THE GERMAN BUNDESWEHR IN THE FACE OF A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: A STUDY OF ADAPTATION, CULTURE, AND POLITICIZATION

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF OPERATIONAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2015
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Abstract

In 2006, Germany released a new security policy to address the emergence of “new risks and threats” with a modernized force capable of “adapting to the dynamic security environment” and conducting operations beyond its borders.¹ Germany has since risen to become a key player in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU); however, security challenges from domestic terrorism, Russian expansionism, and a reduced US presence in Europe have also increased. This paper asserts that the Bundeswehr is inadequate to counter the current and growing security threats due to German culture and politicization. It substantiates this claim based on the results of a model that was synthesized from two organizational theoretical approaches that examined the Bundeswehr and how well it is adapted compared to the regional and global security environment. Secondly, it describes why culture and politicization is a significant contributing factor to these shortfalls. It should be recognized this paper only identifies inadequacies and their underlying causes through the lens of the organizational theory. It is not inclusive of all the problems facing the Bundeswehr and should be viewed as a starting point to recognizing and understanding the deep complications of it adapting to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment.
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Introduction

In the 25 years since the reunification between East and West Germany, the country has continuously evolved as a nation and as a regional and global player. One specific area in which it has evolved is in its security and military role. In 2006, Germany released a new security policy to address the emergence of “new risks and threats” with a modernized force capable of “adapting to the dynamic security environment” and conducting operations beyond its borders.\(^1\) Germany has since risen to become a key player in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU); however, security challenges from domestic terrorism, Russian expansionism, and a reduced US presence in Europe have also increased. It is important to know if the Bundeswehr has the capability of meeting its multilateral security obligations. This paper asserts that the Bundeswehr is inadequate to counter the current and growing security threats due to German culture and politicization. Politicization, for the purposes of this study, describes the external influence of politics on government organizations in which “the winning group must usually compromise with the losing group when structural choices are being made... the losing group is dedicated to crippling the agency in whatever ways it can.”\(^2\) This paper substantiates this claim based on the results of a model that was personally synthesized from two organizational theoretical approaches that examined the Bundeswehr and how well it is adapted compared to the regional and global security environment. Secondly, it describes why culture and politicization is a significant contributing factor to these shortfalls. It should be recognized this paper only identifies inadequacies and their underlying sources of friction through the lens of the organizational theory. It is not inclusive of all the problems facing the Bundeswehr and offers no solutions to the problems identified. It should serve as a starting point to recognizing and
understanding the Bundeswehr’s deep complications in adapting to meet the challenges the evolving security environment presents.

Understanding the shortfalls of the Bundeswehr and its challenges in solving them is an important international issue. In 2011, Germany declined to participate in operations in Libya. In making the decision, then German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle stated, “In weighing the decision [to participate], including the risks, we came to the conclusion that we will not take part in a war, in a military mission in Libya, with German troops.”3 Despite the German leadership’s political statements of support to allied operations, the decision was made to satisfy the growing discontent and skepticism by the German people resulting from the perception that the German military was becoming more offensive and working further outside the borders of the EU and NATO. The decision caused ripples through the international security communities, with United Nations (UN), EU, and NATO allies questioning Germany’s solidarity with its partners.4 As regional and global threats continue to emerge, the political leadership finds itself being squeezed between the demands of the international community and the responsibility to remain accountable to its citizens.

Research Design and Methodology

The evidence gathered to support this paper is based on a mixed method approach of quantitative and qualitative research, prescribed definitions, analysis, and modeling. The bureaucracy of the Bundeswehr was determined through an analysis of primary and available peer-reviewed sources of German security policy, in particular, the *White Paper 2006: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* and the subsequent implementation of this policy through the *Reorientation of the Bundeswehr*. As a matter of scope and simplicity, “bureaucracy” or “bureaucratic environment” is defined in broad terms to include not only the
standard Merriam-Webster definition of a “government organization characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority” but also as the associated culture of an organization defined as, “the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization.”

To define the security environment, a variety of factual but potentially biased articles (predominantly from open-press organizations) were used in conjunction with official documents and statements from the United States, UN, EU, NATO, and German government sources. The security environment is inclusive of current and emerging challenges. To mitigate bias, direct quotes from primary sources were favored over simple reporting and to maintain accuracy, multiple samples of similar events were taken across a variety of reporting agencies. Information on German culture was obtained through an evaluation of historic, peer-reviewed sources and open-press articles. The methods to mitigate bias previously discussed were similarly applied.

