How can the West Better Assist Partner Nations in Establishing Internal Security?

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The Western experience this century is that its militaries are poorly adapted to winning intra-state wars, and pitting conventional militaries against non-state actors yields disappointing results. At the heart of this issue is the inability to respond to failures of internal security in partner nations. This essay posits that supporting the development of transparent, accountable and lawful internal security systems overseas requires a fundamental shift in the contribution from the West. Specifically, a better analysis of the requirement will enable a more appropriate military contribution to building security.

Internal security, intra-state war, security assistance, development, military reform
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ESTABLISHING INTERNAL SECURITY?

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

Intra-state war and its violent criminal counterparts will be an enduring feature of the twenty-first century, demanding Western attention. Yet the Western experience this century is that its militaries are poorly adapted to winning intra-state wars, and pitting conventional militaries against non-state actors yields disappointing results. At the heart of this issue is the inability to respond to failures of internal security in partner nations, as opposed to defending them against the external attacks for which militaries are constituted. Yet, due to structural limitations of Western states, the military is likely to remain the instrument of choice, or perhaps necessity, for responding to intra-state war, which begs a conceptual shift. This is not a call for wholesale military reform but a suggestion for the evolution of an element of land forces to respond to a new, additional paradigm of war.

This essay surveys why helping partner nations build transparent, accountable, and lawful internal security will remain in Western interests, explores existing frameworks for analyzing the requirement, and suggests a more holistic model for considering possible Western contributions. Using two case studies, that of the challenges to internal security in Guatemala, and that of U.S. support to building internal security in the West Bank, it examines the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed model. Finally, it considers the implications for Western militaries engaged in building internal security in partner nations. Throughout, this essay posits that supporting the development of transparent, accountable and lawful internal security systems overseas requires a fundamental shift in the contribution from the West. Specifically, a better analysis of the requirement will enable a more appropriate military contribution to building security.
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# Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1  

Method ........................................................................................................................... 5  

Internal Security within the Wider Discourse .......................................................... 8  
  Internal security in fragile and failed states ............................................................ 11  
  Improving security through sub-state entities ....................................................... 15  
  The military role ....................................................................................................... 16  

Analyzing the Requirement ......................................................................................... 19  
  A Framework for Policy Makers ............................................................................. 21  

Guatemala Case Study ................................................................................................. 30  
  Normalcy and criminal insurgency ........................................................................ 30  
  The long road .......................................................................................................... 32  
  Models for conceiving support .............................................................................. 33  
  Leading support to Guatemala ............................................................................... 35  
  The limits of assistance ......................................................................................... 36  
  Lessons from Guatemala ....................................................................................... 36  

West Bank Case Study ................................................................................................. 38  
  From insurgents to policemen ............................................................................... 39  
  Small steps to sovereignty ..................................................................................... 40  
  Non-military assistance? ......................................................................................... 42  
  The challenges of leadership ............................................................................... 44  
  The limits of support ............................................................................................. 45
Introduction

At the end of the Cold War, a new paradigm of war arose. Its exact character remains the subject of intense debate but, regardless of the label appended or the exact activities undertaken by the belligerents, it is generally agreed that it owes more to intra-state violence than to the inter-state wars of the twentieth century. The concept of new war, which blames the loss of the state’s monopoly on the use of force for the rise of this new paradigm, provides a broader framework for considering this change than the somewhat narrower concepts of hybrid war or gray zone operations.¹ One of the defining features of the concept of new war is the level of violence directed against the civilian population, a trend which advances in opposition to increasingly accepted international norms protecting the security of the individual.

Assuming that the first and most fundamental duty of a state is to provide security for its population, the loss of the monopoly of the use of force, and the associated inability to protect the population, has called the legitimacy of many fragile and failed states into question. In the inter-state paradigm of war in the twentieth century, protection of the nation called for the defense of territorial integrity in the face of aggression by other states. In the intra-state paradigm of the twenty-first century, the threats are manifest within the territory itself and the mechanisms to address them are necessarily different. Military capability to defend against invasion has only a limited part to play in intra-state conflict, the crux of which is enforcement.

¹ The concept of new war as a reflection of the rise of intra-state violence in the aftermath of the Cold War was introduced by Mary Kaldor in order to differentiate from the inter-state, or old, wars that had characterised the first half of the twentieth century. Other authors have since characterised this as hybrid war or gray zone conflict. Kaldor’s concept better reflects the challenges posed by a breakdown in internal security and is the framework used throughout this essay. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 1-14.
of the rule of law, couched in this essay as the ability to provide internal security.² This ability and, as the discourse on individual security has broadened, the manner in which it is manifest, is intimately linked to both international and domestic perceptions of state legitimacy.

Western support for building internal security systems in partner nations has increased both as an evolving, organic response to the rise of new war and as a result of the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet although common threads run through the doctrines of both peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, today the concepts for supporting the development of internal security lag the changing paradigm; keeping pace requires not only new concepts but also the reorganization of the instruments to implement them.³ As regional instability and transnational threats rise, and with its own interests firmly in mind, the West will continue to invest in developing internal security, which is defined here as the ability to ensure the security of the population against the physical threat of organized, armed violence. In so doing, Western states will also seek to bolster both international and domestic perceptions of the legitimacy of their partners, both to realize a long-term, sustainable return on their investments and to protect their reputations for promoting a values-based international order.

² Kaldor holds that the military role in addressing new war is one of cosmopolitan law enforcement, where cosmopolitan law is a synthesis of humanitarian and human rights law. Whilst this has merit in generating international legitimacy, this essay will argue that reflecting the indigenous values enshrined in domestic law is crucial to popular legitimacy. Kaldor, 132-143.

³ General Rupert Smith refers to a paradigm of “wars amongst the people”, reflecting the blurring of both combatant status and the geographical boundaries within which war is waged. In his book “The New Wars”, Herfried Münkler characterizes the global situation as the antithesis of the hopes of a generation of liberalists, where “war has torn down the protective fencing and established itself as an independent presence on the periphery of the zones of prosperity.” Münkler categorizes new war as those which are waged outside of the control or reach of the modern state and the international system. Neither the concepts of counter-insurgency nor stabilization operations deal entirely adequately with the challenges inherent in these models. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 5-6; Herfried Münkler, The New Wars, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).
The lag in the concepts for supporting the development of internal security is a partial cause of the asymmetries which are inherent in new war. Militaries developed for inter-state war have struggled to resolve intra-state violence, despite often overwhelming tactical and operational advantage over their non-state opponents, and political strategies have struggled to accommodate the variety of actors in new war. Thus the asymmetries in hard and soft power between Western states and the non-state actors engaged in new war have often confounded the responses of the former, most obviously in the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fundamentally, the two are competing at different levels for the same ends; the non-state actors in intra-state war compete at the popular level whilst Western states operate as if engaged in a largely inter-state enterprise. Where the end is the control or support of the population, non-state actors enjoy a disproportionate advantage. An attempt to address these fundamental asymmetries is of relevance both to academia and to policy makers today.4

Yet there is a paradox at the heart of the new war paradigm and this essay does not conclude that there is no longer a role for Western militaries designed for inter-state war. Although mutual dependencies between major powers today have added to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, were the West, and particularly the U.S., to significantly reduce its conventional capabilities, the survival of the current international order would be in doubt. It is almost inconceivable that in today’s context that the existence of nuclear weapons alone could deter the infringement of the sovereignty of a third party by one of the world’s major powers; the U.S. would be unlikely to trade New York for Riga in the absence of a conventional response. The

4 The notion of asymmetry in the Western responses to new war belongs to Münkler. This essay posits that a degree of symmetry could be regained by adopting strategies focused on the development of transparent, accountable and lawful internal systems in response to challenges to the state monopoly on violence. Münkler, 25-31.
paradox of the new war paradigm is that it arose from within the global context of
conventional deterrence but the very forces which created this macro-stability are
themselves poorly adapted to resolving to intra-state violence. Thus this essay
considers not the wholesale reform of Western military capability but rather where
some proportion of it must change in order that the West can address the twin
demands of deterring old war and mitigating the new.  

This essay surveys why helping partner nations build transparent, accountable,
and lawful internal security is in Western interests, explores existing frameworks for
analyzing the requirement, and suggests a more holistic model for considering
possible Western contributions. Using two case studies, that of the challenges to
internal security in Guatemala, and that of U.S. support to building internal security in
the West Bank, it examines the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed model.
Finally, it considers the implications for Western militaries engaged in building
internal security in partner nations. Throughout, this essay posits that supporting the
development of transparent, accountable and lawful internal security systems overseas
requires a fundamental shift in the contribution from the West. Specifically, a better
analysis of the requirement will enable a more appropriate military contribution to
building security.

