Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania

Edited by Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer
This book is dedicated to the people of Vanuatu who are recovering from the devastating impact of Cyclone Pam, which struck the country on March 13, 2015.
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The Port Vila event gathered 48 senior attendees from 21 nations and territories, key regional and international organizations, and leading academic and non-governmental organizations from across the Pacific Islands region. Among the nations and territories represented were Australia, China, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Guam, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United States, and Vanuatu. Also represented were three pivotal regional organizations (the Pacific Islands Forum, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, and MSG), the United Nations Development Programme Regional Pacific Center, and FemLINKPACIFIC, a regional non-governmental organization addressing work related to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Workshop discussions and interactions provided a
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Finally, we would like to end with a disclaimer that the opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not represent the official policies or positions of their organizations and governments.

Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer
Abbreviations and Glossary

AAPTC- Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres
ACFID- Australian Council for International Development
ACMC- Australian Civil Military Centre
ADF-POTC- Australian Defence Force Peace Operations Training Centre
AFP- Australian Federal Police
AFPIDG- Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group
ANZAC- Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
ANZUS- Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ARF- ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUD- Australian Dollar
CAVR- Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação
(Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)
CHOGM- Commonwealth Meeting of Heads of Government
CoESPU -European Union’s Centre of Excellence for Stability Policing Units
COM - Congress of Micronesia
COPs- Conferences of the Parties
CPLP- Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese Language Countries)
CROP- Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific
DCP- Defense Capability Plan
DMRR- Defense Midpoint Rebalancing Review
DPKO- Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DWP- Defense White Paper
EEZ- Exclusive Economic Zone
FFA- Pacific Islands Forum Fishery Agency
F-FDTL- Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (Timor-Leste Defence Force)
FLNKS- Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front)
FMM- Foreign Ministers Mission
FRANZ- France, Australia and New Zealand agreement
FRSC- Forum Regional Security Committee
FRWP- Federal Republic of West Papua
FSM- Federated States of Micronesia
GK- GARUDA/KOOKABURRA Exercise
GCCA - Global Climate Change Alliance
Abbreviations and Glossary

HA/DR- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IAPTC- International Association of Peace Training Centres
iCLIM- Pacific Climate Change Information Management Project
IDG- International Deployment Group
IPCC- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISA- International Seabed Authority
KNPB- Komite Nasional Papua Barat (National Committee for West Papua)
LDC- Least Developed Countries
MAP- Mutual Assistance Programme
MAT-Mobile Assistance Team
MSG- Melanesian Spearhead Group
NAP- National Action Plan
NAPAs- National Adaptation Plans of Action
NOAA- National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
NZ- New Zealand
OECD- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PaCIS -Pacific Climate Information System
PACOM- U.S. Pacific Command
PET- Policy Evaluation and Training
PICs- Pacific Island Countries
PICT- Pacific Island Countries and Territories
PIDF- Pacific Islands Development Forum
PIF- Pacific Islands Forum
PIFS- Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
PIPA- Pacific Islands Producers Association
PI-POTC -Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre
PIR- Pacific Islands Region
PIRCA- Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment
PJ- PIRAP/JABIRU Exercise
PLA Navy- People’s Liberation Army Navy
PMG- Peace Monitoring Group
PNA- Parties to the Nauru Agreement
PNG- Papua New Guinea
PNGDF- Papua New Guinea Defense Force
PNGLNG- Papua New Guinea Liquefied Natural Gas Project
POS- Peace Operations Seminar
PPBP- Pacific Patrol Boat Program
PRAN- Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru
PRC-People’s Republic of China
RAMSI- Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RSIP- Royal Solomon Islands Police
RSIPF- Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
SBY - Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SIDS - Small Island Developing States
SPC - South Pacific Community
SPC/SOPAC - Secretariat of the Pacific Community
SPEC - South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation
SPOCC - South Pacific Organizations Coordinating Committee
SPREP - Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
SRO - Single Regional Organization
TDS - Tongan Defense Services
TTPI - Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
UDT - União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union)
UNAMET - United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIR - United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNTAG - United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UN - United Nations
VMF - Vanuatu Mobile Force
VMS - Vessel Monitoring System
WCPTFC - Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries Commission
WPNCL - West Papua National Coalition for Liberation
WPS - Women, Peace and Security
Introduction:
Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania

Rouben Azizian

If the three terms *regionalism, security* and *cooperation* from the title of the book were to be combined together, the title could translate into a more benign *regional security cooperation* or even a more reassuring *regional security architecture*. In fact, the aspirational title and focus of the APCSS workshop in Vanuatu in August 2014 was Regional Security Architecture. Realities on the ground, findings from the workshop, and this book’s chapters, however, require caution and patience in heralding significant success in regional security cooperation or development of a viable regional security architecture. The Pacific Islands region, or Oceania, (the two terms will be used in the volume interchangeably at the risk of raising questions from geographic “purists” in the regional scholarly community), remains torn between various visions of regionalism, and unreconciled between notions of security and development. It also remains underwhelmed by piecemeal and reactive response and cooperation on security as well as challenged and somewhat unprepared to deal with entry onto the regional security arena of new and powerful players.

In *Chapter One*, Richard Herr summarizes specific challenges in the development of a regional security architecture. States supporting a regionalism from outside the region emphasize traditional state security issues, while those on the inside stress development-related, human security concerns. As independence has progressed across the region, and the agenda of non-traditional security concerns expanded to include resource protection, environmental protection and climate change, the separation between the relative interests in the two approaches to security became increasingly evident. Most island states do not have the domestic security infrastructure to
effectively engage regionally with standard state security arrangements used by the traditional extra-regional sponsors of the Pacific Islands’ regional system. Consequently, continues Richard Herr, bridging the two approaches to security has proved challenging at many levels — not least at the regional level where institutional renovation has come under serious pressure to find mutually accommodating answers. The regional system is not self-funded, and its dependence on extra-regional funding is another important driver for architectural reform. Finally, re-engagement with Fiji after the country’s democratic elections in September 2014, and given its central contribution to the regional system, constitutes the major contemporary challenge for architectural reform.

The most significant aspect of today’s regional security environment in the Pacific Islands region, according to Michael Powles (Chapter Two), is the rise of China as a major power. His essay looks at China’s ambition to resume what it sees as its rightful place as not only the predominant Asia-Pacific regional power, but also a major global power—as the driving force behind changes in the Pacific Islands security environment. For small powers in the Oceania region, security nervousness will rise or fall depending on two factors: first, the extent to which China demonstrates in its dealings with other states a respect for international law and the established international order; secondly, the extent to which the West, the United States in particular, is prepared to share power and give China the geopolitical space it seeks. Michael Powles notes that today, there is more Chinese activity in terms of movement of people, trade and cultural exchanges in the Pacific region than ever before. It raises a legitimate question of whether China might have additional objectives beyond its resumption of great power status; objectives which could impact specifically on the region’s strategic environment.

Jian Zhang expounds in Chapter Three on China’s intentions and role in the region by suggesting that Chinese regional interests are diverse, wide-ranging and expanding over time. Its objectives include enduring political and
Introduction - Azizian

diplomatic interests, expanding economic and trade considerations, and managing new and growing security concerns and needs. Beijing’s diverse interests do not mean it has a clearly-thought, well-coordinated grand regional strategy. Instead, many of its activities have appeared spontaneous and lacking coordination, with some even undercutting the effectiveness of others. Jian Zhang offers an interesting observation that China is actually trading more with Island countries with which it has no formal diplomatic ties than with the Oceania countries with which it has formal relations. This suggests economic interests, more than political considerations, drive China’s engagement with the region. He argues that China’s growing regional presence is a new reality that needs to be accommodated, not resisted. Resisting Chinese influence will only lead to a zero-sum strategic competition that could divide the region. Accommodating China’s role, however, requires greater understanding of Chinese interests and views.

Eric Shibuya agrees in Chapter Four that shifts in great power politics, most notably, the rise of China, require the United States, to consider many other actors and not take them for granted, while considering the second- and third-order effects of its policies. He believes that the United States’ general goodwill and political capital in the region is not endless, nor is it unchallenged; and it would do well to consider how to reinvigorate its profile in the region, particularly with Pacific Island nations. The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific announcement was a welcome one, but its substance has left much to be desired for many in the region. While there has been a host of diplomatic and economic initiatives — such as high level U.S. participation at the Pacific Islands Post-Forum dialogue and the Trans-Pacific Partnership — there has clearly been a gap between rhetoric and reality. For the Pacific Islands, however, there are significant obstacles to expanding cooperation. While many countries in the Asia-Pacific have concerns over erosions of sovereignty in cooperating with the U.S., the Islands must also consider issues of scale. For many island states, there is simply not enough personnel to meet official reporting and coordination requirements that the
U.S. and other international donors often place upon them. Eric Shibuya concludes that creative solutions — finding different ways to do the same things — is critical to improving cooperation. Ultimately, greater U.S. cooperation with Pacific Island nations may not be an issue of more, but rather better engagement.

The United States, while it retains primacy in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, looks to Australia, according to Jenny Hayward-Jones in Chapter Five, to take the lead on regional security for the South West Pacific, while it retains direct responsibility in the North Pacific. New Zealand provides for the security of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, while France guarantees the security of the French Pacific, with defense forces based in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Australia may not always be the Pacific Islands region’s most influential player from an economic perspective, but it is the Pacific Islands region’s “indispensable” power from a security perspective. Jenny Hayward-Jones notes that Australia, like other dominant players in their own regions, will always be both damned and praised for its various actions. It has led important security interventions, including helping restore and build peace in Bougainville and restoring law and order in the Solomon Islands. But it has not done as well as it could in responding to climate change concerns. Australia has much work to do in understanding security from a Pacific Island viewpoint; it remains, however, the power most able and most likely to guarantee regional security in the interests of the Pacific Islands people.

Anna Powels points out in Chapter Six that colonial history, current constitutional obligations, and the role of development donor to the region, places New Zealand with Australia alongside the regional periphery powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States. Geography, culture and historical linkages serve to situate New Zealand in the region and on its periphery. In recognition of the region’s shifting strategic environment, New Zealand is increasingly playing a critical role as a conduit, or bridge,
between periphery powers, the non-traditional powers seeking an increased role in the region, and the Pacific Islands themselves. New Zealand’s engagement with China on a water infrastructure development project in the Cook Islands is an example of how New Zealand has effectively harnessed China’s strategic interests in the Pacific with the development needs of a Pacific Island country. This type of bilateral partnership is viewed as a discreet benchmark for development practice in the region. However, New Zealand cannot take its relationship with Pacific Island states — and the goodwill shown to it — for granted. Anna Powles echoes Eric Shibuya’s warning to the United States by concluding that New Zealand too, if it is to retain its influence in the region in the face of competing states, must re-engage with the region in a far more meaningful manner.

Indonesia has recently become one such competing state that has dramatically increased its presence in Oceania. The growth of Indonesia’s regional visibility can be attributed to several factors, to include its economic rise and successful democratic transition, but also its domestic concerns about West Papua. James Elmslie in *Chapter Seven* provides a detailed analysis of Indonesia’s maneuvering in Melanesia. He notes that adding Indonesia into the diplomatic mix may strengthen Pacific Island nations’ bargaining positions in their negotiations with Australia, New Zealand and other donor nations over a range of issues, such as access to visas, design and focus of aid programs, implementation of land registration, and general levels of assistance. Indonesia could act as a bridge for Pacific and Indian Ocean states. But Indonesia’s support, it seems, comes at a price. James Elmslie believes that Melanesian countries’ support for the self-determination of West Papuans in Indonesia has waned as their financial and strategic relationships with Indonesia has grown. However, with the recent election of Joko Widodo to the Indonesian presidency, a window of opportunity may have opened, both for relations between Indonesia and the Melanesian countries, and for the fortunes of the West Papua people – two closely linked issues.
No other country can help the Pacific Islands in understanding the challenges and opportunities of dealing with Indonesia better than perhaps Timor-Leste. According to Jose Sousa Santos in Chapter Eight, Timor-Leste is increasingly interested in interacting with countries of Oceania. He writes that the nation has a focused and proactive foreign policy driven by a form of “comprehensive and collective engagement” that seeks the path of many small nations: peaceful dialogue and collective action. This approach accurately reflects its geostrategic position at the juncture of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and embodies, first, a pragmatic understanding of the need for political reconciliation with Indonesia, the former occupying power, and secondly, an affinity with the island’s development challenges, which mirrors those of its Pacific neighbors. Much of the eastern half of Timor-Leste is ethnically Melanesian and Polynesian, and this has led to discussion as to whether Timor-Leste should identify as a nation with the Pacific Islands as opposed to Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste has a nascent special force capabilities, growing UN peacekeeping experience, and large, and well-trained and equipped policing and paramilitary units. Given this, and in light of the Melanesian Spearhead Group’s (MSG) proposed initiative to develop a regional peacekeeping capability, it would be advantageous in Jose Santos’ opinion, to engage Timor-Leste in strengthening the regional security apparatus. The addition of Timor-Leste to an MSG regional peacekeeping force would establish a triumvirate of states — Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Timor-Leste — with experienced and growing defense forces.

The challenges and opportunities of peacekeeping in the region are discussed by Russell Parkin in Chapter Nine. Referring to the ambition to establish “a regional facility (for) training civilian police for international peacekeeping” proposed by the 2013 Review of the Pacific Plan, he argues for the establishment of a Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre (PI-POTC). In Russell Parkin’s opinion, such an institution would be more than just an important venue for educating and training regional security forces, both police and military. The norms and values that such an insti-
tution would diffuse throughout regional security forces would be powerful mechanisms for greater integration and cooperation in the Pacific. Educating security forces in a range of internationally recognized behaviors, protocols and skills would also significantly enhance their professionalism and contribute to the region’s capacity to deal with its own security problems. The training center would create an environment where the existing level of peacekeeping expertise residing in regional military and police forces could interface with the international peacekeeping community. These interactions could produce regional approaches to peace-building, peace-making and peacekeeping that reflect the Pacific’s unique cultural milieu, while still conforming to accepted international norms.

The next two chapters of the book address perhaps the most dramatic security challenges of the region: resources and environment. For Pacific Island nations, the sea is an essential source of traditional living, notes Yoichiro Sato in Chapter Ten. Large-scale commercial fishing of tuna species by long-distance fishing states has presented a rising level of threat to fish stocks on which local lives depend. Expanding the definition of coastal states’ rights over the sea by international law has not been accompanied by corresponding growth in island states’ capacity to protect their rights through maritime law enforcement. Furthermore, regional fishing management organizations have barely slowed the long-term decline of key tuna species. Additionally, improvements in science and engineering have made seabed resources more accessible for mining, and Pacific Island states have literally become the new Wild West, where a sense of lawlessness provides fraudsters opportunities for exploitation. Yoichiro Sato’s chapter looks closely at Tonga’s ocean resource issues in order to illustrate the serious implications of weak governance on effectively managing its maritime wealth.

By virtue of their shared geographic characteristics, writes Scott Hauger in Chapter Eleven, the Pacific Islands have an overlapping set of shared vulnerabilities to the environmental impacts of climate change. They are exposed
to tropical storms and rising sea levels in ways that continental states are not. Major climate-related security concerns for the Pacific Islands include: access to fresh water (due to changes in rainfall patterns and salt water intrusion); local food supply (damage to coral reefs, declining fisheries, and impacts on agriculture); and infrastructure damage (through rising sea levels, other flooding, and storm damage). Potential second-order consequences include economic loss from these events, declining revenues from tourism, and emigration to escape the situation — especially from atoll islands subject to inundation from sea level rise. For some Island nations consisting entirely of low-lying atolls, including Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, rising sea levels comprise an existential threat. Scott Hauger predicts that climate change will present a growing challenge to Pacific Islands’ security for the foreseeable future. Pacific Island countries and territories must seize opportunities for regional collaboration to plan and implement adaptation strategies, and to develop and disseminate science-based knowledge to meet the threat. They should work together to influence large nations that are substantial greenhouse gas emitters. Finally, they should take advantage of the slow-motion aspect of climate change to plan for increased capacities to manage regional and global response to future needs for humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

The eleven chapters in the book address diverse but related issues. They offer competent and profound analysis of key trends, challenges and opportunities for enhancing regional security cooperation and harmonizing Oceania’s regional security architecture. At the same time, the book does not pretend to be an all-inclusive study of the regional security environment. It hopefully helps build more interest toward better understanding of Oceania’s security — an interest (and attention) that is often missing or lacking cultural sensitivity and strategic vision as many of the authors in this volume suggest.
Chapter 1
Regional Security Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region: Rummaging through the Blueprints

R.A. Herr

Executive Summary

The Pacific Island regional system has evolved significantly since its colonial origins to become today’s robust, but complex arrangement of institutions. The historic pragmatism of this adaptive architecture has been both a factor in its success and a recurrent irritant, promoting demand for renovation. Security expectations of this architecture were important from the outset. However, a fundamental cleavage in perspectives on these security objectives appeared with decolonization in the 1970s. This chapter reviews the foundations, additions and renovations of the Pacific Island regional architecture noting that:

- States supporting regionalism from outside the region continued to emphasize traditional state security issues, while those on the inside stress development-related, human security concerns.
- The regional system is not self-funded, and its dependence on extra-regional funding is a second important driver for architectural reform.
- Re-engagement with Fiji, as a central contributor to the regional system, constitutes the major contemporary challenge for architectural reform.
Introduction

Security has been a significant factor in the Pacific Islands regional architecture since the first blueprints for its construction. It has remained the central component of every renovation and redesign since. However, the relevance of the Pacific Islands¹ to drafting these architectural sketches and blueprints has always been problematic, even in the post-colonial period.

A number of factors have contributed to this alienation of the inhabitants from the designs ostensibly intended for their benefit. A very significant influence has been the continuity of the original blueprint and its centrality to the subsequent renovations of this architecture. Another factor in the post-colonial era has been the means available to the regional countries (the “owner-occupiers” of the regional architecture) to afford some options needed for a structural makeover. Most island states do not have the domestic security infrastructure to effectively engage regionally with standard state security arrangements used by the traditional extra-regional sponsors of the Pacific Islands’ regional system.

Fundamentally, however, the key long-term factor has been a divergence in the core national interests with regard to regional security. The Islands have focused on “human” or non-traditional security over state or traditional security at the regional level. Consequently, linking the two approaches to security has proved challenging at many levels — not least at the regional level where institutional renovation has come under serious pressure to find mutually accommodating answers.

This chapter is intended as an overview of key features of the relevant regional architecture and looks at the emergence of institutions and processes that historically have established and reshaped the contemporary security architecture of the Pacific Islands region.

¹ The terms “Pacific Islands” and the abbreviated forms “Island” or “Islands” are capitalized within this book to identify the region and those polities within it as distinct from other Pacific islands such as Hawai‘i or Okinawa, which are islands outside this region.
The Region

Global perspectives of the Pacific Islands region often seem reduced to a rather vague awareness of a few familiar names scattered imprecisely and inaccurately across a vast expanse of blue. At best, this lack of nuance has unfortunate political consequences. Images of small states remote from major centers of power with problems that are small compared to those of other developing regions has undermined their diplomatic “relevance” internationally. At worst, this stereotype has served at times to justify heavy-handed disregard of the Islands’ interests in favor of broader, extra-regional interests by generalizing regionally from worst-case individual circumstances or events.

Scope of the South Pacific Commission from 1962

Historically, the post-1962 ambit of the South Pacific Commission (now the Pacific Community, but still known as the SPC) has defined the boundaries of the Pacific Islands region.2 The value of the SPC staking out the region’s boundaries became apparent a decade later when the South Pacific Forum validated and legitimized their authenticity. The Forum decided in 1972 to regard Island polities within this sphere as its potential membership pool. This essentially confirmed the region’s scope both internally and as the region has presented itself extra-regionally.

It should be noted that the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum) did not redraw its borders to include Australia and New Zealand despite their status as Forum founding members and the fact that Forum decisions apply to both countries. The region’s architecture continues to rely on the SPC ambit as the region’s core delimiter. Consequently, an “insider/outsider” ambiguity was created as to where Australia and New Zealand fit

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2 The historical development of these boundary issues are canvassed in some detail in: Richard Herr, “The Frontiers of Pacific Islands Regionalism: Charting the Boundaries of Identity,” *Asia Pacific World*, 4(1), Spring 2013, 36–55.
within the regional system; the spatial location of the two developed states was not an issue at the time. Increasingly, uncertainties as to which role they were playing at critical points of regional decision-making has become an architectural irritant in Pacific Islands’ regionalism.

The two ANZAC countries’ bifocal approach to the region remains one of the enduring challenges to regional restructuring and is often a catalyst for demands for architectural renovation.

Pacific Island Regionalism and State Security

Traditional security issues have had significant influences on the development of the regional architecture. These effects have come predominantly from outside the region and were linked to geopolitical security issues that did not directly affect the Islands. Nevertheless, changes in Western perceptions of their traditional state security interests in the Pacific Islands have profoundly shaped the structure and renovation of the regional architecture. These impacts can be seen in the following chart, which identifies them by periods in the external perceptions of security risks in or through the region.

State Security Eras of Pacific Island Regionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>View</th>
<th>External View of Pacific Islands</th>
<th>Perceived Nature of risk</th>
<th>Regionalist Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>1944 - 1976</td>
<td>Security risk</td>
<td>Invasion route through Islands</td>
<td>ANZAC Pact / ANZUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990 - 2001</td>
<td>Financial liability</td>
<td>“Pacific Paradox”</td>
<td>“Constructive Commitment”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001 – 2011</td>
<td>Failed state incubator</td>
<td>Threat from non-state actors</td>
<td>Biketawa/ RAMSI/ “Pacific Plan”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 – present</td>
<td>Arena for geo-political</td>
<td>Political realignment</td>
<td>PIDF/ “New Framework for the Region”</td>
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The present regional system dates back to preparations for post-World War II reconstruction by Australia and New Zealand documented in their 1944 ANZAC Pact. The two allies wanted a broad regional defense commitment through collective security relationships with France, the Netherlands, United States and United Kingdom. This led ultimately to the establishment
of the South Pacific Commission in 1947, a cooperative body created to promote the welfare of the Pacific Islands people. In 1953, the ANZUS Treaty served to provide more traditional security coverage in the region for Australia, New Zealand and the United States and their territorial possessions, but was not a general treaty for regional security.³

The second of the regional security eras began in the mid-1970s when the establishment of diplomatic relations between Tonga and the Soviet Union triggered ANZUS concerns for a breach in the Western strategic policy of containment. Critical changes occurred in policy settings for the ANZUS allies. At a policy level, ANZUS took a direct interest in the regional security architecture and so informally linked state security interests of traditional sponsors of the regional system to its existing institutional arrangements. Within the region, this manifested itself through much greater financial and technical support for the Islands’ human security goals as well enhanced political sensitivities to regional priorities.

The end of the Cold War led to a consequential reduction in the region’s traditional security concerns. They were replaced by a decade of more critical consideration of the region’s value to extra-regional interests – summed up in the World Bank’s finding of a “Pacific Paradox;” it was critical of the region’s high levels of aid and less-than-expected levels of economic growth. The decade did not produce any substantial renovation in the state security-related architecture, although the ANZUS linkage, already damaged by the suspension of collaboration with New Zealand through ANZUS in 1985, virtually vanished.

The Pacific Islands Forum added new wrinkles through declarations seeking to buttress Island state financial and governance capacities in the face of higher expectations of state responsibility. Moreover, there was a more “hands on” approach by Australia in managing compliance through

regional arrangements characterized by Australia’s then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans as “constructive commitment.”

The economic emphasis of Western engagement with the Pacific Islands regional security architecture returned sharply to state protection in the wake of 9/11. A perception of state fragility, encapsulated in the phrase “arc of instability,” drew parallels with security threats from failed or failing states to suggest that similar risks to extra-regional states might emerge from the Pacific Islands region. Coups and civil unrest, particularly in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, resulted in significant renovations to the region’s state security architecture during the ensuing decade. The Biketawa Declaration and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) went beyond “hands on” to direct intervention and included even bilateral intervention through such measures as the Enhanced Cooperation Programme by Australia with Papua New Guinea.

Whether there is a new era of geopolitical rivalry based on the heightened interest of extra-regional powers as exemplified by the American pivot to the Pacific can be debated. Nevertheless, the tone of the debate, to date, suggests there has been a shift away from the failed state imagery of the previous decade. New and established extra-regional powers are also taking a much greater interest in the region’s security architecture. Elements of this argument are developed further below.

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4 The importance of this is reviewed in Greg Fry, “Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of ‘the South Pacific’” in David Hanlon and Geoffrey M. White Hanlon (eds.) Voyaging Through the Contemporary Pacific (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 37–46.

Human Security in the Architecture of the Pacific Island Regionalism

The Pacific Islands have their own perspectives on the regional security architecture, and these have not been identical with the state-centric traditional security concerns of the extra-regional powers. However, this divergence of security interests was not especially marked initially; the SPC’s establishment satisfied the extra-regional founders’ need for a common purpose in the region. Yet the SPC’s original work programme — economic, health and social development — addressed Islander human security needs. As independence progressed across the region, and the agenda of non-traditional security concerns expanded to include resource protection, environmental protection and climate change, the separation between the relative interests in the two approaches to security became increasingly evident.

The contrast in security interests was inevitable and, at some point, had to emerge as an issue. The overwhelming majority of regional states chose to leave state defense largely to a benign international order. Only three states — Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga — established formal defense forces. In certain independence arrangements, there were bilateral relations covering defense considerations, but these did not create treaty obligations. Moreover, there are no regional mutual security treaties that include any Pacific Island countries. ANZUS, whose initial coverage included much of the region’s geographic scope, never expanded to include any newly independent states as signatories. This stands in contrast to the SPC, which opened its treaty to new members.
Pacific Island entities were not in a position to manage their participation in regional affairs, much less shape the regional security architecture, due to their colonial status for several decades after SPC establishment. Yet, as the pressure for decolonization mounted, some local leaders asserted a claim for ownership of their regional security interests. A catalyst for this was West New Guinea’s removal from the region in 1962. The territory was transferred from Dutch to Indonesian control without conferring with the territory’s people.

There were reports of heart-wrenching tears shed by West New Guinean delegates at the 1962 South Pacific Conference as they expressed their anguish at the knowledge they would not see their South Pacific brothers again at the conference. This outraged Fiji’s prominent leader Ratu Kamisese Mara. He attended the next SPC in Lae in 1965 and demanded change at the regional level to ensure that the Pacific peoples, not outsiders, would decide who belonged in their region. This demarche, coupled with Western Samoa’s entry into full SPC membership as an independent state, kicked off a period of rapid renovation of the regional architecture with a strong focus on the autonomy of Island peoples to decide the regional agenda.

