A BLIND GIANT:

A CENTURY OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN

BY

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The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
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To my family, your sacrifice is not lost on me. You are better than I deserve.
ABSTRACT

Within the US there is deep dissatisfaction with the outcome of the last 15 years of war. Policy makers, and leaders at all levels see an establishment that never lost a battle, but never won the peace. Technology and tactics were used as a substitute for knowledge about the object of war – people. The backdrop for these conflicts was a world that had changed. Globalization has transformed the world into a multipolar, transregional, and globalized mix of state and non-state actors using advanced technology to undermine liberal institutions and order. Despite adaptation and deep soul-searching in the wake of unsatisfactory war outcomes, those within US military services shelved ideas that put the population first in irregular warfare and adopted instead strategies for the high-intensity, conventional war. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), however, responded differently. USSOCOM developed a concept, the purpose of which is to develop a deep understanding of the five elements (social, cultural, psychological, physical, and informational) that influence human behavior. Understanding these elements can lead, according to USSOCOM, to strategic advantage in any fight. They call this concept the Human Domain.

A people-centric concept is not new but the Human Domain concept is. This thesis examines the new concept on its own merits. Specifically, it conducts a qualitative analysis using the five elements of the Human Domain as a lens to explore three case studies. To determine the merits of the Human Domain, this study keeps the general context constant but changes the timeframes and conflicts under investigation. The general context for this thesis is the Philippines islands, and the three conflicts explored using the Human Domain elements include the Philippine-American War, the Hukbalahap Rebellion, and, US responses to Muslim insurgency in the southern islands. The thesis then uses the insights gained from these three case studies to ascertain what, if any, value the Human Domain gives to the operational and strategic spheres. Secondary analysis will include limitations, implications, and recommendations regarding the Human Domain. Ultimately, this examination suggests there is value looking at conflicts from the perspective of the Human Domain at the operational and strategic level, but that it could also be profitably refined.
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Introduction

*as if people mattered*

*E.F. Schumacher*

For some, the past 15 years could be summed up it two words: strategic failure. The US has been manifestly unable to achieve its military and political goals during this time; and despite much speculation, few are able to pinpoint exactly why. Opinion varies widely on perceived causes of failures and tends to include the lumbering acquisition process, mistakes related to Counterinsurgency (COIN) as a strategy or an operational approach, and the futility of a global power involved in a human-centric conflict. None of these explanations address the underlying issues. There may, in fact, be another reason for failure, one that involves a shallow understanding of the human condition.

There has always been an invisible entity within warfare. Theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz and J.F.C. Fuller understood this entity as the moral element. This element is an intangible and difficult-to-measure aspect of strategy and war, but one known to have a dramatic effect. Much as an astronomer observes a black hole in outer space, the strategist observes tangible factors that surround and respond to this invisible force. Unless the observer knows of, and understands the central force, he perceives the purpose and behavior of objects within a limited paradigm. When there is an inability to explain observations or to solve problems there is a shock to a system. Thomas Kuhn refers to this as a “scientific crisis,” which leads to a paradigm shift. Kuhn uses the example going from Ptolemy to Copernicus. In this case the paradigm shift requires moving from ethnocentrism to empathy. Comprehending American strategic failure in the past 15 years requires deep appreciation of the moral element and the realization of a crisis.

The armed forces have attempted to gain a better understanding of humans in conflict historically. Concepts such as COIN, the Human Terrain, and Stability Operations were

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pronounced to be the harbinger of victory in people-centric wars. All have had their place in the sun and have achieved tactical success. But they have fallen well short of strategic success. After conflict, these concepts tend to get placed back onto shelves and forgotten. The teams designed to survey the Human Terrain were recently disbanded, and Stability Operations and COIN recognized as overly focused on the tactical realm, which has little use in strategic geopolitical affairs.³ The armed forces have been unable to institutionalize these ideas or raise them above the level of tactical employment. Given the recent dramatic changes in the security environment, placing these ideas on a shelf could have negative consequences.

States have lost their monopoly on the use of force. Relatively small actors can now have significant affects on regional stability. The enemies of America are taking a new tack, one that provides deniability, confusion, complexity, and a level of lethality not previously seen from non-state actors. The new environment washed away the illusion of security through monolithic conventional forces. In her 2014 testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Dr. Arati Prabhakar, director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), said, “Regional instability, shifting military and economic positions, demographic and natural resource trends…drive constant change in our national security environment.”⁴ These shifts in the security environment are exacerbated by proliferation of advanced technologies. Dr. Prabhakar added that there are “Startlingly powerful technologies—semiconductors, information systems, and nuclear and biological technologies among them—[which] are now globally available to a much wider swath of society.”⁵

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Washington, D.C.-based think-tank, published a 2010 report on the emerging challenges in land warfare. The report points out that while the US military may face large-scale war, it cannot turn away from the new security environment.⁶ It also highlights the diffusion of technologies to non-state actors and the changing geopolitical environment, which will make landpower critical to the current and future fight. Thus, a conventionally focused strategy is ill-equipped to respond effectively to these security

⁵ Dr. Prabhakar, 2.
environments. Non-state actors only reveal some of the global issues facing the US and allies. State actors are also exploiting the new global realities.

Russia and China are capitalizing on the new security environment to reclaim their lost power and prestige. Russian leaders have found low-risk and politically feasible method of restoring their greatness, which some have called “hybrid war.” Russia has also been aggressively working in Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, Estonia, and Syria; but its activities remain below NATO thresholds for mobilization and conventional war. Such activities leave few military response options for NATO and the US. In the Pacific, China is extending its regional influence and threatening US partners and allies, but it does so using salami-slicing tactics as well as unconventional methods that remain below the threshold of conventional use of force, including building islands and bases on reefs in the South China Sea. Recent Russian and Chinese examples illustrate state actors using tactics such as coercion, intermediaries, hybrid, proxy, and subversion that capitalize on the new security environment to further their regional and global influence.

The perceptible change in the character of conflict in the modern security environment appears to have rendered conventional US approaches to conflict impotent. The US has relied excessively on technological solutions for military and political problems. Understanding people became an exit strategy from conflicts—a last resort—rather than an entry requirement or operational planning factor. In response, Lt Gen Joseph Votel, then Commander of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), attempted to understand this new security and relationship space. He called the space in which these conflicts occur “gray zones,” the challenges of which are depicted graphically in Figure 1. Gray zones are the spaces between peace and war where state and non-state actors can have a range of strategic options to gain influence and undermine liberal institutions and challenge the world order. These areas are neither peace nor war, but are significant enough to warrant a US response.

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At first glance the depiction of the gray zone is intuitive. There is a zone between peace and war and it is complex and difficult to operate within. But upon closer scrutiny there is more. Where a state or non-state entity operates in the gray zone depends on perspective. For example, Russia is not in the “war” section of the chart, but Ukraine certainly is. Russia can use strategies other than war that can negatively affect or topple a sovereign government in the war section. The Russian approach is an effective strategy for Russia because its primary competitor, the US (in the peacetime zone), only has peacetime or wartime options to deal with this situation.

![Gray Zone Challenges](https://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Gray%20Zones%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%20Sep%202015.pdf)

Figure 1. Gray Zone.
Source: USSOCOM Gray Zone White Paper, 9 September 2015.

The US military, with its focus on conventional war, needs Russia to be in the war zone of the spectrum in order to have effective military options that are palatable to the international community. The US is ill-equipped technically and strategically to deal with the subsequent gray zone gap. Thus, the gray zone comprises the US military’s strategic flank and it is exposed. In recognition of this vulnerability, the senior leaders of the land components of the US military, the
senior leaders of the Army, Marines Corps, and SOCOM, think they have found the beginnings of an answer: the Human Domain (HD).

The HD comprises the study of those factors that influence human behavior. The HD, as a strategic concept, was first mentioned in SOCOM 2020, the strategic vision for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). In SOCOM 2020, the HD was defined as the “totality of the physical, social, and cultural environments that influence human behavior.” The central proposition of the HD concept is if a nation understands the factors that affect the people of a society, it is better equipped to avoid conflict, intervene when appropriate, and succeed when necessary, across the range of military operations. The HD concept was further codified in August 2015 when SOCOM published a more developed concept entitled, Operating in the Human Domain (OHD). According to OHD, success in the Human Domain “depends on an understanding of, and competency in, the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that influence human behavior,” so that the US can be better positioned to achieve strategic ends.

States and their military forces have long understood the need to dominate spatial domains such as air, land, sea, and space that are the focus of human endeavor. SOCOM officials believe the HD is an area in which a new understanding of war and conflict emerges. The HD concept promises to address many of the gray zone questions, respond to the new security environment, and to end the era of strategic failure. On the surface, the ideas presented in the HD seem compelling. Simply understanding humans and having the ability to influence behavior is interesting, but this is not the first time the US military establishment has thought about humans as comprising a terrain, especially at the tactical level. In the mid-twentieth century, the US government developed ideas such as civic affairs, mutual defense, and strategic hamlets. Theorists such as Charles Callwell, Mao Zedong, David Galula, and John Nagl, among others, have written extensively on the importance of understanding people, albeit using different terms. The HD could easily be written off as just another temporary and knee-jerk response to

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12 USSOCOM, Operating in the Human Domain, (MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL: version 1.0, 3 August 2015), 3.
failure. Skepticism regarding another approach to understanding people is reasonable and this thesis assesses the HD on its own merits.

New concepts raise opportunities for new inquiries, and this thesis seeks to assess the value of the HD. Specifically, it attempts to answer the following question: *What value, if any, does the Human Domain have in the strategic and operational spheres?* To answer this question the analysis will use the 2015 SOCOM OHD Concept document as the departure point for scrutiny. The inquiry separates the five elements of the HD, as they are written in the OHD Concept, and evaluates each in turn. The elements will then be used as a framework to examine three case studies: the Philippine-American War, the Huk Rebellion, and the recent Moro rebellion (known to the US as Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines [OEF-P]). In a qualitative case study analysis, it can be difficult to hold variables constant and draw firm conclusions about value. Therefore, to reduce selection bias, all of the case studies for this thesis occur in the Philippines and are interactions between the same two countries. Although imperfect, this methodology offers an appropriate qualitative examination of the HD because it keeps the people of the Philippines and the US government as constants. This methodology will keep the same geography, population, and sources of grievances throughout different periods across a century of American involvement in the Philippines. If the HD has any strategic or operational value it should reveal itself over this arc of time.

As with any analysis, this study has limitations. Although bounding the problem to the Philippines holds certain variables constant, these case studies limit transferability. What succeeded or failed in the Philippines may or may not work in other areas. Bounding the problem is critical to effective analysis. The author hopes that good boundaries will make for a more credible and applicable synthesis. Additionally, this analysis uses commonly held successful examples of conflict. This limitation is an unintentional aspect of the study, but if the HD is to have explanatory and predictive power, it must be applied across the arc of time and avoid what Niels Mulder refers to as, “periodization [which] highlights transient affairs.”¹⁴ Thus, using the HD concept as a framework for case studies may highlight failures in periods of US involvement that, until now, have been considered a success.

Chapter One examines the HD in detail. It is here, that the HD will be broken into its constituent parts before using them as tools for analysis against the three case studies. Chapter

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Two describes the Philippines in broad terms. This chapter lays the foundations for understanding the geography, people, and economy, as well as introduce the main social actors. These foundational elements remain relatively constant throughout the analysis and are imperative to identifying and understanding the common threads that tie the Philippine conflicts and its people together.

Chapter Three uses the HD as a framework to study the Philippine-American War. The Philippine-American War presented the US with a modern and expeditionary combat experience and represents a large-scale conflict, which will help challenge the utility of the HD in large-scale war. Chapter Four employs HD elements as lenses to study the Huk Rebellion. This case study temporally and socially links the early twentieth century and modern twenty-first century interactions between the US and the Philippines. The Huk Rebellion was a conflict that occurred during and after a world war, and as such, it should also help bridge the conceptual gap between large- and small-scale war. If the HD is to have value in the strategic realm, it must have value in all conflict regardless of scale and intensity.

Chapter Five uses the HD to analyze the Moro rebellion. This analysis challenges the HD in a post-modern ideology, national strategy, and warfare methodology. The Moro rebellion is a small conflict that is wholly different from the previous case studies. The Moro rebellion has elements of terrorism, internal ethnic identity, and governmental corruption. It is representative of the new security environment and relates to the gray zone concept. If the HD is complete and sufficient as a concept it must offer strategic or operational value in the current and future fight.

The final chapter takes a step back from case study specifics and answers the inquiry about strategic and operational value. Most of the US responses to human-centric conflict have been tactically focused, and temporary. If the HD concept is to have longevity and utility, then it must offer the strategic and operational spheres valuable insights to achieve strategic success. The final chapter also analyzes any limitations of the HD as it is currently proposed, and what implications there may be from implementation. To begin the analysis, we start with an exploration of the Human Domain concept.
Chapter 1

The Human Domain Concept

This is the so-called theory that “weapons decide everything,” which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view

Mao Zedong

The security environment has changed, and so has much contemporary thought on security relationships. In the past, the monopoly on the use of violence rested with the state, kings, or professional military forces. Increasing complexity, trans-regional threats, and democratization of technologies means the authority on the use of force and violence has shifted to anyone with the will to carry it out. State and non-state actors use these capabilities to challenge the status quo, incite terrorism, or start a revolution. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the US has trained, organized, and equipped its military services to be a conventional hammer while simultaneously avoiding as much as possible the messy gray zones of conflict. The combination of a new security environment and relationships, ubiquitous technology, and conventional war mentality has created an environment in which American military force cannot be applied appropriately or cost-effectively across the spectrum of conflict. In response, SOCOM is attempting to address the issues of security, complexity, and military rigidity, to provide feasible options for commanders at all levels. The answer, according to SOCOM, is the Human Domain.

The Human Domain Concept

At first glance the Human Domain (HD) does not appear to be a new concept. Wars of the people were present before Genghis Khan conquered the Mongolian steppes. Irregular warfare has always been a tool for the disadvantaged to combat and defeat a superior adversary. The previous strategies used to counter terrorism, insurgencies, and revolutions are numerous. The strategies have employed concepts such as strategic hamlets, civic affairs, human terrain
teams, stability operations, and the ideas found in the recent doctrinal tome on COIN, FM 3-24, are all examples of attempts to bring balance to asymmetry and, with it, advantage. SOCOM, however, is promoting the HD as a means to success in more than just small wars.

According to the SOCOM concept, the HD is a rich vein that transcends the small war approach, one applicable across the range of military operations.\(^1\) The OHD Concept document points to the human aspects of military operations, which does not anchor itself to COIN or Irregular Warfare (IW) per se. Rather, the OHD Concept promises insight during peace, war, and all points in between. To accomplish this, the OHD Concept attempts to develop a learning organization that produces special operations forces (SOF) able to operate in and through the HD. The goals of the OHD Concept include creating an HD mindset, equipping forces with appropriate HD tools, and designing operations for success in all domains at all levels of conflict.\(^2\) If successful in these goals, US forces would be better able to avoid; begin; conduct; and, of equal importance, end all conflicts—not just small wars.

Although the HD is similar to other military operating constructs, the OHD Concept does not merely examine a physical location such as the sea or the air. Instead, the HD is a way of thinking about an environment. According to its authors the OHD Concept facilitates insight, and control of the environment by enabling options for commanders through human engagement. The Concept advances this idea by focusing on five main elements that influence human behavior, which are the Physical, Psychological, Cultural, Social, and Informational (PPCSI); and their relationships, see Figure 2. These five elements form the various lenses through which the subsequent case-study analyses will be conducted.

The Physical element of the HD has a sub-structure, which includes geography, resources, climate, and hydrology. The physical environments that surround humans influence specific behavior patterns. If the physical environment can be seen and understood from a human perspective, the military can better grasp the priorities of people and their values. The example given in the SOCOM OHD is people who live in desert climates will value water more than those who live in the rainforest.\(^3\) Such values can alter behavior and living conditions; set priorities for families; influence power structures; and, as we will see in the Philippines, affect every aspect of agrarian lifestyle.

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1 SOCOM OHD Concept, 1.
2 SOCOM OHD Concept, 1-6.
3 SOCOM OHD Concept, 13.
The sub-structure of the Psychological element includes judgment, cognition, and emotions. These sub-elements deal with how a people perceive their situation and then act according to the information they have. The Psychological element draws on behavioral theories to understand the relationship between intentions, cultural norms, beliefs, and actions. Consequences of personal actions, emotions, and behavioral norms can have significant influence on behavior and the perceived difficulty of the action under consideration. In the Philippines, for example, peasants choosing between insurgency and loyalty to the government may not have had a choice at all. Rather, their decisions may be based on their perceptions of their environment and judgment about their future. Insurgency may to them have been the only option that had any reasonable chance to live a satisfactory life. The Psychological element also has varying effects depending on location. For example, an individual living in urban Manila will view violence or politics differently than his rural Filipino neighbors.

Figure 2. Elements of the Human Domain.
Source: SOCOM OHD, Version 1.0, 3 August 2015.

The Informational element of the HD is rooted in how people receive information, what pathways this information takes, and which mediums are critical to receiving information. For example, in one village, locals may trust only family members while in another the villagers may trust their local priest. Understanding this practical aspect can be critical, not just to
understanding the environment in which humans inhabit, but also how people orient themselves and structure their society. Knowing how people receive, process, and disseminate information is critical to monitoring and assessing who is relevant and what information is important or not in a given group, society, or population.

The sub-structure of the Cultural element of the HD includes ideologies, customs, religions, and communication. People tend to look through their own cultural lenses when perceiving their environments. Understanding cultural concepts of family, ethics, shame, or hierarchy can greatly assist others in developing operations that adhere to sensitivities and help the US plan operations, build trust, and communicate intentions. The HD appears to go beyond cultural awareness, however, and attempts to build a cultural thoroughness with which to recognize different cultures and attribute behaviors to beliefs.

The final element of the HD concept is the Social element; it includes state institutions, local governments, and civic groups. People tend to join into social structures for reasons of security, identity, and support. According to the SOCOM OHD document, social relationships and organizations can shape behavior, priorities, beliefs, and customs. The OHD document also notes that how a society organizes and influences behavior can be observed through theoretical lenses such as Social Network Theory (SNT). While social movement and behavioral theories are important, they are outside the scope of this thesis. The OHD Concept document does not specify which theories or models are accepted or rejected by SOCOM. Rather than prioritizing one theory over another, the analysis in this thesis examines the social constructs as they are observed through the HD lens to find value, applicability, and importance of the OHD Concept itself.

The OHD Concept can also become, or comprise part of an operational cycle, as depicted in Figure 3. This cycle of monitoring, assessing, planning, and directing is constantly undergoing change and refinement to understand the environment, identify key actors, and influence behavior. As leaders take in more information via the HD, the ability to reframe the environment from greater degrees of complexity towards increasing clarity should make operations more targeted and effective. The process should also help mitigate risk. According to the OHD Concept, some of the tools for the operational cycle include the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) the Counterterrorism Assessment Framework (CTAF); and

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4 SOCOM OHD, 13.
the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). This cycle operationalizes the OHD concept. The specifics and values of each particular tool are outside the scope of this thesis; however, the case study analysis should show if operationalizing the HD is practical and prudent.

Figure 3, Operational Cycle of the Human Domain Concept. Source: SOCOM OHD, Version 1.0, 3 August 2015.

Using the five elements as a lens, this study will evaluate three case studies that cover more than a century of US involvement in the Philippines. Specifically, through research of primary and secondary sources in each case study, the five elements are clearly defined and will enable the observer to identify relevant actors, find strategic and operational value, understand the relevant values of each element and assess past operations. For the HD to transcend the historically tactical methodologies, it must be relevant and useful to the strategic and operational spheres by providing valuable insights and options before, during, and after the conflict. The hypothesis for this study is that the five elements are necessary, but insufficient, at the strategic

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5 SOCOM OHD, 18.
and operational levels. The elements appear to be overly tactical in focus, and in reality people act on, and are acted upon, by more than them.

If the HD Concept has strategic and/or operational value, there should be clear applicability of the five elements in all levels of analysis. In the strategic sphere, the HD concept should be able to identify relevant actors and groups, as well as influence group and governmental behavior. For the HD to have value in the operational sphere it must guide operational planners, shape regional alignment, inform the scope and scale of the use of force, and tie strategic goals to tactical actions. In short, if the HD is to have operational-level value it must translate strategy into tactics, as well as provide insights and influence regarding the relevant population, groups or individuals.

Throughout this study, the definition of each element does not change with each level of analysis, but the scope of the analysis will. For example, the strategic-level cultural element still includes tribalism and ethnicity, just as the tactical level does. But at the strategic level of analysis there may be more than one tribe or ethnic group. The OHD Concept does not make distinctions between tactical, operational, or strategic level elements. Therefore, this analysis tests the strategic and operational value of the HD by examining the continuity of meaning of the five elements over the course of time.

A parallel element of this thesis identifies the interdependence of the elements. The interdependence of the elements refers to their relationships to one another within the framework of the HD. For example, at the tactical level in Philippine villages the Social element is directly related to the Cultural element. Here the local government and hierarchical structure consists of familial or tribal customs. At the strategic level, the interdependence is less binary and more complex. Common cultural and social traits cannot be attributed to entire regions or populations, and the interactions among differing groups become a necessary study. This thesis puts forward the hypothesis that as the observer is elevated to higher levels of analysis, the interdependence of the five elements become more complex and difficult to attribute in the manner outlined in the OHD. Thus, categorizing human behavior into five categories appears to be overly simplistic and indifferent of the relationship between the elements. The case studies should illuminate if this is true.
Difference Between the HD and IW

The HD can be misunderstood as being similar to IW, Unconventional Warfare (UW), COIN, and other “small war” approaches. However, these terms are limited in various ways. First, small-war tactics are warfare methodologies. Use of IW, COIN, or other terms is typically limited to geographic locations that are considered to be in conflict. The HD, however, is neither relegated to conflict geographically or methodologically. According to SOCOM, it can be used in all areas in peace, war, and all spaces in between. The OHD Concept document argues that successful implementation of the HD could prevent conflict, a goal that is not necessarily evident in reactive approaches such as COIN or IW.

A second way terms are limited is that methodologies such as COIN and UW tend to center around the tactical level for short durations. The HD embraces more than a specific conflict area, time-frame, or level of analysis. The HD can be used at all levels of leadership for long-term activities that have no “end-state.” Third, in COIN and IW there must be specific and well-identified threats or adversaries. The HD has no such limitation. According to SOCOM, the idea is to engage a “range of individuals, groups, and populations (friendly, neutral, and adversary).” In fact, the OHD Concept identifies the need to assess the environment, not just the threat.

Finally, by studying the environment, leaders can begin to evaluate which methodologies (economic, political, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance, COIN, etc.) are best to employ. This evaluation places the HD at the center of analysis from which all other forms of interaction flow. The HD is different from other forms of IW due to the mindset it produces. It is not a special location to be pacified, a timeframe to be adhered to, or a threat to be neutralized. The HD involves a process of analysis and re-framing observations and actions to find the relevant actors, and predict or influence human behavior. The HD can easily be misunderstood as another method to conduct war among the people. But as this brief section has explained, the HD seeks to transcend tactical methods and make humans a strategic and operational focus.

