DEFENSE ANALYSIS
CAPSTONE PROJECT REPORT

NORSOF MILITARY ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

by

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How can Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) improve its capabilities for military assistance (MA) in order to increase the strategic utility of both NORSOF and MA?

After examining and analyzing the broader literature, a more specific body of literature about NORSOF, the results of an already existing survey of NORSOF personnel, and comments contained within both the respective literature and the survey results, we recommend establishing a national SOF doctrine to strengthen NORSOF niches in the global SOF network, seek synergy between national tasks and MA, increase NORSOF “vertical implementation” in operations, use the MA capability in support of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and establish an “MA Network of Practice” across NORSOF units. This capstone concludes with three new courses of action that demonstrate how NORSOF’s enhanced MA capabilities can be pursued in order to achieve strategic objectives for Norway in the realms of deterrence, reassurance, and conflict resolution.

Subject Terms:
- Norwegian Special Operations Forces
- Military assistance
- Capability development
- Foreign internal defense
- Security force assistance
- Security sector reform
- Global SOF network
- Deterrence
- Reassurance
- Negotiations
ABSTRACT

How can Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) improve its capabilities for military assistance (MA) in order to increase the strategic utility of both NORSOF and MA?

After examining and analyzing the broader literature, a more specific body of literature about NORSOF, the results of an already existing survey of NORSOF personnel, and comments contained within both the respective literature and the survey results, we recommend establishing a national SOF doctrine to strengthen NORSOF niches in the global SOF network, seek synergy between national tasks and MA, increase NORSOF “vertical implementation” in operations, use the MA capability in support of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and establish an “MA Network of Practice” across NORSOF units. This capstone concludes with three new courses of action that demonstrate how NORSOF’s enhanced MA capabilities can be pursued in order to achieve strategic objectives for Norway in the realms of deterrence, reassurance, and conflict resolution.
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Commander Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDWMD</td>
<td>Counter-Deproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Conventional Forces</td>
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<td>CHOD</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Regional Combatant Command</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CORE LAB</td>
<td>Common Operational Research Environment Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRU</td>
<td>Crisis Response Unit</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Norwegian Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLF-P</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership and Education, Facilities, and Policy</td>
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<td>DOTP-P</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training/Education, Personnel &amp; Policy</td>
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<td>DSSR</td>
<td>Defense Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>FFI</td>
<td>Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (The Norwegian Defense Research Establishment)</td>
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<td>FFOD</td>
<td>National Joint Military Doctrine</td>
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<td>FHS</td>
<td>Forsvarets Høysskole (The Norwegian Defense College)</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>FSK</td>
<td>Forsvarets Spesialkommando (Norwegian Special Operations Commando)</td>
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<td>GOPLATS</td>
<td>Gas and Oil Platforms</td>
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<td>GSN</td>
<td>Global Special Operations Forces Network</td>
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<td>HPA</td>
<td>High Profile Attack</td>
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<td>HRO</td>
<td>Hostage Rescue Operations</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>HVS</td>
<td>Hærens Våpenskole (the Norwegian Army equivalent to Transformation and Doctrine Command)</td>
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<td>HVT</td>
<td>High Value Target</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification Documents</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Special Training Center</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<td>JCIDS</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JSOU</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations University</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTEC</td>
<td>Joint Training and Evaluation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KJK</td>
<td>Kystjegerkommandoen (Coastal Ranger Commando)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOP</td>
<td>Komplett Organisasjonsplan (Equipment and Organization Plan)</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>Lines of Effort</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Master Instructor</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJK</td>
<td>Marinejeger kommandoen (Norwegian Naval Special Operations Forces)</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Military Transition Team</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVSOF</td>
<td>Naval Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NMT-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission Afghanistan</td>
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<td>National Mission Unit</td>
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<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>RAND</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>Russian Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operation Procedure</td>
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<td>SORT</td>
<td>Special operations research team</td>
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<td>Special Recon</td>
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<td>Senior Staff Officer</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STANAG</td>
<td>Standardization Agreement</td>
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<td>Task Group</td>
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<td>TMBN</td>
<td>Telemark Bataljonen (the Telemark Battalion)</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Training, Tactics, and Procedures</td>
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Last, but not least, we would like to thank all our seven girls back home for all your support and patience through this project. You make it worthwhile.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. SPONSORS AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Norwegian Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) was established in January 2014. NORSOCOM is a strategic-level Special Operations Forces (SOF) command element that guides future development of Norwegian Special Forces (NORSOF),[1] advises strategic leaders on employment of SOF, and expands and maintains an international SOF network.[2]

In 2012, NORSOF teamed up with the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) to strengthen its capacity for strategic research, analysis, and development. FFI subsequently established the Special Operations Research Team (SORT) to combine and integrate the efforts of FFI scientists and NORSOF officers.[3] Since the 1970s, FFI has provided strategic analyses to the Norwegian defense community and has refined its method of scenario-based analysis for long-term defense planning. A key element is the use of scenarios to prepare for future missions and tasks.[4]

As part of NORSOCOM and FFI’s joint future development of NORSOF, they invited Norwegian students enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Defense Analysis Curriculum 699, “Irregular Warfare and Special Operations,” to address the following research question during the first half of 2016: “How can Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) improve its capability for military assistance (MA) in order to increase the strategic utility of both NORSOF and MA?” Answering this research question is the purpose of this capstone report.

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[1] NORSOF consists of two tactical Norwegian Special Operations Forces (SOF) units: the Army SOF unit Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) and the Navy SOF unit Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK).


B. DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF “CAPABILITY”

A key concept in the research question is capability. Defining capability and its underlying elements is, therefore, important for the establishment of a framework and methodology for this study. Since this capstone is about improving a specific military capability for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country, we have decided to use NATO’s definition from ACT 80–7, Managing Transformation: “A Capability can be defined as the ability to produce an effect that users of assets or services need to achieve.”

Since the purpose of our sponsor’s research question is to discover ways to increase the strategic utility of NORSOF, we assume that the “users of [NORSOF] assets or services” will be at the (military) strategic level in Norway, or within the NATO alliance if command/control over a NORSOF capability is transferred.

In order to break down a capability into functional components that can be studied and improved, we are using the U.S. definition from the instructions for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) as a baseline. According to that definition, “A Capability will consist of one or more functional components: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership and education, Facilities and finally Policy (DOTMPLF-P).”

Not all of these functional components are relevant for analyzing the NORSOF Military Assistance capability; for example, we do not address the physical elements “materiel” and “facilities,” but instead focus the institutional functional elements of “doctrine” and “organization,” the functional human elements of “training and education” and “personnel,” and last “policy.”

Consequently, the functional elements of an MA capability that we examine in this capstone are “DOTP-P”

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6 Joseph Dunford, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), CJCSI 3170.O11 (Arlington, VA: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015).
• Doctrine: NORSOF’s doctrinal framework for Military Assistance (MA), or those fundamental principles that guide NORSOF MA operations in support of strategic objectives.

• Organization: How organizational structure and solutions affect NORSOF MA capability.

• Training and education: How changes in training, exercise and education may strengthen NORSOF’s MA capability.

• Personnel: How NORSOF can develop its personnel through recruitment, selection, and career management in order to improve NORSOF’s MA capability.

• Policy: For the purpose of this capstone, we define policy as the declared objectives that a government seeks to achieve in the pursuit of national security.

In order to enhance NORSOF’s strategic utility, we discuss how the NORSOF MA capability can be used to further pursue Norway’s national security objectives, and we propose possible courses of action (COA).

C. THE RISE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR NORSOF

FFI and NORSOCOM’s focus on improving NORSOF’s MA Capability is timely. The role of MA in missions/tasks like Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Security Sector Reform (SSR) has received significant attention in Norway over the last decade. But this has only been after a slow start. In 2000, Norway published its first Joint Military Doctrine. MA was mentioned as a possible mission for NORSOF during “peace support operations”; the doctrine also noted, however, that “MA will usually be carried out by special forces from allied countries.”

The Land Doctrine that followed in 2004 also did not mention MA as a task for Special Forces.

Subsequently, in 2007, the Norwegian Chief of Defence, Sverre

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Diesen, stated that Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA) were the most important tasks for NORSOF, and that MA was a lower priority.9

In 2006, Tom Robertsen argued, in an NPS thesis, that NORSOF possessed only direct capabilities: SR and DA. He identified indirect capabilities (like MA) as an important gap that needed to be closed in order to increase NORSOF’s strategic utility in the future. He also proposed an organizational solution to close this gap.10

Since 2007, NORSOF has, more or less, been continually heavily involved in MA activities. NORSOF has partnered, mentored, and assisted the buildup of a Special Police counterterrorism unit (Crisis Response Unit [CRU]) in Kabul, Afghanistan.11 This effort has included assisting the CRU through a large number of high-profile attacks (HPAs) in Kabul province. From 2014, NORSOF has conducted similar MA operations in Baghdad, Iraq.12 NORSOF mentors have also conducted MA operations to improve SOF capabilities in Latvia and Lithuania.13 A NORSOF officer has been in charge of the establishment of the NATO Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) in Georgia and achieved remarkable results over a short period of time.14 From 2016 on, as part of

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11 CRU has responsibility for security in Kabul and is the first responder for high-profile attacks that threaten the capital.


Operation Inherent Resolve, NORSOF will train, assist, and advise local Syrian groups that fight ISIL in Syria.\(^{15}\)

In parallel with NORSOF’s MA efforts, Norwegian conventional forces (CF) have been heavily involved in SFA, via efforts like Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs), NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in northern Afghanistan. Since 2014, Norwegian elite infantry have also been training Kurds in Erbil, Iraq, to support their fight against ISIL.

In her New Year’s speech for 2016, the Norwegian prime minister expressed her gratitude to the Norwegian Forces who train and assist Afghan and Iraqi forces in fighting terrorists in their respective countries and said that this activity also contributed to Norway’s security.\(^{16}\)

In 2016, the main effort of most Norwegian military operations abroad entails some kind of military assistance to indigenous forces, or groups, a trend that is likely to continue. It is therefore our hope that this capstone will contribute to further develop NORSOF’s MA capability.

**D. METHODOLOGY/OUTLINE**

In Chapter II, we provide an overview of relevant research and literature concerned with the functional elements (DOTP-P) of an MA Capability. The intent of Chapter II is to establish a point of departure. Drawing on our review of the literature, we derive potential challenges, dilemmas, and opportunities for a small state’s SOF, relevant to the development of its SOF MA capability.

In Chapter III, we compare the DOTP-P findings identified in our literature review with the results from a recent quantitative study conducted by FFI.\(^{17}\) This survey was designed to identify DOTP-P gaps based on the past decade of NORSOF MA


\(^{17}\) See Appendix for an English version of this survey (our translation).
operations. The 85 NORSOF members who respond in the FFI survey participated at different levels and in different functions in the previously mentioned NORSOF MA operations. We also make use of the qualitative comments from these NORSOF practitioners when we make our recommendations for a future DOTP design. Several of the responders are current subject matter experts, leaders, or future leaders in NORSOF, and they will shape how NORSOF capabilities evolve.

In Chapter IV, we summarize our findings and make recommendations about how the DOTP functions could be strengthened in order to increase the strategic utility of NORSOF MA operations.

In Chapter V, we address the last P: Policy. How can NORSOF MA capability create strategic effects in new ways? We outline three core Norwegian security policy objectives and present three new MA COAs in which NORSOF could be used in pursuit of those objectives.

In Chapter VI, we conclude this report with a visualization of what an improved NORSOF MA capability might look like in 2025. The visualization is based on the findings and recommendations in this report and may be described as a “best case scenario” for a decade from now.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, we provide an overview of relevant research and draw on official documents concerning the functional elements (DOTP-P) of an MA capability. The intent of this chapter is to establish a point of departure for this report. Drawing on our review of the literature, we derive potential challenges and dilemmas that NORSOF will face in the future development of its MA capability. Some of these challenges and dilemmas are then discussed in relation to the findings of the FFI survey on NORSOF and MA in the next chapter. When appropriate, we deviate from the literature review format and directly discuss some of the findings in relation to NORSOF.

A. DOCTRINE

Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”\(^{18}\) In this section, we review literature relevant to the principles and objectives in play as NORSOF develops its future MA capability.

1. National Doctrines

In 2000, Norway created its first Joint Military Doctrine (FFOD). Together with SR and DA, MA was described as one of three principal tasks for NORSOF, particularly during peace-support operations. The doctrine noted, however, that “MA will usually be carried out by Special Forces from allied countries,”\(^{19}\) implying that other NATO SOF would be more responsible for MA than NORSOF. Perhaps this reflected MA’s relatively low priority vs. SR and DA at the time. The different types of MA operations described were borrowed from NATO doctrine. Worth nothing is that, “establishment, rehearsal and support of escape and evasion networks,” “support to peace-support operations, including other forces’ security assessments,” and “liaison with the different parties in

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\(^{18}\) NATO, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, AAP-06, 2015 ed. (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization Office, 2015), 2-D-B.

\(^{19}\) Forsvarets Overkommando, *Joint Doctrine Part B*, 204.
peace support operations” were important tasks for NORSOF during the conflicts in the Balkans in the late 1990s. FFOD 2000 now listed these tasks as SOF MA missions. These were also tasks that clearly underscored the strategic shift just after the Cold War: “NATO has shifted its focus from military defense and defense planning (near area) for security cooperation and conflict prevention extending beyond the original Alliance borders (out of area).”

Following the first issuance of the Joint Doctrine in 2000 came the first Maritime Doctrine in 2002, which defined MA for Naval Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF) in very broad terms, simply as “other missions requiring special competence.” The first Land Doctrine (2004) did not describe MA at all. Neither of these service-based doctrines have been revised. A new Land Doctrine is in the pipeline and will describe SFA operations. We do not know to what extent SOF’s MA roles will be covered in this version. Norwegian Joint Doctrine was revised in 2007 and 2014, however. The 2007 version is a copy of the 2002 version with regards to MA, while the 2014 version is essentially a version of MA as described in NATO SOF doctrine with the focus on “escape and evasion” and “security for other forces” removed. Instead emphasis is on building partner capacity with indigenous forces, a natural shift given the prior ten years of NORSOF operations in Afghanistan. In sum, at least within the MA field, it seems that national joint doctrines are somewhat reactive; they tend to describe the types of MA

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20 Ibid., 206.
24 Forsvartaban, Doctrine for Land Operations [Forsvarets doktrine for landoperasjoner], 77.
25 Based on mail correspondence with Norwegian Staff College personnel, January 2016.
26 Forsvarets Overkommando, Norwegian Joint Doctrine [Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (FFOD)], 2nd ed. (Oslo, Norway: Forsvarets Overkommando, 2007), 125.
operations that have been conducted by NORSOF in the recent past, rather than offering principles and general objectives for future MA operations.

Norway established NORSOCOM in 2014, but does not yet have its own SOF doctrine. Nevertheless, Norway has ratified NATO’s Doctrine for Special Operations, in which MA is one of three obligatory tasks. The fourth task, which is not a NATO requirement, is “Additional National Activity.” For NORSOF, this national activity can be described as “Maritime and other Counterterrorism (CT) support to the Police, Hostage Rescue Operations (HRO), Support to Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), and Close Protection.” In addition, NORSOF is responsible for classified tasks in the national defense of Norway. Not surprisingly, maintaining capabilities for these national tasks ties up considerable time and resources in NORSOF.

2. NATO

In lieu of a national SOF doctrine, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.5 is NORSOF’s ratified SOF doctrine and defines MA as follows:

MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. **SOF conducts MA within their field of expertise.** More specifically, MA activities may include:

**Training.** These are activities that train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills, provide assistance to designated leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures, thus enabling a nation to develop individual, leader, and organizational skills.

