INTEGRATED UNIT DEPLOYMENTS: RETHINKING AIR NATIONAL
GUARD FIGHTER MOBILIZATIONS

BY

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
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ABSTRACT

This study comprises an analysis of the mobilization and deployment of Air National Guard fighter aircraft units in a search for an efficient and effective means for using the Air Guard. The author uses the historical examples of the Korean War, Vietnam War, Operation DESERT STORM, and the Global War on Terror to illustrate the context and misuse of Air National Guard fighter units over time. These examples show the various deployment strategies used by political and senior military leaders and highlights the reactive way in which senior military leaders used the reserve component.

The current strategy for deploying Air National Guard assets relies heavily on the active duty model of using single squadrons to provide capability to combatant commanders via the Unit Type Code (UTC) process. Two factors, unique to the Air National Guard, highlight the pitfalls of using this model. First, Air National Guard units are geographically significant. The dual role nature of the Air Guard compels the institution to serve both federal and state masters. The Air Guard provides a majority of the Aerospace Control Alert responsibility to NORTHCOM while also serving the governors of states in crisis response, natural disasters, and command and control capabilities. The “tug-of-war” between executing multiple missions stresses the units beyond their design capacity. Second, the structure of the Air National Guard also suggests that active duty deployment models are inefficient for the Guard. The part-time nature of the force and community interaction provides both a benefit and a hindrance to overseas mobilization.

This thesis suggests that Integrated Unit Deployments will provide the balance between Air National Guard overseas deployments and stateside mission. Using the equipment and manpower from multiple units to deploy allows capability to be left stateside for training and home station mission. The Integrated Unit Deployment creates personnel flexibility and alleviates the stress induced by recapitalization, fiscal constraints, and active duty training requirements. This model may also increase tactical proficiency by opening avenues for cross-talk between units and fits easily into the Total Force Integration (TFI) initiatives of the Air Force.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Congress shall have power to... provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress...

U.S. Constitution
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 16

The National Guard of the United States has augmented the nation’s active military forces since the ratification of the constitution in 1788. Since then, the National Guard’s role in national security has grown far beyond what the founding fathers could have envisioned. The United States used aviation elements of the National Guard shortly after the invention of the airplane. New York’s First Aero Company became the first federally recognized aviation unit in the National Guard and was mustered into Federal service on 13 July 1916 for the Mexican Border disturbances, remaining on active duty for four months. Despite War Department decisions that resulted in not using aviation elements of the National Guard during World War I, most of the Guard’s aviation personnel saw service in the conflict. Additionally, the President ordered 29 National Guard observation squadrons, including 800 officers and 4,000 enlisted men into federal service in September 1940 to support national efforts in World War II. These units remained in service until
six month after the end of the conflict.\textsuperscript{1} The emergence of the Air National Guard in 1948 furthered the discussion on how this force should support the interests of the United States in the nation’s overseas operations. Mobilization and deployment of Air National Guard personnel and equipment has often been chaotic. Despite the challenges, Air National Guardsmen have continually answered the nation’s call, providing support to the country in the face of significant challenges. Over time, the Air Guard has had to reinvent itself in order to contribute to national defense while maintaining its constitutional foundation.

The United States attempted a variety of methods to use the Air National Guard over nearly 70 years as an institution. In Korea, the Air Force sent Air National Guard equipment and personnel piecemeal to active duty units. In Vietnam, national leaders intentionally withheld National Guard units from major combat operations to avoid domestic political repercussions. During the Persian Gulf crisis, policymakers utilized the Air National Guard primarily as an augmenting force, relying on individual volunteerism to fill capability gaps in active component units. Since September 11, 2001, senior military leaders have increasingly called upon Air National Guard units to fill capability gaps and active duty shortfalls stemming from significant post-Cold War cuts to the active duty forces and continuous combat operations in two theaters.

The Air National Guard Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035, states, “in line with the USAF Chief of Staff’s vision statement, \textit{A Vision for the USAF}, the source of ANG airpower is the fighting spirit of Guard Airmen, and operational ANG squadrons are the fighting core of the ANG.”\textsuperscript{2} This

\textsuperscript{1} Major General John Pesch, Director Air National Guard, “Mobilizations of the Air National Guard,” Memorandum for Record (United States Air Force, July 26, 1974), 1.
\textsuperscript{2} “ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035” (Director, Air National Guard, November 2014), 7.
idea suggests that the Air National Guard can, and should, organize, train, equip and deploy in a fashion similar to their active duty counterparts. This vision seems straightforward and reasonable. However, two strategic factors significantly influence the implementation of this vision. First, Air National Guard units are geographically distinct, much more so than the active component. The dual role nature of the Air National Guard, supporting both federal and state missions, means that its location inside the country and within respective states provide strategic meaning, not only operationally, but also politically. The second factor that precludes mirror imaging the active component is the structure of the Air National Guard as a predominantly part-time force. Taken together, the Air National Guard must conceptualize the way in which mobilizations and deployment occur in a different manner, such that the Air Guard helps meet national overseas interests but also maintains the strategic strengths of the organization.

**Research Question**

The ultimate question that this research aims to answer is if the Air National Guard is mobilizing its fighter aircraft forces in the most efficient and effective manner to meet federal and state missions while maintaining a resilient training program and maximizing use of the part-time force. The research seeks to determine if squadron level deployments, modeled after active duty deployments, are the most efficient way to deploy Air National Guard forces. This thesis examines historical examples of Air Guard mobilizations and deployments and identifies successful and unsuccessful deployment methodologies in order to show the lineage of using this reserve force as an overseas military asset. From this historical context, the research then aims to identify the specific factors that differentiate Air National Guard units from their active duty counterparts. The research continues by challenging the current deployment concept and suggesting methods that provide more efficacious and efficient use of Air National Guard
units. Finally, although this research focuses on fighter aviation, the thesis will also touch on other mission areas to determine if the Air National Guard can apply these factors to other Mission Design Series’ (MDS) or expand the current deployment model.

**Background and Significance**

The United States has long used Air National Guard capabilities to support national objectives. The events of September 11, 2001 put Air National Guard capabilities into overdrive, especially for a predominantly part-time force. National leadership added a robust homeland defense mission to overseas deployments for Air Guard units. While these events unfolded, the Active Component was downsizing dramatically despite the increase in operations tempo. The Air National Guard helped fill these capability gaps, but increased deploy-to-dwell ratios have threatened to weaken Air Guard units and communities. In the past, the Air National Guard has adapted well to answer the nation’s call. The volunteerism seen from Air Guardsmen in response to American crises is a testament to the people who serve in the Guard. The response, however, was very reactive. This thesis attempts to find a deployment strategy that is strategically proactive in its approach to Air National Guard mobilizations and deployments while maximizing flexibility. It aims to find a solution that satisfies the active duty desire to stabilize its own deploy-to-dwell ratios while maintaining predictable and sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios for Air Guard units in a time of fiscal constraints, recapitalization efforts, and turbulent national aims in overseas conflicts.

Because of the increased use of Air National Guard assets for overseas use, the requirements to defend the skies over America, and a predominantly part-time force, the burden on Guard fighter units has increased. There does not seem to be a reprieve from this operations tempo, therefore the solution must come from streamlined and efficient deployment strategies. Operational planners can learn from a long history of Air National Guard mobilization and deployment failures and
successes, while factoring in current realities, to structure deployments that maximize flexibility and maintain the integrity of the Air National Guard culture. The Air National Guard has an incredible record of volunteerism when called upon, but even this noble action can degenerate into chaos if not properly managed.

National Guard units have many responsibilities including state and federal missions. They respond to humanitarian relief missions and local natural disasters, all while being required to maintain an active duty equivalent level of combat training and proficiency. The keys to continuing these assorted missions are balance and flexibility.

**Limitations and Scope**

The research question applied to the entire Air National Guard spectrum of capability could incorporate a book’s worth of information and still not be complete. As such, the research in this paper is limited to Air National Guard fighter aviation units. Specifically, this thesis uses lessons learned from Air National Guard fighter aviation in its historical evaluation. Limiting the scope to fighter aviation was intentional for a variety of reasons. First, fighter aviation is one of the more significant active duty competencies that has been substantially reduced in the past 20 years. The reduction in active duty forces places the burden to supplement these forces during shortfalls squarely on the Air Reserve Components (ARC). Fighter aviation overall suffers from many of the problems this research aims to ameliorate. The community has been in a near constant state of recapitalization for the past decade, with the F-22A incorporation into the fleet, and will continue to recapitalize with the growth of F-35 squadrons. Recapitalization provides great capability, but also creates equipment shortages as new aircraft come online and older aircraft are retired. Personnel shortages will also manifest themselves because of recapitalization. The Air Force must train new F-35 pilots and maintainers from the current fleet of professionals while building schoolhouses to train a new generation of pilots and support
professionals. The level of training required to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC), combined with the inevitable equipment and deployment problems associated with new systems, will certainly stress the Air Expeditionary Force system. These factors require that deployment operations are conducted efficiently so as not to create burn out in the force.

Second, fighter aviation deployments are relatively large and complex muscle movements requiring a great deal of coordination with airlift and tanker capability. Because of the complexity, gaining efficiency in deploying fighter units provides significant benefits for both the combat units and the United States Air Force.

Third, the author’s experience as a fighter pilot lends itself to determining a more efficient and effective path forward. Admittedly, this factor also brings with it biases associated with being an operator in the system in which changes are recommended. I have tried to provide as much factual data as possible to support the research and conclusions, however, experience will certainly influence some of the recommendations and conclusions. Additionally, many of the suggestions on applicability outside fighter aviation may need further study by experts inside these communities. I present these ideas as possible areas for further investigation.

One final limitation of this research is that it does not completely investigate all of the internal politics associated with mobilizing and deploying Air National Guard units. This paper addresses community involvement in Air Guard deployments as one of the significant factors; however, the political arrangements between senior Air Force and Air National Guard leaders are not discussed. Political implications of deploying Air National Guard units are by no means an insignificant topic and deserve attention, but are outside the scope of this research.

**Definitions and Assumptions**
Because the governor of a state normally commands National Guard units, the federal government must mobilize these units. United States Code Title 10 law controls mobilization of a unit or member of the Reserve Component. A mobilization serves to place National Guard employees, normally operating under Title 32 jurisdiction, into Title 10 status and, therefore, under the ultimate command of the President of the United States. “The reserves can be called to long-term active duty under five different statutes, as authorized in title 10 of the U.S. Code. They range from full mobilization (U.S.C. 12301[a]), which requires a declaration of war or national emergency by the Congress, to reserve component volunteers (12301[d]), which requires consent of the individual reserve component member and consent from the governor to activate individuals in the National Guard. The various mobilization statutes determine how many reservists can be called up, to whom the call up applies, and the duration of the call up.”3 Table 1 shows the full range of mobilization options defined in Title 10 U.S. Code.

**Table 1: Title 10 U.S. Code Mobilization Statutes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Authority Required</th>
<th>Who Affected</th>
</tr>
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| 12301(a) | Requires congressional declaration of war or national emergency | • All reservists including members in an inactive status and required members  
• No number limitation  
• Duration of war or emergency plus six months |
| 12302(a) | Requires declaration of national emergency  
Report to Congress every six months | • Ready Reserve  
• Not more than 1,000,000 members  
• Not more than 2 years |
| 12304(a) | Requires presidential signature  
Notification of Congress  
No congressional action required | • Selected Reserve, with up to 30,000 Individual Ready Reserve  
• Not more than 200,000 members  
• Not more than 365 days  
• Not for domestic emergencies except weapons of mass destruction |
| 12301(b) | Service secretaries may call Reserve up to 15 days per year | • Annual training  
• Operational rotations  
• Involuntary |
| 12301(d) | Requires consent of individual reserve component member  
Governor must consent to National Guard activation | • All reservists  
• No number limitation stated  
• No duration stated |

*Source: Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism*

Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*, defines mobilization as “the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies.”