In addition to reform of the SPC’s decision-making processes, Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa established the Pacific Islands Producers Association (PIPA) in 1965 to promote better terms of trade with New Zealand. PIPA...
expanded its membership to include the Cook Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, and Niue a few years later. This association provided a mechanism outside the formal colonial networks to develop ideas for more indigenous influence over the regional architecture. PIPA played a pivotal role in this when the failure to politically reform the SPC in 1970 led to an initiative that became the South Pacific Forum in 1971.

The institutional fracture created by the formation of the Forum was a visible demonstration of the widening gulf in security aspirations within the region in the declining days of colonialism. For the Island countries, nuclear testing was a human rather than state security issue. It pitted the risk to human, environment and marine resources health against perceived state security benefits for the testing powers. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has become the critical element for the security (state and human) of its Island members in the four decades since it was added to the regional architecture.6

The South Pacific Forum did not institutionalize itself, but rather was content initially to remain a “club” of regional leaders along the lines of the Commonwealth Meeting of Heads of Government (CHOGM). Instead, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) was created in 1973 as an inter-governmental economic advisory agency to the Forum. SPEC became the Forum’s secretariat in 1975 and gradually acquired more responsibility on the Forum’s behalf. It was re-badge in 1988 as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

Shortly after its creation, the Forum espoused an objective to completely renovate the regional architecture to bring the entire region under one roof — its own. The “Single Regional Organization” (SRO) proposal essentially reflected a desire by some, but not all Forum members to decolonize the regional architecture. Despite the Forum’s commitment to an SRO, the Forum sanctioned the creation of a new organization in 1979 in order to respond to

global changes in the Law of the Sea and assert regional ownership of marine resources security. There was a temporizing gesture to the SRO ideal, however. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was autonomous in law, but with a membership restricted to that of the Forum and reported annually to the Forum.

By 1987, the Forum accepted the SRO concept was moribund, and a period of regional cohabitation emerged with an architecture to reflect the new policy environment. A South Pacific Organizations Coordinating Committee (SPOCC) was established to replace the SRO concept. As the following chart of SPOCC members illustrates, human security remained the regional focus. Significantly, the strength of the human security focus was such that SPOCC was more inclusive. SPOCC was renamed the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) in the late 1990s as part of a general move regionally to eliminate “South Pacific” from organizational names to demonstrate respect for membership north of the equator.

**Regional Organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-Governmental Organizations</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Community</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Noumea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Secretariat</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Suva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Fisheries Agency</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Honiara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Apia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Tourism Organization</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Suva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Aviation Safety Association</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Port Vila</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trans-Governmental Organizations</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Island Development Program</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the South Pacific</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Suva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Power Association</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Suva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State security needs resurfaced at the end of the Cold War, however. The Forum secretariat established a Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) to collect and share intelligence on a variety of transnational crime, border protection and terrorism-related issues. As previously noted, the Forum itself agreed to a number of declarations addressing threats to state security.\(^7\) However, by 2005, threats perceived from weak, fragile and failing states led to what was virtually a reinvention of the SRO under a new name — the Pacific Plan. This Forum-based regional strategy was a root-and-branch renovation of the regional architecture to strengthen state capacity within the Pacific Islands.\(^8\)

The Challenge of Sub-Regionalism: Attached, Semi-Detached or Detached?

From the early 1980s, the coherence of regional arrangements came under a new set of pressures for reform. Ironically for the Forum, given its early desire for an SRO, the pressures to recognize sub-regional interests affected it much more than the SPC. The primary reason for this was that motivation for sub-regional recognition was driven by politics rather than technical efficiency.

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8  For a wide-ranging review of regionalism and security challenges faced by the Pacific Islands at the origins of the Pacific Plan see Michael Powles, ed., Pacific Futures (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2006).
Ethno-geographic Pacific Island sub-regions

Interestingly, the first significant sub-regional renovation was not culturally based, but was, in fact, driven by a national desire for resource security. The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), established to put some “spine” into the FFA, included the richest tuna states and so spanned all three of the ethno-geographic sub-regions. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) formed to support the indigenous Kanaks’ desire for independence in New Caledonia. The MSG’s success as a culturally linked, sub-regional association made it a catalyst for the Polynesian and Micronesian sub-regions to follow suit, albeit rather less fruitfully. The current arrangements are summarized in the following table.
Sub-regional associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-Governmental Organizations</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melanesian Spearhead Group</td>
<td>(1983\textsuperscript{†}) 2007</td>
<td>Port Vila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties to the Nauru Agreement</td>
<td>1982 (2010\textsuperscript{*})</td>
<td>Majuro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trans-Governmental Organizations</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micronesian Presidents’ Summit</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polynesian Leaders Group</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller Islands States (Group)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Vaka Moana</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{†} The MSG was formed as a sub-regional association in 1983, but institutionalized with a treaty and headquarters in 2007.

\textsuperscript{*} The PNA was formed by treaty in 1982, but, as it used the FFA headquarters for its activities, was not regarded as meeting the formal requirements of an IGO until 2010 when it set up an independent headquarters in Majuro.

A New Blueprint for Renovating the Regional Architecture?

In response to being frozen out of Forum activities, including its security arrangements in 2009, Fiji’s Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama has pursued a new association of regional countries — the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF).\textsuperscript{9} The PIDF has added new challenges and pressures for the renovation of Pacific Islands’ regional institutions. PIDF’s key objective is seen by some as a lever to crowbar Australia and New Zealand out of their “insider” status within the Forum. Alternatively, the PIDF initiative has been seen as a means to break the historic nexus between the SPC’s island membership and entry into regional clubhouses. Bainimara-

ma has raised the prospect of extending full membership in PIDF to Asian states while excluding Australia and New Zealand. The positive spin on the need for the PIDF is that it will allow non-state stakeholders from civil society and the private sector to get a seat at the regional corporate body’s table. Taking this line, the Fijian prime minister has argued that the PIDF will not be competitive against, but complementary to the existing regional architecture.

Conclusions

The ad hoc evolution of the Pacific Island regional system has been a factor in both its adaptive institutional development and the recurrent perceived need to renovate it. The security elements of this architecture were important from the outset. However, a fundamental divergence in perspectives on security objectives between those outside the region and those inside has become a source of tension in proposals for remodeling the overall architecture. Central to this friction has been the engagement of the outside powers that constructed the original edifice and continue to fund the system and those on the inside who inhabit the region.

The contemporary regional system is not well suited to cover state security, having been designed ostensibly for, and then adapted to focus on human security issues. Post-Cold War developments such as global terrorism, the emergence of the Asia-Pacific century, and the U.S. pivot to the Pacific have renewed external concerns for the adequacy of state security issues within the existing regional architecture. Fiji’s role in re-engaging with the regional system after its 2014 election has amplified apprehensions as to the direction both general and sub-regional architectural renovation might take. Given the dependence on extra-regional support for the Pacific Islands regional system, it is unlikely that future renovations will be entirely do-it-yourself for regional states despite what some of them might wish.
Chapter 2
The Regional Security Environment and Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region
Michael Powles

Executive Summary

- The debate is intensifying on the question of whether China’s rising power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region will continue largely peacefully.
- Concerns about wider regional and global developments associated with China’s rise cause nervousness in the Pacific Islands region.
- China’s intentions in the Pacific Islands region are viewed increasingly as being more to demonstrate and strengthen its power status in the region rather than any malevolence towards the South Pacific.
- Countries of the region, including New Zealand, are increasingly engaging with China on development cooperation and in other fields.

Introduction

The most significant aspect of today’s regional security environment in the Pacific Islands region is the rise of China as a major power. The respected political scientist, Joseph Nye of Harvard University, has described the power shift as the twenty-first century’s most consequential development.1

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It is being felt globally. Some in remoter parts of the Pacific Islands region may hope their environments remain unaffected; they will be disappointed for two reasons. First, as Nye indicated, the development is a global one, with potential impact on the global security environment. Secondly, the Pacific Islands region is, of course, a sub-region of the wider Asia-Pacific, China’s home region. China’s rise and the reaction to it of other Asia-Pacific powers will almost certainly reshape the Pacific security environment, even though it’s almost impossible to see precisely what the new security environment will look like.

To avoid being surprised by developments that call for deliberate and carefully planned responses rather than knee-jerk reactions, we need to understand today’s major trends and the forces driving them. This chapter looks at China’s ambition to resume what it sees as its rightful place as not only the predominant Asia-Pacific regional power, but also a major global power...as the driving force behind changes in the Pacific Islands security environment. Given the current role and place of the United States in the region and, indeed, in the global security environment, this raises the question of how China’s emergence in the region will play out.

Divided Perspectives

One group of observers, the so-called “realists,” see real grounds for extreme nervousness in the present international security situation. John Mearsheimer, of the University of Chicago, drawing on lessons from history, not least the run-up to the first World War, asserted emphatically, “To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.” A number of observers, both politicians and political scientists, agree with Mearsheimer.

Not everyone agrees, however. Some countries in Southeast Asia, which have generations of experience dealing with competing major powers in their region, are less pessimistic. Singapore’s foreign minister has said: “The world and Asia are big enough to accommodate a rising China and a re-invigorated United States.” Similar optimism is heard from Malaysia and Indonesia. None of these countries sees the need to protect itself by joining a China bandwagon or seeking a security treaty with the United States.

Of course, some countries have to be optimistic. Several, Australia and New Zealand are examples, aim to get on well with both the existing superpower, the United States, and the emerging one, China. They have to do this because Australia’s and New Zealand’s biggest trading partner is, by far, China, while their traditional security partner has been the United States. Australia is a major U.S. ally, and has tended to give priority to that relationship. New Zealand, in contrast, has used its smallness and reputation for independent thinking to give emphasis to its relationship with China.

Do China’s leaders indicate their future plans for their nation’s role in the world? In many ways they do. After what they have termed their “century of humiliation,” in which Western powers and Japan subjugated much of China for their own benefit, leading Chinese officials speak of the nation resuming its rightful role as a world leader, a position which it held for many centuries before Western and Japanese interventions. There is little doubt of their determination to achieve what has been called the “Chinese dream.”

Many observers believe this aim doesn’t involve global or regional subjugation. But it does require of other countries the provision of both respect and the geopolitical space appropriate for a great power. Like other great powers before it, it does not like to be challenged, particularly in its home region.

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For small powers, including those in the Pacific Islands region, security nervousness will rise or fall depending on two factors:

- First, the extent to which China demonstrates in its dealings with other states a respect for international law and the established international order. Many observers are concerned on this point due to recent developments in the East and South China Seas.

- Secondly, the extent to which the West, the United States in particular, is prepared to share power and give China the geopolitical space it seeks. Here, too, many observers see stronger grounds for pessimism than optimism. Within Asia itself, however, stalwart allies of the West, such as the Republic of Korea, have indicated they will have nothing to do with any Western plans to contain or obstruct China’s emergence as a great power.

The head of Australia’s foreign affairs department, Peter Varghese, spoke carefully on this point in terms that apply not only to Australia, but also to a number of other Asia-Pacific countries. He related:

> “Australia does not want to be put in the position where we have to choose between the U.S. and China...China has every right to seek greater strategic influence to match its economic weight. The extent to which this can be peacefully accommodated will turn ultimately on both the pattern of China’s international behaviour and the extent to which the existing international order intelligently finds more space for China.”

Against these criteria, the outlook for peace and security in the wider Asia-Pacific region seems somewhat doubtful. The risk of full-scale con-

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flict between major powers might not be great. But if it should occur, con-
sequences for the wider Asia-Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands
region, would be devastating. Some nervousness is understandable. But,
does China pose any more of a direct challenge to peace and security in the
Pacific Islands region?

**China’s Regional Objectives**

I have discussed already the possible impact of China’s rise and its am-
bitions on the global or Asia Pacific-wide security environment. Is there a
direct impact on the Pacific Islands region? What, if any, are China’s specific
objectives in relation to the region and how do they affect the region’s secu-

Today, there is more Chinese activity in terms of movement of people,
trade and cultural exchanges in our Pacific region than ever before. It rais-
es a legitimate question of whether China might have additional objectives
beyond its resumption of great power status; objectives which could impact
specifically on the region’s strategic environment.

Is the prime driver of China’s policy in the Pacific, as elsewhere, the pur-
suit of trade, as many Western business people believe? Or, is it perhaps
the acquisition of resources to keep the fires of China’s engines of growth
burning, as some economic strategists maintain? Or, is China seeking to
challenge American geostrategic supremacy in the Pacific? Some academics
have asserted this and claim that the Pacific Islands region could be a focus
for this competition. This argument first attracted attention several years
ago with the publication of a powerful polemic entitled “Dragon in Paradise:
China’s Rising Star in Oceania.”

Some of these factors undoubtedly play a role, if not the predominant
one, in shaping China’s Pacific objectives. But, I have no doubt that China’s

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5 John Henderson, Benjamin Reilly, and Nathaniel Peffer, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star
prime consideration and highest priority in the region is much simpler: to demonstrate its major power status throughout the wider Pacific region.

While proponents of the “Dragon in Paradise” thesis contend that China’s intentions in the region are more malevolent than benevolent, this may not now be the common view. New Zealand has demonstrated its belief in the opposite view by cooperating practically with China in a symbolically significant development project in the Pacific Islands.

The Negatives

Despite all this, there have been aspects of China’s involvement in the Pacific that have not been welcomed. A decade ago, China and Taiwan were engaged in an intense and bitter competition in the region for diplomatic recognition. The competing campaigns involved significant bribing of politicians, resulting in serious destabilization in one Pacific Island country in particular. New Zealand and Australian foreign ministers spoke out against what they called “check book diplomacy.” Fortunately, the election of a new president in Taiwan, one more inclined to cooperate with Beijing than compete, solved the problem...for the present at least.

As China becomes more involved in the Pacific, inevitably Chinese criminals become increasingly involved, too. I have clear recollections of problems caused by dishonest traders and fraudsters in the past — often individuals from Australia, New Zealand or the United States.6

There has been natural apprehension about whether China’s hunger for raw materials to sustain its thriving economy might result in resource depletion in the Pacific and possibly environmental degradation. A combination of rapacious business practices by some Asian timber companies and weak

6 When I first visited Tuvalu back in 1980 to present a letter of credentials as New Zealand’s high commissioner, I found that the only other guests at the Funafuti hotel were three members of the Ku Klux Klan from Texas. They quite openly said their purpose was to persuade Tuvalu’s Finance Minister to invest the country’s financial reserves with the Klan. Fortunately, the minister at the time, the late Sir Henry Naisali, was never likely to take up their offer.
governance in some Melanesian countries has caused considerable harm in these areas.

Chinese fishing fleets join those from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, United States and Europe in harvesting the Pacific’s tuna resource, the largest in the world. Some fishing is done by Pacific Island countries, but the bulk is done by foreign interests. It is regulated by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention. While the long-term sustainability of the tuna resource is far from certain, China itself has generally observed its obligations under the convention.

Jian Yang, a Chinese New Zealand academic, and now a politician, has written the most comprehensive study so far of China’s objectives and policies in the Pacific Islands region. In “The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games,” he emphasizes the significance of the fact that China’s presence and role in the Pacific Islands is increasing dramatically. But he does not believe that Beijing has specifically aggressive or threatening attitudes towards the region’s governments or peoples. Nor does he believe there is any intent to challenge the United States in the Pacific Islands region, dismissing the “Dragon in Paradise” thesis. Yang believes that China will play an increasing role in the evolution of the regional order. It will insist that it plays a role at least as significant as, and possibly greater than, any other major power. Very clearly, this includes the security field as well as others.

**Security Environment Impact**

Since Yang’s book was published in 2011, tensions have risen over disputed islands in the northern Pacific, specifically in the East and South China Seas. Debate continues as to whether these rising tensions arose in reaction to, or were a cause of, the American pivot, or “rebalance,” to Asia.

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China has certainly been flexing its muscles in its disputes with Japan and nearby ASEAN\textsuperscript{8} neighbors. This is clearly affecting the North Pacific security environment, not least because the deteriorating China/Japan relationship risks involving the United States directly because of its security treaty obligations to Japan.

None of this is impacting directly on the Pacific Islands at this stage, but it certainly could if hostilities should break out, which is a real possibility. Security arrangements and architecture in the Pacific Islands region clearly have to take this risk into account. Nervousness will be fed by uncertainty whether the United States and China are, or will finally become, strategic partners or competitors. Most likely, their relationship will continue to involve a mix of partnership and competition, justifying a watchful wariness on the part of other players in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands.

There is increasing recognition in the region that most immediate challenges to the security environment arise from governance inadequacies within the region itself. And with that recognition, new thinking is being given to the promotion of good governance, with less emphasis on universal, largely Western values and norms, and more emphasis on indigenous customs and traditions.\textsuperscript{9} At the same time, new thinking is going into the region’s physical security architecture, and how it is changing and hopefully being improved. Other chapters in this book elaborate on that.

**Regional Architecture Evolution**

Since Pacific leaders and elders first began to face the challenges of independence half a century ago, they demonstrated their capacity to create whatever regional architecture, formal or informal, was necessary.

\textsuperscript{8} Association of Southeast Nations
\textsuperscript{9} Elise Huffer and Ropate Qalo, “Have We Been Thinking Upside Down?” *The Contemporary Pacific*, 16(1), 2004, 87-116.
Historically, this should not surprise us. Back when several Island countries were still colonies, and the Pacific Islands Forum was not even a gleam in Ratu Mara’s eyes, the only regional meeting at the governmental level was the South Pacific Commission (SPC) — now renamed, of course, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Some SPC meetings had politicians from just-independent or soon-to-be-independent territories among the delegates, but only colonial or metropolitan powers had full rights at these events.

Early Pacific leaders resented their lack of power at the conferences. Plenary discussion of political issues was not allowed, and this policy was strenuously policed by the old colonial powers, including the French and Americans. Future Pacific leaders used to go along, because they valued the opportunity to get together privately with their peers, usually in the evenings. They shared stories about their respective journeys into independence, asked each other’s advice, and enjoyed each other’s company. Albert Henry, of the Cook Islands, and his ukulele would often bring the evening to a close with his distinctive rendition of “Pearly Shells.”

It may seem a long step from ukuleles and “Pearly Shells” to the Biketawa Declaration and the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the several similar groupings today; a long step perhaps, but historically a very logical one.

Not surprisingly, soon after most Island countries gained independence, the idea of a South Pacific Forum, later called the Pacific Islands Forum, was promoted. It included the Island countries, and Australia and New Zealand, but not the more foreign colonial powers. After a period in which Australia and New Zealand are thought to have thrown their comparative weight around in PIF meetings, it is perhaps natural that Island countries should today be seeking forums in which their own views are predominant and don’t have to be negotiated with the region’s two developed countries.

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Conclusion

After many years living and traveling in and among Pacific Island countries, I have become aware of an optimistic attitude, a positive Pacific spirit, among Pacific Island peoples, even during difficult or uncertain times. I think it was best expressed by the revered Tongan philosopher and artist, the late Epeli Hau‘ofa, who described so well the Pacific spirit.

Hau‘ofa, who had had his fill of foreign denigration of Pacific Islanders, their communities and their universe, stated:12

“[T]he surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit it...and the heavens above with their hierarchies of powerful gods and stars and constellations that people could count on to guide their ways across the seas. Their world was anything but tiny. They thought big and recounted their deeds in epic proportions... Islanders today still relish exaggerating things out of all proportions. Smallness is a state of mind... Theirs was a large world in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled unhindered by boundaries of the kind erected much later by imperial powers....”

“Today’s economic reality [led] people to shake off their confinement and they have since moved, by the tens of thousands, doing what their ancestors had done before them: enlarging their world as they go, to Australia, New Zealand, Hawai‘i, mainland USA, Canada and even Europe; they strike roots...all across their ocean, and the ocean is theirs because

it has always been their home. Social scientists may write of Oceania as a Spanish Lake, a British Lake, an American Lake, and even a Japanese Lake. But we all know that only those who make the ocean their home and love it, can really claim it theirs. Conquerors come, conquerors go, the ocean remains, mother only to her children. This mother has a big heart; she adopts anyone who loves her.”
Chapter 3
China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region
Jian Zhang

Executive Summary

• China’s emergence as an increasingly consequential power in the Pacific Islands region has been one of the most important developments in regional affairs over the past decade. Chinese interests in the region are wide-ranging and expanding over time.

• While concerns about China’s growing presence abound, fears of Chinese ambitions to dominate the region are unwarranted. Instead, China’s active engagement provides important new and potentially long-lasting developmental opportunities for Pacific Island countries.

• China’s distinctively different approach to regional engagement, particularly its controversial aid program, poses acute challenges for traditional aid donors in the region. In the foreseeable future, substantial coordination between China and other aid donors is unlikely due to a significant “perception gap” between Chinese and Western views of the nature and impact of China’s foreign aid program. However, there is room for cooperation.

• Whether China’s growing presence will spark destabilizing strategic competition in the region will be determined not only by Beijing’s behavior, but also by the responses of other external great powers. China’s rising regional influence needs to be accommodated; attempts to resist and contain Chinese emergence would likely be unsuccessful and potentially divide countries in the region.
Introduction

On Nov. 22, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Fiji, where he held a summit meeting with leaders of the eight Pacific Island countries that have diplomatic ties with China. During that meeting, Xi and his Pacific counterparts announced their decision to elevate the relationship between China and the eight Pacific Islands countries to the level of “strategic partnership.”1 More than anything else, Xi’s visit symbolizes China’s growing presence in the Pacific Islands region, and its far-reaching consequences for the evolving regional order.

The South Pacific has long been perceived as either “an American lake” or Australia’s and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand’s traditional area of influence. Such perceptions, however, no longer reflect the region’s changing geopolitical landscape. Over the last decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as an increasingly consequential player in the region through active political and diplomatic engagements, significant aid provisions and expanding trade and economic ties. Xi’s visit represents the latest example of increasingly closer ties between China and Pacific Island countries.

Moreover, Chinese interests in the region reflect the country’s new-found economic strength and evolving diplomatic and economic agendas. As rightly noted by some commentators, China’s increased presence provides valuable new opportunities for regional economic development.2 However, its distinctively different approach to engagement with Pacific Island countries also complicates the efforts of Western countries to promote good governance and sustainable development in a region facing a multitude of development and security challenges.

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2 For example, see Yongjin Zhang, “China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(3), 2007, 367-381.
China’s Growing Presence in the South Pacific

China’s growing presence in the Pacific Islands region is first and foremost demonstrated by its substantial aid activities. While the PRC has a long history of providing aid to the region, dating back to the 1970s, it is over the last decade that the nation has become a major aid donor to the poverty-stricken region. According to a study, in 2009 China was the third largest aid provider in the South Pacific, after Australia and the United States.\(^3\) Another analysis estimates that between 2006 and 2011, China provided a total of $850 million in aid to the region, making it the fifth largest donor after Australia ($4.8 billion), the United States ($1.27 billion), New Zealand ($899.3 million), and Japan ($868.8 million).\(^4\) According to China’s two foreign aid white papers published in 2011 and 2014 respectively, the South Pacific’s share in China’s total foreign aid increased from 4 percent in 2009 to 4.2 percent during the period 2010 to 2012, demonstrating Beijing’s increased attention to this region.

While some commentators rightly point out that the overall size of Chinese regional aid is still far smaller than that of some long-standing aid donors, such as Australia and the United States, it should be noted that aggregated aid figures (as shown above) do not reveal the full extent of the significance of Chinese aid. One must evaluate not only the size of China’s aid, but also how the nation delivers it. China’s approach to aid provision differs from that of OECD\(^5\) donors in two aspects: unlike OECD countries that often use aid conditionally as a tool to promote agendas, such as good governance, human rights and civil society development, China attaches virtually no political conditions to its aid. This is based on its long-held foreign policy principle of non-interference in nations’ internal affairs.

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5 OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Additionally, OECD donors tend to focus aid on projects promoting political and economic reforms. China’s aid, however, funds infrastructure projects and public facilities, such as roads, bridges, dams, schools, hospitals, sports facilities and government buildings. China also funds commercial projects that can deliver immediate economic benefits for recipient countries. It’s not surprising, therefore, that many Pacific Island governments have seen Chinese aid as a preferred option to increasingly condition-attached development assistance from traditional OECD aid donors.

Moreover, while at the regional level, the overall size of China’s aid is still considerably smaller than Australian and U.S. aid, in some individual countries, Chinese aid is becoming most consequential. This is perhaps best illustrated in Tonga. Over the last few years, the country received a number of large Chinese “concessional loans” worth more than $100 million. This led to a Tongan accumulated debt load that, as of 2009, was 32 percent of its GDP, raising concerns about the country’s vulnerability to future Chinese manipulation.6

Another case is Fiji. After its 2006 coup, the country went through a considerable period of sanctions, diplomatic isolation and aid reduction from many Western countries, especially Australia and New Zealand. Beijing, however, continued to actively engage with the interim government, led by the coup leader, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Indeed, Beijing provided a total of $121 million aid to Fiji in 2007, attracting strong criticism from Australia and other Western countries. China’s aid and diplomatic engagement, however, drew praise from Fiji’s military government.

Apart from its aid program, China’s growing presence is further reflected in its expanding economic and trade ties with the region. Between 2000 and 2012, China’s trade with the eight Island countries with whom it has diplomatic ties7 rose from $248 million to $1.767 billion, a more than sev-

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6 Fifita and Hanson, “China in the Pacific,” 7.
7 Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Samoa, Niue and Federated States of Micronesia.
en-fold increase.\footnote{Yu Chensen, Chang Chenguang and Wang Xuedong, eds., *The Blue Book of Oceania: Annual Report of Development of Oceania* 2013-14 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), 8.} In 2009, China became the second-largest trade partner in the region, after Australia. According to a report by China’s Ministry of Commerce, based on 2012 Chinese customs statistics, China’s total trade with all Pacific Island countries, including those having no diplomatic ties with Beijing, was as high as $4.5 billion.\footnote{Ibid.} Additionally, China has become an important export market for some Pacific Island economies. For example, around 45 percent of Solomon Islands’ 2013 exports went to China.\footnote{“Solomon Islands,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade factsheet, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/solo.pdf.} For Papua New Guinea, China has become the largest market for its timber exports over the last decade.