The approach for this study is based on organizational theory. The Business Dictionary defines organizational theory as, “the study of organizational designs and organizational structures, relationship of organizations and their external environment, behavior of managers and technocrats within organizations. It suggests ways in which an organization can cope with rapid change.”

Data from the Bundeswehr bureaucracy and security environment were applied to a synthesized adaptation model, which identified shortfalls of the Bundeswehr and, through interpretation and organizational analysis, provided root causes that are discussed in detail. Details of the specific approach and the adaptation model are discussed in the next section.
Organizational Theory Approach and Adaptation Model

To measure the effectiveness of the Bundeswehr using the organizational theory, it was essential to create a proper model. There are a variety of theories that attempt to explain how organizations function and the best way to optimize them. Some theories complement one another, while others are conflicting. Simon considers there to be eight schools of organizational theory: “classical; neoclassical; organizational behavior; modern structural; systems, contingency, and population ecology; multiple constituencies/market organization; power and politics; organizational culture and symbolic management.” Each of these schools advocate different views of how organizations should best function, making it challenging to establish a comprehensive model. After reviewing each school of thought, it was determined to be impossible to accurately analyze the Bundeswehr through any one particular theoretical lens and that a synthesized approach of using two different theories was necessary. The model created is based on the combined theories of contingency, bureaucracy, and power and politics as complimentary views on organizations.

Contingency theory, founded by Woodward in 1965, emerged as a modern perspective that rejected the idea of there being “one best way” a business should organize itself to be successful. The theory evolved through the works of Lawrence and Lorsch, which assert that the relationship between the ways a business is organized and its environment is a determinant for success. Miles and Snow add to this description three organization types that businesses could adopt in relation to their environment: “defender,” “analyzer,” and “prospector.” Morgan provided a postmodern perspective that organizations are much like organisms in nature and must adapt to their environment to survive. That is, success or failure is a measure of adaptability between the internal make up of an organization—which his paper describes as
bureaucracy, and its external environment. This means that for the Bundeswehr to adequately meet the challenges of its security environment, its bureaucracy must be aligned with the security environment. Morgan’s “Profile of Organizational Characteristics,” which will be discussed in greater detail, further establishes a basis for analyzing organizations to determine where they fall in relation to the typologies Miles and Snow described. Contingency theory provides a benchmark for measuring the effectiveness of how businesses organize in relation to their environment, but it does not consider the additional restraints and constraints inherent to the bureaucracy, politics, and power that affect the Bundeswehr as a government organization.

The discussion of power and politics and bureaucracy are considered together in their approach to organization theory. Lasswell is generally viewed as the first to provide a social-science approach to politics in his 1936 work, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How, as a study of “influence and the influential” in their approach to “successful manipulation” of the political environment. The study of government bureaucracy originated in Weber’s 1922 work, Economy and Society, describing it as a specialized hierarchy of rules-based functions that are impersonal in nature but well documented. Moving forward, these two theories merged into what may be referred to as a study of political bureaucracy. Allison and Zelikow put forth the view that government bureaucracies are subject to politicization in what they described as “bargaining games” brought about “by the pulling and hauling that is politics,” that often results in compromises and satisficing external influences rather than provide solutions. Moe further adds that government structures emerge based on the interests of politics and are designed not to be effective. It would be Wilson’s “Criteria for Organizational Success” that provides the modern analytic perspective regarding specific criteria within a political bureaucracy that, when
integrated with Morgan’s characteristics of an organization and its environment, provides a suitable adaptation model for this study. To understand this model, more specificity is provided.

Morgan’s “Profile of Organizational Characteristics” advocates that an organization can measure its effectiveness with a given environment by establishing through a series of questions the characteristics of five organizational subsystems. These subsystems, characteristically described as strategic, technological (the tools, processes, information networks, communications, and equipment), human/cultural, structural, and managerial form an organization’s bureaucracy. These characteristics, described in German security policy and manifested in the bureaucracy of the Bundeswehr, are placed along an axis perpendicular to its current security environment. Morgan’s horizontal axis is a spectrum running between “stable and certain” to “turbulent and unpredictable.” When an organization’s bureaucracy aligns with its environment, it is said to be compatible and adapted. Where an organization’s subsystem does not align, it provides an area of study for improvement.

Within his profile, Morgan utilizes the defender, analyzer, and prospector typologies introduced by Miles and Snow to describe the meaning of the results of the vertical axis characteristics. An organization that has adapted to a stable and certain environment would exhibit characteristics of a defender typology. A defender has an established niche and will take measures to maintain its position. It uses effective technology to provide its product (representing the Bundeswehr mission) and the structure, and human/cultural characteristics are subservient to a rigid authoritarian managerial style that dictates its terms to both employees (personnel) and markets (representing the Bundeswehr capabilities). In the case of the Bundeswehr, this would represent an organizational structure resistant to change but still has effective command and control and firm leadership controlling the mission, the scope of its
personnel and their capabilities. While narrow in its scope, the Bundeswehr would have an effective capability for a given mission.