Deployments may occur in either Title 32 or Title 10 capacity, although overseas deployments most often require a member to operate in Title 10. For the purposes of this research, deployments are defined as the movement of personnel that are tied to one of the five mobilization statutes defined in Title 10 U.S. Code.

A Unit Type Code (UTC) is a potential capability focused upon accomplishment of a specific mission that the military Service provides. It can consist of Manpower Force Element (MFE) only, equipment (LOGNET) only, or both manpower and equipment. A few of the Air Force Instructions that describe the use of UTCs are AFI 10-401, 10-402, and 10-244.

Six reserve components make up the reserves of the United States Department of Defense: the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Navy Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. This thesis focuses on the Air National Guard as one entity of the Air Reserve Component (ARC). Mention of the ARC in this paper includes both the Air Force Reserves and the Air National Guard. This research also includes mention of the active component of the United States Air Force. This paper interchangeably refers to the active component as active duty or active component throughout the document.

Integrated Unit Deployments (IUDs) are a major concept that pervades this research paper. A deployment is an Integrated Unit Deployment if it includes elements of two or more squadrons. The Integrated Unit Deployment is similar in concept to what has been called rainbow operations. Rainbow operations occur when the resources,

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either personnel, equipment, or both, of more than one unit are combined in order to accomplish a mobilization. The phrase ‘integrated unit’ more appropriately defines the nature of the deployment and provides a common language for executing this operation.

**Argument Preview and Problem Statement**

The research in this paper argues that Integrated Unit Deployments are more efficient than squadron level deployments for Air National Guard fighter units. The argument suggests that the Air National Guard has distinct factors that affect its ability to deploy in similar fashion to the active component. Two major factors dominate the discussion. First, the Air National Guard is a geographically significant institution and unit locations are strategically important to the United States. Geography is significant due to the nation’s reliance on Air National Guard fighter units for Aerospace Control Alert and homeland defense. Operationally, the location of these units is critical to deter and counter threats to the homeland. Additionally, since Air National Guard units are state controlled until requisitioned by the President, states value these units as both operational and political institutions. Operationally, most Air National Guard units provide disaster relief, emergency response, and command and control functions for states during times of crisis. Locating bases around the state broadens the flexibility of governors to use these units to support communities in times of crisis. Politically, the connection of the local community to Air National Guard units contributes to overall public opinion of the military and global national objectives. Since Air National Guard personnel typically stay in the same community over much of their careers, the population is invested in the actions of the base. Generational participation in the Air National Guard contributes to community involvement in the base and its mission and represents a strong constituency for politicians within the state.
The second dominant factor that contributes to the use of integrated unit operations is the part-time nature of the Air National Guard. Approximately 70% of the Air National Guard force is part-time, executing full-time employment in the community and contributing their service to the country on a part-time basis. The argument suggests that deploying an Air National Guard unit in similar fashion to active duty units still leaves behind a significant portion of the part-time force whose ability to conduct training is significantly altered. Pilots and maintainers may be left with no aircraft on which to train.

These two factors combine to suggest that Air National Guard mobilization must consider geography and Air Guard structure when contemplating a proactive deployment strategy. Integrated Unit Deployments occur when multiple units combine to form one deployable element. The number of units that combine is variable based on deployment size, home station mission, and equipment and personnel availability. When smaller elements from a single unit deploy, they leave behind a capable force that can continue home station missions, such as Aerospace Control Alert, and training requirements. States benefit from having personnel deployed overseas, creating an avenue for community involvement in national overseas conflicts, while also maintaining enough personnel and equipment to support state missions. Combining multiple units for deployments contributes to increased tactical capabilities. Training and combat deployments allow members to discuss and argue tactics, techniques, and procedures and fosters an environment that develops and refines tactical performance. The Integrated Unit Deployment creates efficiency and flexibility, while preserving unit identity, involving multiple communities, and providing combatant commanders with an effective fighting force.

**Methodology**

The methodology of this research compares the advertised strategic vision of deploying Air National Guard fighter/attack units with historical
examples. The paper examines various vision statements, posture statements, and strategic planning documents to extract the senior leader intent and vision. Comparing these documents to historical analysis can determine the efficacy of the current strategic vector in deploying reserve air component forces. The thesis begins by looking at several historical examples of Air National Guard fighter unit mobilizations and deployments. The history begins after World War II and the creation of the United States Air Force and the Air National Guard. The Korean War illustrates how a fledgling Air Force attempted to utilize an under-trained and under-resourced Air National Guard. The sources used for Korean War research primarily originate from after-action reports completed by deploying unit commanders. These original sources not only provide information regarding numbers of equipment and personnel, but also give insight into the attitudes of Air National Guard units immediately after the war. Following Korea, the Vietnam War describes the challenges of limited deployment of the Air National Guard and the political and cultural impact it had on the organization. Since popular perception of the Vietnam War significantly influenced political decisions, the sources here are accounts of national and military senior leadership’s views on using the reserve component. Several authors provide their insights on why reserve components were deployed in very limited numbers.

The research then looks at the Persian Gulf War and the incredible mobilization efforts that occurred from both the active duty and Air National Guard forces. The post-Gulf War historical analysis reviews the significant military draw down during the 1990s and the introduction of the Air Expeditionary Force and its impact on Air National Guard deployments. The sources on Operation DESERT STORM and the conflicts of the 1990’s come from Air National Guard historical accounts that include first person interviews with commanders and unit personnel. A recent review of deployments from 2011 to the present
rounds out the historical record and illustrates the changing roles the Air National Guard faced during its first 60 years and provides a background of options available to operational military planners looking to utilize Air National Guard equipment and personnel. Recent deployments utilize Air Combat Command deployment data from 2011-2015 for both active duty and reserve components. Additionally, the author interviewed commanders and deployed members on the structure of their deployments and the lessons learned that could benefit future Air National Guard deployments.

The thesis continues by looking at the distinct factors that face Air National Guard fighter units. This chapter focuses on the geographic and structural factors that influence Air National Guard mobilizations. I derive many of these factors from the experiences described in the historical analysis of Air Guard deployments discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. After reviewing these factors, the paper identifies the Integrated Unit Deployment as a flexible and efficient method to deploy Air National Guard fighter forces in an expeditionary mindset, while maintaining Guard unit integrity and the integrity of the militia described in the United States Constitution.

Finally, the paper concludes with a cursory look at mission areas and specialties that may benefit from Integrated Unit Deployments. These mission areas may expand outside the Air National Guard and into active duty units as the fiscal constraints and the realities of current conflicts continue to stress the United States military. Additionally, other Services in the Department of Defense may find utility in reviewing the factors and applying them to their particular situation. As previously mentioned, there are six reserve components in the Department and this research primarily focuses on just one. Continued research and study may find a proactive solution to the problem of using the reserve components effectively and efficiently. This thesis serves as a single step
in the evolution of deploying the reserves in the interest of national security.
Chapter 2

Historical Examples of ANG Mobilizations

On the whole I couldn’t tell a guard from active duty or reservist rank, other than the way they painted their equipment. They performed very well. I’m absolutely truthful about this, I cannot tell the difference between active, Guard... and that’s the way it’s supposed to be.

Lt General Charles Horner
Iraq, 4 April 1991

The comments made by General Horner after Operation DESERT STORM were the result of decades of often painful mobilization lessons. Although not established as a separate reserve component of the United States Air Force until 18 September 1947, National Guard aviators have played significant roles in all of America’s wars and most of its major contingencies since the First World War. They have also aided their states in coping with natural disasters and civil unrest since the mid-1920s.¹ Throughout its history, political and military leaders have experimented with how the Air National Guard assists the active duty component of the Air Force in its prosecution of overseas conflict. From the Korean War to the Persian Gulf crisis, the Air National Guard modified its mobilization practices and procedures to both complement active duty forces and fill niche roles as required. Historical analysis of the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, and the Persian Gulf crisis will show the varied, and often ineffective, use of Air National Guard assets. Additionally, the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept developed in the late 1990s served to manipulate Air National Guard mobilization strategies. This history provides the foundation and background to

evaluate current deployment and mobilization trends and identify salient lessons that can be used to identify a more efficient and effective Air National Guard force.

**The Korean War**

United States Air Force Air National Guard aviation units received their first test as a distinct reserve component of the Service in the Korean War. The mobilization of the Air National Guard for the Korean War was massive. 45,000 personnel comprising 80% of the total force were mobilized. However, the method and character of these mobilizations often splintered and demoralized these Air National Guard units.

A large majority of the mobilizations during the Korean War were in support of Air Defense Command, whose mission was to thwart a potential attack by the U.S.S.R. 22 of the Air National Guard’s 27 wings were on active duty with the United States Air Force in Korea, Europe, and state side locations. In 1954, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau submitted a request to Air National Guard Wings requesting after action feedback regarding their mobilizations. A review of the responses shows that many of the units were poorly equipped or prepared for deployment. Air Defense Command ordered Air National Guard fighter-interceptor units to operate a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week alert schedule with as few as six qualified aircrew. The Air Force deployed many of the Air National Guard’s experienced pilots to Korea with active duty units, filling the void at home station with unqualified and inexperienced personnel. One report from the 134th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron read, “Qualified replacements never kept up with losses; crew strength for

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several months was so low that available crews were on alert 95 hours per week.”

Another significant impact of the Korean War on Air National Guard units was that many individual members mobilized into active duty units to fill vacancies instead of deploying as a squadron. The after action report filed by the 122d Fighter-Bombing Wing, an Air National Guard Wing based at Stout Field, Indiana, highlights the frustrations of unit dismemberment. “Before the unit was called to active duty, it was generally believed the unit would go overseas as a unit, rather than individually. Personnel were transferred individually starting shortly after activation. This greatly reduced the morale and aggressiveness of the organization. Capabilities of the organization were also greatly reduced through the assignment of inexperienced personnel as replacements. The new commander and new operations officer that were assigned were seriously handicapped because of their own lack of fighter experience. It is felt that this unit would have retained a higher state of combat readiness, had it been utilized in its entirety.”

The 123d Fighter-Bomber Wing, based at Standiford Field, Kentucky, endured similar hardships. Their report notes,

Even before call-up, thirty of the best aircraft were pulled out and sent to Korea. Upon activation of the wing, most of the best pilots and many other key people of great experience were stripped from the wing and replacements were sent in, who were largely culls from other organizations. When the wing was sent to England it picked up, upon arrival, three hundred new people to fill in the gaps left by the stripping process mentioned above. It also received jet aircraft left in place by a SAC Wing. These aircraft were 95% out of commission and the 123d was forced to accept them, regulations to the contrary notwithstanding. The SAC Wing

5. 123d Fighter Bomber Wing, “Korean Emergency Mobilization Data, 123d Fighter Bomber Wing, Kentucky” (NGAUS Archives, July 9, 1954).
which gave them up was there upon returned to the states to get new aircraft.  