Together with expanding trade ties, Chinese investments in the region have increased significantly. Between 2003 and 2012, Chinese enterprises invested more than $700 million in Pacific Island countries. Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been, by far, the largest recipient of Chinese investment, receiving a total of $313 million, followed by Samoa ($265 million) and Fiji ($111 million).\footnote{Yu, Chang and Wang, eds., *The Blue Book of Oceania*, 15-16.} China’s investment in the $1.4 billion Ramu Nickel Project in PNG is the largest Chinese investment in the region.

In addition to direct investment, Chinese enterprises have become increasingly active in the region, bidding for large government projects or projects financed by external multilateral financial institutes, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Up to 2012, Chinese enterprises reportedly had won a total of $5 billion in contracts for various projects.\footnote{Ibid., 17.}

Not surprisingly, China’s active diplomatic engagements within the region have been equally impressive. In particular, while Beijing has formal diplomatic relationships with only eight of 14 Pacific Island countries — Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Niue and the Federated States of Micronesia — it reportedly deploys more diplomats in the region than
any other country. Moreover, in recent years, China’s active diplomatic engagement has been further characterized by high-profile, senior-level visits. For example, in 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Fiji, announcing the establishment of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF).

In 2009, China’s then vice-president, Xi Jinping, visited Fiji. In the same year, China’s then senior vice-premier, Li Keqiang, visited PNG. As mentioned earlier, President Xi visited Fiji again in November 2014 after attending the G20 Summit in Australia. These regular visits by top Chinese leaders highlight the importance Beijing has attached to the region. It should also be noted that leaders of Pacific Island countries have also visited China frequently, often sponsored by Beijing.

In addition to its bilateral relationships with Pacific Island countries, Beijing has also actively engaged with regional multilateral institutions. Having been a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) since 1989, Beijing has shown more interest in PIF in recent years, sending senior officials (often at the vice-foreign minister level) to attend meetings. In 2000, China also set up the China-PIF Cooperation Fund and sponsored establishment of a PIF trade office in Beijing in 2002. It is noteworthy that, apart from its contacts with PIF, Beijing has also developed close relationships with other sub-regional groups, such as the Melanesia Spearhead Group (MSG). China funded the building of the MSG headquarters in Vanuatu.

China also created its own multilateral platform to engage with the region, the aforementioned CPICEDCT, comprised of China and its eight diplomatic partners in the region. In the Forum’s first meeting, held in Fiji in April 2006, Wen, among others, pledged a total of RMB 300 million¹³ aid over the next three years to the region as well as a number of tariffs reductions and debt waiver initiatives. In November 2013, the Forum’s second meeting was held in the Chinese city of Guangzhou, during which Chinese Vice-Premier

¹³ RMB: Chinese monetary unit (yuan).
Wang Yang announced an aid package of $1 billion to the eight Pacific Island countries and promised to set up a $1 billion fund to support infrastructure development in the region.\(^\text{14}\)

As part of its overall regional engagement, China has, in more recent years, sought to actively expand its cultural influence in the region. For example, in 2006, Beijing set up the Confucius Institute at the University of South Pacific in Fiji, offering courses on Chinese languages and culture. Between 2004 and 2012, the Chinese foreign ministry also organized six training workshops for South Pacific diplomats. In the aforementioned 2013 meeting of the CPICEDCF, Wang also announced the offer of 2,000 scholarships in the next four years to support students from South Pacific island countries to study in China. According to one seasoned observer of China-South Pacific relations, among all the other external powers in the region, China has been the most active in promoting the study of its national language. During Xi's visit to Fiji in November 2014, he also announced the establishment of a Chinese Culture Centre in that nation.

The last decade has also seen an expanding Chinese diaspora in the region. As a result of China's opening its doors to outward migration, numbers of Chinese migrants (legal and illegal) in the region have increased significantly. While accounting for only a tiny percentage of the entire population in the South Pacific, the Chinese community arguably has a disproportionately high economic influence in the region, partly because Chinese business people have tended to dominate certain economic sectors, such as retail and restaurants. The often held perception, however, that some Chinese community members engage in illegal activities or have close relationships with corrupted local officials, makes the Chinese community a target of local resentment in Pacific Island countries. The growing Chinese community, thus, adds an element of complexity to Beijing's relationship with these countries.

China’s Evolving Interests in the Region

What drives China’s growing engagements in the region? A prevailing view is that as China rises as a potential hegemonic power, its enhanced activities in the South Pacific are driven by an ambition to dominate the region, challenging the longstanding strategic primacy of the United States and its allies. Thus, for some, the South Pacific represents a microcosm of the US-China rivalry in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Others, however, are dismissive of such a view, arguing that China’s regional interests are limited and largely driven by its economic and trade interests, especially its growing appetites for the region’s resources and consideration for South-South cooperation.

In reality, Chinese regional interests are diverse, wide-ranging and expanding over time; objectives include enduring political and diplomatic interests, expanding economic and trade considerations, and managing growing new security concerns and needs. As noted by many scholars, Beijing’s diverse interests do not mean it has a clearly-thought, well-coordinated grand strategy for the region. Instead, many of its activities have appeared spontaneous and lacking coordination, with some even undercutting the effectiveness of others.

Political and diplomatic interests have always been high on Beijing’s agenda since the PRC began its Pacific Islands engagement. Beijing’s official links with the region started in 1970s when Island countries were acquiring independence as a result of the decolonization process sweeping the region. Beijing, for example, established formal diplomatic ties with Fiji and Samoa.

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16 For example, see Hayward-Jones, “Big Enough for All of Us.” South-South cooperation broadly refers to developmental cooperation between developing countries. As China still sees itself as a developing country, it tends to treat its aid activities to other developing countries as part of South-South cooperation. For more information on South-South cooperation, see United Nations Development Programmes at http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html.
17 For example, see Zhang, “China and the emerging regional order;” see also Hayward-Jones, 'Big Enough for All of Us.”
in 1975 and with PNG in 1976. Throughout the Cold War period, China’s regional policy was driven by ideological factors — such as the desire to build a united front with developing countries to oppose the two superpowers — and pragmatic considerations, particularly its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic ties with Pacific Island countries.

Following China’s reforms, its “opening up” in the late 1970s, and the Cold War’s end, the diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan became a main theme in Beijing’s regional policy. This is due to Taiwan’s pro-independence movement, which gained momentum in the early 1990s. Given that six out of twenty-two countries in the world that recognize Taiwan are Pacific Island nations, it is not surprising the region has become a major focus of the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic rivalry. Both Beijing and Taipei have engaged with the region through intensified aid, attracting widespread criticism of the destabilizing impacts of their “check book diplomacy” on various Island countries. The diplomatic competition was particularly stark under pro-independence Taiwanese President Chen Shuibian from 2000 to 2008. During Chen’s term, two Pacific Island countries, namely Kiribati and Nauru, switched their diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei. Despite a diplomatic truce announced by both sides after the election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, the issue of diplomatic recognition is still important for both Beijing and Taipei.

While Taiwan has been an important driver of China’s regional activities, Beijing also has other broader political and diplomatic interests in the region. Enlisting the support of Island countries for China’s agenda in the international arena has also been a long-term and enduring consideration driving Chinese activities in the region. For example, in 2008, a number of Island nation leaders attended the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing when leaders of certain Western countries chose not to do so amid widespread calls in the West for boycotting the event due to China’s human rights issues.
Compared to its long-standing and enduring political and diplomatic interests, China’s economic interest in the region is relatively new, but no less important. This interest has grown strongly due to China’s “go global” strategy since the early 2000s. China’s heightened demand for overseas resources and markets add further impetus to its Pacific Islands engagement. The region’s rich mineral, timber, fish, and potential seabed resources are all of great interest to China. The Pacific Islands have also emerged as new markets for Chinese products, thus giving China a stake in the economic development of the region.

The growing importance of economic considerations is perhaps most clearly reflected by the fact that China is actually trading more with Island countries with which it has no formal diplomatic ties than with those with which it has formal relations. This suggests economic interests, more than political considerations, drive China’s engagement with the region. As mentioned earlier, China’s total 2012 trade volume with Pacific Island countries exceeded $4.5 billion. Its trade with the eight Island countries with which it shares diplomatic ties accounted for less than 40 percent of this figure.

This trade pattern contrasts sharply with China’s aid distribution in the region, with nearly all funds going to countries that diplomatically recognized Beijing. In more recent years, China’s engagement with the region, as in other parts of the world, is driven by growing concerns about the safety and security of the increasing number of Chinese citizens working and living in Island countries. The issue is particularly significant in the South Pacific region, where in a number of Island countries, Chinese communities have been targets of attacks by local residents during domestic riots. For example, in the aftermath of the 2006 anti-Chinese riot in the Solomon Islands’ capital, Honiara, China undertook an urgent evacuation operation to remove more than 300 Chinese out of the country.

Moreover, Xi, who came to power in November 2012, has enlisted Island countries’ support for Beijing’s effort to pursue corrupt Chinese officials
hiding overseas, many of them in Island countries. During his visit to Fiji in November 2014, Xi expressed particular gratitude for that nation’s assistance in this area and vowed further cooperation between the two nations’ law enforcement agencies.

The latest Oceania Blue Book, an authoritative annual development report published by the Centre of Oceania Studies at China’s Sun Yat-sen University, summarized China’s varied interests in the region:

“Politically to reinforce China’s political ties with the region, economically to explore potential economic opportunities for mutually beneficial development through increased trade, investment and aid, exploring the Oceania market, pursuing economic interests and improving China’s influences in the region.”

Aid Coordination with China?

So far, China’s increased regional engagements have generated considerable concerns and criticisms in countries like Australia and the United States, which have exercised significant regional influence. Many critics target China’s aid policy. According to China’s 2011 foreign aid white paper, key features of this policy are:

- Unremittingly helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity
- Imposing no political conditions
- Adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development

18 Yu, Chang and Wang, eds., The Blue Book of Oceania, 6.
• Remaining realistic while striving for the best
• Keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation\textsuperscript{19}

This represents a sharply different approach to aid provision from that of Western donors both in terms of focus (prioritizing development over governance) and style (attaching no political conditions, but emphasizing mutual economic benefits). To many Western commentators, China’s aid program, especially its “no-strings-attached” approach, has not only undermined the influence of other aid donors, but is also detrimental to Island nations’ interests by ignoring issues of good governance, and political and economic reforms.

Others are more positive, seeing that China’s emergence as a major aid provider has created new development opportunities for the Pacific Islands. However, they also call for changes in the no-strings-attached policy, requesting China undertake greater coordination with other aid donors by aligning with Western aid norms and practice. The recent trilateral cooperation between China, New Zealand and the Cook Islands on a water-quality improvement project is widely perceived as a major breakthrough for this desired coordination.

While coordination between China and aid donors should certainly be encouraged, a case could be made that any such coordination will be limited, if not symbolic, in the foreseeable future. For a number of reasons, it is unlikely China will change its distinctively different aid policy to match the practice and principle of OECD donors. First, despite its rapid rise, China still perceives itself as a developing country and undertakes its aid program

\textsuperscript{19} “China’s Foreign Aid,” Information Office of the State Council white paper, April 2011.
as part of South-South cooperation. Consequently, it sees its relationships with countries receiving its aid as fundamentally different from the traditional donor-recipient relationship between developed countries and developing countries. Thus, China’s long-held principles such as “non-interference of each other’s internal affairs,” “equality” and “mutual benefits” have been central to China’s aid policies.

Moreover, contrary to external criticism, Chinese policy-makers and commentators see their nation’s aid program as a distinctively more effective model of development assistance than the Western model. In particular, a widely held belief in China is that development is the pre-condition for good governance rather than vice versa. Chinese officials and scholars generally believe that China’s focus on improving development capacities suits the need of receiving countries more than Western donors’ focus on governance, and political and economic structural reforms.

Such confidence is boosted by China’s own developmental experiences and the positive response to Chinese aid programs from many Pacific Islands leaders. Indeed, China’s 2011 foreign aid white paper proudly claimed that China’s foreign aid program has emerged as an effective model with its own unique characteristics. In this context, it’s not surprising that, despite aforementioned cooperation between China, New Zealand and Cook Islands, China still refuses to join the 2009 Cairns Compact, designed for promoting greater donor coordination and aid transparency in the Pacific Islands region.
Conclusion

Given China’s diverse and expanding regional interests, and its rising economic and strategic strength, one can expect that Chinese presence in the region will only grow stronger in the coming decades. China’s growing regional presence is a new reality that needs to be accommodated, not resisted. On the one hand, Chinese activism in the region has provided important developmental opportunities for regional countries. On the other hand, given Beijing’s expanding ties with Pacific Island states, resisting Chinese influence will only lead to a zero-sum strategic competition that could divide the region.

Accommodating China’s role, however, requires great understanding of Chinese interests and views. Given the substantial difference between Chinese and Western views about China’s unique aid policy, effective aid coordination between China and other aid donors must be based on a two-way socialization process, with both sides acknowledging the merits of each other’s aid practices. Simply requesting that China conform to rules set up by traditional aid donors is unlikely to work; other donors might need to consider how to refine their own aid approaches by learning from the positive aspects of Chinese practices.
Chapter 4

Still Missing in the Rebalance? The United States and the Pacific Island Countries

Eric Y. Shibuya

Executive Summary

- The regional reaction to the U.S. “rebalance” to Asia is mixed. Many countries are more reassured by the returning U.S. focus on the Asia-Pacific region, while others are concerned that they see more rhetoric than reality. For Pacific Island countries, much of the discussion is summed up as just “more of the same” with island states mostly missing in any discussion of the rebalance’s impacts.

- This chapter describes the history of U.S.-Pacific Island relations, highlighting instances of neglect and unwanted attention. While some countries may look to benefit from greater U.S. attention to the region as part of the rebalance, history suggests they should proceed with caution.

- While U.S. disinterest in Pacific Island countries is hardly new, it is more of a mistake today. Globalization has made the world smaller, and international connections, for good or ill, are faster and easier to make. Island nations have built great networks of regional cooperation and are working on ways to connect communities with international actors. Forums, such as those provided by the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, should be taken advantage of as much as possible. Island states have much to teach the international community about cooperation and resilience, and we should learn to listen.
Introduction

The announced U.S. “pivot” towards Asia in 2011 was welcomed by many U.S. allies and friends in the region. Resources diverted to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had taken its toll on U.S. forces’ personnel and preparedness in the U.S. Pacific Command area. Coupled with concerns over a “rising China,” a re-prioritized focus towards the Asia-Pacific alleviated other countries’ fears that China’s increasing influence would go unchecked.

Almost immediately after its announcement, however, the U.S. government found itself having to parse what it meant by “pivot.” First, the policy was retitled the “rebalance” to avoid perceptions of a “quick or sudden move” as the pivot implied for some. Second, beyond the semantics, the U.S. needed to explain how the rebalance was not about confronting China (to avoid tensions with a major trading partner), while at the same time, assuring allies that the rebalance did check an assertive China. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed the former, yet focused more on the latter when out of office. As fiscal constraints became tighter, the United States struggled to give substance to its rebalance rhetoric.

To be sure, there have been visible aspects of the rebalance (though many of these were in the negotiation stages long before the announcement of the rebalance). The porting of littoral combat ships in Singapore and development of the rotating force of U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia, are certainly among the most visible of military adjustments. Diplomatically and economically, the appointment of the first U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — in 2008, long before the rebalance — and ex-

3 The “full” return of New Zealand into the ANZUS alliance deserves mention as well. Suspended for nearly thirty years due to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, US-NZ military relations improved while working together in Iraq and Afghanistan, culminating in New Zealand’s full participation in the Rim of the Pacific naval exercises in 2014.
pansion of the Tran-Pacific Partnership also highlight that, while the Middle East was certainly the priority over the last 10-plus years, the United States did not completely lose focus on matters in Asia. In all of these actions, however, there remains a glaring absence of a policy towards Pacific Island countries.

This would hardly be the first time Island nations were afterthoughts in U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific; if indeed, one could say they were thought of at all. Being ignored in the world of international politics is sadly nothing new for the Pacific Islands, but there are increasingly impending threats that demand their voices be heard on the global stage. Conversely, shifts in great power politics (most notably, the rise of China and India) require the United States to consider many other actors and not take them for granted, while considering the second- and third-order effects of its own policies. The United States’ general goodwill and political capital in the region is not endless, nor is it unchallenged; and it would do well to consider how to reinvigorate its profile in the region, particular with Pacific Island nations.

The United States and the Pacific Islands: From Benign Neglect to Unwanted Attention

In the aftermath of World War II, there was no question as to the predominant superpower in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike in Europe, where the Soviet Union could contest American power, the Cold War security arrangement in the Pacific clearly favored the United States. Soviet alliances with the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Vietnam were never as strong as the Soviets wished. Additionally, these states were surrounded by a network of U.S. bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as a trilateral agreement with Australia and New Zealand. These relationships formed a ring around the Pacific Ocean and were the framework of the region's security architecture. The heart, however, of U.S. influence in the region, was, in fact, among Pacific Island nations, particu-
larly island states in free association with the United States. These included the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau. Along with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, they formed the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).

The TTPI was under a UN trusteeship system administered by the United States for roughly 30 years, starting in 1947. While eleven other trusteeships that included other Island nations, such as Nauru, New Guinea, and Western Samoa, fell under the jurisdiction of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council had oversight over the TTPI. Furthermore, Article 15 of the trusteeship agreement prohibited the agreement from being “altered, amended, or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority (the United States).” Coupled with U.S. veto power in the Security Council, no other trustee holder had such overarching power over its trusteeship.

The trusteeship period between the end of World War II through the Kennedy Administration is often referred to as a period of “benign neglect,” but such a notion is debatable. On the security front, there was certainly no neglect of the TTPI, and the attention was hardly benign. The area was closed off for nuclear testing (even American citizens required a security clearance to enter the TTPI); Island populations from Bikini and Enewetak Atolls were completely displaced for nuclear device testing; and the Kwajalein Atoll population was moved for intercontinental missile and, later, missile defense testing.

While justifications for closing off the TTPI from much of the outside world were to preserve the culture of Island societies, clearly the real intention was to secure military interests. Further, without deference to or understanding of these cultures, the United States established several social programs — universal education, health care, and governmental systems — all patterned after the American model. These caused great problems within these small societies; problems that worsened during the Kennedy and

Johnson Administrations. A UN report highly critical of the handling of the TTPI appeared somewhat embarrassingly the same year that President John Kennedy gave a speech denouncing colonialism before the UN General Assembly. Reports in the popular press referring to the “Rust Territory,” “Our Bungled Trust,” and “Trust Betrayed,” also appeared. The Kennedy Administration responded by throwing more money at the problem. Appropriations for the TTPI — averaging from $1 million to $5 million a year from 1947 to 1963 — exploded to $15 million. Under Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” programs, appropriations expanded to $35 million. The impacts to the traditional cultures of those under the Trust were devastating.

The late 1960s signaled the end of the colonization era, and the beginning of TTPI members’ work to re-shape their relationships with the United States. The Congress of Micronesia (COM) was established in 1965 to further the political development of the TTPI, though the U.S. high commissioner still held much of the governing authority. In 1967, the COM set up a political status commission to explore varying options towards terminating the trusteeship. The COM advocated “free association” (a new status developed between New Zealand and the Cook Islands) and entered into negotiations with the United States in 1969. These efforts stalled as the United States favored commonwealth status, which is essentially complete integration, along the lines of Puerto Rico, Guam and American Samoa. TTPI leaders hoped for maximum independence with maximum financial assistance, while the United States looked to preserve the potential for military use of the islands.

Free Association and the End of the Cold War

Despite earlier resistance to free association, the United States became more accepting of the idea after the TTPI’s unity ended. The Northern Mariana Islands wished to enter into commonwealth status with the United States, and once that agreement was accepted in 1975, the rest of the TTPI began to negotiate separately, looking for the most advantageous deals possible.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (home to Kwajalein Atoll) and the Republic of Palau (westernmost of the TTPI and a great strategic location) separated from the rest of the TTPI, which remained together as the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Marshalls and FSM formally entered into a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States in 1986. Palau’s status was more controversial due to strong anti-nuclear provisions in its new constitution, yet it entered into free association with the U.S. in 1994.7

In return for financial provisions and a host of other services and privileges — such as the use of the U.S. Postal Service at U.S. domestic prices and visa-free entry into America — the U.S. kept the right of strategic denial and, possibly, for future military use of the islands. Perhaps most importantly, the Compact places the highest obligation of defense on the United States. Title Three, Article 1 of each COFA establishes the U.S. “obligation to defend the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia and their peoples from attack or threats thereof as the United States and its citizens are defended” (emphasis added). Similar wording exists in the Palau Compact. This defense provision is not one-sided, as citizens of the freely associated states serve with distinction in the U.S. Armed Forces.

7 The fight over approval of Free Association status for Palau was particularly contentious, to include the assassination of a Palauan president and the suicide of his successor under suspicious circumstances. See among others Arnold H. Leibowitz, Embattled Island: Palau’s Struggle for Independence (Westport: Praeger, 1996), Sue Rabbitt Roff, Overreaching in Paradise: United States Policy in Palau Since 1945 (Juneau: Denali Press, 1991), and Lynn B. Wilson, Speaking to Power: Gender and Politics in the Western Pacific (New York: Routledge, 1995).
The end of the Cold War contributed to return of a general state of neglect by the U.S. towards these Compact States. Relations continued with little controversy, the only exception being that associated with negotiations for compensation for those displaced by and exposed to nuclear testing in the 1950s. Compact States citizens traveled to the United States without visas (and occasionally without passports) and built lives in the United States, while remaining connected to their home islands. The late 1990s to early 2000s included security concerns about “near-peer competitors” (i.e., China), and while Compact States offer geostrategic locations in reacting to potential Chinese aggression, most associated discussions barely included these States, if at all.

“Patching” the Global War on Terror: Failed States and Cooperative Intervention

While Compact security provisions exist until both parties approve their termination, financial provisions had a fifteen-year time limit. A perception had developed that many Compact States citizens had settled in Hawaii and Guam, and had become an economic burden on these governments. Renegotiations resulting in “Compact II” included “impact funds” for Hawaii and Guam, though this was not seen as a major aspect of negotiations, which began in 2001.

Compact renegotiations focused heavily on oversight of immigration of member citizens into the United States. The September 11 attacks made immigration oversight even more of a U.S. necessity. While concerns were raised there would be limitations placed on immigration and/or entry by Compact citizens, the U.S. government’s position was that it was simply strengthening oversight, to include implementing machine-readable passports and requiring passports for entry.8

The “Global War on Terror” reached the Pacific Islands in many ways. In April 2003, allegations arose that Nauruan passports had been found with known al-Qaeda operatives.\(^9\) Though there seems to be little information beyond these initial reports, Nauru terminated its passport sales at the time. Additionally, concerns over the threat of “failed states” and their potential to become terrorist havens entered the discussion and served as the intellectual justification for the Australian-led intervention into the Solomon Islands. (Connecting failed states in the Pacific to potential terrorist threats also allowed Australia to lower its commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq on the justification that it was protecting its “patch” in the Pacific). By 2007, there were also investigations of the rise of Islam in the Pacific, noting that while alarmist cries of an al-Qaeda foothold in Oceania are overblown, the idea of a completely benign environment is also an exaggeration.\(^10\)

**The Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Careful What You Wish For (?)**

Certainly, the rebalance announcement was a welcome one, but its substance has left much to be desired for many in the region. While there has been a host of diplomatic and economic initiatives — such as high-level U.S. participation at the Pacific Islands Post-Forum dialogue and the Trans-Pacific Partnership — there has clearly been a gap between rhetoric and reality. Significant disagreements within the U.S. government led to a government shutdown that brought into stark relief the fiscal realities the Obama Administration and its successors will confront. This reality also generally dampened expectations around the region of a massive influx of military personnel and equipment, and their associated economic benefits.

There were also some sighs of relief, considering the social and environmental pressures that accompany a large foreign presence. Considerations of long-term potential adjustments in U.S. force structure and presence


could have interesting implications — positive and negative — for Pacific Island nations, especially the Compact States.

Unlike all of the other defense agreements, which deal with the considerations of an attack, the Compact relationship puts a proactive requirement on the United States to defend these States. The Compact States’ geostrategic location make them attractive staging points for U.S. assets, and the Compact obligation could justify a greater U.S. presence there. This would undoubtedly bring increased financial benefits and some infrastructure improvements, but again, associated social and environmental tensions should not be downplayed. The rebalance policy could bring greater U.S. attention onto the Compact States, but it wouldn’t be entirely beneficial for them, and they may find there are worse things than being relatively ignored by the United States.

Conclusions: Getting the Balance Right in the Rebalance

The U.S.-Compact States relationship is — at least by legal wording — the strongest defense relationship the United States has with another country. The general U.S. indifference regarding this relationship has strained the generally positive relationship and good political capital the U.S. has with these countries. For example, as of October 2014, Palau’s budget has been funded by continuing U.S. Congressional resolutions because their Compact budget — originally scheduled for a 2011 approval — was caught up in the budget battle between Congress and the Obama Administration.11 The U.S. cannot afford for a relatively insignificant disbursement, totaling about $189 million between 2014 and 2023, to cripple the relationship with a country whose location could have greater security implications in the longer term.

Whatever the larger physical manifestations of the rebalance, the policy focus will be a return to greater engagement by the U.S. with the Asia-Pa-

Pacific region by expanding avenues for cooperation. For the Pacific Islands, however, there are significant obstacles to expanding cooperation. While many countries in the Asia-Pacific have concerns over erosions of sovereignty in cooperating with the U.S., the Islands must also consider issues of scale. For many island states, there is simply not enough personnel to meet official reporting and coordination requirements that the U.S. and other international donors often place upon them. They’re capable of focusing on missions or coordination with larger entities, but frequently cannot do both. Creative solutions — finding different ways to do the same things — are critical in improving cooperation. Taking advantage of small populations and the ability of information to flow quickly could have major benefits in police investigations, for example. What is needed is developing a greater connection between these community networks and the more official policy/security structures.

U.S. entities that facilitate this connection are the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu and other Department of Defense regional centers for security studies. They provide powerful venues for building relationships, and greater personal and professional networks among military and government professionals. Representatives of Pacific Islands civil and government organizations attend APCSS courses and workshops — both at the Center and abroad — that build the cultural understanding necessary for greater communication and cooperation.