**Advising.** These are activities that improve the performance of designated actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

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28 These tasks are not available in one single unclassified document and thus have been derived from Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 26.
**Mentoring/Partnering.** These are activities conducted by small teams of subject matter experts who are tasked to work closely with designated personnel and provide direction and guidance, which may concern the conduct of military or security operations.\(^{29}\)

As depicted in Figure 1 from *AJP* 3.5, MA is a SOF activity across the spectrum of conflict as defined by NATO. MA has particular relevance in both “peacetime”\(^{30}\) and Crisis and Stabilization Operations, addressing what the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) describes as “Gray Zone Challenges,” “Competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.”\(^{31}\)

![Figure 1. NATO Doctrinal SOF Tasks Throughout the Spectrum of Conflict\(^ {32}\)](image)


\(^{30}\) NATO has no definition of a “Phase 0” in the spectrum of conflict, hence the use of quotation marks to point out that “peacetime” is a relative and contested concept.


3. **Comparison of NATO and U.S. Doctrine**

MA is treated differently in U.S. SOF and NATO doctrine. Since NORSOF has strong relations with and commitments to both NATO and U.S. SOF, interoperability with both of these organizations is important for NORSOF capability development. As depicted in Figure 1, NATO scales operations based on intensity, as if peace and conflict are cyclic conditions over time. In contrast, U.S. SOF doctrine scales operations based on purpose, themes, or functions, perhaps an indication that aspects of these operations, for example intelligence production for CT or Counter-Deproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction [CDWMD]), are global constants. The resulting difference is that NATO defines three broad SOF tasks that may be applied to any kind of operation, while U.S. SOF doctrine lists 12 thematic and functional operations as SOF core tasks; however, MA is not listed as a core task in its own right.

Figure 2 compares NATO and U.S. SOF tasks. Although most U.S. thematic operations might involve both Direct Action and Military Assistance, *Counterinsurgency* and *Military Information Support Operations* are highlighted as prominent in both domains. SR and Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance are obviously prerequisites in several kinds of operations. (We do not describe the different U.S. mission types in detail in this report, and would simply note that Civil Affairs Operations [CAO] and Military Information Support Operations [MISO] are not SOF tasks in NATO doctrine.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO, incl Norway</th>
<th>Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance</th>
<th>Direct Action</th>
<th>Military Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 2. Comparison of Special Operations Tasks According to NATO and U.S. Doctrine

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Other scholarly literature on SOF claims there are two principal doctrinal modes in which special operations forces accomplish their tasks: the direct action approach, which brings SOF directly into contact with the enemy, and the indirect action approach, which influences the enemy or operational environment by, with, or through the use of indigenous forces. A common argument among SOF scholars is also that the strategic effect of SOF is relatively higher when indirect approaches are used, compared to direct approaches. Indirect capabilities are critical, not only for reshaping the socio-political environment in which terrorists and insurgents thrive, but also indirectly addressing the root causes of conflict with the help of surrogate forces or actors. The argument is that these capabilities create more sustainable solutions than a direct kinetic approach: hence, the relatively greater strategic effect. If this direct/indirect approach to SOF operations is used as a framework, one way of organizing the different tasks is shown in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO, incl Norway</th>
<th>Direct Action Capabilities</th>
<th>Direct/Indirect</th>
<th>Indirect Action Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Counterterrorism, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. SOF Doctrinal Tasks Separated in Direct Action and Indirect Action Capabilities

Thus, to understand how MA may be applied in operations, numerous functional and thematic doctrines may serve as guidelines for NORSOF. Some examples include JP

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35 See, for example, David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

Figure 4 displays the relationship between thematic and environmental operations, in which MA may be considered a key component.39

![Relationship Between Special Operations and Irregular Warfare](image)

Figure 4. Relationship Between Special Operations and Irregular Warfare40

4. **Thematic Doctrines: Norway**

Several NORSOF studies address thematic operations with implications for development of the MA capability. Most of them are focused on counterinsurgency

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36 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Joint Publication 3–22), 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).


38 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency* (Joint Publication 3–24) (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).


40 Source: Ibid.
(COIN) operations. In 2008, Petter Hellesen studied changes that should be made to enhance NORSOF’s efficacy in COIN operations. He argued that MA should receive increased attention from NORSOF and explained why NORSOF needs better intelligence regarding the human domain, including increased Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capability.\(^{41}\)

In 2009, Gimmingsrud and Pedersen constructed a Norwegian model for counterinsurgency operations based on a comprehensive review of Norwegian military and civilian resources.\(^{42}\) Their report included recommendations for the use of NORSOF in COIN, both in the DA role but also for training other special operations forces. The need for better Norwegian information operations (IO) capability was another important recommendation.\(^{43}\)

In 2009, Torgeir Gratrud made a concrete proposal to include thematic sub-doctrines in the Norwegian national doctrine hierarchy. He argued it was time to develop a Norwegian national COIN doctrine based on the experiences of NORSOF and conventional units in out-of-area operations over the past decade. He also argued that the Norwegian Department of Defense (DOD) should continue to support the entire range of MA missions with its Special Forces, and that NORSOF should intensify its preparations for such tasks.\(^{44}\)

5. **National vs. International Tasks**

An obvious dilemma for NORSOF is how best to balance the time and resources dedicated to training and conducting exercises for national missions vs. international missions and tasks. In some ways, this dilemma can also be regarded as a conflict between focusing on the direct (e.g., SR and DA) vs. indirect approaches (e.g., MA).


\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Torgeir Gratrud, “Norwegian Special Operations Forces: Their Role in Future Counterinsurgency Operations” (master’s strategic research project, U.S. Army War College, 2009).
Such a choice is based on the assumption that most of NORSOF’s national tasks are direct in nature and most international tasks are indirect in nature.\textsuperscript{45}

It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze trends in government White Papers and intelligence services’ “over the horizon assessments” to make educated assessments about where NORSOF’s focus should lie in the future. One reason is that Norwegian foreign policy (along with Norway’s allies) is still in flux at the time of this writing.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, in these turbulent times, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has launched Project Veivalg (“Path”) with the intent to produce what will be only the third government White Paper on Norwegian foreign policy in 28 years.\textsuperscript{47} Obviously, Norwegian foreign policy has been characterized by continuity, but given events in Europe and beyond, modifications are expected later in 2016.

We do, however, want to take into account three trends. Norway’s first Joint Doctrine (FFOD 2000) sought to define new international roles for the Norwegian DOD in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in support of the United Nations (UN) and NATO.\textsuperscript{48} The importance of national defense was downplayed, a stance that was reversed in the latest version of FFOD (2014), in which credible deterrence, NATO collective defense, and other national tasks are listed as the six most important tasks for the Norwegian DOD.\textsuperscript{49} Multinational crisis-response and peace support fell to priority number seven.\textsuperscript{50}

In 2015, the convening of the Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy reflected the recognition of the need to take significant measures to


\textsuperscript{46} The U.S. military is striving for its Pacific shift, Donald Trump is running for president, and the EU project is more fragile than ever.


\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 32–38.
strengthen Norway’s defense capabilities, in pursuit of both national and societal security.\textsuperscript{51} The report issued by the commission notes that NORSOF has an important supporting role to play in domestic counterterrorism. Other analysts argue that a limited “hybrid” attack by Russia against Norway will likely be directed against its energy production capabilities: oil, gas, and power plants,\textsuperscript{52} exactly the kind of infrastructure protection NORSOF has been preparing for in a CT role. In short, there has been a clear trend recently to focus more on national tasks for NORSOF.

For instance, according to the 2015 Expert Commission, “Russia will remain the defining factor of Norwegian defense planning in the foreseeable future.”\textsuperscript{53} Beadle and Diesen likewise argue that Norway will have to take greater responsibility for deterring outside aggression. “This is not a result of fundamental changes in the relationship with Russia, or because the world is likely to become less peaceful. \textit{It is mainly caused by growing uncertainty surrounding allied support to Norway in the most likely crisis scenarios.”}\textsuperscript{54} Historically, Norway’s relations with Russia have consisted of a delicate balance of deterrence through NATO membership and reassurance through self-imposed military and nuclear restraints, diplomacy, and cooperation whenever possible. Reassurance might be described as Norway’s strategic niche. Before the Baltic countries became members of NATO, Norway was the only NATO country that bordered Russia. General Philip Breedlove (former Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR]) describes Norway’s strategic role this way: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in the way it handles relations with Russia. Norway has a long history of working with Russia in the border areas. You have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} The Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, \textit{Unified Effort} (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Department of Defense, 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{53} Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, \textit{Unified Effort}, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Alexander William Beadle and Sverre Diesen, \textit{Global Trends toward 2040: Implications for the Norwegian Defence Forces’ Roles and Relevance} (Oslo, Norway: FFI, 2015), 4
\item \textsuperscript{55} Aashild Langved, “Interview with SACEUR General Philip M. Breedlove, Titled: ‘Bakkestyrker Er Nøkkelen Til Suksess’ (Ground Forces Is the Key to Success),” \textit{Dagens Næringsliv}, February 3, 2016.
\end{itemize}
Deterrence and reassurance of Russia can thus be said to still be of critical policy importance. It is not likely this will change in the foreseeable future for obvious geographic and geopolitical reasons. Given the immense military asymmetry between Norway and Russia, NORSOF has no deterrent effect as a force-in-being. However, NORSOF may contribute to a more credible deterrent posture through indirect action. In fact, we will argue that NORSOF may be able to play an important role regarding reassurance, and in Chapter V will sketch the two Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) for how NORSOF’s MA capability can be used to pursue Norway’s dual policy objectives of deterrence and reassurance regarding Russia.

Another trend of importance is simply that the political demand for deployable MA capabilities will continue to increase.

U.S. president Barack Obama and NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg recently described an increased requirement for building local military capacity in the frontline states facing Russia, and in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and North Africa, to name just a few.56

As Beadle and Diesen argue, the relevance of using Norwegian military means abroad in a globalized world will increase, regardless of changes in the threats at home. This will occur at the same time that increased military costs are causing the conventional armed forces to reduce their size and to focus on national defense.57 In such a situation, we believe politicians will be tempted to use NORSOF as an investment in political credibility and status abroad, while addressing threats together with NATO at the threat’s place of origin. However, balancing between national and international tasks in the future could lead to the possibility of NORSOF being misused, especially since, as Hammersmark points out, NORSOF has both functional and symbolic importance.58

57 Beadle and Diesen, Global Trends Towards 2040, 4.
58 Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces,” 70, 75.
In other words, to sum up this section, the literature suggests there will be an increased demand for NORSOF capabilities in both national and international operations in the future. Consequently, the requirement to balance across demands will grow. NORSOF will need to seek efficiencies in both direct and indirect approaches. Affirming synergies between these two mission sets thus seems more important than ever before; otherwise, NORSOF might find itself subject to imbalance and overstretch.

One source of synergy can be found if both types of missions—the direct and indirect—are conducted by the same people who share the same professional expertise. MA-specific traits and skills will be discussed later in this report. In the next section, we look at where to find synergies between different national and international operations.

6. **NORSOF Expertise, Norwegian Strategic Niches**

NATO SOF doctrine prescribes that “SOF conducts MA within their field of expertise.” Defining this field of expertise is, therefore, important for NORSOF. NORSOF’s expertise is closely linked to the unique Norwegian environment: think arctic, winter, littorals, and mountainous terrain, as well as Norway’s large merchant fleet, and gas and oil platforms (GOPLATS).59

NORSOF has 30 years of experience providing maritime and other CT support to the national police. When conducting these tasks, NORSOF operates under police mandate and rules of engagement (ROE), and NORSOF personnel are used to working in a joint environment. Similarly, we can turn to NORSOF’s role in establishing, mentoring, and assisting a national police counterrorism unit, the crises response unit (CRU) in Afghanistan. The latter, too, serves as an example of a near perfect fit with regard to MA within NORSOF’s field of expertise. The same expertise has been on display in NORSOF’s advising of Latvian and Lithuanian SOF. During the counterpiracy operation Atalanta of the Somali coast, there is the example of NORSOF conducting maritime MA with the Seychelles coast guard.60 One conclusion to be drawn from these examples is

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that the experience required to conduct NORSOF national missions has provided a solid foundation of military expertise that has proved especially relevant in MA operations. Another conclusion would be that in cases when military and political decision-makers have accepted NORSOF senior leadership’s advice concerning partners and modus operandi, the outcome has been positive. However, military advice regarding the use of NORSOF has not always been followed. We will return to this point later in this report.

One question to be posed as NORSOF’s MA capability is further developed is whether the professional expertise derived from maintaining national capabilities is sufficient to “increase the strategic utility of NORSOF” for MA. Without question, NORSOF’s military expertise helps provide relevant guidance as to which type of tactical units NORSOF should ideally mentor, train, and advise abroad. But from a functional perspective, is NORSOF always contributing to achieving strategic effects for Norway? What is Norway’s strategic utility in the international environment? What are Norwegian strategic niches? Basically, how can NORSOF’s MA capability best contribute to strategic success?

While NATO SOF doctrine prescribes that SOF conducts MA within its field of expertise, our argument is that NORSOF should conduct MA within Norwegian fields of expertise according to Norwegian security interests, and NORSOF MA capability should be used to increase Norwegian strategic net-results.

Here is one example of the kind of strategic effect Norway can take ever better advantage of in the future. It is often argued that small-state Norway “punches above its weight” in international affairs, especially with regards to conflict resolution. What has made Norway useful and important to the great powers after the Cold War has been its policy of involvement.61 Norwegian involvement in a series of negotiation processes is what has given the country stature, standing, and access beyond its size. Since 1993, Norway has been involved in conflict negotiations in South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia,

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the Philippines, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Myanmar, Guatemala, Colombia, Afghanistan/Taliban, and Libya.62

The end result of some peace agreements and, in some cases, even a prerequisite for a peace agreement to be reached, is that one or more of the opposing actors engages in some kind of security sector reform. This might require FID and/or SFA, both of which are MA missions.

Norway has had quite substantial success with defense security sector reform (DSSR) projects when the DOD and MFA have worked closely together. For instance, Haaverstad analyzed two Norwegian DSSR projects in the West Balkans, one in Serbia and one in Montenegro. Both were said to enhance stability and development in the Western Balkans, a key Norwegian policy objective.63 Indeed, the DSSR projects in Serbia and Montenegro may serve as archetypes for the types of operations that Norway is well suited to pursue. Arguably, Norway is better positioned than any other country to create strategic effect in conflicts between or within small states, by utilizing diplomatic networks and Norway’s reputation.

In fact, as a “superpower” when it comes to conflict resolution, with well-developed diplomacy, reputation, financial resources, patience, endurance, and a network for this activity,64 Norway also has small, but well educated, trained, and equipped military forces, including NORSOF. A strategic deficit exists when these two sectors do not coordinate to pursue strategic goals together, as some of the literature suggests.

Following this line of thought, we sketch a generic CONOPS in Chapter V that seeks to utilize NORSOF’s MA capability in support of Norwegian conflict negotiations in order to increase Norwegian strategic net-results in the future.


64 See, for example, Jan Hanssen-Bauer, “The Norwegian ‘Model’ for Conflict Resolution” (speech, Lisbon, October 28, 2005), 4.
7. **Summary**

This chapter has discussed NORSOF MA in light of doctrine. That is, what principles and objectives are at play when NORSOF develops its future MA capabilities.

Norwegian doctrine will always need to consider special national requirements, describe circumstances not covered in NATO doctrines, and clarify national perspectives that differ from those in NATO. No Norwegian doctrine currently addresses the special use of NORSOF for national purposes, and current doctrinal guidance for MA is not linked to specific Norwegian strategic interests. Rather, Norwegian doctrine’s consideration of MA is retrospective.

We have described a general argument found in U.S. SOF literature: that indirect approaches yield relatively larger strategic effects than direct approaches. The question is whether this argument also holds true for NORSOF, which has to balance between national and international tasks? We have also provided a comparison of NATO and U.S. SOF tasks within the framework of direct/indirect approaches.

We have argued that the demand for both national (mainly direct) capabilities and international (mainly indirect) capabilities will increase for NORSOF, and we predict a “imbalanced overstretch” in the future.

NORSOF can increase the strategic utility of its MA capabilities, for Norway’s long-term strategic purposes, by investigating cost-effective indirect approaches in pursuit of deterrence and reassurance. (CONOPS proposals will be presented in Chapter V).