Almost all of the 78 after action reports from Air National Guard units that mobilized during the Korean War mimic the frustrations illustrated above. Many units struggled for years to recover from the dissolution of their organizations’ personnel and equipment.

The reports show that Air National Guard units fought to maintain unit continuity and viable equipment during the Korean War. The Air Force often removed working equipment from their inventory to support the war effort in Korea and replaced it with obsolete, and sometimes inoperative, equipment. Through the struggles, some units overcame the obstacles and achieved success. Air National Guard units assigned to Korea flew more than 39,000 combat sorties and destroyed 39 enemy aircraft. Four Guardsmen became aces.

The Air National Guard learned many lessons regarding mobilizations during the Korean War. First, Air Guard units reported a lack of unit cohesiveness due to individualistic mobilization as a significant contributor to lower morale and poor performance. Not only were quality individuals lost to active duty units, their replacements proved unqualified in their jobs and had to be retrained, wasting valuable time and putting significant stress on the remaining qualified personnel. Second, many Air National Guard combat units had to deploy and operate equipment that was new to their unit and often obsolete or in disrepair. The commander of the 123d Fighter-Bomber Squadron best explains the combination of these two factors. In the closing paragraph of the after action report he states, “The record of historic fact demonstrates the 123d was combat-ready at the time the Korean War broke out, and its loss of that stature was the result of a deliberate policy

6. 123d Fighter Bomber Wing, “Korean Emergency Mobilization Data, 123d Fighter Bomber Wing, Kentucky.”
of the Air Force to spread the talent of the Wing over other organizations, rather than to use the Wing to accomplish its original assigned mission.”

The United States Air Force strategy for using Air National Guard aviation, especially fighter-bomber units, was to mobilize the men and equipment into active duty units fighting the war. Fracturing the units to this extent may have satisfied short-term Air Force objectives but destroyed and demoralized many Air National Guard units. Those units that mobilized into Air Defense Command suffered from shortages in men and equipment that placed undue stress on a small number of individuals. Arguably, the most significant lesson learned was that units should maintain their equipment and personnel and remain as a cohesive unit during mobilizations.

**The Vietnam War**

After the Korean War, the Air National Guard took steps to solidify and broaden its mission in order to mitigate its vulnerability to program changes. The Air Guard transitioned from a predominantly fighter force to a mixed-mission force as it welcomed the strategic airlift and air refueling missions. The Guard’s desire to preserve its existing flying units with the most modern aircraft available encouraged a significant number of conversions to tanker and strategic airlift aircraft during the 1950s and 1960s.

The Vietnam War introduced a new, and mostly negative, paradigm in the mobilization and deployment of Air National Guard aviation units. For largely domestic political reasons, President Lyndon B. Johnson chose not to mobilize most of the nation’s reserve forces. The senior leadership of both the active duty military establishment and the reserve forces tried in vain to reverse the president’s decision to avoid a major

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reserve mobilization. As a result, the Reserve and the Air National Guard acquired reputations as havens for relatively affluent, young white men to avoid the draft. In *Prodigal Soldiers*, James Kitfield argues that politics was the primary reason for keeping the Guard at home.

Because of the nature of the reserve structure, National Guardsmen and Army and Air Force Reservists are also generally older than their active-duty counterparts, and mobilizing them meant abruptly depriving families across the country of husbands and fathers. It was exactly the type of polarizing debate and national hardship that Lyndon Johnson had hoped to avoid by not ordering a major mobilization of the reserves during Vietnam. The armed forces had been sent off to fight a protracted war in Vietnam without the will of the country mobilized behind them.

Despite the political misgivings, four Air National Guard fighter units deployed to Vietnam after the Tet Offensive of 1968. Two of the units, the 120th TFS from Colorado and the 174th TFS from Iowa, deployed as complete squadrons. The other two units, the 188th TFS from New Mexico and New York’s 136th TFS, combined into a single wartime entity. All four units flew the F-100 “Super Sabre” during the war. The F-100 could engage in limited air-to-air combat, but its real strength was as a close air support platform to destroy enemy formations and installations on the ground. Fully loaded, these aircraft could carry 500-pound bombs, air-to-ground missiles, napalm, and machine guns for strafing. A fifth unit also served, but mostly in obscurity. The 355th TFS was an active duty unit from South Carolina but contained only 15% active duty personnel. The other 85% of the unit was comprised of Air National Guardsmen from New Jersey’s 199th TFS and the 121st TFS from the District of Columbia. This hybrid unit served from 1968 to

1970 but the Air Force chose to rotate out the Air National Guard personnel in 1969. No wartime credit was given to either Air National Guard unit for their participation.\textsuperscript{13} The reason for the composite squadron was due to Air Force policy that pilots would return home after 100 combat sorties. 18 of the 23 active duty pilots had achieved this mark as well as many of the enlisted support troops supplemented by Air National Guardsmen.

Political leadership determined the strategy for Air National Guard mobilization in the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, this strategy left vast capability at home and created a stigma that Air National Guard units would not, or could not, fight the nation’s wars. Another problem that manifested itself through this strategy was that the American public was not engaged in the conflict. The state and community based structure of National Guard units make them uniquely important in building domestic political consensus. In the Air National Guard, units often use the local public airports and are highly visible to the community. Additionally, the personnel in the unit have typically lived in the community for a long time, and use the National Guard as a way to serve. The link the Air National Guard has with the community engages the civilian population in America’s conflicts. The lack of National Guard participation in Vietnam may have contributed to the negative outlook the civilian population had on the war. At a minimum, the whole question of our involvement in Vietnam might have been subjected to a public and congressional debate had President Johnson decided to ask Congress for authorization to use the reserves.\textsuperscript{14}

The political decision not to use National Guard forces to prosecute the Vietnam War created a stigma that the National Guard was a place to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{13} Listman Jr., “Remembering the Air Guard in Vietnam.”
\end{flushleft}
hide and avoid the conflict. Additionally, the inactivity did not help engage the civilian population to support the war. While certainly not the only cause, not using National Guard units contributed to the public’s negative outlook on the conflict. In stark contrast to the Korean conflict, those units that did mobilize were kept whole, with personnel and equipment from deploying organizations remaining as cohesive units. However, the lack of Air National Guard participation negatively affected the Air Reserve Component of the United States Air Force.

**The Gulf War**

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. On 8 August, President George Bush announced the major deployment of United States forces to Saudi Arabia to take up defensive positions against an attack by Iraqi troops across the Kuwait border. The subsequent deployment of United States forces to Saudi Arabia was one of the most challenging and successful deployments in our nation’s history. In the first three weeks of the operation, the United States deployed more military capability than it did during the first three months of the Korean conflict. Mobilization for the Persian Gulf War was an outstanding success for the United States Air Force and for the Air National Guard. By 22 August 1990, 3,737 Air National Guard members had volunteered to serve in the conflict. Altogether, 12,456 Air Guardsmen participated in Air Force operations during the Persian Gulf crisis. Unlike Korea and Vietnam, Air Guardsmen were immediately prepared to perform their missions alongside their active component counterparts. They did not need additional training or new equipment to do their jobs. President Ronald Reagan drove improved Air Guard readiness in the 1980s due to the need to prepare for a possible war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The President’s changes in

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Air Guard force structure led to a focus on modernization and increased readiness.\textsuperscript{16} Despite being well prepared and equipped, relatively few Air National Guard outfits mobilized as units. Instead, the Air Force called up specific capability packages of equipment and personnel, most of which consisted of volunteers. While effective, this individual volunteerism created problems when units found they needed the reassigned personnel.\textsuperscript{17}

The availability of active duty fighter units limited the need for Air National Guard fighter units. However, three fighter units did participate in the conflict. The New York Air National Guard and the South Carolina Air National Guard provided F-16As. By war’s end, the F-16s had flown 3,645 missions and dropped 3,500 tons of ordnance without a single loss to the enemy. The Nevada Air National Guard provided RF-4C aircraft with specialized side looking pods that could see into Iraq without crossing the border. The RF-4s flew 1,045 tactical reconnaissance missions including 350 in combat.\textsuperscript{18}

The Persian Gulf crisis showed that the Air National Guard was a capable and reliable source of combat power, but also illustrated that politicians and military leaders had not comprehended exactly how to use the reserve component. The mobilization for the Persian Gulf crisis required the Air National Guard to reinvent itself due to the unprecedented levels of volunteerism and tailored packages as Operation Desert Storm unfolded. Of the 10,456 Air National Guard members mobilized for the crisis, more than 8,000 Air Guardsmen entered active duty as volunteers during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{19} The level of volunteerism displays the commitment of the Air National Guard to answer the nation’s call to arms. The downside is that it

\textsuperscript{16} Rosenfeld and Gross, Charles, \textit{Air National Guard at 60: A History}, 15.
\textsuperscript{17} Rosenfeld and Gross, Charles, \textit{Air National Guard at 60: A History}, 16.
\textsuperscript{19} ANG/HO, “ANG Heritage: Missions, Wars and Operations.”
created the same problem of fractured units experienced in the Korean War. While there is no evidence that morale suffered from these individual voluntary mobilizations, the evidence suggests that many Air National Guard units would have struggled to accomplish their unit mission had it been called on to do so.

**After the Storm**

Following the Persian Gulf War, the Air Nation Guard continued to support the Air Force with mobilizations and deployments. However, the Air National Guard wanted to avoid long deployments that would harm civilian-employer relations with guardsmen.

Following Operation Desert Storm, Air Guard personnel became increasingly engaged in helping the active duty armed services conduct operations around the globe. A 15-day active duty tour to support real world operations was popular with traditional (i.e., part-time) Air Guardsmen because it coincided with their required period of annual active duty for training and could be substituted for the latter. To prevent the Air Guard from becoming merely a manpower pool of individual replacements for active duty Air Force members, most Guard volunteers served in tailored “packages” of manpower and equipment provided by their units. That practice enabled ANG units to augment the increasingly hard-pressed Air Force, yet still meet the civilian employment and family needs of its traditional members while avoiding the politically sensitive and bureaucratically complex mobilization process.²⁰

The introduction of the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in 1998 incorporated Air National Guard units into active duty Air Force deployment processes. The demands of the AEF process stressed the tension between an Air National Guard fighter unit’s desire to participate in worldwide operations while maintaining the part-time nature of the force. “To lower the potential barriers to greater ANG participation in such operations, especially by fighter units, the Air Guard worked around the existing Cold War era system of accessing its units. The ANG

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developed provisional or “rainbow” units of personnel and equipment from several organizations that came together for specific short-term deployments.”21

One example illustrating the use of rainbow deployments came in Operation Allied Force in 1999 when the Air National Guard deployed A-10s to support operations in Kosovo. The 18 A-10s deployed to Europe as the 104th Expeditionary Operations Group, a “rainbow” unit of personnel and equipment from the 104th Fighter Wing, Massachusetts, 110th Fighter Wing, Michigan, and the 124th Wing, Idaho. The Air Guard employed the “rainbow” configuration because no single A-10 unit possessed enough fighter aircraft to meet the United States European Command’s wartime requirements for Operation Allied Force.22 Another A-10 deployment to Central Command in 1994 illustrates this method of deployment. Portions of Air National Guard units from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut deployed to Kuwait to form a “rainbow” unit primarily to conduct combat search and rescue support for any downed airmen and to attack Iraqi tanks if needed.23

The Air National Guard again used this deployment method in 2000, when three F-15, six F-16, and three A-10 units participated in four different multi-unit ANG “rainbow” deployments to the Persian Gulf region that lasted about three months each. The units also utilized “swap-outs” where units sent new pilots every few weeks to expose as many of their aircrew as possible to the challenges of combat flying.24 Not only did swap-outs allow combat immersion of pilots, it also allowed traditional, part-time Guardsmen to return to their civilian jobs sooner, lessening the economic impact to the employer.