Greater engagement improves cultural understanding, and greater cultural understanding leads to better, more effective engagement. Ultimately, greater U.S. cooperation with Pacific Island nations may not be an issue of more, but rather better engagement. From issues spanning conflict resolution to resource management, Island cultures have a lot to teach us; we need to learn how to listen.
Chapter 5

Australia and Security in the Pacific Islands Region

Jenny Hayward-Jones

Executive Summary

- Australia has been the dominant power in the Pacific Islands region, or the South West Pacific, for at least three decades. Australia’s continued regional dominance is assured in the medium term thanks to its prominent position as an aid donor, the strength of its trade and investment links, and the depth of its security cooperation efforts.

- The region has long attracted the interest of major powers. France and the United States hold territories of various statuses in the region. Japan has been a long-term player, and China and Taiwan have been on the scene for many years. There has been speculation that the power dynamics in the region are changing, but the region has not yet become an object of great power competition.

- The relative peace the Pacific Islands enjoy makes it difficult for the region’s governments to attract international attention to the serious non-traditional security threats they face. It is in this area that Australia could do more to assist the region by assisting in mitigating and adapting to adverse effects of climate change; managing the impact of natural disasters; and supporting sustainability of the region’s fisheries.
Introduction

Australia, by dint of geography, trade and investment links, tourism, aid, defense assets and sport, has exercised a dominant influence in the Pacific Islands region, particularly in Melanesia, for at least three decades.

Australia's 2013 National Security Strategy identifies the nation's principal and enduring interests in the Pacific Islands region as “security, stability and economic prosperity.” The strategy document doesn't address “hard threats,” but rather economic, gender, social, governance, and security issues as those that hamper sustainable development and potentially undermine the region's stability.¹

Future instability in the region — whether it is a further breakdown in law and order in the Solomon Islands; internal conflict in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea; civil unrest in any island country; a return of anti-Chinese riots; or population movements driven by climate change — will demand an Australian response. Affected governments and citizens will look to Canberra for help or guidance. Similarly, other major powers will continue to rely on Australia to respond to crises in the region.

Australia may be the region’s dominant player, but the balance of influence has changed since 2003 when Australia drove the establishment of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). China is a much more important player, even if not by strategic design.² The United States is more engaged. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton related at the 2012 Pacific Islands Forum — and the traditional powers and China likely agree — that they all have important contributions to make, and each have a stake in the region's successful advances in security, opportunity and prosperity.³

Australia’s Regional Economic Dominance

Australia’s dominant influence in the region is underlined by its status as the region’s primary trading partner and aid donor, and most prominent investor. Australia’s merchandise trade with the Pacific Islands was worth over AUD$7 billion in 2013⁴.

Australia is a significant partner of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS). In signing the Australia-PIFS partnership for 2014-2016 in April 2014, it pledged AUD$21.6 million to support advancing regionalism, which includes regional security initiatives.⁵

Australia as the Dominant Aid Partner

Nothing illustrates Australian predominance more than its aid commitment to the region. Australia committed more than AUD$1.1 billion to the Pacific Islands in the 2014-2015 financial year; the vast majority of which is spent in Melanesia (principally Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands).⁶

In 2012 — the most recent year for which comparative data is available from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development — Australia’s net disbursements totaled US$1.147 billion, which constituted 60 percent of the bilateral and 54 percent of the Pacific Islands region’s total aid.⁷ According to OECD Development Assistance Committee statistics for 2012, the next biggest OECD donors are the United States, New Zealand, Japan and France.⁸

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⁸ Ibid.
Australia is the region’s leading donor by a significant margin, but new development assistance is coming from as far as Russia, South Korea, India, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar.

China

China’s global aid program has grown as has its economy and defense spending. From 2006 to 2011, it gave approximately $850 million to the eight Pacific Island states that recognize it as the “one China,” making it the region’s fifth largest donor over this period. In contrast, in that same period, Australia gave more than five times that amount: $4.8 billion. The United States gave $1.27 billion, New Zealand provided $900 million, and Japan gave $869 million.

China’s growing engagement in the Pacific Islands has fueled talk of a power struggle in the region. But viewing China’s regional activities in geostrategic terms is inappropriate and potentially counterproductive. China has not been disruptive — in a security sense — in Pacific Island countries; it has been a largely constructive partner, with its aid and investment largely concentrated in building infrastructure.

The Traditional Security Domain

Australia is the key security partner for many Pacific Island states. More broadly, it bears much of the security responsibility for the South Pacific, which it identified in the 2013 Defence White Paper as one of Australia’s four key strategic interests.

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9 Hayward-Jones, Big Enough.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
In support of these strategic interests, Australia spends $53 million per annum on defense cooperation with Papua New Guinea and other Pacific Island countries, and $130 million on securing the neighborhood.\(^{13}\)

The United States, while it retains primacy in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, looks to Australia to take the lead on regional security for the South West Pacific, while it retains direct responsibility in the North Pacific. New Zealand provides for the security of Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, while France guarantees the security of the French Pacific with defense forces based in New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

Australia, New Zealand and France actively cooperate on defense, disaster relief and regional maritime surveillance under the FRANZ arrangement, in place since 1992.\(^{14}\) There are also cooperative arrangements between Australia, New Zealand, France and the United States that coordinate surveillance in the region.

Japan demonstrates renewed strategic interest in the region by its participation in Pacific Partnership humanitarian missions and its aid to Pacific Island countries. It has also shown interest in the PNG’s Liquid Natural Gas Project, highlighted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Papua New Guinea in July 2014, and cooperation on military training with the Australian Defense Force, PNG Defense Force and U.S. Armed Forces.\(^{15}\)

China’s contributions include refurbishing barracks in and providing military uniforms, vehicles and other non-lethal equipment to Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. China also provides some training to the Fiji military.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\) Hayward-Jones, *Big Enough*. 
Military cooperation between Australia and China beyond the Pacific Islands suggests China will not seek a disruptive security presence in the region. Australian troops, alongside New Zealand and U.S. forces, are due to train on the ground in China for the first time. Chinese troops are also coming to Darwin to train with Australian soldiers and U.S. Marines. China also invited two Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctors to join their People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hospital ship Peace Ark on its 2014 humanitarian mission in the Pacific Islands.

**Australia’s Dominant Security Role**

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is the most striking example of Australian security dominance and influence in the Pacific Islands. It cost Australia AUD$2.6 billion over a decade, with Australian funding making up 95 percent of overall mission costs. The nation spent AUD$2.2 billion on law and justice operations alone — 83 percent of overall costs. Defence absorbed AUD$406 million, while the Australian Federal Police (AFP) spent almost AUD$1.5 billion. It was a high price to pay for restoring stability in a small country. There were nevertheless many laudable achievements for RAMSI, the most important of which was the value of working with the whole region. The cooperation of defense and police forces from every country in the region was vital to the mission’s success.

Defence support is underpinned by 24 Royal Australian Navy maritime surveillance and technical advisers located across the Pacific Islands (two additional participants are Royal New Zealand Navy personnel). In June 2013, a new training contract was established for the provision of training

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More recently, the government approved almost AUD$594 million in purchase costs and AUD$1.38 billion for maintenance and personnel costs over the next thirty years of the updated Pacific Maritime Security Program.\(^{21}\)

The program, which replaces the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, assists Pacific Island countries in managing their exclusive economic zones. The program is a key element of Australia’s defense engagement in the Pacific Islands region and provides financial, technical, logistics, maintenance, training, and other support to 22 patrol boats across 12 Pacific Island countries. The boats are the sovereign assets of Pacific Island countries and are used principally for maritime surveillance and law enforcement tasks.\(^{22}\)

### Pacific Islands Defense Forces

Among Pacific Island nations, only Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga have their own military forces, although the Vanuatu Police have a paramilitary wing. These militaries are small and lightly equipped; none would be capable of defending their nations against a foreign military force. In Fiji, the military itself has been a major contributor to domestic instability. In Papua New Guinea, certain undisciplined forces have instigated violence against civilians.

The Tongan military benefits from a close relationship with the U.S. and Australian militaries, and has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, but has only done so with significant financial and material assistance from the United States and Australia.\(^{23}\)
The PNG military’s main roles are enforcing internal law and order, and border protection. It has been careful to maintain its independence from the nation’s famously unstable political situation, but is not consistently reliable.

Although Fiji’s military contributes to UN operations, most prominently in the Sinai and Golan Heights, it is lightly equipped and suffered suspension from the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Defence Cooperation Program after the 2006 coup.

The ADF maintains an approximately AUD$27 million Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with Papua New Guinea, comprised of training, exercises, technical advice and infrastructure upgrades. This was enhanced in May 2013 with the signing of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which provides a framework of principles as a point of reference for future cooperation between the two countries.24

In the wider Pacific Islands, the AUD$31 million Australian DCP assists defense and police forces through the provision of advisers, capability, infrastructure development, and support for exercise participation.25

Defence and security issues are increasing in profile in the region. South Pacific defense ministers met for the first time formally in Tonga in May 2013. The meeting included participation from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, France, and Chile. Ministers agreed it was important to build within the region’s traditional and new partners an awareness about the region’s unique security challenges.26 The meeting also resulted in the announcement of the new “Povai Endeavour,” a cooperative arrangement between the ADF and Pacific Island militaries to carry out regional exercises.27

27 Ibid.
At this time, it is difficult to see state-to-state conflict arising in the Pacific Islands region. Australia’s National Security Strategy 2013 identifies the more likely risk to its interests as “another state seeking to influence Australia or its regional and global partners by economic, political or military pressure.”28 The 2013 Defence White Paper states Australia needs to ensure “that no major power with hostile intentions establishes bases in our immediate neighborhood from which it could project force against us.”29

The nation’s forthcoming 2015 Defence White Paper is likely to reconfirm the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands region to Australia, but may have more to say about cooperation in regional security.

Most island states in the region (with the possible exception of Fiji) are not seeking to change the existing security order, even if they could; although, they are keen to attract new external aid and commercial partners. Their attitude was best summed up by Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill, who said his nation’s paramount strategic and security relationships were with Australia and the United States, but his country will continue to look for economic growth opportunities throughout Asia, as well as in Australia.30

Non-traditional Threat Domain

The Pacific Islands region is widely regarded as being peaceful, which means it is not on the radar of international security experts or on the agenda of the UN Security Council. In a world distracted by security crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, and China’s activity in East Asia, it’s difficult to attract much-needed international attention to non-traditional security threats affecting the Pacific Islands region.

28 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Strong and Secure,” 11.
29 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, 25. No file, see above footnote 12.
Australia can continue to play an important role in working with the Pacific Islands region on non-traditional security issues. Australia, together with New Zealand and France, under the terms of the “FRANZ” arrangement, are usually the first foreign responders after cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis hit countries in the region, quickly mobilizing defense and aid assets to assist affected populations.\(^{31}\)

Australia has made sizable aid contributions to assist Pacific Island countries in responding to climate change challenges. However, Australia’s current lack of attention to climate change on a global scale has disappointed Pacific Island states.\(^{32}\) They have urged Australia to alter its climate change policy.\(^{33}\) The region’s leaders look to Canberra to take a leading role in acting on this issue and advocating for the needs of small island states in international forums.

Another regional issue — illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing — is the main reason for reduction in the region’s fish stock. Australia has cooperated in fisheries surveillance, largely through the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and in monitoring the exclusive economic zones of respective Pacific Island countries through the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, now known as the Pacific Maritime Security Program.\(^{34}\)

**Fiji**

Fiji’s isolation from the region since the 2006 coup has led it to pursue relationships with other powers and emerging economies, and promote sub-regional arrangements that do not include Australia. This approach

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34 “Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency,” https://www.ffa.int/about.
served to diminish Australia’s role in dominating the regional conversation about security issues. For example, Fiji has sought military assistance from China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, and Israel because of the suspension of defense cooperation with Australia. The Fiji government has signed memorandums of understanding on military cooperation with China, Russia, and United Arab Emirates, and has approached Brazil about a similar arrangement.

Australia is re-establishing defense cooperation ties with Fiji following the island state’s Sept. 17, 2014, democratic elections. In the lead up to the elections, Australia ensured that Fiji received Australian intelligence and other cooperation during international efforts to secure the release of 44 Fijians captured in the Golan Heights.35 The 44 were participating in a UN Disengagement Observer Force.36 Additionally, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, ADF vice-chief, visited Fiji in December 2014, holding talks with Timoci Natuva, Fiji’s Minister of Defense, National Security and Immigration. It was Australia’s first senior officer visit to Fiji since 2006.37

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36 Ibid.
Conclusion

Australia may not always be the Pacific Islands region’s most influential player from an economic perspective, but is the Pacific Islands region’s indispensable power from a security perspective.

Australia, like other dominant players in their own regions, will always be both damned and praised for its various actions. It has led important security interventions, including helping restore and build peace in Bougainville and restoring law and order in the Solomon Islands. But, it has not done as well as it could in responding to climate change concerns.

Australia has much work to do in understanding security from a Pacific Island viewpoint; it remains, however, the power most able and most likely to guarantee regional security in the interests of the Pacific Islands region’s people.
Chapter 6
Finding Common Ground:
New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation in the Pacific
Anna Powles

Executive Summary

• The Pacific is growing in geostrategic relevance, and this has implications for New Zealand’s engagement and influence in the regional security architecture.

• Regional security architecture in the Pacific Islands is becoming increasingly tested, contested and challenged as a consequence of sub-regional dynamics and the heightened engagement of new and non-traditional partners.

• Geopolitical dynamics are also re-shaping regional security in the Pacific as periphery powers China, India and Russia challenge the influence of the traditionally dominant smaller powers, Australia and New Zealand.

• Larger peripheral powers, China, India and Russia, have stepped up engagement with the Pacific Islands; and France, having previously shown little interest in the actual region in which her Pacific outre-mer, or overseas territories, are situated, is becoming increasingly concerned about being left out of the regional security architecture.
Introduction

The geopolitics of the Pacific is entering a fascinating phase. The winds of political change are gathering strength within the region — in part, spearheaded by Fiji’s fiercely independent foreign policy — and will ultimately transform regional security and governance. The region, historically the site of external geopolitical competition, is increasingly experiencing the pressures and tensions of the larger powers on its periphery.

With New Zealand’s election to a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (2015 - 2016), there is an opportunity for New Zealand perspectives on the regional security architecture in the Pacific Islands to gain a wider currency and influence. This will, however, require New Zealand to demonstrate stronger leadership in the region.

The nature of threats facing the Pacific Islands region, including climate change, fragile cities, resource and environmental security, demographic pressures, the potential emergence of two new states in the next decade, and worsening health security, demand innovative and creative solutions. The regional security architecture will be challenged by two independence referendums scheduled to be held in Bougainville and New Caledonia before 2020. Regional security groupings will need to reorient themselves to face these challenges, and that will mean engaging new and non-traditional actors seeking greater influence in the region. As a consequence, New Zealand can no longer assume its influence in the region.

It is argued here that New Zealand’s influence in the Pacific has already waned significantly, although Wellington has been reluctant, indeed resistant, to acknowledge the fact. This chapter first examines New Zealand’s strategic environment and approaches to the Pacific, and its engagement with and contribution to regional security cooperation mechanisms. The chapter then asks what effective and resilient regional security cooperation mechanisms look like; and critiques opportunities for New Zealand to further enhance regional security cooperation. The chapter then concludes
that New Zealand needs to reclaim its comparative advantage in the regional security cooperation arena.

**New Zealand’s Immediate Strategic Environment**

New Zealand’s strategic environment is unequivocally the Pacific. The nation considers itself a Pacific nation with a considerable *Pasifika* population\(^1\) and with constitutional responsibility for the realm territories of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, and a significant marine territory. In 1897, New Zealand Prime Minister Richard Seddon, who viewed New Zealand as a natural leader of island peoples, advocated for the annexation of Pacific Islands as far away as Hawaii. The failure of Britain to develop a Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific apparently “caused chagrin” in New Zealand as American, German and French influence extended into the region.

Almost a century later, official documents have continued to advance the link between New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. A 1984 report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs examining New Zealand’s relations with its Pacific neighbors declared as one of its assumptions that “New Zealand should recognize that we are part of the Pacific.” In 2002, former Labour Government Foreign Minister Phil Goff suggested that “We see ourselves as a Pacific nation with key responsibilities in the South Pacific, with an increasingly important trading and political relationship with Asia.”

The legacy of these desires for a South Pacific sphere of influence can be seen in New Zealand’s constitutional relationships with Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands, and through its Treaty of Friendship with Samoa. The 2010 “Inquiry into New Zealand’s Relationships with South Pacific Countries,” by Parliament’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, acknowledged the nation’s increasing Pacific composition and found that “New Zealand

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\(^1\) The New Zealand 2013 census showed that 295,941 people identified with one or more Pacific ethnic groups; Pacific peoples were the fourth largest ethnic group, making up 7.4 percent of the population; however the Pasifika population grew by 11.3 percent compared with 14.7 percent the previous census period. [http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census.aspx](http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census.aspx).
is increasingly part of the regional fabric.” To what extent New Zealand’s alleged “Pacificness” and the rhetoric on championing regional issues and regional sensitivity remains debatable.

Historian Malcolm McKinnon, writing in the 1990s, was skeptical that New Zealand had adopted a stronger Pacific identity. He argued that rather than viewing New Zealand’s regional policies — including concerns over nuclear waste, fisheries, and Law of the Sea issues — as exemplifying a Pacific dimension, they should be seen as a continuation of its independence in foreign policy, of an alternative strategic culture, and reflecting interest-driven policies.² This was certainly the case in response to the coup in Fiji in 2006.

Following the Fiji coup, Australia and New Zealand both responded with a similar tone, reflecting a rigid, non-negotiable and principled stance; a stance that was appropriate from a neo-liberal democratic perspective, but has been quietly criticized for lacking a more nuanced appreciation of the cultural and political context. As former New Zealand diplomat Gerald McGhie pointed out, while rhetoric on New Zealand’s Pacific-orientation and engagement with the region is oft-repeated, the country has yet to fully address the complex nature of problems facing Pacific states; this requires a change in approach.

The paradox of New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific is that New Zealand sits both within the region, but also on the periphery. A colonial history, current constitutional obligations, and its role as a development donor to the region, places New Zealand alongside Australia with the regional periphery powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States. Geography, culture and historical linkages therefore serve to situate New Zealand in the region and on its periphery. In recognition of its shifting strategic environment, New Zealand is increasingly playing a critical role as a conduit

or bridge between the periphery powers, non-traditional powers seeking an increased role in the region, and Pacific Islands themselves.

Since the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and the resumption of high-level ties between Washington and Wellington, there has been a clear expectation that New Zealand will support American interests in the region. The 2010 Wellington Declaration states New Zealand and the United States are both Pacific nations; our governments and peoples share a deep and abiding interest in maintaining peace, prosperity and stability in the region; and cites practical cooperation in the Pacific region in the areas of renewable energy, disaster response management, and climate adaptation.

The 2012 Washington Declaration on defense cooperation between the United States and New Zealand includes maritime security cooperation, including strengthening maritime domain awareness, maritime security presence and capabilities, and humanitarian and disaster relief preparedness. The two landmark declarations restoring relations between the two countries have led to growing questions about the impact of the renewed U.S.-New Zealand relationship on the Pacific Islands. Since Eleanor Lattimore wrote in November 1945 that “the United States proposes to make an American lake out of the Pacific Ocean,” U.S. interest in the region over the past 70 years has proven more ambivalent than ambitious. For Pacific Island countries, the pivot has been underwhelming and there is regular debate that the region is once again the object of geopolitical contestations.

The “China in the Pacific: The View From Oceania” conference, held in Samoa in February 2015, sought to address some of these concerns and successfully highlighted three key issues: the variance in views towards Chinese

3 The Wellington Declaration was signed in 2010.
5 Eleanor Lattimore, “Pacific Ocean or American Lake? Far Eastern Survey,” November 7, 1945, 14(22), 313-316.
engagement; Beijing’s lack of a clear and coherent “Pacific Strategy” in the region; and the depth of personal relationships being built between the Chinese and their counterparts in the Pacific Islands.

New Zealand’s engagement with China on a water infrastructure development project in the Cook Islands is an example of how New Zealand has effectively harnessed China’s strategic interests in the Pacific with the development needs of a Pacific Island country. This type of bilateral partnership is viewed as a discreet benchmark for development practice in the region. At the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said New Zealand was leading the way in working with China on Pacific development projects, and that her nation would model its regional cooperation with China on New Zealand initiatives.6

Significantly, New Zealand’s oldest and most longstanding peripheral partnership is with Australia, and it is one of convergence and divergence, competition and collaboration. New Zealand is at times uncomfortable with Australia’s “sphere of influence” approach to the Pacific Islands region, but will bandwagon where necessary. What is clear is that the increasing divergence between Australia and New Zealand on defense capability and political agendas may have potential ramifications for regional security cooperation. This is particularly in relation to defense interoperability, differing policy approaches to key issues of concern in the region, such as China’s rise, and, most significantly, an understanding of the region which is not always complimentary.

Moreover, with regards to Fiji – and by extension the region – there is the most room for divergence. Following the resumption of Australian-Fijian diplomatic ties and the lifting of sanctions, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s visit to Fiji in November 2014 revealed a potential estrangement in trans-Tasman relations. Bishop’s and Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimara-

Bainimarama’s diplomatic seduction, combined with Bishop’s inexperience in regional politics, resulted in the successful conflation of two critical issues in regional governance; the first of which is Fiji’s readmission as a member of the Pacific Islands Forum. Since its expulsion from the Forum in 2009, Fiji has categorically stated that it would only return if Australia and New Zealand were downgraded from full members to development partner status. The second issue is the role of non-traditional periphery partners in the Pacific, such as China, Japan, South Korea, France and the United States, and the impact and influence of larger power tensions and geopolitics on Pacific governance and security.

These are distinct issues wrongfully conflated. Moreover, the failure of both Australia and Fiji to consult with other Forum member countries has signaled a potential schism in regional dynamics. It heralded a divergence in Canberra-Wellington relations where traditionally the two countries have presented a common front. It also signaled an emerging nascent geopolitical competition between Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG). The regional competition between Fiji and PNG has been further intensified by PNG becoming a regional development donor as well as recipient; increased PNG investment in Melanesian states; and the appointment of PNG’s Dame Meg Taylor as Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Fiji considers itself the natural “hub and leader” of the Pacific and the region’s leading defense actor. PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill responded to Fiji’s refusal to rejoin the Forum unless Australia and New Zealand are excluded by calling for a dialogue and a common sense approach that rec-

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ognized “that we all live in the same region and Australia and New Zealand are very much part of that region.”

The Sydney Meeting was postponed indefinitely in March 2015. The delay has given Canberra much-needed time to consider the implications of Fiji’s proposal and the opportunity for Forum member states to consult amongst themselves prior to the Forum Leader’s Meeting in late 2015. The delay has also given Fiji further opportunity to consolidate its relationships with non-regional defense and economic partners, such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, India, China, Russia and Indonesia. From New Zealand’s perspective, it is a critical time to re-evaluate the shifting geopolitical dynamics within the region and the consequences for New Zealand’s influence.

New Zealand Engagement with Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms

New Zealand does not have a formal strategy to guide its regional security cooperation, but rather employs a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral engagements. This ad hoc approach has resulted in some within the security and defense community to call for a more coherent strategy. Whether a regional security strategy would necessarily better inform and guide New Zealand’s contribution to regional security cooperation is debatable, given the complexities of the issues facing the Pacific Islands region. What is clear is that while defense and law enforcement cooperation is a considerable part of New Zealand’s regional security cooperation strategy, there is deep regional engagement involving a cross-section of multiple government agencies despite the absence of a whole-of-government strategy. Certainly, the country would benefit from greater cross-sectoral engagement in order to develop more nuanced approaches and responses. Government departments are in-

9 Bainimarama was rumoured to be “unavailable.”
New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles

herently vulnerable to the silo effect where information is not shared across agencies and lessons learned are not transferred.

For New Zealand, there has been a consistent emphasis that Pacific Islands’ security is a shared responsibility. Official New Zealand government documents consistently emphasize the centrality of regional security issues to the nation. This regional focus is underpinned in the “Defence White Paper 2010” (DWP 10); “2014 Defence Capability Plan” (DCP); “Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force: The 2013 - 2016 Statement of Intent;” the recent “Defence Midpoint Rebalancing Review” (DMRR); and the May 2014 Cabinet review of peace support operations. Continued focus on regional security issues has informed, for example, the acquisition of military capabilities, such as joint amphibious capability systems. Alongside growing collective regional efforts, New Zealand has been providing extensive support to law and justice sector reforms. Targeted assistance has been provided to improve policing and crime prevention, access to and delivery of justice services, accountability mechanisms, and to reduce corruption in Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.

The Pacific Security Cooperation Committee is the central oversight body managing the Pacific Security Fund. The fund, established in 2003 under the leadership of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, aims to enhance the region’s security environment. The annual fund of $3 million is accessible by New Zealand law enforcement and border control agencies to provide training and other support to Pacific Island countries. Projects funded to date include assisting Pacific Island states with becoming compliant with the International Maritime Organisation’s International Ships and Port Security Code, and customs laws. The Fund also provides a forum for discussing security issues. There are recommendations that the Fund’s scope be broadened to include projects that may be outside New Zealand’s immediate interests, but which are highly relevant to Pacific partners.
Other security cooperation mechanisms in support of New Zealand foreign policy objectives include the New Zealand Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP). This is a New Zealand Army training assistance programme that includes training assistance to Tonga, PNG, Samoa, Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Niue. The MAP supports New Zealand Defence Force initiatives to strengthen the capabilities and effectiveness of regional security forces through the development of professional skills rather than the provision of equipment.

In regards to conflict resolution in the region, New Zealand spearheaded a new approach to intervention and peacemaking in Bougainville in the 1990s; a context and mission-specific form of hybrid peacebuilding. The nation led the way in reintegrating development specialists and diplomats into a peace support operation that also incorporated cultural and customary approaches to peacemaking. New Zealand's experiences and the lessons learned in the early days of the Bougainville peace process — including the highly successful, but provocative decision that the initial deployment, the Truce Monitoring Group, would be deployed to the island unarmed — still need to be better integrated into current regional security cooperation mechanisms.

