Terrorist tactics have evolved to increase destructiveness and the threat to diplomats continues. This thesis adds to the discussion of diplomats as targets of terrorism by bringing it up to date with a focus on data.

19 Ibid., 174.
20 GTD. 08/07/1998: Suicide attackers detonated a vehicle bomb outside of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. Four thousand people were also injured in the attack perpetrated by Al-Qa’ida.
Chapter 4: Data Analysis

10/28/2009: At about 0500, three militants wearing suicide vests attacked the Bekhtar United Nations guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. The three gunmen in police uniforms with AK-47s were dropped off at the location by an official green Afghan national police truck and started killing the Afghan guards at the front gate of the guesthouse. They later used grenades during the two hour gun battle at the guesthouse; the three militants, six foreign UN employees, two Afghan security force personnel and a civilian were killed and nine others injured. The militants were killed by security personnel during the attack. This attack targeted UN personnel because of their involvement in the electoral process in Afghanistan and the second run-off in the presidential election.¹

This chapter uses the GTD data to compare attacks against diplomats across the two time periods in several ways, including casualties, form of attack, nationality, and location. From 1970 to 2015, only slightly more than 2 percent of all terrorist attacks were against diplomats, embassies, or consulates. This may seem like a small percentage of terrorism, but it still amounts to 3,413 attacks against high profile, value, and many cases, well defended targets. This chapter focuses on the data and the subsequent chapter focuses on a discussion of topic in the context of the changing political landscape.

Total Number of Attacks

A comparison of the total number of attacks between the two identified eras show the rate of total attacks remains relatively constant, however, the number of people killed or wounded increased. From 1970 to 1991, 524 people were killed and 1,069 were wounded in 1,701 total attacks against diplomatic targets. From 1992 to 2015, 2,212 people were killed and 8,615 were wounded in 1,712. This is an approximate 227% increase in the number of killed and 1271% increase in the number of people wounded.

¹ START GTD.
During the cold war era the fatality rate was one death per 3 attacks. The Post-Cold war averaged over 2 fatalities per attack (2.34). Although the accuracy of the number of wounded is questionable, it adds to the perceived notion of the increased destructiveness of terrorist attacks against diplomats.

Figure 1 below depicts the static rate of attacks but the increase in lethality. The blue column is the total number of attacks, the orange column is the number of people killed, and gray is the number of people wounded.

![Figure 1: Total Attacks](image)

The number of attacks against specifically U.S. diplomatic personnel or facilities decreased by half between the two periods but the number of killed and wounded remained constant. From 1970 to 1991, 35 U.S. citizens were killed and 34 were wounded in 362 attacks targeting U.S. diplomatic facilities or personnel. From 1992 to 2015, 34 U.S. citizens were killed and 27 were wounded in 176 attacks (See Figure 2 below).
Attack Type

Bombings are still the most common form of attack but are now only 40 percent of the total number of incidents. Assassinations moved from the second most common tactic to fifth and armed assaults are now second. Figure 3 below shows how armed assaults have moved closer to challenge bombings for the most common form of attacks.

Target Nationality

The U.S. was the highest targeted nationality in attacks against diplomats or diplomatic premises during the earlier period. Following the Americans, in rank order, were Turkey, France, International, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. In the later
period, International targets, such as the UN, became the number one target. The U.S.
was second, followed by multinational groups such as the African Union, and then
Turkey, Russia, and Iran. Figure 4 below highlights the drastic increase in the targeting
of International diplomats and gives credence to the concern for the safety of UN
personnel.

Figure 4: Nationality of the Victim

Diplomats from the US, International, France, GB, Soviet/Russia, and Turkey
remain in the top ten of highest targeted nationalities in both periods. The increase in
attacks against “international targets” in Sub-Saharan Africa is tremendous. Figure 5
below shows the targeted nationality by top three regions and sheds even more light on
the issue of UN personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Not only are International organizations and their members targeted more frequently in the years following the Cold War, but they suffer far greater casualties. Figure 6 below shows that in attacks against international organizations 57 people were killed and 32 wounded during the Cold War period while 546 people were killed and 733 wounded Post-Cold war. There is a potential shortfall in this portion of the data. Not all of the people included in Figure 6 were diplomats. Some of them could have been security forces and possibly even innocent bystanders. This is because the Global Terrorism Database only separates out U.S. personnel from the total and not specifically diplomats. They were measured the same for both periods so it does still show an increase in the destructive power of the attacks.
Location