For purposes of strategic utility, NORSOF should increase its contributions abroad, but should do so carefully. One way NORSOF can increase the strategic utility of its MA capability is by supporting select Norwegian conflict negotiations via military expertise, preferably in small countries. Finally, with the likely increased demand for NORSOF, and NORSOF at a historic peak in political popularity, the literature suggests

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that the misuse of NORSOF might also increase, which could be dangerous for NORSOF and for Norway.

B. ORGANIZATION: WHO DOES WHAT

In this section, we review literature regarding the organization of SOF in general, and NORSOF in particular, as a function of its capabilities. We also analyze NORSOF from an organizational structure perspective, using Mintzberg’s dimensions of organizational design as a framework.66

1. Research on NORSOF Organization

The organization of NORSOF has been the subject of a few unclassified research projects over the past decade, mainly in the form of theses or research papers from SOF officers at military institutions.

In 2008, Kjetil Mellingen recommended in an NPS thesis that NORSOF should establish a national-level joint SOF command to ensure and optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF. NORSOCOM was established in 2014 and is the sponsor of this report. Another recommendation, the reorganization of MJK/NORNAV SOF from Level 5 to level 3, was realized in 2012.67 These changes impacted MJK in regard to chain of command and resource allocation, since this resulted in a more elevated position in the Norwegian military system than previously.

After the realization of a strategic-level NORSOCOM in 2014, Eirik Kristoffersen argued that the Norwegian model could serve as an example of a small nation’s development of a strategic-level SOCOM, and described its challenges, roles, and responsibilities.68 Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of the U.S. global SOF network (GSN) as an expansion of the SOF organization for small states, and commented on how SOF reach and utility could be expanded through this SOF network of trust.


68 Kristoffersen, “Small States, Smart Solutions.”
Tom-Erik Kihl and Jonas Carling expanded on the GSN issue in 2015 and described how Norway and Sweden could utilize their membership in the GSN more effectively. They argued that GSN membership could provide those at the policy level with an alternative security cooperation forum that would have access to information and resources.\(^{69}\) For the purpose of this report, we aim also capitalize on the GSN when discussing NORSOF future MA capabilities, as we believe the GSN could and should be viewed as extending NORSOF capabilities. For instance, the CONOPS proposed in Chapter V seeks to use GSN capabilities in the pursuit of Deterrence.

In 2014, Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen tackled NORSOF’s current organizational culture and suggested a leadership approach to unify NORSOF’s two tactical units and the newly established NORSOCOM in order to improve organizational efficiency.\(^{70}\)

2. **“Vertical Split”**

However, the most relevant examination of the strategic utility of NORSOF’s capabilities remains Tom Robertsen’s NPS thesis from 2006.\(^{71}\) Using the dichotomy of direct action vs. indirect action capabilities as a framework, he hypothesized that an organizational structure with two tactical SOF units with largely overlapping direct capabilities (SR/DA) was inconsistent with future roles and missions. Analysis of the forces’ history, the security environment and the strategies adopted to deal with current and future threats, led Robertsen to conclude that NORSOF would increase its relevance by acquiring competency in indirect action capabilities. His organizational recommendation was to cede the main responsibility for direct capabilities to MJK and responsibility for indirect capabilities to FSK.\(^{72}\) In this report, we use the term “vertical split” to describe this kind of organizational solution.

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\(^{69}\) Tom-Erik Kihl and Jonas Carling, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network from a Partner-Nation Perspective” (capstone report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015).


\(^{71}\) Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces.”

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 89–93.
Robertsen based his arguments for an organizational split between indirect and direct capabilities in NORSOF largely on the U.S. SOF scholarly literature, which seems to almost unanimously suggest that a split is the best solution. For instance, David Tucker and Christopher Lamb argue that the direct action approach tends to be overemphasized and indirect action downplayed when applied in the same unit, an argument also made by Thomas Adams. Anna Simons, a social anthropologist, researcher, and lecturer on SOF, argues that direct and indirect approaches appeal to very different individuals, require very different skill sets, unfold along very different timelines, and offer markedly different rewards. She makes a solid argument for why “maintaining a firewall between (direct and indirect forces) is the only way to ensure that the division of labor remains congruent with where individuals’ talents and interests lie up and down the chain of command.”

Other NATO allies are also considering establishing permanent units of advisors. Guro Lien argues that for smaller nations, which may have difficulty deploying a large number of combat troops, this could be a way to contribute to operations and be a force enabler through supplying a niche capability. Citing Jan Erik Haug, she also cites the discussion in the UK about the possibility of forming permanent capabilities for military assistance, security, and development tasks.

Apart from differences in size, an obvious organizational difference between U.S. SOF and NORSOF is that those elements of U.S. SOF that have an indirect approach as their main capability are also regionally aligned in support of geographical regional Component Commands (COCOM). Simons argues that regional proficiency for SOF

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74 Anna Simons, “Why Firewall?”


76 Jan Erik Haug, “The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Program as a Model for Assisting the Development of an Effective Afghan National Army” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009); Lien, “Military Advising and Assisting Operations,” 86. We do not know if this relates to UK SOF or just CF.
only is possible “if people stay put for long periods of time and engage in serious, career-
long study of the areas of responsibility.” NORSOF has no such regional alignment, and predicting where future NORSOF missions may take place in order to develop NORSOF regional proficiency seems futile. However, given Norway’s geostrategic position as a NATO flank state in the High North bordering Russia, regional proficiency for NORSOF in its own region should be at least be considered. We follow this line of thought in chapter V, when discussing possible MA CONOPS for NORSOF in support of “reassurance” of Russia.

3. “Organizational Fit”

One set of academic considerations that is missing from the unclassified literature concerning NORSOF capabilities is organizational theory. Robertsen’s analysis of FSK and MJK was based on their historical development. Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen focused on organizational culture. But, organizational structure remains unaddressed. Analyzing FSK and MJK from an organizational theory perspective could offer critical insights as to the extent to which “organizational fit” might matter, especially if dividing responsibilities for direct and indirect capabilities remains on NORSOCOM’s agenda.

Detailed organizational research on NORSOF would obviously have to be classified. Unclassified research has tended to describe the two tactical units in NORSOF as near equal in size, structure, and capabilities, with a slight tilt toward their service-affiliation (Navy/Army). We contend that this description is incomplete. We also think that one kind of “organizational configuration” might be relatively better fitted for the indirect approach (including MA), as opposed to a different configuration, better suited for direct approaches. For example, if we use Mintzberg’s “Dimensions of Organizational Design” as a framework, our assumed differences become easier to highlight, as indicated by the red text in Figure 5.

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78 We assume that this is done for OPSEC reasons.
Based on such a framework, we further contend that the two units could be identified more or less as two of Mintzberg’s five archetype organizations: “professional bureaucracy” and “adhocracy with operating core.”

Our working assumption is that both units have the same level of professionalism, but we contend there are differences in other dimensions. For instance, it is likely that 30 years of national CT readiness as the core task for FSK has shaped its organization relatively more toward being a “professional bureaucracy.”

Professional bureaucracy has the operating core as its key part, uses standardization of skills as its prime coordinating mechanism, and employs vertical and horizontal decentralization. The organization is relatively formalized but decentralized to provide autonomy to professionals.80

What receives priority in both training and exercises is “the CT system,”81 comprised of a large Joint organization with FSK as the operating core. Hostage rescue

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81 In Norwegian, “System Kontraterror.”
operations (HRO) are also conducted using this same type of system. FSK administrative and support ratios are relatively higher and the operational elements are larger. To minimize the complexity of the environment, high value infrastructure and other possible targets are mapped, plans are devised, exercises are undertaken and results are filed. When incidents occur, plans are hastily adjusted based on deviations derived from available intelligence. “Deviation analysis” is actually a term in FSK. “Thoroughness breeds confidence” is FSK’s motto, invoking images of drills and standardization. For national missions, FSK operates under police mandate and ROEs. As Mintzberg suggests, an organization formalizes its behavior to

reduce its variability, ultimately to predict and control it. One prime motive for doing so is to coordinate activities. The fully formalized organization, as far as possible, is the precise organization. There can be no confusion. Everyone knows exactly what to do in every event.

This is necessary for systems doing large-scale CT operations.

The assumption that FSK’s three decades of national CT standby and training have developed it into a more formalized organization than MJK is supported by the findings of Olsen and Thormodsen when they examined organizational culture in NORSOF: “Members of FSK think they are significantly more efficient on the following four points: readiness, overall organizational performance, the quality of their staff/support, and resource allocation,” all qualities related to FSK as a system.

In the same survey, MJK members scored themselves as “significantly more efficient on innovation, quality of the selection course, TTP development and quality of the operators,” all qualities related to the effectiveness of individuals and the team. Relative to FSK, it is possible that MJK has moved more in the direction of being an “adhocracy with operating core.” According to Mintzberg, such organizations seek “in

82 As dictated by the nature of the high value infrastructure like oil platforms, cruise ships at sea, hotels, and government buildings, such an attack force is never large enough. The availability of infiltration platforms will be the limiting factor.

83 Mintzberg, Structuring of Organizations, 83.

84 Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces,” 45.

85 Ibid.
complex environments …(to) engage sophisticated specialists, especially in their support 
staffs, and require them to combine their efforts in project teams coordinated by mutual 
adjustment.”86 Also, “The structure tends to be low in formalization and decentralization. 
The primary goal is innovation and rapid adaptation to changing environments. 
Adhocracies typically are medium sized, must be adaptable, and must use resources 
efficiently.”87

As Olsen and Thormodsen indicate, MJK escaped being restricted by national CT 
readiness prior to 2015, and could therefore indulge in experimentation with new 
capabilities.88 Some of MJK’s supporting (specialist) capabilities are cutting edge, but 
this may not be apparent to outsiders.89 Within MJK the prime level of focus has 
traditionally been the MJK patrol, not the MJK system at large. Given MJK’s slightly 
different focus and history, it is possible that initiative is valued more highly in selection 
and training.90 Also, decision-making is possibly more egalitarian.91 The natural 
conclusion would be to think that the MJK patrol is a relatively more autonomous unit, 
possibly with a higher quantity of skills at the patrol level than their FSK counterpart, an 
assumption based purely on time available for picking up skills.92 Unlike FSK, MJK has 
a separate SOF-related curriculum at the Naval academy, and possibly a broader 
exposure to higher education to include King’s College and NPS.93 In addition it is

1981). For adhocracies “with operating core,” these experts will also be found in the operating core as well 
as the staff.

87 Lunenburg, Organizational Structure: Mintzberg’s Framework, 7.

88 Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (master’s 

89 These are classified capabilities and solely our own impression.

90 An argument largely based on Tone Danielsen, “Making Warriors in the Global Era: An 
Anthropological Study of Institutional Apprenticeship; Selection, Training, Education, and Everyday Life 
in the Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando” (doctoral dissertation, University of Oslo, 2015).

91 Ibid.

92 Tugwell and Charters define the “quantity and intensity or level of skills required of each man or 
very small group” as separating SOF from CF. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters, “Special Operations 
and the Threats to United States’ Interests in the 1980s,” in Special Operations in U.S. Strategy, eds. Frank 
1984), 146.

93 Our own assessment after discussions on education during NORSO 2025 project, NPS 2015.
relevant to point out that MJK is a smaller unit, with less control-span and less administrative support than FSK.94

We believe both MJK and FSK are mainly “professional bureaucracies” in garrison, and that both units (as with most SOF units) do move in the direction of “adhocracy with an operating core” when task organized and deployed on exercises and operations.95 We have argued, however, that a classified structural analysis of these forces based on Mintzberg’s framework would likely identify FSK as more of a “professional bureaucracy” even when deployed, and that MJK remains more of an “adhocracy with operating core.” The recent Afghanistan investigation report presented to the Norwegian government supports our hypothesis:

[In the beginning in Afghanistan], the differences in training, modus operandi and culture were too large. While one community (MJK) is influenced by a maritime conflict environment, where lower commanders for practical reasons often get a lot of liability, the other (FSK) is increasingly characterized by tighter planning, command and control.96

We mention these distinctions to raise the question: What are the implications if NORSOCOM still seek a “vertical split” between FSK and MJK? Theoretically speaking, working indirectly by, with, or through indigenous forces demands more relational, flexible, and innovative methods of conducting operations than do direct approaches; this often calls for a different type of individual operator as an advisor.97 If our hypothesis and assumptions about the organizational differences between FSK and MJK are confirmed, we would expect MJK to provide a better organizational fit for indirect approaches over FSK, which has a better organizational fit than MJK for direct approaches.

94 Control-span is defined as “the number of persons that reports to one leader/supervisor in an organization,” see: Richard L. Daft, ed., Organizational Theory and Design, 8th ed. (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western, 2004)

95 As the on-scene commander gets more authority, the number of liaisons increases, etc.

96 Godal et al., NOU 2016, 62.

97 Mintzberg, Organization Design.
4. “Horizontal Development” and “Vertical Implementation”

As previously mentioned, the literature in support of an organizational, vertical split between indirect and direct approaches mainly focuses on the world’s largest SOF community, that of the United States. The size of the entire NORSOF community amounts to about 1% of U.S. SOF. NORSOF is also significantly different in that NORSOF personnel have the possibility of serving for much longer.98 The NPS strategic design project NORSOF 2025 took these Norwegian particularities into account and recommended a career management system with three separate tracks: The subject matter expert (SME) track focusing on deep knowledge to include MA experts; the warrior-diplomat track, to include senior MA advisors, negotiators, and high level liaisons; and the traditional command track.99 As the NORSOF 2025 report suggests, NORSOF personnel would begin as “warriors” early in their career, mainly focusing on SR/DA missions, and evolve into “warrior-diplomats” at later stages in their careers, as they gain education, maturity, and experience. In this report, we refer to this organizational solution as “horizontal development.” NORSOF 2025 did not reach a conclusion about an optimal organizational structure, but identified five possible options. Only one of these resembles what we have described as “vertical split” in this report.100

Another organizational trend in special operations forces is that the number and range of skills individual operators/teams are expected to master is increasing. On one hand, this increase might degrade the intensity and level of skills which Tugwell and Charters describe as characteristic for SOF.101 On the other hand, the increased use of experts and enablers represents a recent workaround. Both NORSOF 2025102 and SOF 2030103 describe how SOF teams will likely be smaller, with a core of irregular warfare–experienced operators assisted by enablers. The enablers would even outnumber the

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98 Retirement with benefits starts at 57 years of age, up to 67 years.
100 Ibid., 57.
101 Tugwell and Charters, “Special Operations and the Threats to United States’ Interests.”
operators. As a result, SOF 2030 argues that “enablers, enhancers, and support staff also need to go through a rigorous assessment and selection.”\textsuperscript{104} Viewpoints of NORSOF personnel on drawing external expertise into NORSOF to increase its MA capabilities are discussed in the next chapter.

Another organizational recommendation drawn from the literature described as a best practice in military advising, is the importance of advising at all different levels of command in the mentored force in a coordinated manner (including real-time coordination of all day-to-day cases). A RAND study from 2013 identified best practices when building Afghan special operations forces and cited NORSOF’s training, assisting, and mentoring of CRU 222.\textsuperscript{105} According to the RAND study, a best practice was to engage in “comprehensive mentoring”; advisors followed the different national mission unit’s (NMU) communication, requests, and orders, up and down the chain of command on a case-by-case basis. When coordination between the advisors at different levels became hampered, outcomes suffered.\textsuperscript{106} We refer to NORSOF’s ability and capacity to mentor a force at different levels as “vertical implementation” in this report, and discuss it in more depth in the next chapter.