From a regional perspective, as a member of the Pacific Islands Forum and the Forum Regional Security Committee, New Zealand's approach to regional security cooperation is guided by the Biketawa Declaration and other key regional declarations. New Zealand supported the Biketawa Declaration-mandated Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI); the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN, 2004); and the decision to sanction Fiji following the 2006 coup. New Zealand's contribu-

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10 The MAP was originally created to provide training assistance to Tonga, Singapore and Malaysia. It has since been expanded to the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Niue.

tions to RAMSI were substantial, but there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of the nation's cost benefit and lessons learned from the RAMSI experience.\textsuperscript{12}

New Zealand is also party to several multilateral frameworks with periphery partners, which effectively exclude Pacific Islands Forum nations, although they are designed to strengthen regional security. These include FRANZ, the QUADRILATERAL Agreement, and, more recently, a reinvigorated version of ANZUS, a result of recent re-engagement between the New Zealand and U.S. militaries. New Zealand's approach to regional security cooperation has traditionally been backed by strong bipartisan political will, but it has limited assets and resources with which to act. Allegations that New Zealand has been conducting mass surveillance of Pacific Island countries\textsuperscript{13} has been met with quiet disapproval by the region's political leaders and undermines the fabric of political and personal trust between New Zealand and the region.

**Effective and Resilient Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms**

Security cooperation mechanisms can be described as a patchwork of five elements: activities, programs, resources, processes and organizational relationships (RAND, 2012). Security cooperation mechanisms and security governance — at both the regional and national levels — are inter-related and mutually reinforcing.

The key question for New Zealand as a regional security actor is how to measure and evaluate what is effective and therefore resilient? A key challenge in assessing regional security cooperation lies in the choice of benchmarks by which to evaluate progress. Assessing the value of what are es-

\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, Jenny Hayward-Jones' report on “Australia's Costly Investment in the Solomon Islands,” The Lowy Institute, May 8, 2014.

\textsuperscript{13} “NZ spying on Pacific ’growing,’” Radio New Zealand, March 5, 2015, \url{http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/267788/nz-spying-on-pacific-growing}. 
sententially qualitative activities and where the correlation among activities is not always apparent is difficult. Additionally, regional security cooperation mechanisms face critical challenges, including limitations of resources and institutional capacity. The fundamental challenge in assessing security cooperation mechanisms is that the quantitative, or measurable, indicators of efficiency and effectiveness are neither developed nor tracked in a systematic manner. Even qualitative indicators are based more on anecdotal evidence and narrative than structured assessment. A fairer question, then, would be what added value, if any, regional approaches provide compared to available alternatives?

And Missed Opportunities

There are several high-profile and highly significant examples of where Pacific Island countries have not been included in regional security decision-making. These are the missed opportunities to develop resilience. The 2003 - 2014 Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is an example of a missed opportunity to build effective and resilient regional security cooperation amongst Forum member states. Ultimately, RAMSI supported the creation of a “negative peace” — the freezing of tensions through intervention — but not positive, sustainable, resilient peace. RAMSI was a neo-liberal state-building project that reflected the Howard government’s14 desire to radically re-engineer the Solomon Islands from the corridors of Canberra. RAMSI was mandated under the Biketawa Declaration with widespread regional support; however, the participation of Pacific Island bureaucrats, civil servants and policy-makers in the strategic planning and day-to-day running of the mission was minimal.

The 2013 report “RAMSI Decade,” commissioned by the Solomon Islands government and the Pacific Islands Forum, acknowledged the mission’s key successes. It also identified a number of factors critical to success in future

interventions. This included addressing the absence of local ownership. The authors of “RAMSI Decade” cautioned against heralding the mission as a successful model for regional intervention because one of its core elements, the rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), is deeply flawed. They relate that RAMSI has contributed to the police force’s demoralization and dependence on outside support. Moreover, earlier reports noted the lack of Solomon Islanders’ and other Pacific Island states’ participatory engagement.

**What Does Success Look Like?**

What are the strengths of regional security cooperation in the Pacific? Regional security cooperation mechanisms at the multilateral and bilateral levels have proven to work in the Pacific. It is arguable, though, that the key strengths of Pacific regional security cooperation remain untapped. The strengths of the Biketawa Declaration lie in its flexibility, cooperative security, and the range of tools it has at its disposal. Combined with the Human Security Framework for the Pacific (2012 - 2015), there is a clear drive and opportunity for the full and inclusive participation of all peoples affected by conflict.

The evidence, including that from New Zealand’s Bougainville experience, suggests that local, inclusive approaches can provide legitimacy, a framework for long-term, self-sustaining efforts, and deeper integrative effects. As a consequence, culture and communication are important part of regional engagement tools.

In measuring the success of security cooperation mechanisms in the Pacific region, three criteria should be considered. The first is legitimacy; the second is effectiveness; and the third is resilience, or robustness. The three are interrelated, but legitimacy underpins effectiveness and resilience. Legitimacy is critical, whether achieved at the local or village level, or national
Opportunities for Enhancing Regional Security Cooperation

New Zealand has contributed to Pacific Islands' regional security by developing and strengthening its own security frameworks and infrastructure, but there remain areas of critical strategic importance. For New Zealand, there has been a consistent emphasis that Pacific Islands' regional security is a shared responsibility. To address future challenges, New Zealand must re-examine its approach to the Pacific in the following five areas:

Development of New Zealand’s maritime strategy policy

When the New Zealand government ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in July 1996, it acquired a maritime territory between fifteen and twenty times larger than the total land mass of New Zealand. As a consequence, New Zealand is recognized as having one of the largest maritime domains of all coastal states, with an Exclusive Economic Zone considered the world’s fourth or fifth largest. Moreover, under its constitutional obligations, New Zealand has responsibility for the maritime territories of Tokelau, Cook Islands and Niue.

However, New Zealand defense strategists suffer from sea blindness. New Zealand has little maritime consciousness despite the Maori legends of ocean voyages from Hawaiki. It is a strategic paradox that New Zealand is a marine nation, but not a maritime nation. With the anticipated release of both New Zealand’s maritime security policy and the Defence White Paper due in 2015, it is hoped that a comprehensive, overarching maritime strategy is articulated; one that drives increased maritime awareness and capabilities to enable New Zealand to undertake a greater role in monitoring, surveillance, patrolling and protection of its maritime domain.
Advancing the Security-Development Nexus

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that “development and security are inextricably linked” and the 2001 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development study on “Security Issues and Development Cooperation” stated that “the security of states and the security of people should be seen as mutually reinforcing.” The emergence of the security-development nexus is critical to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and comprises governance, security sector, and the rule of law. The concept of “developmental peacekeeping” originated in South African scholarship and seeks to create “sustainable levels of human security through activities aimed at accelerating capacity building and socio-economic development, to dismantle war economies and conflict systems, and replace them with globally competitive ‘peace economies.’”

New Zealand has an opportunity and an imperative to ensure that regional security cooperation mechanisms incorporate human security principles in keeping with the comprehensive Pacific Island Forum Human Security Framework for the Pacific (2012 - 2015). The framework is Pacific-centered and includes conflict-sensitive approaches to programming and policies; its core principles are preventative, localized, collaborative, people-centered and inclusive. In practical terms, the framework has significance for New Zealand Defence Force personnel involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, particularly those in post-conflict countries and fragile cities. An example of NZDF operations includes the 2014 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response to flooding in the Solomon Islands.

A New Approach to Engaging in Regional Defense Diplomacy

There is an emerging culture of defense diplomacy within the region and between regional island states and external defense partners (such as the establishment of defense ties between Fiji and a number of countries, includ-
ing Indonesia, Russia, China, and India). New Zealand and Australia are no longer the primary defense partners for Pacific states, and it is critical that New Zealand changes its approach to how it engages with Pacific militaries. Enhancing mechanisms for interaction among security actors is crucial to building resilience within regional security cooperation. Examples include exchanges between the Vanuatu Military Force and PNG Defence Force on the PNG officer cadet course, and PNG and New Caledonia bilateral military field training exercises. While examples given are military-to-military exchanges designed to strengthen regional security cooperation mechanisms, key avenues exist for developing civil-military relations through training and educational exchanges.

**Making the UN Non-Permanent Seat Meaningful to the Pacific**

In August 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 2167 (2014) affirming the critical role of regional cooperation in international peacekeeping and security. The importance of regional security arrangements has long been encouraged under the so-called subsidiarity principle, but has gained currency as a consequence of the seeming intractability of conflicts and failures of intervention. The resolution does not suggest that regional organizations supplant the United Nations in peacekeeping, but rather that comparative strengths need to be recognized. The resolution calls for regional organizations to strengthen their relationships and develop more effective partnerships. Fiji’s statement on the resolution, given by Fijian diplomat Namita Khatri, echoed an accepted truth in peace operations: “regional organizations are likely to have a keener understanding of the local situation and cultures.”

New Zealand successfully won a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2015 - 2016 period with the considerable support of the Pacific Island Forum member states. New Zealand regards the role as an opportunity to influence at the reform level, and there is an opportunity for New Zealand to contribute to the transformation of regional UN security
cooperation mechanisms. This includes addressing how the UN can better support, through regional security cooperation mechanisms, local capacities and leadership for local solutions to conflict; and how the United Nations can ensure, through regional security cooperation, greater accountability towards the local population. These questions underpin the overriding one: how will New Zealand bring its win at the United Nations home to the region? How will New Zealand ensure its UN Security Council position is meaningful for Pacific Island states?

Conclusion

New Zealand’s perspectives on, and contributions to regional security cooperation mechanisms have remained fairly consistent. New Zealand prides itself on being a good regional security actor; however, there are certain assumptions around New Zealand’s role that need to be challenged. New Zealand cannot take its relationship with Pacific Island states — and the goodwill shown to it — for granted. The failure of New Zealand Prime Minister John Key to attend the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum sends signal of ambivalence to both the region and New Zealand’s domestic audience about the importance that his government places on the region. The Pacific security complex is a structured matrix of formal and informal cooperation, and increasingly, interdependence, interaction and communication is critical. To build true resilience, regional security cooperation mechanisms need to better reflect the region, and that means more Pacific Islanders in positions of leadership.

New Zealand and other periphery partners need to listen more. Creative approaches to regional security cooperation — looking beyond the formal to informal linkages that strengthen Pacific relations — are essential. New Zealand, if it is to retain its influence in the region in the face of competing states, must re-engage with the region in a far more meaningful manner.
Chapter 7

Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia: Challenges and Opportunities

Jim Elmslie

Executive Summary

This paper examines the convoluted process underway in which West Papuan political actors are seeking to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), a sub-regional body representing the interests of a collection of South Pacific countries. This development is being vigorously opposed by the Indonesian government, which believes it will strengthen the West Papuan independence movement. In the ensuing diplomatic tussle, the regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific is being redrawn, creating several challenges and opportunities.

Challenges to Melanesian countries posed by increased Indonesian diplomacy:

- The new “terms of trade” may take focus away from anti-corruption reforms, good governance and the promotion of human rights; they may indeed negatively affect these areas.

- Pro-Indonesian policies will clash with growing public support for the West Papuan cause, leading to internal conflicts.

The creation of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) may undermine the effectiveness of the widely respected Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and diminish Australia’s and New Zealand’s often positive role in the region.
Opportunities associated with a greater Indonesian presence in the region:

- Increased aid and development assistance from Indonesia would be welcomed, as all MSG countries still lag far behind their development goals.
- Adding Indonesia into the diplomatic mix may strengthen MSG nations’ bargaining positions in their negotiations with Australia, New Zealand and other donor nations over a range of issues, such as access to visas; design and focus of aid programs; implementation of land registration; and general levels of assistance.
- Facilitate the MSG as a forum where pressure can be applied to Indonesia over its policies and actions in West Papua. Human rights abuses, a lack of land rights, political repression, and poor health and education services for West Papuans are significant issues that could be addressed by the Indonesian government; however, it has, so far, lacked the will to do so.

**Introduction**

The driving motivation behind Indonesia’s recent diplomatic offensive targeting MSG countries has been to counter growing support for the troubled region known as West Papua (understood by indigenous Melanesians to comprise the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua). Melanesian inhabitants of West Papua have long desired independence from Indonesia, a dream that has been brutally crushed by military force since Indonesian takeover in 1962. Fellow Melanesians’ sympathy for the West Papuans’ plight has not translated into effective support until recently. Now, domestic developments, particularly in Fiji, have invigorated the issue of West Papua within the MSG and drawn a countervailing reaction from Indonesia.
This new diplomatic dynamic presents both challenges and opportunities for Melanesian countries.¹

**Proposed West Papuan Membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group**

The West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), the most prominent West Papuan umbrella group seeking independence, was encouraged to apply for MSG membership at the group’s annual summit in Noumea in June 2013. All MSG members — Vanuatu, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia’s Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste, (FLNKS)² — appeared initially supportive of this application. Then chairman of MSG, Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, met West Papuan diplomat and WPNCL Vice-Chairman John Otto Ondawame and encouraged him to submit the application. Expectations of success were high, but ultimately unfulfilled. Vigorous Indonesian diplomacy stymied the bid by persuading the MSG to defer the membership application until after a January 2014 Foreign Ministerial Mission (FMM), comprised of MSG leaders, to West Papua to investigate the situation firsthand.

Two key points behind the deferral were the veracity of West Papuan claims of human rights abuses and the WPNCL’s legitimacy as a representative body of the West Papuan people. Indonesia claimed that significant social and economic progress was being made in the province and human rights abuses were a thing of the past. Meanwhile, two other West Papuan groups disputed WPNCL claims of representation: the West Papuan National Authority and its self-declared government in exile — the Federal Repub-

¹ I would like to thank my colleague, Dr. Cammi Webb-Gannon, coordinator at the West Papua Project, University of Sydney, for her advice and comments on this chapter. See, Jim Elmsie and Cammi Webb-Gannon, “MSG Headache, West Papua’s Heartache? Indonesia’s Melanesian Foray,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 12(47), November 24, 2014, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Camellia-Webb_Gannon/4225.

lic of West Papua, represented in Noumea by Australian-based activist Jacob Rumbiak; and pro-Indonesian West Papuans represented by Franz Albert Joku and Nick Messet.

The FMM proved to be a farce, spending less than half a day on the ground in West Papua and representatives meeting none of the government’s critics. This was due to the issue’s extreme sensitivity and the likelihood a serious investigation by the FMM would cause mass demonstrations. Concerns that the mission would be a whitewash had already caused the Vanuatu government to pull out of the trip. Ultimately, the visit allowed the FMM to merely report they were unaware of the existence of local concerns or unrest. Far from being a genuine investigation, the mission became a public relations exercise. It ended with MSG delegates, together with Indonesian officials, signing a statement committing each to respect the “sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and […] non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.” The MSG-Indonesian statement also promised cooperation in food security, trade, education, policing and cultural exchanges.³ MSG countries, with the exception of Vanuatu, had effectively leveraged the West Papuan issue to enhance their relations with Indonesia.

**Indonesia and MSG Countries**

The Vanuatu government has long been a supporter of West Papuans and their desire for independence. This is more than a sentiment held by the political elite; it is felt strongly amongst the society's grassroots. Even at the time of Vanuatu's independence in 1980, West Papua was a significant fixture on the political landscape. Vanuatu’s first Prime Minister, Father Walter Lini, said the country would never be truly free while other parts of Melanesia, especially West Papua, remained occupied by foreign powers.

The ongoing presence of high-profile West Papuan activists in Vanuatu ensured the West Papuan issue has been covered in local papers and media.

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in a way unlike that in other Melanesian countries. Thus, the issue of West Papua is strongly embedded in the national psyche and on the domestic political agenda. The Vanuatu Traditional Council of Chiefs, which at times of political crisis has proved to be Vanuatu’s supreme repository of political power, is also vocal in its support for West Papua. So, one can see how the issue has percolated down through society from the elite to village level.

Indonesia has been aware of West Papua support within the Vanuatu body politic for many years, but has only recently sought to counter it. The most obvious example of this was the courting of former Vanuatu Prime Minister Sato Kilman with lavish trips to Jakarta, talks of a closer relationship between the two countries, and direct aid, such as police uniforms. Kilman was instrumental in the Indonesians obtaining MSG observer status. He was forced to resign, however, on March 21, 2013, ahead of a non-confidence vote, largely due to his dealings with Indonesia.4 Vanuatu voters believed he was too close to the Indonesians, fearing their influence on Vanuatu’s internal politics.5

Kilman’s successor as prime minister, Moana Carcasses Kalosil, made his support for the West Papuan cause firmly known from the outset of his term; in many ways it dominated his short time in office. Kalosil immediately distanced himself from the Indonesian push for closer ties and instead embraced attempts to have an official West Papuan presence in the MSG. He asked the WPNCL to formally apply for observer status and facilitated the efforts of Vanuatu-based Papuan diplomats Andy Ayamiseba and John Otto Ondawame to lobby the governments of PNG, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.

Meanwhile, Kalosil continued pushing the West Papuan cause even after its other erstwhile MSG supporters faltered. At the United Nations on September 28, 2013, he challenged the world body with the question, “How

5 Interview with John Otto Ondawame, Port Vila, Vanuatu, April 12, 2013.
can we then ignore hundreds of thousands of West Papuans who have been brutally beaten and murdered?”

Kalosil went even further on March 4, 2014, in a speech to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva, where he specifically referred to the horrific torture and murder of individual West Papuans, which had been filmed by soldiers. He called for the Committee to establish a country mandate which should “include investigation of alleged human rights violations in West Papua and provide recommendations on a peaceful political solution in West Papua.”

The Indonesian ambassador to the United Nations responded forcefully to Kalosil’s speech, denying the accusation of human rights abuses. He buttressed his statements with a reference to the FMM:

“Furthermore, the statement of Mr. Kalosil is simply in contradiction with the visit of a high-level delegation of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members representing [the] Melanesian Community to Indonesia from 11 to 16 January 2014 in which [the] Ministerial Level Delegation of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and representative[s] of the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) of New Caledonia as well as MSG High Representative conducted [an on-site] visit to Papua province and obtained firsthand information.”

This open diplomatic confrontation was a sign that Indonesia’s diplomatic offensive over West Papua was well underway. While within the Vanuatu government and throughout the country, there is heartfelt support and empathy for the Papuan’s struggle, this sentiment proved much more superficial in other Melanesian countries. Their support for the West Papuans waned

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8 Ibid.
as their financial and strategic relationships with Indonesia blossomed. Indeed, it is hard to separate these two developments. The financial and strategic support from Indonesia can be clearly linked to the withdrawal of support by MSG states for West Papua. The clearest example of this was Fiji.

Indonesia-Fiji Diplomatic Entente

Fiji was one of the MSG countries actively promoting West Papua’s membership, or at least the same observer status that Indonesia enjoys. WPNCL Vice-Chairman Ondawame received an enthusiastic response from Fiji’s Prime minister, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, when he visited Fiji’s capitol, Suva, for talks over proposed MSG membership in March 2013.9

Fiji had been suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2009 under pressure from Australia and New Zealand, following the coup launched by Frank Bainimarama in 2006. This, along with sanctions, was an attempt to diplomatically isolate Fiji and the Bainimarama regime until free and fair elections were held for a new government. Bainimarama responded to this exclusion by forming a rival organization to the PIF, the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), which had its inaugural meeting in Suva in early August 2013. Australia and New Zealand were not invited.10 Frank Bainimarama also reinvigorated the MSG, principally by pushing West Papua as a pan-Melanesian issue.

While regional concerns about the Bainimarama regime are legitimate, Fiji also has legitimate grievances against Australia and New Zealand. Pacific countries often felt that the PIF was dominated by the “big two,” whose economic, military and diplomatic power dwarfed that of small Pacific nations. Australia brushed aside Pacific nations’ concerns, such as restrictive visa policies, the threat of global warming (and rising sea levels), and the

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off-shore processing of asylum seekers. While Australian development aid
to all PIF countries is substantial, many policies pushed by the nation, such
as the registration of traditional land as a precursor for its commodification
and possible sale (leaving Pacific Islanders landless), are strongly resisted
by many Islanders, and also deeply resented as an external intrusion into a
profoundly domestic issue.

While the PIDF may have exercised a degree of legitimacy amongst some
Pacific nations, it was the role played by Indonesian President Susilo Bam-
bang Yudhoyono at the PIDF forum in June 2014 that transformed the na-
scent organization into a tiger that threatens the established architecture of
international relations in the South Pacific.

Even before the PIDF meeting, Indonesia was not-so-quietly maneu-
vering to suppress the West Papua issue; it contributed, for example, $30,000 to
Fiji to help fund the costs of hosting the United Nations’ regional meeting
of the Special Decolonization Committee. Vanuatu’s Daily Post newspaper
saw this as blatant manipulation: “Jakarta’s cheque book diplomacy reflects
its determination to silence any murmurs of regional support or discussions
within the MSG on the issue of re-enlisting West Papua back on the de-
colonization list.”11 It seems to have been money well spent as there was
scant mention of West Papua in official forums, despite local moves by some
church groups to have the issue aired.

The depth of Indonesian engagement with Fiji became apparent at the
PIDF meeting held on the island of Denarau on June 17-19, 2013. President
Yudhoyono was the chief guest and keynote speaker at an event focused on
climate change and sustainable development. It was the first visit to Fiji by
a serving Indonesian president, and the length of the stay – three days –
showed just how important the Indonesians judged the event. Espousing the
benefits of a closer relationship between Indonesia and Pacific Island states,

11 Winston Tarere, “Indonesia Exercises Cheque Book Diplomacy Ahead of UN Decolonization
5c5a-85d1-30188fc6b2eb.html.
Yudhoyono also made firm commitments to increase aid and engagement. Amongst other things, he promised $20 million over five years to address challenges of climate change and disasters; talked of plans to triple trade to a billion dollars in coming years; and outlined how Indonesia could act as a bridge for Pacific and Indian Ocean states. Yudhoyono was offering Indonesia as a conduit by which Pacific Island nations, especially Fiji, could interact with not only the dynamic Asian region, but also the wider world.

The PIDF meeting also seemed to acknowledge the “terms of trade” of the Indonesian-MSG states relationship: on the one hand, there would be silence by Pacific leaders on West Papua, and on the other hand — as the former Fiji Times editor, Netani Riki, put it — Indonesia “would not rock the boat on questionable governance, transparency and human rights issues.” This Faustian pact should have sent alarm bells ringing in Canberra; there are already voices of concern being raised in the Pacific. Reverend Francois Pihaatae, general secretary of the Pacific Council of Churches, commented, “Where our self-determination interests are concerned, whether it be in the areas of governance, development and security, or our firm support for West Papuan freedom, we cannot allow the state visit to cloud our prudence and better judgment.”

This perhaps is the core of the conundrum. It is no secret that Melanesian countries do have serious problems with poor governance and widespread corruption. What MSG countries need is more transparency, not less. Transparency, along with an independent judiciary, are among the few effective remedies for reining in corruption. In Papua New Guinea (PNG), billions of dollars of foreign aid and a recently resurgent economy have not translated into improved living standards, or higher education and health.

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services for the majority of people. In many areas, such as the Sepik River region, basic services have gone steadily backwards since independence. The master explanation for this is poor governance and corruption.

Frank Bainimarama was ecstatic over the PIDF meeting’s success and Yudhoyono’s visit. He called it “one of the greatest things that had ever happened to Fiji.”\textsuperscript{15} Yudhoyono must have been well pleased with the visit too; there had been no mention (at least publicly) of West Papua, and the substitution of Indonesia in the “big brother” role traditionally played by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, was being openly discussed. For Bainimarama, there was an added bonus: Indonesia co-lead the multinational group of observers that monitored Fiji’s general election in December, which resulted in Bainimarama’s election as prime minister in the ruling Fiji First Party. International observers endorsed the results.

\textbf{Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and FLNKS}

If diplomatic responses by Vanuatu and Fiji to Indonesian maneuvering can be seen as the two ends of the spectrum, the responses by PNG, the Solomons and FLNKS lie somewhere in between. Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo had been openly supportive of the WPNCL’s bid for the MSG prior to the Noumea Summit; however, shortly thereafter, he visited Indonesia. This trip, allegedly paid for by the Indonesian government, marked a turning point in the Solomons’ endorsement of West Papuan aims. Despite strong public criticism that he had been “lured” by Indonesia, Lilo’s support for West Papuan MSG membership waned, replaced by an enthusiasm for stronger ties and increased trade with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{16}

PNG has always had a more problematic relationship with Indonesia, sharing a long land border with their giant Asian and Muslim neighbor.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
A latent fear of military invasion has always constrained PNG’s response to the sufferings of their brother Melanesians over the border. Instead, frequent affirmations of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua remain the mantra. There is also PNG’s own secessionist dilemma: the referendum on independence for Bougainville is due from 2015, and deep tensions remain over the island’s ultimate political status. However, even in PNG, support for West Papuans is growing as a younger and more globally experienced leadership emerges both within government and NGO circles. Certain individuals, such as prominent PNG politician Powes Parkop, have come out openly in support of West Papuan independence.

PNG’s handling of the West Papuan issue within the MSG is therefore more nuanced than other Melanesian states. PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neil did not attend the Noumea Summit; he was leading a large delegation of PNG leaders on a visit to Indonesia for discussions on border controls, and increased trade and investment between the two nations. PNG is in a delicate situation as it balances these competing imperatives in its asymmetrical relationship with Indonesia. PNG is seeking ways to both stay on good terms with Indonesia and fulfill what PNG opposition leader Belden Namah refers to as “a moral obligation to raise the plight of the West Papuans and their struggle for independence with the Indonesians and before international bodies and forums.”

The FLNKS, an organization formed to advocate for New Caledonia’s independence, has also prioritized its own concerns ahead of West Papuan MSG membership, even though it’s expressed its strong support for West Papua. As the FLNKS enters the final phase of the Noumea Accord, where a referendum(s) will decide New Caledonia’s eventual political relationship

with France, it is fearful of losing MSG support for its own cause, or of an internal split (over West Papua) that might weaken the MSG as an organization. There are also genuine misgivings about whether the WPNCL should be the West Papuan people’s sole representative. The Kanak delegate who completed the FMM visit, Yvon Faua, noted, “The report FLNKS has to make to the leaders is that it is not possible to accept the application. I think the [WPNCL] has to join all the others because we know there are also other organizations.”

The MSG Decision

Prospective WPNCL membership in the MSG was deferred at the June 2013 Noumea Summit, pending the FMM fact-finding trip to Indonesia. The MSG’s decision was formally announced at its meeting in PNG’s capitol, Port Moresby, on June 26, 2014. Not surprisingly, given the foregoing analysis of regional politics, the WPNCL’s application was knocked back. The official MSG communiqué announced that:

8. The Leaders:

(i) Noted and accepted the contents of the Ministerial Mission’s Report;

(ii) Agreed to invite all groups to form an inclusive and united umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on submitting a fresh application.19

This represented a substantial victory for Indonesian diplomacy in thwarting WPNCL attempts to join the MSG. The group’s decision appeared to,

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in effect, give the Indonesian government a veto over MSG policy on West Papua. Apparently, West Papuan membership would only be reconsidered if competing independence groups — the WPNCL, FRWP, the influential activist movement Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB), and pro-Indonesian West Papuans — collectively apply and gain the Indonesian government’s approval. Given the deep antagonism felt between these various groups and the individuals who lead them, a united application appeared to be a difficult undertaking.