The prospector typology is the opposite of a defender in that it is best adapted to a turbulent and unpredictable environment. A prospector constantly looks for new opportunities with a focus on innovation and establishes technology for short-term projects. Its structure and culture is very agile and supports a more democratic managerial style. It can generate products to market faster but at a greater cost and some risk to quality. Within the Bundeswehr, this would mean being able to operate with greater autonomy, to upgrade capability, and to respond to new threats faster. It would be capable of conducting a wider but perhaps not as effective range of missions. A lack of a focused mission could also result in the Bundeswehr spreading itself too thin and increasing costs of operation.

In the middle of these typologies is the analyzer. The analyzer organization attempts to combine the best of both the defender and prospector typologies by providing a range of products while keeping an eye out for new opportunities (emerging threats). If an analyzer determines that a new product is viable, a flexible managerial style sees no problem in stopping an ongoing process to accommodate it. Applied to the Bundeswehr, it would be capable of conducting a moderate range of missions with an eye toward the future and emerging threats. Along with threats, the Bundeswehr would have an ongoing investment in its structure, technology and capability toward the future. Under this construct, costs are higher than the defender typology but less than the prospector typology. Additionally, because of the investment in future structure, technology, and capability, this construct is more vulnerable to strategic surprise from an unaccounted-for, emerging threat than the prospector typology, but it is still capable of handling a wider range of challenges than a defender typology. A list of questions
used for the characteristics are found in Appendix A. It is important to note, as the contingency theory proclaims, there is no one best fit and any typology could work based on the environment.

Wilson’s “Criteria for Organizational Success” focus on political bureaucracies of governments and refine Morgan’s characteristics for a more accurate assessment. According to Wilson, the success of an organization can be determined based on the way it deals with three organizational issues: (a) how it performs its critical task, (b) widespread agreement on and endorsement of the critical task, and (c) the sufficient freedom and external political support in redefining the critical task based on the changing environment if necessary. Wilson defines critical tasks as “those behaviors, which, if successfully performed by key organizational members, would enable the organization to manage its environment.” For German security policy, this means it should enable the military to solve the problems created by the external environment. This is more difficult than it sounds as it encompasses a variety of internal and external pressures of the political structure. The second criterion, “widespread endorsement of the way a critical task is defined,” relates to the culture of the Bundeswehr, the politic and population, and how they view the military should perform its tasks. To be successful, German security policy should bridge gaps between the Bundeswehr, the Bundestag, and its citizens in agreement regarding how its mission should be performed. Wilson’s third criterion of having the freedom and political support to adapt to a changing environment, like Morgan, examines the environment in which an organization operates but from a political perspective. Wilson explains that a government organization is most successful when it possesses “a reasonable degree of autonomy” from external political forces.

Synthesizing Wilson’s criteria with Morgan’s profile to form a model accounts for variations due to politics that would otherwise skew results. For instance, it is possible a given
organization should align with its environment in Morgan’s study but still not be adapted because it lacks the political autonomy, something usually not found in nongovernment organizations, to effectively do its job. This is seen in the example of the 2011 Libya case discussed previously. The Bundeswehr had the capability, manpower, and resources to support NATO operations in Libya and thus could be seen as being aligned with its environment. However, the Bundestag, despite having consistently stated it would provide forces for multilateral operations, feared backlash from the population during an election year and chose not to support the operations. This external influence on organizations is unique to government organizations. Figure 1 provides an example of the adaptation model described for this study.

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**Figure 1.** Example Adaptation Model (adapted from Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization*, 53-58, 76-79. and James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do*, 25-26.)
Analyzing the Bundeswehr is a three-step process. First, it requires determining how the Bundeswehr was intended to be organized based on the analysis of the White Paper 2006: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, hereafter referred to as the “security policy,” and the subsequent implementation of this policy, Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, referred hereafter as “reorientation,” as well as the effects of being a political bureaucracy. The second step measures the stability of the current and emerging security environment. The final step determines what typology the Bundeswehr most closely matches and compares it to the stability of the security environment as a measure of its effectiveness in meeting those challenges.