5 This runs counter to the theses of both Smith and Kaldor but seems to be borne out by the recent
behaviour of both Russia and China, which are flexing conventional military capabilities to promote
their national interests in the Mediterranean and Caucasus for the former, and the South China Sea for
the latter.
Method

The research for this essay was conducted in three phases. The scholarly corpus on supporting the development of internal security in partner nations is limited and therefore the first phase of research sought to situate the concept of internal security within the current, somewhat more extensive, academic discourse on human security. The research sought to link the relatively narrow definition of internal security to the very wide concept of human security that has evolved over the last two decades. The critical element of this phase of research was to demonstrate a link between a government’s ability to provide transparent, accountable, and lawful internal security and perceptions of its legitimacy. The first phase concluded by investigating the general scenarios in which the West might decide to support the development of internal security systems in partner nations, and where the military might be the preferred instrument.

The second phase of the research was to examine the factors which Western states might consider when designing their support for developing internal security. Building on the first phase of the research, this assumed that the legitimacy of a government and its ability to deliver internal security to its population were intrinsically linked. Although literature on the subject was limited, three models offered the basis for building a framework around a key criterion and a number of supporting factors. This second phase of research led to the proposal of an analytical framework for considering how Western states might better support partner nations in developing their internal security systems.

The third phase of the research was to identify case studies against which the proposed framework could be judged: the limited scope of this paper significantly constrained both the number and detail of the case studies that could be conducted.
The post-intervention scenarios of Iraq and Afghanistan have already been extensively covered, and Western reticence to commit ground troops to prolonged nation-building in Libya and Syria suggest that these interventions are unlikely to be repeated in the near future. The research made no attempt to cover these instances of Western support to developing internal security, although the proposed framework does have utility in a post-intervention scenario. Nor did the research cover failed states such as Somalia, where central governance is virtually non-existent. In the case of Somalia and its peers, the demands of building national identity and cohesion far exceed the impact that improved internal security alone might have on perceptions of government legitimacy.

The research focused instead on two case studies of fragile states, where perceptions of legitimacy are intimately linked to the ability to provide internal security, although for very different reasons. In the case of Guatemala, both the military and the internal security apparatus were used during a thirty-six year civil war to repress elements of the population; Guatemala is a case study of the rehabilitation of the state in the eyes of both its people and its allies by improving, amongst other things, its ability to safeguard the nation. The case of the Palestinian National Authority offers a counterpoint; a formerly insurgent organization which now seeks recognition as a state in its own right, with its ability to provide security central to proving legitimacy in the eyes of Israel, the international community, and its own people. The two case studies thus represent the twin extremes of a fragile state which could conceivably fail and a proto-state which is seeking autonomy. Both provide a useful context in which to consider the proposed framework.

Drawing on the analysis of the research, the author then sought to discuss the potential implications for Western militaries in supporting the development of internal
security systems in partner nations. The implications were considered against the five key factors for handling a military component which Rupert Smith offered in the Utility of Force: forming; deploying; directing; sustaining; and recovering.¹ This framework is sufficiently broad and jargon-free that it is relevant to both the policy maker and the military practitioner, and was conceived to address the utility of force in the modern age. The essay concludes that a better analysis of the requirement for building internal security will ensure a more effective contribution from Western militaries when part of a broader scheme of assistance to fragile or failed states.

¹ Smith, 25.
Internal Security within the Wider Discourse

With the ending of the Cold War, a seemingly new conception of security arose. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is widely credited with the first articulation of what it might comprise in his 1992 Agenda for Peace. He described a paradoxical world where greater stability between states was offset by threats below the national level, which could transcend international borders. Although the Secretary General believed that the world faced an unprecedented opportunity, he also recognized that armed conflict continued to bring fear and horror to humanity. In addition to the well-understood terms of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping, the Secretary General introduced the idea of post-conflict peace-building – the construction of a new environment to prevent the recurrence of war. As he described the demands which this placed on the world’s leadership, he coined the term human security.

Despite the scholarly discussion it generated, the Secretary General’s conception of human security was not entirely revolutionary. The reconstruction of post-war Europe and Japan were historical examples, albeit without the label. In his historical examination of police functions in peace operations, Erwin Schmidl states that the Allies recognized the requirement to provide indigenous security to prevent local violence after occupying Morocco and Algeria in 1942. Parallels to the idea of human security extend back to colonial times, witnessed in the recognition of the requirement to provide justice in occupied territory. Nevertheless, the Secretary General’s concept is rooted in the globalized context of the post-Cold War world.

3 Schmidl, 25-40.
In the years following the UN Secretary General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, the concept of human security evolved. The United Nations Development Programme 1994 Human Development Report drew on the founding documents of the United Nations when it articulated “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” as the two major components of human security, and noted the former had increasingly outweighed the latter in foreign policy.\(^4\) In their wide-ranging study of human security, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy chart the evolution of the concept, suggesting that human security is best apprehended as “a concept in motion tailored to moving situations, rather than sticking to motionless approaches of security as static in an ever more mobile world.”\(^5\) Their own broad definition is “the protection of individuals from risks to their physical or psychological safety, dignity and well-being”, which is too all-encompassing for a meaningful discussion of setting or implementing foreign policy.\(^6\)

Although Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy suggest that a de-militarized concept of human security is necessary (they suggest human dignity), they admit the basic requirement for physical security of the individual before the additional components of a broader interpretation can be overlaid.\(^7\) This narrower concept of individual

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\(^6\) Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 3.

\(^7\) Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 116.
physical security highlights the importance reducing freedom from fear, although not
to the exclusion of developing wider of systemic stability within the state. The focus
of this essay is on developing internal security, recognizing that economic and
security development must proceed in tandem.

The manner in which internal security is re-imposed is key to realizing human
security. Here Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy’s notion of human dignity is useful. Whilst a
police state may successfully reduce internal violence, it does so without reducing
freedom from fear; indeed in many cases the state poses as much of a threat to its
population as the violent elements which oppose it. Thus there is a critical link
between the manner in which internal security is provided and both domestic and
international perceptions of legitimacy. Although many other factors also play into
these perceptions, the rise of new war has thrust security to the forefront. Even where
internal security systems are effective, if they are not transparent, accountable and
lawful they undermine the long-term stability of the state and the human security of
the nation. Furthermore, support to the development of security systems which are
believed to be illegitimate undermine a state’s international backers. In the response
to new war, the manner in which internal security is developed is critical.

In keeping with Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy’s call for a de-militarized concept,
this essay assumes that internal security systems comprise three elements; police,
judiciary, and corrections. When intra-state war exceeds the ability of a police force to
re-establish the state’s monopoly on violence there is also a role for military
stabilization operations, grounded in the rule of law. It is in situations of the violent
overmatch of the rule of law that this essay explores how Western states might
improve their military contributions to developing internal security in partner nations,
recognizing that the eventual goal is a de-militarized system.
Internal security in fragile and failed states

In his J-curve theory, Ian Bremner offers a useful model of where shortfalls in human security might be found and where external, Western support to the development of internal security might be desirable. He posits that states exist on a J-curve wherein stability on the vertical axis is plotted against openness on the horizontal (his diagram is reproduced at Figure 1 opposite). Stable, closed, authoritarian regimes exist on the left hand side of the curve, distinct from significantly more stable, open, democratic states on the upper right hand side. Separating the two, the base of the J-curve represents a sink of instability and chaos which may be visited as states experience shocks which alter their levels of openness and hence stability. Bremner points out that the transition from a closed authoritarian regime to open democracy is neither inevitable nor irreversible, suggesting instead that each state will have its own path with internal and external factors affecting the depth of the instability associated with transition. Bremner notes that states in transition may become stuck in the base of the curve, unable to extricate themselves, an analysis which is congruent with Münkler’s assessment that intra-state wars are self-perpetuating.  

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Normalcy vice democracy

Although Bremner’s model holds ‘right-side’ states to be democratic, a more useful concept might be one of ‘normalcy’ – a scenario in which the form of government is acceptable to a sufficient majority of the population that the state is able to resist the slide back into instability. As Paul Collier has noted in his discussions on bringing hope to the bottom billion in global society, attempts by Western nations to build democracy in partner nations have taken place in the complete absence of the checks and balances provided by the mature apparatus of states. Democracy in itself (manifest in free and fair elections) is little use without a functioning executive, legislature, judiciary, civilian service, free press…the list goes on.9 Thus the idea of normalcy, grounded in both popular and international acceptance of the form of government which it provides, is a pragmatic substitute for democracy and is used throughout the remainder of this essay. This does not negate the requirement for internal security assistance to occur within a broader, structural program of institutional development.