5. Doctrinal Responsibility for MA in Norwegian DOD

Another general argument made in the literature is that military organizations tend to re-focus on their traditional (conventional) capabilities between wars, while a focus on indirect approaches seems to live on, if at all, only in some academic circles. It is striking how lessons learned from indirect approaches during World War II (WWII) had to be re-learned late in the Vietnam era, and how the lessons learned from Vietnam had to be re-learned again, late in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Tellingly, among the approximately 20 “centers of excellence” in NATO, we can find no institution concerned

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} CRU has responsibility for security in Kabul and is the first responder to high-profile attacks that threaten the capital.

with MA-type operations, like COIN or SFA, with the possible exception of NATO special operations headquarters (NSHQ). 107

Doctrinally, MA is a SOF responsibility in NATO, and USSOCOM is the joint proponent for all SFA in the United States. 108 Hærens våpenskole, the Norwegian army’s equivalent of the U.S.’s training and doctrine command (TRADOC), 109 has been responsible for training programs for conventional forces (CF) advisor teams like OMLTs. CF advisor training largely focused on technical and tactical training to achieve a necessary level of military competence prior to soldiers deploying. 110 According to a Norwegian institute of international affairs (NIIA) report from 2012, most of the OMLT mentors interviewed saw no branch of the Norwegian defense establishment express a specific interest or focused effort to learn from their experiences or expertise, “and neither did they expect this to happen.” 111 The lack of doctrinal or organizational sharing of responsibility for MA-type expertise and operations in Norway seems self-evident. Consequently, the organizational dilemma for NORSOF may be described as follows: NORSOF is the only entity doing (SOF) DA operations in Norway, and their responsibility for codifying and institutionalizing this knowledge is obvious. But MA is a mission for both SOF and CF. Doctrinally and traditionally, MA is NORSOF’s domain. But the new Norwegian land doctrine will shortly include SFA operations at large for the very first time. 112 Different organizational solutions to institutionalize MA knowledge, therefore, are not just possible, but will be necessary for NORSOF. These are elaborated upon in Chapter IV.

The aforementioned NIIA report also concludes that the Norwegian defense system should have a “structure available” to enable Norwegian forces to maintain

109 In Norwegian, Hærens Våpenskole (HVS).
111 Ibid., 15.
112 Based on mail correspondence with Norwegian Staff College personnel responsible for the new Norwegian land doctrine, January 2016.
readiness for MA, and that MA should receive more attention in the curricula at Norway’s military academies and staff college. Finally, the report suggests that the Norwegian government should coordinate its competence-building when situations call for the defense, justice and foreign departments to provide assistance to other countries’ security sectors. According to the report, all the initiatives and projects that are implemented within “classic” security sector reform from all departments, as well as the MA activities that the armed forces have conducted since 2005, should be considered.113

6. Summary

In this section, we have reviewed literature regarding SOF’s organization with a special focus on the organization of SOF’s MA capabilities. We have argued that the GSN could and should be viewed as an extension of NORSOF capabilities. We have considered the idea of organizational “vertical splits” between SOF units (separation by specialization into direct and indirect approaches), and we have argued that organizational “fit” should be taken into account when considering such a solution. We have introduced “horizontal development,” a concept borrowed from NORSOF 2025 as an alternative to “vertical split.”

We have described an organizational trend in SOF that has led to an increased number of experts and enablers, and also discussed the importance of advising different levels of command in real-time (vertical implementation/ comprehensive mentoring). We have described the need for an institutionalization of MA knowledge and best practices across both NORSOF and Norwegian CF, and we will propose additional organizational options later in this report. Finally, we have suggested that NORSOCOM should be the coordinating authority in the DOD at the strategic level with responsibility for joint/interagency operations that encompasses SSR, SFA, and SOF-type MA.

C. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL

Indirect action missions “are very hard to define and prepare for.”

—Thomas K. Adams in *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action*\(^{114}\)

The literature on selection, training, and education of military advisors is relatively broad. For the purposes of this report, we have chosen to look at three main categories:

- Literature concerning requirements, traits, and skills deemed necessary for effective advisors
- Literature evaluating MA selection and training, both in SOF and CF
- Literature that mentions selection, training, and education of Norwegian military advisors

The literature that addresses requirements, traits, and skills deemed necessary for effective advisors consists largely of concrete “lessons learned/advice for advisors.” However, generally these lessons are deduced from an array of research publications, military reports, biographies, doctrines, and interviews.\(^{115}\) Personal accounts, like those of a very young Ben Malcom in North Korea, prove what can be achieved by young men at the tactical-operational level without deep military expertise or strategic oversight; but such young people need great interpersonal skills, obvious organizational talent, and a young lieutenant’s view that “anything seems possible.”\(^{116}\) When it comes to strategic level military advisors, the wile, humor, tact, and strategic understanding of the “curious


solipsist” Edward Lansdale, are examples of traits to look for when advising at higher levels.\textsuperscript{117}

1. Professional Skills vs. Cultural and Pedagogic Competence

Robert D. Ramsey from the U.S. Army combat studies institute has written two extensive studies on military advising.\textsuperscript{118} In the first, \textit{Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador}, Ramsey distills the insights gained by the U.S. Army from its advisory experiences in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. Among the key points Ramsey makes is “the need for U.S. advisors to have extensive language and cultural training and to adapt U.S. organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions.”\textsuperscript{119} He also notes “how important it is for the host nation’s leadership to buy into and actively support the development of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system.”\textsuperscript{120} We believe NORSOF personnel with recent experience as mentors for CRU 222 in counterterrorism operations in Kabul would likely agree with his view of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system,\textsuperscript{121} even though the latter (e.g., a meritocratic promotion system) might be utopic in tribal/feudal societies like Afghanistan and Iraq.

A classic work on military advising, written by individuals who actually advised advisors, is Gerald Hickey and Walter Davison’s 1965 RAND Vietnam study.\textsuperscript{122} Unlike Ramsey, Hickey and Davison contend that “the first qualification for anyone serving in an intercultural context is professional competence; linguistic and social skills do not


\textsuperscript{118} Robert D. Ramsey, \textit{Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006a).


\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{122} Gerald Cannon Hickey and Walter Phillips Davison, \textit{The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam} (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1965).
make up for lack of professional and technical know-how.”  

Much of the literature from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq describes military advisors’ lack of cultural awareness and failure to establish rapport as the main obstacles for successful military advising. Hickey and Davison, too, describe “cultural empathy” or “cross-cultural sensitivity” as important qualities and argue that these traits are more likely to be found among minorities, members of groups with a strong tradition of involvement overseas, or the offspring of intermarriages.

The targeted selection of individuals from specific groups for special warfare was an important feature when the OSS was established to support indigenous forces during WWII. It was also a key feature in the establishment of U.S. Army SF. First-generation immigrants and naturalized citizens do represent a group of people that can have valuable experiences that can be utilized when working with indigenous forces, and should therefore be potentially be targeted through selection.

Given the current and future operational needs in 2008, Trevor O. Robichaux conducted a study where he addressed the potential immigrants and naturalized citizens represented for the U.S. SF community. We, therefore should ask, is this concern also relevant for NORSOF?

The targeted recruitment of personnel from immigrant communities is possibly easier in the United States—where numbers are higher and U.S. SF’s regional focus makes targeted recruitment more viable over the long term—than in Norway. Nevertheless, NORSOF has operated for more than a decade in Afghanistan without any specific effort to recruit individuals from the region. Peter Hellesen also points to this untapped potential for NORSOF in his thesis. Worth noting is that this category of

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123 Ibid., 73.
124 Ibid., 73.
127 Hellesen, “Counterinsurgency and Its Implication,” 70.
personnel has played a limited but important role within the Norwegian intelligence community.128

2. **MA-specific Traits and Skills**

DA and SR traits and skills are arguably more concrete, tangible, visible and appealing to both potential SOF candidates and their evaluators and trainers. In contrast, MA traits and skills are harder to conceptualize, measure, exercise, and showcase (for recruitment purposes). Furthermore, the literature describing military advisor traits and skill sets is diverse, and often-required traits and skill sets depend on the local cultural context. Nevertheless, we have striven to search for common denominators mentioned in the literature and in discussions on military advising. The purpose of the following is, therefore, to present a list of traits (which may be inherent and, therefore, need to be selected for), vs. skills (which can be taught, given the right traits). Such a list could be used by NORSOF selection personnel (including psychologists) and training wings for their consideration:

- Professional competence and courage. There is a misconception that military advising and assistance operations are low-risk operations and mainly involve training inside a camp.129
- Patience, endurance, maturity, and considerable reserves of mental stamina because MA missions are slow, messy and invariably political.130
- Language learning abilities, negotiation skills, empathy.
- Genuine interest in different cultures, social and military systems, and a curious mindset.
- Ability to build rapport with a purpose, and then to use this rapport.
- Enthusiasm, adaptability, and navigation skills in both the human and physical terrains.
- Enthusiasm about training, exercises, and operations outside the *social* comfort zone (in addition to the classic SOF training outside the *physical* comfort zone).

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128 Our own experiences.
130 Simons, “Why Firewall?”

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- Superior organizational skills, along with teaching skills and the capacity for adapting and exploiting a wide range of different cultural settings.
- Writing skills and a willingness to document actions, analysis, assessments, etc., so as to create an organizational memory for each MA operation.
- Humor, wiles, intelligence, and honesty.
- Minimal personal need for recognition and attention from others. Not dependent on regular positive feedback, as it is less likely to be provided during MA missions.
- An opportunistic mindset. The ability to influence one’s own chain of command as well as the advised chain of command, an empiric necessity based on literature.
- An “unmilitary” philosophical and reflective bent, to cope effectively with ethical dilemmas and moral anguish.

No one has all of these traits and skills, and it is possible a generation gap exists between generations X, Y, and Millennials regarding interests and self-realization as SOF members.\textsuperscript{131} This is important, because MA is not about “us”; it is about “them.” The purpose of SOF conducting military advisory missions at the tactical level is undoubtedly to teach and train foreign military forces (by doing FID), or irregulars (by doing UW). Some of the literature we reviewed argues that “teaching SF to teach others” has, to a large degree, been left out of training and education, mostly to make room and time for tactical training (SR/DA) in non-permissive environments.\textsuperscript{132} “Teaching teaching-skills” was an important part of the U.S. SOF curriculum before 9/11 when, according to the literature, a focus on direct action capabilities took over. The subject has had to be put back in the curriculum; increased focus on teaching is often included in the term “bridging the UW gap.”\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} Simons, “SOF 2030.”
\textsuperscript{132} See, for example, Steven P. Bucci, \textit{The Importance of Special Operation Forces Today and Going Forward} (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), paragraph “SOF training and expertise.”
\textsuperscript{133} See, for example, United States Army, Special Operations Command, \textit{ARSOF 2022}, Special Warfare 26 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2013).
One specific study, which evaluated CF military transition teams and interviewed U.S. Army soldiers from the conflict in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, indicates that the soldiers received education in cultural differences, but not any education in teaching or presenting material.\textsuperscript{134} We consider it equally important to NORSOF to ask what degree NORSOF is specifically teaching its advisors to teach indigenous forces as well.

3. **Norwegian “Exceptionalism”?**

The extensive U.S. literature on military advising begs the question of whether there are differences between U.S. and Norwegian advisor experiences, and whether it is possible to discern specific Norwegian cultural or national traits with specific relevance to NORSOF MA operations. For future Norwegian advisors, we highly recommend Ola Krekvik’s investigation of the ethical dilemmas and practical challenges Norwegian OMLTs experienced when working alongside Afghan forces, and the cultural challenges of living and operating side-by-side with local forces.\textsuperscript{135} This particular study argues that the common practical and cultural challenges and dilemmas faced by military advisors were present, but perceived as manageable by Norwegian CF advisors.\textsuperscript{136} Living and fighting together with Afghan forces was considered to be positive and meaningful. The biggest challenges arose when local forces treated civilians unethically, and, to a lesser degree, when national constraints caused tactical limitations.\textsuperscript{137}

Krekvik’s report further suggests that the professional identity adopted by Norwegian soldiers and officers may have made it easier for them to understand, interact with, train, and help Afghans rather than forces from more centralized, hierarchical, and authoritarian military systems. Norwegians are expected to contribute outside of their prescribed responsibilities, and flexible and unconventional solutions are perhaps more common to Norwegian forces, to include those outside of NORSOF. One reason might be


\textsuperscript{135} Krekvik, “Transferring Responsibility for Security.”

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 66.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 65.
that Norwegian forces are less hierarchically structured and exhibit more informal relationships between the ranks. The contrast drawn here is with the U.S. approach. Other evaluations of Norwegian OMLTs confirm this picture, although their validity might be questionable since Norwegian interviewees are evaluating themselves in both of these reports.

We found one unclassified report that evaluates NORSOF’s ability to build “indigenous” special forces capacity. A RAND study from 2013 examines best practices when building Afghan special operations forces. Examining NORSOF’s training, assisting, and mentoring of CRU 222 was an important component of the study. The RAND study does not evaluate individual advisory skills and traits, but focuses on systemic best practices and approaches when special mission units are advised. NORSOF are described as concentrating on improving CRU capabilities, rather than on racking up operational statistics. On the one hand, NORSOF displayed a “tough love” approach to training:

As one senior Afghan CRU officer noted, the difference between Norwegian mentors and others he has worked with is that Norwegian SOF “will let you drop, drop, drop, drop and you are about to drown and they will then pick you up.” Such a “tough love” approach has shown results: “While they saw us drop, they also saw us stand up.”

On the other hand, NORSOF also took building personal rapport seriously:

Building rapport between host-nation and partner units is key to successful mentoring and partnering. Norwegian SOF, for example, focused on building friendships, playing sports together, and even engaging in Afghan dance and traditional activities. The Norwegian mentor team built a small and relatively unsecured enclave inside the larger CRU facility. The enclave was adjacent to the CRU’s living quarters and allowed unfettered interaction between the mentors and the CRU operators.

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138 Ibid., 57–58.
140 CRU has responsibility for security in Kabul and is the first responder for high-profile attacks that threaten the capital.
141 Paul et al., What Works Best?, 10.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 12.
The report concludes:

The advances across these units were aided by a number of sound partnership approaches. [CRU] mentors focused on building Afghan capacity rather than focusing solely on achieving operational effects. They sought to wean coalition support to operations by curtailing the number of coalition personnel on Afghan missions and limiting certain levels of intelligence enablers to foster a sustainable Afghan approach to operations. **Rapport and continuity were especially strong areas of mentorship**, with British and Norwegian troops performing numerous repeat tours with their Afghan partners. Such repeat tours played an especially important dividend in building strong relationships with Afghan personnel.144

In Chapter III, we discuss some of the quantitative data from the FFI survey regarding which factors NORSOF personnel felt constrained them in their advisory efforts in this specific MA mission.

4. **Summary**

In this section, we have reviewed the literature on selection, training, and education of military advisors. The literature describes “professional competence” as perhaps the most important capability during MA missions. Seemingly, this has not been a problem for NORSOF during MA missions, as most operations have been a perfect fit with regards to NORSOF’s “field of expertise”: building a CT unit with a police mandate.

Besides professional competence, we have derived a list of different skills and traits from a variety of texts. In the next chapter, we discuss to what degree such traits and skills are currently part of NORSOF’s recruitment, selection, and education processes.

Our literature review also reveals that lack of time and resources spent on “teaching both SF and CF to teach others” are the main obstacles to effective military advising. How NORSOF has dealt with this is also a subject of discussion in the next chapter. We also examine factors related to personnel and training which may have constrained NORSOF’s performance in MA operations.

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144 Ibid., 20 (emphasis added).
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FFI SURVEY

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast some of the DOTP-P challenges and dilemmas identified in the literature in the last chapter with the results from a very recent quantitative-qualitative study conducted by FFI. 145 The 85 survey participants were key NORSOF personnel who previously had participated in NORSOF MA operations.

The FFI survey was designed to quantify different normative attitudes regarding the future of NORSOF’s MA capability. The survey was also designed to collect qualitative information from these NORSOF practitioners of MA in order to strengthen our analysis of the quantitative data. It is important for us to take into account both qualitative and quantitative data from this sample when we make our recommendations for future DOTP modifications. After all, some of the survey participants are current subject matter experts, leaders, or future leaders in NORSOF, and they will shape how NORSOF capabilities evolve.

The FFI survey maybe found in the appendix of this report. The most important results are discussed in this chapter. Questions concerning the survey can be directed to research scientist Frank B. Steder at the Norwegian defense research institute (FFI).