However, in a seminar at the University of Sydney on June 30, 2014, West Papuan “dialogue” diplomat Octo Mote spoke of the recently articulated willingness of WPNCL and FRWP leaders within West Papua, and those of the KNPB to work together in this regard. Unity amongst the three groups was achieved at the West Papuan Leaders’ Summit held in Port Vila December 4-8, 2014, which saw the creation of the United Movement for Liberation of West Papua (ULMWP). A new application for MSG membership was lodged by ULMWP on Feb 4, 2015, to be considered by the MSG in June. Jakarta’s longstanding opposition to inclusion of West Papua in the MSG is obviously still a barrier. Although, according to Mote, West Papuans can appeal to the MSG on the basis that FLNKS did not need France’s approval to join the MSG, so why should West Papua need Indonesia’s?

Optimists expressed the view that this potential unity grouping may be able to create a forum in which serious negotiations could take place between various segments of West Papuan society and the Indonesian government.20 While this may appear unlikely, diplomatic power plays between Pacific nations and Indonesia are far from over. Vanuatu, which has always supported the WPNCL and boycotted the FMM, continues to advocate on the West Papuans’ behalf. Recently installed Vanuatu Prime Minister Joe Natuman raised the prospect of referring the case of West Papua to the International Court of Justice, declaring: “We consider seeking an opinion on

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the legal process held by the UN when it handed over West Papua to Indonesia.”21 Such a proposal is anathema to Indonesia. The recent establishment of ULMWP in Port Vila, in December between the various West Papuan groups, who are still hopeful of jointly gaining a place at the MSG table, shows this process is far from over.22 Indeed there is something intrinsically Pacific about how the negotiations are unfolding in the face of the seemingly insurmountable MSG communiqué.

Indonesia’s machinations over West Papuan’s MSG membership have also forced the different West Papuan groups to try to thrash out a ‘unity ticket’ in the form of ULMWP. This is a positive development. With the recent election of Joko Widodo to the presidency of Indonesia, a window of opportunity may have opened, both for relations between Indonesia and the Melanesian countries, and for the fortunes of the West Papua people – two closely linked issues. President Widodo visited Papua Province twice in his election campaign and stated his clear intention to address many of the social, economic and political problems besetting the two Indonesian provinces that make up West Papua. He did, however, rule out any discussion on independence, but affirmed his commitment to end human rights abuses. These are promising statements and the MSG, by using possible West Papuan membership as a pressure point and showing creative diplomacy, may help its broader aims become something more than mere rhetoric.

Chapter 8

Acting West, Looking East:
Timor-Leste’s Growing Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region

Jose Kai Lekke Sousa-Santos

Executive Summary

- Timor-Leste is situated geopolitically and culturally at the crossroads of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands region, and has pursued a two-pillared neighborhood foreign policy of “comprehensive and collective engagement,” which is defined by “Acting West” and “Looking East.”

- Timor-Leste is seeking to integrate itself within regional governance and security structures, and institutions of both Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, thereby increasing its strategic role as a conduit for cooperation and collaboration between the two regions.

- Timor-Leste is of increasing geostrategic importance to the Asia Pacific in view of the growing focus on the Pacific Ocean in terms of resource security and the growing competition between China and the United States.

- Timor-Leste could play an increasingly significant role in regional defense diplomacy developments if the Melanesian Spearhead Group regional peacekeeping force is realized.
Introduction

Timor-Leste is situated geopolitically and culturally on the crossroads of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands region and has, since achieving independence in 2002, pursued a two-pillared neighborhood foreign policy of ‘Acting West’ and ‘Looking East.’ Timor-Leste claims that its geographic position secures the “half-island” state as an integral and categorical part of Southeast Asia while at the same time, acknowledging the clear links it shares with its Pacific Island neighbors to the west, particularly in the areas of development and security. Timor-Leste, for example, has sought greater influence and engagement with regional inter-governmental groupings — the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Pacific Islands Development Fund (PIDF), and the Small Islands Developing States (SIDS). This chapter examines why the nation is pursuing deeper relations with its neighbors to the west, and explores how Timor-Leste can both meaningfully contribute to and benefit from Pacific regional security architecture and governance structures.

A Short History

Timor-Leste comprises the eastern side of Timor Island and the enclave of Oecusse in the island’s western region. West Timor is part of the Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara. Timor-Leste’s long history of colonialism

and resistance, and its short history as a modern independent state has shaped and captured its national identity and foreign policy in highly complex ways. Referring to the Portuguese landing in 1515 in Lifau, Oecusse, Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao stated: “We believe that it was this meeting of civilization and cultures that shaped the destiny of a People, a Country and a Nation — with a history and a culture that are unique in the region.”

The Portuguese colonized Timor-Leste for over four hundred years in a largely indifferent and inconsistent approach that was met with both indigenous acquiescence and resistance. Following the 1974 pro-democracy Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which led to the fall of the fascist Salazar-Caetano dictatorship, those Portuguese colonies furthest from Lisbon were set adrift. After the failure of both Portuguese and Timorese initiatives seeking to develop a roadmap towards independence, Indonesia capitalized on the security vacuum, and on Dec. 7, 1975, invaded Timor-Leste. The twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation were as influential — and more brutal — than the four centuries of Portuguese colonization that preceded it.

Strong indigenous political forces had emerged within Timor-Leste, and between 1974 and 1975, a brief civil war pitted the Democratic Union of Timorese (UDT), who favored progressive autonomy, against the pro-independence Fretilin force (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). Fretilin won the civil war and declared national independence on Nov. 28, 1975. Capitalizing on perceptions of instability in the former colony against the backdrop of fears of communism spreading throughout Southeast Asia, Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste nine days later. The 2005 report by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), titled Chega! (Enough!), cited human rights violations during Indonesian rule, estimating that approximately 180,000 Timorese died during the Indonesian occupation.

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3 A third political party emerged during this period and favored integration with Indonesia: APO-DETI (Popular Democratic Association of Timorese).
occupation, either as a direct consequence of conflict or indirectly due to illness and hunger, with an estimated 55 percent of the population displaced.\(^4\)

In 1999, almost a quarter century after occupation, the tripartite May 5 agreement was signed by the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia, establishing the unarmed UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee the act of popular consultation. This took place Aug. 30, 1999, under UN Security Council Resolution 1236. In a climate of increased intimidation and violence, 98.6 percent of the population registered to vote, and on Aug. 12, 1999, 78.5 percent voted in favor of independence, rejecting special autonomy within Indonesia. Prior to the ballot, the Indonesian military and locally-sponsored militias conducted a three-week campaign in September 1999 called *Operation Clean Sweep*, killing hundreds, possibly thousands, and causing mass displacement and destruction of 70 percent of the physical infrastructure. In the East Timor capital, Dili, upwards of 95 percent of the infrastructure was destroyed. The CAVR report states that following the ballot, Dili became “the crucible of post-ballot violence and destruction.” An estimated 250,000 to 280,000 people were displaced or forcibly removed to West Timor.

Following the referendum’s clear result and post-ballot violence, UNAMET II was established, and on Sept. 12, 1999, Indonesia acknowledged its inability to manage the situation in East Timor and accepted the immediate admission of a UN-sanctioned international force. Since gaining the restoration of independence in 2002, Timor-Leste has experienced twelve years of a UN interregnum comprising five successive UN missions,\(^5\) the last of which withdrew following successful and peaceful elections in 2012.

Since independence, Timor-Leste has experienced periods of instability,


most notably in 2006, when violent in-fighting among the nation’s political elements shattered Timor-Leste’s image as “the poster child” of successful UN state building. When the political and security sector crisis fractured and polarized Dili, it gave rise to East versus West regional identity tensions, and displaced 15 percent of the population.

**Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy: Acting West, Looking East**

Timor-Leste has a focused and proactive foreign policy driven by a form of “comprehensive and collective engagement” that seeks the path of many small nations: peaceful dialogue and collective action. This approach accurately reflects its geostrategic position at the juncture of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and embodies, first, a pragmatic understanding of the need for political reconciliation with Indonesia, the former occupying power, and secondly, an affinity with the island’s development challenges, which mirrors those of its Pacific neighbors to the west.

Timor-Leste has consistently advanced the geopolitical message that it is part of Southeast Asia and should, therefore, be engaged as a strategic player within and by the region. Achieving full membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a paramount strategic objective of the Timorese government.6 Prime Minister Gusmao argues that being part of Southeast Asia geographically means that Timor-Leste wants to be part of ASEAN and, “together, contribute to regional growth, social progress and cultural development in a spirit of partnership. We feel like an integral part of our neighborhood and have a strong sense of regionalism and solidarity with our Southeast Asian Nations — we are one of you.”

The ‘Act West’ approach is pursued through a consistent message from

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Timorese political leadership that its Portuguese colonial heritage brings with it economic advantages. Timor-Leste has sought to position itself as the corridor between Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, while exploiting its “Lusophone alliances” with fellow former Portuguese colonies as gateways into Europe, Africa and Latin America. Gusmao articulated his strategic outlook in 2014, stating:

“Timor-Leste is strategically located between the CPLP countries and ASEAN, China, and the Island States of the Pacific. We also want to make use of our strategic positioning in Southeast Asia, since we have the possibility of creating bridges with Europe, Africa and Latin America.”

Timor-Leste regards itself as having multiple roles within the various regions it seeks to connect. This includes serving as an economic and political conduit between the CPLP and Asia, but also the aspiration to play a bigger role in the international arena by setting an example for “post-conflict” development as manifested in Timor-Leste’s chairmanship of the “g7+” program.

Moreover, Timor-Leste strongly advocates ASEAN goals of greater political and economic integration within the region. The nation uses the example of its reconciliation with Indonesia and growing bilateral ties between the two as evidence of Timor-Leste’s commitment to a shared vision. In the words of Gusmao:

“Many would have thought this too would be improbable. In a model of reconciliation, and with a firm commitment to focus on the future, we have built a strong relationship of trust and friendship. Rather than being enslaved by the

8 Gusmao, “Timor Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges.”
9 Sahin, “Timor Leste: A More Confident or Overconfident Foreign Policy Actor?” The g7+ initiative is a voluntary association of 20 countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are in the next stage of development. Its main objective is to allow participating nations to share experiences and learn from one another, and advocate reform to the ways the international community engages with conflict-affected states, g7+, http://www.g7plus.org.
trauma of our history, we are instead honoring our struggle by working towards a better future for our people. We know that Indonesia and Timor-Leste not only share an island, we share a future.  

In fact, Timor-Leste could see this reconciliation as a way forward for greater dialogue and peacebuilding within the region. Gusmao has also driven the economic message that: “Asia Pacific countries will profit from Timor-Leste’s strategic location as the connector between two regional organizations — ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum — thus creating opportunities for wider trade and cooperation...The country also has a good relationship with Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu that could benefit ASEAN.”

Timor-Leste has also sought to integrate itself into the regional security and governance architecture through its membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 2005, and more recently, as a participant in the Bali Democracy Forum, Shangri-La Initiative and the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue. ASEAN remains, however, in the words of Gusmao, “the cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

‘Looking East’ to the Pacific Islands

‘Looking East’ is the second pillar of Timor-Leste’s neighborhood foreign policy and reflects its desire to engage with the Pacific Islands region in its capacity as a conduit, or corridor, to Southeast Asia and Europe, and as a champion of new development approaches in fragile and conflicted states within the g7+ grouping.

There is also a subtle distinction being made in relation to Timorese identity. Much of the eastern half of Timor-Leste is ethnically Melanesian and

10 Gusmao, “Timor-Leste’s Role and Future in a Rising Asia Pacific.”
12 Gusmao, “Timor Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges.”
Polynesian, and this has led to discussion as to whether Timor-Leste should identify as a nation with the Pacific Islands as opposed to Southeast Asia. The latter lobby is currently prominent. This subtle distinction is borne out in a recent speech by Gusmao, in which he states “In Timor-Leste, as well as in the Pacific Islands, we can find a combination of the best that nature has to offer. We share the same conviction that the Timorese, and all peoples of the Pacific, know how to take advantage in a peculiar way of their precarious resources, transforming them into major achievements.”

Timorese political leadership, however, have been careful not to alienate its neighbors to the east, a number of whom, such as Vanuatu, supported the Timorese independence struggle. Parallels are also drawn between similar shared issues of vulnerability and fragility, and Timor-Leste has pursued a proactive policy of engagement with the regional governance architecture. Timor-Leste has been an observer at the Pacific Islands Forum since 2002; participated in the Pacific Small Islands Developing States meetings; and contributed as a donor partner to the Pacific Islands Development Forum established in 2014.

Timor-Leste has assumed a similar development partner role with the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), funding the MSG Secretariat’s economic advisory position. Timor-Leste has also attended MSG Leaders’ Summits and the Secretariat has indicated a strong desire to engage with Timor-Leste on other issues, including security and development. Herein lays two signifi-

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14 Gusmao, “Timor-Leste’s Role and Future in a Rising Asia Pacific.”
15 Timor-Leste donated USD250,000 for the establishment of the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) Secretariat in Suva, Fiji.
significant avenues for future Timorese engagement with the MSG. Timor-Leste’s defense force, Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), consists of two active light infantry battalions and 1,500 reservists, with a unit of marines and small brown water naval capabilities.

Timor-Leste also has a nascent special force capabilities and growing UN peacekeeping experience, as well as large, and well-trained and equipped policing and paramilitary units. In light of the MSG’s proposed initiative to develop a regional peacekeeping capability, it would be advantageous to engage Timor-Leste in strengthening the regional security apparatus from both “boots on the ground” and security sector perspectives. The addition of Timor-Leste to an MSG regional peacekeeping force would establish a triumvirate of states — Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Timor-Leste — with experienced and growing defense forces. Should Timorese integration within MSG increase, analysts suggest that the Group will be further strengthened as the most powerful regional integration movement, totally overshadowing economic possibilities from the Pacific Plan.18

Engagement with Timor-Leste brings clear benefits to the Pacific Islands region, including the nation’s role as a conduit to Southeast Asia and ASEAN member states. This may help states, such as Papua New Guinea (PNG), which despite receiving special observer status with ASEAN in 1981, and its extensive and, at times, troubled shared border with Indonesia, has not been able to achieve full ASEAN membership.19

Timor-Leste is also hoping to expand its engagement with the Pacific Islands through membership in the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC).20 Timor’s representative at the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum in Palau, Ambassador Abel Gutteres, related that Timor-Leste was eager to build

practical (fisheries and environmental security) as well as political ties with the region. “We are hopeful...that Pacific countries will endorse it, so we can participate in the SPC family,” said Gutteres.

Timor-Leste’s extensive experience in nation-building, conflict transformation and development processes, and the leadership role it is increasingly assuming has real relevance for the Pacific Islands region. Timor-Leste’s approach to conflict transformation and the reintegration of veterans and former combatants into the modern independent state has important lessons for other fragile and conflict-affected states in the Pacific, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, particularly Bougainville. The Timorese government has been successful so far in averting “the Zimbabwe effect” by ensuring that veterans of the resistance struggle have received favorable treatment, from pensions to a degree of political empowerment, and thereby preventing veterans from capturing the state. This has been a fine balancing act which underpins the complexities of the security-development nexus in Timor-Leste.

Moreover, twelve years of successive UN missions have shaped Timorese perspectives of their own political agency and the role of the client state within development of the donor-client continuum. On one hand, the UN presence cultivated a degree of dependence, but it also encouraged – quite possibly inadvertently — an opposing desire for greater sovereignty and autonomy. The UN experience and legacy in Timor-Leste has also influenced Timorese notions about development processes and successes, and has led to Timor-Leste g7+ leadership within a consortium that represents 350 million people from 20 countries experiencing fragility as a consequence of development challenges and/or conflict.

The Timorese Minister of Finance, Emilia Pires, held the inaugural chairmanship, and the nation has taken a driving role in crafting critical agreements on development. Among these agreements is the Dili Declaration (2010), which laid out innovative approaches towards peacebuilding and
state building processes, and improvement of donor efficiency. Timor-Leste's leading g7+ role also includes the drafting of a “New Deal” which the United Nations is considering as part of its post-2015 Development Agenda. Timor’s role in this project is driven in large part due to frustrations which emerged during the UN interregnum years. As Gusmao stated:

“During our own State building process we noticed that the international agencies of support and the United Nations pursued the wrong approaches to development in fragile and post-conflict countries. The international community insisted on a ‘one size fits all’ policy and felt that it was in a position to say what was best for those peoples.”

Timor-Leste can offer the Pacific Islands region a critical understanding of the relationship between development and security in fragile and conflict-affected states and the imperative of seeking context-appropriate solutions. Moreover, there are critical lessons to be learned in regards to challenges posed by a growing youth demographic and related issues of disenfranchisement, vulnerability and growing criminality. Growing youth demographics in Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands region are conducive to and facilitate transnational crime. Cooperation between Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands in countering transnational crime is critical, as both regions are increasingly targeted by transnational criminal syndicates due to their porous borders, corruption levels, and strategic geography as gateways to richer neighbors. Timor-Leste is a prescient warning of how quickly transnational narcotics syndicates can take root in the fragile and conflict-affected states.

22 Gusmao, “Timor-Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges.”
Conclusion

Timor-Leste’s growing engagement with the Pacific Islands region reflects an under-prioritized and less known aspect of Dili’s neighborhood foreign policy. It could potentially, however, become one of the more significant dynamics within the Timorese strategic outlook with the increasing importance of the Pacific Ocean in terms of resource security and the growing competition between China and the United States. There are also critical areas for cooperation and collaboration available between Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands in the security and development arenas.
Chapter 9

Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice: The Role of Norms, Values and Principles in Training for Peace Operations

Russel Parkin

Executive Summary

The ambition to establish “a regional facility (for) training civilian police for international peacekeeping” is one of the outcomes of the 2013 Review of the Pacific Plan.¹ This chapter argues that the creation of such a facility could:

- Enhance regionalism and expand the professionalism of regional security forces;
- Become a focal point for the collection, development and dissemination of regional expertise in peace operations, including indigenous approaches to peacebuilding and peacemaking to the Pacific community of nations;
- Act as a center for development of regional leaders and assist in developing expertise areas, such as disaster response and crisis management, for security forces, with a particular focus on climate change effects in the region.

Peace Operations

Creating a facility for training civilian police in international peacekeeping is a laudable objective; however, peacekeeping is not just a police task. Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld once said, “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only soldiers can do it.” The concept of peacekeeping has evolved considerably since the first operation in 1956; modern peace operations are complex, multi-agency undertakings. From its inception, peacekeeping has been a military task. Pacific Island nations with armed forces — Fiji, New Guinea and Tonga — have considerable expertise in both international and regional peacekeeping operations. Sir Brian Urquhart, the only Hammarskjöld adviser with significant military experience, described the task of peacekeeping as dependent upon:

“...the non-use of force and on political symbolism. It is the projection of the principle of non-violence onto the military plane. It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction. It takes time to develop the full effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation and to secure the confidence and cooperation of the conflicting parties...For soldiers, peacekeeping can be a thankless and unglamorous task, and yet we have found that most of the soldiers value the experience....”

These insights hold true for the role of police in modern peace operations, especially since law enforcement tasks are an integral part of many missions. It would, therefore, make little sense to exclude the military from involvement in such a training facility. Indeed, the involvement of both po-

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2 Quoted in Dave Woycheshin and Miriam de Graaff, eds., Comprehensive Approach to Operations – International Perspectives, (Kingston, Ontario, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013), 133.

lice and military personnel would have considerable advantages, such as enhanced regional interoperability between security forces. Additionally, such an institution has the potential to increase the professionalism of regional police and military forces through the diffusion of internationally accepted norms and standards to which personnel would be exposed during training.

Peacekeeping reforms that followed release of the 2000 “Brahimi Report” saw the United Nations adopt a holistic approach to training peacekeepers. While training security forces for peace operations is the responsibility of individual member states, all training is coordinated by the Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). PET provides member states with training publications and materials as well as training assistance and certification.

From its inception, a Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre (PI-POTC) would be able to draw on PET’s standardized training materials and courses. This link would also make training at PI-POTC a mechanism for diffusion of internationally accepted norms and standards, because institutions focused on education and training provide a very effective means of establishing, promoting and maintaining norms. Institutions, however, are not just collections of norms. They derive their individual character and competence from a range of behavioral elements, such as procedures, rules, protocols and practices, working together with norms to produce a level of institutional performance that determines an organization’s success or failure.

A PI-POTC would have considerable advantages in terms of its access to both regional and international expertise in peacekeeping. The training center would create an environment where the existing level of peacekeeping expertise residing in regional military and police forces could interface with the international peacekeeping community. These interactions could produce regional approaches to peace-building, peace-making and peacekeeping that reflect the Pacific’s unique cultural milieu, while still conform-
ing to accepted international norms. In terms of the Biketawa Declaration’s framework for dealing with regional security interventions, the creation of a PI-POTC would be within the scope of the declaration’s call to support “appropriate institutions or mechanisms that would assist a resolution of regional security issues.” Indeed, a PI-POTC would represent a significant increase in the region’s capacity to deal with its own problems in a credible, coherent and consistent manner.

Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice

One interface for such an exchange of ideas and diffusion of norms is the international community of interest developed around topics of peace and peace operations. The term “community of interest” describes a group of people or organizations who share a common professional interest. In 2000, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions listed over 1,200 organizations — either academic or private peace research bodies — in 80 countries. By engaging with this worldwide community, a PI-POTC could further develop the level of knowledge and expertise residing within the region’s security forces. More specifically, a PI-POTC would also have access to a global community of practice through interaction with peace operations training centers around the world and other organizations with a similar focus on training and educating security forces for participation in peace and stability operations. The community could evolve to mirror the Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Training Centre (ADF-POTC), and how it operates as a center of excellence for peace operations.

6 See Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Wenger is a cognitive anthropologist who, with colleagues, developed the idea of a community of practice as a group that shares a professional domain and collectively advances their professional knowledge through a process in which members learn from one another by sharing experiences, thus increasing the professional understanding of the whole community.
education and training in conjunction with a number of partner institutions and organizations, both nationally and globally.

**Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Training Centre’s Community of Practice**

Each year, ADF-POTC engages with a range of partners at national, regional and international levels. These activities include, but are not limited to, student and instructor exchanges and the conduct of training courses and seminars. In a typical year, the Centre will work and interact with a range of organizations that comprise its community of practice:

**National**

ADF-POTC conducts a number of courses, including the UN Military Observers Course that is attended by both Australian and foreign military students. The course’s final exercise takes place in a purpose-built training facility run by the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group (AFPIDG) at Majura in Canberra.

**Regional**

The Centre is a member of the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres (AAPTC) and holds joint exercises with two other member nations: Thailand and Indonesia.

Exercise PIRAP/JABIRU (PJ)\(^7\) is a bilateral series of exercises that commenced in 1998 and are conducted in English. PJ is held biennially and uses seminar and syndicate work for the consideration of problems. The PJ exercise scenario is a complex, multi-dimensional situation with forces operating under a UN Chapter VII mandate. This scenario serves as the basis for consideration of problems such as the roles of international, government, and non-government organizations (NGOs) in peace operations. The exer-

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\(^7\) A Pirap is a Thai bird and a Jabiru is an Australian bird.
Exercise GARUDA/KOOKABURRA (GK) is an Australian and Indonesian bilateral activity that aims to provide peace operations training to officers from both nations who are likely to be deployed to UN missions. GK seeks to improve their understanding of strategic and operational planning considerations for participating in complex and multi-dimensional peace operations. As with JB, this exercise series uses English as the instruction language and employs scenario-based problems and syndicate work for consideration of problems.

International

In addition to engagements with the UN DPKO and partner institutions in nations such as Chile, Brazil, Canada, the United States, and in Africa states, ADF POTC is an active member of the International Association of Peace Training Centres (IAPTC). The organization holds annual conferences of member institutions. These conferences are themed around training issues. The 20th IAPTC Conference was hosted by the Indonesia Defence Forces Peacekeeping Centre in June 2014 with a theme of “Towards a Global Peacekeeping Training Architecture.”

To conduct this program, the ADF POTC has a full-time staff of six, supplemented by around fifteen military reservists. The Centre’s annual budget is $330,000, a relatively modest figure considering the scope of its activities.

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8 A Garuda is a large mythical bird-like creature from Hindu and Buddhist mythology and a Kookaburra is an Australian bird.
The ADF POTC aims to position itself as a center of excellence for peace operations training and the partner of choice for institutions in other nations looking to develop their expertise in training for stability and peace operations. This institutional ambition, Australia’s membership in the Pacific Islands Forum, and its geographic proximity would make the ADF POTC a natural partner for a PI-POTC and the first link in its community of practice.

**Other Initiatives within the Australian Peace Operations Community of Practice**

In 2012, a partnership between the Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC) and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) led to the development of a handbook entitled, *Same Space, Different Mandates: a civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in international disaster and conflict response*. This publication aims to improve the collective understanding of civil-military stakeholders responding to international natural disasters and complex emergencies and to create greater opportunities for constructive engagement between them. The handbook is a guide to the principles, expectations and operational styles of key stakeholders involved in responding to natural disasters and complex emergencies. In addition to serving as a reference for military personnel, police and field workers from both government agencies and NGOs, the publication is also designed for use in education and training.

In recent years, both the ADF POTC and the Australian Command and Staff College have adopted a similar approach to fostering constructive engagement between multiple agencies involved in peace and stability operations. ADF POTC conducts a Peace Operations Seminar (POS) series that brings together personnel from various agencies and countries to consider the type of problems frequently encountered in peace and stability operations, including rule of law issues, the conduct of elections and dealing with displaced persons. The POS employs a complex scenario involving both a
natural disaster and civil unrest in a small, fragile island state.

A primary POS learning objective is conveying the primacy of the political and the need to sometimes refrain from acting, even if the capacity to act exists. A military force can often bring stability and security through its visible presence in activities, such as regular patrols. While participation of military personnel in peace and stability operations is an important factor in the success of such missions, Urquhart noted success can often hinge on “the non-use of force and on political symbolism (and)…requires discipline, initiative, objectivity and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction.”