The largest number of diplomatic attacks during the Cold War period took place in Western Europe, with the Middle East and South America coming in second and third. In the Post-Cold War period, Sub-Saharan Africa became the site of the majority of diplomatic attacks, followed by the Middle East, and South Asia (See Figure 7 below). There does appear to be a shift away from Western Europe and the Americas. Western Europe drops from first to fourth, and North America goes from fifth place to last. The rise in attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia could be linked to interventions by foreign military forces that may have had a destabilizing effect. Terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are possibly taking advantage of the permissive environments.²

From 1970 to 1991, Lebanon was the country with the greatest number of attacks on its soil, followed by the U.S., Peru, France, Turkey, Columbia, El Salvador, Italy, Greece, and West Germany. From 1992-2015, Afghanistan became number one, followed by Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, Mali, Greece, Libya, Yemen, and Syria (See Figure 8 below). This author was struck by the inclusion of Greece in the top ten of both period. Further research accentuated Crenshaw’s argument that old terrorism still exists. Leftist/Marxist groups are still common in Greece and they have attacked diplomats from the US, UK, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Philippine, Italy, and Bosnia. The Greek financial crisis has made the threat from these Marxist groups a major concern for German diplomats.

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Suicide Attacks

The GTD only lists five suicide attacks against diplomatic targets prior to 1991 and all occurred in the Middle East, four of which were in Lebanon. After 1991, the GTD lists 99 suicide attacks against diplomatic targets, with 45 in South Asia alone. The Middle East and North Africa have 25 and Sub-Saharan Africa lists 24. This is relatively consistent with the overall rise in suicide attacks between the two time periods so this increase may be more of a function of the tactic rather than its sudden use against diplomats. Regardless, the tactic of suicide attacks poses additional challenges for diplomatic security professionals and will be address further in later chapters.
In terms of specific countries, 34 suicide attacks against diplomats occurred in Afghanistan, followed by 15 in Iraq, 10 in Mali and Pakistan, and 9 in Somalia. Robert Pape’s revised theory of Suicide Terrorism, stemming from a perception of occupation, holds when looking at the breakdown of the countries in Figure 10 below.

**Figure 10: Location of Suicide Attacks**

Suicide attacks against International diplomats appear to be on the rise as well. In the Cold War period there was only one suicide attack against a diplomat, and it occurred in Lebanon. The Post-Cold War period saw 23 attacks against International Diplomats across five countries, all of which have either an Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda Affiliate presence (See Figure 11 below).

**Figure 11: Location of Suicide Attacks Against International Diplomats**

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5 Pape, Robert A, and James K. Feldman. Cutting the Fuse. 335
The data provided shows the number of attacks against diplomatic targets during the last 22 years of the Cold War (1970-1991) is roughly equal to the number in the first 23 years following the end of it (1992-2015). There is, however, an increase in the number of casualties. The number of terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets decreased, however, the number of fatalities and wounded increased slightly. Attacks against “International” diplomats, of which UN personnel are included, rose tremendously, especially in the Sub-Saharan region. Bombings/explosions remain the most common tactics, but armed assaults increased greatly since the end of the Cold War. Western Europe was replaced by Sub-Saharan Africa as the location of the most attacks. The Middle East remained number two and South Asia replaced South America. The upcoming chapter identifies several possible explanations to address these changes by using the “new terrorism” theory and also drawing from Robert Pape’s theory for the rise of suicide terrorism.
Chapter 5: Discussion

06/09/2009: In Peshawar, Pakistan, three armed assailants drove a truck into the Pearl Continental Hotel, exploding on impact. The suicide truck contained 1,100 pounds of explosives. At least sixteen civilians, including two UN workers from Serbia and the Philippines were killed. At least 57 people were wounded in the attack, including three UN workers who were of Somali, Briton and German nationalities. The Pearl was known as the hotel that housed diplomats on temporary duty assignment to Peshawar.¹