Bundeswehr Bureaucracy: German Security Policy and Reorientation

In 2006, as a result of the UN, EU, and NATO efforts to combat international terrorism and the demand for a more expeditionary force, Germany released its first update to its military security policy since 1994. The security policy expanded and clarified tasks and roles of the Bundeswehr that had emerged since 1994 and reinforced its commitment to operating multilaterally. Those roles were to, “Prevent, whenever possible, regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany’s security and to help manage such crises” and to “Confront global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Like the 1994 security policy, the 2006 security policy continued to emphasize conscription and Innere Führung, the concept of the citizen-soldier as cornerstones to the future of the Bundeswehr and an “unqualified success.” The policy consistently emphasized the need to address security interests outside of its borders and the European continent under the auspices of the UN, EU, or NATO authorities.
Though it expanded its role in support of the UN, EU, and NATO on a global level, the overarching concept of German security policy remains much as it did in 1994. At its core raison d’être, the Bundeswehr is responsible for the defense of Germany against external threats with the intent of being, “forward-looking and multilateral.” It is focused on being preventative to stop a crisis before it leads to combat. Per its basic law, Germany is not allowed to act unilaterally. The policy delicately dances around the subject of the Bundeswehr in combat. It deliberately avoids words that would infer Germany is willing to enter into direct action or conduct offensive operations. The word “offense” is found nowhere in the policy. The policy also emphasizes the need and intent to modernize to support the UN, EU, and NATO.

Following its security policy, Germany laid out its plan for military reform in the reorientation. In a single phrase, reorientation could be described as “broad and flat.” The desired end state was a prioritized capability profile that the Bundeswehr could implement focused on multinational efforts. This profile ranged from the international level of being able to take responsibility for two land theaters and one maritime operation through the national level of supporting homeland security. Reorientation claimed the Bundeswehr could achieve this desired end state by reducing manning, basing, redundancy, bureaucracy, and services while still maintaining the “entire capability spectrum.” Like the security policy, reorientation recognized the need for funding to address structural, personnel, capacity, and modernization problems along with training and equipping forces for operations. One significant change that occurred between the security policy and reorientation was the ending of conscription and a transition to an all-volunteer force.

Strategically, this security policy predicts possible changes in the security environment and to “continually assess” through a wide range of missions stating, “The Bundeswehr is facing
up to these developments by embarking on a process of permanent adaptation.”³⁴ It further declares, “The constantly changing challenges to security in a globalized world can be countered effectively only through security structures that are adaptable and flexible.”³⁵ A drawback within its strategic view is a consistent message of budgetary constraints. Though the security policy recognized suitable funding as, “crucial for Germany to remain able to act on security and defense,” it equally emphasized that missions, personnel and modernization efforts must be accomplished, “within budgetary constraints”³⁶ In what will be shown later, this lack of strategic investment in the capabilities of the Bundeswehr had a cascading effect through the remaining subsystems within the adaptation model. Despite the challenges of funding, the Bundeswehr has the strategic vision of developing a wide range of missions and scanning for new threats. In answering Morgan’s first question of, “On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent ‘defensive operational goal settings’ and a 5 represents ‘proactive creations of learning systems,’ what kind of strategy is being employed?” the Bundeswehr scored a 4, placing in the middle range of the adaptation model.

Technology, as previously described by Morgan, represents the tools, processes, information networks, communications, and equipment used within an organization. This security policy recognizes the deterioration of the Bundeswehr of all of these capabilities and the need for modernization.³⁷ This makes sense based on the strategy previously discussed for it to meet future challenges. It further recognizes the need for “radical modernization of information technology equipment and network” with the intent of achieving “information and command and control superiority.”³⁸

Unfortunately this is the area where the challenges of a lack of funding manifest. Though the security policy and reorientation expresses the desire to modernize, it also maintained a
persistent underlying theme of balancing the desired end state with financial sustainability. An excerpt from the reorientation states, “Funding of the Bundeswehr means that mission, tasks and capabilities are—and remain—in tune with the required financial resources.” Budgetary constraints effectively crippled implementing the intent of the security policy to modernize. Despite pledges to the NATO that it would dedicate a minimum of 2% of its GDP to develop and modernize its military forces, since 2010 Germany has actually reduced its commitment on an annual basis from 1.3% to where it currently is at 1.09%. The security policy portrays the technology of the Bundeswehr in line with its strategy as modernizing and flexible; however, because of the resource constraints placed upon it, no real improvements have taken place. As the Bundeswehr must continue to rely on outdated capabilities and being limited in its range of operations, it is forced to maintain a status quo. Therefore, in answering Morgan’s second question of, “On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent ‘routine, low discretion roles’ and a 5 represents ‘complex, high discretion roles,’ what kind of technology is being used?” the Bundeswehr scored a 1.5, placing it in close to the left of the adaptation model.