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Senior leadership saw the success of these “rainbow” deployments as further validation of the ANG fighter force’s accessibility, readiness, willingness, and capability to accomplish real-world missions. The well-established practice of relying on short, voluntary tours of traditional Guardsmen and Reservists overseas inspired the key ideas under the leadership of the Director of the Air National Guard, Major General Paul A. Weaver, Jr. From experience, the Air Directorate of the National Guard Bureau preferred to allow the reserve components to develop their own force packages, including “rainbow” deployments, to meet operational requirements. Those practices were also consistent with the established two-week annual training requirements of the air reserve components.25 With the implementation of the AEF after 1998, growing numbers of Air National Guard units joined operational organizations in regular, relatively short voluntary rotations. As a result, the Air National Guard integrated seamlessly with the active duty Air Force while preserving its militia culture, unit integrity, and high level of operational readiness.

Summary

The Persian Gulf crisis and conflicts afterward validated the Total Force concept conceived in the 1980s and did a great deal to enhance the image of the Air National Guard as a competent, professional, and capable component of the United States Air Force. The Air National Guard created flexible deployment options that allowed mobilization of entire units, tailored packages of specialized skill, and individual volunteerism to support the needs of combatant commanders during specific contingencies. Although the Air Force had made great progress by the time the Persian Gulf crisis began, some of the frustrations of Korea and Vietnam persisted. Individual deployments left capability gaps in home units, especially if the Air Force subsequently mobilized the

unit. Another real concern was the accessibility of Air Guard assets for repeated and extended Federal call-ups due to reduced active duty fighter squadrons and requirements that exceeded active duty availability. Senior Air Force officials were, and still are, concerned that volunteers would not always be available from the Guard when needed. On the other hand, Air National Guard leadership feared that repeated call-ups, voluntary or involuntary, and long tours of active duty would drive airmen out of their units.

Three major areas of concern emerge from the historical analysis of Air National Guard mobilizations. First, fracturing units into individual personnel and equipment entities in order to backfill active units results in splintered reserve units, who then struggle to maintain morale and mission success at home. The Korean War illustrates this method as flawed and dangerous to Air National Guard units. Second, avoiding the Air National Guard and Reserve component as a whole is also a precarious national strategy. National Guard ties to community engage the population in national overseas missions. Politicians and senior military leaders realized that the Vietnam War isolated the population from the will of national leaders. Third, mass volunteerism of National Guard members may degrade the capabilities of the units from which these volunteers originate. Volunteerism shows that Air National Guard members are ready and willing to participate in the nation’s conflicts around the world, but too much volunteerism may damage follow on capabilities of these units.

The landscape of the United States Air Force has changed significantly since the Persian Gulf crisis. In 1990, the United States Air Force had an ample supply of fighter aviation units. There was little need to mobilize fighter units for the conflict. This has changed significantly. “Without question, the U.S. Air Force America remembers from 1991 is now shockingly smaller and older. 25 years ago, we had 134 combat-coded fighter squadrons while today we have 55; we had
946,000 Total Force military and civilian Airmen while today we have fewer than 660,000. If World War II’s B-17 bomber had flown in DESERT STORM, it would have been younger than the B-52, KC-135 and the U-2 are today.”26  Active duty fighter units struggle to meet the current deployment demands and Air National Guard units often fill the gap. The next chapter will look at recent Air National Guard mobilization strategies to compare to historical examples in order to conceptualize the best use of the United States Air Force’s reserve component.

Chapter 3
Recent ANG Fighter Utilization Trends

The events of 9-11 highlighted to the Nation that the National Guard was no longer a strategic reserve – but a full spectrum operational force. As an operational force, the Guard requires resources to man, equip and train in all mission areas, state and federal, and perform these missions simultaneously.

Maj Gen Edward W. Tonini,
Air National Guard Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035

The United States Air Force has relied heavily on Air National Guard assets to fight the global war on terror. Similar to past conflicts, the method and strategic use of the Air National Guard continues to react to meet the needs of the nation. Since September 11, 2001, Air National Guard units have mobilized for both homeland defense and overseas operations. Active duty force reductions, recapitalization efforts, and drawn out conflicts contribute to the increased use of reserve forces in deployed locations.

September 11, 2001 began a new era for Air National Guard mobilization and deployment. An attack on the nation’s soil by airborne threats required the nation to reevaluate its air defense posture. Immediately, some Air National Guard units began a constant homeland defense alert mission, much like what existed during the Korean War and which continues to this day. Because of the 9/11 attacks, homeland defense became the top national defense priority. This enhanced defense of North America and military support to civilian government agencies, known as Operation Noble Eagle, began on 12 September when General Eberhart, the Commander of NORAD, issued an executive order launching the campaign. On September 14, President Bush declared a
national emergency and made members of the nation’s Ready Reserve subject to federal service for as long as two years.¹

Pentagon officials acknowledged that the Air Guard, since 11 September 2001, has carried the major share of the increased air defense responsibilities under Noble Eagle. They considered the ANG the right organization to carry those burdens because of the wide geographic dispersal of its units and its long-standing participation in the homeland defense mission. But they emphasized that homeland defense would not become an exclusive ANG mission. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, plus the continued homeland defense mission, would challenge the Air National Guard as it rounded out its first 60 years.²

Since 2011, United States Air Force fighter and attack units have conducted 136 overseas deployments, illustrated in the appendix. During this period, 33 of the 136 were Air National Guard deployments and six were Air Force Reserve units. Of the 33 deployments conducted by Air National Guard units, 22 were part of a rainbow deployment. Of the remaining deployments, only two were six months long, similar to active duty deployments.³ The data suggests that Air National Guard fighter and attack units are leaning away from the active duty deployment model, where a single squadron deploys for six months, despite advertising that the organization deploys like its active duty counterparts.

The data from 2011-2015 suggests that Air National Guard deployments have in fact been significantly different from active duty deployments. Active duty fighter units deploy on six-month rotations with very little or no “swap outs”, moving personnel in and out of the deployment zone. Air National Guard deployments show very different

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¹ Rosenfeld and Gross, Charles, *Air National Guard at 60: A History*, 42.
² Rosenfeld and Gross, Charles, *Air National Guard at 60: A History*, 44.
trends. Often, many of the units “rainbow” the deployment, in which multiple units share manpower and equipment. One unit deploys for the first three months while the second deploys for the final three. The details of the deployments vary, but the majority of units conducting six-month deployments used shared equipment and was manned via a “swap-out” of personnel from the two squadrons. This model alleviates the airlift and tanker requirements for overseas deployment. A close examination of the execution of fighter/attack deployments from 2011-2015 will attempt to demonstrate deployment trends. In order to simplify the analysis, the research will look at specific fighter/attack aircraft independently. The goal is to show the actual execution of Air National Guard fighter/attack deployments in order to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the mobilization models. The complete data of fighter/attack deployments for active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserves is located in the appendix.

**ANG F-15C Deployments**

The first analysis will examine Air National Guard F-15C deployments. Table 2 lists the deployments of Air National Guard F-15Cs from 2011 to 2015. During this period, four units deployed to the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) in support of national objectives. All four units are also Aerospace Control Alert organizations which maintain a 24/7 alert presence at their assigned home base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wing</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deployed</th>
<th># A/C</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
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<td>7/1/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>142 FW</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>F-15C</td>
<td>7/1/2015</td>
<td>9/30/2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACC/A3O Fighter Deployments FY11-FY15

Since 2011, four F-15C Air National Guard squadrons have conducted two six-month deployments. Air Guard F-15Cs conducted both deployments, one in 2012 and the other in 2015, as rainbow
operations. In both cases, Air Guard leadership assigned two squadrons to fill the six-month deployment window. The deployment was a rainbow of both personnel and equipment. Personnel from one squadron deployed for the first three months while personnel from another squadron deployed for the second three. Units shared equipment for the duration of the deployment. Of the 12 F-15C’s, each squadron deployed six to obtain the 12 desired. Additionally, swap outs also occurred within each three-month rotation, allowing some members to conduct 45-day deployments. The swap out program successfully adapted to the varying schedules of the traditional Air National Guard workforce, allowing personnel who could not afford extended time away from their civilian employer.

Active duty F-15C deployments during this time contrast with the Air National Guard model. Of the nine active duty deployments, five deployments were between four and six months in duration, one was three months, and the final three were one month. All nine used a single squadron of personnel and equipment to conduct the deployment.4

The reason Air National Guard squadrons used the “rainbow” model for this type of deployment is primarily because the Aerospace Control Alert mission requires that all operational Air National Guard F-15C units continuously conduct the alert mission at home station. Because Air National Guard units are equipped and manned similarly to their active duty counterparts, these units do not have the indigenous personnel or equipment to conduct two Federal missions simultaneously. Therefore, aircraft and personnel must remain at home station during the deployment to continue the homeland defense mission. Often, the result is a small number of people conducting the alert mission at a much higher rate than normal and getting very little flying training while the rest of the unit is deployed. In both cases, members of other Air

4. ACC/A3O, “Fighter Deployments FY11-FY15.”
Guard F-15C squadrons and F-15C pilots on the ANG staff and other statutory tours went on Temporary Duty (TDY) status to the deployed unit’s base to facilitate alerts.

The pilots remaining at home station suffered significantly in areas of training. The lack of aircraft and maintenance personnel and equipment, combined with the incessant alert requirement left little capability to train effectively. With aircraft required on alert, training missions were of a very small scale and irregularly scheduled. Pilots also struggled to maintain the Combat Mission Ready (CMR) status required to operate on alert. The Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) defines the quantity and specific training events that each pilot must accomplish in order to maintain CMR status and be eligible to sit alert. In 2015, the Air National Guard required experienced F-15C pilots to fly a minimum of six times per month to maintain CMR status.

The results of the Air National Guard F-15C deployments illustrate the constraints involved in executing an overseas deployment, maintaining the Aerospace Control Alert mission, and continuing a reasonable training program. Correctly, the missions of the deployment and Alert took primacy over continued training for individuals that remained behind.

**ANG F-16 Deployments**

Air National Guard F-16 deployments from 2011-2015 are listed in Table 3. The ACA mission also influenced F-16 units to deploy in a rainbow fashion. The 121 FS at Andrews AFB and the 119 FS from Atlantic City both performed home station ACA missions and twice have teamed up for rainbow deployments since 2011.

The data shows several trends in F-16 Air National Guard deployments during the period. First, most deployments longer than three months were done as part of a rainbow deployment. Of the 24 units highlighted in this data, 14 were rainbow operations. The remaining deployments were all three months in duration or less, with
the exception of the 134 Fighter Squadron’s deployment in 2015, which was four months long. Notably, the information suggests that deployments of over three months were consistently conducted using rainbow operations to cover the full deployment period.