Measures and Metrics of Success

If a concept has value in the strategic and operational spheres, it must be able to identify what is important and assign metrics for success. In some military endeavors this can be

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6 SOCOM OHD, 15.
7 SOCOM OHD, 66.
quantitatively assessed by measuring commercial shipping sunk, tanks destroyed, or aircraft shot down. Humans, however, pose interesting problems in terms of traditional metrics and measurement. Once a group of people has been observed, the data may soon become obsolete. People are constantly acting upon, and reacting to, their environment; any change to their system may produce a change to themselves. Complicating matters, humans can change on purpose to hide their behavior or intentions. Additionally, the HD may offer new ideas about success, and how best to measure effectiveness. For these reasons, successful performance and successful effects are two very different things, as Emile Simpson points out in his book *War From the Ground Up.*

The SOCOM OHD concept recognizes the challenges associated with measures of performance and measures of effectiveness by addressing “analysis and assessment” as building blocks to building appropriate metrics. The OHD concept does not specify how an organization could develop metrics, or what they must be like, other than to mention that using Social Network Analysis, Open Source Reporting, and Sentiment Analysis will help leaders develop appropriate metrics. This analysis challenges the HD concept by asking: *If the US adopted the HD concept, would it be better able to identify what is important and build appropriate metrics and measures of success?*

**Limitations of the Human Domain**

All theories and concepts have limitations, and the HD is no different. The first limitation is the lessons learned from one HD endeavor may not translate to another. Typically, in military operations, many of the lessons learned about how to engage the enemy can be transferred to the next conflict. In the HD methodology this is not the case. At the local level, for example, experiences in the rice paddies of the Philippines may not translate well to Colombia. The culture, society, and physical environment are much different in both, which means the people are different and respond to different incentive structures. Thus, application of previous lessons from other HD endeavors should be applied carefully.

Another limitation is the time required to understand the environment and establish trust with the population. The HD requires long-term engagement at all levels. The US is not known

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9 SOCOM OHD, appendix D.
10 SOCOM OHD, appendix D.
for its persistence or patience when it comes to engaging or understanding people. The rotational system for military units lends itself to short duration operations. The US military, for example, maintains force health through rotational deployments overseas. Force health, however, comes at the cost of learning and developing leadership, and strategy can start anew with each deployment. This limitation may not reside internally with the HD, but rather how it conflicts with the structure and culture of Western society and military forces. The HD is focused on the long-term, while much of the US military establishment focuses on short-term objectives and incentives.

This chapter has performed two main functions. First, it provided an understanding of the goals and methods of the OHD Concept as it is currently written. Second, it identified the lenses from the OHD Concept—Physical, Social, Cultural, Informational, and Psychological—through which the case studies will be analyzed, and provided amplifying data about interdependence, measures of success, and inherent limitations in the concept. For clarity, the remainder of this analysis uses the HD concept in its recent articulation by SOCOM to represent the prototypical use of human analysis used by previous actors. Before moving into the case studies, the next chapter uses the HD lens to develop a Philippine-specific contextual and historical foundation, as well as identify which aspects of the Philippines and the people have remained relatively constant throughout the 100 years of US involvement.

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Chapter 2

The Philippines: A Summary of Human Domain Elements

We might say that understanding the Philippines begins in the realization that it is one nation made up of three countries

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A study of the HD in the Philippines begins with a basic understanding of the history, context, and the elements that remain constant in the archipelago. This chapter summarizes the five HD elements with respect to the Philippines and provides basic knowledge from which to conduct the case studies. Much like the United States, the Philippines cannot be cast into a single, or even a few, social or cultural categories. Part of HD study is becoming comfortable with the ambiguity of data; however, major themes do invariably stretch across the islands, just as they do for any other country or peoples. These major themes, drawn from the broad physical, social, cultural, psychological, and informational elements, are discussed below for the specific context of the Philippines.

Physical

The Philippine archipelago is a politically young yet geologically old country.¹ It is situated in Southeast Asia in the Western Pacific and comprises over 7,000 islands, the smallest of which are uninhabited and have no names. By way of size comparison with the United States, the Philippines would stretch from northern Michigan to the Florida Panhandle and extend into parts of the Atlantic Ocean. The Philippine islands have a mild tropical climate along with a topography that includes mountains, jungles, lakes, and rivers. The country sits within the typhoon belt and receives much of its precipitation falls during the rainy season from June to

November. In addition to typhoons and cyclones, the islands experience earthquakes and volcanic activity.

The islands themselves are divided topographically, and sometimes socially, into three distinct regions, depicted in Figure 4. In the northern area, the largest and most populous island is Luzon. This island is home to the national capital, Manila, and has been the epicenter of most foreign involvement, including that of Spain and the US. Luzon in general, and Manila specifically, have historically been and continued to be the center of Philippine economics and foreign intervention. There are, in Luzon, numerous and distinct inhabitants, such as the Pampangans, Tagalogs, and Bicols, each with its own culture and language.

South of Luzon, and in the center of the Philippine island chain, lay the Visayas. This group of islands includes Cebu, Leyte, Negros, Panay, and Samar. The Visayan area is known for its sugar and rice crops, as well as its fishing. The islands of the Visayas have also acted as a buffer between Luzon and the third region further south in the Philippine archipelago known as Mindanao. The southern region includes the island of Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu archipelago. The southern islands have a long history of Muslim influence, which predates Christianity by one hundred years. These islands have acted as a buffer against Malay and Indonesian influences heading north into the Philippines.

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Understanding the physical make-up of a country is an important first step in Human Domain analysis. Geographic features dictate many individual and group behaviors. For example, an archipelago is usually diverse in terms of cultural and social development compared to other forms of geography. In the Philippines, the water barriers and mountainous geography limit transportation and communication, making each island a semi-insular state. Each group of islands developed a unique social and cultural tradition largely isolated from the development and influence of other islands. Archipelagic geography also accounts for the retarding of deep nationalist roots. Thus, any power or central government, colonial or otherwise, must be aware of this limiting factor when attempting to establish strong central governance.
The Philippine archipelago is also situated in an active geopolitical area. Spain, for example, used the Philippines as a Pacific base from which to project its economic power, which is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The US, for its part, also used the Philippines as a Pacific hub from which to project its power, first to spread its influence in Asia as examined in Chapter 4, and then to prevent the spread of terrorism as outlined in Chapter 5. Currently, the Philippines is balanced politically between two great powers, the US and China, both of which are vying for Filipino influence. The archipelago has long been an important trade route across Asia, and rich resources in the region have made the Philippines a lucrative target for foreign businesses and colonizers alike. Although the Philippines are located in an important area, the country’s regional neighbors such as Malaya and Indonesia have enjoyed the full attention of foreign business and investment based on a singular geographic reality. Both countries controlled the sea lines of communication through Asia. As a result, the Philippines have been interesting to foreign governments and businesses as a thoroughfare or way station, but not one to warrant, in Spain’s case, its full attention or investment.5

Unlike other elements of the HD, the Physical aspect in the Philippines did not change significantly during the periods surveyed in this thesis. Other than migration due to climate, abuse of resources, or typhoons and earthquakes, the Physical element of the Philippines has remained largely static. Thus, this thesis will intentionally not consider the Physical aspect of the Philippines in the HD case studies and will focus on the remaining four elements.

Social

As Luis Francia observes, “The smallest politico-social unit” in the Philippines is the barangay (neighborhood).6 The term “barangay” comes from the type of boat the early travelers used to move among the islands. When the Spanish arrived they changed the name from barangay to barrio, but the colloquial name has since returned to use. Although numbers vary, a barangay could include 100 to 500 persons and be completely self-contained.7 The members of the tight knit barangay worked together to produce food and shelter. They remained mostly insular to surrounding tribes or similar barangays. In fact, there were few agreements or alliances between disparate barangay datus (chief, leader of the barangay).8 The barangay

6 Francia, 32.
7 Francia, 32.
8 Francia, 32.
served a number of functions such as providing civic actions, security, and social bonds. Within these functions, kinship and familial bonds were the most important. Jose Abueva notes that in many cases the barangay was too far away from the center of the town or city resources to receive help from the local government. In this instance, the datu, became even more important and powerful in their social structure by “perform[ing] the basic functions of government.”9 Usually, political issues were handled at the local barangay level if no other legitimate form of government was nearby. The local social structures provided rural necessities, but there were also regional and even national-level social structures.

The social structures at the higher levels of government and civic action included the “ruling elite, their peers, and followers.”10 This type of structure ensured dependency on elites and removed incentives for a middle class. Typically, the local rulers were the power brokers; but when the Spanish colonized the country they changed the local’s religion, and power structures by replacing the locally derived datu with Spanish-controlled clergy. Many datus were further supplanted by missionary friars who began to take on the role of leaders, and acquired large parcels of land for the church. The change in power, wealth, and leadership planted seeds of social rebellion, as noted in Chapter 3.

Many societal groups emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and continued well into the twentieth century. Social groups were extremely diverse; some consisted of political affiliations such as the Nationalista and Federalista parties, while others included ideological and economic groups such as the communist party, socialist party, and labor unions. These groups helped local Filipinos organize and communicate, as well as pool resources for reform or rebellion. The social structure of the Philippines has important implications for understanding the HD.

Asian countries tend to have different social structures than Western societies. The Philippines is unique in that it fits both Western and Asian molds. By 1900, the Philippines became the only Asian country with Western religion and Western governmental structures, but was still able to maintain a distinctly Asian and uniquely Filipino culture. The Western and Asian duality of Philippine society confused US leaders when they attempted to categorize, understand, or predict Filipino behavior. The Philippine social duality is an important point because social structures help shape human behavior. While the US military and policy makers

10 Francia, 31.
observed or imposed many Western influences in Philippine society, they also misunderstood indigenous social behavior, organizations, and structures, which were distinctly non-Western.

**Cultural**

Given its geography, it is not surprising that the Philippines is culturally diverse. There are approximately 60 cultural minorities throughout the islands, with the majority of people identifying as Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Bicolanos, or Visayans. Even within the cultural majority three of these are a mix of backgrounds, with some of Spanish descent and others being Chinese or Malays.

There were also cultural hierarchies deriving from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Philippines. Luis Francia observed that the Spanish clergy and Spanish government were at the top of the hierarchy; the Chinese comprised the small, but important middle class; and the indigenous population was at the bottom. As Brian Linn points out, the term “Filipino” does not clearly define all the people of the Philippines any more than being American implies a certain race or religion in America. As with America, the Philippines have diversity of language and culture, which has affected issues of governance and legitimacy. Philippine diversity is not merely limited to ethnic or tribal background. The numbers vary depending on the source, but there are reported to be over 170 unique languages and dialects in the Philippines.

Language in the Philippines has been a source of pride and nationalism, but has also led to conflict and resentment. During Spanish occupation, the different Filipino groups continued to use their own languages, which allowed Spanish clergy to become powerful intermediaries between locals and government. When the US arrived, those local languages were largely replaced with English. The reduction in the use of local dialects and languages was accompanied, in places, by a cultural backlash and limited native collectivism, which bred resentment and anchored cultural reflection and development. Today the official languages are English and Filipino (Tagalog). The former remains a source of strong loyalty to, and resentment of, Western

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11 Francia, 47.
12 Francia, 77.
13 Linn, 15.
15 For more on Filipino identity and nationalistic tendencies in the Philippines see, Mulder, 55-80.
involvement. While diverse language and culture helped drive behavior and conflict, so did the family, *barrio*, and kinship bonds.

Culturally, the interpersonal relationships are largely familial and originate from tribal and *barangay* culture, which accounts for much of the deeply ingrained importance of kinship and loyalties.¹⁶ Filipino society is largely agrarian, with much of its trade, and internal wealth coming from the earth. The people of the Philippines have been trading with others outside the archipelago since at least the seventh century A.D. for surplus resources such as minerals, spices, coconut, copra (dried coconut kernels), and timber.¹⁷ In the Philippines, the *barrio* has been the nucleus for agrarian roots, familial loyalty, business relationships, and interpersonal cooperation. These attributes combined have resulted in dependency, corruption, and nepotism.¹⁸ According to Frank Golay, “The system of family loyalties…also shaped Philippine political institutions,” and were characterized as “highly personal.”¹⁹ The interpersonal and kinship bonds were forged by rural geography, social structures as well as religion. The introduction of Western religion added another layer to the already complex cultural makeup of Filipino life.

The Spanish spent the better part of 300 years converting Filipinos to Catholicism. The Spanish did so well that today over 80 percent of the population is Catholic.²⁰ The devout religious convictions also shaped social and cultural behavior. Many rural Filipinos lived near or “under the bells” of the church, and much of their daily and weekly routines were created from a Catholic impetus. In more rural areas, the local datus and landowners would perform many of the baptisms and religious ceremonies, which had the cultural effect of identifying patriarchy and power. Additionally, with such a strong majority of a Catholics, seeds of future conflict were sown between the Catholic majority in Luzon and the Visayas, and the Muslim minority in the south. The Muslim tribes and societies become integral agents to conflict, which will be highlighted in Chapters 3 and 5.

**Psychological**

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¹⁷ Francia, 28-29.
¹⁸ Golay, 15-16.
¹⁹ Golay, 16.
This thesis will not attempt to place all Filipinos analytically into one psychological category. There are, however, a few generalities that may help the reader understand major trends and common interpretations of the timeframes. The main theme that permeates the Psychological element in the Philippines is that Filipinos have perceived their environment directly according their social status, rural or urban situation, and economic position.

The rural social structure fostered a paternalistic hierarchy whereby each Filipino depended on their local patriarch to provide security, direction, and leadership. These were also rural areas isolated from civilization and dependent on agrarian forms of income and subsistence. Most people’s perceptions were based on their relationships with the social hierarchy. The patriarchal system, however, was a two-way street. While farmers and peasants worked for the local leader or landowner, the patriarchs returned the social and psychological favor by becoming heavily involved in religious and family ceremonies and the economic well being of the farmer and his household. In contrast, urban elites tended to look toward the government and businesses for their direction and subsistence. Most elites were land or business owners with obligations to their political or business societies, many of which resided in Manila. Thus, each of the classes, rural peasant and elite, viewed their environment from their own economic and social perspective.

Cultural upbringing underpinned Filipino views such as kinship bonds and familial loyalty. Centuries ago, the people we now call Filipinos travelled on barangays in and around the Philippine islands. As mentioned above, the barangay was a self-sufficient neighborhood with each member helping others and dependent on others for the collective good and prosperity. The dependency among members of a tribe or barangay fostered relationships whose lineage can be traced to today. For example, many Filipinos, regardless of class, feel obligated to help their family first, which has led to nepotism and corruption in local and central governments. Aside from corruption, the strong familial loyalty can also be observed by the economic dependence on remittance from migrant workers. The social class, cultural traditions, and familial bonds help shape how different islands, peoples, and classes developed perceptions on how they viewed the environment and how best to interact with that environment. Any changes or increased risk to socio-cultural norms and/or economic well-being would be viewed from a perspective influenced by hues from an agrarian, familial, security, and dependency palate.

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Informational

Perhaps the most dynamic HD element in the Philippines is the informational realm. Between Spanish colonization and US intervention in 1898, the majority of the Filipino population was illiterate. Rural social hierarchy and agrarian cultural structure led to dependence on face-to-face communication. Additionally, locals depended on either their nearest Filipino leaders or Spanish clergy to interpret or communicate outside their dialect or language. In the late nineteenth century the Spanish began to implement new economic and social reforms, which helped to build a new and educated elite class of Filipino. The educated and elite class of Filipinos, whose members included Jose Rizal and Andres Bonifacio, were able to travel abroad and study at universities. Such opportunities for most Filipinos, however, were rare.

The new minority class of educated Filipinos began to participate in the politics of Philippine society by writing for journals and newspapers. By the end of the nineteenth century there were 74 of the burgeoning news and political outlets. Most of the revolutionary leaders started their rebellious careers as writers for what turned out to be political organs. Some of these included, La Opinion, Manila Alegre, and El Comercio. These literary outlets helped produce the intellectual foundations of rebellion, but the ideologies did not permeate rural areas until the late twentieth century. Rural societies were still illiterate and geographically isolated.

By the late twentieth century literacy had improved dramatically due to a massive influx of English teachers and Western education systems. Most Filipinos learned English, but Westerners struggled with understanding that old habits die hard and many locals still depended on and trusted face-to-face communication over other forms of communication using English. US leaders may not have realized it, but teaching someone English did not mean they would trust, or even want to talk with anyone other than local leaders. Today, Filipinos enjoy the same literary and intellectual development of any modern state. Such development has been slowed, however, by cultural and nationalistic anchors stemming from Spanish and US colonialism, a condition that causes tension to this day.

In sum, this chapter has laid the contextual foundation needed to investigate the three case studies in the Philippines. It has provided a short survey of the Physical, Social, Cultural, Psychological, and Informational elements and those aspects, which have remained relatively constant throughout the 100 years of US involvement. The cultural influence on behavior,

22 Francia, 104.
23 Francia, 104.
familial ties, as well as social hierarchy and identity, are all enduring aspects of Filipino society. Thus, with a proper foundation, this thesis turns to the end of the nineteenth century when the short Spanish-American War provided the US with its first colony.

Chapter 3

The Philippine–American War

_The sleep had lasted for centuries, but one day the thunderbolt struck, and in striking, infused life_

*Jose Rizal*

_The island was practically in the possession of a blind giant: strong, but unable to see where to strike_

*Colonel Wagner*

This case study separates the Philippine-American War temporally into three periods. The first is the prelude to war, which involves the specific context of the Spanish, US, and Philippine governments and people. The second period includes the beginning of the war, which is characterized by a tenuous relationship between the US and Filipinos, followed by a series of misunderstandings and movements toward violent confrontation. The third epoch includes the end of the war when violence was declining and the modern US-Philippine relationship began to take its initial form.

Prelude to War

By 1898 the US had weathered the Industrial Revolution, healed itself from a Civil War, and was recovering from a debilitating depression. The westward expansion, crystalized in the thoughts and writing of Frederick Jackson Turner, had been a success, leaving the US public and its leaders of right and necessity to expand beyond the country’s borders. The speed of US expansion was fueled by fear of European expansion into Asia and losing critical resources and business opportunities. In response, many in the US warmly embraced Alfred Mahan’s theory
about sea power and the prosperity of nations.\textsuperscript{1} The US engaged in new global markets, worked toward annexing Hawaii, and spread its influence in Latin America. Thus, the US became increasingly embroiled in international affairs.

Meanwhile, Spain had become a waning power. Successive Spanish rulers over-extended their empire and proved unable to defend or suppress uprisings within their colonies. Spain’s trade, commerce, and prestige pivoted on its global holdings in Mexico; Cuba; and, to a lesser extent Asia, specifically the Philippines. Cuban rebels reacted to repressive and violent Spanish government measures in 1895, garnering support within the US. US diplomats overtly acknowledged Cuban independence and demanded Spain give up its control over the island.\textsuperscript{2} Spanish leaders dismissed US assertions, and tensions between the countries continued to mount. In response to Spanish actions in Cuba and elsewhere, the US positioned itself diplomatically and militarily in Asia so it could better secure markets and defend against the Spanish if fighting broke out.

By 1898, the Philippines had been a Spanish colony for over three centuries. Much like Cuba, Filipinos had rebelled against Spanish rule for decades. The two main socio-economic classes within the Philippines that existed at the time were the \textit{tao} (peasant) and the elite.\textsuperscript{3} Spanish mechanisms of governance were isolated in the Philippines and concentrated in Manila. Manila provided the only treasure for leaders in Madrid. Very few Spanish officials ventured out into the islands, or rural areas, as most of their time was spent securing resources and business deals with foreign traders.\textsuperscript{4} Those Spaniards who did venture out were clergymen intent on converting the masses to Christianity.

Numerous missionaries were organized throughout the islands to keep the Filipinos “under the bells.” Over centuries, the Spanish and Filipino elites, along with clergymen, were able to change Philippine social structures by congregating small villages and \textit{barangays} into larger municipalities, or \textit{municipals}. Historically, the \textit{barangays} were self-sufficient and self-determining. Forcing Filipinos to live in \textit{municipals}, and “under the bells” of the church, uprooted the traditional social system of small, self-sufficient \textit{barangays}. The dissimilar groups and tribes now served a Spanish purpose. The Spanish also changed the names from \textit{barangay} to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} Alfred Thayer Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783}. (New York, NY: Cosimo Inc, 2007), v.
\end{flushleft}
barrio, and from datu (chief) to “village headman.” Filipinos were also forced to take Hispanic surnames enabling the Spanish to better tax, count, and control the masses. To enforce the edict, schoolteachers, government officials, and priests were not allowed to work with those who did not change their names. The change in cultural hierarchy and social structures allowed the Spanish clergy to gain control by replacing historical ethnic and tribal frameworks with religious and Spanish-imposed structures.

The Spanish clergy gained a tremendous amount of power in the Philippines as a result of the change in social structure. Stanley Karnow writes that “The friar exercised power,” because he “audited the parish budget, conducted the census, registered the residents, directed the tax board, managed health and public works projects, screened recruits for military service,” and “presided of over the police.” Additionally, to retain their power and control, the Spanish clergy kept Filipinos illiterate. The tao depended on clergy as intermediaries to talk and interact with elites, businesses, and government and provided the latter with power, prestige, and money. Keeping the masses illiterate anchored the colonial socio-cultural structures, but also stunted Philippine rural development and growth.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Spanish leaders recognized the importance of the Philippines as a possession and base after two events: the loss of Mexico and the opening of the Suez Canal. As a consequence, Spanish leaders attempted to build the Philippines into a commercial powerhouse. New regulations went into effect, which opened borders for immigration, suspended tariffs, and implemented “economic catalyzers.” As David Sturtevant points out, “By 1870, [Manila] had emerged as the hub of a developing hinterland…and more and more rural areas became directly involved in the city’s destiny.”

Commercial changes were accompanied by widespread socio-cultural changes, which resulted in Filipino self-awareness. Development came in the guise of taxes, and a new governmental encroachment on local villages. As commercial industry became more important, and taxes were levied, Spanish officials, as well as the Guardia Civil, began entering into the

5 Sturtevant, 28.
9 Sturtevant, 32-33.
10 Sturtevant, 33.
rural areas to ensure compliance. Until then, the rural villages had been led by a local authority under local laws and traditions. With new taxes and oversight came new and expansive legal frameworks, which helped clergy and well-connected individuals gain more land and become wealthier, while the condition of the tao and Filipino masses remained stagnant. In fact, by the end of the nineteenth century almost 400,000 Filipinos had lost their lands to those with legal means, and education. Tenancy became the norm for a large group of people who had worked their lands for generations.

The new cultural, social, and legal frameworks changed the barrios substantially. Traditionally, the local leader of the barrios, or province, looked after the well-being of their workers. The locals, in turn, looked after the leaders’ needs for the town. A dramatic social change occurred when the power shifted from the locals to those who were literate and understood the Spanish legal system. In essence, the local leaders and inhabitants were supplanted by Spanish and Filipino outsiders who were not of their tribe, language, or customs. There was also an economic incentive to work with Manila rather than tend to the traditional and more local relationships. The new power brokers became an agent of the state, rather than a leader of local people. This was the beginning of the “rural elite,” which was a result of, and contributed to, a change in social hierarchy, economic incentives, and loyalties.