Within the culture of the Bundeswehr, the security policy advocated for the continued need for conscription and Innere Führung. The underlying concept of conscription and Innere Führung was to establish an obedient military culture subservient to the government and the public to dissuade thoughts of unilateral military actions. Germany used conscription as a way of developing the “citizen in the soldier” and instilling a “high degree of social awareness and interest in issues concerning security” and “responsibility for the polity.” As previously stated, the security policy continued to highlight these qualities of conscription as an “unqualified success.” However as a result of reduced budget demands, conscription was not implemented in the Bundeswehr reorientation and ended in 2011.
"Innere Führung" is a leadership principle that balances the obligations of the military service with the rights of the citizen. The security policy defines "Innere Führung" as, “the realization that the capability to act on security matters requires a successful interchange between politics, society and the military.” The 1994 White Paper states serving is, “an expression of the individual citizen's willingness to take his personal share of the responsibility for protecting his polity. The defense of freedom, justice and human dignity is a matter that concerns everyone.” This close civil–military relationship was a deliberate action to develop “citizen–soldiers” within the Bundeswehr who are in direct alignment with the overarching German national culture of restraint. Given its history, Germany wanted to ensure the citizens would have close contact with those in the Bundeswehr to belay any misconceptions as to its purpose.

The analysis of culture reveals the personnel of the Bundeswehr appear fairly constrained in their traditions and beliefs. As the militaries of democracies are usually subordinate to the civilian political leaders of the government, a certain level of restraint is to be expected. However, German culture, based on its history, reflects sensitivity about its military and adds additional pressure of conformity within civil society to discourage any trends toward fascism. The security policy dedicates two full pages to its discussion on the topic. Such emphasis of acting without clear authorization from the politic emphasizes moral responsibility at the cost of moral fortitude at the decisive moment when innovation and initiative are required. It presents the potential of the Bundeswehr going beyond a willingness to comply with orders to submission, which creates a meek or passive obedience that causes a lack of courage in the face of a daunting challenge. For these reasons, in answer to Morgan’s third question, “On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent ‘economic/instrumental orientation to work’ and a 5 represents
‘self-actualizing orientation to work,’ what are the principal employee motivations?” the Bundeswehr scored a 2 on the adaptation model.

Structurally, the security policy states the Bundeswehr, “is multilateral in character,” “adopting a strictly deployment-oriented posture,” and, “oriented towards conflict prevention.” This structure describes an organization that has the capability to be integrated with other international militaries and is mobile with the means of deployment to conduct peacekeeping operations in large quantities as its primary mission. The security policy goes on to describe a military structure of response, stabilization and support construct where 14% of the forces be dedicated to response, 28% dedicated to stabilization, and 42% to support. A concern with this structure is that it does not align with the strategy the security policy describes as being focused on a wide variety of missions and adaptable. Rather, there is a larger preponderance of support personnel compared to those available for more traditional military missions, particularly personnel, which would support multilateral combat operations. This duality indicates that despite a vision of broad operations, there is a lack of commitment to those operations. The security policy is out of synch with itself, claiming to be adaptable, but also maintaining the status quo, unable to conduct the offensive portion of its mission should it be necessary.

Additionally, the lack of funding hampers the Bundeswehr’s mobility and ability to integrate with other nations to establish a networked security structure. This further reduces its ability to innovate and adapt. Finally, structure also considers the impact of the organizations’ culture previously discussed. Once again returning to Morgan, in reply to his fourth question, “On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent ‘mechanistic/hierarchical’ and a 5 represents ‘organic,’ how is the organization structured?” the Bundeswehr scored a 2, also placing the structural sub-system on the on the adaptation model left side of the adaptation model.
The last area of the security policy and reorientation to analyze is managerial style. Managerial style, as it relates to government bureaucracy considers internal as well as external authorities, in this case the Bundestag, and how they support and lead the organization. Internally, the Bundeswehr as a military organization should be seen as authoritarian in its approach to good order and discipline, but it is not. As previously discussed regarding culture, at the center of Innere Führung lies a deep conviction to the “citizen-soldier.” The security policy, in relation to Innere Führung, declares that, “responsibility, motivation, care and welfare, mission command, and leadership by example continue to be the central ideas of the command and control philosophy in the Bundeswehr of the future.” This underlying concept contrasts with traditional militaries of following orders based on subordination. The concept of the Bundeswehr using subordination though rank and authority to give and follow orders is an unfamiliar idea to the citizen-soldier who are taught to follow orders because they are moral, right and necessary. This is not to imply the Bundeswehr is “soft” when it comes to managing personnel; only that the approach it takes gives subordinates more latitude to question orders. In contrast, externally, the Bundestag is authoritarian in its approach to emerging threats, new missions, expanded capabilities, and as previously mentioned, funding. German Basic Law describes that the foundation of authority over the Bundeswehr as resting within the political leadership. This is typical within all democracies. However, through the lens of Kultur der Zurückhaltung, or “culture of restraint,” the authorization of military operations is done reluctantly and requires deliberate approval from the Bundestag. Normally, the president or prime minister of a given country can authorize military operations for a limited amount of time without formal Bundestag/Congressional approval. In the United States, this is 60 days and in France it is four months. For the Bundeswehr, authorization for all operations requires approval
from the Bundestag. This reduces the agility of the Bundeswehr to react to changes in the environment. This means Morgan’s fifth question on sub-systems, “On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent ‘authoritarian’ and a 5 represents ‘democratic,’ what is the managerial style of the organization?” scored a 1.5 on the adaptation model.