Where international support might be required

Bremner’s model helps to narrow the scenarios in which Western militaries might find themselves helping a partner nation to develop its internal security systems. Although Bremner himself is categorical that the West should “neither shelter nor militarily destabilize authoritarian regimes,” post-intervention is clearly one such scenario.10 This essay does not directly address the Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the debate engendered by those two adventures has founded many of the ideas upon which it draws. Although some of the lessons which

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10 Bremmer, 23.
this essay suggests may be applicable to post-intervention scenarios, they are hardly new in this context. In a remarkably prescient article written for the Royal Institute of International Affairs before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Graham Day and Christopher Freeman argued that post-invasion stability would hinge on the functioning of a legitimate police force, itself a critical component of a functioning internal security system. There is no way of knowing whether their suggestions, even if they could have been enacted, would have delivered a different outcome but their article is evidence of a discussion on the role of internal security even before the invasion took place.

Other scenarios suggested by Bremner’s model might include states moving independently into the base of the curve and, either through the activities of the actors they harbor or by dint of refugee flows, directly threatening Western interests. Although Bremner calls for the West to assist closed regimes in transitioning to openness, the very fact they are closed precludes a role for Western support to left-side regimes. Equally, the role for Western military support in open, right-side states which experience shocks to normalcy is very limited; this is the domain of civilian organizations, most often of the international non-governmental variety. Thus the variety of scenarios in which there may be a requirement for Western military support to the development of internal security systems will range from the immediate aftermath of a significant shock which causes a formerly closed, authoritarian state to slide towards the base of the J-curve, to states already in the base of the curve which endure high levels of organized, armed violence. It may also include proto-states emerging from fragmenting nations, a scenario dealt with later in this chapter. The

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role of Western military support is to complement a wider development initiative to help states (or proto-states) move up the right side of the curve.

The risks of failed and fragile states

Not every state which exists in the very base of the J-curve will warrant Western support to develop its internal security, notwithstanding the humanitarian urge to improve human security across the globe. Although the link between fragile or failed states and transnational threats has been something of an article of faith for U.S. policy makers since the end of the Cold War, Stewart Patrick’s analysis poses a counter to this received wisdom. Rather, argues Patrick, each case demands individual analysis and whilst human misery and regional instability will be common to all, state weakness does not automatically correlate to harbouring transnational threats. In fact Patrick suggests that transnational crime and terrorism prefer fragile to failed states because a basic level of governance allows the uninterrupted pursuit of criminal or terrorist goals.

As important is Patrick’s differentiation between state capacity to provide the “four critical sets of goods: goods of physical security, legitimate political institutions, effective economic management, and basic social welfare” and the willingness to do so. In the context of Western military support for the development of internal security, this is a key distinction: there can be no success if the partner government simply lacks the will to fulfil its basic responsibility of providing physical security to its citizens – or if the will has been subverted. Where policy makers determine that national interests drive support to failed or fragile states, or in the post-intervention scenario of ‘you break, you own it,” the ability and willingness of the partner

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13 Ibid, 19.
government to provide security should be addressed in distinct yet complementary approaches. Willingness might be encouraged by incentives and is an essential component of developing internal security.

Improving security through sub-state entities

There is another dimension of internal security, which exists below the level of the state and thus does not feature on Bremner’s J-curve. In the post-colonial, post-Cold War context described by Münkler, it is not just the anarchic, self-enriching warlords that have emerged, although they are undoubtedly in the majority. In parallel, a small number of sub-national entities have developed, unified by a common sense of identity and bent upon assuming both the benefits and responsibilities of statehood. These are referred to throughout this essay as proto-states. As an example, the sub-national government of Somaliland has managed to impart a degree of stability and governance which has entirely eluded the central government in Mogadishu. Likewise, during the rise of the Islamic State, the Kurdish government of northern Iraq was able to maintain stability and territorial integrity in a manner which the Iraqi government was not. Both of these sub-national elements aspire to sovereign territory and international recognition and, in the chaos in which they exist, represent an opportunity to bring at least a degree of stability to limited areas within weak states. As populations across the world increasingly identify themselves at the sub-national level, with all the implications inherent in that change, the West may find itself supporting sub-national entities in order to maintain local stability in otherwise chaotic regions.

14 Münkler, 5-8.
Western interest in supporting the development of internal security may range beyond the scope of failed or fragile states. It could also extend to ostensibly democratic states plagued by chronic high violence, often at their peripheries, and could encompass sub-state groups where they offer the prospect of longer-term stability. With such a broad remit, the selection of the instrument with which to engage would seem critical. The default for the U.S. and the U.K. is currently their respective militaries.

The military role

There is a strong argument that developing internal security is not a role for Western militaries but, as Derek Reveron points out in his analysis of its changing role, the U.S. military has already undertaken a significant shift away from a singular focus on combat operations to a much broader contribution to security overseas. He notes that the creation of United States Africa Command, a Combatant Command independent of (United States) European and Central Commands “is designed to strengthen security cooperation efforts with African partner countries,” rather than to fight wars on the continent. However, as Reveron describes it, the roles of Africa Command and others like it serve a broad notion of human security, which sits uncomfortably both within the U.S. military, other U.S. government departments, and many international non-government organizations. This disquiet at a broadened military role is mirrored in many Western societies.¹⁵

Reveron’s discussion of the drivers for the U.S. military’s diversification makes equally uncomfortable reading. Writing in 2010, he offers four reasons: weak

states have largely supplanted peer competitors as the focus of strategic thinkers; the Department of State delegates security assistance programs to the Defense Department; the Defense Department has a distinct advantage over the foreign assistance agencies in both size and resources; and changes in the U.S. foreign assistance bureaucracy have turned development specialists into contract managers. These drivers are common to many Western states. Regardless of the desirability of either the drivers or the outcomes, the fact is that without equivalent expeditionary capabilities in other arms of government, the military becomes the instrument of choice.

The demands of new war, where Western involvement may not follow a pattern of phases, and the predilection of Western governments to employ their militaries in response, suggest a growing responsibility to adapt those militaries in the face of a changing demand. Although the development of Regionally Aligned Brigades by the U.S. and Special Infantry Battalions by the U.K. might offer the opportunity to do so, there is little indication that a conceptual shift is taking place. Furthermore, whilst Western militaries recognize their obligation to support the development of stability in the aftermath of old war, few if any have the structures or doctrines to reflect this recognition.16 Significant changes to relatively small elements of its militaries could lead to a levelling of the asymmetries which have plagued Western attempts to resolve new wars, and to win the peace post-intervention.17

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16 U.S. military doctrine recognizes the requirement for stabilization operations but the organization has tended to re-role conventional forces in the aftermath of fighting inter-state wars to address the subsequent challenges of intra-state violence. Although the adaptability of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was deeply impressive, having doctrine and structures to respond to intra-state violence might have reduced both the cost and time of stabilization post-invasion. Outside of post-invasion scenarios, the argument for doctrine and structures designed for intra-state war enjoys even greater force. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning. Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011), III–43-46.
Looking to the future

The evolving concept of human security has already significantly influenced the employment of Western militaries, including that of the United States. Strategic leaders and their policy teams have accepted that remote intra-state wars can have a direct bearing on the security of their own country, and that assisting in developing internal security can mitigate transnational threats. With an eye to Western values and the pragmatic desire for long-term success of any given project, lawful practice, transparency, and accountability are at the very least implicit goals of security support, and more often overtly sought. There is an inexorable trend for Western militaries to be used to support the development of internal security which, whilst not overriding the requirement to ensure partner nation territorial integrity, has at least come to match it. Assisting in developing internal security of partner nations is part of the business of Western militaries for the foreseeable future.
Analyzing the Requirement

Although there is currently no specific framework by which to analyze the requirement for Western support to building internal security there are, outside of military planning doctrine, various models which provide a useful start point in developing one.¹ Three are explored below.