Socio-cultural change continued into the late nineteenth century. The elite and working class Filipinos become acutely aware of their loss of native lands, wealth, and the subsequent changes to traditional relationships and lifestyle. Furthermore, the commercialization of the Philippines granted more opportunities for education abroad. The newly educated Filipino elite were also aware of the repressive and authoritarian church and Spanish government, but they were now able to give voice to others. Rebel leaders such as Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and Emilio Aguinaldo had been instilling nationalistic fervor against the Spanish for a number of years. Although they were similar in cause, they did have differences. Jose Rizal came from an elite and educated background and promoted reform, not necessarily revolution. Andres Bonifacio came from humble beginnings and desired independence through more radical means. Bonifacio began the Katipunan (revolutionary group fighting against Spanish rule) movement,

11 Sturtevant, 35.
12 Sturtevant, 36.
13 Francia, 111.
14 Sturtevant, 37. See also, Uldarico S. Baclagon Lt Col, Philippine Campaigns (Manila, Philippines, Graphic House, 1952), 37.
which is credited for the start of the Philippine Revolution in 1896.\textsuperscript{15} Emilio Aguinaldo came from the mixed-race or \textit{mestizo} elite family, and mobilized action (militaristic) for independence.

Aguinaldo became a national figure, fighting against Spain with his exploits, aggressiveness and prowess as a military leader. He was originally a member of the Katipunan and heavily involved in a number of pitched battles against the Spanish, many of them successful. In 1897, however, the Spanish government and Aguinaldo reached an agreement. The Spanish essentially paid off Aguinaldo to leave for Hong Kong and lay down his arms in exchange for governmental reforms. The rebel version of the agreement is that it was a clever ruse to get more money to support the rebel insurgency.\textsuperscript{16} But neither peace nor reforms occurred. In the midst of internal turmoil, great-power conflict would force another turn in Philippine history. On 15 February 1898, the USS Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor, leading to war between Spain and the United States.

**The Spanish-American War**

The first shots of the Spanish-American War were not fired off the coast of Cuba but rather in Manila harbor by the order of Admiral George Dewey. He was sent there to interdict Spanish supplies and ensure the Philippines could be used as a bargaining chip for the US during post-war negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} The Spanish fleet was quickly defeated, causing an immediate power vacuum in the Philippines. The Spanish-American War ended in four months, and the US had incidentally won its first colony and created a conundrum.\textsuperscript{18} Admiral Dewey did not have the forces required to occupy the islands; and the President of the United States, William McKinley, felt he could not leave the Philippines to itself because of predatory nations in Asia or Europe. The popular sentiment within America at the time was that the Filipinos could not govern themselves.\textsuperscript{19} The US and the Filipino rebels were thus set on a collision course. In a prophetic statement, President McKinley noted, “if such a conflict should break out it would engender jealousy and hatred on the part of the natives which could not be overcome for many years.”\textsuperscript{20}

US actions within the Philippine archipelago were initially tepid. What is now known as “commander’s guidance” was sparse. Admiral Dewey was told to hold the area, and General

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Baclagon, 39.
\item Baclagon, 49.
\item Linn, 5.
\item Linn, 5. See also Karnow, 125.
\item Bernstein, 78. See also Linn, 5.
\item Quoted in Linn, 5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Wesley Merritt was ordered to make peaceful preparations for annexation. The problem, however, was that the Navy was unable to establish control of an entire country, and the Army was “ill prepared” for an occupation in tropical conditions.\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, the exiled Aguinaldo was becoming more vocal; and the US was unable to ignore him. Initially, the US developed vacillating policies, which were intended to stall for time to broker a treaty with Spain; but to the Filipinos this meant confusion and inaction. The US attempted to present its forces as peaceful and supportive, operating under local customs and laws, but many locals felt differently as their revolution gained steam.\textsuperscript{22} Not all Filipinos were filled with revolutionary fervor. Some elites wanted US control and Philippine autonomy, as it would solidify survival, financial control, and political power they enjoyed under Spanish rule. The US supported these elites because their mutual interests aligned.

Despite a crushing naval victory fighting in the archipelago was not over because the US still had to deal with Spanish forces inside Luzon. In an effort to defeat Spanish holdouts throughout the country, Admiral Dewey decided to return Aguinaldo to the islands, and supply his forces with equipment. Initially, the reassembled rebel groups made quick work of Spanish fighters throughout the countryside, but the co-habitation of US and rebel forces would prove both tense and tenuous. There were diplomatic misunderstandings, duplicity, and distrust between American leaders and Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo believed that the US brought him back so he could begin preparations for independence. American leaders, however, had no such intention. Shortly after defeating Spanish holdouts, Aguinaldo restarted an interim government based on many of the same constitutional foundations as the US.\textsuperscript{23} He began to raise an Army of the Republic, which numbered over 20,000, and his power and intentions worried US leaders.

**The Philippine-American War Begins**

The final battle between US and Spanish forces occurred where Spanish power was centralized: Manila. The US immediately shipped 5,000 troops to the islands to help preserve the peace and eliminate the remaining Spanish troops, who numbered 5,600 and were fortified inside the walls of Manila.\textsuperscript{24} Outside the walls of Manila lay deeply entrenched rebel troops. On the ground, US generals feared that Aguinaldo’s forces would massacre the Spanish holdouts and asked Aguinaldo not to enter the city. He complied with the request but would not retreat from

\textsuperscript{21} Baclagon, 66. See also Linn, 8.
\textsuperscript{22} Baclagon, 108-112.
\textsuperscript{23} Francia, 142.
\textsuperscript{24} Baclagon, 72-73.
his trenches.\textsuperscript{25} Fearing for their lives and wanting to save face, the Spanish asked Admiral Dewey to allow them to surrender after a sham engagement. The US Navy complied, but did not tell Aguinaldo of the intent, mostly because Admiral Dewey did not recognize Aguinaldo as a leader or the Philippines as a state.\textsuperscript{26} After the Spanish surrendered, Filipino rebel leaders suddenly realized they had been left out of negotiations. The tipping point in US-Filipino relations occurred when US forces occupied Manila and refused entry to rebel forces. From a rebel standpoint, the US used them to clear the countryside of Spanish military, negotiated with the Spanish without Filipino knowledge, and then kept them out of their capital city.\textsuperscript{27} For a group of people who felt strongly about their identity and sovereignty, these were more than just slights—they were the actions of another colonial master.

Each side in the Philippine-American War—business elite, rebel elite, peasant, and various US leaders—viewed it from its own perspective based on personal or group interests. The rebels (mostly Tagalogs from Luzon) wanted self-determination and independence. Peasants throughout the archipelago wanted to live life as they always had and avoid the rebellion contained mostly to Luzon. Filipino business elites wanted US protection and autonomy. Senior US decision makers, seeing the Philippines for its potential, began to shift their ideals from altruism to a “reluctant colonizer.”\textsuperscript{28} President McKinley wanted to “uplift and civilize and Christianize [the Filipinos].”\textsuperscript{29} As Luis Francia points out, McKinley’s position was ignorant as “the islands had been Catholic for more than 300 years.”\textsuperscript{30} The US actions showed more chauvinism than benevolence. The Filipinos were going to be remade in the image of the US regardless of their own preferences.

The rebels and the US agreed on more topics than either realized. The Aguinaldo government wanted religious freedom. Aguinaldo lived under Spanish colonialism and understood the inherent problems associated with clerical rule. The US political leaders, even though McKinley wanted to “Christianize” the Filipinos, took a stance that supported a separation of church and state. As one example, the Filipinos of a recently secured town were shocked when the officers assured them their churches would continue offering services and that the US

\textsuperscript{25} Baclagon, 74.
\textsuperscript{26} Senate, \textit{Affairs in the Philippine Islands}, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines, 57\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1902, 2929.
\textsuperscript{27} Baclagon, 80-112.
\textsuperscript{28} Francia, 148.
\textsuperscript{29} Bernstein, 78. See also Francia, 149.
\textsuperscript{30} Francia 149.
“respected and protected everyone’s religion.” Further, both the US and Aguinaldo governments wanted a democratic republic to be established. Aguinaldo’s government desired open ports and trade, immigration control, judicial reform, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the religious fraterities, as well as exploitation of the natural resources. Unsurprisingly, American leaders wanted the same things for the new colony and would work diligently to make good on those desires. For two sides that agree on so much, a move toward violence seemed out of place.

From a contemporary perspective the fighting seems unwarranted. The US had come in peace and benevolence; thus the inhabitants should simply submit to colonial rule until independence can be granted at a later date. For Filipinos, the choice was less clear. Their fate was fluid because the unsigned treaty between the Spanish and the US provided that the US could return the Philippines, or at least parts of it, back to Spanish control. If the treaty stipulated a return to Spanish rule, overtures of US support from Filipino business or government could be seen as collaboration. Additionally, the rebels could not wait for the treaty. Any control had to be taken immediately, as a fait accompli, and a Filipino republic had to be installed. Decades earlier, Jose Rizal wanted to wait until the right time for reform. Bonifacio sought to revolt in the 1890s but lacked the backing or generalship. Aguinaldo saw an opportunity to obtain what Filipinos had been fighting for decades to achieve.

Senior US decision makers had difficulty clearly seeing the issues confronting them in the Philippines. Gen Elwell Otis, commander of US forces in the Philippines, made close contact with Filipino business elites who convinced him and others that Aguinaldo wanted a “Tagalog dictatorship.” They suggested the proper Filipino, meaning the landed and wealthy ones, sought annexation by the US instead. The biased US view of the class structures in the Philippines was ubiquitous. For example, Lt Col Thomas Hamer, the appointed military governor of Cebu, stated that, “the better class of natives here, especially the landed proprietors…are with us, but the lower classes…are susceptible to [revolutionary] leadership.” His statement represented an oversimplification of complex social and political issues. The US could not untangle the sociocultural complexity to discover the realities of the violence in the Philippines and in some ways

32 Bernstein, 70. See also Karnow, 116.
33 Linn, 29. See also Karnow, 133.
34 Linn, 29.
35 Quoted in Linn, 84.
were controlled by Filipino elites who desired to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the US could not understand why peasant groups and locals in Luzon were supporting the rebel forces.

Major themes resulting from this conflict are control and bias. The US military and political officials had difficulty identifying important individuals, understanding behavior, and observing the environment correctly through unbiased lenses. Stathis Kalyvas, in his groundbreaking work, developed a theory of understanding violence in civil war through a mechanism he terms “agency.” Knowing to whom to attribute violence and control requires more than stating that a particular person represents all Filipinos, or that all violence is due to a desire for independence. Kalyvas argues that “the locus of agency…is simultaneously located at different levels of aggregation: the center, the region, the village, and so on.”

Thus, from the outset of the War, the US was unable to attribute violence to appropriate groups or persons. The inability to attribute violence or discern agency led many leaders in Washington to support indecisive policies and strategies. Additionally, Gen Otis could not accept the reality that fear, ignorance, and anger were not the only motivators for peasant collaboration with rebel insurgents. Kalyvas suggests their reasoning could be “qualified, cautious, and ambivalent collaboration along the two poles of sympathy and fear.” He also argues that an “urban bias,” which observes civil war violence from the perspective of the city elites as opposed to those actually rebelling in the rural areas, creates an inherent problem. Kalyvas asserts that urban bias views conflict “acontextually and in an exclusively top-down manner.” Did the peasants really desire independence? Could Filipinos govern themselves? Did the business elite really desire independence, or did they want to prolong colonialism? Was Aguinaldo using the US to restart the revolution? These were important questions about agency and control for which US leaders had insufficient answers.

The ignorance of US leadership about Filipino culture and class structures could perhaps be written off as a product of its time. The US began its involvement in the Philippines on what a military leader today would call a “cold start.” The US knew little about its new colony and even less about the inhabitants. After the first battle in Manila harbor against the Spanish, President McKinley said that he, “could not have told where those darned islands were within two thousand miles.” In light of their obvious lack of knowledge, President McKinley established the

37 Kalyvas, 101-102.
38 Kalyvas, 39.
39 Quoted in Karnow, 104.
Schurmann Commission in 1899. Also known as the First Philippine Commission, it consisted of five members (Gen Otis, Adm Dewey, Dean Worcester, Jacob Schurmann, and Charles Denby) whose charter was to investigate the situation in the Philippines and make recommendations for US policy and strategy.

In its day, establishing the Schurmann Commission and following through upon its recommendations was perceived as representing a rather enlightened approach. With help from Dean Worcester, who had years of experience in the Philippines prior to this particular service, the Commission’s members would investigate and seek to understand the problems of the people, government, and judicial system. Its members, however, largely stayed in Manila and interviewed elite, educated, and wealthy Filipinos. Dean Worcester wrote home early in his duties in the Philippine Commission that some of his Commission counterparts drew conclusions about the Filipinos solely from those who were in Manila. He wanted them, however, to “broaden their horizons by a little trip to the provinces” and see the Filipinos as they really are.\textsuperscript{40} The Commission’s efforts were hailed as a success at the time; its members presented suggestions about future policy, but they lacked substantial insights into systemic issues of nationalism and socio-cultural changes. Instead, the Commission’s members recommended a new English-based educational system, judiciary reforms, and governmental representation. These recommendations were made with an implicit understanding that a second commission would return to implement them.

The policies and strategy of the US in its first year in the Philippines were dithering, but that was about to change. After months of facing down rebel forces in Manila, President McKinley declared that an occupation of the entire archipelago was required.\textsuperscript{41} The focus of the new US policy was on civil issues to “win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{42} Shortly after, on 23 January 1899, Aguinaldo declared the Philippines a republic, but it was not widely regarded as legitimate or representative.\textsuperscript{43} For example, Aguinaldo called for elections; but in one municipality of 33,000, only 78 people could vote.\textsuperscript{44} Additionally, the republic representatives in the Visayas were all Tagalogs from Luzon, not local Visayans.\textsuperscript{45} By all accounts, Aguinaldo’s declaration was largely demonstrative, but it continued to stoke

\textsuperscript{40} Dean C. Worcester, \textit{The Philippines Past and Present} (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1930), 12. Dean Worcester was Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands from 1901-1913.
\textsuperscript{41} Linn, 30.
\textsuperscript{42} Quoted in Linn, 30.
\textsuperscript{43} Linn, 34.
\textsuperscript{44} Linn, 34.
\textsuperscript{45} Linn, 34.
nationalist sentiments. Given the new US policy and Aguinaldo’s announcement of a republic, the tense and distrustful situation was teetering on the brink of war. In February 1899, a US patrol in Manila ignited the Philippine-American War when they sent a volley of bullets at rebel forces. Violence immediately erupted along the US front surrounding Manila.

A number of military campaigns in Luzon followed from this irruption of hostilities. Although interesting in their own right, and worthy of study, they are outside the scope of this analysis. The critical element in an analysis of the war from an HD perspective is the US Army in the Philippines began to view the conflict through social, as opposed to strictly military perspectives and improved the living condition of the local Filipinos. US soldiers began to clean up the streets, inspected hospitals, built a secular education system, and improved the public works system.

Merely enacting civic programs was not, however, enough to turn the tide in the Philippines. Gen Otis increasingly understood the importance of Filipino social structures and attempted to connect them to a new US framework for action. For example, he assessed the repressive Spanish municipality taxation and representation as, “a development of the former family, clan, or tribal village customs…but failed to satisfy the people because of burdensome taxes.” He recognized the local governmental structure was run by elites, who were becoming more nepotistic and corrupt. As a result of this social insight, Gen Otis focused civil efforts on the municipal level knowing they were the foundation upon which central government would be based. But he also realized, “an intimate practical knowledge of their [Filipinos] capacities, virtues, iniquities, and political tendencies was essential to formulate [government] wisely, and this no one connected with the army possessed.” In other words, Gen Otis recognized his own biases and modified strategy and operations accordingly.

Unfortunately, American recognition of the importance of social structures and one’s own biases did not extend to culture and language. Meaning and intent derived from social and cultural backgrounds are inherent in languages, and the US struggled to bridge the gap between culture and language. James Scott notes, “The great cultural barrier imposed by a separate language is perhaps the most effective guarantee that a social world, easily accessible to insiders,

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46 The details of whether the US patrol fired first is not established fact. Regardless, open hostilities began due to a tinderbox that had been building since the end of the Spanish-American war.
47 Karnow, 153. See also, Linn, 31.
48 Gen Otis Report, 279.
49 Gen Otis Report, 280.
will remain opaque to outsiders.”

One US negotiator saw the opacity first-hand when he claimed, “The trouble is to get a secure basis to talk upon. These people use our phrases and terms in quite a difference [sic] sense from the way we use them.”

The language and culture gap extended beyond mere difficulty in communicating; it overlapped into rebellious and nationalistic behavior.

On Luzon alone, there were five different tribes, each with a distinct language. As David Bernstein points out, one of the biggest issues confronting nationalism was the “lack of a common language.” Additionally, less than ten percent of the people of the islands could speak English or Spanish. Most Filipinos, 56 percent, could not read or write in any language; and those considered able to read and write and to have a superior education, amounted to 1.6% of the population. Thus, communication in the barrio was usually verbal between individuals and rarely was anything written down in an agreed upon terminology. The net effect of language and literacy differences was binding agreements with locals were difficult to achieve and led to frequent misunderstandings.

When US soldiers arrived, they could only speak through interpreters, which made communication difficult and, in some cases, dangerous. The tactical commanders in the southern islands such as Mindanao found it difficult to communicate because of their interpreters. The officers distrusted them to transmit their desires accurately because of the interpreter’s personal interest in the matter. The lack of common language drove the US to build an education system that focused on teaching everyone English. Educational books written in English were delivered, and by 1901, over 1000 teachers had arrived to “solve” this problem.

The US certainly developed an English-speaking Philippines, but this only helped the US communicate. Western education, specifically in the English language, did not forestall rebellious fervor, and in some ways it suppressed the nationalistic underpinnings of an already disaffected peasant group. Furthermore, by making English the primary language, the US

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50 Scott, 72.
51 Quoted in Linn, 36.
52 Bernstein, 17. See also Linn, 15.
53 Census of the Philippines, 78.
54 Census of the Philippines, 78.
55 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, December 1, 1900 to October 15, 1901, Part 2, 1901, 86.
inadvertently lost a window into the psychology and behavior of Filipinos, thereby blinding itself to Filipino culture.

By 1900 the peasant class had been converted to Christianity, were legally separated from their land through Spanish regulation, had their social structure and cultural hierarchy upended by external incentives, and were only able to communicate through a foreign (occupying) language. Niels Mulder expanded on the this point when he wrote, “The very cultural imperialism that thwarts nation-building also destroys historical continuity, and so the Filipino sense of a collective becoming has been obliterated.”\(^57\) The US intended to “solve” a language problem, but may have caused other, more long-term issues.

The Beginning of the End

According to Elihu Root, then Secretary of War, by 1900 the US Army totaled 100,000 men, including reserves. At the height of the Philippine-American War, almost 70,000 men were serving in the archipelago.\(^58\) With almost one-third of the US Army serving overseas in conflict, combined with the naval assets, the Philippine-American War was a large-scale conflict for the US for its day. This is an important attribute as for the HD to have value, it must provide insights into conflicts regardless of scale.

After a year of buildup the US had a sufficient number of troops to increase the scope and scale of the conflict. Specifically, the US began a pacification campaign that spread into other parts of Luzon and the Visayas. Aguinaldo’s Revolutionary Army was outgunned and outmatched, as the US had better rifles, artillery, and logistics to carry out the occupation of Manila and support expeditions. After a year of fighting, and incurring numerous losses, Aguinaldo’s forces adopted guerrilla tactics. After defeating the regular Revolutionary Army in late 1899, Gen Otis, and his successor Gen Arthur MacArthur, proclaimed the war to be all but over. Macarthur wrote in November 1899 that, “The so-called Filipino republic is destroyed” but he misunderstood the underlying issues.\(^59\) Defeating the Revolutionary Army in battle was not decisive; the rebels were fighting for independence and political reform, not military victory. In

\(^{57}\) Mulder, 56.


\(^{59}\) Gen Otis Report, 80.
response, Gen MacArthur wanted to grant leniency to any guerrilla forces that turned over their arms. MacArthur thought that by temporarily offering amnesty the US could later use heavy-handed tactics to justify a violent eradication of the remaining guerrilla holdouts. Gen Otis disapproved MacArthur’s suggestion fearing it would increase the level of violence.60

Gen Otis recognized the change in the character of the war and made changes to facilitate victory. Specifically, he changed from a typical military organizational structure to a “territorial occupational” force structure that included four regions: Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.61 The reorganization of US forces in the Philippines under General Order (G.O.) 40 and G.O. 43 made the districts and local commanders responsible for living with the people, controlling security, and developing civic action. The new structure also aided military flexibility by encouraging local civilian control at the municipal level, but still enforced the broad framework of the two General Orders.62

The new force structure and flexibility were not greeted with universal approval. MacArthur, for example, thought the reorganization ruined his mobile reserve and spread US forces too thin. Operationally, MacArthur may have been right, but Gen Otis accepted the risk to his forces because his strategy was centered on Filipinos, not rebels. In practice, the new general orders had troops living among the people, but this did not immediately translate into success. The guerrilla units organized shadow governments for tax collection and intelligence gathering for their own strategic goals.63 US forces, despite their local presence, were still regarded by most Filipinos as outsiders who had to demonstrate their intentions before locals would support them. Much as the US military was considered outsiders in Luzon, the rebel forces were also considered outsiders in the southern islands.

Although the Filipino insurgency was a nationalist movement, it did not spread to the southern areas of the Philippines such as the Visayas or Mindanao. Uldarico Baclagon, an instructor and Lt Col in the Philippine infantry, wrote in 1952 that the Visayas could not fall to the revolutionary government because they “were not well organized for insurrection.”64 Aguinaldo’s government and the Visayan rebels may not have been well organized, but a Tagalog rebellion was also not well received in the Visayas where many long-standing disputes between

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60 Karnow, 157.
61 Gen Otis Report, 246, See also, Baclagon, 123.
62 Linn, 200.
63 Baclagon, 122.
64 Baclagon, 121.
the Tagalogs and Visayans still existed. Uldarico Baclagon further suggests the US achieved success in Mindanao because, “The Moros were easily won over by the Americans through peaceful negotiations and display of friendship.” He failed to see that the Moro power brokers in Mindanao also looked at US involvement as legitimizing their control and ensuring their autonomy. The US made agreements, including the Bates Agreement, to allow local Muslim leaders to rule their people internally, while the US controlled external issues such as rival gangs and insurgent republic forces. The power struggles and internal division among Muslim Filipinos will be an important aspect of the Moro Rebellion case study in Chapter 5.

As the US gained small victories across the island chain the insurgent fighters grew more desperate and turned increasingly violent and oppressive of the people who had supported them. They began by levying taxes and even purged some of their own supporters. Cruel rebel behavior coincided well with US benevolence of the time. By 1901, members of the Second Philippine Commission had already been travelling through most of the archipelago articulating benevolent US intentions, as well as establishing local governance (with local caveats). The combination of these factors led many Filipinos to warm to the idea of a return to peace, and many of them shifted their support from rebellion to annexation.

The Second Philippine Commission, led by William Howard Taft, arrived in the Philippines in June 1900. Its members immediately took on legislative powers and superseded the US Military Governor, Gen MacArthur. Taft instituted a “policy of attraction” by establishing elected assemblies and commissioners as a foundation to a firm central government. The effectiveness of this policy was evident in the observation of one insurgent commander. This commander stated, in reference to Lt Col Thomas Hamer’s work in the Visayas, that the army’s “policy of attraction” and “its irreproachable conduct” had won over most of the elite in Cebu city, including the revolutionary government. The momentum was shifting toward American victory, and the labor of benevolence would soon bear fruit. By July 1901, the Army began transferring the responsibility of 23 provinces from military control to the Philippine Commission.