B. DOCTRINAL ISSUES

1. MA in Doctrine

Reviewing allied and national doctrine describing MA, we found that current doctrine does not address the special use of NORSOF for national purposes, and the current doctrinal guidance for MA capabilities and operations is not linked to specific Norwegian strategic interests: rather, doctrine is retrospective in focus. This issue was not addressed directly in the FFI survey. However, when asked to rank 13 factors (in order of

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145 See Appendix for a full overview of this survey. Forsvarets Forsknings Institutt (FFI), FFI Survey: On Military Assistance in NORSOF, ed. Frank B. Steder (Kjeller, Norway: Forsvarets Forsknings Institutt (FFI), 2016).
importance) which may have reduced the effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations, the lack of doctrine and concepts for MA in NORSOF ranked as the third highest factor. This does not support the immediate need for a national SOF doctrine, but it does point to a perceived weakness in the hierarchy of NORSOF documents regarding MA, which is worth considering. The results from this part of the study are presented in Figure 6.

![Figure 6. Factors That May Reduce the Effectiveness of NORSOF MA Operations](image)

As these results from the FFI study suggest, the two top factors are organizational: “Lack of organizational memory and documentation of activities and evaluations,” and “lack of vertical implementation on the levels above me in the mentored force.” The

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latter describes a situation whereby NORSOF does not have mentors at the necessary higher levels or support functions in the mentored chain of command. This could reflect the fact that NORSOF does not educate enough advisors for higher levels of command, or the fact that Norway does not receive enough positions at higher levels in what are usually international and coalition constructs. Given these results, a possible future national SOF doctrine should insist on both “vertical implementation” and a better documentation system as prerequisites for future NORSOF MA operations.

2. NORSOF on “Strategic Importance of Direct vs. Indirect Approaches”

In Chapter II, we described a common argument regarding the doctrinal use of SOF: that indirect approaches yield relatively larger strategic effects than direct approaches. We rhetorically asked whether this argument also held true for NORSOF, given that NORSOF has extensive national (mainly direct approach) tasks.

The response to this question in the FFI survey was a bit surprising to us: “Most academics who have studied SOF, argue that the strategic effect/importance of the SOF indirect approach (e.g., MA) is relatively higher than the direct approach (e.g., DA).” The responses appear in Figure 7.
Sixty-eight percent of the respondents agreed, at least to some extent, that indirect approaches have a higher strategic effect than direct approaches for SOF in general. Of these, 11% completely agreed with the statement, 71% agreed that the statement was true at least to some extent, and for NORSOF in particular 21% were in complete agreement. Given NORSOF’s mainly direct action national tasks, our initial hypothesis was that the respondents would hold the statement to be less true for NORSOF than for SOF in general. But the opposite turned out to be the case, although by a very narrow margin (3%). What might explain this result?

One of the responders clearly objected to comparing the strategic effect of the two different approaches for NORSOF without first considering NORSOF’s given roles and tasks. With the exception of national responsibility for maritime CT and HRO, it is our perception that the roles and tasks for NORSOF (e.g., MA) are constantly changing and evolving; they are far from set in stone. Since both tactical units in NORSOF officially describe themselves as “full spectrum SOF,” we believe the NORSOF responders’

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147 FFI, *FFI Survey*, questions 7a and 7b.
148 Ibid., comments on question 8.
opinions about the strategic importance of direct and indirect approaches matter. When examining the qualitative comments related to this question, NORSOF responses point to several possible explanations:

- Some commented that DA is only successful as part of an indirect strategy. These respondents pointed to a general phasing of conflicts, where direct approaches have higher strategic utility in particular phases in order to shape the enemy and set conditions for lasting solutions by, with, and through local government forces (FID) or other supported groups (UW). Hence, a strategic indirect approach has a higher impact in the long term but is often dependent on direct capabilities for shaping. Some respondents compared this development with their own experiences in Afghanistan.

- Others pointed to what Hammersmark describes as a political/symbolic strategic effect (as opposed to a functional strategic effect):\textsuperscript{149} Norwegian politicians believe MA operations pose less risk to the force and that it is easier to gain both domestic and international political goodwill for MA activity. Some respondents even argued that it is pointless to discuss whether direct or indirect approaches are most valuable at the strategic level, as decisions on the use of NORSOF “mainly are based on political considerations and not on the strategic requirements in the theater.”\textsuperscript{150}

- Some respondents commented on the limitations of predominantly direct strategies in contemporary conflicts, based on their own experiences in Afghanistan. They recognized the strategic effect of killing/capturing High Value Targets. At the same time, they acknowledged that such operations are rare and pointed to the limited strategic effects of such a strategy if the judicial system is corrupt or incompetent. As such, they agreed with the findings in the \textit{SOF 2030} report, where the problem of “rendition” is described as the main obstacle for efficient direct approaches.\textsuperscript{151}

- Respondents who answered that direct approaches have a relatively higher strategic effect than indirect approaches for NORSOF mainly pointed to the importance of NORSOF’s national missions. One comment sums up this point of view:

  For Norway, the strategic purpose of most MA operations is to gain status as a reliable and trustworthy partner to the U.S. and NATO. The strategic purpose of the DA capacity is mainly to protect vital Norwegian infrastructure and save Norwegian lives,

\textsuperscript{149} Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces.”

\textsuperscript{150} FFI, \textit{FFI Survey}, comments on question 8.

\textsuperscript{151} Simons, “SOF 2030,” 1.
something no foreign capability can do for us. Hence, MA capability is a strategic investment. DA capability is a strategic insurance. The Norwegian challenge is to balance investments and insurance.152

Seventy-one percent of the responders agreed that indirect approaches have a higher strategic utility for NORSOF than direct approaches do. However, when asked to rank the different doctrinal capabilities from AJP 3.5 in order of importance for NORSOF, the result is seemingly the opposite, as shown in Figure 8 (only first rankings are depicted):

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8.** Doctrinal Capabilities Ranked After Importance for NORSOF153

If we assume that most national tasks are direct in nature, 77% of the respondents ranked direct capabilities as most important, while 23% described indirect capability (MA) as most important. While this may seem like a contradiction given that 71% agreed that indirect approaches had the highest strategic utility for NORSOF, strategy is not the

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152 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 8.
same as capability. When analyzing the qualitative comments, we discern some additional explanations for this apparent contradiction:\textsuperscript{154}

- Several respondents argued that MA capability to a large degree is the result of the professional competency derived from training, for practicing, and conducting national tasks of SR and DA. Following this line of argument, it makes sense to rank the direct capabilities first, as they constitute the professional basis for the MA capability. These respondents emphasized military professional skills as most important even in MA operations.

- A few respondents commented that developing and maintaining capabilities to fulfill the national tasks are most important. These are described as “first-responder” and “no-fail” missions in the comments. The general argument from this group of respondents is that national requirements trump the needs of allies. (See the previous comment about insurance vs. investment).

- Others commented that MA is only successful if it is part of a strategic, comprehensive indirect approach, and indicated that this has not been the case in contemporary conflicts. We interpret some of the answers to imply that, because of the lack of political will in coalitions to do what it takes to implement a comprehensive indirect strategy, direct capabilities were ranked higher, since they are of national importance and less dependent on the comprehensive, uncertain variables which a coherent coalition strategy abroad requires. (Our summary of several comments).

3. **NORSOF on Doctrinal Responsibility for MA**

In the last chapter, we described a trend whereby MA had evolved from being historically mainly a SOF activity now to involving huge numbers of conventional forces—contrary to the DA and SR tasks, which continue to be mainly SOF activities. Norwegian conventional forces (CF) have also done extensive MA operations in Afghanistan over the past decade and now also in Iraq, and SFA will be described for the first time in the upcoming revised Norwegian land doctrine. Given this trend, the question is whether MA should continue to be a SOF doctrinal responsibility in Norway.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., comments question 10c.
As the results depicted in Figure 9 suggest, 70% of the NORSOF respondents disagreed with the normative statement that *there is no obvious reason why MA doctrinally is a SOF function in Norway*. Also, when MA is presented as a specialist function, respondents were asked whether this specialization justifies MA’s doctrinal affiliation with NORSOF, and 50% disagreed. These results suggest that a majority believe that NORSOF should remain the doctrinal proponent of MA for Norway’s defense forces, while only 50% agreed that the alleged need for specialized MA selection and training justifies this NORSOF ownership. Therefore, other rationales must inform the respondents’ points of view.

None of the comments elicited by question 11 in the survey spoke specifically about justifications for why MA should remain a NORSOF doctrinal function. Most responders commented that MA is a task for both SOF and CF, although directed at different types of partners (e.g., SOF with special units vs. CF with conventional units), and in some cases in different phases of a conflict, (e.g., SOF may initiate the contacts

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155 FFI, *FFI Survey*, questions 11c and 11d.
and do the initial assessments of standards and requirements, with CF taking over if CF military expertise is a better “fit”).

Two respondents highlighted the Norwegian conscription model as an important first selector: this “guarantees” people with sufficient intellectual and educational capacity both in CF and in NORSOF. This was also considered to be a comparative advantage that Norwegian CF has when conducting MA missions relative to some other nations. As one individual commented: “Not all CF should do MA, but Norwegian CF are a product of a modern education system and selection through conscription. The foundation is in place.”

One respondent argued that leadership in MA operations is linked to the “SOF mindset,” focused on humans rather than hardware and emphasizing creativity and flexibility, and that this is the main reason why MA doctrinally belongs in NORSOF. Two respondents distinguished MA conducted by CF with MA conducted by SOF through the use of some of SOF’s characteristic attributes: economy of force, ability to be discreet or covert, ability to advise in less permissive environments, and ability to act with more autonomy and superior tactical judgment at the lowest level.

The bulk of the comments about this problem get centered on discussions about whether the MA task for NORSOF requires modifications to selection and training. Possible answers to this question will be discussed in section D (Training and Personnel) of this chapter.

4. **NORSOF on Norwegian Strategic Interests in MA Operations**

In Chapter II, we projected an increased demand for both direct and indirect capabilities from NORSOF in the future and argued that this implies that NORSOF must look for cost-effective, small footprint MA operations, prioritized toward Norwegian strategic security policy objectives. The FFI survey investigated whether Norwegian strategic interests have been clear in NORSOF MA operations, and whether this matters to NORSOF personnel during operations (see Figure 10).

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156 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 11e.
Forty-four percent of the respondents indicated that Norwegian strategic interests have been unclear while conducting MA operations, and here we find one of the few statistically significant differences between the different strata of respondents: 59% of the responders who characterized themselves as “staff” felt that Norwegian strategic interests had been unclear during MA operations, while only 40% of those in the group “leadership felt similarly.” It is difficult to elucidate why “staff” is overrepresented in this case.

Sixty-eight percent disagreed to some extent with the normative statement that it is not terribly important to me what Norwegian strategic interests MA operations pursue. It is not my job to assess Norwegian strategic gains of every single mission. While 32% agreed. There were no statistically significant differences between the strata on this issue, although the group that categorized itself as belonging to “leadership” tended to disagree more (74%) than the rest (68%). Personnel with higher military education (staff

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157 FFI, FFI Survey, questions 15a and 15b.

158 Respondents who defined themselves as having a “leadership function” in the FFI survey. Other functions are staff, support, operational saber squadron, and other.
college) disagreed marginally less (64%) than the average (68%), which might come as a slight surprise.

When analyzing the qualitative comments, some explanations can be found:

- Norwegian political ambiguity concerning strategic interests in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to be the dominating factor that explains the high percentage of respondents who described strategic interests as unclear, across all strata.

- Some respondents argued that it is not their job to assess Norwegian strategic interests, though at the same time they do care that Norwegian interests are pursued during any type of NORSOF operation. This suggests there may be a problem with the phrasing of question 15b, which has implications for the validity of this particular result.

- A few commented that Norwegian strategic interests are not important; what is important to these respondents is simply that NORSOF is the best “tool in the toolbox” to do the job asked.\(^{159}\)

- Most respondents argued that clearly stated Norwegian strategic interests are important (but not crucial) to motivation when conducting MA; such clarity improves the results of the mission. Several respondents did describe a lack of clear communication about these interests. A sampling of comments is highlighted below:

  The strategic interests have been obvious, but they have not been clearly communicated; rather, they have deliberately been made vague. A clear example is Afghanistan.

  We lack agreement on the strategic goals to synchronize Norwegian diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) efforts. The effect could have been much higher if plans and tools were coordinated between agencies towards nationally agreed strategic ends.\(^{160}\)

  These, and similar comments, reflect some of the viewpoints recommending a national COIN or LIC doctrine (as presented earlier in this report).

  Several respondents commented that Norway has no national strategic interests in the contemporary conflicts in which NORSOF is involved, except on the basis of

\(^{159}\) FFI, \textit{FFI Survey}, comments on question 15c.

\(^{160}\) Ibid.
reciprocity with our NATO allies in case Norway faces a crisis in the future. This comment is illustrative:

> It is difficult to separate Norwegian interests from “the rest of the West’s” interests. … Norwegian politicians are, understandably, “band-wagoning” on big allies, with one notable, positive exception: Iraq 2. … Diesen is right when he said there is a lack of strategic discourse in Norway. If Norwegian interests are clearly stated, we could war-game and task-organize SOF to support national strategic interests in a whole range of scenarios beyond those already tried, and push more options to the political level.161

One respondent interpreted “national strategic interest” to be the same as “separate national agenda,” which he perceives negatively:

> The strategic goals of the missions have always been clear to me. I am glad we have had no separate national agenda during these missions. My experience is that the nations that do have such agendas might damage the relationship with the mentored force.162

From our perspective, “separate national agendas” are agendas that may work contrary to a coalition’s strategy. Consequently, “national strategy” may simply be to fully support a coalition strategy; it does not have to be separate or different. But then, this full support has to be made clear, and without caveats.163

5. **NORSOF on the Dangers of Misuse**

In the last chapter, we described a cost-driven trend of shrinking conventional forces, who will increasingly be tied to national tasks, particularly given a historic peak in political popularity for NORSOF. Based on this, we argued that the possibility of misuse of NORSOF might increase. This argument echoes that of Spulak, who argues that “applying the principle of economy of force may lead to the misuse of SOF, thinking that as more capable elite warriors they are just more economical conventional forces.”164

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161 Ibid., comments question 15c.
162 Ibid.
163 For example, several Norwegian military theses point to the obvious contradiction of participating in a COIN campaign, while at the same time being restricted from using specific COIN tools due to domestic interagency disagreements. See Godal et al., *NOU 2016*.
In the FFI survey, the following statement was presented to the NORSOF respondents (see Figure 11).

![Chart showing responses](image)

**Figure 11. NORSOF on Misuse of MA Capability\(^{165}\)**

In response of our survey participants, 65% indicated that they fear misuse of NORSOF to some extent, while 35% to some degree indicated that they do not fear misuse. Although below the threshold of statistical significance, some differences among the different strata responding are worth a comment since both those in the operational squadrons (78%) and in “leader roles with staff college”\(^{166}\) (74%) feared misuse more than did the average at 65%. The latter stratum represents NORSOF officers with the highest levels of military education. Presumably some of these officers work in NORSOCOM and, as such, are responsible for military advice regarding the use of NORSOF.

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\(^{165}\) FFI, *FFI Survey*, question 14a. NOTE: this survey question may lead the survey participant toward one partial answer.

\(^{166}\) The FFI survey categorized the responders demographically. See Appendix A for details.
This was the statement in the FFI survey that generated the most comments. Of the minority who disagreed (and who not fear misuse of NORSOF in MA operations), the following comments are worthy highlighting:

I agree that not all missions NORSOF has been part of were SOF missions. However, with a strategic staff (NORSOCOM) in place, I believe the chief of defense will receive sufficient advice on the future use of NORSOF. If, then, we are asked to take on missions contrary to the military advice, we have to improvise to achieve the best outcome anyway.167

I think SOF should focus on solving problems and not be too busy considering if one is “misused” or not. If the Norwegian government thinks it is an important mission we should be happy to contribute.168

The comments from the majority of respondents, who feared misuse to some extent, revolve around the political decision to deploy NORSOF to an MA mission in Baghdad in 2015. According to some media sources, this decision was taken contrary to the military advice of the chief of defense169 and compromised NORSOF identities to Iraqi authorities in the process:

The fact that the Government decided to deploy NORSOF on a basic training mission in Iraq, contrary to the advice of the chief of defense, proves that NORSOF can be used to serve political and not military purposes.170

I think the Baghdad mission bordered on misuse of the SOF capability. The justification for not sending NORSOF was well founded. The decision to compromise NORSOF personnel in order to do a political mission, contrary to military advice, was disappointing.171

This was allegedly a case in which Iraqi authorities demanded passports and other personal information about NORSOF personnel in order for them to train Iraqi units in Baghdad. Despite NORSOF’s protests, the Iraqis’ demands were eventually met:

167 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 14b.
168 Ibid.
170 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 14b.
171 Ibid., comments 14b.
“otherwise NORSOF would not be welcomed by the Iraqi authorities.”