First, RAND modelling provides a useful tool for predicting the likelihood of success of security cooperation. However, the authors are explicit that “the tool does not answer the question, ‘Should the United States give security cooperation funding to countries where there is a low probability of success?’” As the authors note, it is entirely logical that policy makers will decide to conduct security cooperation with states which fall outside the criteria which the tool suggests would predict a successful partnership. Thus the decision to undertake security cooperation to build internal security must consider the risks of a fragile state failing to develop the traits which the RAND study identifies as critical to success. If translated outside of the U.S. model which it employs, the framework proposed by the RAND study does help indicate where the best lead for assistance might be found. Overlaps of interest and culture increase the likelihood of success in delivering security assistance, and the choice of lead state for such assistance appears significant. The RAND tool provides a useful start point, however its utility wanes at the point at which a country feels compelled to act in a situation where it suggests that the probability of success is low.²


Second, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy hold that all elements of human security are equally important but admit that this is not a helpful position for policy makers. To assist in a practical approach, they suggest a threshold system by which elements of human security are considered and prioritized for a given situation. This has merit when examining internal security, as there seems to be a threshold above which the government’s inability to contain violence directly undermines its legitimacy. Likewise, there is also an upper level of impotence or corruption within the judicial and corrective systems which begins to undermine the faith of the population. The authors’ concept of a threshold is a useful one in analyzing complex situations which defy empirical classification.³

Finally, in his considerations of post-war transitions in Latin America, Charles T. Call posits seven indicators of whether internal security is a primarily military or civilian function. Although Call uses the model to predict the likelihood of success of a war transition, he does so on the assumption that in a state of normalcy, internal security is a civilian function. Crucially, his research and model indicate that highly militarized states find the transition to democracy more challenging than those with a stronger civilian security component. Therefore, his proposal provides a useful framework against which to analyze potential Western support and determine whether the nature of that support is more likely to assist on the path to normalcy, or to become an impediment.⁴

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³ Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 116-122.
A Framework for Policy Makers

This section offers a model for how Western states might consider the provision of assistance to developing internal security systems in partner nations. It suggests one key consideration will shape the assistance, supported by the analysis of a number of contributing factors. Underpinning the framework is the assumption that there is a direct link between the manner in which internal security is provided and international and domestic perceptions of legitimacy. There are broad parallels with both the military mission analysis and design processes, and utilization of the framework will owe much to the latter.5

What is normalcy?

The overriding consideration for planners should be how the partner nation envisages the delivery of internal security under conditions of normalcy.6 This understanding should reflect not just the views of the political elite which run, or aspire to run, the state but also the views of the nation itself, in accordance with the preponderant culture, religion, and view of national history. Each individual case will have a culturally unique norm, which may evolve over time. Whilst international standards of humanitarian law and norms surrounding human rights are essential to international legitimacy, local stability will only be achieved through domestic legitimacy.7 There is thus a delicate balance to be struck in this critical consideration

5 JP 5-0, pg IV – 4, AJP-5, 2 – 39.
6 Normalcy is distinct from an end state as defined in NATO and UK doctrine as it does not assume the termination of Western military involvement, nor indeed the cessation of wider Western support to the partner nation. AJP-5, 2-62. By the same token, it is not equivalent to the U.S. military end state or to termination criteria. JP 5-0, III-19.
7 In contrast, Kaldor suggests that cosmopolitan law enforcement, a concept exists which somewhere between policing and military peacekeeping, is a possible mechanism for ensuring adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law. Although this concept offers a powerful tool at the international level, and adherence to humanitarian and human rights law is important to legitimacy in that context, its constructivist approach is unlikely to resonate strongly outside of a relatively small intellectual body within a nation. By harnessing domestic precedent on law enforcement instead,
if legitimacy is to be built at all levels. The path to normalcy, and the requirement for
Western assistance in travelling it, will depend on both the current shortfall in the
internal security systems and the future envisaged.

As demonstrated by Call, building significant military capability to counter
highly violent threats to internal security poses challenges to the long-term transition
to normalcy. Although Western military support may initially be required to counter
organized armed violence in partner nations, it does not necessarily follow that
developing the indigenous military as the principal means of enforcing internal
security will assist that eventual transition. Rather, policy makers will be required to
identify how a balance of military stability operations and police activity can enforce
the rule of law and how that balance might morph as conditions tend to normalcy.

This poses challenges to the current frameworks within which internal security
assistance is delivered by many Western nations, which are addressed in the
recommendations of this essay. The program of assistance should reflect the partner
nation’s conception of the enforcement of rule of law within a normalized society. In
almost all cases this will be a civilian function.

Defining normalcy also requires an analysis of the economic conditions which
are likely to underpin the internal security system. This will include not only an
assessment of potential partner nation economic capacity but also a projection of the
likely scale and duration of international support to both developing and maintaining
internal security systems within that country. The propensity of international backers
to build exquisite, expensive ‘special’ forces within the partner nation’s security

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particularly in former colonies where rule of law was widely understood, the partner nation government
is more likely to accrue consent and popular legitimacy. Kaldor, 132 – 143.

Although, like Bremner, Call also envisaged democracy rather than normalcy as the desired end state.

Call, 1-20

Schmidl, 25-40.
systems should be examined very closely; the experience of closing two campaigns suggests that a proliferation of ‘special’ forces is at odds with the need to transition to an indigenously-funded structure. Developing systems entirely congruent with the domestic concept of normalcy will still result in failure if they prove financially unsustainable.

**What is the path to normalcy?**

The path to normalcy will entail the evolution of police and military roles over time, in parallel with the development of judicial and corrections facilities. As long as the object is to improve domestic legitimacy through a demonstrable improvement to internal security, the relative prioritization of the development of these functions of state will be driven by the subjective assessment of the thresholds of public tolerance in each area.\(^{10}\) Although empirical data is often a preferred basis for decision making, the concept of legitimacy defies categorization in such terms. Prioritization of development thus becomes a continuous dialogue between the participants.

The issue of prioritization will be subject to the perspectives of those who conduct it. Political requirements, such as the need for a show of strength to a domestic audience, and organizational proclivities, such as the authorities to build military vice civilian capacity or the desire to build on a community vice government platform, have the potential to skew the analysis at this early stage. Therefore the act of prioritization will be a collaboration between Western backers and the partner nation government, informed by independent experts, in order to temper the political and organizational biases of the principal actors. The object will be to balance as far

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\(^{10}\) This idea of thresholds draws on the work of Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, albeit in a narrower context than they conceived.
as possible the interests of the domestic government (securing its population and hence its legitimacy) and Western backers (in general, reducing transnational threats).

Separate to prioritization is the issue of timing. New war is characterized by its persistence, yet on any path there are points of inflection which can render events or narratives ambiguous. Where ambiguities have chance to harden, animosities become entrenched, blurred lines become clearer, and vested interests in continued violence become stronger. 11 Periods of ambiguity render violent systems more susceptible to change than periods of entrenchment, suggesting the potential for greater return on investment during the former. In developing a path to normalcy, the key will be to recognize and exploit ambiguous times. 12

Finally, the path to normalcy of internal security should be conceived in the context of wider development programs but should not be beholden to them. Where overlap exists, especially in the work of non-governmental organizations, the partner government should be encouraged to require parallel assistance programs to coordinate their efforts with the development of internal security. This approach would reduce the burden of coordination on a weak state.

**How to conceive the support?**

For the states and non-governmental organizations providing assistance to the development of internal security, the manner in which the support is conceived will shape the nature of its delivery. Although political designs and organizational biases

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11 General Clark recognized the opportunities present during periods of ambiguity in the Kosovo conflict. Other examples of ambiguous times might include the periods immediately after the successful invasion of Iraq in 2003 and after the killing of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. General Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 423.

12 The accession of Sultan Qaboos following the palace coup in which he ousted his father from the throne is one example. With British, Jordanian, and Iranian support, the Sultan was able to stabilize Oman and defeat the communist threat from what is now Yemen. By seizing the period of ambiguity which came with the transition of power, the Sultan and his backers were able to secure long-term stability with relatively little investment. The United Kingdom benefits to this day from the outcome.
have the potential to cloud this issue, it is critical to determining the nature of the response.

If support is conceived as military aid, it has the potential to skew the development of internal security away from a path to normalcy and towards a more militarized response. This might be a legitimate decision where levels of state control are minimal and levels of violence demand military stabilization rather than the re-imposition of the rule of law. However, this is unlikely to be the case for an entire country and it is equally unlikely to support the long-term vision of civilianized internal security. The benefits of this model are the deployable military capabilities available to implement it, their ability to operate in high levels of threat, and often high levels of military funding available. Yet, in the majority of cases, conceiving support in this way potentially challenges both the vision of normalcy and the path to realizing it.

Support could be conceived as non-military security assistance to a partner nation, as has been the case with much of the increased U.S. counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and counter-narcotics activity since the attacks of 9/11.13 This categorization perhaps confers greater flexibility in selecting the target audience for support and is more appropriate to developing civilian security systems. In the U.S. case, however, this model is undermined by the gap between the concept and the delivery mechanism. As the Department of State delegates the implementation of security assistance programs to the Department of Defense, support conceived as civilian assumes a distinctly military hue, most obviously in the limitations imposed on U.S. military engagement with civilian security organizations in partner nations.

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Outside of the U.S., other Western militaries enjoy slightly greater freedom in this regard and support may be provided to non-military partners.