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65 Baclagon, 121.
66 Linn, 180.
67 Linn, 180. This also had an unintended effect of pitting the US against any rival tribes or leadership already simmering in the region; a topic that is revisited in chapter 5.
68 Bernstein, 86-87.
69 Karnow, 174. See also, Bernstein, 88.
70 Quoted in Linn, 84-85.
71 Linn, 217.
The sudden change in Filipino loyalty can be explained by a number of factors. First, the cultural-linguistic barriers were overcome by the Second Philippine Commission members who travelled to each provincial capital and talked directly to the people in their own language. The Commission’s representatives used Filipinos speaking local dialects to explain the plan for governance, answer questions, and address grievances. Direct personal communication also demonstrated US power and ability to provide security and stability in the barrios. Second, the psychological aspect of face-to-face communications reduced local fears. Rural peasants worried that once the Americans won, those who sided with the insurgents would be held as criminals and put to death or left to rot in jail. For this very reason many chose to hold out in the mountains. There were also peasant fears that should the US lose Aguinaldo would come for revenge. A strong US presence in the provinces helped assuage those fears.

The root of Filipino support for the insurgency was not based on hatred or contempt for Americans or America. Rather, they feared the unknown and consequences of choosing the wrong side. Gen Smith, who went to Bacolod, understood these fears. He telegraphed Gen Otis noting, “When the influential man fears…he ceases to be our earnest advocate,” and that most people “come valiantly to our side once the storm has passed.” Furthermore, by 1901, US presence was growing from 24 to 639 military posts. The approach worked best in the Visayas and Mindanao where the Tagalog rebellion had its weakest support base.

There is another important difference between the Luzon-Tagalog rebellion and the rest of the Philippines: variance in ideologies and customs between the different islands. For example, although the entire archipelago was agrarian at its foundation, each region contained its own crops and methodologies for growing and selling those goods. The Spanish did not care to become involved in economic endeavors outside of Manila, and the lack of central government gave those within each region carte blanche to trade and interact with other regions, the rest of the country, and even the rest of the world based on their own customs, preferences and needs. Thus, provincial and municipal development was extremely diffuse and decentralized, which explains the similarities in religion and basic familial ties, but variant behavior during the revolution. Rebellion meant each region was going to gain or lose something different and it was

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72 Report of the Philippine Commission, 159.
73 Gen Otis Report, 213.
74 Gen Otis Report, 213.
75 Thomas Bruno, “The violent end of Insurgency on Samar,” Army History, no. 79 (Spring 2011): 30-46.
up to the people and leaders in each region to perform the economic and socio-cultural cost-benefit analysis to decide whether or not to support the rebels.

Aside from the economic development and cultural differences, there were historical and situational reasons for the disparity in rebel support, which contributed to a long-standing tension between the Tagalos and the Visayans. According to Gen Otis, the Tagalos had for some time prejudiced, directed, and restrained the Visayans, leading to long-standing animosity between the two. Ananias Diocno, an Aguinaldo appointee in the Visayas, agreed with Otis’ evaluation when he wrote there was a “profound antagonism between the Visayan and the Tagalog.” In his report to Congress, Gen Otis went so far as to suggest that if left alone, the Tagalog and Visayans would turn to war against each other. Gen Otis, then in country for over a year, began to see the socio-cultural issues and differences that would help the US build sound strategy.

Gen Otis understood the importance of socio-cultural issues but did not refrain from using force. He designed an approach to strike balance between the two, and it would pay off when Aguinaldo was captured during a daring raid in 1901. Although Gen Otis had left the Philippines by then, his operational guidance laid the groundwork for Aguinaldo’s capture. The idea of Aguinaldo’s capture, however, was interpreted in two ways. First, Gen Otis thought his capture would be insignificant because he was already hiding in the mountains and ineffective as a military commander. Second, Gen MacArthur believed the capture would have a tremendous psychological effect on remaining guerrilla holdouts. After his capture, MacArthur proved to be correct, as Aguinaldo told the guerrillas to surrender to American rule, and most resistance after his capture was largely by bandits and radical holdouts. Otis and MacArthur may not have recognized it, but they were beginning to find operational merit in understanding the adversary’s organizational structure and the subsequent relationship to human behavior.

Paul Staniland suggests rebellious behavior and organizational theory are intimately connected. In his in book, *Networks of Rebellion*, Staniland develops a social-institutional theory of rebellion based on models of rebel organizations. These models are: Vanguard, Integrated, Parochial, and Fragmented. The ability to understand which model applies to the enemy enables the operational planner to target and plan effectively. In the case of the Philippine-American War,

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78 Quoted in Linn, 71.
80 Baclagon, 125.
the rebel movement followed a Fragmented model as it had weak central and local control. Evidence of the weak central and local ties supports Staniland’s argument. First, the center of the rebellion was comprised of landowning elite, and the active members were mostly Tagalogs from Luzon. Second, there were weak horizontal ties due to internal division on the appropriate pathway to success -- autonomy or independence. Even many locals wanted peace more than they wanted independence. Furthermore, there was little discipline in the vertical axis of Aguinaldo’s forces. One US intelligence officer would note that Aguinaldo’s government was unable to control his “loosely organized forces,” and could not institute discipline. Staniland also asserts that to counter a fragmented organization the forces must apply pressure to the organization’s survival, identify and exploit internal cleavages, and deny foreign intervention. Whether intentional or not, the US employed all of these measures, as well as civic action to consolidate gains. Staniland also claims that Fragmented organizations, such as the Republic Forces and guerrilla forces, lack the “social underpinnings” to maintain a long-term military strategy. In the Philippines, rebel forces did not represent a social uprising; instead they were a political movement lacking mass support.

The work to bring the fragmented guerrilla forces to heel was painfully slow. MacArthur, newly appointed as Commander of US forces in the Philippines, noted this when he wrote, “week by week, situation shows little improvement; month by month, progress slow, but quite apparent.” MacArthur and many of his subordinates, such as Gen Jacob Smith and Gen Frederick Funston, were growing tired of their men being killed and wanted more firmness of action. MacArthur granted them leeway when he ordered a “new and more stringent policy” and counseled that “whenever action is necessary the more drastic the application the better.” While MacArthur did not abandon Gen Otis’ civil focus, there was no doubt he emphasized a more military approach to dealing with insurgency, which included burning villages, relocating civilians, and confiscating property. In some cases, the US adopted methods that included killing cattle and burning crops to reduce guerrilla supplies. These tactics also reduced civilian supplies at the same time. While a punitive strategy led to some military successes, such as the

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82 Staniland, 8.
83 In one example, the four (revolutionary) governmental representatives for Cebu (a Visayan Island) were all from Luzon. See Linn, 34.
84 Quoted in Linn, 34.
85 Staniland’s, 53-54.
86 Quoted in Linn, 210.
87 Quoted in Linn, 213.
88 Bruno, 33.
89 Bruno, 34.
capture of Aguinaldo in 1901, it also had a long-term deleterious effect on the people, which ultimately led to MacArthur’s dismissal.90

The punitive strategy rebounded on the US in September 1901 in the town of Balangiga on the island of Samar. At the request of the Filipino mayor, the US established a post in Samar in 1901.91 Later that year, civilians and insurgents, angry over their maltreatment, surprised US forces and killed 48 soldiers. The church bells, which were historically a signal to gather for church, were used to signal the beginning of the attack. After the massacre, the bodies of the soldiers were mutilated and left to rot. Gen Adna Chaffee was MacArthur’s successor in July 1901. His response to the Balangiga massacre was that “benevolence” was “silly” and was “no substitute for shot, shells, and bayonets.”92 The “Samar Massacre,” as Balangiga became popularly known, stirred wild emotions of shock and anger in the US. In response, Gen Chaffee sent Brig Gen Jacob Smith to exact revenge for the killings. Gen Smith’s orders to his men were to take “no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better you will please me” and added his now-infamous line that, “Samar must be made a howling wilderness.”93 In a nod to the social and psychological aspects to violence and biases, Gen Smith also warned his subordinates to “not allow their suspicions [of the Filipinos] to be lulled to sleep by friendly association and social intercourse with the native inhabitants.”94 US actions in Samar ended in early 1902, but not until US forces had starved and killed civilian and guerrilla Filipinos alike. Gen Smith had achieved a military victory but at substantial cost. Filipinos would remember the Samar expedition, and others like it, for many years.95

The Philippine-American War ended on 4 July 1902. In human terms, the War cost the US over four-thousand dead and 2,800 wounded. A further 20,000 Filipino soldiers and 200,000 civilians died, the latter from direct or indirect actions of the war.96 In the US, the war ended without much fanfare. For four years the US had battled in the jungles, swamps, and mountains of the Philippines, as well as rebel forces, but the American people did not celebrate its conclusion with parades. After the war, the members of the second Philippine Commission

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90 Linn, 218.
91 Karnow, 189.
92 Quoted in Karnow, 187, 191. See also Bruno, 36.
93 Quoted in Bruno, 39. See also Karnow, 191. See also Linn, 315.
94 Quoted in Bruno, 36.
95 One illustration of the social memory of the Filipinos includes the Balangiga bells. The bells that the Filipinos had lived under for generations, and were used in Samar as a signal for attack, were confiscated by the US -- three to be exact. One is kept in South Korea; the other two are in Wyoming. These bells provide tension to this day.
96 Karnow, 194.
implemented governmental, judicial, and economic reforms, as well as restrictive voting rights, and land reforms. US policy had the best of intentions, but many of the new edicts supported the elite class of Filipino, and would sow the seeds of the next conflict.

The HD in the Philippine-American War

In the midst of a great-power conflict such as the Spanish-American War, the US had stumbled into a revolution for independence in the Philippines. The US had little knowledge about the geography or people, but endeavored to develop what we would consider today “HD knowledge” by centering on a civic affairs and a national-level Philippine Commission. During the Philippine-American War, the US began to understand the nature of a complex social structure that had been rearranged in over 300 years of Spanish absenteeism and cleric control. Filipinos had lost their historical and cultural roots after being herded into municipalities that taxed and oppressed the peasant class. The economic boom of the 19th and early 20th centuries continued to reshape social structures by tying rural output to urban progress; adding top-down control and pressures on rural municipalities. The previous leaders of the barangay, who had benefited from familial relationships, had been supplanted first by clergy, then by business interests.

To complicate the social structure further, the disaffected peasant class and ruling landed-elite were also accompanied by educated and revolutionary elites, e.g., Rizal, Bonifacio, and Aguinaldo. This class of educated-elite benefited from the previous economic and educational opportunities. Unlike the landed-elite class, the educated-elite focused on developing a new form of democratic government to break free from the Spanish and begin to build their own nation. The revolutionaries wanted wholesale governmental and economic changes to be self-determining and sovereign.

Each of the social classes viewed the Spanish-American War from its own perspective, according to its own interests. Landed elites wanted to continue to preserve the status quo under US occupation. The revolutionary educated-elite wanted to continue the independence movement. The peasant class wanted to return to security and predictability. To the US, the Philippines had to be westernized through education, new forms of government, a Western judiciary, and modern civil developments.

The US also unknowingly entered a country undergoing a substantial cultural change. Filipinos had experienced three centuries of religious conversion, poor local representation, and
drastic changes to power structures. Spanish clergy kept those in the *barrio* ignorant and uneducated in order to keep their own intermediary position strong. Clerics also changed the hierarchical structure by changing from a self-sufficient *barangay* to a larger, less familial municipality that lived under the bells. Religion played a key part in the cultural underpinnings of conflict when the US espoused a separation of church and state to a country that depended on the church for three centuries. The social and cultural foundation was built upon religious control. Those in power would not relinquish control easily.

The US, even with a benevolent policy, did not uncover the socio-cultural issues until several years into the Philippine-American War. Even when people such as Gen Otis did realize the complex situation, they had already developed and implemented their strategies and operations, which may or may not have been well informed or appropriate. Of note, the US Army placed a rather progressive general, Gen Otis, to lead US forces, but his selection did not lead to victory. Gen Otis had many faults, but his progressive stance on the use of force, and appropriate organizational design did set the stage for success. It took many years of developing knowledge of the people and society before Otis’ efforts began to produce positive results.

Similarly, the members of the Philippine Commission developed HD knowledge about Filipinos, but it did not translate to victory. The Commission’s recommendations had to be connected to strategic and operational planning through Otis’ command. Success in the Philippine-American War can be attributed to the symbiotic relationship between Otis and the Philippine Commission. In contrast, Generals MacArthur, Chafee, and Smith are examples of leaders who used HD knowledge as military intelligence, for targeting, and not in support of strategic or political objectives.

The implications for the HD from this case-study are that knowledge alone is insufficient. HD knowledge must be connected to the operational level structure to train, organize, and equip to support the process of socio-cultural change. Being able to see and sense is a good first step, but the organization must also be made to act, or not act, appropriately. A comprehensive HD approach, therefore, requires a combination of HD-minded leaders at the strategic and operational levels. A HD-minded leader should recognize in advance or as early as possible when host nation and US interests clash. HD-minded leaders should also be able to recognize their personal and institutional biases. The example of the Philippine-American War suggests that the HD starts with a look inward before developing strategies and policies. President McKinley, for example, wanted to demonstrate US benevolence and the positive aspects of Western influence, but most Filipinos did not want either. Some wanted independence; some wanted a return to the status
quo, while the vast majority desired security and a return to traditional social systems. US leaders were initially blinded by their ideology and firmly believed not only were they in the Philippines to help, but also that Filipinos wanted it.

**Operational Value**

From the evidence in the Philippine-American War, and with the benefit of hindsight, there does appear to be operational value to the HD. Value at this level works in three ways. The first is the ability to identify the enemy’s organizational structure. The second is by informing restraint in the scale of action and the use of force. The third way is through the identification within the population, and between the population and insurgents, of cleavages and alliances.

The identification of the enemy’s organizational structure is critical to the application of force. Initial knowledge of the HD would have helped the US military planners identify the key agents and their type of organization. Adm Dewey and Gen Otis never fully understood the dynamic nature of the revolutionary forces until they turned into guerrillas. Unfortunately, it took several years for the Philippine Commission and US military leaders to recognize weak vertical and horizontal ties. Fortunately, for the US, the fragmented rebel forces helped the American cause by turning violent and repressive on their own supporters. The US waited more than two years to begin applying pressure to organizational and regional cleavages. Had Aguinaldo been a better general, the Philippine-American War could have turned out much differently.

Operational value from the HD is also about restraint. Typically, military operators want action against the enemy. An HD perspective, however, suggests action should be tempered through informed restraint. In 1898, the US had a strategic opportunity to either occupy the islands or allow Aguinaldo the space to develop a democratic government. US politicians, particularly President McKinley, chose the former not because he wished it, but rather he felt he had no other options. Although counterfactual, an HD mindset may have informed restraint and allowed US leaders to develop different relations with a revolutionary government that had many of the same interest as the US. Instead, US leaders felt compelled to occupy and civilize the Philippines.

During the Philippine-American War the US was better able to use informed restraint at the operational level after hostilities began. For example, understanding of the archipelago in its entirety allowed US leaders to recognize the revolutionary limits of control. Gen Otis, for example, understood that the people in the Visayas and Mindanao were suspicious of a revolution, and he used that knowledge to avoiding making insurgents in the south. In another example, in the
beginning of hostilities, Gen Otis did not land on the island of Iloilo in the Visayan chain. The US would have been able to militarily take the island at some cost, however, Gen Otis took a more informed tack, based on the knowledge that if the US landed on the island, its presence would “rally the moderates” behind the revolution. If Gen Otis offered no invasion there would be no rally. Thus, the HD may provide valuable insights to the operational and strategic leaders by allowing them to refrain from action when preference, pressure, and potential ignorance propels them onward.

Initially examining a conflict environment from an HD perspective may also provide operational planners with the ability to identify alliances and cleavages. General Otis spent his first year in country attempting to identify aspects of the HD. In his report in 1900, Gen Otis mentioned that the opportunity to watch the human terrain before taking action allowed him to “acquire a knowledge” of the “political situation…government…judiciary…trade…immigration, and international interests.” The period before hostilities appeared to be the most opportune time to understand the operational aspects of the HD.

The period before overt hostilities also allowed the US opportunity to build alliances with business owners, town officials, and local paramilitary and police forces, which built intelligence and decision space. In one example, new intelligence from the field led the US to shut down food shipments in the islands to disrupt the insurgent supply line. Gen Otis, having knowledge of the social and cultural aspects, also understood such disruption would cause hardships on the peasants. In another example, Gen Otis’s HD knowledge enabled him to build alliances with some of Aguinaldo’s closest advisors. During negotiations, Gen Otis was able to turn Aguinaldo’s followers into partners who would eventually oust one of the leaders of the revolution and instill further dissention in the rebel ranks.

**Strategic value**

The HD offers strategic value by providing leaders with the ability to identify biases. Biases are inherent within all peoples, groups, and organizations. It is important for the leaders to identify those biases and seek to correct them. For example, the US political base and those within the military institution knew little about the Philippine people or geography, but attempted

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97 Linn, 41.
98 Linn, 41.
100 Linn, 93.
101 Linn, 109.
to correct this by implementing the Philippine Commission. Unfortunately, the members of the first Commission stayed mostly in Manila, which further biased the members and their recommendations. The recommendations of the first Commission included judicial reforms, governmental development, and educational reforms. The problem, however, was that these were not systemic issues of the insurgency or monolithic causes of revolution. The issues identified by the Commission were based in large-part on US biases, whose members believed the Philippines could not govern themselves. The recommendations were not wrong per se but were shortsighted and looked only at American-inspired governance rather than addressing the systemic social and cultural issues stemming from Spanish colonialism. Biases drove US behavior, and any recommendations would have to reconcile their beliefs about Filipino self-governance.

The Filipino elite, who stood the most to gain from US governance, supported the recommendations of the Commission. Maintaining the status quo under US annexation was helpful to the elites who wanted to retain their wealth and political power. The US could not determine, as Kalyvas warns, who had agency. The HD can be valuable at the strategic level if it looks inward first. It can also assist those at the strategic level to recognize their own political, social, and cultural self-interests. Instead of projecting those biases on others, the HD can help shape policy and strategy into something more beneficial to the people it is meant to help.

In this case study, identifying the strategic value of the HD was more difficult than at the operational level. This difficulty may reflect the large scale of the war, or the vacillating political and military policies. It may also be a function of the operational level, where victory or success can be attributed quickly. At the strategic level, in contrast, success and value can only be observed over long periods of time. The next chapter examines another uprising in Philippines, almost a half-century after the Philippine-American War: the Huk Rebellion.
Chapter 4

The Huk Rebellion

For centuries, our people had fought for national freedom and social justice.

Independence did nothing to solve our problems

Luis Taruc

The main fighting during the Huk Rebellion occurred from 1946 until 1954. To understand the Rebellion from a HD perspective, this chapter separates it into three different phases. The first phase, the “Repression of the Peasant,” is from approximately 1902-1941. During this period the Philippine government lost legitimacy, and its socio-cultural framework began to unravel. The second period, from 1941-1950, can be considered the “Alignment Phase.” During this period, lines were drawn across socio-political groups, primarily in Luzon, and elite preferences dictated behavior. The final period was from 1950-1954, and could be called the “Co-opt Phase.” In this period, the US and the Philippine government began to understand the rebel movement and sought to allay peasant unrest through social, cultural, and economic reforms.

Repression of the Peasant

In a global context, the period from 1902-1954 brought changes that shaped geopolitics and the world order. Global markets became entangled, world wars redefined security arrangements, post-war alignments took shape, and communism spread. In the period from 1941-1954, China had fallen to communism, Russia was expanding, Korea was invaded, Germany was a battleground, and countless communist insurgencies were brewing. For the US, the Philippines were a critical Asian rampart against communism. The Philippines also gave the US a
dependable export market, as well as key regional military basing and access. For the mass of Filipino insurgents, however, the islands were much more than markets and basing.

Between 1910 and 1940, the peasants and the Philippine government grew further apart. New economic legislation such as free trade ensured the US had a steady market for its goods as well as guaranteeing the Philippines did not build internal and self-sufficient industries. The US had promised independence, but deep governmental and economic integration wedded the two countries into a dependent relationship. In fact, the Philippines, under US direction, began to build a bicameral congress and branches of government that resembled their colonial headmaster. While some prospered under the new system, most peasants dealt with worsening poverty and government growing increasingly repressive.

This period was marked by population increases, migration, colonialism, and occupation, as well as short bursts of rebellion and governmental violence. The peasants developed social groups to protect themselves and represent their interests. For example, peasants created a pro-labor party in 1924 in reaction to governmental abuses and relative economic disparity. The early peasant groups included the Sakdal movement, the General Workers Union (AMT), and the National Society of Peasants in the Philippines (KPMP). In addition to the peasant groups, the urban elite also formed social movements including the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), or the Philippine Communist Party, in 1930. The PKP adopted a non-confrontational approach, in order to build an “urban proletariat” for eventual revolution.

The 1930s also brought the beginning of the Philippine Socialist Party, which formed to represent the peasants and advocate for fair treatment and good governance. Its leader was Luis Taruc, who would eventually become one of the leaders of the Huk Rebellion. The Socialist Party leaders wanted fair loans, the right to collective bargaining, and fair pay and funding of the crops. Many peasants felt these demands were moderate and would return the cultural traditions and social hierarchy to its original, if not, improved state. The veneer of independence and self-determination was beginning to wash away.

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1 Francia, 172.
2 Luis Taruc, He Who Rides a Tiger, (London, England: Praeger Inc, 1967), 13. Many years before writing He Who Rides a Tiger, Luis Taruc wrote, Born of the People. Both are excellent insights into the mind of a revolutionary leader, however, Born of the People was extensively rewritten by the communist party before publishing. Therefore, this thesis uses his later work as a base for his insights and thoughts.
4 Kerkvliet, 42.
In addition to forming new social groups to counter governmental abuses, the cultural underpinnings of the Philippines were changing as well. Prior to the Huk Rebellion, the unwritten agreement between the farmers and the landowners reflected traditional societal paternalism. For generations the farmer understood his social status and enjoyed the protection and emotional attachment of the patriarchal arrangement. The landowners typically acted as godfathers who presided over weddings, and ceremonies, and were involved in the well-being of the farmers. Additionally, the customary deal between the landowner and farmer involved the latter working the land and reaping a percentage of the crop, which could then be sold or used as the farmer needed. The remaining percentage of the crop went to the landowner for sale on the market. In exchange, the landowner would provide security for the farmer, guarantee loans, and represent the farmer’s interest politically.

The arrangement worked well until economic incentives, such as free trade, began driving alternate behavior. Specifically, landowners, who had been physically connected to the land, increasingly moved to larger cities to tend to their trade interests. The cultural tether of loyalty and paternalism was being usurped by urban incentives. Additionally, with market forces driving landowner behavior, the absentee landlords stopped giving interest-free loans and began to only approve usurious loans (with interest rates ranging from 50%-200%) to peasants knowing that they could never repay them. This practice led to a form of economic slavery, in which the severely poor or the agriculturally unlucky would never get out of debt. In one interview, an elderly farmer lamented with considerable understatement, “that relations between tenants and big landowners went from decent to indecent.”

