SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE. To provide security and policy review on the document at Tab 1 prior to release to the public.

2. BACKGROUND.
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5. RECOMMENDATION. Sign coord block above indicating document is suitable for public release. Suitability is based solely on the document being unclassified, not jeopardizing DoD interests, and accurately portraying official policy.

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Professor, Computer Science

1 Tab Paper for approval

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Provably Secure DNS: A Case Study in Formal Methods

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Abstract. We describe the use of formal methods in the development of IRONSIDES, an implementation of DNS with superior performance to both BIND and Windows, the two most common DNS servers on the internet. More importantly, unlike BIND and Windows, IRONSIDES is impervious to all bad-packet denial of service attacks and all forms of remote code execution.

Keywords: formal methods, software systems, DNS, Ada, internet security, computer security, network security, buffer overflows, denial of service.

1 Introduction

DNS is a protocol essential to the proper functioning of the internet. The two most common implementations of DNS are the public domain version BIND and the implementations that come bundled with various versions of Windows. Unfortunately, despite their ubiquity and importance, these implementations suffer from security vulnerabilities and require frequent patching. As of this writing, according to the Internet Systems Consortium’s web site, there are 45 known vulnerabilities in various versions of BIND [1]. Over the past five years, Microsoft has released at least 8 security bulletins relating to vulnerabilities in Windows DNS. Since neither of these products have ever been, to our knowledge, formally validated, it is likely that further flaws remain for hackers to discover and exploit.

The existence of security flaws in such a vital component of the internet software suite is troubling, to say the least. These vulnerabilities permit not only bad-packet denial of service attacks to crash a DNS server, but in the worst case can actually lead to remote code execution exploits, giving the adversary control over the host machine.

To address this problem, the authors have used formal methods and the SPARK tool set from Praxis Systems [2] to develop a high-performance version of DNS that is provably exception-free. We first give a brief overview of DNS, and our implementation of it using the SPARK tools. We then describe our experimental test
bed and the results we obtained. We conclude with lessons learned and directions for future work.

2 Overview of DNS

DNS is an abbreviation for the internet's Domain Name System. Theoretically it is a naming system for any resource connected to the internet, but in practice it associates host names (e.g., www.cnn.com) with IP addresses (157.166.226.26). The DNS protocol was developed by Paul Mockapetris, first codified in IETF documents RFC 882 and RFC 883 and later superseded by RFC's 1034 and 1035. Clients of a DNS server interact with it supplying queries of various types, with the server providing the answers. Communication between a DNS client and server takes place at either the UDP or TCP layers of the internet protocol stack.

The distinguishing feature of DNS is its hierarchical and distributed nature. Because it is hierarchical, a single DNS server may not and need not know the answer to a client query. If it does not, it can query another DNS server at a higher level in the internet domain name space for further information. This process may be repeated up to the root server, with further information then propagating back down to the original querying server.

The system's distributed nature means that there is no central DNS server. Hundreds of thousands of implementations of DNS are all running at once, and because they all use the same protocols to communicate they all function correctly.

Simple implementations of DNS may perform solely as authoritative name servers, responsible only for managing the IP addresses associated with a particular zone. To reduce the load on the root zone servers and to improve performance of applications that rely on nearby DNS servers, more complex implementations of DNS may cache query answers as well as fully implement the recursive query protocol described previously.

The most popular implementation of DNS is the Berkeley Internet Name Domain server, or BIND. Originally written in 1984, it has been ported to a number of systems and compilers, and has been maintained in the public domain since its inception. According to the Wikipedia entry on DNS, it is the dominant name service software on the internet. However, numerous alternatives remain available, including implementations bundled with Microsoft Windows.

3 SPARK: A Tool For Creating Provably Correct Programs

The SPARK language and toolset from Praxis Critical Systems Limited is used in the creation of software systems with provable correctness and security properties. SPARK is a subset of Ada, augmented with special annotations. These annotations appear as ordinary comments to Ada compilers, but are visible to SPARK's pre-processing tools used to validate the software. SPARK is a fairly mature technology and has been used on several projects [3-5]. Accordingly, given our prior institutional experience with Ada (see for example [6]), we chose SPARK and Ada as the platform
for constructing DNS software that would not be subject to most of the vulnerabilities of BIND and Windows versions currently deployed around the globe.

4 Overview of IRONSIDES

IRONSIDES is an Ada/SPARK implementation of the DNS protocols. Currently, it supports only authoritative name service, but future versions are expected to support recursive queries. We are also in the process of adding support for DNSSEC, the protocol that adds encryption to DNS transaction to further reduce vulnerability to spoofing and other attacks [7]. We expect full support for DNSSEC to be available in a future release.

A data flow diagram of the various functional modules of IRONSIDES is shown below. Arrows indicate a data flow dependency:

![Diagram of IRONSIDES](image)

Fig. 1. Module and data flow representation of IRONSIDES.