The data in the previous chapter shows that terrorist attacks against diplomats have increased in lethality and shifted locations from Latin America and Europe to Africa, the Middle East, and South Central Asia. So what caused these shifts? The “new terrorism” theory, that the current groups are transnationally networked, religiously inspired, and focused on mass casualties against civilians with excessive violence, combined with Pape’s strategic logic of suicide terrorism, provide us with possible explanations.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the transformation of many new states, the world saw a rise in violence conducted by non-state actors. This violence was conducted by opportunist warlords, criminal organizations, and ethnic groups who did not appear to have political objectives. These conflicts lead to more civilian death and ultimately the displacement of large groups of refugees. Eventually, the international community intervened in an effort to end suffering and legitimize individual rights and the rule of law.² The UN and other multinational coalitions conducted operations in Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East and South and East Asia in an effort stabilize governments, prevent atrocities, and/or promote democracy.

¹ START GTD
During the Cold War, the major powers were preoccupied with preparing for a massive state on state conflict and many terrorists groups focused on internal struggles. The Soviet Union, with loose control over many of the terrorist groups operating at the time, was able to prevent the violence from escalating into World War III. With the fall of the Soviet Union, more attention was given to smaller conflicts around the world, without the umbrella of the Cold War overshadowing them.3

Post-Cold War, democracies increased in number, many of whom were fragile and beset with challenges on multiple fronts. Many states struggled to overcome weak rule of law, unequal distribution of wealth, poor access to education and medical care, and lack the ability to address the root causes of instability. Widespread corruption threatened stability by undermining public trust and confidence in the legitimacy of leaders while siphoning money away from public treasuries and limiting capital investments in infrastructure, public health, education, and security force training. Security forces lacked transparency and their weak support for human rights undermined public trust and increased the potential for violations of international humanitarian law.4

The proliferation of modern weapons throughout the globe increased the availability of advanced weaponry to black markets and terrorists groups. Local and transnational criminal organizations exploited weakly governed spaces and engaged in a wide range of illicit activities. Terrorists groups saw the benefit of the drug trade to fund their operations and developed their own illicit networks.5

3 Gray, Colin S. War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History. Abingdon, UK: New York, 2011. 245-261
5 Ibid. 57-65
The globalization of the 1990s, combined with advancements in information technology and communications, contributed to the rise of transnational terrorism networks. Al-Qaeda (AQ) was not the first group to have an international reach, but they capitalized on the chaotic nature of the Post-Cold War landscape better than any other group. AQ, and later its affiliates, were able early on to communicate using satellite phones, videos, and the internet to spread their message of violence and increase recruitment and sympathy across the world. These new communication options also increased the sharing of information amongst disparate groups. Information posted to the internet allows amateur terrorists to learn, radicalize, and plan their own attacks. Skilled terrorists are able to pass on lessons learned to groups across the globe. Tactics tested in Afghanistan were seen utilized in the Middle East and Africa very soon after.6

Because international coalitions conducted more operations abroad, terrorist groups were able to blame many of their troubles on foreign intervention. These groups, especially Al Qaeda and its many affiliates, viewed these coalition forces as occupiers. This perception of occupation led to a spike in suicide terrorism against anyone seen as occupying forces.7 The terrorists knew successful attacks against high profile, well defended structures would garner massive news coverage and potentially coerce a government into making concessions. Even during the Cold War, the suicide attacks against the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marines Barracks caused then President Ronald Reagan to remove the Marines from Lebanon.8 Osama bin Laden and other terrorist

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7 Robert Anthony Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the fuse: the explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 335
8 Ibid. 204
groups and leaders recognized this as an example of suicide bombings coercing a
government into removing its troops from foreign soil, which contributed to the rise in suicide terrorism. It also led to the deadliest attack against a diplomatic target ever, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, which was an attempt by Al Qaeda to convince the U.S. to remove its military forces from Saudi Arabia.

As noted in the previous Chapter, suicide attacks against International diplomats appear to be on the rise in Africa. This is likely a result of Osama Bin Laden's 1996 fatwa in which he specifically mentions the UN as collaborators and tools of the U.S. and Zionist regimes. Pape stated before an Emory University audience that the UN is no longer seen as an impartial mediator and is now seen as occupiers. The data appears to corroborate Robert Pape's revised theory of Suicide Terrorism, that the decision to resort to suicide terrorism could stem from a perception of occupation.