Alternatively, assistance could be conceived as a function of development. This has the potential to link the assistance to wider work to improve human security within a partner nation, might depoliticize the program, and allows more collegial work with organizations inherently skeptical of security activity. In harnessing capacity to provide parallel development in judicial and corrective systems, and indeed human security more widely, this might be a highly desirable outcome in some scenarios. However, the associated blurring of the responsibilities of diplomatic, development, and defense departments or ministries would require wider conceptual shifts in Western governments than are covered in this analysis of the impact on the military role.

**Who should lead the support?**

If form is to follow function, then the selection of the lead for assisting a partner nation in developing its internal security should reflect both the balance between military and police operations, the partner nation’s vision of normalcy, and – most important of all – the agreed path to realizing it. The lead should fall to that organization which is best able to conceive and implement the ways to achieve the vision, based on its role and expertise. This will demand an intimate understanding of a partner nation’s conception of security and its historical implementation of the rule of law, as well as a detailed understanding of the current internal security challenges. Moreover, because of the sensitivities associated with the sovereignty of the state, it will call for highly developed relationships at all levels of government to facilitate the assistance program, as will the realization of a future which is the vision of the partner nation rather than those working to help it.
The selection of the lead thus operates on two levels. At the highest level is the agreement on the lead state in the assistance program, or possibly in the selection of the trans- or supranational entity which will assume that function. As the RAND study indicates, cultural ties will play a strong part, as will language.14 But resource and interest are often likely to be the key determinants. The selection ultimately lies with the partner nation but it does also require a high level of coordination on a multilateral level. The lower level of the decision is the selection by that state or organization of the department or arm that it charges with the program. At both levels, this leadership is likely to be a civilian function if form is to follow function, perhaps excluding military alliances and departments of defense from the leadership role.

**What are the limits of the support?**

Just as the path to normalcy should be conceived in concert with the partner nation, so should the limits of external support. These will depend on thresholds of perception, both within the partner nation and at the international level.

The first issue is of sovereignty, that which the partner nation is willing to cede in the development of its internal security apparatus. As a general rule, where the issues of stability are so acute that its survival is in doubt, and Western military support is required, the partner nation will be more willing to make significant compromises in areas normally considered to be exclusively sovereign. These are likely to include participation in the development of internal security policy, strategy, and planning; routine or embedded access within domestic security institutions; and possibly some international delivery of security functions. Setting these limits will also provide reasonable evidence of the partner nation’s willingness to undergo reform or development of its internal security systems.

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The second issue is that of sufficiency, grounded in the notion of thresholds proposed by Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy. Sufficiency determines what level of development is required to both improve stability and improve perceptions of government legitimacy. Almost invariably, the thresholds for both will be lower for a domestic audience (conditioned to high levels of instability and low levels of legitimacy) than for a Western audience (conditioned to low levels of violence and high expectations of government). Setting the limitations for Western support based on a partner-nation understanding of sufficiency will cut both cost and time and is intimately linked to the development of the path to normalcy.  

Analysis of the requirement

Although the overriding consideration concerning the nature of normalcy will drive the analysis, this framework is not proposed as a linear process. Rather the analysis will be an iterative, discursive consideration of the factors which will support the realization of a state of normalcy. In many cases the factors will be in tension, particularly those determining how the support is conceived and which department, ministry, or international organization should lead. The solution is likely to be a compromise, one that can be adjusted as levels of internal security rise or decline. The nature of the information required to conduct this analysis suggests that the process will be undertaken with the government of the partner nation and with independent advisors who are well-versed in both local and regional dynamics. This activity

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15 Measuring human security or government legitimacy is probably impossible. But it may be possible to develop proxy indicators; one might be to measure levels of domestic and international investment in a country. Investment (as a manifestation of confidence both domestically and internationally) might approximately reflect perceptions of both security and legitimacy, although in a post-invasion scenario models would have to allow for the war economy which tends to spring up around major Western bases but does not represent long-term confidence or stability. This aside, an analysis of investment has the additional benefit of scalability, allowing a level of granularity at the local or regional level which could inform a more nuanced understanding of the security challenges at the sub-national level.
cannot be the preserve of planners working in geographical isolation from the prospective partner.
Guatemala Case Study

Guatemala is a state which exists on the low right-side of the J-curve, above the sump of failed states but unable to elevate itself further because of the pernicious effects of transnational crime, gang warfare and corruption. The stability of Guatemala, on the land bridge between continents, has a direct bearing the United States but its utility as a case study goes much further than this. Guatemala provides a study of the rehabilitation of a state after it has conducted years of brutal repression against large segments of its own population, and a study in how Western interests since that time have not aligned closely with Guatemala’s. Today, transnational criminal organizations, gangs, and the corruption of the state have led to levels of violence waged for commercial or personal gain, rather than political or social objectives, which regularly overmatch civilian law enforcement. Yet this is to view Guatemala in an instant. Taking a historical perspective on Guatemala highlights critical lessons in the challenges of building security in the aftermath of intra-state war, and what challenges to internal security systems may arise if the systems are not built or reconstituted sufficiently swiftly after violence decreases. Like many other states which have made the transition from authoritarian regimes, Guatemala aspires to openness, stability and prosperity but lacks the means to deliver itself from its current condition.

Normalcy and criminal insurgency

Such are the challenges posed today by criminal violence that, writing for the Strategic Studies Institute, Hal Brands argues that Guatemala, like many other Latin American countries, is facing levels of violence and degradation of the state that has much in common with the insurgencies witnessed in other parts of the globe.
Although he admits that the aspirations of the criminal gangs undermining the state are pecuniary rather than political, Brands paints a picture of Guatemala on the edge of failing.¹ Brands’ comparison with insurgency bears scrutiny in terms of the effects of the crime and some of its methods, but not necessarily in terms of the rationale. Sullivan and Bunker recognize this, using criminal insurgencies to describe organizations which seek to destabilize their host state to the extent that they can conduct criminal activity unimpeded, without seeking the trappings of government.² In the case of Guatemala, the level of penetration of the components of internal security by drug trafficking organizations and ‘hidden powers’ render the former sufficiently ineffective that the latter can pursue illicit wealth unhindered.³ The challenges to normalcy are legion: the capacity and willingness of the organs of state to confront criminality are weakened; violence exceeds the capacity of the security systems; and political leaders appear either complicit or impotent by turn.⁴ Brands proposes a solution which has much in common with counter-insurgency doctrine.

But using the language of insurgency risks invoking connotations of a military response, which would be difficult to reconcile with the Guatemalan vision of normalcy. During the twentieth century the government of Guatemala continued a historical trend of employing its security apparatus, including the military, to maintain deep divisions within Guatemalan society and preserve the power of the ruling elite.

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³ Brands, 9-10.
⁴ President of Guatemala Jimmy Morales was elected on the basis of a campaign slogan “neither corrupt, nor a thief.” This somewhat low bar for political office was, and remains, both a reflection of the level of rot in the Guatemalan state described by Brands and the level of popular discontent with the status quo. Jimmy Morales: How the comedian became president of Guatemala. The Independent. 13 Jan 2016.
through a campaign of violence against elements of the population.\textsuperscript{5} The human rights violations conducted by the Guatemalan military during this time led to a suspension of U.S. military assistance, limited elements of which have been gradually reinstated under the Merida and Central America Regional Security Initiatives.\textsuperscript{6} The peace accord of 1996 sought to establish normalcy within the country by returning the military to the role of territorial defense against external threats and removing it from the political process, with some success. However, since then, the Guatemalan military has been increasingly called upon to support the police in dealing with rising criminal violence within the country. Yet, because of its history and in the face of increasing levels of violence, the vision of normalcy for Guatemala remains one of internal security delivered by civilian organizations.\textsuperscript{7}

The long road

Despite the vision of normalcy and today’s creeping return of the military into Guatemala’s internal security, in the immediate aftermath of the civil war – a period of ambiguity – the relatively rapid removal of the military from this arena without the ability to replace it with a viable police presence actually inhibited a long-term transition to normalcy. The inevitable consequence of this was a security vacuum, notwithstanding the fact that in many areas it was the military which had conducted the armed, organized violence against elements of the population. The aftermath of Guatemala’s civil war highlights the complexity of changing the balance of military stabilization and civilian police operations over time, especially when some or all of

these organizations are active or complicit in the internal violence. The return of the Guatemalan military to a limited internal security role shows how the balance may shift away from the vision of normalcy if violence escalates beyond the level which can be contained by civilian organizations, although this should be a temporary measure to regain stability.\(^8\) The rate at which a nation travels the path to normalcy will depend heavily on the capacity of the components of its internal security system to assume changing roles. In the case of Guatemala, despite significant external assistance, civilian elements of the internal security system have struggled to control rising violence.