These modules are implemented in a total of 42 Ada files, comprising 6480 lines of text. Of these, 4564 are neither blanks nor comments. Comments include 746 SPARK proof annotations, about a 12% overhead in terms of source lines.
As a result of the software validation process, IRONSIDES code is known to be free of uninitialized values, data flow errors (e.g. writes that are never read or values derived from incorrect sources), array bounds errors, and all runtime exceptions. This renders it invulnerable to single-packet denial of service attacks and all remote execution exploits. If IRONSIDES is properly compiled and configured, it cannot be taken over as a result of any external input, no matter when the input arrives and no matter how it is formatted. Also, it cannot be crashed and all its loops are guaranteed to terminate, which renders it invulnerable to denial of service attacks that rely on badly formatted packets.

5 Experimental Results

Having software that is crash-proof is valuable, but unless its performance is comparable to existing implementations it is not likely to be accepted by the user community. System administrators, if faced with the choice, might regard software vulnerabilities as acceptable risks if fixing them significantly impacts performance. Furthermore, from a computer security research perspective, it would be useful to understand the nature of the tradeoff between security and performance, or even better to discover that in at least some cases no such tradeoff is required. We present here the results of a case study performed to better understand these questions.

Our experiment compared the performance of IRONSIDES with BIND and Windows DNS using the DNS stress testing tool ‘dnspert’ [8]. Because IRONSIDES is still in its early stages of development, it does not have the feature range of BIND or Windows DNS. Any comparison thus needs to take these differences into account. Following the style of [9], we show a comparison of these three DNS packages below. Footnotes and parenthetical comments for BIND and Windows are omitted to save space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Server</th>
<th>Authoritative Recursive</th>
<th>Recursion Slave</th>
<th>Caching</th>
<th>DNSSEC</th>
<th>TSIG IPv6 Wildcard</th>
<th>Free software horizon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIND</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows DNS</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRONSIDES</td>
<td>Y*</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Comparison of BIND, Windows and IRONSIDES functionality
The following resource record types are currently supported: A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, PTR, SOA.

Our experimental test bed is shown in Figure 2:

*Fig. 2. Experimental test bed for performance comparisons of DNS software*

"dnsperr" runs on a Backtrack 5.0 client virtual machine. A Windows Server 2008 virtual machine is loaded as a server. Testing is done by starting up the DNS server to be tested under the server virtual machine, and then running dnsperr. Only one DNS server is active at a time.

Since the purpose of the experiment is to measure the computational performance of the server, both VMs are loaded on the same computer, in this case an ACE 2600 Workstation with 8GB of RAM. Using the same computer for client and server eliminates the effect of network latency. "dnsperr" issues queries over the standard DNS port to whichever server is listening. The server in turn responds as appropriate. At the end of a run, the tool generates a performance report.

We performed three test runs for three DNS implementations and then averaged the results, scaling them to queries per millisecond. The raw data are shown in Table 2. Averaged results are shown in Figure 3:
The most important result of our experiment is that IRONSIDES not only has better security properties than the two most popular DNS servers, but outperforms them as well. IRONSIDES is 7% faster than Windows DNS and more than twice as fast as BIND. Given IRONSIDES superior security posture, we find these results significant. They show that one need not sacrifice security for performance in software design.

In fact, it should not be that surprising that there are at least some instances in which the use of formal methods can improve performance. Data flow analysis, for example, can identify redundant or ineffective statements that generate unnecessary code. Code that has been proven exception-free no longer needs run-time bounds checking, so that code can be eliminated as well.

On the other hand, there are also cases where total reliance on formal methods negatively impacts performance. Allowing users to override formal proof requirements when appropriate is an important feature that we believe formal methods tools should continue to support. In one case, performing this type of optimization in
IRONSIDES led to a 14% improvement in performance on a Windows VM. Since such overriding is optional, users in environments where manual verification of source code is deemed too risky can revert to the original, formally verified source code at some cost in performance.

IRONSIDES is invulnerable to denial of service attacks caused by badly formatted packets that raise exceptions. But terminating a server is not the only way to deny service. If the server can be thrown into an infinite loop, service is just as effectively denied. IRONSIDES is invulnerable to this form of service denial as well, because the tools employed help prove that all of its 85 loops terminate. This is accomplished by using loop invariant assertions to show that loop variables monotonically increase and have an upper bound. This is not accomplished automatically by SPARK, but with appropriate loop assertion annotations added by the programmer SPARK can assist in showing these properties to be true.