Table 3: ANG F-16 Deployments (2011-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wing</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deployed</th>
<th># A/C Type</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>115 FW</td>
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<td>12 F-16</td>
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</table>

Source: ACC/A3O Fighter Deployments FY11-FY15

Similar to the dynamics that affect F-15C deployments, the Aerospace Control Alert mission affects Air National Guard F-16 deployments. For units that do not maintain a constant alert presence, the part-time nature of the Air Guard influences the desired length of deployments. Longer deployments mean that part-time members are away from their full-time jobs. The trends show that F-16 units prefer splitting deployment responsibilities in order to alleviate stress on the part-time force.
One exception in the Air National Guard F-16 deployment information is the Alabama Air National Guard’s 100th Fighter Squadron deployment for six months in 2014. This was the longest deployment of a single unit of Air National Guard F-16s. Like many of the deployments listed above, the unit mobilized as a voluntary deployment under Title 10 U.S. Code section 12301[d], meaning the unit had to volunteer to go and the governor had to agree.

**ANG A-10 Deployments**

Table 4 illustrates the Air National Guard A-10 deployments from 2011 to 2015. The A-10 is the one MDS in this study that does not participate in the Aerospace Control Alert mission. The factors that influence A-10 units to conduct rainbow deployments derive from insufficient numbers of Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) and the part-time nature of the Air National Guard force. The 2012 deployment of the 104th Fighter Squadron and the 184th Fighter Squadron solved the problem of PAA by conducting a rainbow operation. The only way an A-10 unit can provide 18 aircraft for an extended period is to combine assets from multiple units. Air National Guard A-10s were the MDS that conducted the most active-duty like deployments, as the 163rd Fighter Squadron and 107th Fighter Squadron conducted six-month deployments in 2014 to 2015. The Air National Guard ordered both these deployments to be done with only indigenous personnel and equipment.

**Table 4: ANG A-10 Deployments (2011-2015)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wing</th>
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*Source: ACC/A3O Fighter Deployments FY11-FY15*
The 163 Fighter Squadron Commander addressed some of the challenges of deploying an Air National Guard unit for six months. The first problem was manning the deployment using only Indiana Air National Guard resources. The squadron was mobilized under U.S. Code Title 10 section 12301[d], voluntary mobilization, for the deployment effort. This method of Air National Guard mobilization is not unusual in the analysis period. The unit volunteered, and the governor agreed, to execute, which forced many part time members of the unit to ask permission of their full time employers to deploy. Ultimately, the unit requested, and received permission, to include three additional pilots and 21 maintainers from another A-10 unit to meet changing deployment requirements.5

A second problem resulted in little capability left behind at home station to provide continued training for non-deployed pilots and maintainers. The squadron did not deploy ten of their pilots, who each required six sorties per month to maintain combat mission ready status. Additionally, few experienced maintainers remained, which led to a further reduction in availability of the already small supply of aircraft. The 60 sorties a month required by Air Force Instruction to maintain currency was impossible to sustain. A three-month deployment may have been sustainable and achieved the requirements of Air Force Instruction, but a six-month reduction in training left both pilots and maintainers in what the deployed squadron commander termed “a near dangerous situation”.6

Active duty A-10 squadrons deployed 13 times from 2011-2015. All but one of the 13 deployments were six months in duration, with the single outlier being a two-week deployment to AFRICOM in 2011. Active-duty A-10 squadrons deployed in a manner consistent with the active-

duty deployment model. As mentioned earlier, the biggest detractor for Air National Guard A-10 squadrons is the part-time structure of the Air Guard and maintaining training qualifications for members left at home station.

**Lessons Learned**

Examination of the recent past Air National Guard fighter deployments reveals several lessons for evaluation. First, Air National Guard units with Aerospace Control Alert responsibility cannot independently maintain this mission and simultaneously produce an active duty type deployment. The Primary Aircraft Availability (PAA) and available manning do not support multiple federal missions simultaneously. This chapter highlights the Aerospace Control Alert mission as a predominant mission that affects some Air National Guard units, but any unit conducting a continuous home station federal or state mission is also impacted.

Second, a unit tasked to voluntarily deploy for an extended period will struggle to maintain currencies for pilots and maintainers not deployed. The same PAA and manning constraints that impact accomplishing multiple federal missions also apply to the training regime. Any long-term deployment threatens to deplete the currency and proficiency of non-deployed personnel, leading to longer reconstitution times after the deployment. Active component units often have multiple squadrons at the same home station that can absorb pilots and maintainers left behind. Few Air National Guard squadrons enjoy this luxury. Only Air Guard squadrons that are part of a Total Force Initiative (TFI) base can hope to rely on another squadron to support home station training while deployed.

Third, there is a significant impact on the community, especially smaller communities, when some of their employees deploy for an extended length of time. Local businesses and industries lose skilled workers that affect their products and output. These businesses are
often supportive of the military and the local Air National Guard unit, but these communities can suffer from longer deployments of their citizens.

**Conclusion**

The recent historical record provides insight into the hurdles that Air National Guard units have overcome in order to accomplish the mission requested. The examples of Air National Guard fighter unit deployments from 2011 to 2015, combined with historical deployment examples in the Korean War, Vietnam, and Operation DESERT STORM, provide a foundation to suggest alternative methods and solutions to mitigate the unique challenges deployments have on Air National Guard units. The solution must achieve the intent of the combatant commander and also be flexible enough to alleviate the mission and structural considerations of Air National Guard fighter/attack units. The next chapter will highlight the unique challenges and set the stage for recommendations so that future deployments achieve the combatant commander’s intent while maintaining the integrity of Air National Guard forces.
Chapter 4
Factors Affecting ANG Mobilizations

Our foundational assumption on the use of the ARC has shifted from a strategic reserve augmenting active capacity to a force that is fully engaged and organized in operationally indistinguishable units. In addition, the ARC still provides strategic depth and surge capacity. We must ensure this development is accounted for in our doctrine. Additionally, we must record this change for critical analysis by future thinkers. Leaders armed with the doctrinal concepts, critical histories, and experiences stand the greatest chance of conceiving how to wield the Total Force effectively.

Air Force Strategic Master Plan, 2015

An excerpt from the Air National Guard Strategic Master Plan, November 2014, states, “The source of ANG airpower is the fighting spirit of Guard Airmen, and operational ANG squadrons are the fighting core of the ANG. The superior strategic agility required to be a strong ANG in the future is derived from unit-equipped squadrons based on operational Unit Type Codes (UTCs).”¹ This assertion originates from the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force’s statement that squadrons are the fighting core of the Air Force. It is true that the UTC concept tailors fighter squadrons to provide efficient and effective capability to combatant commanders. Air National Guard squadrons, however, have additional characteristics that force a reevaluation of this statement. Two general factors influence Air National Guard units to operate differently than their active duty counterparts. First, all Air National Guard units are geographically significant. The underlying principle is that the location of Air National Guard units plays a vital strategic role

¹. “ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035.”
from both mission and political points of view. Some active duty units also provide geographically significant roles, but these units are predominantly based overseas and provide a strategic forward presence of United States military forces. Second, the construct of the Air National Guard as a predominantly part time force emphasizes the need to maintain agile deployment capability. The part time nature of the reserve component allows for significant fiscal savings during times of peace, but also limits the ability to deploy like active duty forces. There are also competing interests between the factors that create geographic importance and the desire to support overseas missions. These factors create a “tug-of-war” between the Air National Guard home mission and culture and deploying forces.

**Geographic Significance of ANG Units**

Unlike most Active Component units, Air National Guard units are geographically significant. Installations in the Air National Guard provide a location available to both federal and state institutions and spreads capability across the country. “With 89 wings throughout the 50 states, four territories, and the district, the ANG provides self-sustained and secure bases that can accept and support forces and materials for domestic and international use at the discretion of the president and/or governors.”

Three significant factors contribute to the geographic importance of the Air National Guard. First, the Air National Guard is the primary source of equipment and personnel to accomplish the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA), or homeland defense, federal mission. Second, the constitutional nature of the Guard puts it normally under control of the governor of the state in a Title 32 status. Removing capability from state control reduces the ability of governors to respond to state-specific contingencies such as natural disasters. The final geographic consideration is community involvement, which has proven to

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2. “ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035.”
tie the Air Force, and the nation’s, mission to the population and is a source of pride and energy.

**Homeland Defense (Federal Mission)**

Homeland defense units provide one of the strongest arguments for reevaluating deployment concepts for Air National Guard fighter units. The Air National Guard defends the nation with armed fighter aircraft around the clock, 365 days a year by executing 16 of 17 Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) sites. The necessity to spread ACA resources across the country in order to defend prioritized potential targets defines the geographic significance of these units. For example, the District of Columbia’s 121st Fighter Squadron of the 113th Fighter Wing is geographically significant because it defends the nation’s capital region. The 121st Fighter Squadron serves as one clear example of the geographic importance of individual ACA units.

The geographical construct of the ACA mission prioritizes coastal regions and the national capital region. The “4 corners” concept places alert fighters at the edges of the country, supporting control of the Air Defense Intercept Zone (ADIZ) and simultaneously positioned to defend the most densely populated areas of the country. “The ADIZ is an area surrounding much of North America – namely airspace surrounding the United States and Canada – in which the ready identification, location, and control of civil aircraft over land or water is required in the interest of national security.” For example, the northeast United States contains one quarter of the country’s population. The region from Maine to the Carolinas is supported by three fighter alert units, all Air National Guard assets, strategically positioned to respond to threats against New York City, Boston, or Washington D.C. The interior of the country also

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maintains strategically positioned units whose role is to protect various critical elements. In addition to the continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii maintain Aerospace Control Alert units to secure non-contiguous United States territory.

The demands of the ACA mission, or any home station mission, affect resources that units would normally use for training and deployment. Currently, the ACA mission is not a UTC based mission, meaning that the personnel and resources dedicated to this mission are not visible in the Air Expeditionary Force construct. The result is that any ACA unit that intends to deploy for an overseas mission must be supplemented and backfilled by other units. As such, all of the Air National Guard’s ACA units that have deployed since 2011 have done so as part of a coordinated deployment with another similarly equipped squadron. The fundamental problem is that these units are attempting to execute two separate and distinct federal missions simultaneously. This consideration holds true for any unit that maintains more than a training mission while at home base.

Fighter units account for just one portion of the homeland defense assets, but other Air National Guard units also contribute significantly. Command and Control units and alert aerial refueling units maintain constant vigilance to support Operation NOBLE EAGE. The geographic significance of these organizations is similar to the fighter units and is critical to the success of the national defense. In addition to operations, many support agencies at these bases are also enablers of the ACA mission. The United States Air Force could not accomplish ACA without maintenance, Security Forces, and Command Post controllers who enable the safe and efficient operations.

**State Mission Considerations (Dual-Role)**

In 2013 alone, Guard airmen executed over 53,000 man-days in response to more than 200 individual domestic operations covering all 10
FEMA regions and 46 states and territories. Similar to the Aerospace Control Alert mission, Air National Guard units play a critical role in state-specific mission requirements such as natural disaster relief. Hurricane Katrina represents one of the best-known examples of National Guard contribution to state disaster relief missions. “The Air National Guard flew over 3,000 sorties, moved over 30,000 passengers, and hauled over 11,000 tons of desperately needed supplies into Gulf Coast airfields, some of which Guard personnel opened and operated.”

The geographic significance the Air National Guard plays in this situation is its affiliation with its state.