The nature of tenancy agreements also changed, particularly from the landowner’s perspective. No longer were they comprised of a familial bond between the landowner and the tenant. The pressures of capitalism and market forces turned the personal, cultural agreement into a “business partnership” instead. Landowners attempted to increase profits and lower their operating costs. One way to lower the costs was through decreasing the level of paternalistic care for the farmers. Added to this situation was a population boom, which made usable land even more rare than it had been and further increased the farmers’ dependency on the landowners. In

5 Abueva, 30.  
6 McCoy and de Jesus, 73.  
7 Kerkvliet, 6. Excerpt came from one of many interviews in San Ricardo.  
8 Kerkvliet, 14. Excerpt is from an interview with a Philippine landowner, Manolo Tinio.  
9 Kerkvliet, 18. In 1903, the population was seven million; in 1929-12 million; in 1939, 16 million. See also Berstein, 13.
the peasants’ view, the landowners were abrogating their end of the customary unwritten bargain. In addition, the emotional and psychological impact of a suddenly repressive central government was another blow to the collective psyche of the peasant class. The collective impact of these pressures and changes on the peasants is difficult for outsiders, specifically Westerners, to understand. But it is vital to comprehend subsequent peasant behavior. The peasants began agrarian revolts, which spread across the rural areas of the archipelago in the mid-to-late 1930s.

In response to landowner and elite requests, President Manuel Quezon established a violent “mailed fist” policy against the peasants. Benedict Kerkvliet characterizes the policy in the following way: “The government’s actions were a mixture of force, intimidation, moderate legislation to govern landlord-tenant relations, and pledges of sympathy.”\(^\text{10}\) The Quezon Administration also increased Philippine Constabulary (PC) forces in local towns and barrios and took control of the villages when unrest became too great.\(^\text{11}\) The landowners and elites had their own paid militia called the Civil Guardia, whose purpose was to keep tenants in line. Both the PC and the Civil Guardia had a reputation for corruption and overuse of force. They intimidated the masses, broke up meetings, and guarded crops at the behest of the landowner, rather than protecting the public.\(^\text{12}\) The repressive behavior of the government and landowners had the unintended consequence of forcing the peasant social groups closer together, as evident in the merging of the PKP and the Socialist Party in the late 1930s. While the alliance between the parties was never intimate, it does illustrate the binding of disparate social groups in response to governmental pressures. The subsequent rebellions of the peasants had a communist hue, which in turn gave the Quezon government even more reason to target them.

In terms of social and cultural arrangements, the divide between the government and the peasants was becoming unbridgeable. Overt rebellious behavior by the peasants began in the late 1930s because of the heavy hand of the government. Although the new peasant social groups were beginning to gain political ground in late 1930s, World War II (WWII) would rearrange the political landscape in the Philippines.

Alignment Phase (1941-1950)

In 1941, in the midst of a peasant rebellion based in Luzon, the Japanese invaded the Philippines. The rapid collapse of American and Filipino forces, led by Gen Douglas MacArthur,
was immediately followed by Japanese occupation. The occupation of the islands forced new alignments, separated social groups, and further enflamed grievances. The Japanese squandered whatever goodwill they had towards their fellow Asian Filipinos through their abhorrent and chauvinist behavior. More importantly, from psychological and cultural perspective of the peasants, Japanese behavior paled in comparison to actions of their fellow Filipinos who collaborated with the Japanese. In an effort to ensure their own survival and preserve their own status and wealth, many of the elites, landowners, and governmental agents collaborated with the Japanese against the peasants and nationalist elites. Specifically, the collaborationist government used the hated instruments of regime oppression, the PC and Civil Guardia, on behalf of the Japanese to violently hunt guerrillas and suppress the people. Government officials and elite landowners used repression to satisfy Japanese occupiers, so they could secure their place in the new occupational order, and ensure their power and wealth in case of US liberation.\textsuperscript{13}

During the occupation, two main guerrilla groups fought the Japanese. The first was the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) guerrillas. US officers stranded in the archipelago after the Japanese invasion led the USAFFE guerrillas.\textsuperscript{14} Their primary purpose after they made contact with Allied forces was to watch and report enemy movements to US intelligence teams and, in today’s parlance, “prepare the environment” for liberation. Their lack of direct action against the Japanese, however, put them at odds with the second guerrilla group, known as the Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), or People’s Anti-Japanese Army.\textsuperscript{15} More popularly known as the “Huks,” these guerrillas organized around and built on the foundation of the previous peasant movements of the preceding 20 years.\textsuperscript{16} Due to their differing interests and focus, there was little collaboration between the US and Huk guerrillas; they even fought against each other on occasion. On one hand, the USAFFE guerrillas were providing Allied commands with the Japanese order of battle and avoided actions that would cause reprisals against the population in order to preserve their strength to assist in the eventual liberation. On

\textsuperscript{14} US officers such as Col R.W. Volckmann, and Brig Gen Blackburn wrote about their time as USAFFE guerrillas. For a US account of the Japanese resistance in the Philippines see R.W. Volckmann, Col US Army, \textit{We Remained} (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1954).
\textsuperscript{15} Although less active militarily than their Huks counterparts, USAFFE guerrilla intelligence gathering work was nevertheless dangerous. For example, one force, the Cagayan-Apayao Force operating in Northern Luzon, was all but wiped out by the autumn of 1943. For details, see Bernard Norling, \textit{The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon} (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1999).
\textsuperscript{16} The Hukbalahap was officially formed on 29 March 1942.
the other hand, the Huks wanted to fight the Japanese and collaborationist government to protect the civilian population.

The Huks grew in size and popularity throughout the Japanese occupation. Their growth was a reflection of the popularity of their stated purpose: engage and harass the Japanese, as well as defend the people from Japanese exploitation.\(^{17}\) The Huks organized local shadow governments that provided security and predictability for peasants in a time of occupation. The Huks also became the *de facto* patriarch in some parts of Luzon. Benedict Kerkvliet mentions the Huk “leaders and guerrilla officers even officiated at weddings, baptisms, and funerals, and issued marriage licenses and baptismal certificates.”\(^{18}\) In essence, the Huks had taken the place of both absentee landowners and the central government. Security and stability was only aspect of Huk services to the peasants. Unlike the central government leaders and many landowners, who were collaborating the Japanese, Huk governance reconnected the peasants to the familial relationships the latter craved.

The Huks differed dramatically from the USAFFE guerrillas in that their leaders and members wanted to engage and kill the Japanese regardless of the costs before liberation. Many Huk members saw their families slaughtered and livelihoods shattered by the Japanese. They were angry; wanted justice; and, above all else, they desired revenge. Many individuals who joined the Huks believed sincerely that their cause was just, and after the war they planned to disband and continue the work they began prior to invasion. US leaders could not separate the personal motivations from the broader organizational ones and reported to MacArthur’s command that the Huks were “subversive,” “radical,” and “communist.”\(^{19}\) In truth, the Huk guerrillas did start from a communist call to the peasants; but they were not necessarily communist.\(^{20}\) The relationship was one of necessity and based in organizational behavior. The PKP was already well organized and the peasant groups, including labor and other socialist movements, needed a uniting force against repressive government and Japanese occupiers. The relationship between them was not necessarily a validation of communist ideals. In fact, when asked later about groups and alignments during this time, many Filipinos referred to the Huk movement as something other than communist.\(^{21}\) Additionally, the party discipline and

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\(^{17}\) Some estimates of Hukbalahap forces are near 15,000 at their peak, and their supporters into the hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

\(^{18}\) Kerkvliet, 95.

\(^{19}\) Quoted in Kerkvliet, 115.

\(^{20}\) Luis Taruc, 22. See also Kerkvliet, 67.

\(^{21}\) Kerkvliet, 72.
adherence to communist principles was largely absent from the Huk ranks. Very few low or mid-level leaders or followers subscribed to subversion. Many wanted justice, social reforms, and an honest living under democratic ideals. Said one Huk leader, “I wanted to settle back into a normal life and farm.”22

Infighting and alignment among the guerrillas, collaborationists, Japanese and the US would continue through July 1945 when the US liberated the islands. The USAFFE and Huk guerrillas both aided in the liberation of the islands. During liberation operations the Huks supported the American advances and worked alongside the Americans in taking back villages and towns.23

After liberation, many Huks assumed the fighting was over, “came down from the hills and disbanded,” and turned their organization into a “veterans league.”24 Many Huks felt entitled to a hero’s welcome from a grateful nation. They were wrong. As Major Lawrence Greenberg points out, “six days after US forces landed on Leyte in October 1944,” MacArthur reported that the Huks were remnants of the Sakdalistas.25 He labeled them as terrorists, communists, and, worst of all, collaborationists.26 With WWII over, US politicians and now MacArthur returned to the pre-war status quo by supporting a repressive government and absentee landowners.

In an effort to forestall insurgent violence, US and Philippine authorities offered amnesty to the Huks if they forfeited their guns and individually registered with local authorities. The Philippine government, with US backing, took advantage of these circumstances to arrest or kill many of the former guerrillas. The same treatment was not given to USAFFE guerrillas or the Japanese collaborators in the PC. The latter, in particular, were given veterans benefits by the government while they oppressed the peasant class. Additionally, the landlords were returning to their farms and demanding high interest rates, as well as back rent, and began to evict farmers who failed to comply. Without any legal means of recourse, the peasants looked to a political group called the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA merged two ideologies: the peasant movement and the urban left. It was designed to help elect representative candidates in

22 Quoted in Kerkvliet, 107.
24 Luis Taruc, 24, 25.
26 Greenberg, 27.
elections.\textsuperscript{27} The DA had some early success in the 1946 election with six voted into office, but once President Manuel Roxas was sworn in as President he did not allow the six DA congressmen to take their elected seats.\textsuperscript{28}

The welcoming of collaborators into governmental ranks further strained the relations between the Philippine government and US and the Huks. In one incident, the PC in one province of Luzon deserted the Japanese just days before liberation and joined the USAFFE.\textsuperscript{29} Many in governmental positions merely changed sides without fully addressing their collaboration with the Japanese. President Harry Truman recognized the problems collaboration presented but said that after studying Paul McNutt’s, the High Commissioner to the Philippines, and Douglas MacArthur’s recommendation, “there is no necessity for any change in our established policy of leaving the disposition of civil collaborationists in the Philippines to the civil authorities there.”\textsuperscript{30} President Manuel Roxas, who collaborated with the Japanese, was a personal friend of Douglas MacArthur.

The combination of collaboration, political subversion and violent repression of the peasant class convinced many the status quo had returned. With few other options, many Huks fought back. Like their historical predecessors, the Huk demanded agrarian reform, justice, and an end to repression.\textsuperscript{31} Small battles between government and the Huk forces continued when, on 4 July 1946, the Philippines was granted independence. The realities of injustice, feudalism, and corrupt government would set in quickly, however, and the day of independence would merely mark the beginning of serious hostilities within the new nation.

The US had been present and involved in the Philippines for over four decades, yet still applied prejudiced legislative and economic policies that did not address underlying issues and helped ensure Philippine dependency. For example, after negotiations with the Roxas administration in 1947, the US was granted “ninety-nine year leases on twenty-two [military] sites, including Clark Field and Subic Bay.”\textsuperscript{32} US leaders wanted to preserve their access to these

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Kerkvliet, 125. See also Taruc, 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Kerkvliet, 150. See also Hernando J. Abaya, \textit{Betrayal in the Philippines} (New York, NY: A.A. Wyn Inc, 1946), 265.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Kerkvliet, 105.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Kerkvliet, 157.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Karnow, 332.
\end{itemize}
bases for national security reasons, but to many Filipinos, continued “foreign” presence was anathema to true independence and self-determination.

Another example of short-sided policy was the Bell Trade Act of 1946, which granted economic aid to a devastated Philippines. Immediately following liberation, the US sent a War Damage Commission to the islands to estimate and advise on amount and type of aid needed. Its members, however, either did not or could not see the underlying problems. If approved the Act would open Philippine markets to US manufacturers, allow free or preferential trade for 28 years, and gave parity rights for US citizens for Philippine resources. Prior to signing, Secretary of State James Byrnes wrote to President Truman pointing out the issues with the Bell Trade Act. Byrnes outlined them and stated they would undermine the US diplomatic positions in the Philippines and the Far East. Truman nevertheless signed the Act. The well-intended post-war aid characterizes what was wrong with the status quo: those in power looked to their own interest first. The Huks would see the Bell Trade Act in the same way and it only served to rekindle their rebellious fervor.

If the political and social issues were not enough, there were also conflicts of interest between the US and the Philippine elite, namely Gen MacArthur and Paul McNutt, the High Commissioner to the Philippines. MacArthur had a long history in the Philippines prior to WWII and enjoyed both in its luxuries and politics. MacArthur either turned a blind eye toward or was uninterested in peasant culture and social structures. He occupied lavish quarters and was complicit in preserving the status quo and benefited personally from it. For example, then-President Elpidio Quirino gave MacArthur $500,000 for his services in 1942, a clear violation of Army regulations and general ethical standards. Later, in the immediate aftermath of the war MacArthur, granted Roxas amnesty from charges of treason.

MacArthur was not alone in his prejudices, as other US political and military officials held the similar ones towards both the peasants and elites. In one interview, Clarence Boonstra, Agricultural Officer in Manila from 1945-1947, said that Paul McNutt, “recruited from all the old Philippine colonial hands,” and that all of MacArthur’s and McNutt’s cronies were reinstated in

34 Taruc, 26. See also Greenberg, 36-37.
35 Francia, 179-180.
36 Francia, 191. Shortly after his triumphant return, MacArthur left the Philippines for Japan.
the government. The collection of cronies subsequently spent much of the rehabilitation money on the sugar industry, in which many of them had vested interests.

Supporting nepotism was a bad choice, but MacArthur made others after the war. For example, he gave responsibility of Philippine civil affairs to Courtney Whitney, a bad choice for a position requiring empathy and understanding. Whitney, according to one assessment, was “undiplomatic…belligerent” as well as “condescending toward all Filipinos.” MacArthur went out of his way to shield outsiders from the some of the realities of the Philippines. For example, when Senator Joseph Tydings went to the Philippines to study the problems the US should address in 1945, MacArthur forced him to stay in Manila rather than investigate the countryside. As a result, the only perspective MacArthur and McNutt could have received or comprehended was that of the elites and not perspectives of the peasants.

Vicious fighting on both sides marked the internal battle for the Philippines, but the Huks appeared to have the people on their side. The Philippine government, in turn, repressed anyone thought to be supporting the Huks. Spurred on by government action, a number of people supported the Huks because they lived with them and shared in their sacrifices and gains, offered justice, and provided security. The Huks could talk with the people in person, while the US and Philippine government forces remained in Manila except to attack Huks or their supporters.

The identification by the US and the Philippine government of the Huks as anti-government and communist undermined any chance at peace. Both not only mischaracterized the Huks motivations but also gravely underestimated their popularity. The Huks were the millions of people who provided security and justice to Luzon in the vacuum of an absentee government. The security and socio-cultural framework had broken apart and the Huks provided a solution.

The election of 1949 was an important point for both sides. The election was between Jose Laurel, a collaborationist who was given amnesty by Roxas, and Elpidio Quirino, who continued Roxas’ iron-fist policy. Quirino won, but the election was marred by intimidation, murder, stuffed ballot boxes, and rampant fraud. In one province there were more votes than

40 Karnow, 333.
people. Quirino was suspected of killing dissenters and some found “heads bobbing in the water,” killed by the PC. In another example, one lawyer who ran for office said that he voted for himself and only got one vote; he was sure his mother had voted for him. Democracy, the last hope of the Huk and many of the people, was gone. Luis Taruc said of the times, “For four centuries, our people had fought for national freedom and social justice. Independence did nothing to solve our problems.” The violence increased through 1950 when a new hope emerged.

**Co-Opt Phase**

The Co-opt Phase, which lasted from 1950 to 1954, was marked by significant changes in approach by all sides. Previously, the US needed the Philippine government to help fight communist expansion in Asia and overlooked its transgressions. The corrupt Philippine government needed the US financial aid to maintain its internal political power. By 1950, however, the US military forces in the Philippines began to look at the Huk Rebellion from a social and governance perspective. Specifically, the US and the Philippine government began to co-opt the Huk’s demands for social changes, justice reforms, and connecting the people to the government. In contrast, the Huks came under tremendous pressure from this reformed US-Philippine approach. As a result, the Huks began to turn on each other and their support base, the peasants.

Prior to 1950, the US looked at this rebellion in the Philippines primarily through an economic and political lens. Considering the global situation, and given events such as, Korea, the Soviet Union, Greece, and Germany, this view was not irrational but rather skewed. As Robert Jervis points out, “Perceptions are influenced by immediate concerns (“evoked sets”) as well as deeply rooted expectations.” For the US, the evoked set was communist expansion. From an economic standpoint, the US needed a strong trading partner and began to implement massive reconstruction. By 1949, total US expenditures to the Philippines were $1.5B. Ernest Schein, former Chief of Public and Private Claims of the Philippines War Damage Commission, wrote, “[For] rehabilitation to be constructive [it] must be along modern designs…rather than

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42 Greenberg, 63.
43 Quoted in Kerkvliet, 205.
44 Lansdale, 29.
45 Taruc, 37.
restoration of the status quo ante bellum.”

He also argued that the strategy must not be isolated from the realities of the day, and even though donations are good for relations and humanity they may not equate to an effective rehabilitation program. Despite the best of intentions, the money was used by large industries and landowners who looked after their own interests first. Prior to 1950, the US and Philippine governments did not identify systemic socio-cultural issues, many of which were caused by their own policies and behavior.

In contrast, the Huks had the pulse of the people. Its leaders understood the changes in social hierarchy through absentee landlords and provided a replacement patriarchy. They realized the psychological aspect of having your patriarch abandon you, collaborate with Japanese, then return to demand back rent. The Huks also understood the informational elements given that most in the barrio were illiterate, and those who could read did not believe what they read. Instead they trusted their barrio lieutenant to give them information. Huk slogans such as “Land for the Landless,” “Bullets not Ballots,” and “Prosperity for the Masses,” helped inspire followers and spread their message. The Huks produced newspapers, radio broadcasts, periodicals, essays, and poems, which focused on cultural, theoretical, and pragmatic issues. With this informational campaign and multi-dimensional approach, the Huks were able to reach a wide audience in Luzon, including some elites. Culturally and socially effective literature, and face-to-face communication, was largely absent from US and Philippine approaches.

More importantly, awareness of the extant human conditions on the ground gave the Huks the needed perspective to assign agency. Prior to 1950, the Philippine and US government placed agency at the presidential and landowner levels. This level was the deepest their analysis of issues in the archipelago had penetrated. In contrast, the Huks built their basic unit around the barrio. Jose Abueva highlights the barrio as a “well-knit community” with roots in the family structure. The barrio was a strong loyalty group that influenced its members based on kinship and family ties. Attitudes and behavior of individuals would be driven by barrio (group) thought, not necessarily individual or nationalist tendencies.

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49 Schein, 541.

50 Abueva, 23-25.

51 Greenberg, 41.

52 Greenberg, 53.

53 Abueva, 26.
The Huks intuitively understood agency and control. The Huks instituted the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC), which carried out “recruiting, intelligence, supply, and civil justice.”\(^{54}\) The BUDC was supported by regional commands, and was the lowest element of control for the Huks and communist party. This new shadow government also served a potential future governmental role; once liberation or revolution came, the local/regional Huk government would present a “fait accompli.”\(^{55}\)

By 1949, the US was becoming aware of Filipino social realities, and its relations with the Philippine government were souring. In a memorandum from a meeting between President Truman and President Quirino, the former made the observation that the latter “minimized the problem of internal security,” and could not get down to “brass tacks” on much of anything substantial.\(^{56}\) The other branches of the US government were beginning to take notice as well. A declassified CIA report from 1950 showed a marked difference in the US-Philippine political relationship. The report stated that the Philippine government had “poor leadership,” and President Quirino was “weak, vacillating, and bewildered.”\(^{57}\) It also described the need for real reforms, fair elections, and identified the interests of the Philippine government leaders as mostly economic and political.\(^{58}\)

There were a number of elements that coalesced to change the US position as well as the situation. In 1947, the US signed the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) with the Philippine government. One of the elements of the MAA was an organization known as the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), which would help train and advise the Philippine military forces. Additionally, in June 1950, the US sent a team, the Bell Mission, to the Philippines to “survey the entire Philippine economic situation,” and make self-help recommendations. The members of the team had experience in economics and the Philippines.\(^{59}\) Frank Golay suggests the Bell Mission report provided the “introduction of much needed

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\(^{54}\) Lansdale, 7. See also Greenberg 22. See also Kerkvliet 94-95.

\(^{55}\) Greenberg, 23.


\(^{57}\) Central Intelligence Agency Report, 5.

\(^{58}\) Central Intelligence Agency Report, 1-3.

objectivity...to replace...ad hoc expedients to deal with transient symptoms.” He adds that the Bell Report was economically focused and addressed long-standing trade issues, but it also recommended provisions for “social services and social investment.” In 1951, Truman began the Mutual Security Agency, which provided long-term development and administration of military assistance. These events also coincided with pressure from the US ambassador and the US military to President Quirino to appoint Ramon Magsaysay to be the Secretary of National Defense in 1950.

Magsaysay was a native of Luzon who grew up of modest means and worked as a mechanic and manager. During WWII he served with the USAFFE guerrillas during liberation, ultimately becoming a district commander. Magsaysay served in the House of Representatives and on numerous committees prior to becoming the Secretary of National Defense. Because of his background as a working-class guerrilla steeped in politics, he understood all sides of this issue. Magsaysay also had help from a US intelligence officer, Edward Lansdale. Lansdale had previous experience in the Philippines working as an intelligence officer in the Office of Special Services (OSS), and Army Intelligence. He left the Philippines in 1948 but not before he had immersed himself as a neutral observer in the social and cultural life of the Filipino people. He returned in 1950 attached to the JUSMAG, which had been gathering intelligence since its inception in 1947. When Lansdale returned to the Philippine in 1950 he received briefings from military and political leaders on communism and the military efforts to stop the Huk. In his book, In the Midst of Wars, Lansdale lamented the inability of the JUSMAG to grasp fully the concepts outside of the military metrics of success.

Magsaysay and Lansdale became close friends and are given much of the credit for the defeat of the Huks. Within days of his appointment, Magsaysay began to rid his office of corruption, fired corrupt PC officers, and travelled to visit both his military personnel and local civilians to hear their concerns. He started reforms to pay the Armed Forces of the Philippines

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60 Golay, 81.
61 Golay, 355-356.
64 Greenberg, 80.
65 Lansdale, Chapters 1,2.
66 Lansdale, Chapter 2.
67 Lansdale, 18-25.
68 Greenberg, 83.
(AFP) well, so they did not have to steal from the people they were there to protect. Magsaysay instilled discipline and professionalism in the AFP, but did not necessarily seek to make them stronger. He took such actions to win back the respect of the locals who feared the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) and the PC. Maj Lawrence Greenberg notes that, “three months into his term as secretary children ran to greet Army trucks…rather than running to hide in the jungle.” After reforming the AFP and providing central security, Lansdale and Magsaysay began counter the shadow governments (BUDC) and provide local security. In countering the BUDC, the AFP began building volunteer units to protect the barrios. By 1955 the program had grown to over 10,000 participants.

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After addressing internal corruption and local security, Lansdale and Magsaysay looked to co-opt the foundational elements of the Huk Rebellion. These elements included social change, fair justice, and legitimate governance. One particular co-option program that focused on the social and land reform elements was called the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR). EDCOR provided former Huks with better treatment, farming education, and their own plot of land. They also implemented a “cash-for-guns” program, which, according to one estimate, reduced Huk weapons by half. Magsaysay also implemented a new legal representation program. The legal program provided counsel for poor farmers who had been exploited in court against the better-educated lawyers hired by the landowners. With these three programs Magsaysay had co-opted the three major Huk sources of support.

Lansdale and Magsaysay also secured a fair and safe election in 1951. They built the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which was meant to educate and support fair elections. They used the newly professionalized AFP and PC to secure the voting locations, as well as town meetings. The new programs and security closed the gap between the central government and the people by giving hope for a fair judicial and governmental process.