Worth noting is that RAND has found that when the advisor-nation wants a mission more than the nation receiving the advisors, the fit is obviously bad and the advisor-nation should step back. Seemingly, Norwegian politicians wanted this mission more than the military did and bowed to Iraqi demands. As the FFI survey suggests, revealing information about NORSOF operators may explain about 50% of the skepticism directed at future misuse.

Judging by the comments, the remainder of the respondents who fear some kind of misuse of NORSOF in future MA missions attribute this to a fear of being bogged down with operations that other Norwegian forces can do. The comments suggest that NORSOF personnel should hand over MA missions to other units when possible. Sixty-two percent of the respondents agreed to some extent that they have personally conducted MA operations where they assessed that conventional forces could have conducted the operation.

I fear that the political level still think that NORSOF are “elite infantry” which are far easier to deploy than CF. There will be MA missions that Kystjegerkommandoen (KJK) or Telemark Bataljon (TMBN) are well suited to do, but using SOF instead might increase political gains. This might restrict our capability to take on more important tasks.

I have two fears regarding misuse of SOF: The first is that we are sent to do jobs conventional can do. It was pointless to have SOF instructors running a basic recruit school in Baghdad. The second fear is that of being deployed with too many political caveats. There will be future operations where the demand for direct action will be imminent while conducting

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174 This estimate is made based on the number of qualitative comments in the FFI study, focused on this case in particular.

175 FFI, FFI Survey, question 19b.

176 Ibid., comments on question 14b.
MA. My fear is that we might be restricted from doing what is right and smart in the theater due to political compromise at home.\textsuperscript{177}

6. **Summary**

The FFI survey suggests that “lack of doctrine and concepts for MA” is a challenge within NORSOF. Judging by the comments, a better conceptualizing of MA “concepts” is a more immediate requirement than written doctrine.

NORSOF respondents largely agreed with the literature that suggests that SOF indirect approaches yield comparatively higher strategic effects than direct approaches, to include operations conducted by NORSOF itself. However, the respondents rightfully argued that SR, DA, and MA are all important capabilities when an indirect strategy is pursued.

The respondents supported the view that NORSOF should remain the doctrinal proponent for MA in the Norwegian DOD. They agreed that NORSOF should remain supportive of Norwegian CF doing MA operations and should remain willing to shed MA operations to CF when this is feasible. The challenge for NORSOCOM remains how to execute and share this doctrinal responsibility with CF.

Almost half of the NORSOF respondents, all of whom have participated in NORSOF MA operations, indicate that Norwegian strategic interests were not always clear during MA operations. The need for a clear guidance in regard to national interests is described as *important, but not crucial*.

Well over half of the respondents (65%) feared misuse of NORSOF in the future. The first MA mission NORSOF was sent to conduct in Iraq in 2015 against military advice seems to be the main trigger for this skepticism.

C. **ORGANIZATION OF NORSOF**

1. **Current Fit for Doctrinal Tasks**

This section begins with an analysis of the NORSOF respondents opinions about how well NORSOF is currently organized and trained in relation to the doctrinal tasks\textsuperscript{177}
derived from *AJP* 3.5. Only the first place rankings are depicted in these two figures. There were no significant differences among the different strata of the respondents (see Figure 12).

![Figure 12. NORSOF #1 Rankings Organizational Efficiency vs. Training and Exercise](image)

Since most national missions are either DA or SR, many respondents have commented that “national missions” should not be a category in its own right in this ranking, and we agree. This explains the difference between these results and those depicted in Figure 8.

We have summarized the main impressions from the qualitative comments related to each individual task.\(^{179}\)

- Direct action: This capability is ranked highest, both on organizational fit and when it comes to training and exercises. Most comments revolved around the necessity for an integrated NORSOF air capacity.

\(^{178}\) FFI, *FFI Survey*, questions 16a and 17a.

\(^{179}\) Ibid., comments 16b and 17b.
• Special reconnaissance: The main argument in the comments is that NORSOF has a lag in its organic intelligence capability development and is too dependent on support from the national intelligence service (NIS).

• National missions: Support to the police, mainly CT support, is practiced and conducted via large joint missions. This gives NORSOF and their joint partners necessary system-training at the operational and strategic levels, as well as tactical training for the squadrons. Some commented that the bureaucracy has increased, and that involvement of an even-larger joint, interagency organization may have added unnecessary layers when time is of the essence. As mentioned, many respondents have categorized such operations as “DA” when ranking the capabilities.

• Military assistance: Some commented that conception that how MA missions should be conducted has a greater variance than for the other tasks. They argued that SR and DA have several standard operating procedures (SOPs), TTPs, and courses that synchronize NORSOF, while MA missions are more ad hoc. Some respondents commented that there are huge differences in how the different task groups (TGs) conduct MA with the same partner (rotating TGs for the same mission). This is strongly supported by another finding in the FFI survey: The lack of organizational memory and documentation of activities and evaluations was ranked as the highest factor out of 13 alternatives and may contribute to reducing the effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations.180

Fixing such an organizational problem requires ownership in the form of MA subject-matter experts and instructors. NORSOF uses a system with Master Instructors (MIs)181 for most skillsets. The FFI survey also measured to what degree MIs were formally established for different skillsets, including MA.182 About 20 different MI positions were mentioned in the comments. Of these, three are assessed to have a direct relationship with building MA capabilities: one Officer 6 (OF-6) “senior staff officer (SSO) MA-Capacity Building” in NORSOCOM, one newly established OF-5 “SSO International Relations” in NORSOCOM, and one “MI international operations” in FSK’s training wing. In addition, the senior instructors in MJK’s intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) squadron are teaching MA-related skillsets related to rapport building, coordinating meetings, and reporting. These positions may form the backbone

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180 FFI, *FFI Survey*, question 20; see also Figure 6.
181 In Norwegian, Hovedinstruktør (HI).
of a future “community of practice” network for MA in NORSOF should NORSOCOM choose to implement the recommendations from NORSOF 2025 with horizontal development of MA specialists.

2. “Vertical Split” vs. “Horizontal Development”

In the last chapter, we reviewed literature on the organization of SOF capabilities. We described a “vertical split” between SOF units (separation by specialization in direct and indirect approaches), featured most commonly in the U.S. literature. We also described “horizontal development” as a possible organizational solution and alternative to “vertical split.” The latter is a solution whereby SOF personnel mainly focus on DA skills early in their career, then evolve into “warrior-diplomats” through education, experience, and maturity later in their careers.

The FFI study included the following statements designed to measure NORSOF respondents’ opinions about the “vertical split” option for NORSOF (see Figure 13).
Across all strata, an average of 80% of respondents disagreed with a vertical split for NORSOF based on the dichotomy between mainly direct vs. indirect capabilities. The respondents made several arguments against a vertical split. The following is a summary of the most frequently cited arguments:

- **Size & sustainability.** Assuming that NORSOF numbers will not increase substantially, NORSOF is too small to specialize. This was by far the most common argument made.\(^{184}\) To be sustainable over time, to maintain capabilities in order to fulfill NORSOF’s role in the defense of Norway, to deal with other national tasks, as well as future MA/SR/DA missions abroad, will require rotation among all operative elements in NORSOF. Another argument made is that specialization will increase the burden on the squadrons over time, more than generalization and rotation will, relatively speaking. Some also argue that variation of tasks over the course of a career is important; this motivates NORSOF personnel to have longer careers. In sum, these comments support “horizontal development” rather than a “vertical split.”\(^{185}\)

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\(^{183}\) FFI, *FFI Survey*, questions 18b and 18c.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., comments on question 18e.

\(^{185}\) FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 18e.
Synergy between direct and indirect capabilities. This is also a function of limited size. Several respondents warned against treating MA as “something special.” This group’s main argument is that the MA capability is a product of NORSOF’s other capabilities. Therefore, a split will erode the skills that are foundational for MA. These respondents supported the idea of NORSOF personnel conducting MA within their field of expertise derived from training for and from executing their national missions.\textsuperscript{186}

The FFI survey measured responses about “horizontal development” with a statement related to NORSOF’s ability to mentor at operational and strategic levels (see Figure 14).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure14.png}
\caption{NORSOF on “Horizontal Development”\textsuperscript{187}}
\end{figure}

When “NORSOF capability to conduct MA at the operational and strategic level” is presented as justification for establishing a new “MA career track” in NORSOF, about half of the responders agreed, while the other half disagreed. We discuss NORSOF’s capability to produce advisors for the operational and strategic levels later in this report.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} FFI, \textit{FFI Survey}, question 18a.
At this point, however, the results from the FFI study suggest that “horizontal development” has a higher rate of support in NORSO (49%) than does “vertical split” (20%). Although few commented on the “horizontal development” solution directly, some comments regarding organization were:

- Rather than designating MA to a unit, self-selection and selection could be used to give some NORSO personnel more education and experience within this field.\(^{188}\)

Some respondents commented that “task-organizing” is even more important during MA missions than other missions. They argued that modifications to the “normal” TG structure is relatively more necessary during MA missions due to the increased importance of MA-related personal skills and traits.\(^{189}\)

3. **MA Experts and Enablers**

In the last chapter, we described an organizational trend in SOF, whereby the numbers of “experts” and “enablers” are increasing in the SOF community. This development has also affected NORSO. It is our hypothesis, however, that such “imported expertise” mainly has enabled NORSO in areas other than MA.

The FFI survey measured NORSO response to external recruitment of personnel with specific expertise to enhance MA directed toward the operational and strategic levels of MA respondents. The results are depicted in Figure 15.

\(^{188}\) Ibid., comments on question 18e.
\(^{189}\) Ibid.
Few commented on this question directly. One commented that the NORSOF community already has too many “non-badge d” personnel who lack a basic “hunter-spirit.”\(^{191}\) Others commented that bringing in such outside expertise must be mission-specific. For some MA missions, the necessary expertise will be “in-house,” while in other cases external expertise has to be recruited. Others commented that NORSOF should always attract talent from wherever it may be found; NORSOF numbers are limited and external expertise is a requirement, especially if mentoring above the tactical level is an ambition.

Some respondents recognized the important role non-badged personnel also play in MA missions. One reason might be that during DA-operations, non-badged personnel almost always have supporting roles, while in MA operations they may be in supported

\(^{190}\) Ibid., question 18d

\(^{191}\) In Norwegian, Jeger-ånd. Is an expression used in NORSOF to describe “each man’s determination to solve the mission regardless of conditions.” Definition from Tone Danielsen and Sigmund Valaker, *Technological Innovation With Speed And Direction in Special Forces: An Anthropological Study* (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Institution/FFI, 2012), 23 (our own translation).
or even leading roles: “MA provides clearly non selected personnel an opportunity to be recognized among the selected operators.”\textsuperscript{192}

4. Summary

- The most important factor reducing the impact and effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations is organizational: The lack of organizational memory and documentation of activities and evaluations.

- While other NORSOF tasks have “Master Instructors” to help synchronize concepts and activities, this is less true for MA. Nevertheless, the top level of a potential MA network is currently in place in NORSOCOM.

- A vast majority of the respondents oppose the idea of a “vertical split” between capabilities, while roughly half of the respondents support the “horizontal development” model presented in NORSOF 2025. The limited size of NORSOF, and the need for sustainability in operations and synergy between direct and indirect capabilities appear to account for the respondents’ preferences.

- A majority of respondents agreed that NORSOF needs increased recruitment of external expertise if “vertical implementation” at several levels of command during MA operations is to be achieved.

D. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL

This section discusses the results of the FFI study related to the findings in Chapter II concerning the functional factors training and personnel, including selection and education. At first glance, the FFI study suggests that there appears to be a gap between the perceived strategic importance of indirect approaches (e.g., MA), and the attention it receives in selection, training, education, and organization. This apparent gap is depicted in Figure 16.

\textsuperscript{192} FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 26.
While 71% agree that indirect approaches like MA have the highest potential strategic effect, only 46% agree that this should be reflected in selection, training, education, and organization. There might be many reasons for this gap, and one of them has already been discussed: the fact that SR and DA are regarded as the building blocks of SOF MA. In Chapter II, we highlighted the discussion in the literature about whether military professional skills or cultural knowledge and teaching abilities are the most important qualities of military advisors. We argued that, when training, mentoring, and assisting indigenous special units, such as NORSOF has done in the Baltic countries and Afghanistan, “professional competence” in SR and DA were critical capabilities. As depicted in Figure 17, a majority of NORSOF personnel think that professional competence at NORSOF tasks is the “backbone” of MA. However, 44% also recognize that there is more to MA missions than just teaching basic SR and DA techniques.

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The respondents’ comments may be summarized as follows: The statement is most valid at the TTP level; without professional and technical expertise in SR and DA, training others is pointless. However, when building supporting functions, that is, when assisting a functioning staff and advising leaders at higher levels, the importance of SR and DA skills decreases. Officer training, cultural awareness, understanding of power dynamics in the mentored force, interpersonal skills, and social tact become more important instead. Several respondents commented that the common denominator for advisors across different military levels is “cultural understanding and knowledge and understanding of SOF.”

1. **Thoroughness Breeds Confidence?**

Beyond military technical skills, does NORSOF have a systematic approach to building MA capabilities? How does NORSOF address MA skills beyond DA and SR? Special Operations Forces are commonly known to be innovative and almost unstoppable in exhausting opportunities and taking prudent risks, as well as developing different kinds

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194 FFI, *FFI Survey*, question 21b.
195 Ibid., comments on question 21f.
of expertise to conduct SR and DA missions in whatever manner might be required. This is also the case in NORSOF. The FFI study suggests, however, that NORSOF’s thoroughness with regard to MA may not be at this same level (see Figure 18).

Figure 18. NORSOF Perceived Thoroughness in Doctrinal Tasks\textsuperscript{196}

Seventy-two percent of the respondents think that NORSOF’s approach to MA is not as thorough as it is for SR and DA. As with most SOF, NORSOF’s primary identity group is likely to be the tactical unit, (e.g., MJK or FSK). And, like most humans, NORSOF personnel are mainly motivated by status and positive feedback from this primary identity group. Since the FFI study suggests that NORSOF’s approach to MA is not as thorough as it is for SR and DA, a natural question is whether MA performance generates less internal status and/or less positive feedback from within the units. When asked whether MA efforts are valued/appreciated differently compared to DA/SR efforts in NORSOF, all but one of the comments starts with a “yes.”\textsuperscript{197} Here are some of the most representative comments:

\textsuperscript{196} FFI,\textit{FFI Survey}, question 21d.  
\textsuperscript{197} FFI,\textit{FFI Survey}, comments on question 26.
Yes. MA is valued totally different. No one is valued to think long term! It is “all about getting” the DA experience.198

Yes. MA generally has a low status. MA is a mission thrown at you, with orders that basically read: You’ll figure it out.199

Yes. There are not many medals awarded for MA efforts, for those who think medals are a way to measure appreciation.200

Yes. Naturally, it’s more status with DA. There are few good “war stories” from training afghans in operations planning. You get no recognition for spending 20 hours per day to slowly build up local capacities. But this is natural.201

Yes. Generally, very little credit is awarded for anything else than DA. In the Norwegian armed forces, we are better at appreciating personnel who have been in contact with the enemy rather than personnel using cleverness to avoid contact.202

Yes. On one of my tours mentoring CRU 222, we encountered several contacts with the enemy, yet none of my soldiers fired their weapons in combat during that tour. Our focus was that CRU 222 should do the fighting; we would not engage until strictly necessary. We were always present, just a few meters from our Afghan colleagues, but we did not take active part in the fighting. When I explained this back home, I was confronted with how much better it was during the earlier deployments, when NORSOF engaged actively in all the fighting. They implied that things were better when CRU were worse. This is one example of values in my unit.203

Others drew a contrast between how young vs. more experienced personnel view DA and MA.