Unlike the ACA mission, state missions rarely require fighter aircraft. Many times the question that is asked sounds like, “why does a state governor need fighter aircraft?” The answer is very simple; fighter aircraft typically do little to support state missions. However, governors do need people, and both the Air National Guard and regular Air Force desire to spread mission capability across the reserve components. As the Air National Guard Strategic Master Plan states, “93% of ANG equipment is dual-use, and 100% of ANG Airmen are dual-use.” A typical Air National Guard Fighter Wing employs approximately 1,000 military or dual-role employees. When a fighter squadron deploys, the Air Force may task a significant percentage of the wing to mobilize. With those people geographically separated from the state, governors and state leaders lose a valuable commodity for state-specific missions. The Air National Guard Strategic Master Plan summarizes the importance of Air National Guard support to state leadership.

The National Guard has always been the state and territorial governors’ first choice to augment first responders in an emergency. Guard Airmen can fill sandbags, walk foot patrols, and distribute emergency food and water. However, they are optimized to provide less visible but equally vital

5. “ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035, 12.”
6. Rosenfeld and Gross, Charles, Air National Guard at 60: A History, i.
7. “ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035, 4.”
support such as establishing a Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (JRSOI) air operations site for military and non-governmental assistance; airlifting equipment, food and other essential supplies to the disaster area; configuring and manning emergency communications centers; providing food and shelter for disaster response teams; transporting, setting up, and operating emergency medical facilities; or providing the incident awareness and assessment essential for effective consequence management.  

The weight of deployments on state missions varies from state to state and depends on many factors. One factor may be seasonal. States in the northern United States may desire that more Air National Guard personnel be available during the winter months to assist in storm recovery. States who are susceptible to forest fires may desire their Air National Guard assets remain in state control during the forest fire season. Hurricane season in southern states is another example of how seasonal factors drive the desire for state resources to remain in place during specific times of the year. States that rely on Air National Guard personnel and equipment to support emergencies and contingencies within the state may benefit from rainbow operations. By reducing the number of personnel or equipment any one state deploys at any time, states can maintain capabilities to support state missions.

Community Implications (Politics)

The Vietnam War taught many painful lessons on warfighting and the deployment of troops abroad in support of national goals. As mentioned in chapter 2, the Air Force deployed very few intact Air National Guard units, including fighter squadrons. After the conflict, senior leadership at the political and military levels realized that the country was not invested in the war and that Air National Guard units heavily contribute to the population’s involvement in global conflicts.

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8. “ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035, 12”
“The only visibility a US citizen may have with the military is through their local National Guard unit. These relationships build trust between the military and the nation providing community support to military efforts at home and abroad. These tight community bonds ensure that when the National Guard mobilizes, it mobilizes the Guard Soldiers and Airmen as well as the American public and the national will.”

The National Guard acts as the face of the United States military in many areas across the country.

Energizing and bonding the community to Air Force and national goals through Air National Guard deployments is a double-edged sword. On one hand, deploying the unit typically invigorates patriotism and national pride. On the other hand, potentially hundreds of people must leave their full time employment to answer the nation’s call. Because many Air National Guard wings are embedded in smaller communities around the country, tasking a single wing potentially removes hundreds of people from the local economy and puts additional strains on the community. The Department of Defense identifies the impact on the economy and community when mobilizing Air Guard units in Joint Publication 4-05. “Community support is crucial to maintaining a viable source of military manpower-RC personnel. Mobilization impacts the economy, employers, and the community. Commanders and mobilization planners should be aware that the call-ups may impact key national economic segments. Critical economic segments closely related to RC call-ups include communications, transportation (especially airline services), and public services (e.g., police, fire, and medical).”

The Air Guard is a significant user of the critical civilian employment segments JP 4-05 mentions and the effects on community are certainly a significant mobilization concern.

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10 Joint Publication 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, IV-12.
James Kitfield writes in *Prodigal Soldiers* that the Persian Gulf crisis reignited the same political discussions regarding use of the reserves as in Vietnam. He notes, “…the reserve call-up foretold by Total Force did not insure public support. Rather, it insured early participation in any major mobilization of a broad swath of the American public and body politic and consequently guaranteed that debate over whether the country supported a military action would be joined early and vigorously. Thus was a double-edged sword for both the president and the military.”\(^{11}\) The realization was that public support for military action around the world is heavily dependent on the mobilization of the United States’ reserves.

In her book *Drift*, Rachel Maddow recognizes the impact the Guard and Reserve units have on the community. She emphasizes using the Guard and Reserves as a method to keep the population engaged in America’s wars. “Our Guard and Reserves need to be the Guard and Reserves again, which is to say the institutions that weave civilian life and military life together. The life of a National Guardsman or Guardswoman should be mostly a peacetime, civilian life. When we ship these men and women off to war, civilian communities all over America should feel that loss.”\(^{12}\)

Today, the Air Force reserve component, including the Air National Guard, continues to influence political thought because of its close connections with the American public. The geographic significance of Air Guard units contributes to a broad investment of the community in the nation’s foreign affairs. Air National Guard strategy recognizes this in its master plan. “ANG wings throughout the 50 states, four territories, and the district, along with their Army National Guard counterparts, bind the

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all-volunteer military to the powerful spirit of America’s communities – the core of our great United States.”

**Air National Guard Construct**

The second major factor that affects Air National Guard units is the construct of the organization and its ability to train and employ with a part-time force. The same design that keeps cost low in peacetime, by keeping experienced manpower in reserve and maintaining low overhead, factors into the calculus of deploying Air National Guard resources overseas. The part-time nature of Air National Guard personnel presents unique problems regarding deployment operations. A majority of the force maintains full-time employment outside the unit and trains with their local organization under the one weekend-a-month, two weeks-a-year construct.

**Training**

Maintaining the training standards of non-deployed personnel is one area where Air National Guard units struggle when deployed. Active component airmen who do not deploy with their unit are typically absorbed into sister squadrons (when more than one similarly equipped squadron is co-located with the unit) or given other jobs on the base while the squadron is deployed. Part-time members of an Air National Guard unit who do not deploy have few options to maintain training standards in the absence of the squadron. For example, if an Air National Guard fighter squadron deployed its full complement of aircraft with associated pilots and maintainers, how would non-deployed part-timers maintain flying currencies? In that event, would there even be a full-time member present to plan and execute any training events required by part-time members? At the very least, highly experienced professionals left behind to act as trainers are absent from demanding deployment requirements. Depending on the length of deployment, part

time members not deployed may require retraining at the end of the deployment to regain qualifications. The part-time nature of the Air National Guard makes any large-scale deployment of a wing detrimental to the continued training, and therefore the readiness, of the rest of the unit.

**Experience**

Experience is one of the great strengths of Air National Guard units. Compared to their active duty counterparts, Air National Guard units have more experienced personnel which requires less pre-deployment training, quicker deployment spin-up, and faster post-deployment reconstitution. The Air Guard gains this experience by hiring much of its workforce from the active duty. The active component trains these members and the National Guard allows them to maintain proficiency in their area of expertise. The experience also allows for more efficient deployment operations since most members are very familiar with the deployment process at their assigned unit. Because of the increased experience, mobilized Air National Guard members integrate quickly and seamlessly into a deployment force.

One of the key efforts defined in the Air National Guard Strategic Master Plan is promoting the experience of the force. “The ANG is a highly experienced force. Some units have been affiliated with a mission set, or multiple mission sets, for many years which enable Guard Airmen to possess unparalleled depth in their subject matter expertise.”14 This expertise is invaluable for deployed operations. Many Air National Guardsmen have conducted several previous deployments and can integrate quickly into the deployed environment. The Air Force draws on this experience through the volunteerism program that has been a significant aspect of Air National Guard deployments since its inception. Deployed active component units short on personnel can use Air Guard

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members to quickly gain capability and fill short falls. Individual deployments can serve both the member and the gaining unit. The member satisfies yearly service requirements while the unit gains a valuable team member requiring little spin-up. As mentioned in previous chapters, however, individual volunteerism is a slippery slope. The deployed individuals remove their experience from their home station unit to fill these short falls. Experience allows volunteerism to succeed but the Air Force mobilization process must manage personnel effectively to avoid capability gaps at home.

**Competing Interests**

The factors listed above show that a push/pull effect exists in deploying Air National Guard units. The current advertised deployment strategy is to deploy Air National Guard units similarly to the deployment of Active Duty units. This option presents problems unique to the Air National Guard and creates competing interests between several factors.

**Homeland Defense vs Deployment**

The first hurdle is the combination of Aerospace Control Alert units executing two separate federal missions simultaneously. ACA units provide continuous defense of the United States through geographically important staging areas. The homeland defense mission cannot terminate simply because the Air Force tasks the home station unit to deploy. One option is to deploy a new unit to replace the deploying unit. The Air Force used this strategy during the Korean War. The negatives to this approach are numerous. First, the back-filling unit is also deploying, thus adding to the total deployment count. Instead of one squadron deployment, a second deployment must occur to continue the ACA mission. Second, the back-filling unit has to become accustomed to the local area that includes local area orientation flights, procedural training, and logistical considerations. The deploying unit is likely to take much of the equipment that the alert mission also needs. Deploying in this manner puts the homeland defense mission at risk due to
reduced supply of equipment, parts, and personnel. A back-filling unit would experience the same hurdles.

Coordinated deployments would mitigate these obstacles by decreasing the total deployment footprint from a single unit at any one time. In fact, the Air Force should develop a UTC specifically for the ACA mission. Primarily the home station unit would permanently fill that UTC and units would pair equipment to the mission so that deployments would not sacrifice ACA requirements. In addition to equipment, coordinated deployments would sacrifice fewer people and resources from a single unit and therefore leave enough resources for the Alert mission.

This research highlights the Aerospace Control Alert mission as a major influencer in deploying Air National Guard fighter units, but several other Air Guard homeland operations also exist. Air Guard units provide modular airborne firefighting systems, Aero Medical evacuation capabilities, firefighters, and law enforcement and security during national crisis. Additionally, the Air Guard operates RED HORSE / PRIME BEEF units, Homeland Response Forces, Search and Rescue units, Counterdrug capabilities, Civil Support Teams, and Southwest Border Operations. All these capabilities directly support the geographic footprint of the United States and mobilizations can affect the ability to conduct these critical missions. The competing interests mentioned in this section translate to these missions as well as ACA.

**State Contingency Missions vs Deployment**

State contingency missions generally fall under the geographically constrained scenario developed with homeland defense. Deploying large numbers of resources, as active duty units typically do, can remove critical capabilities, such as disaster command and control, from state leadership when contingencies arise. Smaller deployments of single units allow the rest of the unit to be available to provide support for state emergencies like natural disasters or crowd control.
Public Support of National Goals vs Hometown Economics

One of the most important characteristics of the National Guard is its bond with the community. This bond fosters community involvement in national goals that involve the Air National Guard. The conflict emerges when a large group of guardsmen from a single unit deploys and removes a portion of the local workforce. Some Air National Guard bases are located in small towns and the workforce comes from this relatively small community. A large deployment from the base could affect local businesses and the local economy, especially if the deployment is prolonged.

Training vs Deployment

Not every member of a unit mobilizes each time a unit deploys. The deployment poorly positions those members left back to continue training due to a lack of trainers, equipment, and opportunities. The part-time nature of the Air National Guard amplifies this effect. Part-time guardsmen rely on the small full-time contingent to plan, prepare and conduct training events that occur during weekend drill. The absence of personnel, equipment and scheduling resources due to deployment reduce the training effectiveness at the home station and potentially remove training opportunities altogether. A full-time force suffers from this, but not nearly as much as part-time military employees. The ideal deployment model would leave some personnel and equipment behind to allow training to continue.