Models for conceiving support

In his study of responses to gang violence, José Miguel Cruz contends that the very policies enacted by the northern Central American governments to counter the rise of gang activity have led to the current levels of violence.\(^9\) In his analysis of the responses of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, he suggests that the ‘broad brush’ policies adopted by the former three states actually fueled the rise of the gangs by: exacerbating extralegal violence by the state; encouraging vigilante groups from the population; and incarcerating huge numbers of gang members. He suggests that not only were the *mano dura* (iron fist) policies inspired by the U.S. – specifically policing in New York – but also that they were at least tacitly supported by U.S. representatives in those countries. At the end of the civil war, the point at which there

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was the greatest potential to build Guatemalan government legitimacy after decades of conflict, Cruz argues that foreign support focused on the short-term political need to counter gangs and drug trafficking at the cost of the longer-term development of transparent, lawful, and accountable internal security.\(^\text{10}\) Conceiving support under a broader framework of internal security assistance vice focused anti-gang or counter-narcotics support might have helped move Guatemala closer to a vision of normalcy, and perhaps come closer to realizing U.S. policy objectives.

Recognizing the issues with both military aid and the non-military security assistance described above, USAID has attempted to grow security from the ground up in Guatemala through projects which are conceived more in the development mode. The Latin American Public Opinion Project evaluation of USAID’s community-based crime and violence prevention approach in Central America finds a strong correlation between that program and improved, or at least stable, perceptions of security. Although the report strongly advocates the pursuit of such policies in preference to the “arms race” between law enforcement and gangs in Central America, this approach sees no significant change in the popular perceptions of government.\(^\text{11}\) It appears very challenging to improve government legitimacy through a grass-roots approach without a strategic dimension. This approach seems unlikely to provide the long-term structures required for a transition to normalcy, although community policing is undoubtedly an important component of a broad approach to internal security.

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Guatemala suffers the effects of both transnational crime and gang violence, each of which could shape how support to internal security is conceived. The examples above illustrate the importance of conceiving support not only in the mode which suits the Western backer but also in the domestic context of a wider collapse of security and legitimacy. For Guatemala gang violence is the most immediate threat, whereas the effects of drug trafficking, the immediate preoccupation of the West, are insidious over the longer term.

Leading support to Guatemala

Although Guatemala’s geography and diaspora make the U.S. its natural partner, some of the greatest developments in internal security have been conducted with support from the U.N. The joint development of the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has ceded some of the sovereign function of investigation and prosecution of Guatemalan state employees to an international non-governmental organization.\(^\text{12}\) The choice of the U.N. as Guatemala’s partner in this endeavor militated potential popular discontent over such an abrogation of sovereign power, perhaps due to the positive popular perceptions of the U.N. following its role in the negotiation of the 1996 Peace Accords. Popular perceptions of the U.S. are very different, given its reported support to the Guatemalan government during the civil war and backlash against its recent attempts to repatriate elements of the Guatemalan diaspora. The existence of the CICIG, and its relative success, indicates the utility of international non-governmental organizations, particularly where Western supporters wish to distance themselves from the assistance to preserve diplomatic freedom of maneuver.

The limits of assistance

Although the work of the CICIG gives some indication of the likely limits of the intrusions of sovereignty which Guatemala might countenance in pursuit of improved internal security, it is very hard to draw conclusions on what an understanding of sufficiency might be in this arena – although the low bar set by the recent Presidential elections suggests that domestic and international understandings might differ considerably. A rather more fundamental limit to internal security assistance was identified in the 2016 Political Risk Services report on Guatemala: in contrast to the vast sums of money flowing through the country as a result of the drug trade, the Guatemalan government is unable to raise the revenue to provide for a functioning state. Brands even suggests that in 2009 the revenue of transnational criminal organizations exceeded the security budget by a factor of ten. Although this has clear implications for the long-term sustainability of any program of assistance to developing internal security systems, this starkly demonstrates the limits of developing government legitimacy through transparent, lawful, and accountable internal security. In the face of such inadequacies, assistance to developing internal security systems is of value only in the context of a wider program of support.

Lessons from Guatemala

The development of the internal security systems in Guatemala is a case of the rehabilitation of the state following a prolonged period of repression of the population. Guatemala passed from an authoritarian, closed government to a weakly functioning condition of normalcy but was unable to reinforce the transition by

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13 See footnote 4 above on President Jimmy Morales’ winning slogan “neither corrupt, nor a thief.”
14 Brands, 45.
demonstrating both a monopoly on violence and its lawful application. Given the history of its civil war, the manner in which Guatemala provides internal security is key. This strongly reinforces the importance of understanding the national vision of normalcy when designing Western support.

External assistance which responds to very specific elements of a breakdown in internal security, even when conceived in a manner which is coherent with the vision of normalcy, threatens to undermine its attainment. Against the pervasive malaise of the state, narrow projects will do little to improve government legitimacy and they have little tangible benefit for the majority of the population. Despite the categories proposed in the framework for analysis, it may be that neither non-military security assistance nor development are appropriate. Rather, it might prove that a hybrid mechanism is needed to provide a strategic dimension to local ownership or vice versa.

Guatemala is a country whose hopes for the future are intrinsically linked to a domestic role for international non-governmental organizations, as shown by the CICIG. The more apolitical nature of the relationships between weak states and international non-governmental organizations, vice those with major powers, have great utility in areas where national pride is linked to sovereignty – particularly where external influence could be construed as a violation. The relative success of the CICIG suggests that there is a greater role for international non-governmental organizations in assisting in the development of internal security than has perhaps been the case in the last decade.
West Bank Case Study

The experience of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank provides a useful study of the role of sub-state entities in building local and regional security. All internal security structures have roots in their national history and in the case of the West Bank, the roots of today’s Palestinian security forces lie in their insurgent struggles to secure territory. Although these struggles might not have been new wars, they were its harbingers and in their resumption would certainly fit the criteria.¹

The challenge for the Palestinian National Authority is to demonstrate that its security forces have successfully transitioned from paramilitary or terrorist operations attacking the Israeli state to civilian policing capable of directly supporting the Palestinian government and indirectly the Israeli. Without a clear demonstration of this transition, the Palestinian National Authority will lack legitimacy in the eyes of both Israel and the international community. But building domestic legitimacy simultaneously demands a degree of distance between the security force and the Israeli state. These challenges will not be unusual in future instances where Western militaries are called to support the development of sub-state entities, indeed the future of northern Iraq (perhaps someday Kurdistan) and parts of eastern Syria might hinge on it.² This will offer considerable challenges for those who choose to assist these aspirant proto-states.

¹ Kaldor, 31.
From insurgents to policemen

In his history of Palestinian security forces, Brynjar Lia charts the modern evolution of the Palestinian Police from the Arab Revolt of 1936-9. Although he focuses on police rather than security forces more widely, the key tenets hold equally for both. He shows that the antecedents of the police lie in the insurgent groups which have controlled Palestinian territories since the Arab Revolt, a history which is common to the wide variety of Palestinian security forces. At various times between the 1930s and the present day, Palestinians have held territory in Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, forcing both the Palestinian leadership and their hosts to address a wealth of public order and law enforcement problems as a result. In each case the critical issue lies in the paradox of maintaining security for a population whilst possessing neither territorial inviolability nor legal sovereignty. 3 What is most striking is that part of the Palestinian movement, which has embraced terrorism and insurgency for large parts of its history, apparently holds a long-term vision of normalcy whereby internal security is a civilian function rooted in the rule of law and the path to statehood implies commitment to international norms.4 This demonstrates that a violent struggle for self-determination by sub-national groups, perhaps even some considered terrorist organizations, need not preclude a vision of stability and ultimately legitimacy for the future.

4 There is a clear distinction here between the approaches of Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Although this is not to suggest that Hamas does not ultimately share the same vision of normalcy as Fatah, Hamas has not demonstrated as clearly that it recognizes a link between the manner in which it pursues security and the international legitimacy of its government.
Although Lia’s history is commanding, it is necessarily limited in scope; charting the history of other elements of the Palestinian security apparatus at the unclassified level is rendered very difficult by the sensitivity of the subject matter. Nevertheless, Lia’s work offers a useful framework for considering the issues which face the Palestinian internal security forces as a whole.