MA is perceived as second-class by many, especially the younger ones.204

198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 26.
204 Ibid.
DA is generally more valued. There is, however, a tendency that more experienced personnel appreciate the effects of MA more than the personal satisfaction of conducting a successful DA.205

My response is generic: I think DA is valued higher, perhaps primarily for the younger guys. More experienced personnel understand that the real long-term effect is best achieved with MA. Medals are awarded for DA, rarely for MA. So there is a potential for improvement, to provide formal recognition for superior performance in MA missions.206

Based on these comments, it seems evident that MA efforts provide less status and are appreciated less than performing other doctrinal tasks. At the same time, some operators seem to develop a deeper understanding of the importance of MA with operational experience and age.

2. Recruitment

A thorough approach to any NORSOF capability starts with recruitment. Recruitment in NORSOF consists of a selection phase and a basic training program of 12–18 months for personnel in the operational squadrons,207 and targeted or self-recruitment by application for other categories of NORSOF personnel.208 This last category has a separate basic training program. As depicted in Figure 19, about three-quarters of the NORSOF respondents agree that MA-specific traits and skills play no significant role in selection, training, and education:

205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Norwegian conscripts are selected after testing of all 17-year olds. There is competition to get in; more people want to serve than there are positions available. NORSOF selects from this pool of already selected people.
208 Active recruitment: NORSOF reaches out to personnel with required expertise.
While the survey results suggest that a systematic fostering of MA-specific traits and skills play no significant role in NORSOF selection, training, and education, respondents had numerous opinions about what kinds of traits and skills are most important for military advisors.\textsuperscript{210} Most fall under the categories listed in the literature review, Chapter II, section C.2 “Training and Personnel, MA-specific Traits and Skills.” Rather then repeat them, we only note additions here:

- More training with different weapon systems used by mentored forces prior to MA operations
- Assume minimal western information technology (IT) tools and high-tech ops rooms; be able to visualize tactics and operations and use aids like: modeling tables, mock-ups; know how to use figures, do basic map-writing, etc.
- Concentrate on more English language training, to include military technical terms; increase training in the use of interpreters

\textsuperscript{209} FFI, \textit{FFI Survey}, questions 24a and 24c.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., comments on question 25.
Develop knowledge of organizational/societal culture and theory (to understand foreign military/irregular organizations, as well as foreign social systems like tribes and clans)

Train in countering insider threats (indicators and behavior to look out for)

The comments concerning selection for MA split into two groups, reflecting those who are fine with the “status quo” and those who seek “minor changes.” Both groups are reluctant to make major changes in the current initial selection process. Some comment that very few people pass the initial selection as it is. Thus, adding “negative selection” tests to root out those deemed “unfit” for MA during the initial selection phase would be premature in someone’s SOF career.

Synthesizing points of view from the group favoring the “status quo” yields the following synthesis of several comments.

The current selection provides NORSOF with physically and psychologically robust personnel who can work and support a team, who have a sense of responsibility and a strong work ethic. The basic course provides the necessary basic SOF skills and builds professional confidence. It is premature in the initial selection phase to select for MA-specific traits or de-select those “unfit” for MA. Positive selection and self-selection for MA should be done at later stages. Talent management throughout the career is important to increase NORSOF’s MA capabilities.

Here is a synthesis of the views of the second, smaller group that advocates minor modifications:

It should be possible to attract more MA talent to selection if the MA operations and skills were also “showcased and advertised” as part of NORSOF, on par with those of SR and DA. Targeted recruitment of specific groups is another possibility. While the technical, social, and cognitive requirements of SOF operators have changed over the past decade or so, selection has remained largely unchanged. While increased negative selection tests should not be undertaken during the selection

211 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 24f.
212 Ibid.
213 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments 24f: The following groups are mentioned as additional talent pools for NORSOF: FEH; minority groups; university faculties that have area studies, language, and engineering on the curriculum.
phase, more positive selection for MA and leadership tasks could be done as early as the basic course.\(^{214}\)

Not one respondent in either of these two groups desires major changes, and all respondents agree that talent management after initial selection is most important when it comes to improving NORSOF’s MA capabilities. However, while comments throughout the survey suggests that a vast majority of NORSOF respondents think that “personal traits” are relatively more important in MA than in other operations, and that MA units, therefore, need to be task-organized with the right individuals, the comments also reveal that this is not being consistently emphasized right now. Most respondents describe a situation in which the task organizing is done in an ad hoc fashion, by choosing the “closest man available, not necessarily the best person for the job.”\(^{215}\) Alternatively, “my experience is mixed: from ad hoc task-organizing of personnel with less probability to do a good job, to a TF with the right people with the right traits to influence in a great way at their respectable level,”\(^{216}\) or; “When we have a great fit in higher MA positions, it is because of “luck,” not because of a systematic approach.”\(^{217}\)

### 3. Training and Education

If we move past the initial selection phase and focus on subsequent training and education, the FFI survey suggests that specific MA training and education has a low priority (see Figure 20).

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\(^{214}\) Ibid., comments on question 24f.

\(^{215}\) Ibid., comments on questions 18e, 19e, and 24f.

\(^{216}\) Ibid.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., comments on questions 18e and 19e.
Again, the importance of the military components of MA (SR and DA) may partly explain these results, as some comments suggest. However, a majority of the respondents who wrote comments about MA training and education argue that a more systematic approach is needed; today the focus differs too much between squadrons. The main concern is that the current training, education, readiness, and operations regime already stretches the squadrons, and especially the staff in the two tactical units, to their limits, especially in terms of time. Some comment that a training and education system for MA has to be implemented from the top-down: “if this is subject to individual squadron planning, it will not be prioritized.” These findings concur with the ones we highlighted from the literature: SR and DA will always trump MA-specific training and education in units that are supposed to master all three skillsets.

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218 FFI, *FFI Survey*, question 21c.
219 Ibid., comments on question 21f.
220 Ibid.
The FFI survey asked the NORSOF respondents to explain whether they had received training or education specifically related to MA.\textsuperscript{221} The most common answer was “No.” Besides pedagogical skills taught to them during basic officer training, a few respondents listed courses at NPS, the international special training center (ISTC), King’s college, and Joint special operations university (JSOU) as relevant. Others listed basic intelligence/liaison courses, which included instruction on culture, communications, preparing for meetings, and reporting.\textsuperscript{222} Several respondents commented positively about the effect of both training other Norwegian units during the preparation phase for MA operations\textsuperscript{223} and the learning experience gained from participation in exercises like Flintlock in African countries.\textsuperscript{224} Currently, NORSOF has no internal MA exercise in its annual exercise program. Training other military personnel as if they were indigenous forces, just as U.S. SF does in its Robin Sage exercise,\textsuperscript{225} is not a part of any exercise in the current NORSOF “official” exercise program.

“Lack of language skills and competence” was ranked number six of 13 factors that affect NORSOF MA operations.\textsuperscript{226} A very limited number of NORSOF operators have done language training in foreign languages other than English as part of their overall military training. English is the working language both in coalition operations and when working with local interpreters. Currently, there is no NATO STANAG testing or English language training of NORSOF personnel who have not been through officer training at Norway’s military academies.\textsuperscript{227}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} Ibid., question 22.
\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibid., comments on question 22.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibid., comments on question 21f.
\item \textsuperscript{225} One example can be found in Anna Simons, \textit{The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), ch. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{226} FFI, \textit{FFI Survey}, question 20. See also Figure 6.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Information released from FSK and MJK.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
4. Pedagogical Skills and Vertical Implementation

Our review of the literature revealed that while U.S. CF and SF advisors are educated in cultural awareness issues, teaching them how to teach others in a different cultural setting (MA pedagogy) is increasingly absent from military advisor training. We also described how U.S. SF had refocused on this issue through its “bridging the UW gap” strategy. The FFI survey did not address the question of pedagogical skills directly. From other sources, however, we learned that all enlisted NORSOF receive basic non-commissioned officer (NCO) training from their service (Army/Navy) within the first two to three years of their military service; pedagogical skills are supposed to be an important part of the curriculum. Recently, in FSK, this has been reduced to a three-week “modified course” to make room for SR/DA training in the squadrons,\(^\text{228}\) as occurred in U.S. SOF during the period between 2001–2014.\(^\text{229}\) In contrast, MJK has maintained a three-month-long course. MJK also has a higher percentage of personnel educated at the military academy relative to FSK. Interestingly, both MJK and FSK have trouble motivating their personnel to apply for officer training at the military academies,\(^\text{230}\) where the development of pedagogical skills is a significant part of the education.

Based on some of the survey comments, it is possible that a subculture is developing in NORSOF (especially among the young operators) that dismisses intellectual interests and higher education.\(^\text{231}\) Other comments suggest that there are absolutely no economic incentives for undertaking officer training; on the contrary, the incentive system benefits those who stay in the squadrons as long as possible. While this holds obvious advantages for NORSOF, it might also impede its ability to produce enough SOF officers in the future, and vertical implementation at higher levels in MA missions will likely be more difficult.

As described in Figure 6, *lack of vertical implementation in the mentored force* was rated as the second most important factor preventing NORSOF MA operations from

\(^{228}\) Information released from FSK.

\(^{229}\) In both tactical units teach pedagogical skills as part of their Patrol Commander training.

\(^{230}\) Based on numbers received from NORSOCOM, MJK, and FSK via personal communication.

\(^{231}\) Based on information released from FSK and MJK. See FFI, *FFI Survey*, questions 23b and 21f.
being more effective. Other sources have also critiqued the lack of staff Norwegian officers in senior ranking positions on MA operations in which NORSOF has been involved, most notably during the debate over NORSOF’s participation in operation Inherent resolve in Jordan and Syria.232

5. Summary

The FFI survey exposes a gap between perceptions about the strategic effect of MA approaches and the lack of MA-oriented selection, training, and education in NORSOF. It appears that Norway’s approach to MA (both in terms of capabilities and missions) is not as thorough as it is for DA and SR. Reasons for this are several. NORSOF members perceive that MA is of lesser status than other doctrinal tasks. This perception is more evident among younger personnel than among more experienced personnel. A majority of the respondents were of the opinion that MA-related traits and skills are not evaluated during initial selection and basic training.

How to deal with this challenge between the perceived strategic effect of MA and the actual training / education in NORSOF is itself challenging. Nevertheless, a majority of respondents argue that talent and career management after initial selection are crucial to improving NORSOF’s MA capabilities. Details for how to improve processes include suggestions such as showcasing the MA part of SOF to attract talent, targeted recruitment of certain interest groups, and more positive selection of MA-oriented and leader-oriented talent starting as early as during the basic course.

The FFI survey results suggest that prioritizing MA-specific training and education must be implemented from the top-down and must be anchored by some of the more experienced formal/informal influencers within NORSOF. Several reasons for this are worth highlighting. First, no MA exercise currently exists. Respondents cite both the positive effects of training Norwegian CF and exercises like Flintlock, and consider both of them good preparation for MA operations. Second, no formal testing of language skills, to include English, exists for NORSOF besides the testing done of the officers who

232 Sveinung Bentzrød, “Norway Runs the Risk of Training Rebels Who Will Fight for IS (Interview with Officer Tormod Heier),” *Aftenposten* [Evening Post], October 5, 2015.
go through the military academy. Third, NORSOF is no different than U.S. SOF in that
time spent on learning pedagogical skills has decreased as SR and DA activities have
increased. Fourth, cultural attitudes and economic incentives are factors that likely will
impede NORSOF’s ability to produce enough officers for “vertical implementation” at
higher levels during future MA operations unless a more proactive approach is taken.
IV. DOTP OPTIONS

The research question posed to us from our sponsors was: “How can NORSOF improve its Military Assistance (MA) capability in order to increase the strategic utility of NORSOF?”

We chose to use the functional capability elements of doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and policy (DOTP-P) as our analytical framework. Based on this research, we conclude and recommend changes or modifications to NORSOF DOTP in this chapter.

In Chapter V, we propose three different MA CONOPS designed to widen the strategic utility of NORSOF, addressing the last P: policy. However, in this chapter we offer recommendations for DOTP.

A. DOCTRINE

1. National SOF Doctrine

Our research has shown that current NORSOF doctrine hierarchy does not sufficiently address the special use of NORSOF for national purposes and that the current doctrinal guidance regarding MA is not directly linked to Norwegian particularities or strategic interests; rather, guidance has been reactive. While NORSOF personnel agree that an indirect approach, in which MA is a key component, generally yields larger strategic effects than direct approaches, the FFI survey also showed us that the “lack of doctrine and concepts for MA” is considered by the survey sample of NORSOF personnel to be one of the three most significant shortfalls in NORSOF MA operations. Our research also suggests that improvement of NORSOF’s MA capability must be implemented from the top-down, not bottom-up. Such an implementation starts with an authoritative document like doctrine.

Based on our research, we recommend that NORSOCOM consider writing a national SOF doctrine-type document. In our opinion, NATO SOF doctrine is a suitable capstone doctrine for NORSOF, but is mainly a NATO SOF “encyclopedia” and not a
sufficient guide for future decisions regarding the use and development of NORSOF. Future decision-makers may find descriptions in allied doctrines about what SOF, in general, can do, but not about what NORSOF in particular can do. Nor will they find anything that tells them what separates NORSOF from the rest? The kind of document we envision does not have to fit the general understanding of doctrine; it would most likely have to be classified, it would not have to be lengthy, and it should be subject to more frequent changes than the FFOD. Our point is that such a document would serve as a more useful guideline for NORSOCOM than *AJP* 3.5, especially regarding the prioritization of doctrinal tasks and capabilities, criteria for use in support of strategic objectives, and for concept development. For instance, given the global SOF network, an argument can be made that NORSOF might be better off developing certain niche capabilities, rather than duplicating what already exists in other SOF’s, especially when these do not create synergies or contribute to Norway’s particular national security needs. We believe a national SOF doctrine may increase the strategic utility of all NORSOF capabilities, including the MA capability that is the subject of this report.

Another finding is that with increased demand for NORSOF capabilities in the future, and a historic peak in NORSOF’s political popularity (especially for its use abroad), likelihood of NORSOF being misused increases. Well over half of the survey respondents (65%) feared misuse of NORSOF in the future and according the FFI survey many already believe this has already occurred. A national SOF doctrine document that offers criteria for NORSOF’s use, as well as a detailed description of the status of NORSOF capabilities, could help counter misuse in the future.

We also believe previous NORSOF officers’ proposals to develop a national COIN or LIC doctrine at the strategic level would increase the strategic effect of NORSOF MA operations in the future. The process of writing the doctrine would in itself force much-needed interagency cooperation. This is supported by other official
government reports, which also recommend future Norwegian interagency efforts with regard to SSR and MA.233

2. Overstretch, Synergy, and Size

All indications are that the demand for both national (mainly direct) capabilities and international (mainly indirect) capabilities will increase for NORSOF, and, therefore, we have predicted what we describe as an “imbalanced overstretch” in the future. One arguments is that costs will drive CF to shrink in size and to focus more on national defense, which will increase the political pressure on NORSOF to deploy, both for functional and symbolic reasons.234 But at the same time, NORSOF national tasks are also likely to expand. A number of measures have to be taken counter such an overstretch.

It is critical to seek synergy between meeting national tasks and conducting MA abroad. When Norway has a choice of MA partners, NORSOF should assist, mentor, and train maritime SOF or CT units. Whether these are military or police units is not very important, although “vertical implementation” for special police units may require police officers at higher levels in the mentored chain of command. Training, assisting, and mentoring infantry-type forces above the company level, with integrated organic fires, engineers, and combat service support (CSS) is most likely a better fit for professional Norwegian maneuver units than for NORSOF. Availability of such CF in the future, though, will likely be more limited.