During the Bougainville crisis, however, military members of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) frequently expressed their frustration at not pursuing a more active role. Military culture has a strong planning component and, for most military personnel, planning implies that action will follow. In scenario-based activities, the impulse of military participants is often to plan “the solution” without considering broader contexts available through discussion with multiple participants and stakeholders.

In some situations encountered in complex emergencies, military action or even a high-profile military presence is not appropriate. For example, military tasks generally don’t include significant development activities, conducting elections or running refugee camps; the military may have support roles in such activities, such as the provision of transport and logistics. It is also important to expose students to organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, which will reject military security because its members believe it compromises their independence and can actually endanger their field workers.

The learning model adopted by the POS and the Australian Command and Staff College aims to bring participants together rather than simply pro-

9 Ibid.
duce a solution to a problem; students consider situations’ complexity and associated issues. This approach produces a more open exchange between all participants – military, police, government officials and NGOs – who exchange ideas and counter-ideas in a process that is neither competitive nor wholly consensus-building. The end result is a conversation that deepens and intensifies both the understanding and the meaning of what is being discussed.

As this brief survey of ADF POTC’s activities demonstrates, a PI-POTC would have access to a well-established community of practice. From its inception, the institution could draw on a professional network with abundant connections, both regionally and globally. With most Pacific nations relying on police as their major security force, the PI-POTC would have a particular interest in establishing links with institutions such as the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group (AFPIDG) and the New Zealand Police.

Another important potential partner is the European Union’s Centre of Excellence for Stability Policing Units (CoESPU) located in Vicenza, Italy. CoESPU’s institutional aims would make it a natural partner for a PI-POTC because its charter is to conduct training programs, including “train the trainer” courses, and send out Mobile Assistance Teams (MATs) to instruct on international and humanitarian law, peace support operations, rules of engagement, operational planning and procedures, and policing techniques in hostile environments. CoESPU also seeks to promote interoperability between police, military forces and other organizations, and to develop common doctrine and operational procedures for use in complex emergencies.

CoESPU’s charter aspires to create a doctrinal network worldwide by interacting with a range of international organizations, academic institutes and research centers that share a similar focus on peace and stability operations. While principally focused on Africa since its creation in 2005, CoESPU has entered into a range of agreements that have seen it conduct
training in Italy, Chile, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything”}\textsuperscript{12}

Australia’s response to peace and stability operations, particularly regional emergencies in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, has emphasized the missions’ interagency nature. While East Timor was a military-led operation, civilians and police had a much greater role in Bougainville and also in the 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Much of what is now taught at ADF POTC and Australian Command and Staff College reflects the evolution of such missions over the past fifteen years, from military-led peacekeeping operations to multi-agency undertakings in response to complex political, social and economic emergencies. The lessons absorbed by Australian agencies through their participation in such missions demonstrate the importance of two interrelated factors: leadership and planning.

\textbf{Leadership} – One of the main factors in RAMSI’s initial success was the experience of key personnel. The mission was civilian-led, with Australian diplomat Mr. Nick Warner as the special coordinator. RAMSI’s initial mandate was to restore law and order. Participating police forces were commanded by Australian Federal Police Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt, whose police had primacy over the mission’s military component. Both Warner and McDevitt had previous experience with complex emergencies, and both men also worked in the Pacific prior to their involvement in RAMSI. Warner had been head of the Australian Liaison Office to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia during 1989 and 1990. He also served in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 and was the Austra-

\textsuperscript{11} See http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Arma/CoESPU/.

lian high commissioner to Papua New Guinea from 1999 to 2003 during the Bougainville crisis.

Similarly, McDevitt served in various national and international law enforcement roles over three decades. His service includes time with the AFP; working as law enforcement advisor to the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group; and deployment with UN police in Cyprus before his appointment to RAMSI. The mission’s military commander, Lt. Col. John Frewen, was a skilled infantry officer who had deployed as a peacekeeper with the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Planning – Eisenhower’s oft-quoted aphorism is generally truncated and worth quoting in full:

“I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”

In a mission’s planning stages, consideration of issues is more important than arriving at a “solution.” In the lead up to RAMSI, Australian agencies involved in the mission had ten weeks to plan the deployment of 2,200 police — civilian and military — to meet mission objectives. As McDevitt recalled, “We had a very interesting series of meetings…the military representative said securing the strategic military points would take 32 days, and then the military would be ready to withdraw.”

Putting the security problem in context, McDevitt explained “the community had lost trust in the RSIP (Royal Solomon Islands Police) and the police component of the mission could take up to 10 years.”

13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Another agency then explained that issues, such as dealing with corruption, infrastructure development, and governance reforms, would require a generation before seeing results. Different agencies eventually managed to compromise over widely varying timeframes. It is worth noting that the last rotation of Australian and Tongan troops withdrew from the Solomon Islands in August 2013. This substantiates Eisenhower’s belief that in emergency situations, “it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”

RAMSI has been a watershed in Australia’s whole-of-government approach to complex emergencies. In 2004, for example, the AFP established its International Deployment Group (IDG) to provide the Australian government with a standing capacity to deploy police to contribute to stability and security operations. The lessons of planning and leadership from RAMSI and other recent missions have contributed significantly to the development of a methodology for responding to complex emergencies that is still evolving.

While it is prudent to create an organization with the expertise needed to deal with regional security issues, a vision for a PI-POTC might also include a role for the Centre in crisis management, with a particular focus on natural disasters and climate change. The rationale for such a role is that military and police personnel are among those expected to respond to such crises, especially on the basis of their planning and management skills. Security forces, however, also have the potential to become risk managers, particularly in relation to climate change, which can be viewed as a slowly developing disaster that will affect Pacific Island nations in the years and decades to come.

The characteristics of a community of practice, outlined above, would make security forces, along with health, transport and communications authorities (plus a range of other technical specialists), the obvious groups to work together to coordinate information, and develop guidelines and plans for managing and responding to a range of natural disasters; Such disasters
include cyclones, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and the effect of storm surges on vulnerable islands and infrastructure. By providing this institutional framework for crisis management and response, a PI-POTC would further enhance regional integration and cooperation.

**Conclusion**

The ambition to establish a PI-POTC is something Pacific nations should consider seriously. Such an institution would be more than just an important venue for educating and training regional security forces, both police and military. The norms and values that such an institution would diffuse throughout regional security forces would be powerful mechanisms for greater integration and cooperation in the Pacific. Educating security forces in a range of internationally recognized behaviors, protocols and skills would also significantly enhance their professionalism and contribute to the region’s capacity to deal with its own security problems.

The case outlined above has demonstrated developing a PI-POTC would be greatly assisted by its ability to participate in communities of interest and communities of practice that connect it to regional and global networks. These same networks would also position the Centre to develop additional expertise in crisis management and natural disaster response. In time, the institution might also serve as a place to develop leaders who share a common understanding of how to approach regional security issues from the perspective of the norms and values they absorbed from their education and experience in peace and stability operations. More importantly, it might also be the place where security forces of Pacific Island nations, schooled in these international doctrines, can begin to develop “Pacific Ways” of peace-making, peace-building and peacekeeping that have been shaped by their own traditions, values and practices.
Chapter 10

Managing Maritime Resources in the Pacific—With a Focus on Tongan EEZ Management

Yoichiro Sato

Executive Summary

- Management of key maritime resources in Pacific Island states suffers from the mismatch between their vast resource potentials and the shortfall in their enforcement capabilities.

- Tuna fishery resources in the region have been relatively healthy, but the decline in yellowfin and big eye tuna call for introduction of a new international management scheme and development of national enforcement capacity.

- Lack of financial resources is a major obstacle to fishery patrols, yet interagency and multilateral cooperation have been attempted to achieve efficient and effective enforcement.

- Seabed mining in national and international waters offers attractive revenue potentials for some Pacific Island states. However, Tonga’s experience shows that lack of technical and legal expertise, and transparency in governance may greatly reduce this potential.

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Introduction

For Pacific Island nations, the sea is an essential source of traditional living. Large-scale commercial fishing of tuna species by long-distance fishing states has presented a rising level of threat to fish stocks on which local lives depend. Expanding the definition of coastal states’ rights over the sea by international law has not been accompanied by corresponding growth in island states’ capacity to protect their rights through maritime law enforcement. Furthermore, regional fishing management organizations have barely slowed the long-term decline of key tuna species. Additionally, improvements in science and engineering have made seafloor resources more accessible for mining, and Pacific Island states have literally become the new Wild West, where a sense of lawlessness provides fraudsters opportunities for exploitation.

This chapter will look closely at Tonga’s ocean resource issues in order to illustrate the serious implications of weak governance on effectively managing maritime resources. Such management is made more challenging by expanding scientific knowledge and engineering skills, and current business models and globalization. A governance shortfall exists at both national and international levels, with the former contributing to the latter. This chapter will also briefly discuss associated cooperation activities that assist in Tonga’s maritime resource management.

Maritime Resource Security for Pacific Island States

The International Law of the Sea, particularly its granting of 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to coastal states, is the basis for Pacific Island nations’ claims to vast amounts of maritime resources. Previously limiting themselves to traditional fishing, island states have struggled with the dilemma between the new international legal entitlement to these resources and their own lack of financial, technical and scientific expertise
to commercially exploit them. Pacific Island states, for example, have even been unable to effectively patrol their vast EEZs against poachers.

In the past, depletion of tuna stocks impacted the expensive temperate bluefin tuna in the Atlantic and the Southern Oceans; but it now has reached Pacific Ocean species, including the Pacific bluefin tuna and tropical species, such as big eye and yellowfin tuna. The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries Commission (WCPTFC) for the first time agreed to set a total catch quota for Pacific bluefin tuna in 2014 and has started more closely monitoring other Pacific species.² Because tuna are highly migratory species, improving international tuna resource management regimes is important to the Pacific Islands as is improving their own EEZ patrol capabilities.

The launching of the WCPTFC in 1996 with inclusion of Pacific Island EEZ states and long-distance fishing nations, such as Japan, Korea, and United States, was a milestone in managing Pacific tuna. The new regime has developed quickly through lessons learned from earlier tuna management protocols. Previous regimes, heavily dependent on national scientists from member states, often suffered from politicization of scientific stock assessment processes.³ Under the new program, the science committee uses external expertise directly answerable to the commission. The WCPTFC mechanism provides the means to overcome island states’ lack of scientific expertise, which previously resulted in domination by national scientists from long-distance fishing states. Cooperation between Pacific Island nations and long-distance fishing states has further improved catch certification and trade statistics to narrow the windows for unreported fishing and product distribution. Such cooperation is essential for further refinement of international management regimes.

For Pacific Island nations, seabed mineral resources offer growing potential for boosting economic development; their vast EEZs are host to various mineral resources as yet untapped. Furthermore, the seabed in Pacific international waters is now open to international mining consortia under management of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) of the UN Law of the Sea Commission. While most participants are from developed countries with large capital reserves and advanced technology, Pacific countries like Nauru and Tonga have partnered with an international investor to join the mining effort. In EEZ mining, national governments hold authority in licensing for area prospecting and actual production. In addition to setting license fees, ensuring that subsequent operations are environmentally sound is an important national government responsibility.

**EEZ Fishery Management**

Tonga’s EEZ hosts a rich tuna resource. Species caught in the area include yellowfin, big eye, albacore and skipjack tuna, as well as several types of swordfish. The main catch during the early 2000s was albacore tuna at a time when more than 20 vessels operated in Tongan waters. In recent years, longline fishermen have avoided schools of smaller and cheaper albacore tuna; smaller boats operating within territorial waters catch skipjack tuna to be sold along with reef fish in the local fish market. Some big eye and yellowfin tuna, and swordfish are airlifted to Japan, as are occasional catches of more expensive bluefin tuna. Remaining tuna catches go mostly to upscale local restaurants. Only three Tonga-registered boats catch these tuna using longline gear, mostly within the country’s EEZ.

Some twenty foreign fishing vessels were licensed to operate in the Tongan EEZ, but the government placed a moratorium on foreign fishing operations in 2004. The Tongan government resumed licensing of foreign vessels

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for EEZ fishing in 2010, and one Taiwanese vessel has been licensed since then. During the moratorium period, some violations were confirmed. In 2008, a New Zealand areal patrol identified a Taiwanese vessel illegally fishing inside the Tongan EEZ (but outside the “Proclamation” area), and in 2010, a Tongan patrol boat identified a Korean fishing vessel in a similar non-enforced part of the EEZ. The extent of actual violations during this period is unknown, however, due to shortage of routine patrol activities.

Two Tongan government agencies assume primary responsibilities for fishery management. The Fishery Ministry is responsible for licensing foreign vessels and monitoring fishing vessels over six meters in length and operating inside the Tongan EEZ. Tonga’s monitoring efforts rely on the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), managed by the Pacific Island Forum Fishery Agency (FFA), which receives and disseminates data on fishing activities throughout the Pacific Islands region. The Tongan Defense Services (TDS) conducts actual fishery patrols at sea and enforces fishery laws. There is no catch quota on tuna and swordfish in the Tongan EEZ, thus, enforcement targets non-licensed vessels. Other participating agencies include the Customs Office, which certify export contents (including fish); the Police Ministry, which supports enforcement of the Fishery Act; and the Transportation Ministry, which registers marine vessels.

Budget shortfalls generally limit Tonga’s fishery management capabilities, so it remains dependent on external partners for assistance. The need to patrol the large EEZ and the absence of “domestic” tuna fishing industry to match the country’s potentially large fishery resources compound Tonga’s difficulties.

The U.S. Coast Guard has signed a “rider’s agreement” with Tonga to allow the latter’s law enforcement officers on board its patrol boats visiting the area, and the U.S. Navy is considering a similar arrangement. Tongan fishery and other officers can take advantage of such limited, yet low-cost opportunities to increase patrolling frequencies.
In order to maximize the efficiency of surface patrol boats, air surveillance is necessary. No Tongan government agency owns patrol aircraft; thus, the nation relies on infrequent air patrols by New Zealand and France, and occasional flyovers by the United States and Australia. Australia’s return to more frequent air patrols is one assistance possibility, as is a multilateral regional approach to replace current bilateral air patrol agreements.

**Pacific Patrol Boat Program**

To help with Tonga’s efforts, Australia provided the TDS with three boats under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (PPBP) to use for EEZ fishery patrol, or search and rescue operations. Australia pays fuel costs when the boats are used for these specific missions; this amounts to about half the total fuel cost. Tonga may use the boats for other operations, but its domestic law mandates the TDS use them primarily for fishery enforcement and external defense. To encourage boat usage, Australia also applies an AUD$1,000 subsidy toward the cost of “slipping” (preventive maintenance at a dry dock) for every day the boat is at sea. Australia has also provided life-extension repairs for the three boats, which recently cost AUD$15 million.

TDS can perform first-level maintenance, but no hull repairs under the waterline because there is no dry dock facility anywhere in Tonga. Such repairs must be performed overseas. The TDS’ boat maintenance capability relies on the comprehensive training course its engineering officers receive at the Australian Maritime College in Tasmania. The Tongan Maritime School also enrolls a number of TDS officers for more basic engineering training. The Australian Navy stations mechanical and technical officers in Tonga to assist boat maintenance by the TDS.

The boats will reach their lifespan in approximately ten years, and the future of the PPB program is undetermined as of this writing. The change from the Navy to the Custom’s Office as Australia’s lead agency for coordinating
assistance to Pacific Island countries may result in the emphasis of alternatives.

**Vessel Monitoring System**

The Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), which locates fishing vessels in the EEZs of Pacific Islands Forum members, tracks signals emitted from vessels’ onboard VMS units. It is a powerful surveillance tool; when combined with other surveillance data, such as that from air and surface patrols, it’s possible to identify craft operating illegally without a mandatory VMS unit (or without turning it on). The first generation of VMS, tied to the Argos satellite system, has reached its lifespan, so the FFA is shifting to a newer system based on INMARSAT and is providing operating subsidies to member states.

Aging VMS units on Tongan vessels are in disrepair with no local repair capability. This will be a continuing problem, because Tonga’s small market doesn’t warrant local stationing of the manufacturer’s technical staff. Up-front costs of switching to the new system are estimated at US$50,000 for the first year ($2,500 for each of 20 domestic snapper boats), which local boat owners would not be able to shoulder. Because only three Tongan boats conduct longline tuna fishing, VMS for all 20 Tongan boats may not be an absolute necessity. However, its potential utility for search and rescue, and other purposes (such as anti-trafficking enforcement) needs to be taken into account.

Fishery Ministry and TDS are working on closer coordination in fishery regulations’ enforcement. The Fishery Ministry has to overcome two obstacles in order to fully benefit from the VMS. First, powerful real-time data feeds from the system are not fully utilized due to the ministry’s slow internet connection. The ministry does not subscribe to the fastest available service in Tonga due to budget shortfalls. Secondly, the ministry needs training for its staff in analyzing and using historical VMS data more thoroughly.
This was put into action during the region-wide multilateral Operation Kurukuru, which targeted illegal fishing in November 2011 and was led by the FFA. Participating FFA members included Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States.5

**Seabed Mining**

Despite Tonga’s “democratic transition” after the Nukualofa riot of 2006, its politics has been dominated by the royal family. The absence of transparent law governing deep sea mining, and the Tongan government’s decision to sign international joint exploration and production agreements have set the stage for partial privatization of its national resources without a fair return to the general government coffer. The Tongan government’s involvement in seabed mining in international waters exposes it to risk of losses and liabilities, which will have to be shouldered by the taxpayers. With Tonga’s poorly developed governance competency, seabed mining simultaneously offers too much economic lure and demands too much supervising responsibility.

Deep-water seafaths within the Tongan EEZ are host to numerous hydrothermal vents known as “black smokers” that produce polymetallic sulphide deposits containing various metals, such as copper, lead, zinc and gold. In March 2008, the Tongan government granted a 15-year exploration license to Nautilus Minerals — a Canada-based firm active in deep sea mining throughout the Pacific — for an 80-square-kilometer area off Nukualofa known as the Lau Basin.6 Nautilus organized its first exploration voyage in September 2008.7

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Tonga’s government also awarded the Korean government a similar exploration license in March 2008; the Koreans completed three exploration voyages within the following month. The project attracted US$13.8 million in investment from five “local” companies.8

The Tongan government is also involved in Nautilus’ deep sea mining outside the Tongan EEZ. The government, in 2008, sponsored the application by Tonga Offshore Mining — a sole subsidiary of Nautilus Minerals — to explore the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the Central Pacific. The area is located midway between Hawaii and Mexico, and governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).9 The government asked to postpone the application process in 2009 over the question of responsibility and liability of sponsoring states,10 but was persuaded to proceed. The exploration right was granted by ISA in July 2011, and the agreement between the ISA and Tonga Offshore Mining was signed in January 2012.11 The Tongan government signed an agreement with Tonga Offshore Mining to receive royalties for the initial 15 years at “US$1.25 per dry ton for the first 3 million dry tons of nodules mined per year, and US$0.75 per dry ton for all subsequent tons mined thereafter in that same year.”12 Nautilus has signed a similar agreement with Nauru Ocean Resources Inc., with Nauru government’s sponsor-

ship, to explore seabed mineral resources in separate ISA-governed blocs. While the Tongan-sponsored bloc has announced good resource prospects, Nauru-sponsored blocs have not. Meanwhile, Nautilus has tied the Tongan project to Nauru’s through a swapping of interests in the two subsidiaries. The company now controls 100 percent of the Tongan project and let Tonga hold 50 percent of the Nauru project.13

While seabed mining in the Tongan EEZ seems promising, the lure of a quick profit in the poorly governed regulatory environment invites shady figures. An investor group, comprised of mysterious firms allegedly based in Denver and London, and centered on a Russian individual, signed agreements with the Tongan government for hydrocarbons exploration and mining, and established three Tonga-registered subsidiaries. Princess Royal Pilolevu Tuita owns 20 percent shares in each of the three subsidiary firms.14 The three firms received exploration rights for 11 years and 35 years of production rights if resources are found in the “37,000 square kilometers of marine scheduled lands.”15 The area amounts to 5.5 percent of the Tongan EEZ,16 and an international investment of US$20 to $40 million was sought for the initial exploration set to start in 2014.17 “Not one public notice released by the advisory committee based in the Tongan prime minister’s office or from the company itself gestured to a start date.”18 Tonga’s “new business models and practices” to bring international capital to a risky emerging market19 have effectively privatized a part of the Tongan EEZ sea

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16 Field, “New Scam in Tonga?”
17 “Denver firm optimistic.”
19 Ibid.
bed, despite no major international oil and gas firms having shown interest in the prospect of hydrocarbons there.

Tonga’s inexperience with international negotiations and lack of legal training concerning deep sea mining have been addressed by a collaboration of international and regional organizations, such as the European Union and the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SOPAC). Critics are skeptical, however, about acculturation of the Tongan elite through associated workshops. Tonga’s “Strategic Development Framework, 2011-2014,” states:

The opportunities for oil exploration and seabed mining remain in the future, however, government recognizes the potential contribution these could make to the future development of the Kingdom. Government also recognizes that there are many lessons to be learned from other countries where oil and mineral wealth has greatly disrupted political reform and social solidarity.

Government will review the need for new legislation to ensure that exploration and any future mining or extraction of resources will generate a significant benefit to the Kingdom. This legislation will include measures to ensure royalties and other charges are received by Government and to protect the economy and political system from any possible economic disruption and potential corruption that might eventuate from a failure to effectively manage mineral wealth.

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Tonga issued three exploration licenses in its EEZ in 2008 without a national law on seabed minerals mining. Legislation was scheduled for August 2013, but was delayed until a year later. The European Union and the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands community assisted the preparation of the Seabed Minerals Act of 2014, which spelled out a “vetting process” and “public consultation” for deep-sea and seabed mining and legally empowered the government to enforce “environmental impact assessment” and “monitoring.”

Conclusion

Despite the vast potential for EEZ resources, Tonga’s development of its state capacity to manage these resources has lagged behind. The Tongan case illustrates a danger of weak governance leading to ineffective development and utilization of its available maritime resources. While developing its own national scientific, business, and legal talents, which takes time, it seems an urgent and necessary task for Tonga to better exploit sources of external expertise in these areas through cooperation with government and non-government organizations. Furthermore, political pluralization, which enables a freer flow of such knowledge, is lacking in Tonga’s transitional polity. The government would ultimately benefit from a political process that encourages open dialogue between national leaders and the citizens, particularly those impacted most heavily by the nation’s maritime policies.

Governance capability in Tonga has made positive progresses in sync with its political opening. Active debates over seabed mining issues involving the vocal expat communities have played a key role in steering the government policy into the right direction. While it is premature to judge Tonga’s performance in enforcing the newly legislated processes, other Pacific Island states are well-advised to emulate Tonga’s shift towards increased transparency and comprehensive governance of seabed resources.

Chapter 11
Climate Change Challenges to Security in the Pacific Islands Region and Opportunities for Cooperation to Manage the Threat

J. Scott Hauger

Executive Summary

- The Pacific Islands are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
- Direct security impacts may include diminished access to fresh water, local food supply and coastal infrastructure damage.
- For atoll island nations, climate-related sea level rise is an existential threat.
- Areas for cooperation to manage the threat are mitigation, adaptation and response, plus knowledge creation and dissemination in support of those initiatives.
- The Pacific Islands should promote and exploit opportunities for regional collaboration to better manage mitigation, adaptation and response to climate change, and to develop and disseminate better knowledge in support of those activities.
Introduction

There is a strong scientific consensus that global warming is causing changes in the Earth's climate system with consequent impacts on environmental security.¹ By virtue of their shared geographic characteristics, the Pacific Islands have an overlapping set of shared vulnerabilities to the environmental impacts of climate change. They are exposed to tropical storms and rising sea levels in ways that continental states are not. Island nations depend on reef-generated fisheries and tourism, both threatened by ocean acidification and rising temperatures. Fresh water supplies are vulnerable because of limited land area to capture precipitation and because of groundwater exposure to saline intrusion from rising sea levels.

For small islands, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report projects a medium risk of “loss of livelihoods, coastal settlements, infrastructure, ecosystem services and economic stability,” in the near term (2030 - 2040), and a very high risk in the long term (2080 - 2100).² More generally, it projects “reduced biodiversity, fisheries abundance and coastal protection by coral reefs,” and “coastal inundation and habitat loss due to sea level rise, extreme events, changes in precipitation, and reduce[d] ecological resilience,” with high risk in the near term and very high risk in the long term.³

Security Implications

Major climate-related security concerns for the Pacific Islands include: access to fresh water (due to changes in rainfall patterns and salt water intrusion); local food supply (damage to coral reefs, declining fisheries, and impacts on agriculture); and infrastructure damage (through rising sea

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³ Ibid., Assessment Box SPM2 Table 1, 24.
levels, other flooding, and storm damage). Potential second-order consequences include economic loss from these events, declining revenues from tourism, and emigration to escape the situation — especially from atoll islands subject to inundation from sea level rise. For some Island nations consisting entirely of low-lying atolls, including Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, rising sea levels comprise an existential threat.

These anticipated climate change impacts interact with other global trends, such as population growth, water and air pollution, and increasing demands for natural resources, such as tuna, from developing nations. The U.S. Department of Defense summarized its assessment of the security implications of climate change as follows:

“The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions — conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.”

The security threat is similarly recognized by Pacific Island nations, as stated by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Secretariat:

“Climate change is an immediate and serious threat to sustainable development and poverty eradication in many Pacific Island Countries, and for some their very survival. By their geography and mid-ocean location they are at the ‘frontline.’ Yet these countries are amongst the least able to adapt and to respond; and the consequences they face, and already now

bear, are significantly disproportionate to their collective miniscule contributions to global emissions.”

Managing the Security Impacts of Climate Change in the Pacific Islands

Adaptation and response to climate change, together with greenhouse gas mitigation and knowledge creation, make up available tools for managing climate change security impacts. Mitigation refers to activities to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (and thus the oceans). “Adaptation” means activities to strengthen resilience to climate change impacts, the extent of which will depend on the success of global mitigation strategies. “Response” refers to activities that work to ameliorate higher levels of danger, disaster or catastrophe that may occur despite our best efforts to mitigate and adapt. “Knowledge creation” is a key activity that enables mitigation, adaptation and response in the face of the complex and emergent nature of climate change. In particular, there is a need within the security sector for actionable knowledge that can guide associated policy and planning.

Figure 1 presents a matrix of governance levels and tools available for international cooperation to manage climate change security impacts. Regional organizations active in cooperative initiatives include the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP).