The above issues associated with globalization, networking, communications, and suicide terrorism all seems to align with the “new terrorism” theories when applied to the increased dangers diplomats face. However, central to these theories is a premise that new terrorist groups would employ Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs) to maximize casualties, destruction, and publicity. To date, new terrorist groups like AQ have not used WMDs against any targets, diplomatic or otherwise, despite these groups stating they would use WMDs if given the opportunity. However, not enough data or empirical evidence exists to suggest it is not a possibility in the future. The highlighting of the topic

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9 Pape and Feldman. Cutting the Fuse. 174.
10 GTD. 08/07/1998: Suicide attackers detonated a vehicle bomb outside of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. Four thousand people were also injured in the attack perpetrated by Al-Qa'ida.
by new terrorist theories may have contributed to increased security, law enforcement, and intelligence measures that may have prevented the use of WMDs. The next section will identify what this author sees as the most dangerous trend in terrorist tactics diplomats face today.

Through the process of compiling the data for this thesis, this author noticed a disconcerting trend in attack types. This alarming evolution in terrorist tactics against diplomatic targets is the combining of various attack types to maximize efficiency and lethality.¹¹

Most diplomatic missions implement security counter measures, many of which remain classified, but the most visible are known as physical security and include high fences, fortified walls, barriers, and entry control points. These walls and barriers are placed as far from buildings as possible to create distance from possible attackers or explosions, called setback. These increased physical security measures and setback standards forced terrorists to develop new strategies to gain access to diplomatic facilities and attack hard targets. These strategies involve combining suicide bombers or Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) with armed assault forces. These multipronged, coordinated attacks are difficult to defend against as they allow the terrorists to first gain access utilizing explosives, and then while the target is in a weakened state, they assault with firearms and grenades while entering the heart of the compound. Once inside a compound, additional suicide bombers will explode themselves in an effort to cause the most damage and inflict the greatest number of casualties.

¹¹ These identified attacks have been compiled and listed in the appendix.
This style of coordinated attack occurred against diplomatic facilities in the Middle East, South Asia, and is now spreading to Sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorists used this complex style of attack to target U.S., British, Indian, Spanish, and U.N. diplomatic facilities, as well as hotels housing predominately diplomats. Robert Pape describes suicide terrorism as the "lung cancer of terrorism," meaning it is potentially the most lethal. Combining multiples suicide bombs with armed assaulters who are also wearing suicide vests can be tremendously lethal and destructive.

When developing security plans to protect diplomatic facilities and personnel, it is important to look beyond just physical security barriers and walls. Terrorists will continue to evolve and develop ways to defeat physical security and access control measures.

A comprehensive approach to security includes a competent guard force and increasingly requires armed response element. This type of security is the responsibility of the host nation. In times of internal crisis, however, the host nation may not be capable or have the capacity to provide for the security of the diplomats in their country. If a host nation allows it, countries may choose to reinforce security with their own personnel. This can be effective but can also lead to a perception of occupation forces as these personnel tend to stand out in foreign countries, thus potentially increasing the danger to diplomatic installations and personnel. Security for diplomats should attempt to be inconspicuous and predominantly made up of local police or military forces. It can be difficult to rely on local personnel in countries facing internal strife or civil war. It is essential for security personnel to work closely their host nation counterparts early and often before a crisis arises.
When trust in the local forces is nonexistent or they simply lack the capacity to defend against these coordinated attacks, it may be necessary to evacuate diplomatic personnel. This decision cannot be taken lightly as reopening an embassy once it closes is extremely difficult and dangerous. It may be necessary to accept a level of risk and even a certain amount of casualties. The UN still faces pressure regarding safety and security but seems to continue to believe its style of diplomacy requires increased exposure to the local populace and is worth the risk to its personnel. There have been U.S. diplomats advocating for the acceptance of this risk and a relaxing the strict security measures in place in many overseas missions, but political pressure from Congress turned overseas security into a political hot button.