**The Current and Emerging Security Environment**

With the analysis of the Bundeswehr complete, the next step in the adaptation model is to analyze the current security environment. Understanding the security environment is important in the analysis of the Bundeswehr reforms. While not intended to be a history lesson, it describes three key events and their impact on the future, the increased threat of terrorism, Russian expansionism, and the reduction of US presence. These trends compared to German security policy and reforms determine how well the Bundeswehr is prepared to meet future challenges. The trends discussed are a snapshot in time as of this writing. It is recognized that the nature of the security environment is fluid and these trends may change. However, it is further recognized that because of this fluidity, the Bundeswehr must be able to adapt to a variety of missions.

It has already been recognized that international terrorism is a challenge and threat to German security; however, a growing security concern within Europe is the real and potential increase in domestic terrorism. In the last twelve months, Europe has seen three separate terrorist attacks. Prior to these events, the last attack occurred in 2012. Though none of these attacks occurred in Germany, in late 2014 four suspected Islamic radicals were arrested in Germany for supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and following the January 2015 attacks in France, two more suspects were arrested in Berlin. Europeans going to Syria to fight in support of ISIS is further fueling domestic terrorism concerns. According to the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Politics, nearly 2,000 Europeans have left to support ISIS. Of
this number, 240 are German, third only to Belgium and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{53} While domestic terrorism is outside the responsibility of the Bundeswehr, it begs the question of what might happen when these radicalized veteran fighters return home from Syria. ISIS continues to grow and has stated it will invade Europe. With a 64\% increase in illegal immigration and open borders for easy transit, countries such as Italy and France express concerns that terrorists are moving freely through the EU.\textsuperscript{54}

Another unforeseen challenge to Germany and the EU’s security environment is Russian expansionism. In early 2014, following civil unrest and the exile of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, pro-Russia opposition, possibly assisted by Russian military forces, took control of the Crimean Peninsula and voted to secede from Ukraine. Both the EU and the United States condemned the action, but Russia defended it citing international law and the UN charter in which people have the right to self-determination. As 2014 continued, further civil unrest erupted between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian groups in eastern Ukraine. Despite statements of non-involvement, Russian military soldiers were captured in the region in August.\textsuperscript{55} Despite economic sanctions placed on Russia by the EU and United States, by November Russia had given up any pretexts of non-intervention, with heavy weapons, tanks, and artillery moving into Ukraine.\textsuperscript{56} By 2015 it was clear an invasion of the Ukraine was underway. Cease fire agreements have been continuously broken by opposition forces, and Russian President Vladmir Putin has called for the surrender of Ukrainian troops while simultaneously making provocative statements regarding his country’s military might.\textsuperscript{57} As the conflict continues, other regional actors, specifically the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are concerned over the possibility of Russia encroaching on their countries as well. The Deputy Commander of NATO forces has
stated that Russian expansionism, “represents an existential threat” to NATO-allied countries and that tensions could escalate into all-out war.\textsuperscript{58}

Perhaps the largest issue complicating the security environment comes from the reduction of presence and support from the United States in NATO. In a June 2014 interview, German Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen advocated that European security would be a bilateral product of the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{59} However, with growing deficit problems and a war-weary population, the United States is reducing its military presence abroad with the expectation that European countries will fill the gaps. This decision has been long in coming. In 2011, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Gates stated, “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience…to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”\textsuperscript{60} This warning continued with similar rhetoric from SecDef Hagel in early 2014 stating, “Rebalancing NATO’s burden-sharing and capabilities is mandatory—not elective.”\textsuperscript{61} This dwindling appetite and impatience manifested itself in early 2015 in two significant events. The first was the United States announcing the closure of 15 bases in Europe as it moved to recuperate costs of operations overseas.\textsuperscript{62} The second event was the release of a new US National Security Strategy that describes that, while committed to its allies, the United States will “have to make hard choices among many competing priorities” and that it expected the “constructive contribution of responsible and rising powers.”\textsuperscript{63}