Small steps to sovereignty

The paradox of sovereignty and territory presented by Lia should present a fundamental barrier to the development of effective, autonomous internal security within the limited territory, not least because the perception may develop that the Palestinian security forces are simply Israeli proxies. Indeed, some media reporting suggests that this is already the case and, with the hopes of a Palestinian state disappearing, that a significant majority of Palestinians favor ending security cooperation with Israel. Mandy Turner, in the Review of International Studies, makes an even stronger case, arguing convincingly that international peace building efforts, including programs to develop the Palestinian security forces, are simply mechanisms to further an Israeli counter-insurgency campaign seeking to ensure the quiet acquiescence of the Palestinian population.

Although Turner’s argument is particularly compelling, it does not account for Lia’s view that security forces, particularly the police, may be agents of political change themselves. Lia’s view reinforces the link between the manner in which internal security is provided and perceptions of government legitimacy, although he approaches this from the opposite angle to the growth of the Palestinian security forces by citing the development of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as a contributing factor to resolution of the insurgency in Northern Ireland in the late twentieth century.
Nor does Turner’s argument allow that the Palestinian National Authority must make some tangible contribution to the security of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples if it is to credibly advance its claims as the legitimate government of its territory, regardless of how unpalatable the circumstances of that contribution may be for the Palestinian National Authority itself.5

The experience of the Palestinian National Authority and the development of its security forces teaches that an analysis of the path to normalcy will not simply hinge on the transition from military stabilization to civilian policing on behalf of the state (in this case Israel). In many cases this transition will be inextricably linked to the development of internal security systems at the sub-national or sub-federal level. Where these lower levels represent aspirant states or autonomous regions the path will be complicated by the need to demonstrate that former insurgents or separatists can provide internal security in a manner that does not threaten the existence of the federal government or, where sub-national entities achieve independence, new neighbors. The successful parallel evolution of both state and sub-national security systems will hinge on the confidence built through adherence to both domestic and international norms. It follows that security assistance to sub-national entities holds little chance of success if not conducted in the context of wider engagement with the state in which it exists.

Non-military assistance?

The obligations of both the Israeli and Palestinian governments under the 2003 Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (or roadmap) are ‘predicated on the understanding that security is a core issue upon which Israeli-Palestinian peace depends.’ The U.S. established the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to provide assistance to the Palestinian Authority in developing security and coordinating with the government of Israel. In his description of his work, the then USSC Lt Gen Keith Dayton highlights the support which the USSC, under a program run by the Department of State, is providing to the Ministry of Interior in assisting the development of the National Security Forces. The program offers an example of how military forces can be employed to develop non-military internal security systems in sub-national partners. Of note is that much of the initial training is conducted in Jordan, outside of the West Bank, to reduce domestic influences on recruits and to improve enculturation to the nascent Palestinian state architecture. This has the potential to help reduce over time the links that Lia draws between the Palestinian Police and its insurgent antecedents.

But in his analysis of US support to the development of Palestinian security forces, Jim Zanotti highlights some of its ambiguities. He writes that the National Security Forces lack the powers of arrest when employed on rule of law operations. He also believes that the structure and scale of the National Security Forces begs

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questions of their future. On one hand he suggests that they appears too small to make a significant contribution to security in the nine governates of the West Bank, on the other he highlights concerns that this is in fact a Palestinian ‘proto-Army’. The ambiguities which Zanotti details are a function of the gap between how the assistance to the Palestinian National Authority is conceived, as non-military security assistance, and the means available to deliver it. The U.S. military is legally prohibited from assisting non-military security forces overseas yet, by building military capability within the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, the program potentially undermines its own rationale. The example suggests that genuine shifts to Western military assistance to building internal security systems may require legal and policy changes, as well as structural and doctrinal evolution within Western militaries. Nevertheless, the program offers a good example of how support might be conceived.

Other international backers of the Palestinian National Authority have conceived support in the development mode, most notably where they have sought to improve other elements of the internal security system. In their analysis of European Union security sector reform, Dimitris Bouris and Stuart Reigeluth state that European Union projects to develop the equally important judicial and corrective systems have been fundamentally hindered by a bottom-up focus on governance rather than a top-down government approach. The authors note the paradox of the European Union expecting local actors to act in accordance with good governance and the rule of law but failing to complement its own bottom-up efforts with a top-down program to help reconcile the issue of Palestinian sovereignty with Israel. In his study of perceptions of the USSC’s role, Karapatakis neatly captures the issue faced by the

8 Zanotti, 204.
European Union when he notes that local ownership has no strategic dimension – a seemingly common shortfall of the development mode.9

The challenges of leadership

Zanotti deals more widely with the breadth of Palestinian internal security forces than Dayton or Lia and highlights some of the contradictions both within those forces and amongst their external backers. He draws directly on the writings of Yezid Sayigh, who highlights the tendency within the Palestinian population to view the USSC-sponsored National Security Forces as responsible for the human rights abuses and political intimidation which he blames on Palestinian intelligence agencies. Although Sayigh draws a clear line between the activities of the CIA in supporting these agencies and the entirely distinct activities of the USSC, he suggests that making this distinction is increasingly difficult for the Palestinian population.10 Zanotti’s analysis also extends to the role of the National Security Forces in support of the Palestinian Civil Police, and suggests that the popular belief that the CIA is funding the National Security Forces is undermining the civil police’s opportunity to shape public opinions.11

By exposing how divergent interpretations of U.S. interests in countering terrorism and building stability undermine their successful pursuit, Zanotti and Sayigh present a useful reminder of how even a single external backer can severely

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11 Zanotti, 202.
complicate the development of internal security in partner nations. As Western militaries move into assisting the development of internal security systems, they will nudge closer to what was once the preserve of intelligence agencies. It may be necessary to ensure that the leadership of both military and intelligence agency assistance to developing internal security systems falls under the same department of government of the Western backers.

The limits of support

An understanding of sufficiency in the development of Palestinian security forces is complicated by the multiplicity of thresholds for internal security. For the Israeli government, Palestinian internal security systems must be capable and willing to forestall threats both to the Palestinian and Israeli nations without posing a threat to the existence of the latter. For the Palestinian nation, its internal security must be sufficiently strong not only to protect the population from armed, organized violence, but also from the violence it has endured from the Israeli state – a much higher bar than Israel could tolerate. And the Palestinian National Authority will seek sufficient capability that it can demonstrate to the international community that it is both competent and capable to administer its territory. The tension between these thresholds reinforces the necessity for the development of systems which can only serve internal security, if they are not to cross a line which is unpalatable to Israel. This does not mean a dilution of capability against the threat but rather selection and training of security forces to deliver security through the civilian rule of law, rather than any military construct.
Lessons from the West Bank

The Palestinian government under President Abbas faces monumental challenges to its claims to legitimacy. It enjoys no territorial contiguity, levels of jurisdiction within Palestinian pockets vary considerably, and Palestinian institutions have no sovereignty over Israeli citizens. It may be that the structural disagreements between the Israeli and Palestinian governments have hardened to the point that a two-state solution is now unachievable. It is absolutely certain that the issue of the legitimacy of the Palestinian National Authority and the realization of Palestinian statehood hang on far more than how internal security is delivered. 12

And yet the Palestinian National Authority has to demonstrate to Israel, to the international community, and to its own people that it has moved on from its insurgent roots. At the very heart of this is the clear demonstration that the manner in which its leadership construe the use of violence has changed. Without this, it cannot make a claim to legitimacy. This is common to many sub-national entities across the globe, some of which were highlighted in the earlier discussion in their role in developing stability. Although assistance to the development of internal security is but a single component of a far-reaching, multinational panoply of support, it is fundamental to the success of the Palestinian National Authority’s claim to legitimacy. If the West is truly serious in its attempts to assist proto-states gain legitimacy, it must redress legislation which prevents its militaries delivering exactly the support those entities require – to civilian security organizations.

12 The view that the structural disagreements between the Israeli and Palestinian governments may have hardened to the point that a two-state solution is now unachievable was presented to the author at a visit to Brookings Institute in late 2016. A few months later and the future of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is certainly in severe doubt, reinforcing the centrality of Israeli (and more widely the parent state) will in allowing the development of sub-national (proto-state offspring) internal security systems. Nevertheless, the work of the USSC remains an excellent start point from which Western militaries could further development support to internal security systems.
Recommendations

The rise of new war, the proliferation of sub-national entities striving for statehood, and rising transnational threats all demand that the West reconsiders its support to the development of internal security. Although this essay concludes that the number of instances in which the West will seek to improve internal security in partner nations is relatively limited, a small number of disproportionately destabilizing conflicts demand an increase in Western military support – such as that now occurring in Iraq and Syria. Whilst this will not require a wholesale reform of the conventional capabilities which deter inter-state war, it does demand that a small component of Western militaries undertake the significant conceptual shift to building capacity under a civilian rule of law. Some of the factors associated with this shift are considered below, using Rupert Smith’s framework. The military contribution to developing internal security systems will be but one component of a broader response to intra-state war, delivered by a variety of state and non-state actors with highly diverse organizational cultures; indeed it cannot but fail if conducted in the absence of a wider scheme of support.