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12 The U.S. Embassy in Tehran has been closed since 1979, Damascus since 2012, Sanaa since 2015.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

08/03/2013: Three assailants wearing explosives-laden vests attempted to ram their vehicle into the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. Two assailants opened fire on the checkpoint guards and one assailant detonated a vest. Nine civilians and three assailants were killed and 22 other people were injured in the attack.¹

Diplomats continue to have a dangerous job and it appears to be getting worse. The rise of “New Terrorism”, increasingly sophisticated adversaries, and the use of large bombings or complex and coordinated attacks are changing the way diplomats have to operate. Security professionals have not ignored the evolution of terrorism but its increasingly complex nature challenges even the most sophisticated countries. Following most terrorist attacks, review boards convene to investigate lapses in security and often result in additional security upgrades or policy changes. The use of larger bombs and multipronged attacks are a response to counter these enhanced security measures. As a result, despite enhanced security, the current batch of transnational terrorist networks do pose a greater threat to diplomats than ever before and this is corroborated by the data provided in chapter three.

As mentioned previously, diplomats cannot hold up in fortresses and limit travel while still being effective in promoting foreign policy. Striking the correct balance of security and freedom of movement is necessary, but also incredibly challenging. Increases in diplomatic security spending and security personnel will continue to be necessary to promote a safe and secure environment in an increasingly dangerous world. Security professionals must continue to monitor the evolution of terrorist tactics and

¹ START GTD.
recognize the increasing complexity and lethality of attacks in an effort to turn diplomatic facilities and personnel into what is known as hard targets.

While security professionals work hard to prevent attacks, terrorist groups will continue to evolve and develop tactics to defeat physical security measures and cause increases in casualties. The wealth of information online combined with increased access to more destructive weapons will likely speed the evolution. The geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions that led to the rise of new terrorism are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. If Rapoport's Waves Theory of Terrorism does hold true, the current wave of Religious Fanaticism will diminish at some point, but it will surely be replaced by the next evolution of terrorism. The expectation that terrorism can be prevented or defeated is unrealistic.

This does not mean attempts should not be made to minimize casualties and damage when they do occur. There have been vocal U.S. diplomats advocating for the acceptance of this risk and a relaxing of the strict security measures in place in many overseas missions. The resiliency of these brave diplomats is admirable, but the 24hr news cycle and its sensational reporting have made it all but impossible. Security professionals should continue to focus on comprehensive plans that include a combination of physical security as well as armed response forces. They should also reach out to the diplomatic community and share best practices with other countries' security to assist in improving the aggregate safety of all diplomats.

The author has discovered several topics outside the scope of this thesis that warrant further research. Because the GTD does specifically filter out diplomats from other casualties, compiling a list of all International diplomats could make a compelling
argument for an international organization similar to Interpol but devoted to diplomatic security. A case study comparing the lethality of multipronged attacks combined with suicide bombers, compared to other simpler attack types could be useful. Another useful endeavor would be identifying what upgraded security measures are most effective at defeating multipronged attacks. This, along with data on foiled attempts, would likely require access to classified information and therefore, be difficult for scholarly research. The rate of attacks against U.S. diplomats may be down simply because of effective intelligence and law enforcement operations. This would be an exciting opportunity for additional research if given access to the information.
Appendix: Summary of Complex Attacks

The following is a list of complex attacks between 2008 and 2015 that combine suicide bombing along with armed assailters the list was compiled using the Global Terrorism Database and cross referencing them with news reports:

01/14/2008: Taliban gunmen and a suicide bomber stormed the Serena Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan and killed eight people including three foreigners on Monday at around 6 pm. The foreigners included a US national, a Filipina employee and a 39-year-old Norwegian photographer. There were four included in the attack one of whom is named Humayun. Police arrested Humayun in eastern Afghanistan on Tuesday as he was trying to flee to Pakistan. He is accused of supplying the three other attackers with weapons, explosives and suicide vests as well as transportation to the hotel. The gunmen used Kalashnikovs as their weapons. Two of the attackers, Farouq and Salahuddin, were suicide bombers. One blew up in the hotel lobby. The other, for reasons unknown, decided not to trigger himself. One attacker’s suicide vest was triggered when a guard shot and killed him at the hotel's parking lot gate. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed claimed the attack was supposed to coincide with a visit by Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere and send a message. However, the minister was unharmed. The men killed at least two Afghan guards and three other employees not including the Filipina spa supervisor.