In response to Morgan’s final question, “On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent ‘stable and certain’ and a 5 represents ‘turbulent and unclear,’ how stable is the organization’s environment,” the answer is 4. Clearly large shifts in the security environment are occurring,
introducing new challenges that have not been encountered before. The increased threat of terrorism, Russian expansionism, and the reduction of the presence of the United States, indicates an environment of significant change but not so much that it could be defined as turbulent and unpredictable. However, as no clear plans to contain these threats have emerged within the UN, EU, or NATO, there is potential for the environment to become unstable. With analysis complete, Figure 2 shows the organizational sub-systems of the Bundeswehr and the security environment plotted for comparison. It provides the measure of how well the Bundeswehr has adapted to its environment and indicates where there are shortfalls.

**Analysis and Findings**

Based on the results of the sub-system analysis, shown as blue circles on the adaptation model in Figure 2, the Bundeswehr is more representative of a defender typology and far from adapted to the security environment, shown as the red circle. The model reveals the Bundeswehr expresses the strategy to create an analyzer organization, which is better suited to handle the existing environment; however, the constraints placed on the remaining sub-systems move it further toward a defender. It is less agile, unable to conduct operations beyond a narrow focus, and lacks the ability to innovate. The two significant constraints keeping the Bundeswehr from becoming an analyzer organization are inadequate funding and the restraints placed upon the structure and personnel.

Understanding these constraints bring us no closer to understanding why they exist or solutions for these problems. Turning to organizational theory once more, it is revealed these constraints are symptomatic of the difficult-to-solve issues of culture and politicization. The remainder of this study describes these interrelated root causes and why they are difficult to resolve.
Figure 2. Assessment of Bundeswehr Bureaucracy and its Security Environment.

It could be argued that a nation’s economic budget should never take precedence over its existence as a nation. Fredrick the Great stated “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” As a contributing and reliant member to a variety of regional and international security organizations, outsiders might advocate that funding the Bundeswehr should be a priority of German national interest and the lack of commitment goes against Germany’s desire to pursue preventative diplomatic solutions for crises. However, this is not the case for Germans.

Following World War II, two Germanys, split between Eastern and Western ideologies, each handled Entnazifizierung, or “denazification,” differently but with the same overarching theme: never again. Such evidence of this is found in the Federal Republic of Germany making
Nie wieder Auschwitz, or “never again Auschwitz,” the heart of its education program. So strong was this emphasis that the German people adopted the Kultur der Zurückhaltung that permeates all facets of its society and is reflected in its foreign and security policy. Additionally, to avoid any perception of offensive or assertive military actions, restraint was deeply embedded in the German people and their forces through Innere Führung.

This Kultur der Zurückhaltung is the first of two reasons why the Bundeswehr is not getting the funding it needs. The deep concern of funding the military results in something of paralysis for the Bundestag at the cultural level and affects the Bundeswehr ability to adapt. Germany does not view itself as a military power. Throughout the Cold War and into reunification, German foreign policy remained committed to restraint and multilateralism in what had become known as Verantwortungspolitik, or “foreign policy of responsibility.” In a post-Cold War environment, with the threat of conventional and international terrorism on its doorstep, Germans still seek to avoid increasing their military capabilities; not necessarily for fear of what the world might think but for how they might think of themselves in the context of history and where such actions might lead.

Kultur der Zurückhaltung is also why German security policy is intentionally vague regarding its use of force and potentially impacts the capability of military personnel to conduct operations. Federal courts have determined that Basic Law authorizes use of force in operations conducted within the scope of UN, EU, and NATO missions. This requires a capable Bundeswehr that possesses the readiness and willingness to commit necessary violent action in support of multilateral objectives. This willingness may come into question when considering some of the concepts taught through Innere Führung, as it may cause fear of thinking too militaristically and limit innovation. It may also potentially delay actions or cause a loss of
fortitude in the brutal action of war, which is, by its nature, morally challenging. Together, the looming challenge in the vague use of force and the impact it has on personnel means the Bundeswehr does not routinely train for offensive maneuvers, which could lead to disaster.