The newly professionalized AFP reorganized into smaller units, following unconsciously the approach Gen Otis instituted decades prior. After the reorganization its units were better able

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69 Greenberg, 88.
70 Greenberg, 134.
71 Greenberg, 117.
72 Major Andrew E. Lembke, Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines: A Case Study of Limited Intervention Counterinsurgency, Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2012), 52.
73 Lembke, 53-54.
to attack in more coordinated and precise methods. The AFP patrols worked together with locals in the *barrios*, and they arrested members of the communist party without harming innocent Filipinos. The Philippine government increased both the legitimacy and proportionality behind its use of violence, in contrast to the former iron-fist policy. In essence, the Philippine government divided the people from the guerrillas. After numerous victories, especially the widely successful politburo arrests, the PKP stayed mostly in Manila and away from the peasants, where Magsaysay now had control in the *barrios*. In response, the Huks turned more violent and desperate and lashed out at innocent civilians who did not support them.

Co-opting of the psychological and informational elements continued into 1952 when the AFP built the Public Affairs Office, which conducted programs using “pamphlets, posters, and public address systems.” The US revived the Free Philippines newspaper, which was underground during the Japanese occupation. The nostalgia of the newspaper helped inspire people when it resurfaced. The Public Affairs teams also lived among the people and helped them build schools and other civic buildings. Such projects were based on self-help as opposed to blind monetary aid. Communicating with the people ended the Huk monopoly on informational elements and messaging, much as the second Philippine Commission had done in the Philippine-American War. Lansdale and Magsaysay built a combined informational and psychological approach that undermined support for the Huks.

The last co-option problem to be addressed was perceptions of the illegitimacy of the Philippine government. In 1953, Magsaysay resigned from his position as Secretary of National Defense and ran for president with the Nationalista party. He wrote in his resignation letter, “It would be futile to go on killing Huk while administration continues to breed dissidence by neglecting the problems of our masses.” During his presidential campaign, he visited 1,100 *barrios*, talked with locals, assuaged their psychological traumas of the past, and promised to mend the socio-cultural issues of the present. By 1953 he began healing the wounds left by the Spanish, the Philippine-American War, the Japanese occupation, and American colonialism. Maj Andrew Lembke mentions that by the time he was elected president, Magsaysay’s political

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75 Lembke, 68.
76 Greenberg, 133.
77 Lembke, 81.
78 Greenberg, 133.
79 Greenberg, 137-138.
80 Greenberg, 138.
movement “had chapters in 15,600 of the approximately 18,000 barrios in the Philippines.”

Some fighting continued, but after Magsaysay was elected president, the Huks never returned as an effective fighting force.

The Human Domain in the Huk Rebellion

At the end of WWII, the Philippines had been devastated. William Manchester notes that of all the cities in WWII, “only Warsaw suffered more [than Manila].” The Philippines were among the last Japanese holdouts. Almost one million had perished; “70 percent of the utilities, 75 percent of the factories, 80 percent of the southern residential district, and 100 percent of the business district were razed.” By itself, such devastation would have been a difficult task to overcome. A corrupt Philippine government, a self-interested elite class, a disaffected peasant class, an opportunistic communist party, and the US preoccupied with global concerns made the situation worse.

The Huk Rebellion is often mistaken for a “small wars” but in reality it was much more. The richer vein to this conflict is the human aspects bookended by large-scale (WWII) and small-scale wars (rebellion), as well as the spaces in-between. It was not until the US and Philippine governments recognized the combined meaning of the social (tenancy, politics, corrupt government), cultural (paternalism, familial bonds), psychological (collaborationist, veterans benefits), and informational (face-to-face, barrio focus, messaging) elements that they forged a new approach based on more than pure repression. Centuries of Spanish colonization and decades of American colonization had divided the Philippines into what Dr. Mina Ramirez describes as the indigenous and the dominant cultural spheres. The indigenous culture stemmed from the barrio, familial, and Filipino language society, whereas the dominant culture was the impersonal, and externally incentivized “mediated” culture. American colonization and complicity advanced the latter and made no concessions for the conflicting values that result from competing cultures. Filipino cultural and social events did not present themselves overnight. US leaders had time on their side because they had been present and active in the Philippines for decades. Looking at the conflict from the perspective of HD may tell us why the US initially failed.

81 Lembke, 81.
82 Manchester, 413.
83 Manchester, 413.
The Huk Rebellion was largely a reaction to an environment that emerged slowly over decades of economic downturn, exploitive and absentee landlords, socio-cultural transformation, and psychological trauma. Furthermore, the capitalist-induced termination of patriarchal responsibilities, coupled with the abuses that come with absenteeism, broke the cultural traditions that the peasants relied on for generations. The violence and shock of Japanese occupation provided political opportunities for the Huks and the PKP to grow and fill the void left by those who abandoned the masses. From a cultural, social, and psychological perspective, rebellion was the only rational option for the population. Their landlords turned on them, the government left them, and the US was complicit.

After the elite abandoned the peasants, the interested parties attempted to be the paternalistic leader, each pursuing its own interests. The US was trying to educate its “little brown brother” out of economic self-interest and to ensure Asian security. The communists were trying to absorb both the peasants and the urban proletariat into their political sphere. Even though communism was anathema to democracy and religion, two ideologies that Filipinos have historically defended, the communist agenda succeeded temporarily because it overlaid a new social hierarchy on a cultural transformation. This also helps explain why the Huk rebellion did not spread past the island of Luzon. Not all of the islands had the drastic changes in social and cultural traditions or the governmental repressions that accompanied them. Much as occurred during the Philippine-American War, the spread of rebellion stopped at the Visayas. Both the US and PKP attempts at winning the people failed because neither had the true interests of the peasant at heart.

Operational Value

Three major operational values of the HD come to light in the Huk Rebellion case study. The first is knowledge of the environment and looking beyond the superficial to find underlying causes. The second is the value of providing purpose to presence. Presence in a country, no matter how lengthy, is not necessarily equal to knowledge of the people. The third operational value of HD includes freedom of action.

When deployed to new terrain the first thing military forces do is refer to a map to orient themselves. Maps provide a two-dimensional representation of three-dimensional space with large and fairly obvious terrain features with major roads and cities. Maps are useful for targeting and navigating, but insufficient for explaining, defining, or anticipating behavior or consequences of action. At the operational level, the HD provides a different sort of map in many other
dimensions, including the economic, cultural, social, and political. Instead of telling the observer where to go, an HD map helps him understand where he is, but it is a snapshot in time and must be routinely reevaluated. This ever-changing map may also show the relationship between elements of the HD. Each element is connected to the others and can push or pull depending on the context of the situation. For example, over many generations in the Philippines there was a cultural impetus to develop the social hierarchy of patronage and tenancy. Added to this dynamic was an economic pull from global markets, which lured the landowners and elites away from the proximity to the peasants and toward abandoning their traditional social roles. Thus, the HD may provide knowledge and a deeper understanding of the environment by revealing the terrain and also the interdependence between its various elements.

The second operational value of HD provides purpose to presence. The tactical level will provide much of the context and information needed to develop sound operational plans, but as Ed C. de Jesus observes, focus on the tactical level runs the risk of “learning more and more about less and less.” He goes on to suggest that we should avoid the “pedantic interests” at the “local/national axis levels” and instead “focus on the linkages between sub-national units” and identify “patterns of relationships” instead. The operational level can strike the right balance between the forest and the trees. It has the dual role of contributing to the development of sound strategy with tactical information. Lansdale and Magsaysay were in this position of blending operational and tactical spheres to the point at which their seams almost disappear. In a practical sense, the HD concept facilitates the merging of tactical context and operational knowledge into something purposeful. The US had been involved in the Philippines since 1898. MacArthur and McNutt lived there. Even the JUSMAG had been present since 1947. It was not until a different HD vantage point was developed by Lansdale and adopted by the operational and strategic leadership and organization writ large that US presence became purposeful.

Third, inherent in the HD concept is the assumption of freedom of action. No nation, which has a global reach and impact on other states, especially the US, can be fully focused on a single town, city, or country. The HD requires a level of autonomy to observe the people and then act according to necessity and “ground truth” without the typical high-level management. David Kilcullen argues that the “national-level shorthand, [which] lumps huge and diverse” groups into one homogeneous entity, “flattens out the crucial important variations among

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85 McCoy and de Jesus, 447.
86 McCoy and de Jesus, 447.
The resultant effect is a watered down response with top-level pressure. The HD provides a new methodology to avoid the shorthand and move toward freedom of action, similar to what Kilcullen refers to as the “co-design” process. The JUSMAG provides a clear example of this relationship and freedom of maneuver. JUSMAG members, whose control fell under the State Department, were able to take a long view of the Huk problem. Lansdale and Magsaysay were better able to produce local results from local intelligence, with operational and even strategic assets as a supporting role, after high-level pressure was released and they were granted freedom of action. Thus, the value of freedom of maneuver in HD is in the ability to send few resources, over long periods, with sufficient autonomy to make mistakes and adjust. When the strategy is executed in too directive a manner from the top-down approach, mistakes tend to be amplified and are difficult to reverse.

### Strategic Value

After studying the Huk Rebellion through an HD lens, three aspects of strategic value are evident. The first relates to the previously mentioned biases, however, HD may also provide an ability to perform self-assessment as well. The US changes the environment it is attempting to study or operate in and HD may provide an ability to elevate our assessment of the subject. The second aspect of strategic value relates to coercion and international relations. On a grander scale, having HD capabilities means greater influence in the new security environment. Lastly, HD may offer value by revealing a new way to think about the temporal domain.

When the Huk Rebellion started, the US had been in the Philippines for forty years. During that time the policies and connections changed the environment. Voting rights, land agreements, taxation and trade, all influenced the socio-cultural changes that occurred throughout the period of colonization and independence. The US changed the environment it was attempting to study but made no concession to that fact. The strategic value of an HD approach came when the JUSMAG, Lansdale, and the US government abandoned overly simplistic explanations and biases, and began to see the conflict in broader terms. Programs such as EDCOR, and the improved local security, were solutions to problems the US either caused or was complicit in causing. Groups and individuals desire to see themselves on the side of good, however, the HD mindset helped the US overcome this hurdle and find appropriate solutions. Only then did its actions produce effective results. Therefore a crucial insight is that the HD should not just be a

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88 In 1951, the JUSMAG was placed under the general guidance of the ambassador. See Greenberg, 101.
lens to look at others. It can and should be a lens to look at everyone and everything, including oneself, as objectively as possible.

The HD may also add value to strategic coercion.89 The HD may add a new strategic dimension to the idea of deterrence and compellence, which can have utility in addressing the challenges of the new security environment. Such utility can occur in two specific ways. First, the HD offers insights into second- and third-order effects to US behavior and coercion. A RAND study in 1999 stated that, “Successful future coercion will depend on understanding time horizons, recognizing unanticipated consequences, and otherwise incorporating context.”90 The evidence in this case study suggests the HD may offer the context, temporal, and behavioral consequences of policies and behavior. Ideally, the HD could offer another avenue for coercion in this new security environment that does not respond to large conventional threats or typical deterrent measures.

The second dimension the HD offers to strategic coercion relates to the limits of US economic, political, and military power. Prior to 1950, the US responded to challenges first by authorizing funds. After funding, and if the problem escalated, the next preferred response was military in nature. When Lansdale arrived to the Philippines in 1950 he received briefings that focused solely on military operations.91 The situation in the Philippines involved more than politics or communism. Social and cultural turmoil could not be solved by money, political pressure, or military operations. It was not until the Bell Mission, the Mutual Security Agency, JUSMAG, and well-aimed economic incentives were implemented that the situation turned for the better. Through an analysis similar to HD, various US agents were able to identify their limits of power and adjusted their coercion strategy accordingly. Additionally, identifying the limits of power can help one restrain the use or threat of force and other behaviors with negative, long-term consequences. Knowing when not to fight may be just as valuable as knowing how to.

The third value of HD relates to the temporal domain. Historically, time has been used in small wars as a weapon to wear-down an enemy and drain resources. The HD offers a more expansive look at time. For example, the Huk Rebellion is typically understood as taking place from 1946 to 1954. From an HD perspective strategically, however, many of the issues that

89 Thomas Schelling popularized the term Coercion. Coercion is the umbrella term, which includes deterrence and compellence. Coercion is the ability to change behavior of others through force or the threat of force. See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
91 Lansdale, Chapter 1.
prompted the Rebellion date back to the 1920s and 1930s or even back to the Philippine-American War when the policies regarding voting rights, tenancy, and economic incentives were made. There were US and Philippine government opportunities before and after WWII to alter the trajectory and tempo of the socio-cultural changes, but the former lacked the capability or perhaps even the interest to intervene in this manner. Instead of looking at the problem of fast or slow, the HD may have offered a more informed strategy to avoid bad situations, and capitalize on opportunities. Having more options at strategic levels suggests there are “on-ramps” and “off-ramps” for conflict, at a pace of our choosing. The HD then, is beneficial as it alters a mindset of an “on/off switch” for the use of the military and suggests there are other, middle-ground options over time. The HD may even suggest interim solutions when political interest is insufficient for action.

In sum, the Philippine-American War and the Huk Rebellion were two separate conflicts with very similar traits. From an HD perspective these conflicts share the lineage of centuries of colonialism, repression, and socio-cultural change. Interestingly, the rebellions studied so far have been limited to Luzon. By the 1980s, however, the policies and military decisions of the US during and after both of these conflicts indirectly set the stage for conflict farther south in the archipelago. The Moros of the southern islands were affected by socio-cultural change, spurred by economic incentives and myopic policies and strategies.
Chapter 5

Muslim Rebellion in the Philippines

Moros did not become Muslims...Muslims became Moros, Philippine Muslims

Charles Frake

In the wake of al-Qaeda’s attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), policymakers in the US noticed the Philippines had become an increasingly unstable and dangerous country. In addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US opened up a “second front” of the Global War on Terror in Southeast Asia. Specifically, US decision makers focused on the violent Islamic extremist threat in the southern Philippines, which includes the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, among others. Considering the history of terror attacks in the Philippines and the events of 9/11, the “second front” was probably justified. However, incorporating the Philippines into a Global War on Terror was ahistorical at best. At worst, it fails to grasp the long struggle between Christians, Muslims, and a repressive and corrupt government. This chapter studies the unrest in the south of the Philippines from a broad historical and socio-cultural perspective and offers relevant insights about the nature and character of the conflict. This examination will also
analyze the utility of the HD in this type of conflict. In short, in the Philippines, the roots of rebellion run deep.

**Background**

The history of the southern Philippines dates back centuries but is beyond the scope of this thesis. This chapter surveys broadly the salient historical events and their context in order to assess the Muslim rebellion in the Philippines from a HD perspective. Islam arrived in Southeast Asian region and the southern parts of what are now the Philippines in the 14th century. During Spanish colonization from the sixteenth century until to the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslim population was largely separated from the northern region in almost every way, including language, culture, and social structures. The Muslim population, known colloquially by the name given to them by the Spanish, the “Moros,” had been present in all parts of the Philippines until Spanish occupation. The conversion of most Filipinos to Catholicism, as well as sporadic fighting, forced many of the Islamic faith south, to the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Jolo, as well as to the Sulu archipelago.

Prior to colonization, Moros were not static peoples simply living in peace and tranquility. They had been a part of a 16th century world-system and underwent changes in economics, ideologies, power, and cultural identity, as did their Christian neighbors. Islam and its ideology had been welcomed by many in the areas of Southeastern Asia, which resulted in differing sects of Islam forming among the various tribes. As a result, different regions were cast in various Islamic hues based on language, religion, and social structure. Spanish clergy unsuccessfully attempted to convert the Moro inhabitants by establishing missionaries throughout the southern region. The Spanish built Fort Pillar in Zamboanga in 1718. George Radics argues that the fort not only challenged the local power structure and self-determination of the local leaders, but also the religious foundation on which local power was based. Conflict was common and violent throughout the Spanish colonization, with Christian incursions in the south and Muslim incursions in the north. The Moro population is comprised of thirteen very diverse

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1 Fracia, 58.
3 Frake, 41-54.
5 Linn, 180.
“ethno-linguistic groups,” as illustrated by tribal and fractious behavior. The differing tribes included the Tausugs, Maranaos, and Maguindanaos, among others. With internal and external challenges to power and identity, the Moro have become fiercely defensive of their territory, people, and any outside influences, including other Muslims.

During Spanish colonization, the Moros also expanded into other regions of the Philippines. *Tulisanes* (Muslim outlaws) frequently invaded the northern islands in search of recently cultivated rice or other sea-traded crops. The southern and eastern coasts of Luzon were the sites of numerous acts of Moro piracy, criminal activity, and terrorism that eventually affected the evolution of economic development and the relationships among the disparate regions and peoples of north and south. The relationship between the Christian north and Muslim south could largely be described as a *modus vivendi*, or agreement to live separately in coexistence. This coexistence, however, was hardly peaceful and was punctuated by acts of invasion and violence on both sides with neither side gaining significant advantage. The history of identity and culture, while foreign to American conceptualizations of our own past, is important to the understanding of 21st century “terrorism” in the southern Philippines.

The US Army recognized the Moro fierceness and defensiveness first-hand when it arrived in the Philippines in 1898. Gen Kobbe, commander of the Mindanao-Jolo area, and Dean Worcester witnessed the fierceness of the Moro tribes and the inhospitable terrain. As a result, both concluded they should not attempt to push the Moros into a western social structure too soon. The US also made agreements in 1899 when, as Brian Linn points out, “the Sultan of Sulu accepted US sovereignty,” with the US military promising protection from local and regional enemies. The peaceful status quo would not last, however, as US district commanders could no longer turn away from the internal violence and slavery practiced by the Moro. Additionally, there was political pressure from Manila to incorporate the southern areas into the Philippine

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10 Linn, 123.
political and legal spheres. Political pressure and internal violence contributed to the Moro rebellion, which occurred from 1901 until 1913.\textsuperscript{11} Brig Gen John Pershing was sent to quell the fight with the Moro insurgents, who were fighting for an autonomous state, much like their Christian Filipinos cousins had been doing since 1896.\textsuperscript{12} The US reaction to the Moro rebellion was considered heavy-handed, as news reports relayed the death of 600 Filipinos, including women and children, in the town Bud Dajo.\textsuperscript{13}

By the mid-twentieth century the Muslim population had been influenced by Islam and the Koranic societal structures, as well as Spanish and American colonization, resulting in socio-cultural clashes.\textsuperscript{14} The Moro, like their Christian Filipino cousins, had undergone several societal changes. Spanish and American colonizers forced the typical self-determining and self-sufficient barangay settlements, led by powerful chiefs, into larger and more centralized municipalities used for taxes and legal control.\textsuperscript{15} This could be viewed in much the same light as the Spanish desire to have people live “under the bells” of Catholicism. The Moros viewed the socio-cultural movement as a control mechanism that shifted authority from a locally derived and trusted persons or groups, to one controlled from Manila by Christians. Furthermore, American colonialism brought with it distinct democratic and economic values and behavior. World markets, combined with democratic idealism, forced changes in Filipino language, culture, trade, and the body politic in general. After liberating the islands from Japanese, the US granted the Philippines independence in 1946. The elites coveted independence, but for the rural Filipinos independence alone did not address their economic or political problems. For the Moro inhabitants, American encroachment and Christian central authority were quite unnerving.

For the Moros, independence meant that they no longer had a level of self-determination enjoyed under US colonialism. To Muslims, independence meant that the southern Philippines were just as much a part of the national government as Luzon or the Visayas. The Sultan and datu power were again being undermined. Rural disaffection and neglect had different effects within different Moro groups. Followers of the local power brokers began to wonder if their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "Moro Wars", (accessed April 20, 2016), http://www.britannica.com/event/Moro-Wars.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Karnow, 194.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Francia, 308. As a testament to the ferocity of the Moro Filipinos, the US Army changed to a .45 caliber sidearm because the standard lighter round would not stop a charging Moro tribesman.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Francia, 13.
\end{itemize}
leaders had abandoned them or were no longer in control. By 1950, the southern region of the Philippines had been influenced by benevolent and imperialist interlopers as well as an inter-Philippine collaboration between the majority Christian Filipinos and Americans. The Moros believed they were being forced to integrate into Christian socio-cultural structures. The Huk Rebellion would confirm their beliefs and also begin a period of abrupt changes within the relationship between Moros and Christian Filipinos.

The Moros viewed the Huk Rebellion as a Christian-based power struggle in the north. Even worse, the power struggle resulted in a resettlement of 20,500 Hucks and their sympathizers into Muslim territories. The resettlement plans from Magsaysay and EDCOR encroached heavily on Moro territory and directly threatened power structures that had been in place for over four centuries. As Moros saw it, the movement of democracy, Catholicism, capitalism, and world influences spread beyond Luzon and the Visayas. The socio-cultural changes that resulted from outside pressure began to be felt in the otherwise insular Moro south, as Christians not only settled in the region but quickly became the majority. The addition of Christian settlers was accompanied by edicts from the central Philippines government that protected them physically and economically. Astrid Tuminez asserts that, for example, many “laws in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nullified Moro traditional concepts of communal land ownership.”

The Moros, however, were not the only Filipinos feeling abused by the government. After the mid-twentieth-century, Filipinos throughout the archipelago became increasingly aware of their dire situation. The economy was poor, rural areas were underdeveloped, and the Philippine government was corrupt. Activists such as Alejandro Lichauco ascribed the problems to American imperialism, military basing, a colonial educational system, and a general undermining of Filipino culture and self-determination. The World Bank gave its report on the Philippines in 1976, which stated, “three-quarters of the population…lives in rural areas, where social services are poor, economic activities [are] limited…and underemployment high.” Furthermore, the disparity in income distribution was driving a wedge between the rural and urban population. By 1971, “half of all rural families [in the Philippines]

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17 Tuminez, 122-125.
19 World Bank Report, 92.
had incomes below that required to provide adequate nutrition and other essentials of life.”

While many rural Filipinos shared burdens across the archipelago, Mindanao was specifically neglected by private industry and lagged behind the northern islands in the number of banks and in overall electrification. The gaps in income as well as public and private neglect may not have been intentional, but they did not have to be.

The Presidential Administration of Ferdinand Marcos, elected in 1965, led to the slow decline of the Philippine economy and a return to a representative government. Its progress was accompanied, however, by the growth of corruption, which made the troubling economic situation in the Philippines worse. By 1980 prices on basic needs had tripled, wages were down 20 percent, and commerce was down 40 percent. Relative deprivation was evident in the fact that the top 10 percent of people were earning over 40 percent of the total income. Income disparity also led many talented and educated Filipinos to leave the country in search of opportunities elsewhere, leading to a “brain drain” that continues to plague the islands.

Economic decline led those who remained in the Philippines to protest or take other forms of action against the government. In the southern islands, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), which began in the 1960s, was a natural response to the lack of support in central government as well as a political movement to grant Mindanao independence. Muslim Filipinos saw their own independence as promising a much-needed return to traditional cultural and power structures. The political and physical fighting continued between MIM and the Philippine government. But during his tenure as president Marcos was able to fracture the growing MIM rebellion by persuading its leader to defect. After the MIM defection, another more radical movement emerged. According to Charles Frake, this movement “challenged... Philippine government rule [as well as] the Muslim elites.”