09/17/2008: Between 0915 and 0930, suspected Al Qaeda militants disguised as security forces detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, fired rocket propelled grenades, rockets and firearms on the U.S. Embassy in San'a, Yemen. A suicide bomber also blew himself up at the embassy. Six Yemeni police, four civilians, including
an American civilian, and six attackers were killed while six others were wounded in the attack. Nineteen people were arrested in connection with the attack. The Islamic Jihad, a group connected with Al Qaeda in Yemen, claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack occurred at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen.

06/09/2009: In Peshawar, Pakistan, at the Pearl Continental Hotel, three armed assailants drove a double-cabin pick-up truck into the hotel, exploding on impact. The suicide truck contained 1,100 pounds of explosives. At least sixteen civilians, including two UN workers from Serbia and the Philippines were killed. At least 57 people were wounded in the attack, including three UN workers who were of Somali, Briton and German nationalities. No group claimed responsibility; however, authorities suspect the Taliban is responsible for the attack. The Pearl was known as the hotel that housed diplomats on temporary duty assignment to Peshawar.

10/28/2009: At about 0500, three Taliban militants wearing suicide vests attacked the Bekhtar United Nations guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. The three gunmen in police uniforms with AK-47s were dropped off at the location by an official green Afghan national police truck and started with killing the Afghan guards at the front gate of the guesthouse and later used grenades during the two hour gun battle at the guesthouse; the three militants, six foreign UN employees, two Afghan security force personnel and a civilian were killed and nine others injured. The militants were killed by security personnel during the attack. This is related to the emergency crews responding to the scene by 0900. Also, the United Nations has implemented a "white city" lockdown, which confines all the staff to the guesthouses and banning any movement within the city until further notice. Furthermore, the Taliban has claimed responsibility for the attack.
This attack was targeting UN personnel because of their involvement in the electoral process in Afghanistan and the second run-off in the presidential election that will occur shortly.

01/29/2010: In Lashkar Gah, Helmand, Afghanistan, militants targeted the United Nations and government buildings with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. At least five attackers were killed and four Afghan soldiers had been injured in the gun-battle. It began with a pair of rockets fired toward the barracks from the desert outside the city. The only heavily damaged building was the market that the insurgents first entered. Six suicide bombers had carried out the attack; only two of them managed to detonate their vests, while the other four were killed by security forces. The Taliban were responsible.

04/05/2010: In the Peshawar district of North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, at least six Pakistanis and four militants were killed, while 20 Pakistanis were injured when Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan militants assaulted the United States consulate. The militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, the second attack was at the consulate's gates, before attacking with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. No US personnel were harmed in the attack. Witnesses said the attackers were disguised in the uniforms of the Frontier Constabulary, a paramilitary force that provides security throughout northwestern Pakistan. A Pakistani Taliban spokesman claimed responsibility for the assault and vowed there would be more like it.

10/23/2010: Herat, Afghanistan, four Taliban suicide bombers dressed as police and women attacked the main United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UN) compound, two attackers, including a car bomber, blew themselves up at the entrance and
another detonated his bomb just inside the compound, while a fourth was shot and killed. The attackers used rockets, machine guns and explosives. No casualties were reported from the UN staff and two police officers were wounded in the attack, but ultimately the attack was not successful. The attack caused an unknown amount of property damage. A Taliban commander, Mullah Bilal, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the group. One fighter had blown himself up and others had entered the compound, he told Reuters by telephone. Taliban spokesman, Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, in talks with media via telephone from undisclosed locations, also claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that the attackers on UNAMA office inflicted casualties on employees, however, he did not give more details.

08/19/2011: In the Karte Parwan area of Kabul city, Kabul province, Afghanistan, on Afghanistan’s Independence Day, the British Council building was attacked by four suicide vehicle-borne improvised devices. The attack resulted in the deaths of nine Afghan police officers and one member of New Zealand's Special Forces. The attack caused an unknown amount of property damage and Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claimed responsibility for the attack by telephone from an undisclosed location. Mujahid said the attack was carried out to mark their Independence from Britain.