Volunteerism vs Unit Integrity

One of the most impressive examples of Air National Guard participation in conflict was the volunteerism shown during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Nothing defines the Air Force core values better than volunteering to serve the country over and above the decision simply to join the military. This volunteerism comes at a cost. Air National Guard members that heroically volunteered were no longer able to support the mission of their original unit and state. Rainbow operations mitigate the
risks associated with volunteerism. Because the deployment from a single unit is smaller, volunteerism from the same unit affects the organization significantly less. Rainbow deployments reduce the risk associated with volunteerism, enhancing the inherent capabilities of the Air National Guard.

**The Changing Structure of the Air Force**

One final factor deserves discussion relating to the Air National Guard involvement in further deployments. The structure of the Air Force as a whole has changed in the past decade. As the number of active duty fighter units has decreased, the Air National Guard has predominantly maintained its equipment and personnel levels, meaning that Air Force senior leadership may call on the Air National Guard to provide capability that is in short supply in the active duty. “Without question, the U.S. Air Force America remembers from 1991 is now shockingly smaller and older: 25 years ago, we had 134 combat-coded fighter squadrons while today we have 55; we had 946,000 Total Force military and civilian Airmen while today we have fewer than 660,000. If World War II’s B-17 bomber had flown in DESERT STORM, it would have been younger than the B-52, KC-135 and the U-2 are today.”\(^{15}\) The United States Air Force has especially reduced the number of fighter aircraft since Operation DESERT STORM. “Prior to 1992, the Air Force procured an average of 200 fighter aircraft per year. In the two and a half decades since, curtailed modernization has resulted in the procurement of less than an average of 25 fighters yearly.”\(^{16}\)

The introduction of the F-35 will also decrease the number of fighter aircraft available to provide capability both at home and abroad. Similar to every new platform produced, the transition will include a

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period of years of reduced fighter aircraft available to combatant commanders. Additionally, more aircraft are going to be required to remain at home stations in order to train pilots and get the squadron to a Combat Mission Ready level.

The shifting of the preponderance of fighter aircraft into Air National Guard units and the transition to the F-35 will force defense leadership to use Air Guard assets more than in the past, which will highlight the importance of having a resilient deployment structure that allows for simultaneous homeland defense, overseas operations, and training requirements.

**Conclusion**

The cumulative effects of a squadron-based UTC deployment weigh heavily on Air National Guard units. Unlike their active duty counterparts, mobilizations and deployments affect Air National Guard units because of their geographic importance and structure. There are competing desires not encountered in active duty units. Air National Guardsmen want to deploy just as much as their active duty counterparts, which is evident when viewed in light of the significant volunteerism shown in previous conflicts. The factors listed above are generic in that they are not solely applicable to Air National Guard fighter aviation. Many of these conditions apply to other functional areas of the Air National Guard and the Reserves as well. Additionally, some of these factors contribute to deployments of active duty units. While this thesis focuses on Air National Guard fighter aviation, leaders can apply the theories across a broader spectrum. The next chapter willdescribe a few of these instances.
Chapter 5

The Integrated Unit Deployment

*The Air National Guard will meet twenty-first century challenges by proactively shaping its future with combat ready, innovative Guard Airmen at its core. The ANG, as part of our one Air Force, will continue to provide the capabilities necessary to guard the United States of America at home and defend freedom worldwide.*

ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2014

The factors discussed in Chapter 4 illustrate the complexity of mobilizing and deploying Air National Guard units. The Air National Guard’s geographic strategic significance and structure suggest that the active duty model of deployment is not efficient for the reserve components and therefore not in the best interest of the organization. Additional factors, such as fighter reorganization and the F-35 transition, also suggest the implementation of a more balanced deployment methodology. In this chapter, I propose an alternative solution to the deployment of Air National Guard fighter squadrons. This solution attempts to balance the increasing requirements for Air National Guard fighter deployments with the limitations of a reserve force.

**Integrated Unit Deployment Execution**

Integrated Unit Deployment execution provides a balance between overseas deployment, home station missions, and training requirements. The first criteria for executing deployments in this fashion are to determine the requested number of deployed resources and weigh this against squadron Primary Aircraft Available (PAA). PAA is the number of aircraft authorized for performance of the unit’s mission. The PAA forms the basis for the allocation of operating resources, to include manpower, support equipment, and flying hour funds. The operating command
determines the PAA required to meet their assigned missions.\textsuperscript{1} PAA varies from unit to unit and between Mission Design Series (MDS). A typical Air National Guard fighter/attack squadron maintains 18 PAA. This number is significant because PAA sets the allowable number of pilots and maintainers possessed by a squadron. An 18 PAA squadron may have more actual aircraft, but PAA determines its manning and flying hours.

Once PAA is determined, the number of pilots and maintainers potentially available to the unit are easily determined. Single seat fighter squadrons are typically authorized two pilots per PAA. This equates to an average Air National Guard squadron supporting up to 36 pilots. Maintenance manning is also based on PAA and varies from platform to platform.

Once PAA and manning are determined, an assessment of the unit mission is required. Each unit and MDS must determine requirements for its overseas mission, its home station or state mission, and training. If the unit has significant contributions to all three, dividing the PAA by four should provide an approximate number of aircraft that units should allocate to each mission. For example, a typical Air National Guard F-15C unit may be required to deploy overseas, maintain a full-time alert posture on its home station, and maintain Combat Mission Ready status for pilots not deployed. Assuming this unit has 18 PAA, the unit would provide four, potentially up to five, aircraft for overseas deployment, four aircraft for alert, and four aircraft for home station training. The remaining aircraft would typically be unavailable to the squadron due to required maintenance action. A normal F-15C overseas deployment usually consists of 12 aircraft. The result is that an Air National Guard

F-15C squadron would pair with two other F-15C units to conduct a 12-ship deployment overseas. Each squadron would provide four aircraft, eight pilots, and the proportional amount of maintenance to support the overseas deployment while leaving a capable package of equipment and personnel at home to support alert or state missions and training.

The benefit to this system is that it is completely tailorable. Units can adjust the formula to account for changes in overseas deployment requirements, personnel factors, home-station mission requirements, or aircraft availability.

**How Integrated Unit Deployments Alleviate the Factors**

The flexibility of Integrated Unit Deployments mitigates many of the factors that affect the current deployment scheme of Air National Guard fighter assets. As described in chapter 4, the Air National Guard is strategically important due to its geographic significance. Homeland defense is one of the factors that make the Air National Guard geographically significant. The Air National Guard operates a majority of the Aerospace Control Alert facilities throughout the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. The alert mission is a no-fail mission that requires constant manning and equipment. During non-deployed operations, the alert mission is able to operate with the full complement of people and resources provided to a typical fighter squadron. However, deployments away from home station significantly affect this mission. Any alert unit required to deploy as a UTC-based squadron package would remove much of the personnel and equipment used to support the homeland defense mission. The Korean War example shows that the mobilization strategy deprived units of pilots and equipment during this time because of the decision to deploy significant portions of airplanes, maintainers, equipment, and pilots elsewhere. Air defense pilots were often sitting long alert tours with poor equipment.

One alternative that the Air Guard has used extensively is to task a separate squadron to deploy into the alert role at the homeland defense
site. However, this doubles the required effort, since two units must now deploy. Additionally, the guest alert unit would be unfamiliar with the local environment and require training to get prepared for the new location. Another previous solution was to make homeland defense units non-deployable. F-16 ADF units illustrate this concept. Another dated example was Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (FIS), whose sole job was alert. These units did nothing but train for and execute the alert mission. This structure limited a multi-role F-16 to a single mission platform and reduced the overall capabilities of the airframe for other missions the aircraft’s designers expected it to execute. It also isolated the pilots of the unit, who became outsiders in their own community because they only trained to one mission of the platform.

While the F-16 ADF provides an actual example of the drawbacks associated with limiting a unit solely to an alert role, applying this construct to F-15 or F-22 units is almost impossible due to the sheer limited numbers of aircraft. Since approximately two-thirds of the United States Air Force’s operational F-15Cs exist in the Air National Guard, and all the Air Guard units execute the alert mission, there would be a significant shortfall of counter-air platforms to conduct overseas air superiority missions. This factor, combined with the fact that the Air Force purchased limited numbers of F-22s, suggests that the air superiority mission for overseas operations would be rapidly depleted.

Integrated Unit Deployment operations would allow the alert mission to continue uninterrupted at the alert site with the aircrew, maintainers and equipment already in garrison. The familiar location, procedures, and equipment would ensure the seamless conduct of an operation vital to the defense of the nation.

Integrated unit operations also support continued state operations. This paper focuses on fighter operations, which contribute little to the operations of individual states, but the personnel that vacate the state for overseas missions are significant. Air National Guard members who
play a role in natural disaster preparation and response, emergency services, or state command and control operations during a crisis could potentially be lost to the state. Integrated unit operations limit the total number of personnel that deploy, allowing the unit to manage manning and provide the services needed both at the deployed location and the state.

Community interest in the nation’s overseas affairs also profits from integrated unit operations. As mentioned in chapter 4, the communities surrounding National Guard bases feel the impact of unit deployments. Integrated unit operations allow units from multiple states to contribute to the federal mission. This can provide broad support for overseas operations over a bigger spectrum of the population. Additionally, since fewer personnel are deploying from a single location, the deployment affects local businesses and economies, especially in smaller towns, less than a large-scale deployment. Deployment of Air National Guard units also has political repercussions. State politicians support Air National Guard units because they provide jobs and services to the state. Deploying members of National Guard units show that the state is involved in federal missions as well and can garner political support of overseas operations. Integrated unit operations spread the political influence across more states and keep state political bodies engaged in the Air Force’s global reach.

In addition to the factors contributing to the geographic significance of Air National Guard units, Guard structure also would benefit from integrated unit operations. Air National Guard participation is primarily a part-time endeavor. Approximately 70-80% of an Air National Guard wing is part-time, and these members usually have full-time employment in the local community. Because fewer personnel deploy from any one base, part time members may have more flexibility on when they can deploy, since there may be other members of the unit who wish to deploy on certain trips. This mitigates the impact on the
businesses that employ part-time Air National Guard members and can increase predictability among the force.

Integrated unit operations also support the volunteerism that is so important and prevalent from Air National Guard members. A unit member can volunteer for deployments outside their AEF window with minimal impact to the unit, should it be tasked to deploy during the volunteer period. There should be personnel available because a deployment would be smaller than typical full-package squadron deployments.

The part-time nature of the Air National Guard force also stresses the training system during deployments. Both part-time and full-time members, not deployed with the unit during a large-scale deployment, have a difficult time maintaining training requirements during the unit’s absence. It is difficult for pilots to maintain landing currency if there are no airplanes or maintainers to keep the planes operational. Even if there were one or two airplanes available, fighter training would be limited to small part-task training missions. Eventually, pilots and maintainers alike would lose proficiency and, in extreme circumstances, may even lose qualifications.

The solution of sending members on temporary duty to other units is possible, but it requires the extra time and money to do so. This solution is also not appealing to part-time members who wish to come in for a single day to accomplish flying training. Integrated unit operations would allow for airplanes and personnel to be available to continue a reasonable amount of training for those not deployed.

Air National Guard experience levels support this plan. Unlike active duty squadrons, which at various times may suffer from inexperience in both operations and maintenance, Air National Guard units are very experienced and typically have an abundance of seasoned instructor pilots and maintainers. An Integrated Unit Deployment by an
Air National Guard unit would be able to provide this experience to both the deployment and the home station training and alert mission.