The movement became known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The group was formed in 1972 after fighting in Manila and Mindanao had become more sectarian and

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20 World Bank Report, 94-95.
21 World Bank Report, 175, 319.
22 Francia, 241.
23 Francia, 241.
25 Frake, 41-54.
26 Frake, 41-54.
bloody. The intention of the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, was to join Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan into a separate state. Ideologically, the MNLF had two goals. First, the Front attempted to join the disparate cultures of the Moro population into a unified “pan-Moro” group. Second, the Front sought to challenge the corrupt Philippine government as well as the local Muslim leaders who had been unsuccessful, if not inept, in their role of championing Muslim issues. MNLF leaders also began to establish ties with other regional Muslim organizations in the Middle East, Malaysia, and Indonesia as part of their pan-Moro vision. The growth of these ties led Libya to establish the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines to “coordinate overseas assistance.” Misuari denied any religious undertones in the MNLF agenda and even accepted the name “Moro,” which implied Filipino roots. Observers and those in other governments, however, remained suspicious of MNLF motives, and Misuari could not convince either Muslims or Christians the group had a pragmatic, secular agenda.

Unable to sell his agenda as being inclusive, Misuari and the MNLF increasingly clashed with the AFP. The MNLF was able to do so with backing from countries in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Muammar Qaddafi during the 1970s. After fierce fighting, and under threats of an oil embargo, the MNLF and Marcos began to negotiate. The result of negotiations was an agreement to establish a Muslim autonomous region. Ten of the thirteen provinces in question voted for Moro autonomy, which allowed for Muslim-led schools and judiciary institutions. The agreement, however, would not endure. Marcos entrusted the running of the autonomous region to his cronies and they in turn went into business for themselves. Crime and corruption within the autonomous region were rampant, as local warlords and Marcos cronies and government representatives colluded for profit. This corrupt and sometimes violent behavior would further divide the central government and Moro populations, spurring more fighting between the MNLF, local police, and the AFP.

28 Francia, 247-250. See also, Ramakrishna and Tan, 99-100.
29 Frake, 41-54.
30 Frake, 41-54.
31 Ramakrishna and Tan, 99.
32 Ramakrishna and Tan, 99.
33 Frake, 41-54.
35 Rogers, 15-20.
The stress of internal economic and political pressure broke down the pan-Muslim social fabric. Ethnic divisions subsumed for the pan-Muslim movement reappeared between the Muslim tribes such as the Tausug, Maranaos, and Maguindanaos. Aloysius O’Neil, Political Counselor in Manila from 1994-1997, observes that Muslim identity did not necessarily align with tribal loyalties and that “there was tension even within people who alleged that they were fighting for the same objective.”

Tausugs, for example, lived primarily in the Sulu archipelago and had developed a reputation for ferocity and violence. In addition, members of this tribe are known to value courage, which has led to their collective labeling as an “honor society.” As within other honor societies, male Tausugs participate in a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood. In Tausug culture, this rite, called pangusual-usal, involves young men embarking on adventurous excursions to other areas for “romancing and fighting.” With the Tausugs thought to be in control of the MNLF, the delicate social fabric and ethnic divisions produced another fracture.

In 1978, Hashim Salamat, a more orthodox Muslim from the Magindanao tribe and deputy to Nur Misuari, broke away from MNLF and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF believed that the MNLF had become too moderate and lost its way ideologically. MILF members, for example, detested the MNLF for its willingness to accept autonomy and not fight for independence. The MILF attempted to become the stronger Muslim group, but the Philippine government was reluctant to negotiate with radicals.

The relationship between the Philippine government and MNLF was tenuous but improving. Internal Philippine political turmoil persisted until the election of 1986 when Corazon Aquino took power. Aquino was able to reverse some of the harm done by Marcos when she released political prisoners and returned to a bicameral legislature, rather than a dictatorship. Aquino’s efforts went a long way to restoring communication between the government and insurgent movements such as the MNLF. By 1989, communication and negotiations between the Philippine government and Muslim groups improved to the extent that another vote was cast by southern Filipinos to decide on autonomy of the southern Moros. This time, only four of the

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38 Orr, 253-273.
39 Orr, 253-273.
40 Frake, 41-54, See also Francia, 251.
41 Francia, 262-263.
thirteen provinces voted in favor of Muslim autonomy.\textsuperscript{42} The other provinces, now with Christian majorities, voted against the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM remained active for a number of years but was largely ineffective due to its lack of voter-approved mandate. Additionally, the Region’s leaders proved incapable of providing governance to Muslims and had little support from the national government in Manila. Furthermore, land ownership in the Muslim population shrank from majority status in the southern areas after the Philippine-American War to a mere 18 percent by 1982.\textsuperscript{43} As the 1980s drew to a close, the Moro population had little cause for optimism. Two separate votes on the ARMM resulted in failure, Moros increasingly lost their lands, and the cultural and social power structures were being challenged.

By 1990 there were two main Muslim movements: the MNLF and the MILF. Over time, the MNLF grew more moderate in its political demands and was never able to unite the Muslim community because internal fractures and divisions among tribes and goals became more acute. In contrast, the MILF was growing in numbers and turned more violent and began to turn to terrorism and larger cities. The MILF built training camps and shadow governments throughout its area of control, and subsequently became more brazen in the mid-1990s, when its leaders plotted to kill the Pope, as well as blow up a passenger airliner.\textsuperscript{44} In the late 1990s, after failed ceasefires and negotiations, Aquino’s successor as President, Joseph Estrada, ordered an all-out assault on MILF camps. In one particularly culturally provocative display, Estrada travelled to a recently liberated MILF camp and proceeded to eat pork, which is proscribed by Islamic practices.\textsuperscript{45} The situation between Muslim groups and the Philippine government was growing worse, as were the relationships between the two main Muslim groups.

As the divide among Muslim tribes grew wider, other groups sprang up. One of these new groups, called Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), was founded in 1991. ASG had bases in Basilan, Jolo, and Mindanao; it was led by Abdurajak Janjalani. Charles Frake notes that, “Janjalani was a student” of fundamentalism in Zamboanga when it was “filled with [Muslim] refugees from the violence.”\textsuperscript{46} Later, Janjalani received his military training in Egypt before returning to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{47} The members of ASG were typically from the Tausug and Yakan tribes, which

\textsuperscript{42} Tuminez, 122-125. See also Francia, 265.
\textsuperscript{43} Tuminez, 122-125.
\textsuperscript{45} Francia, 299.
\textsuperscript{46} Frake, 41-54.
\textsuperscript{47} Frake, 41-54.
were dissatisfied with Misuari’s leadership and willingness to negotiate with a Christian government. Similar to the rite of passage of the Tausug, ASG produced roving bands of young men who fight and romance. Unlike the educated and secular MNLF and the more Islamicist and politically elite MILF, ASG consisted of “displaced, unaffiliated youth [from] refugee communities,” that seek a militant solution for an Islamic State. The relationship among the MNLF, MILF, and ASG was tenuous. Each side was fighting for Muslim superiority over their Christian colonizers, but the two differed drastically in local loyalties, ethnic divisions of power, and methods of operation.

The Growth of ASG

Given its connection to other violent Islamic extremist groups, ASG gained a degree of international recognition. Senior ASG members had linkages to al-Qaeda and, more specifically, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden’s brother-in-law had cemented his connection to ASG through marriage to a Filipina and began to funnel funds through a local charity. Bin Laden eventually sent his operations director, Ramzi Yousef (known for the bombing of the World Trade center in 1993), to train the ASG and helped fund the young start-up organization.

ASG gained even greater recognition after a string of kidnappings and terrorist acts. ASG was blamed, for example, for the 1995 Ipil (a Christian town) massacre of 57 people. Senior members of the Philippine government took ASG seriously after the Ipil incident and began to fight back. The Philippine National Police had some successes, such as in the killing of Janjalani in 1998. In general, however, the larger Philippine government response was not effective.

ASG leaders soon discovered criminal activity was easier and more profitable than violence. One journalist concluded, “the group’s Islamic identity was subordinated to the quest for profit.” It was not until the turn of the millennium that ASG’s criminal actions, specifically kidnapping and ransom, earned Western attention. In 2000, ASG raided a resort taking 21 foreign tourists hostages and demanded the following: an Islamic State, large sums of money, and

48 Ramakrishna and Tan, 108. See also Frake, 41-54. See also Orr, 253-273. 262.
49 Frake, 41-54. See also Francia, 292.
50 Vaughn et al 2. See also Francia, 292.
51 Ramakrishna and Tan, 108.
52 For an account that attributes the violence of Ipil to ASG see Ramakrishna and Tan, 108. For an account that sees ASG as largely innocent and taking the blame, see Frake, 41-54.
53 Rogers, 15-20.
release of Islamic militants from prison.\textsuperscript{54} Also in 2000, ASG took 51 hostages on Basilan, and in May 2001, they kidnapped two American missionaries. Much as Moro piracy had in previous centuries, ASG violence and criminality struck fear into Christian Filipinos as the group continued to bomb cities, airports, and cinemas. In an effort to continue negotiations with the Manila government, and maintain their local power, the MILF quickly condemned ASG behavior as being “un-Islamic.”\textsuperscript{55}

The al-Qaeda attacks in September 2001 instantly changed US perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Immediately following the attacks, President George W. Bush announced a “Global War on Terror.” The ASG was only one of eleven groups identified as a terrorist organization by Executive Order 13224.\textsuperscript{56} The Philippine government quickly announced its support for the US war. In a broader context, Philippine support could be viewed as loyalty to the US after a century of aid, or as a method to help balance Chinese expansion in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{57} According to another view, the Philippine support can be viewed as an effort to enlist US financial and military assistance to help defend against an internal threat. Whatever the Philippine intentions, in January 2002, the US sent more than 600 troops to Basilan as part of a global counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.\textsuperscript{58}

ASG was already well-known to the planners and staff of US Pacific Command (PACOM). The Command’s planners, through the Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC), established an operation designed to “deny sanctuary” and support to ASG, as well as “eliminate their ability to move.”\textsuperscript{59} The resulting task force, US Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P-- see Figure 5), was stationed in Zamboanga to help train local AFP forces and integrate intelligence.\textsuperscript{60}

The initial US response had limited success because it included ASG within a group with the Taliban, and al-Qaeda without having cognizance of local realities. ASG was not a global

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{54} Ramakrishna and Tan, 109.
\textsuperscript{55} Ramakrishna and Tan, 110.
\textsuperscript{56} Executive Order 13224, State Depart Doc
\textsuperscript{59} Maxwell, 20-23.
\textsuperscript{60} The US materially provided C-130s, Point-class cutters, special forces landing craft, 28 UH-1H helicopters, and 30,000 assault rifles. See Renato Cruz De Castro, 235-253.
\end{footnotesize}
terrorist organization taking its instructions from al-Qaeda. It did, however, receive training and some funding from al-Qaeda. Such support represented less a commitment to the global Islamic cause as it was driven by necessity, in the same way the Huks used the Communist Party. ASG used al-Qaeda and regional powers for similar self-interested reasons. The connections between global terror and the MNLF and the MILF were also sporadic and opportunistic at best.

Figure 5. JSOTF-P Joint Operations Area.
The local reality was MILF, MNLF and ASG were not beholden to anything other than local interests, and power. John Gershman explains further: “[ASG] operates in a limited area, lacks a major organized base, and has no coherent political agenda.”61 When viewed in this context, ASG appears to be a small band of criminals capitalizing on corrupt and inept central and local governments. Gershman adds that, “[MNLF, MILF, and ASG]…are all symptoms of the same diseases: problems in the local economy, weakness of states in the region, and the fragility of democratic institutions and regional intergovernmental organizations.”62 All three groups were responding to local, as opposed to global, sources of Philippine authority: distant authority, corrupt authority, and Christian authority. The initial strategic miscalculation of equating MNLF, MILF, and ASG with al-Qaeda kept US military and policy makers from addressing internal and systemic issues at the outset. Adding to the problem, Muslim Filipinos once again saw the US military establishment as supporting the AFP, which was known for human rights violations, as well as enabling a corrupt and violent local police.63

The arrival of US forces in the Philippines was accompanied by temporary and localized successes in the JSOTF-P operations. The AFP, with help from the US military, aggressively pursued members of ASG, and many of them fled to neighboring countries or went into hiding. After successful training, clearing operations, and the rescue of one of the American missionaries, the JSOTF-P reduced their presence in country. After the reduction in forces, however, ASG returned even more aggressively. Figure 6 depicts the increase in terror attacks in the Philippines around 2009. The rise in violence does not mean JSOTF-P failed, only that the strategy guiding its actions was incomplete and inadequate. Those in JSOTF-P were not ignorant of what it takes to be successful in such conflicts. From the beginning JSOTF-P was trying to work “by, with and through” the Philippine government, in an effort to “increase the legitimacy of the host government.”64 However, the US was working “by, with, and through” a government that was historically corrupt, inept, and repressive of Muslim minorities.

62 Gershman, 60-74.
63 Gershman, 60-74.
64 Swain, 2-3.
The US had unintentionally aligned itself along what Charles Frake calls “ethnically based fault lines,” which exacerbated the violence and did little to reduce the tension. The US historically espouses a “whole of government” approach; but in this case, the Philippine government was part of the problem. The strategy of legitimizing the government was not incorrect; it was, however, insufficient given the widespread disaffection and socio-cultural and governmental abuses of the past century. Thus, the US response had been overly focused on supporting actions such as Special Forces (SF) and local civic actions. For their part, SF were conducting appropriate tasks. Such tasks, however, were insufficient because there was no operational or strategic-level development of HD recognition of the need for government reform. For example, the JSOTF-P mission statement in 2006 read as follows:

“JSOTF-P, in coordination with the country team, builds capacity and strengthens the Republic of the Philippines’ security forces to defeat selected terrorist organizations in order to protect US and Filipino citizens and interests from terrorist attack while preserving Philippine

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65 Frake, 41-54.
66 Swain, 12.
The JSOTF-P mission was not incorrect but it lacked long-term sustainment and operational and strategic-level integration to address long-standing grievances. Gershman phrases this point another way: “Even if Al Qaeda…and Abu Sayyaf is crushed, the underlying conditions that facilitated the emergence of these movements…will continue to exist.” A positive development was a tactical-level shift towards more longer-term projects. The larger US and Philippine security apparatus, however, would take a number of years to turn the corner toward a comprehensive HD approach.

The more comprehensive approach took shape in a number of different initiatives. For example, COL James Linder, commander of JSOTF-P from 2005-2006, focused on influencing the 6-12 age group to deny the groups the next generation of recruits. Like his predecessors he wanted to turn away from military raids and contextually unaware efforts to influence the Moro population. In 2005, the Philippine government took a more comprehensive approach than it had in the past through initiatives such as the Sixteen Point Counterterrorism Program, as well as the passage of the Human Security Act, which focused on economic, military, diplomatic, and legal root causes of terrorism. These initiatives were steps in the right direction, but without real reform of corruption and poor governance, any chance at peace talks was doomed. Even with properly executed COIN and influence operations at the tactical level of JSOTF-P, the tide against ASG had not yet turned. By 2009, peace talks had stalled and the violence was about to reach its peak. Additionally, national Philippine elections were ongoing through 2010. In a typical scene of Philippine presidential elections, political rhetoric threatened peace talks with the MILF as previous presidents were calling for another military assault on Muslim areas, and referred to them as “untrustworthy.”

Benigno Aquino III, a moderate candidate, was elected president in 2010. In his inaugural address he committed himself to the peace process with a desire to be “inclusive of the interest of all.” In light of this, the US military operations no longer appeared to be relegated to

67 Quoted in Swain, 23.
68 Gershman, 60-74.
71 Tan, 68.
72 Tan, 68.
local success. With Aquino’s election the US appeared to gain an indigenous governmental ally. In a striking parallel, Aquino’s election was reminiscent of the election of Magsaysay described in the previous chapter. The net effect was that only by 2011 did the US and the Philippine governments pay serious attention to systemic, as opposed to transient, problems.

The new Philippine commitment to inclusiveness was demonstrated in 2011. Colonel Fran Beaudette, commander of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), points out, “[the Philippine government] recognized the need for a fundamentally different approach and adopted the Internal Peace and Security Plan-Bayanihan (IPSP).”73 The IPSP was a six-year program that shows the aspiration to “win the peace,” by focusing on “governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction and sustainable development and security sector reform.”74 The IPSP is a plan that gives “equal emphasis to combat and non-combat dimensions,” for a “People Centered/Human security” approach.75 The Plan also calls for local and AFP members to maintain human rights and advance their professionalism. Colonel Beaudette also observed that JSOTF-P worked with counterparts in the military, Department of Treasury, the Justice Department, national police and a “variety of political, religious and civilian leaders.”76 Their support has synchronized with the overarching US government objectives in the country through hosting of national level meetings. Colonel Beaudette also noted that, “Fundamentally, this complete horizontal and vertical integration between the comprehensive US Government team and our respective partners, from the strategic to tactical level, has been the key to success.”77 The new approach appears to have received a sound strategic foundation through an operational and strategic partnership, rather than a tactical approach that attached itself to an inept government through a nebulous “whole-of-government” methodology. Lastly, the IPSP identified the root problems when it stated that “insurgency is largely driven by structural problems in Philippine society, such as unequal development, non-delivery of basic services, injustice, and poor governance – all of which are beyond the military’s purview.”78 In light of the limited military purview, the US State Department also has a robust plan to enhance governance, promote peace, increase equities, and improve the health of the people of the southern

76 Beaudette, 9-12.
77 Emphasis is mine. See Beaudette, 9-12.
The USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 2012-2016 highlights the difficulties facing these areas of improvement. The Cooperation Strategy mentions the pervasive corruption, as well as the Philippines possessing the lowest GDP in Southeast Asia. Over 41 percent of Filipinos live under the international poverty level. The results of the new approach have been mixed. Although the economy is beginning to improve, terrorism remains a significant issue in Muslim areas with the entrance of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in 2008 and the resurgence of violence from 2012-2015. Additionally, the MNLF and BIFF appeared to have joined together in their vision for an Islamic state. Their unification is designed to thwart the finalization of the MILF and Philippine government temporary agreement for a MILF-led ARMM. The new alliances and fractures appearing between the Muslim groups show just how complex and difficult effective action in the HD can be.

In May 2015, after 13 years of work, JSOTF-P was deactivated in a ceremony in Zamboanga. According to Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of USPACOM, the Task Force’s mission of tactical advise and assist had come to an end. Later that year, in a show of solidarity with Islamic state fighters in the Middle East, BIFF forces attacked Christian villages in the southern Philippines. The violence from the Muslim rebellion over the past 40 years has led to an estimated 120,000 deaths and forced millions to become refugees.

Unlike the Huk Rebellion and the Philippine-American War, the final chapter of the Muslim rebellion has yet to be written. But from an HD perspective, history appears to be repeating itself. ASG and BIFF recently pledged support to external supporters such as the

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Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), violence from ASG/ISIS cells is increasing, and fear among Muslim Filipinos is rising. In April 2016, ASG announced it would behead its Canadian hostages if it did not receive the $8.3 million ransom. The relationship between ASG, BIFF, and ISIS is still unclear, as the autonomy of these groups makes it difficult to identify direct or strong ties. Additionally, the US armed forces are returning to five bases in the Philippines. The recent move of US forces to the area is designed to reassure Filipinos concerning American support to resist Chinese actions in the South China Sea. The new basing agreement, however, is accompanied by Filipino socio-cultural concerns. Put into a historical context, the Philippine and US relationship recalls the situation after WWII, but this time the rebellion is farther south.

The HD in the Philippine Muslim Rebellion

The repression of Muslim rebellion in OEF-P appears on the surface to be an unconditional US success. Upon further examination, however, this case study suggests caution. Initially, the US observed the violence in the Philippines as an extension of the threat to the homeland. Even the name Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines implied a US-centric approach. To the US decision makers, OEF-P was an area of operations. To Filipino Muslims, the term “OEF-P” is a foreign categorization of their environment. The Moro simply refer to it as “home.” On closer inspection, the violence in the Philippines was a result of long-standing disputes about power, socio-cultural changes, corrupt government, and a construct enabled by US policies and intervention decades earlier.

When examined through the lens of HD, three main points emerge from the Muslim Rebellion in the Philippines. The first is the long-standing conflict surrounding ethnic identities, which influenced radical groups to rebel. According to the US, violence in the southern Philippines was a manifestation of global terrorism. The violence and its causes were not, however, a product of al-Qaeda. Andrew Tan observed that the ethnic identities and cleavages “predated the events of 9-11 and Al Qaeda.” When the US responded to global terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in Asia and the Middle East, its reaction was swift and militarily focused. Moros viewed US strategic responses as representing a realignment of the US with a corrupt and ineffective Philippine government, which led to further Muslim disaffection. In response,

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85 Liljas, “ISIS is making Inroads.”
87 Tan, 59.
Muslim rebels established numerous groups through which to express their dissatisfaction. Moderate Muslims could turn to the MNLF, while more hardline Muslims could support the MILF, or even ASG. The separate identities among the groups reveal the complexity of internal cleavages and the realities of a conflict with deep historical roots.

The second aspect the HD reveals in the Muslim rebellion is the dismantling of traditional social structures. Resentment of the distant, corrupt, and Christian central authority was not the only factor causing violence. Dating back centuries, the Moro inhabitants of the southern territories built their own hierarchical structures based on tribal customs and Sultanate and datu leadership. The datu and Sultans were powerful leaders that commanded their areas of Muslim inhabitants under an Islamic framework of religious and tribal traditions. When the US and Philippine governments began relocating Christian Filipinos to Mindanao during the Huk Rebellion, traditional Moro structures were immediately uprooted. In attempting to solve one problem, the Philippine government (EDCOR) laid the foundations of another. Muslim leaders worried about their power base and their ability to rule as they had for many years. Muslim leaders did, in fact, begin to lose power and authority over southern inhabitants as evident in the voting record for the ARMM. Tausug and other local tribal social structures saw violence as the preferred option when dealing with power struggles. Thus, Muslim violence was not necessarily against the US or with al-Qaeda, but rather against any encroachment on their power and social structures.

The third aspect HD reveals is the relative disparity of the Muslim population. The southern areas such as the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao contain "35 percent of the Philippine’s landmass," and "25 percent of the country’s 92 million people," but they also have the “highest levels of poverty." It is difficult to identify which came first, the disparity or the rebellion; but from an HD perspective the observer does not have to identify the exact cause, as there is rarely only one. In this case, economic disparity helped shape the socio-cultural conflict by fostering recruitment, building disloyalty to the central government, and encouraging violent extremism. As Steven Rogers notes, “Mindanao’s enduring poverty is an effective incubator for violence.” The dire poverty provided fertile ground that fostered the rebellion against a corrupt government that was, in their view, attempting to reduce the power of local datu and Sultans, and reorder the social structure on which Muslims had based their identities for centuries.

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89 Rogers, 15-20.
Operational Value of the HD

The Human Domain concept may offer the operational arena value by informing the development of a coherent strategy that recognizes limitations. There is a paradox in such a “bottom up” approach to strategy. While there is much to learn about local customs, ethnic rivalries, and socio-cultural behavior at the tactical level, there is also a risk to this approach. Specifically, those at the tactical level may be unable to recognize operational and strategic limitations. Initially, the US had a tactical focus, which successfully reached out to locals and addressed their immediate needs such as health care, and clean water. But it did not achieve operational success, as it did not identify the systemic issues. The US may be capable of successfully conducting COIN, building partner capacity, and security assistance. These approaches by themselves, however, may not be the solutions to the deeper, systemic problems. The US may not be able to solve the systemic problems at all. It was not until JSOTF-P met with regional and national leaders across all ranks of government, and the Philippine government began to change itself, that the operational began to take on a new, long-term, and robust approach. Knowledge about HD at the operational level may highlight limitations and provide a degree of self-assessment that otherwise would have gone unnoticed.