Mitigation

Pacific Island countries and territories contribute little to global greenhouse gas emissions. Nonetheless, there is a high level of awareness of fossil fuel dependence across the region where diesel generators are the

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main source of electricity and where commerce depends on the maritime transport of goods. There is a common policy emphasis in island states on the adoption of renewable energy for sustainable development, as expressed by PIF in the September 2013 Majuro Declaration, which states in part:

“We, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum, underline the need for urgent action at all levels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions commensurate with the science and to respond urgently and sufficiently to the social, economic, and security impacts of climate change to ensure the survival and viability of all Pacific small island developing States, in particular low-lying atoll States, and other vulnerable countries and regions worldwide.”

Figure 1. Matrix of Tools and Levels of Governance for International Cooperation to Manage the Security Impacts of Climate Change

An underlying political purpose of the Majuro Declaration was to present a united position to the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as they seek to establish an effective global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions in the 2015 Paris

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meeting.\textsuperscript{7} This is a goal that has eluded the parties since the Kyoto Protocol drafting in 1997. Thus, the Majuro Declaration represents a dialogue between Pacific Island nations and major world powers (and emitters). Although the declaration expresses a regional intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the actual commitments are at the national level. An annex to the declaration aggregates specific commitments by the fifteen PIF member nations.

\textit{Adaptation}

The UNFCCC has provided significant support to the “least developed countries” (LDCs) to plan for climate adaptation, establishing a fund to support the preparation and implementation of national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs). The Pacific Island nations of Kiribati, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have completed NAPAs and received support from the LDC Fund.\textsuperscript{8} The World Bank has provided $140 million for climate adaptation projects and policy assistance in six Pacific Island nations, and has pledged to increase its investments.\textsuperscript{9} The European Union’s Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), working through SPC and SPREP has supported adaptation projects in nine Pacific Island countries.\textsuperscript{10}

Much of the funding for climate mitigation and adaptation activities, however, comes to the Pacific Islands through bilateral aid and technical assistance. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, in 2012, climate-related, bilateral assistance worldwide reached $21.5 billion in 2010 to 2012, with 58 percent for mitigation, 25

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\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
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percent for adaptation and 18 percent mixed. In Small Island Developing states (SIDS) worldwide, climate adaptation projects accounted for 45 percent of assistance. Although nations in Oceania received only 2 percent of adaptation aid overall, SIDS, including the Pacific Island nations, received the highest amount of such aid on a per capita basis.11

Multilateral aid has flowed to Pacific Island nations from the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund and agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and is expected to increase. For example, in February 2014, the European Union and PIF signed a financing agreement that allocates EUR 37 billion for climate change adaptation and sustainable energy in the Pacific Islands.12 SPREP is working to obtain and manage funds from the Green Climate Fund, being established by UNFCCC.13

Nonetheless, overall progress toward climate resilience remains slight. A recent report to the UN Development Program (UNDP) estimates that over the last 25 years, several hundred million dollars in climate-related aid has come to the Pacific Islands, but observes, “While worthy and sincere, most of these initiatives have failed to either inform Pacific Island people about the need for long-term sustainable adaptation or to develop and mainstream appropriate solutions throughout the region.”14

The four mentioned regional organizations are all engaged in multilateral climate adaptation projects. For example, PIF addressed climate issues at its Majuro Summit in 2013 and manages collaborative climate programs with both the European Union and the United States. SPREP undertakes

a variety of programs in adaptation, mitigation and policy development, including the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project in partnership with UNDP, which coordinates national activities in 14 Pacific Island countries and territories. MSG designated an environment and climate change officer in 2013, and has executed a memorandum of understanding for climate change projects with Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. SPC has prepared policy briefs on climate adaptation topics and manages several climate adaptation projects funded by the European Union, Germany, and the United States.

Response

From the security sector perspective, climate response will be understood as an element of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Based on scientific consensus that climate change will cause an increase in natural disasters, there will be a growing need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief over the course of this century. Planning for that challenge is in its early stages, as evidenced by a special session on “Climate Change, HA/DR, and Security in the Asia Pacific,” held on May 31, 2014, as part of the Shangri-La Dialogue. In his remarks, Raymond Quilop, of the Philippines’ Department of National Defense, noted that the session brought together the issues of HA/DR and climate change, which have long been treated separately. During this session, Lord Tu’ivakano, Tonga’s prime minister, stated that “Climate change is [the] number one threat to the security of our region, our survival and our people,” noting that “Tonga is doing what we can do internationally. But climate change poses threats that are beyond our own capacity to respond.”

Adm. Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), has also acknowledged the connection between climate change and HA/DR missions. At the Atlantic Council, in March 2014, he was asked if climate change provided a framework for military-to-military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. He responded, “I think the consequences of climate change already drive that. One thing we can find common among all of us is the need to be able to respond to human disasters. And we’re doing it.”

**Knowledge creation and dissemination**

Because climate change is an emerging threat, there is continuous need for new knowledge to support planning for mitigation, adaptation and response. Thanks to the IPCC’s work, scientific knowledge of climate change — its environmental impacts and their societal implications — is increasingly well-known and available to governments and the public. Sections of the Fifth Assessment Report directly address issues pertaining to the Pacific Islands, and, more generally the oceans and small island states, and provide valuable information to security policy makers.

Regional organizations are also engaged in developing knowledge networks for climate adaptation and response, often in collaboration with partner nations. From 2010 to 2014, for example, the University of the South Pacific administered the Pacific component of the Global Climate Change Alliance, funded by the European Union. This capacity development project provided training of climate adaptation professionals and supported applied research in 15 Pacific Island nations. More recently, SPREP has been work-

20 Pacific Island nation scientists are under-represented; among the 841 contributing authors and editors to the report, only three are from Pacific Island nations. Fifth Assessment Report Authors and Review Editors, IPCC, May 27,2014, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/ar5_authors_review_editors_updated.pdf.
ing with Griffith University, with support from the Australian government, to implement a Pacific Climate Change Information Management project.21

Several domestic U.S. research and knowledge dissemination programs address the interests of the Hawaiian archipelago and U.S.-affiliated Pacific Islands. For example, the Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA), funded by the Department of the Interior and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has assessed climate change indicators and adaptive capacities of these islands, and provided input to the 2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment.22 A consortium of the University of Hawaii Manoa, the University of Hawaii Hilo and the University of Guam manages a Pacific Island Climate Science Center funded by the Department of the Interior.23 NOAA has also established a web-based Pacific Climate Information System (PaCIS) that provides information to support climate adaptation.24

Ways Ahead

With relatively small populations and limited resources, Pacific Island countries and territories should pursue highly collaborative strategies to manage climate change threats. Interagency, cross-sectoral, regional and international collaborations are in order to represent common interests, to forge consensus approaches, to combine physical and intellectual resources, and to maximize the influence of Pacific Island countries and territories in the global arena. Global mitigation outcomes will depend primarily on the actions of large countries that are responsible for most carbon emissions.

22 “Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA),” http://www.pacificrisa.org/projects/pirca/.
Because they are among the most vulnerable to climate change resulting from these emissions, Pacific Islands should continue to work together to influence those nations through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change system and other available means. Island nation economies depend on fisheries, on resilient coastal infrastructures, and on environments and weather that are attractive to tourism — elements threatened by climate change. Protection of these resources is important not only to Pacific Islanders but also to those international consumers who travel to experience the islands. This situation provides clear opportunities for coordinated public diplomacy and for cross-sectoral collaboration to influence public opinion and public policy in developed nations.

Local opportunities will remain for Pacific Island initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The relatively high cost of imported fossil fuels provides an economic incentive for sustainable development based on renewable energy. Developed nations continue to make funds available for such projects. Moreover, USPACOM has supported military-to-military demonstration projects in the past, and current policies should be supportive of future initiatives.25

A key area for potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the Islands is the maritime use of biofuels. A variety of civil sector research, development and demonstration projects are ongoing in this arena, as well as military projects such as the joint Department of Agriculture – U.S. Navy “Farm to Fleet” venture.26 Pacific Islands can work together through regional organizations to influence shipping firms to test, demonstrate and adopt these technologies, and they can propose and request mil-to-mil projects to transfer biofuel technologies.

Adaptation to inevitable climate change impacts must be a core concern.

of Pacific Island countries and territories. The extent of these impacts will
depend on the success of mitigation efforts. Even the most successful out-
comes, however, will result in an extended period of global warming for
the foreseeable future. Adaptation to climate change in the Pacific Islands,
therefore, will be a long-term, strategic process and a way of life.

Most adaptation activities, such as infrastructure strengthening or chang-
es to agricultural practices, will be managed at national or community lev-
els. According to emerging national and international policies, strategic ad-
aptation will be an integral part of sustainable development. International
support for such activities — either bilaterally or through regional organiza-
tions — is likely to grow over the coming decades, largely through agencies
and mechanisms that are already or soon to be in place.

For islands or nations with higher ground, adaptation may be expensive
and stressful, but manageable if resources are available. But for atoll islands
and nations, in situ adaptation may be impossible. It is not yet possible to
project future sea level rise, and its interaction with tides and storms, with
enough precision to predict when specific islands will become uninhabit-
able. This is likely to be a long-term, gradual, and in some ways, sporadic
process leading to increasing emigration over time. A reasonable guess is
that some low lying atolls may become uninhabitable by the end of this cen-
tury. That schedule, however, could be accelerated by complex, interactive
factors, such as increased methane release from Arctic permafrost, which
accelerates the melting of polar icecaps.

For those Island nations under existential threat, there is a critical need
for international cooperation to manage the security aspects of human mi-
gration; the legal and economic aspects of the pending loss of nationality;
and of the sovereign right to natural resources under the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To wit, there is a need to update UN-
CLOS, which did not anticipate sea level rise associated with climate change
and doesn’t adequately address the economic rights pertaining to Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) of Island nations which may become submerged. Working together through regional organizations, Pacific Island countries and nations must pursue these issues of social and legal adaptation and promote their common interests in global forums.

Anticipating the increase over time of natural disasters related to climate change and their impacts on infrastructures, livelihoods and human security, Pacific Island countries and territories should strengthen national and regional capabilities to respond. They should also work with regional powers and civil sector organizations to enhance their capacity to facilitate and manage international HA/DR operations when they become necessary. Planning should anticipate worst-case scenarios where climate-related events, such as cyclones, occur coincidentally with other events, such as an earthquake, volcanic eruption or tsunami, to create a catastrophic “black swan” event.

Pacific Island countries and territories should invest in maintenance and expansion of institutions and programs for knowledge creation and dissemination regarding the impacts of climate change and their potential for mitigation, adaptation and response. There is a continuing need for education at all levels — from public education for an informed citizenry to higher education to provide the skills necessary to fully participate in global scientific and policy communities. Pacific Islanders should also pursue a higher level of participation in climate-related research and policy; for example as authors and editors in any subsequent round of IPCC assessment reporting and as participants in growing observation networks to collect and analyze data on climate-related events, environmental change, and social impacts of these phenomena.

Finally, there is an apparent opportunity for closer collaboration between Pacific Island nations and the United States, which sponsors a variety of domestic research and development programs concerned with Pacific Island climate issues as they pertain to U.S. states, territories and associated states. Most of this research is relevant to other Island entities, but to be rigorously relevant, it should specifically include data and analyses from non-US-associated islands. There will be bureaucratic barriers to such inclusiveness based on different responsibilities and funding streams for agencies with domestic and international missions. With goodwill and intent, however, these should be resolvable issues, requiring interagency agreements and transfer of funds, and perhaps requiring authorization by Congress. It would be in the interests of both the U.S. research community and Pacific Island nations to establish a presumption of such collaboration in future research programs.

Climate change will present a growing challenge to Pacific Islands’ security for the foreseeable future. Pacific Island countries and territories must seize opportunities for regional collaboration to plan and implement adaptation strategies, and to develop and disseminate science-based knowledge to meet the threat. They should work together to influence large nations that are substantial greenhouse gas emitters. Finally, they should take advantage of the slow-motion aspect of climate change to plan for increased capacities to manage regional and global response to future needs for humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
Conclusion

Regional Security Architecture in Oceania: Quo Vadis?

Carleton Cramer

The Pacific Islands region was settled thousands of years ago. Starting in the sixteenth century and continuing through the nineteenth century, European and American explorers and traders colonized the region. By the turn of the twentieth century and onset of World War I, major external powers were ceding and acquiring Pacific territories through political compromise and necessity. World War II brought global notoriety to the Pacific Islands region through many famous and bloody battles, including the Solomon Islands Campaign, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the Marshall Islands campaign. In the decades following WW II, the British, French and Americans used various remote Pacific Island locations to conduct atomic and nuclear testing. During this same time frame, the region rejected the yoke of colonialism and pursued self-determination in various forms, from independence to compact-protectorate type arrangements.

Who then, from among the regional nation-states and the external powers with strategic interests in the region, should gather together to discuss twenty-first century security cooperation? And, just as importantly, on which security challenges should their limited time together be focused?

As was suggested in the introduction, this book incorporates authored chapters as well as findings from a week-long workshop which brought together an inclusive group of Oceania officials, non-governmental organizations, and external powers. The workshop leveraged the outcomes of the
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Summit on the regional strategic vision held in Palau, in July 2014. It provided a timely opportunity to engage the region following participants’ own assessment of the regional security architecture, and to discuss and prioritize areas where action and assistance could best be applied to enhance security governance.

No topic was off limits, including the then pending internationally monitored elections in Fiji. Many passionate discussions continued far into the evening hours. Attendees’ start point was self-assessment of the effectiveness of Oceania’s regional security architecture. Attendees identified key regional norms and values, as well as development challenges and opportunities to see how they shaped the regional security architecture. This effort, aided greatly by this book’s authors and workshop presentations, contributed to rich workshop discussions that followed. The assessment process enabled further discussion of key questions associated with the future development and prosperity of Oceania. First, what were the required next steps for enhancing regional security architecture? Second, to the extent possible, what would be the metrics of success in enhancing the regional security architecture?

During discussions, participants identified key issues for consideration. They noted that while recognizing diverse national interests across the Pacific, attendees desire a Pacific which is peaceful, stable, and prosperous; a region in which people live according to the universal rule of law, customs and traditions, and who value inclusivity, responsibility, respect and dignity. Attendees all expressed a desire to maintain traditional values, but to also ensure that traditional practices and norms adhered with current international norms. Participants expressed concern that donor money often brings donor values that may conflict with traditional values, principles and systems. There was broad consensus that outsiders do not necessarily understand how the region works and improving the understanding of “international” outsiders on local and regional values was necessary. Finding
commonalities and similarities between traditional norms and international universal rights was identified as an important next step.

Attendees focused on “The Pacific Way” – inclusiveness, listening, consensus and non-confrontation — as a valuable means for economic development, and reconciliation and peacebuilding. Inclusiveness at village, district and national levels was identified as crucial to addressing a host of economic and political security challenges. The “Wantok” system from Melanesia was highlighted as important in that decisions made “today” do impact relationships “tomorrow.” Attendees expressed a continuing common desire for regional solidarity to be achieved through consensus in the Pacific Way and, in this regard, recognized the necessity of improved communication and accountability between national and regional stakeholders. There was candid recognition that decision making at the regional level is significantly more difficult now that there are more member nations represented.

Attendees recognized that economic interests, growth and development do in fact drive the security infrastructure, and that current mechanisms are failing to deal with these drivers. They cited problems that included uneven and growing economic gaps, taxation, transnational crime and the fundamental inability to meet requirements imposed by both trade and aid agreements. Participants also identified greater emphasis on human security and local, district and national economic planning as important links between regional security, development and sustainable growth.

The week-long workshop was important from the perspective of both “process” and product. Intimate, small-group discussions allowed for transparent, mutually respectful discussion. Difficult issues concerning the role of external powers, the regional security architecture and comprehensive security policies were discussed with candor and passion. Three broad conclusions resulted from the event:

First, there was a belief the current security architecture was capable of accommodating and reconciling potential challenges to regional stability,
including the tension between extant regional structures and sub-regional groupings, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and recently formed Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF). Participants, to include senior Pacific Islands leaders, applauded the initiative of convening a workshop on this topic at a timely juncture in regional relations. The event facilitated a conciliatory atmosphere among several regional bodies that will enable closer cooperation and coordination in future efforts.

Second, discussions highlighted the important role of larger external powers in the region and the need for greater dialogue between such powers and Pacific Island nations to enhance trust, confidence and transparency in regional security. For the United States, in particular, participants emphasized an increased diplomatic presence was more important for the Pacific Islands region than additional military activity.

Third, attendees emphasized that enhancing the development of national security processes and documents is a way to generate greater political commitment and national ownership over regional security arrangements. They also stressed that development of a robust national security policy is a crucial foundation for a resilient regional security architecture. Discussions with PIF and the UN Development Programme Pacific Centre highlighted the urgent importance of assistance to the Solomon Islands particularly in view of the current drawdown of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

**Summary**

Oceania represents one of the world’s most diverse regions. It is an extraordinary mix of cultures, languages, peoples and countries. Most countries in this region are “young,” having achieved their modern independence in the post-World War II era. Perhaps more so than any other region of the world, Oceania struggles in reconciling traditional norms with international
values driven by globalization. Issues such as overfishing and environmental
degradation represent nontraditional security challenges to many coun-
tries around the world. These same challenges threaten the very survival of
Oceania. Tragically, Oceania may play a key role in global norm setting for
the movement of people associated with climate change.

The peoples and countries of this region are connected by the oceans. As
is frequently acknowledged in many Pacific Island cultures, the ocean does
not separate people, but instead, connects them. In a broader context, Oce-
ania connects Asia with the Americas and serves as a maritime highway be-
tween East and West. The twenty-first century is being driven by important
trends, all associated with the maritime domain. Maritime commerce con-
tinues to grow exponentially; giant “K Mart” ships loaded with many thou-
sands of containers with products from around the world are a common
sight. Growing sea lanes of commerce cut throughout the Pacific Islands
region. More and more, countries are relying on their maritime commerce
for their economic growth and prosperity of their people. Pacific Island
countries are unique among the world community in that all have vast mar-
itime territories that significantly exceed their relatively modest amount of
land territory. And, in the broader Asia-Pacific region, countries are en-
gaged in an unprecedented naval arms modernization. As noted in previous
chapters, few Pacific Island nations have armed forces. In many respects,
these three mega-trends are converging in the vast waters of Oceania. What
happens in Oceania has global implications. Hopefully this book will help
inform the discussion and contribute to a successful way forward.  

1 The conclusion to this book is derived in large part from DKI APCSS staff and faculty working
papers, as well as recorder notes from workshop plenary and small group discussions.
Notes on Contributors

**Rouben Azizian** is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. His main areas of research and teaching are regional security architecture, security sector development, Oceania, and Russian and Central Asian security issues. Dr. Azizian has published seven books as well as numerous book chapters, journal articles, and working papers on regional security. From 1994 to 2002, he taught at the Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland, New Zealand. Prior to becoming a full-time academic, Dr. Azizian had an extensive career in the Soviet and later Russian Foreign Service, which included assignments in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and New Zealand. He is a member of the editorial boards of *Asian Politics & Policy, Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science and Education, Central Asia Journal of Area Studies* and *Russia and the Pacific* (scientific journal).

**Carleton Cramer** is the Dean of the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he has also been a faculty member since 2004, focusing on international law, counterterrorism and maritime security. His previous naval career includes numerous assignments in the Asia-Pacific region. His additional experience in the region includes working for the Supreme Court of Hawaii and U.S. Attorney, District of Hawaii. Mr. Cramer is a member of both the California and Hawaii State Bars. He is admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit and the U.S. District Court, District of Hawaii.
**Jim Elmslie** is the co-convener of the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, which he founded in 2002. In this capacity, he has coordinated many workshops and conferences, and has published widely on the conflict in West Papua. Dr. Elmslie has been involved in study, research and business on the island of New Guinea since 1983, simultaneously working as an art consultant and a political economist in both Papua New Guinea and West Papua. He has completed a master’s of international studies degree and a doctorate of philosophy on the political economy of West Papua at Sydney University.

**James Scott Hauger** is an associate professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. He teaches in areas of science, technology and security policy, including climate change and environmental security, and space and the global commons. Prior to joining DKI APCSS, Dr. Hauger served as research professor and vice president for government and business relations at Nevada’s Desert Research Institute (DRI). Dr. Hauger’s career has spanned the research and innovation enterprise across the private, academic, non-profit and government sectors. In the 1980s, he was founder and CEO of Applied Concepts Corporation, a high-tech, small business firm addressing issues of technology assessment and innovation. In the 1990s, he founded the Science and Technology Studies program at Virginia Tech’s Northern Virginia Center. He then served as a program director at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Dr. Hauger’s initial education was in chemistry at Stetson University (B.S.) and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He holds a master’s degree in American history from the University of Chicago, and a doctorate in science and technology studies from Virginia Tech, with an emphasis on science.
Richard Herr is the director of the Centre for Regional and International Affairs at the University of Fiji. He taught at the University of Tasmania for four decades and has held a variety of positions including head of department. Dr. Herr has held academic appointments in Hawaii, New Caledonia, Republic of Korea and the USSR. He was awarded a Medal in the Order of Australia (OAM) in the 2007 Queen's Birthday Honours List, for promoting higher education. The Royal United Services Institute awarded him the 2013 Blamey Medal for his security assessment of Melanesia, and AusAID conferred a Peace Builder Award in 2002 for his work in the Solomon Islands. Dr. Herr has served as a consultant on the regional architecture for the governments of the Pacific Islands on a regular basis since 1976.

Jenny Hayward-Jones is director of the Melanesia Program at the Lowy Institute. Prior to joining the Lowy Institute, she was an officer in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for thirteen years, serving in the Australian missions in Vanuatu and Turkey. She worked as policy adviser to the special coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands from its inception in July 2003 to 2004. Dr. Hayward-Jones holds a bachelor of arts with honors in political science from Macquarie University and a master’s degree from Monash University. Her interests focus on Australian policy in the Pacific Islands region, political and social change in Melanesia, and the strategic and economic challenges facing Pacific Islands in the Asian century.

Russell Parkin is a member of the directing staff at the Australian Defence Force Command and Staff College in Canberra. He served in the Australian Army as both a reserve and regular officer between 1980 and 2004. Since 2004, he has been employed in government service and the higher education sector, including with the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the University of Canberra, and the
Australian National University. Dr. Parkin’s research interests include Australian military and political history, professional military education, peace operations and regional security issues.

Anna Powles is a senior lecturer in security studies with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University, New Zealand. She is co-editor of “United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of the Integrated Approach,” (Ashgate: July 2015); co-editor of “Private Military and Security Companies in the Pacific” (forthcoming: 2016); and is writing on the rise of geopolitics in the Pacific. Dr. Powles previously held positions as the monitoring and evaluation security sector specialist with the United Nations in Timor-Leste; the Timor-Leste analyst with the International Crisis Group; and as advisor to the Timorese government on its response to the 2006 crisis. She has conducted humanitarian response evaluations for the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam International, and World Vision International as well as undertaken research projects on post-conflict recovery in the Solomon Islands and the protection of civilians during the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste. Dr. Powles is an Alumni Fellow of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii. She is the founder of the New Zealand affiliate of Women in International Security (WIIS NZ), a member of Women, Peace and Security Academic Collective (Australia/New Zealand), and a committee member of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

Michael Powles currently serves as a Senior Fellow with the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies in Wellington, New Zealand. In February 2015, he was Conference organizer for a conference held in Samoa on China and the Pacific: “The View from Oceania,” sponsored by one university each from New Zealand, China and Samoa. Ambassador Powles has also edited two books on Pacific politics and modern Pacific Island history. He was
ambassador and permanent representative of New Zealand to the United Nations from 1996 to 2000. His previous experience in international relations is extensive, having served as New Zealand’s ambassador to China and Indonesia and as high commissioner to Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu. He was former deputy secretary for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade with responsibility for the South Pacific, North Asia, the United Nations, the Middle East and Africa. Ambassador Powles holds a master’s degree in law from Victoria University, Wellington.

**Yoichiro Sato** currently teaches and is the director of International Strategic Studies at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan. Previously, he also taught at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii; Auckland University in New Zealand; and Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College, and University of Hawaii. In fall 2013, Dr. Sato was a visiting professor and researcher at Colorado School of Mines. His major works include *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy* (co-edited with Keiko Hirata, Palgrave, 2008); and *The Rise of China and International Security* (co-edited with Kevin Cooney, Routledge, 2008); and *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (co-edited with Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, Palgrave, 2011). Dr. Sato holds a bachelor of arts degree in law from Keio University, master of arts in international studies from University of South Carolina, and doctor of philosophy in political science from University of Hawaii.

**Eric Shibuya** is professor of Strategic Studies at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. Prior to his joining Marine Corps University, he was associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, from 2000 to 2007, where he taught courses on Oceania and was one of the founders of APCSS’ Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism course. Dr. Shibuya’s re-
search interests are in the politics of Oceania, post-conflict demobilization/reintegration, and transnational political violence. He holds degrees from the University of Hawaii, University of Oklahoma, and Colorado State University. He was a Fulbright Fellow to Australia in 1999 and a 2002 Pacific Century Fellow, and has been adjunct faculty with the Center for Civil-Military Relations (Naval Postgraduate School) and Center for Asymmetric Warfare, participating in maritime security and pandemic response exercises in the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. Dr. Shibuya’s latest publications are *Demobilizing Irregular Forces* (Polity, 2012) and “Beijing Building Influence, Shelving Competition in the South Pacific,” *China Brief*, vol.12, issue 20, October 19, 2012, Jamestown Foundation.

Jose Sousa-Santos is a principle consultant with JKLSS Consulting and a regular contributor for IHS Jane’s on Asia-Pacific security and defense issues. He is a former lead analyst with the UN Integrated Mission in the Timor-Leste Joint Mission Analysis Cell and advisor to the acting prime minister and president of Timor-Leste. Mr. Sousa-Santos received numerous commendations and awards for his role in conflict mediation in Timor-Leste, including a 2008 nomination for the Sergio Vieira de Mello Human Rights Award, United Nations and Government of Timor-Leste, for achievements in the area of community conflict mediation and dispute resolution during the 2006 crisis; a 2007 UN Police National Investigations Department Commendation; and a 2006 Presidential Commendation for the facilitation of multi-party negotiations between martial arts and ritual arts groups, the government of Timor-Leste, and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. He is completing a masters in international relations at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand.
Jian Zhang is deputy head of school, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Australia. His primary research interests are in China’s foreign and security policy, Chinese military and Asia-Pacific Security. Dr. Zhang has published widely in various international journals and edited volumes. He is a member of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (AUS-CSCAP).