Forming

Conventional Western military forces will be increasingly tasked to deliver support to developing internal security systems, an activity that was once largely the preserve of special forces but which now outstrips the capacity of the latter to do so. This is not to argue for a wholesale expansion of Western special forces but rather to suggest the formation of organizations with the specific role of developing internal security systems – perhaps up to 5% of regular land forces might assume this role. The organizations will not be special forces as understood as elite units, the
distillation of martial spirit, but forces which are *specialized*. The British Army’s Specialised Infantry Battalions and the US Army’s Regionally Aligned Brigades might be developed to fulfill this function. Specialized elements of Western militaries should anticipate providing support across a spectrum of law enforcement ranging from military stabilization to high-threat police operations, conducted in the context of wider development of all three components of internal security.

The permanent structure of specialized organizations fulfilling this role would reflect this function and context, drawing on both military and civilian police personnel to provide the necessary expertise. The latter presents difficulties in most Western states, where police are generally in high demand and short supply. But relatively early retirement ages from public service and general improvements in health and fitness suggest that it may be possible to recruit retired police into a second career, to develop inter-service loans of senior personnel, or to employ Reserve-service mechanisms to bring civilian police expertise into military structures. The role for military police in such structures would be relatively limited, given the requirement to develop civilian structures. Nevertheless, as specialized military organizations, the permanent structures would remain predominantly military with civilian police personnel in key training, planning and operational roles.

Individual operations would require mission-specific forces according to how the support was conceived, the balance between military stabilization and police operations, the vision of normalcy agreed with the partner nation, and the levels of instability. This will require adaptability in the force structure of the Western military organizations charged with delivering the support as the balance between military and police capability changed over time in specific operations. In the face of often slow-moving military bureaucracies, there are two methods by which adaptability might be
enhanced. The first is through partnering, whereby capability is brought into the specialized organization from other Western states or international non-government organizations. This might include Western para-military law enforcement agencies, militaries or police forces within the region the operation is conducted in, or trans-national organizations such as Interpol or Europol. The second is to harness the commercial security sector to provide both specific capabilities and increased capacity at short notice. Commercial partnering would allow specialized organizations to hire indigenous or regional experts, to generate additional training capacity at short notice, and to alter the balance of the organization in response to changing security conditions.\(^1\) Where large-scale military stabilization was required, the specialised organizations might be required to form the backbone of a wider conventional military effort – both in operations and training.

It is entirely in keeping with the emergence of a new paradigm of war that the response should represent a significant shift for Western militaries. It is likely to require the routine employment of non-military personnel, permanent relationships with commercial providers, and flexible organizations capable of absorbing a wide range of state and non-state actors, all of which will present significant challenges to current human resource management systems in Western militaries. These measures may recover a degree of symmetry between the challenges of intra-state war and the responses available to the West.

Deploying

Just as the form of the organizations responding to a breakdown in internal security will challenge the twentieth century models evolved to inter-state war, so will

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\(^1\) The idea of commercial partnering in military capacity building belongs to Brigadier Charles Walker DSO, British Army.
their deployments. As the West Bank case study suggested, support to developing internal security in partner nations may require a broader deployment both to harness regional capabilities and to allow some of the support to take place outside of the societal and security pressures which it is designed to address. This may be particularly relevant to support to sub-national entities where limited territory precludes the ability to remove a training audience from the immediate pressures of the task they face, or the pressures of the groups or factions from which they are drawn.

As the development of security systems is both slower and less intensive than combat operations, deployments will be conceived in different timeframes. The duration of the operation will be measured in years rather than months, with direct implications for the forces employed. Wherever security conditions permit this will lead to permanent postings rather than operational deployments, at least for key staff. Training teams might be able to cycle through this framework but short tour lengths and repeated visits by the same teams should be used to ensure both personal and organizational familiarity between the trainers and their audience.

Assisting a partner government in developing legitimacy through transparent, accountable and lawful internal security systems is a project to change perceptions of both international and domestic audiences, requiring a broad application of military capability in both time and space. This is somewhat at odds with the doctrines of concentration of force associated with inter-state wars of the twentieth century. For the relatively small military organizations charged with providing this support, the key will be to avoid a death by a thousand cuts as the demand increases. Although deployments might be low-density, their number should be correspondingly low if the capability is to remain effective.
Directing

Specialized military organizations to support the development of internal security will remain under military command, notwithstanding their internal balance of civilian and military personnel. However, depending on the manner in which the support is conceived and which department leads, these specialized organizations must also be capable of operating under direct civilian control. This will call for highly developed relationships between the military organizations and the diplomatic or development departments which they facilitate. In the event that specialized military organizations are deployed under the lead of a multinational body, most likely the U.N., diplomatic departments may also be required to assist the interface between the two. Even in a post-intervention scenario this remains valid, as an analysis of the requirement for support to developing internal security is likely to suggest that a civilian lead for this element of the wider operation is appropriate even here.

The wider international assistance to the development of components of internal security which are not the purview of the military will call for close collaboration with a highly diverse set of actors if the military element is to effectively support the development of partner nation legitimacy. Although civilian control of the operation will assist in overcoming some of the challenges here, the military organization will be required to interface at both the tactical and operational levels in order to collaborate effectively. This will call for a maturity and level of education which may exceed that of conventional military units. Although this level of international interaction is more commonly associated with special forces, this is again a driver for specialization rather than the creation of elite units.
Although specialized organizations to support the development of internal security in partner nations will not be special forces in the traditional sense, these organizations will require greater ability to operate at the political-military interface than equivalent units and formations in the conventional force. This will have a direct bearing on the maturity and experience of those serving in this field.

Sustaining

The low density of forces supporting the development of internal security systems, the prolonged duration of the task, and the requirement to be intimately integrated with the partner nation security forces will place great stress on sustainment systems optimized for support to twentieth-century war. The peculiar challenge of sustaining these specialized organizations once deployed will be the need to minimise their infrastructure footprint and logistic demand whilst maintaining acceptable levels of force protection. In an operational environment where the security situation changes relatively frequently, this will demand greater flexibility for deployed elements to determine their own requirements and meet them through local arrangements. Local contracting through sub-unit arrangements might be one option if military support elements are not to swiftly outnumber those delivering the operation. This will represent another significant shift for many Western militaries.

Recovering

The issue of recovery is less pertinent than the issue of transitions between stages as internal security systems develop (or regress) in the partner nation. Maintaining institutional memory in Western militaries is intensely problematic in an age where information management is complicated by the sheer volume of data produced by modern computer systems. When forces are recovered from supporting
the development of internal security systems in a particular partner nation, the organization will need to codify the knowledge gained through the partnership in case it is called back in the future. Persistence is central to the nature of intra-state war, and regression in internal security is highly likely over the medium term. Having the ability to resume support from a position of knowledge will be invaluable to the organizations working to counter it.
Conclusion

New war and its violent criminal counterparts will be an enduring feature of the twenty-first century. Although the West is likely to intervene only where its interests are directly threatened, the rising incidence of new war suggest that this will become more and more common. The military is likely to remain the instrument of choice, or perhaps necessity, but Western militaries are, by and large, poorly adapted to resolving intra-state conflict. This is not a call for wholesale military reform but a suggestion for the evolution of a part to respond to a new, additional paradigm of war.

Assistance in developing internal security systems which are transparent, lawful and accountable will support the legitimacy of those governments which the West seeks to back in resolving new wars. These may not be limited to the states which have become familiar during the twentieth century and will include a number of proto-states and sub-national actors which offer a chance to develop local stability. An analysis of the requirement for Western assistance to developing internal security, whether in support of states or non-states, must be informed by a clear understanding of the domestic vision of normalcy, at both the popular and political levels. This suggests an iterative, discursive approach to the analysis, conducted by a variety of experts, domestic representatives and prospective international backers. There may also be a rising role for international non-governmental organizations in this field. It is certain that in the vast majority of cases, the vision of normalcy will be civil-led internal security systems.

Realizing this vision will place unusual demands on the militaries which are called to support it. In some cases this may require legal and policy changes in order that they can partner effectively with civilian organizations. In all cases it will require
a conceptual and structural shift in the small elements which are specialised to
undertake this role.

This essay concludes that supporting the development of transparent,
accountable and lawful internal security systems overseas requires a fundamental shift
in the contribution from the West. Specifically, a better analysis of the requirement
will enable a more appropriate military contribution to building security.
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Vita

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