Returning to the challenge of funding, the second reason the Bundeswehr is not being funded is because it is a government organization and subject to politicization. Politicization is the result of “bargaining games” brought about “by the pulling and hauling that is politics” described previously by Allison and Zelikow. Unlike traditional businesses in which the owners of that business make key decisions (such as funding and investing in infrastructure), the Bundeswehr, for all its intentions, is subject to the influence and decisions by the Bundestag. Government bureaucracy, as Moe states, “arises out of politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies and compromises of those who exercise political power.” In the case of the Bundeswehr, those interests and strategies are vested in or compete with Kultur der Zurückhaltung, as well as less deeply rooted reasons such as the environment, social welfare programs, highways, and so forth. This reflects the government bureaucracy and challenges that Wilson discusses in this third criterion of an organization needing the political support to adapt.

To fully appreciate this aspect of why the Bundeswehr is inadequate to counter the current and growing regional and global security demands, politicization will be explained in further detail.

The challenge for the Bundeswehr and funding is that, while it may have a voice in advocating for resources, it does not have a vote. The Bundestag, or “Parliament”, responsible for allocating funds to the Bundeswehr, prioritizes its annual spending against a variety of requirements. This prioritization, however, is not a rational process. With politicization, governments make decisions based not on rational choice but on compromise. Allison and Zelikow advocate that, “government leaders have competitive, not identical, operational
objectives; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions.” This means decisions are made based not on reason or fact but on consensus and negotiation. No one person, not even the chancellor, can act unilaterally without political cost or risk. The political bureaucracy of the Bundestag is one of competition with individuals and political parties trying to secure power or favor for organizations they control or for their constituencies. This negotiation usually requires there be some benefit to the voting members. Sometimes the fix for a given problem, such as providing necessary funding for the Bundeswehr, runs counter to a party’s political objective of supporting social welfare programs. If such a problem is presented and a party cannot stop an action to fix it, they may attempt to dilute the solution to marginalize it.

It should be noted that politicization exists in nearly all forms of government and should be seen as both a cause of and vehicle for the inadequacies in the Bundeswehr. This is because while politicization forms its own challenges for the Bundeswehr, culture also uses politicization as a means to express challenges as well. In this way, the two are interwoven and form a formidable barrier to resolutions.

Unfortunately, there are no realistic solutions to overcoming culture or politicization. Culture may change but usually cannot be rushed, and politicization is inherent to democratic societies. As a unified Germany moves forward through the next 25 years, its success in maintaining security for itself as well as that of the EU and NATO will depend on the ability of the Bundeswehr to adapt to the current and emerging security environment. Having examined the Bundeswehr through the lens of organizational theory, it is clear the Bundeswehr is not yet ready to meet these challenges. The threats of terrorism and Russian expansionism are real and continue to grow. Perhaps this will hasten this change and compel politicians to action. It appears Germany recognizes this as well. In the course of this examination and analysis, there have been
new developments in Germany’s approach to security. In February of 2015, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced a new “White Paper was in development to address the changing security environment specifically noting the emergence of ISIS and Russian expansionism.”

She stated the approach to German security policy has now, “changed quite fundamentally” with the need for an increased budget for new equipment and weapons. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has echoed this sentiment recently stating the need to, “expend more in the coming years on defense.”

Though Germany prefers to present itself as a nation that works with regional partners through diplomacy and economic negotiations, the Bundeswehr is still likely to play a key role in ensuring the sovereignty of the nation and serving as a credible force to enforce those negotiations. With the United States reducing its position and influence in Europe, a vacuum of capability and leadership is likely to form. If Germany becomes this leader, it will not be chosen by the international community but will be determined by its people and their willingness to adapt to this role.

Notes

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Appendix A: Questions for Morgan’s Profile of Organizational Characteristics

1. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent “defensive operational goal settings” and a 5 represents “proactive creations of learning systems,” what kind of strategy is being employed?

| ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

2. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent “routine, low discretion roles” and a 5 represents “complex, high discretion roles,” what kind of technology is being used?

| ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Note: Technology in this context refers more to process and flexibility of operations vs. levels of computer/data processing.

3. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent “economic/instrumental orientation to work” and a 5 represents “self-actualizing orientation to work,” what are the principal employee motivations?

| ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

4. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent “mechanistic/hierarchical” and a 5 represents “organic,” how is the organization structured?

| ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

5. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent “authoritarian” and a 5 represents “democratic,” what is the managerial style of the organization?

| ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

6. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 would represent “stable and certain” and a 5 represents “turbulent and unclear,” how stable is the organization’s environment?

| ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

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