09/13/2011: At 1320, in one of three related attacks, in Kabul city, Kabul province, Afghanistan, several Taliban militants armed with rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47s and suicide vests took up a 12-story uncompleted building on the edge of Abdul Haq Square and began firing on the U.S. embassy, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters, and a compound home to several government office buildings. One policemen and three civilians were killed while 20 civilians were
injured. Security forces killed six militants in retaliatory fire. This was the first in a coordinated series of attacks by suspected Haqqani and Taliban militants around Kabul city that day. In total, at least 16 people were killed and over 30 others were injured, including six ISAF personnel, in the linked attacks. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement, but several Afghan and International Security Assistance Force intelligence officials suspected the Haqqani Network to be responsible.

10/31/2011: At 0600, in Kandahar, Kandahar, Afghanistan, four militants attacked the United Nation Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) building. The attackers consisted of a suicide bomber and gunmen. The suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck, in front of an animal clinic close to the UN building. The other militants exchanged fire with the police officers. Four militants, four Afghan guards of the UNHCR, one police chief were killed and two civilians were injured. Police also recovered three Kalashnikovs, 30 magazines and several hand grenades. Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousef Ahmed, claimed responsibility for the attack.

04/15/2012: Assailants attacked the United States (US) embassy in Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood, Kabul province, Afghanistan. This was one of 21 coordinated attacks in Afghanistan on this day, across which 51 people, including 36 assailants, were killed and 74 others were wounded. The Haqqani Network claimed responsibility for all of the incidents.

05/24/2013: Assailants attacked the United Nations' International Organization for Migration (IOM) office in Kabul city, Kabul province, Afghanistan. The attackers used a combination of suicide bombings, gunfire, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) during the attack that left ten people dead and 14 other individuals injured. The Taliban
claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that they were targeting a guesthouse used by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

06/19/2013: Seven gunmen detonated an explosives-laden truck at the gates of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) compound and then proceeded to attack the campus, in Mogadishu city, Banaadir region, Somalia. At least 16 people were killed in the assault, including all of the gunmen. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the incident.

08/03/2013: Three assailants wearing explosives-laden vests attempted to ram their vehicle into the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. Two assailants opened fire on the checkpoint guards and one assailant detonated a vest. Nine civilians and three assailants were killed and 22 other people were injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, the police commissioner attributed the attack to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Haqqani Network.

09/13/2013: Suicide bombers detonated two explosives-laden vehicles outside of the United States (US) consulate in Herat city, Herat province, Afghanistan. Following the explosions, assailants opened fire, leading to a gun battle with security forces. At least 17 people, including guards, police officers, interpreters and assailants, were killed and at least 18 other people were wounded. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that their goal was to show the US that its representatives were not safe anywhere in Afghanistan.

01/17/2014: A suicide bomber detonated at the entrance to the Taverna du Liban restaurant in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul city, Kabul province, Afghanistan.
Two assailants then opened fire on the restaurant. At least 24 people, including the three assailants and three citizens of the United States, were killed and four others were injured in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that it was in retaliation for a coalition forces airstrike in Parwan province in Afghanistan.

01/17/2015: A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle detonated at the entrance to a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) base in Kidal town, Kidal region, Mali. This was one of two suicide attacks near the base on the same day. In addition to the two bombers, at least one Chadian peacekeeper was killed and another person was injured across both blasts.

12/11/2015: A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle and three other assailants attacked a guest house near the Spanish Embassy in Sherpur area, Kabul city, Kabul province, Afghanistan. Twelve people, including the four assailants, were killed and seven civilians were injured in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.
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Vitae

Justin M. Geinert joined the U.S. Department of State in 2009 as Special Agent in the Diplomatic Security Service. SA Geinert served in the New York Field Office and Regional Security Offices in the U.S. Embassies in Jordan and Bahrain. Prior to joining the U.S. Department of State, he was a DoD contractor and a U.S. Marine. While a Marine, SA Geinert served in Iraq, Macedonia, Bahrain, Kenya, and Italy and attained the rank of SSgt. SA Geinert holds a Bachelor's Degree from Excelsior College and speaks both Arabic and Persian.