**Benefits to Other Entities**

This research intentionally focused the benefits of integrated unit operations on Air National Guard fighter units. However, the criterion described in chapter 4 can have other applications within the Air National Guard and United States Air Force as a whole. The following discussion will introduce other mission areas and units that may benefit from Integrated Unit Deployments.

**Total Force Integration**

Total Force Integration has been active in the United States Air Force since the 1980s and has expanded and become more robust over time. The combined capabilities of the Active Component, the Air National Guard, and the Reserves gives the United States Air Force an advantage that no other Service or country around the world enjoys. Integrated unit operations are a method to provide more efficiency to these operations. For Total Force units, such as the 1st Fighter Wing and the 192nd Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, VA, integrated unit operations would allow both the active duty and Air National Guard unit to deploy simultaneously, sharing equipment and personnel. In addition to co-located units, geographically separated units could integrate as well. For instance, a small F-15C deployment from Barnes Air National Guard Base in Westfield, MA could deploy to Lakenheath AB, UK to supplement the mission in Europe. The small, flight-sized packages would allow integrated operations.

**Air National Guard Quick Reaction Force**

One of the shortcomings of Air National Guard units is the difficulty in mobilizing a squadron-sized deployment on short notice. Typically, Air Guard units require at least 30 days to activate part-time members and train them for deployments. Integrated unit operations would allow a small section of the full-time force to be immediately
deployable, similar to active duty timelines. Combining these quickly deployable entities with others creates an active duty capability of quick reaction within the Air National Guard.

**Transitioning Units and Recapitalization**

Many active duty and Air National Guard units find themselves in transition periods. F-35 implementation is one example of this. Many units, both active duty and Air National Guard, will find themselves transitioning out of their current Mission Design Series (MDS) and into the F-35. Transitioning is not limited to units executing a full mission change. Many times, aircraft go through upgrade modifications that require aircraft to go through significant maintenance. One example of this is the Active Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) radar modification to F-15C aircraft. On average, an additional one to two aircraft from each unit was in modification for up to eight weeks.

While units may modify deployment timelines to account for aircraft modifications, integrated unit operations would nullify the need to change timelines due to aircraft modifications or unit transitions. The transitioning unit could declare Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for a relatively small number of aircraft and personnel and be ready for deployment. Integrated Unit Deployments would then leave aircraft and manning for further training of the unit behind.

**Geographically Significant Operations**

Integrated Unit Deployments are not necessarily limited to the flying community or just the fighter community. There are mission areas that meet the criterion for Integrated Unit Deployments based on their geographic significance. One example is the Security Forces career field. The mission of the “Defenders” never ceases. Whether at home or abroad, Security Forces guardsmen always have a mission to defend the people, equipment, and infrastructure of the location they occupy. Integrated unit operations for Air Guard Security Forces would mimic operations of fighter squadrons. Small units from multiple bases would
deploy, while leaving a capable number at home station to defend the base and continue training. This is significant for Air National Guard “Defenders” because these airmen also typically integrate with local law enforcement and are often called to respond to state and local emergencies. The Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 provide one example of this. The governor recalled Massachusetts Air National Guard Security Forces members to State Active Duty to help with crowd control and crisis management during this no-notice emergency. A large deployment of Security Forces members during that time would have left few people to respond to the incident and continue to defend the base.

Other geographically significant operations can benefit from integrated unit operations. Areas of the country that are prone to certain natural disasters, such as wild fires, can manage equipment and personnel to both be prepared for state contingencies and conduct federal overseas missions. Civil Engineers, Emergency Operations specialists, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units also fit into this category. Many of the missions that Air National Guard units maintain support both federal and state missions, and integrated unit operations offer the opportunity to continue both.

**Unit Training Code Structure**

Another benefit of the Integrated Unit Deployment process is that it easily adapts to the current Unit Training Code (UTC)-based deployment structure currently used to assess readiness. The AEF UTC Reporting Tool (ART) allows units the ability to report UTC level readiness data. It provides one central location to archive reported data and allows immediate updates and ready access to an aggregate UTC status for all levels of command. ART complements readiness data reported in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). ART focuses reporting on the modular, scalable capability-based UTCs designed to meet the needs of the AEF while SORTS is unit-centric. Operationally, ART collects and collates unit-reported data to answer, in whole or in
part, the following questions: 1) Are UTCs able to accomplish their MISCAP? 2) Are UTCs able to accomplish their deployment tasking? 3) Are adequate resources and training available in order to accomplish and sustain the AEF mission(s)?

There would be little impact on the UTC programs currently in place under Integrated Unit Deployments. ART and SORTS users would have to adjust the inputs to account for the new process but the structure would remain intact.

**Potential Hurdles**

Integrated unit operations are not without their hurdles. There are potential factors that limit the efficiency of these operations. For flying units, maintenance equipment is one such factor. Low density, deploying units would have to prioritize specialty equipment used on aircraft for either home station or deployment. Coordination on which unit would bring certain equipment would have to be programmed in advance to ensure both locations had the resources necessary to accomplish the mission.

Logistically, the hurdle of transporting the deploying unit also can be troublesome. Typically, a deploying squadron would get airlift to arrive at the base to load equipment and personnel. Under integrated unit operations, airlift would be required to go to multiple bases to get geographically separated units into theater. Similar to the equipment factor, airlift programming would have to occur to ensure that deploying Air Guard units efficiently used airlift assets to transport equipment. Airlift assets are already a premium in the United States military, and maximizing their efforts would be required to conduct integrated unit operations efficiently.

Another potential hurdle is training and cohesion. A lesson learned from both the Korean War and Vietnam was that units separated

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were less effective in combat. In addition, units that conduct integrated unit operations must execute in similar manners and abide by similar contracts in order to be successful. In both cases, training and standardization can overcome these challenges. Most United States Air Force MDSs abide by 3-1 mission series tactical manuals that articulate the standard execution for a platform. These manuals, and others like them, would have to be the backbone for tactical execution. Additionally, integrated unit units would have to train together. Exercises such as Red Flag would be valuable opportunities to test the mobilization of equipment and personnel, as well as test the operational and tactical employment of the units.

**Conclusion**

Integrated unit Operations represent a change in the mentality of how the United States Air Force would mobilize for the country's national interests. The current AEF and UTC structure would maintain their general construct, but units would deploy as small, flight-sized organizations that combined with other units to create a full UTC complement requested by combatant commanders. Integrated unit operations are extremely flexible, allowing dynamic modification of personnel, equipment, and resources based on each unit’s factors. The deployment of small entities from multiple bases would allow a full deployment of effects, while allowing individual units to continue stateside missions and training. This method allows for proactive deployment planning while maintaining a reactive capability to back-fill individuals into active-duty shortfalls. Integrated unit operations are especially useful for Aerospace Control Alert units who execute a full-time, no-fail stateside mission, with overseas deployment commitments and training requirements. Although this paper focuses on Air National Guard fighter units, the benefits of Integrated Unit Deployments exist in other platforms and mission areas as well. While there are potential
hurdles, planners can mitigate many of these factors by planning and practice.
Chapter 6

Recommendations and Conclusion

The world needs a strong American Joint Force, and the Air Force is its first and most agile responder in times of crisis, contingency, and conflict. The Joint Force depends upon Air Force capabilities and requires airpower at the beginning, middle, and the end of every Joint operation.

FY16 Air Force Posture Statement

The Air National Guard provides capabilities to a variety of state and national entities. Its unique structure offers a highly experienced, part-time force that complements the active component of the United States Air Force and state and local agencies. Historical analysis illustrates the errors of previous Air National Guard fighter mobilization and deployments strategies. Learning from history, the Air National Guard can rethink its strategy regarding fighter deployments.

Recommendations

The central recommendation of this thesis is to arrange Air National Guard fighter deployments to include multiple units contributing small numbers of personnel and equipment to create combat Unit Type Codes (UTCs) that fit the desires of the combatant commander. These Integrated Unit Deployments not only provide combat capability down range, they also preserve equipment and personnel at home station for training and state missions. The high experience level of Air National Guard personnel allows highly trained airmen to continue operations in support of both missions. Unlike active duty units, which may struggle to maintain enough experience in their unit, an Air National Guard unit should be able to spread the experience.
An additional benefit that Air Guard fighter units should explore is the possibility to create a quick-reaction capability. This quick-reaction capability would use full-time or easily accessible part-time members to rapidly deploy, similar to active duty timelines, and rapidly provide well-trained personnel. Because cooperative deployments spread the weight of the quick-reaction force to multiple units, stateside missions such as homeland defense and training missions could continue uninterrupted.

An additional recommendation is to include Aerospace Control Alert as a separate UTC. The Air Force conducts the Aerospace Control Alert mission under NORTHCOM, a geographic combatant commander. Creating this UTC would accurately show a unit’s real-time involvement in the homeland defense mission and give senior military leaders a clearer picture of forces in use compared to those available for deployment. It also helps shape the structure of the Integrated Unit Deployment, since it shows what equipment is already in use by a combatant commander.

Air National Guard commanders and personnel gain valuable flexibility in managing home station missions and deployments. Part-time members who have full-time jobs outside the unit could manage their deployment options in order to satisfy both their full-time employer and Air National Guard commanders. Commanders can deploy members who want to mobilize, while keeping those with family or work concerns at home.

**Conclusion**

The Air National Guard is a critical component to the warfighting capability of the United States. Its dual role mission, serving both the governor of individual states and the President of the United States, provides inherent flexibility and capability that no other force can offer. In the current fiscal environment, the Air National Guard must seize every opportunity to streamline processes and achieve efficiency, while maintaining or increasing effectiveness. Integrated Unit Deployments
provide a method to achieve the Air National Guard’s dual role mission, while providing combatant commanders warfighting capability. Senior Air Force leaders must continually evaluate the evolutionary processes of using the Air Guard’s vast capability. The lessons of the Korean War, Vietnam, Operation DESERT STORM, and the post 9/11 conflicts serve as reminders that national leaders must manage military might correctly to maintain the United States role as a superpower.

The Air Force must temper the Air National Guard’s use in overseas military operations with the factors that make it a valuable force. The geographic significance of the Air Guard provides capability at home. The Air Guard is the primary provider of Aerospace Control Alert resources and defends the country in a no-fail mission. It also provides governors with manpower and equipment to respond to crisis, natural disasters, and security situations. Additionally, the population around National Guard bases is invested in these units and provides a mechanism to communicate the United States’ national interests in overseas operations. The geographic significance of the Air National Guard makes it a vital player in both stateside and overseas missions.

The unique structure of the Air National Guard as a reserve component of the United States Air Force also factors into the deployment of Air Guard capability. The part-time nature of the force provides community employers a quality work force and the United States with combat capability. Known as a highly experienced and qualified force, the Air National Guard harbors some of the nation’s brightest talent. This experience allows the Air Guard to conduct operations differently than the active component with little loss of capability. Managing this experienced and predominantly part-time force requires a fresh look at strategic deployment options.

Integrated Unit Deployments offer the balance between combat capability and home station effectiveness. As the United States Air Force recapitalizes its fighter force, using multiple units to deploy while
maintaining training and home station capability provides the flexibility to sustain overseas combat operations. This model certainly has hurdles to overcome but can provide the United States Air Force with deployment options that can increase the efficacy of the force.
### Fighter Deployment FY11 - FY15 Fighter

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Bibliography

“ANG Strategic Master Plan, 2015-2035.” Director, Air National Guard, November 2014.