For example, consider the code below:

```plaintext
-- Amount_Truncated prevents infinite loop
while Answer_Count<0 and Amount_Truncated<RR_Type.WinStringType'Last
and Natural(Characteristic_Pos(Current_Name(Current_Name'First)))/=0 and
Current_Qname_Location<=DNS_Types.QNAME_PTR_RANGE(Output_Bytes)loop
  -- assert Answer_Count<0 and Amount_Truncated<0 and
  --# Amount_Truncated<RR_Type.WinStringType'Last
  --# and Output_Bytes<=DNS_Types.Packet_Length.Range'Last and
  --# Current_Qname_Location<=DNS_Types.QNAME_PTR_RANGE(Output_Bytes);
  Trim_Name(
    Domainname   => Current_Name,
    Trimmed_Name => Trimmed_Name,
    Qname_Location => Current_Qname_Location,
    New_Qname_Location => New_Qname_Location);
  Create_Response_SOA(
    Start_Byte   => Start_Byte,
    Domainname   => Trimmed_Name,
    Qname_Location => New_Qname_Location,
    Output_Packet => Output_Packet,
    Answer_Count => Answer_Count,
    Output_Bytes  => Output_Bytes);
    Current_Name := Trimmed_Name;
    Current_Qname_Location := New_Qname_Location;
    Amount_Truncated := Amount_Truncated +
      Natural(Characteristic_Pos(Domainname(Domainname'First)))+1);
end loop;
```

Fig. 4. Using loop invariants to prove termination

SPARK annotations begin with "--". Here the annotations are loop invariants that serve as both a postcondition for one part of the loop and as preconditions for the next. In this case the tools prove that Amount_Truncated is at all times both non-negative and below a constant upper bound. Data flow analysis shows that Amount_Truncated is not modified elsewhere in the loop. Given these properties and the last line of the loop, we can conclude that Amount_Truncated is monotonically increasing, therefore the loop terminates.

Note that without the use of this variable and the proof annotations, we could not prove loop termination. This would leave open the possibility for the other termination...
conditions to never be reached, something that could be exploited under the right circumstances to deny service through an infinite loop.

6 Lessons in Humility

The use of formal methods and the SPARK tools in particular produced results that were both impressive and humbling. Both the authors are experienced software engineers, having written compilers, introductory programming environments, circuit emulators, and other non-trivial software systems. In addition to over 40 years combined computer science teaching experience, we have consulted for both industry and government. Nonetheless, the formal methods tools we employed caught boundary conditions and potential problems. Some examples are shown below:

1) The use in a zone file of a domain name consisting of a single character:
   --SPARK caught possible exception if length=1, modified
   --by adding "length > 1 and then"
   if Name(1) = '.' or Name(1) = '-' or (length > 1 and then
   Name(Length-1) = '.' or Name(Length-1) = '-') then
   RetVal := False;

2) A resource record of length equal to the maximum line length allowed:
   --endIdx might be the maximum value possible, so must catch last character here. Caught by SPARK.
   if Ctr = EndIdx and numSeparators <= REQ_NUM_SEPARATORS
   then

3) Failure to account for erroneous input:

   if Query_Class /= IN_CLASS then            --Forgot else to handle erroneous input! Caught by SPARK.
     elsif Query_Type = A then
     end if;

4) Failure to check for subscript overflow:

   --copy name from packet to Domainname (null terminated)
   while Integer(Byte) < Integer(Input_Bytes) and then
   Input_Packet.Bytes(
     Byte)/=0 loop
   --this could overflow Domainname array! Caught by SPARK.
     Domainname(I) := Input_Packet.Bytes(Byte);
     I := I + 1;
     Byte := Byte + 1;
   end loop;
   Domainname(I) := ASCII.NUL;
These are all problems we should and could have detected on our own, but did not. Had they gone undetected, they could have led to security holes exploitable by hackers, particularly if they had access to source code. Our experience suggests the use of formal methods and tools is an essential part of improving the security properties of software. Using experienced, security-conscious programmers is not enough.

7 Conclusions and Future Work

Our work indicates that the theory and practice of formal methods has progressed considerably in the past few years, to the point where formal verification of certain desirable properties of software is now achievable at relatively little additional cost. Within less than a year, two academics whose primary duties are teaching were nonetheless able to produce a verifiably exception-free version of DNS. We did this despite having no prior familiarity with SPARK or indeed any formal language tools from industry.

While overriding the requirements for explicit storage initialization does indeed permit software engineers to trade security for performance, our results show that in general no such tradeoff is required. IRONSIDES runs significantly faster than either BIND or Windows DNS, and does so on a Windows “home court” VM running Windows Server 2008.

IRONSIDES is in the public domain, and will be distributed free of charge. Future work could include testing under other operating systems, testing under actual network loading, adding support for recursive queries, DNSSEC, GUI and web interfaces (IRONSIDES is currently command line only) and other more advanced features. Other implementations of internet protocols that suffer from security flaws could also benefit from the approach described here.

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References