The HD may also assist in removing chauvinistic blinders and help create an adaptive organization. In response to 9/11, the US classified the Muslim insurgency as part of the global terrorist movement. This classification, however, was the result of a misunderstanding of realities in the Philippines. The US misidentified the ties between ASG and al-Qaeda because they conformed to basic assumptions about terror and violence. al-Qaeda may have helped ASG, but that does not necessarily equate to shared vision and rationale. US blindness kept military and policy makers from noticing linkages and fracture points that closely resembled those of the Huks and the communists. When the US made OEF-P about terrorism it effectively halted any cognitive flexibility that might elevate US presence to fulfill a long-term strategy aimed at systemic issues. Additionally, when vision is restored, the HD can help build an adaptive organization. An HD mindset requires planners to constantly reevaluate their assumptions, actions, and behaviors, as well as those behaviors and beliefs of the audience (enemy, neutrals, and adversary). With every military action or governmental behavior, the environment changes, and so too must the evaluation of the environment. The process of challenging assumptions, reevaluation, and changing methodology helps an organization become and remain adaptive to the environment.
Strategic Value of the HD

Population-centric conflicts are known for their complexity. From the evidence here presented, the HD may provide strategic insights that help bring clarity in the moment when emotions are high and the war drums are beating. The US is able to reduce fog and friction in conventional wars with technical conventional assets such as satellites or airborne command and control. In the new security environment of transregional terror and low intensity conflict, however, the US must also develop clarity in the highly complex human dimension.

Seeing through the complexity of human conflict and developing sound strategy are not impossible. In the years leading up to and including US involvement in OEF-P, many authors such as Steven Rogers and Charles Frake sounded the alarm about misidentifying problems and developing myopic strategies for the Philippines. In 2004, for example, Rogers wrote that, “[The US has] failed to recognize…that terrorists did not create the conflict in the southern Philippines and do not control any of the combatants.” Rogers, 15-20. Charles Frake highlighted the difficulties in understanding these situations: “much of what is going on in the production of social and cultural worlds maybe hidden.” He added that, “interpretation requires attributions of the identity of perpetrators and victims,” and failing to accurately attribute identities has “fatal consequences.” Frake, 41-54. There is difficulty in finding the “hidden hegemony of cultural power.” Frake, 41-54. John Gershman also warned, “Looking at Southeast Asia through the lens of Afghanistan will lead US policy makers to the wrong conclusions and the wrong policy.” Gershman, 60-74. He cautioned that the US “would overestimate the threat of al Qaeda” and focus on a military response to existing problems. These individuals were certainly outsiders of the local tribal regions; but they nevertheless understood HD aspects of ASG, MILF, and MNLF, as well as the historic context of identities, agency, and violence. Obtaining such knowledge is not impossible, and in many cases it is already present. After 9/11, the US was once again blind, and its response lacked clarity in the moment. The resulting ineffective strategy missed opportunities and wasted valuable time.

In sum, there was terrorism and rebellion in the Philippines, but this does not tell the entire story. Using Rommel Banlaoi’s observations as a guide, there are a number of ways to observe the Muslim rebellion. First, an observer may conclude the groups are criminals seeking

90 Rogers, 15-20.
91 Frake, 41-54.
92 Frake, 41-54.
93 Gershman, 60-74.
94 Gershman, 60-74.
profit. Another observer may determine they have legitimate grievances with the government and require reconciliation. A third view might think Muslim rebellion is part of a broader terrorist movement. From the evidence in this case study, each viewpoint could be both correct and incorrect at the same time. A more productive strategic question to ask is: Why is rebellion so attractive in the Philippines? The Human Domain can help provide the answers to that question and from those answers come better-informed strategy.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

While there is evidence strategies incorporating cultural analysis have been used with success in moments of crisis, there is less evidence these lessons are being assimilated...within the infrastructure of US intelligence and security policy

95 Ziemke, I-20-I-21.
The global security environment has changed and with it, the old ideas about security, relationships, geopolitics, and strategy changed. In response to democratization, trans-regional threats, and the gray zone, USSOCOM developed the OHD Concept. The OHD concept was described in Chapter 1 as a structure based on five elements: Physical, Psychological, Cultural, Social, and Informational. The five elements provide the framework from which to observe people to shape the environment, prevent conflict, and combat violence. The HD concept seeks to foster feasible options for coherent strategy, and relevant operations. This thesis has used a qualitative case-study analysis to determine the operational and strategic value of the HD framework. Specifically, the five elements of HD were used as a lens through which to view three case studies in the Philippines spanning over 100 years of US involvement. The remaining portions of this chapter will summarize important findings from each case study; highlight the limitations, implications, and value of HD; and provide recommendations.

Analysis of the Philippine-American War identified three insights into the value of the HD in the operational sphere. The insights included the ability to identify organizational structure of the adversary, the need for restraint on the scale and use of force, and the requirement to identify cleavages and alliances within the population and between the population and rebellious groups. US policy and the actions of US military forces produced mixed results due to differing uses within the HD concept. Gen Otis used an HD concept as focal point of operations during his tenure; while Gen MacArthur used such concepts merely as an aside. The mixed uses of the human analysis provided an opportunity to observe different reactions of the population to two separate operational approaches. Gen Otis restrained the use of force and dispersed his units throughout the rural areas. His actions increased risk to his dispersed units and mobile reserve but also provided knowledge and opportunities, both of which enabled him to see clearly and target the organizational weaknesses of the enemy. In contrast, Gen MacArthur increased the use of force, which closed communication links between him and the population. Without such HD links, Gen MacArthur was unable to measure the effectiveness of his actions and subsequently lost escalatory options in the future, thereby reducing his ability to compel the adversary. The lack of HD insights led Gen MacArthur to believe Filipinos were either rebels or supporters of the US.

HD in the strategic arena may help identify biases and implement proper strategy after the cessation of hostilities. Beginning with biases, the US began the Philippine-American War
with an expansionist ideology that sought to Christianize an already Catholic country, as well as assimilate an Asian culture into Western social and governmental structures. Additionally, inherent biases also led the US into harmful collusion with the Filipino elite whose interests aligned with the US military, which caused cognitive closure and ultimately what Colonel Wagner referred to as, blindness. Although internal beliefs and the perspectives of Filipino elite biased Gen Otis, in hindsight he appears to have been rather progressive for his time. Gen Otis used what is referred to now as HD to develop a new approach enabling him to recognize biases, then account for them in his strategy. The Second Philippine Commission was also able to use a prototype of this methodology to develop a sound strategy and provide a link between the operational and strategic levels. After the war, however, US policy and strategy regressed to pre-war chauvinism and was unable to sustain a successful momentum.

Study of the Huk Rebellion also identified three main operational benefits to HD. These include: enhancing knowledge of the environment, binding purpose to knowledge, and gaining freedom of action. Gen Douglas MacArthur had been present in the Philippines for many years but he knew little about Filipinos. On the positive side, an HD mindset enabled Lansdale and the JUSMAG to observe their environment from an accurate perspective and operate effectively. The HD also gave a purpose to their knowledge of the environment. For example, Lansdale and Magsaysay used their deep understanding of the socio-cultural issues within the Philippines to build useful outlets and strategies to end the rebellion. To do this, they needed a semi-autonomous framework in which to act. Lansdale and the JUSMAG, under direction from the Department of State, were able to operate within the environment without restrictive policies clouding operational judgment and inhibiting flexibility. The new operational framework of the JUSMAG and its relationship with Magsaysay enabled knowledge accumulation and provided purpose so that the operational actors were able to identify agency, categorize behavior, and provide influence.

Gaining freedom of action is also an important outcome of an HD mindset because it allows success to be reconceptualized. Instead of bounding success within narrow US operational metrics, HD success measures progress within a native socio-cultural framework, which had more durable roots. JUSMAG measured success prior to 1950 in terms of numbers of Huks killed or missions accomplished. After 1950, it defined success by the degree of support of the population and the quality of incentives to resist rebellion. Thus, freedom of action gives the operational level the authority to determine success according to the attitudes of the people. Put simply, HD will let you know what is needed; and the people will let you know when you have won.
The Huk Rebellion also revealed HD strategic value by providing policy makers an ability to see their own biases, re-think coercion, and manipulate the temporal domain. The particular bias here refers specifically to the environment. In 1950, the US certainly had urban (peasant) and political (communism) biases that informed their assumptions, but the biases also resulted in economic incentives and governmental reforms, which changed the environment. Put simply, the US had become a part of the environment. After 1950, national-level US and Philippine decision makers began to perceive their environment from a better cognitive vantage point. Only then were they able to see their previous actions as connected to violent rebel behavior. The HD requires users to assess themselves and the effects on the system they intend to influence.

The HD also provided strategic-level actors with the ability to be judicious in coercion by realizing the limits of power. After WWII, the US sent the Philippines rehabilitation funds, provided political support, and increased military aid. Despite employing these instruments of power, the Huk Rebellion could not be prevented or defeated. Once the US gained knowledge of HD, identified limitations of the use of power, and developed better options for the use of the instruments, the tide began to turn. Thus, an HD mindset may facilitate coercion in small conflicts, something needed in the new security environment.

The Moro rebellion, the subject of Chapter 5, highlighted two operational values derived from HD. These values include recognizing operational limitations and building an adaptive organization. First, HD raises cognitive interpretations of the environment above the tactical level (forest rather than trees). At the tactical level, COIN and FID are insufficient because they mainly offer tactical results and they are unable to identify operational limitations. At the outset of OEF-P, JSOTF-P was directed to provide tactical results such as fighting terrorists, digging wells, or providing dental care. These efforts were well-intentioned; their effects, however, were locally derived and insular. It was not until the US worked with national and regional level Filipino authorities and identified the underlying issues of abuses, corruption, and disaffection, that a productive change in the approach was possible. The HD thus provided the beginnings of an operational framework to address operational-level systemic problems.

Second, an HD mindset helps an organization become adaptive. From the American perspective, OEF-P was merely one theater in a campaign against global terrorism for the US. But on the ground, OEF-P was a reaction to a century of growing disaffection, socio-cultural changes, and ethnic conflict in the southern Philippines. The response of the US was typical: a
surge of forces, followed by a meeting of initial objectives, declaration of success, and then going home, only to return after violence reemerged. After returning, the US adapted its strategy by redefining success, metrics, and operations. The US and Filipinos still attacked ASG and other violent groups, however they had adapted to HD realities at an operational level by integrating their efforts with the Philippine government to address systemic grievances and eliminate longstanding corruption and local abuses. The adaptation worked, and by 2011 the AFP developed a new military and governmental strategy to address Moro concerns. People change, and behaviors change; therefore any organization operating among the people must be adaptive, willing to reassess its actions, and challenge its assumptions. Thus, the HD concept may help reassess relationships, adjust when necessary, and overcome bureaucratic inertia.

Analysis of the Moro rebellion also identified the strategic value of HD because the concept provided clarity. One of the more difficult tasks during a conflict is finding clarity in the moment; complexity and confusion tend to rule the day, especially when the adversary actively withholds information. Typically, national leaders do not understand systemic issues until well into a conflict after the fog clears, or sometimes long after the cessation of hostilities. As David Price observes, “by the time a military relies on counterinsurgency for foreign victories it has already lost.” During the Moro Rebellion, US military and policy makers initially took a myopic tack by ascribing global ambitions to the violence in the southern Philippines. There were many in academia and local reporters who questioned this approach from the beginning. The US government, specifically through JSOTF-P and the State Department, used an HD approach only after years of violence. Over time, JSOTF-P and the State Department began to recognize Philippine governmental abuses, corruption, and local issues as the root causes of violence, and subsequently began to view terrorism as a symptom. In much the same way communism blinded the US during the Huk Rebellion, terrorism blinded the US during the Moro Rebellion. A strategic HD mindset could have prevented overreaction, or at the least led to a realization that OEF-P could not have succeeded in the long term without addressing continued governmental transgressions and long-standing ethnic rivalries.

Limitations

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The case studies in this thesis have revealed a number of limitations to the HD concept as it currently exists. Specifically, the HD lacks a theoretical foundation, a common interpretation of interdependence, economic lenses, regional influences, and organizational modeling.

Analysis of the three case studies revealed a difficulty in analyzing and interpreting the epochs due to a lack of theoretical foundation. Currently, the HD concept is based on an assumed patchwork of theories on social networks, cultural understanding, and behavioral models. The lack of a consensus on which theories to use and which to discard and when, means that any number of observers using disparate theories and relationships could have arrived at substantially different perspectives from the same evidence. Admittedly, the social sciences have never had a unifying “theory of everything;” the HD, however, is limited by its overly broad and compartmentalized framework. The HD concept is in its early stages of development. For future growth, it needs a more robust theoretical grounding. For the HD to be useful for more than tactical checklists, it should have a well-developed theoretical foundation on which to attach the operational musculature. Theory helps elevate the concept to higher levels of analysis, but also provides agreed-upon definitions, explanations of behavior, and anticipatory methods for future analysis.

After the groundwork is laid, the keepers of the HD concept should explore the relationships and interdependence among the elements, as well as between the elements and the environment. For example, a social networking model based on resource mobilization is interesting, but it is overly specific for operational and especially strategic value. It appears from the evidence of this thesis that the HD would be more useful in operational and strategic arenas if, for example, resource mobilization theory (social) were used with a behavioral model (psychological) in a layered approach that also recognizes the interdependence between the two theories and what that relationship tells us about human behavior. Neither can arrive at the right answer alone, but together they can derive a more accurate answer, and that could lead to better strategic decisions. The key to success is not in a single model or theory per se, but in the relationships and interdependence between theories and models, and the environment.

The HD is also limited by its lack of an economic perspective. The lack was evident in the Philippine-American War and Huk Rebellion. At the dawn of the twentieth century the Philippines had developed a diverse set of incentives based on regional and global trade markets, internal crop development, and inter-island commerce. The US did not, however, fully understand the economic incentive structure during the first half of the twentieth century
demonstrated in the deleterious policies for trade, markets, and land reforms. Without an accurate understanding of economics and the relationship to behavior, US policy makers, members of the Philippine Commissions, and General Douglas MacArthur all underestimated the influence of economics on behavior and the second and third-order effects its decisions would have on elites, peasants, and politicians. US and Philippine economic decisions not only had an impact on local and national behavior, but also had influence on regional actors such as China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and European powers who all have interests in the region.

In its current form, the five elements are focused inward toward a country, group or entity. To be useful to the strategist and operational commander, the HD should also adopt a regional lens to recognize sources of influence. As previously mentioned, the security environment has changed into a connected and integrated whole, and understanding such links becomes imperative to understanding behavior. The new security environment demands, and the case studies show, that HD must have regional alignment and influence as an operational or strategic element to be useful. For example, the Moro rebellion demonstrates the importance of understanding regional ethnic alignments, loyalties, and purpose of violence. The Moro rebellion was not solely about local identities and local power struggles, but rather how those identities and power structures interacted or even disengaged with regional power brokers, religious movements, and aspects of East Asian geopolitics. The Huk rebellion, and to a lesser extent the Philippine-American War, can be viewed in the same light. The limited scope of this thesis precluded any analysis or conclusions on how great power conflict affects behavior but its relationship to the HD would be worthy of further study. In short, an HD analysis, opposed to threat analysis, would have served the US military better before it engaged in OEF-P.

Finally, the HD also lacks organizational modeling with which to help predict behavior. As an illustration, during the Huk Rebellion the US was unable to distinguish between organizational behavior and a perceived communist insurgency. The US for the most part, had a myopic view on the Huk membership and motives until it realized, with Magsaysay’s insight, that the Huks were not communist. Rather, the Huks were an organization acting to survive like any other. Only when the US connected structure and motive to organizational behavior did it begin to find the right strategy. In their book, Essence of Decision, Allison and Zelikow argue that behavior is not merely understood as a rational actor, making rational decisions. Instead, there are organizational reasons for behavior. Most organizations want to survive. To do so,

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2 For a primer on the Philippines balancing between the US and China see, De Castro, 235-253.
organizations develop standard operating procedures, and generally act on the “logic of appropriateness,” not the “logic of consequences.”3 Put differently, even though a certain behavior may be in the best interest of the organization (separation from communism); or that organization was founded on a certain set of principles (Christianity and democracy); that does not imply they will act in accordance with those principles or interests. In fact, organizational behavior may affect behavior more than cultural and social aspects. Therefore, an understanding of organizational behavior would widen the HD aperture and provide more value to the operational and strategic spheres.

Implications

Any attempt to incorporate the HD in an organization requires a long view of strategy. Historically, the military establishment has lacked a long view not because such a view is unimportant but because the establishment is structured to provide rapid turnover of personnel and short assignments to ensure the long-term health of the force. As a result, the US military has adopted measures of performance rather than the measures of effectiveness the HD approach would prescribe. To be successful, an HD approach implies a need to develop appropriate assignments and incentives, build new definitions of success, and develop more qualitative indicators of success.

An HD approach implies a need for long-term presence in a country and region to develop a deep socio-cultural understanding. This goes well beyond country and region specific assignments and presence. Compiling information is one thing but HD also requires an organization to retain and utilize tacit knowledge.4 Basic facts and rote data are better suited for typical military endeavors but storing and utilizing tacit knowledge about HD is a much different task. The HD also requires organizational structures and methodologies that go beyond regionally aligned forces, joint lessons learned, and website data storage. Any HD approach implies the organization incentivizes behavior such as patience and restraint, the development of tacit knowledge, and the distribution of information throughout the organizational structure horizontally and vertically. To be successful, the US military would be required to go beyond the tactical level and instill incentives for a human-centric approach at all levels.

An HD mindset also implies strategic patience and an abandonment of the archetypal ideas of order, control. Most military strategists want to create order from chaos, or certainty from uncertainty. In HD, as in most areas of strategy, these ideas are illusory. Order is rarely a reality, controlling humans has practical and moral hazards, and success may mean avoiding a fight. These are hardly military ideals. In HD, it appears that any attempt to establish order and certainty simply places unattainable demands upon a complex situation. Instead, HD implies a comfort with uncertainty and an ability to operate well in disorder to achieve strategic advantage.\(^5\) Thus, the implication in HD is to find locations in the organizational structure that is accepting of these traits, incentivize them, and safeguard the promotion of leaders who espouse these disruptive attributes.

Another implication of the HD concept is that it is as important to look forward as it is to look back. The HD must ask the questions: How will US policies affect the future? What are the second-and-third-order effects? There is no crystal ball for strategists, but HD must make an attempt at correlation and causation, without inserting endemic biases. If the US is to be present, and implement policies and action, it must also realize that actions and presence have an effect on the environment and people under examination. For example, the policies of the US, which included economic, military, and political aspects, all shaped the Philippines in positive and negative ways. After the Philippine-American War, the US implemented policies led to social rebellion in the 1920s and 1930s. During the Huk rebellion, the EDCOR plan, which resettled thousands of Christian Filipinos in the south, set the conditions for the Moro rebellion. Every action has a reaction and any attempt at an HD mindset must recognize that the US is not a disinterested third party, but an integral part of the system, which is under examination. The inherent risk in this implication is paralysis in action or decision-making, but for HD to have value this risk must be addressed and avoided.

Finally, HD implies a third dimension in military strategy. Conventional wisdom focuses on controlling time and space. The US typically wants to shorten the temporal domain, and control the spatial domain. The theoretical ideas of offense and defense are partial to a temporal and spatial focus of strategy; however, this dyad is insufficient to explain success or failure in the past. Much like the black hole observed by its effects on other bodies, there appears to be a third dimension adding tension to the historically dyadic structure. This thesis argues that the HD is the third pole. Adding HD to form a triad helps define and explain the constant tension that

strategists and operational planners have faced, but rarely recognized. Identifying, labeling, and categorizing the tension between these three elements is out of the scope of this thesis, but one worthy of academic attention.

**Recommendations**

This thesis has spanned over 100 years of US involvement in the Philippines and concludes the HD concept has merit. An HD mindset can produce more synoptic strategies, better control of time, and more effective operations in the new security environment. The argument concludes with five recommendations.

First, the HD concept could be easily stretched beyond its means. Therefore, HD should not be bureaucratically integrated into joint planning cycles and processes. Spending hours trying to fit HD into a targeting cycle defeats the purpose of an HD mindset. The idea behind HD is to learn how to influence, gain strategic advantage, generate options, and manipulate time for advantage. The HD concept should not be used as a checklist to build culturally-aware target lists.

Second, the HD concept should be used at all levels of organization. The HD concept should be taught at the appropriate levels of leadership and Professional Military Education (PME). Before this is accomplished, however, the theoretical and practical application should be matured in SOCOM and provided to Joint Staff and the armed services. This thesis further recommends SOCOM generously fund master’s and PhD-level studies in cultural and liberal arts for the purpose of HD development. Additionally, SOCOM should develop specific training across all members of the force in a region, language, and country of their choice. This training and education should not take place in a virtual world, but rather in class and in-country study.

Third, the HD concept is not a panacea or an emergency response mechanism for use when conventional approaches do not work. An HD mindset takes time to train, develop, and gain understanding about the environment. If one needs HD in an emergency, it is probably too late to be useful. Fourth, the HD concept will not solve all strategic problems. HD is a framework with which to understand ones’ self and ones’ enemy, regardless of the scale or intensity of conflict. Finding strategic advantage in today’s security environment, characterized by fewer resources, smaller footprints, gray zone challenges, and the like, can be challenging. The HD concept can help address these challenges, add rigor to the process, and illuminate the unknown.
**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines. Established in 1935.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition/Explanation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barangay</td>
<td>Small boat used by early settlers to travel among the islands. Came to be known for the small size yet self-sufficient.</td>
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<td>Barrio</td>
<td>Spanish name given for a small village.</td>
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<td>Datu</td>
<td>Village headman. Patriarch who tends to security and politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDCOR</td>
<td>Economic Development Corps. Plan by Magsaysay to provide former Huks with training, education, and land.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gray Zone</td>
<td>Term used to describe the space between peace and war where traditional methods of conflict have little use.</td>
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<td>Guardia Civil</td>
<td>Originally a Spanish police force. Used oppressively to maintain local control of peasants.</td>
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<td>Huk</td>
<td>Shortened name given to the Hukbalahap or Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon, meaning People’s Anti-Japanese Army.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Human Domain. Is a people-focused approach to the issues with the Gray Zone, and realities of the new security environment.</td>
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<td>JUSMAG</td>
<td>Joint United States Military Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Katipunan</td>
<td>Revolutionary society during the 1890s. Started by Filipino revolutionaries like Andres Bonifacio, and helped spread Spanish resentment throughout Luzon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>Name given to Filipinos with mixed race such as Chinese or Spanish.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Spanish name given to Muslims in the Philippines. Its roots are from the moniker “Moor,” the name given to the Muslims fighting in the Iberian Peninsula.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>A group of barrios or barangays subdivide a municipal, which the Spanish controlled through Christian conversion, and taxation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMFREL</td>
<td>National Movement for Free elections. Started by Lansdale and Magsaysay.</td>
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<td>OHD</td>
<td>Operating in the Human Domain. This is the document which outlines the ends, ways, and means of how best to implement and mature the HD concept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Philippine Constabulary. National police force established by the Philippine Commission in 1901.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKP</td>
<td>Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, or Philippine Communist Party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tao</td>
<td>Filipino peasant.</td>
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Tulisanes  Filipino bandit.

USAFFE  United States Armed Forces in the Far East.

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