NORSOF’s size obviously matters if future situations of overstretch are to be avoided. NORSOF’s growth will most likely need to continue. The amount of skills demanded of operators, and time available for current staff and support functions, might already be at a breaking point. With a requirement for full-spectrum NORSOF (in which

233 See, for example, Vegard Valter Hansen, Helge Lurås, and Trine Nikolaisen, Within Their Best Ability—The Norwegian Forces and their Afghan Partners, Security in Practice 2 (Oslo, Norway: NUPI [Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs], 2012b).

234 These terms are best explained in Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces.”
a more professionalized MA capability is one of the added pieces),

a larger number of enablers and experts (especially within intelligence, IO, and other MA-related functions) is needed.

There will be arguments made against continued growth: NORSOF cannot be mass-produced; the conscription pool to select from will shrink even more; NORSOF has already seen exponential growth over the past decade (while other services have experienced severe cuts). Nevertheless, NORSOF will continue to be a cost-effective toolkit for Norwegian decision-makers relative to the other services, so we believe it is safe to assume it will continue to grow.

3. Cost-effective Solutions, Strategic Objectives

Over the past decade, NORSOF has “chased missions,” accepted most requests and showcased and proved its capabilities. One implication of greater future demand is that NORSOF should look for even more cost-effective, small footprint MA operations, and limit its operations to only those that clearly support prioritized Norwegian security policy objectives. In addition, a more thorough evaluation of strategic utility and impact on national readiness and capabilities should become standard.

Even with ongoing shifts in the geostrategic landscape, Norway’s policy objectives of deterrence and reassurance of Russia are unlikely to change. Both represent a strategic niche fulfilled by Norway in NATO. We have also described Norway’s role in conflict resolutions as another strategic strength, and in preserving international institutions and the rule of law as another niche. We believe, the development of the GSN will prove important to Norway’s security in the future, but the success of this effort depends on a diversity of expertise within individual SOF’s. While the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) are likely to remain a focus area for the GSN and NORSOF in the foreseeable future, NORSOF would do well to continue to acquire regional expertise in the high north and Russia, and increase interagency efforts in support of state department

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235 According to FFI, *FFI Survey*. The two other most important shortfalls are integrated SOF air capacity and increased SOF intel capability (in-house).

236 Following this line of argument, NORSOF should keep its in-house conscription “training units” in the future.
conflict resolution efforts. If the goal is to increase NORSOF’s strategic utility, a few senior NORSOF officers will also need to become “senior MA specialists” for the Norwegian DOD.

Given the experience within Norway’s military and diplomatic communities, Norway should be able to provide “vertical implementation” assistance to small countries (to strategic, operational, and tactical military and civilian actors alike). The Norwegian DSSR projects in Serbia and Montenegro may serve as examples of the kind of operations that Norway is well suited to pursue. The best example of a cost-effective NORSOF MA effort with a high strategic effect is most likely NORSOF’s recent leadership of the NATO-Georgian joint training and evaluation center (JTEC).237 This organization has had remarkable achievements over the last year, largely thanks to the leadership of one young NORSOF officer. While his achievements might not have been the result of a systematic approach to MA education within the NORSOF system, he has other very visible “SOF-ish” traits: the ability to work relentlessly, with minimal input; belief in his own abilities; and the ability to gain the trust and confidence of those he led.238

We believe NORSOF can increase the strategic utility of its MA capability by engaging in several similar, feasible, cost-effective operations in support of the three abovementioned policy objectives. Examples are given in the next chapter.

B. ORGANIZATION

The results from the FFI survey suggest that NORSOF currently is best organized to do DA and SR missions, while MA ranks third. At the same time, the most important factor that may reduce the effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations is organizational: The lack of organizational memory and documentation of activities and evaluations.


238 Joint Training and Evaluation Team, NATO JTEC, Assessment Report Presented to the International Staff of NATO HQ on the NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Center (Tbilisi: NATO JTEC, [2015]).
1. **“Vertical Split” vs. “Horizontal Development”**

In this report, we have reviewed the literature on “vertical splits” between NORSOF units (separating then by direct vs. indirect approaches) and concluded that the organizational fit should be taken into account if such a solution still is under consideration. We have borrowed the idea of “horizontal development” from NORSOF 2025 as a possible organizational solution. According to the FFI study, NORSOF personnel fear that specialization will increase the burden on the squadrons over time, and will do so more than keeping everyone generalized and frequently rotating. Some also argue that variation is important; this motivates NORSOF personnel to have longer careers. In sum, these comments support a “horizontal development” rather than “vertical split.”

The question NORSOCOM has to consider is, therefore, whether earlier recommendations to divide the responsibility for indirect and direct approaches between MJK and FSK, two (relatively) small tactical units in NORSOF remain relevant and applicable for Norway. In numbers, the two units in question equal somewhere around 1% of U.S. SF. Neither has the capacity to both sustain a NORSOF MA operation (which is time-consuming by nature) and maintaining its DA/SR readiness over any relevant time on their own. The past decade of NORSOF operations in Afghanistan has proven, the tactical units will have to support each other some way or another. Accordingly, most NORSOF MA efforts of the last decade have been as part of a COIN campaign. Even though MA in order to establish and operate with the CRU in Kabul has been the most strategically important contribution, the nature of the conflict also required NORSOF to do SR and DA first independently, and then by, with, and through the CRU. This argument supports NORSOF 2025’s “horizontal development” solution.

A similar argument about limited size can be made about NORSOF CT operations in a national role. All NORSOF units need SR/DA competence if future terrorist attacks are:

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239 FFI, *FFI Survey*, comments on question 18e.
240 Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces.”
Deemed to have been carried out by a state actor by the Joint counter
terrorism analysis center (it is then the responsibility of DOD, not MoI)

- Offshore

- Conducted on large or complex infrastructure (e.g., government buildings,
  large hotels, oil and gas installations on land), too big for the Police CT-
  unit to handle alone, or

- Beyond reach of the Police CT-unit because of distance/limited mobility.

In Norway, all such operations would, by the nature of our limited size and
command and control (C2) arrangements, be joint/interagency. The only argument left
for why NORSOF should remain split in two separate tactical units based on former
service affiliation depends on whether these affiliations are crucial for NORSOF’s tasks
in other national crisis/war scenarios. In this report we have not discussed the tactical and
organizational benefits vs. the political and emotional/cultural risks of a full merger at the
tactical level in NORSOF. According to earlier research, this merger is supported by one
of the units and strongly opposed by the other. Accordingly, our literature review
suggested that “direct-approach units” trump “indirect approach units” when it comes to
recruitment, resources, and status. The FFI survey suggests the same. Splitting indirect
and direct responsibilities between the two NORSOF units would, therefore, not only be
unwise because of their small size, but would also likely generate emotional and political
responses like the ones we have seen in the past when earlier proposals were made for
restructuring NORSOF’s base structure and the merger of units was proposed. We,
therefore, support the “horizontal development” solution proposed by NORSOF 2025. In
reality, “horizontal development” is a “talent and career management plan” to better
utilize NORSOF personnel “for life,” with obvious organizational consequences. As our
research indicates, while “master instructors” help synchronize concepts and activities
related to DA and SR, they are virtually absent for MA. This is one reason for why it is
critically important that dedicated MA specialist positions are established within the SME
and the warrior-diplomat track. Similarly, such positions are also essential for creating

241 Olsen and Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces.”
242 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 54. (See Fig. 32: NORSOF
Career Management Sub-System).
a “community of practice” network for MA. The initial structure of this MA network is in place and anchored at the top level in NORSOCOM. To reiterate what this organizational solution entails:

- SR and DA are the building blocks early in a career.
- MA is a more reflective thinking man’s game; experience and credibility from having done SR and DA for years adds a lot.
- MA expertise is developed throughout a NORSOF career within the warrior-diplomat and SME tracks especially.

A full description of “horizontal development” is beyond the scope of this report, and may be found in NORSOF 2025, Chapter VI “People” and Chapter VII “Sub-System: Human Resource Management (HRM).”

As our research suggests, another prime responsibility for this network would be to collate lessons learned/best practices for MA, and develop MA concepts equivalent to concepts developed for SR and DA.

2. Organizations in Norwegian DOD and MA

According to the literature we examined, the general argument is that military organizations tend to re-focus on their traditional (direct) capabilities between wars, while a focus on indirect approaches seems to live on, if at all, only in some academic circles. As an example, among the approximately 20 “centers of excellence” in NATO, we found no institution concerned with MA-type operations like COIN or SFA, with the possible exception of NSHQ. This represents a long-lasting cyclic trend that has to be broken, especially since we may be caught in an era of ongoing wars during which the management of conflicts will be paramount.

Although more Norwegian CF now have done MA operations than in the past, our study supports the view that NORSOF should remain the doctrinal proponent for MA in

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243 Ibid., 56 (Fig. 34: Example of a CoP Network).
244 Ibid., 43.
245 Ibid., 51.
246 NATO, “NATO Topic: Centres of Excellence.”
the Norwegian DOD. We recommend that NORSOCOM be the coordinating authority in
the DOD at the strategic level, with responsibility for joint/interagency operations that
encompass SSR, SFA, and SOF-type MA. The top node of the MA Community of
Practice in NORSOCOM should bear this responsibility and should utilize any
opportunity to “shed” operations to CF when possible. The challenge for NORSOCOM
remains how to “institutionalize” this responsibility with CF.

The following is a list of organizational opportunities which have not yet been
touched upon in this report. The list is not prioritized. Nor are the options that are listed
mutually exclusive. The list is intended as “food for thought” for the future.

- Establish a SOF training detachment, which encompasses both SR/DA and
  MA, as recommended in NORSOF 2025.247

- Fill SOF billets with a focus on MA capabilities tailored for SOF in a
  future SFA community at HVS.248 SFA will be described in the new land
  doctrine, and it is likely that the Army will dedicate positions at this
  institution for the purpose.

- Strengthen the existing SOF education at the Naval Academy as a “hub of
  excellence” for IW/UW/MA operations. The final year of academy
  education for all NORSOF could be SOF-specific. A year of joint
  education between the two tactical units would also “facilitate constructive
  interaction within the whole of NORSOF,” a policy goal for COM
  NORSOCOM.249

Another recommendation that supports expansion of the GSN is to establish a
small MA Training unit, joint with U.S. Special Forces, within the Home guard training
center.250 Norwegian independent company 1 was a British special operations executive
(SOE) group formed in March 1941, originally for the purpose of performing commando
raids during the occupation of Norway by Nazi Germany. Personnel from this unit were
central in the establishment of the Home guard after WWII.251 The Norwegian Home

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248 HVS: Hærens Våpenskole (Norwegian miniature Army TRADOC).
249 Olsen and Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces.”
250 Heimevernets Skole og Kompetansesenter (HVSKS), Dombås.
251 Egil Ullateig, Heimevernets The Heath of the Norwegian Home Guard: The Home Guard Training
guard has trained with U.S. SF since 1960, first in the United States and then in Germany. From 1963 through the mid-1980s, U.S. SF and the Norwegian Home guard conducted joint training and exercises at this center as part of the U.S. Military assistance program. As previously described, U.S. SF has recently refocused its efforts on UW. The best way to train for UW is via FID, preferably in a permissive environment. NORSOF respondents in the FFI survey also highlighted the importance of training other Norwegian forces during preparation phases for MA. The Home guard training center trains the “civilian” Home guard in different skills. The potential the Home guard holds for Norwegian defense is, in our opinion, underestimated. We believe there may be some interesting synergies worth considering by making better use of the Home guard and the training center, and we elaborate on this in the first COA presented in Chapter V.

C. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL

Our research suggests that a gap exists between the perceived strategic effect of MA operations and the willingness to take MA into account when conducting selection, training, and education in NORSOF. In this section, we recommend changes and modifications to recruitment, training, and education, as well as the framework needed to make these changes.

Or, has been expressed in the U.S.:

Perhaps the most important changes will be to the personnel system. Changes in doctrine, education, training, and even operations will not have major impacts unless the various government personnel systems recognize counterinsurgency and peacetime advisory billets as career enhancing. Further, they must be appropriately rewarded for assuming these challenging jobs. Advising and the accompanying increased understanding of another culture must be recognized as a critical element in the path to flag or senior executive service rank.

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1. Recruitment and Selection

While the NORSOF respondents have numerous notions about which traits and skills are necessary during MA missions, three-fourths of the respondents were of the opinion that none of these are evaluated during initial selection and basic training. Lists of traits and skills derived from the literature review and the FFI survey can be found in Chapter II, section C.2 Training and Personnel, MA-specific Traits and Skills; and in Chapter III, section D.2 Training and Personnel, Recruitment, of this report. Further studies and working groups should now be devoted to operationalizing both the screening of these traits for career management use, and the development of these skills through training, education, and exercises. This is an obvious first task for a future NORSOF MA “community of practice.”

While our study suggests that the initial selection phase probably is too soon, and premature, for negative selection of those unfit for MA, later positive selection/self-selection and talent management are crucial to improved MA capability in NORSOF. Advancing MA skills is, possibly, not for everyone. Making MA-related courses and education exclusive is one way to change a negative cultural image, especially among younger NORSOF personnel.

Attracting MA talent might be a challenge. Research indicates that MA does not have the same appeal for potential SOF recruits as SR and DA. This may, however be addressed by showcasing and advertising the MA capability in new and innovative ways. For instance, millennial’s have grown up during the globalization era, and some are more likely to be interested in language, area studies, and cultural peculiarities than are their predecessors. Millennials are also said to be more individualist than collectivist-oriented, and notions of “exclusivity” with regards to MA-related courses and education are likely to be tempting. Arguably, MJK has already seen something similar with its ISR squadron. The challenge with MA is that it does not belong to a unit in NORSOF; instead, it belongs to a network of skilled individuals across units.

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254 MJK’s ISR squadron has a notion of exclusivity about it, which attracts personnel from the other squadrons. It also has some of the most senior operators and cultural bearers in its ranks.
Targeted, active recruitment of certain interest groups or individuals is another of our recommendations. The fact that NORSOF already attracts high numbers of applicants should not be an argument for maintaining the current low level of resources spent on recruitment. Youth with above-average fitness levels and stamina will still apply for NORSOF duty. But, personnel with specialized skills or other personal interests might need a poke and an eye-opener. For example, not too many conscript paratroopers apply for SOF duty; some feel they have already gone through the toughest conscription needed for their CV. However, if they were given a broader understanding of the opportunities available in NORSOF at an early stage, even more might seek to attain personal fulfillment through a NORSOF career.\textsuperscript{255} We have also noted an organizational trend in SOF of increasing numbers of experts and enablers. Experts will still be needed within intelligence, IO and other MA-related functions. As NORSOF 2025 describes, the recruitment of such expertise is largely based on word of mouth and personal acquaintance; it is not systematized.\textsuperscript{256} We propose formalizing this process, without bureaucratizing it heavily, by adding a separate selection as well as basic training for this category of personnel. Fitness levels could be limited to the minimum standards for paratroopers, while social/analytical/technical/other required skills could be tested through a selection phase more like that used in the intelligence community.

Another category of personnel with useful attributes are members of minority groups from conflict areas. Here, NORSOF has an untapped potential recruiting pool. For instance, looking at current Norwegian MA efforts in Iraq and Syria, one suggestion that would definitely rock the boat would be to recruit Norwegian Kurds Peshmerga into Norwegian forces. According to media sources, there are over 100 former Peshmerga in Norway ready and willing to fight IS.\textsuperscript{257} A program could be launched whereby they could be trained and equipped in Norway, and then enrolled in the Kurd Peshmerga

\textsuperscript{255} This does not only apply to future “warrior-diplomats” who are “horizontally developed” through the operational saber squadrons.


resistance forces that are currently being trained by Norwegian advisors in northern Iraq. At least one Norwegian politician has already proposed something similar.\textsuperscript{258} When political initiatives like this are debated, NORSOCOM could increase its strategic relevance by offering concepts of operations to illustrate how such an idea could be made to work.\textsuperscript{259} While such a CONOPS would likely remain politically sensitive, (which is SOF’s niche), it would help political decision-makers appreciate the spectrum of opportunities NORSOF can provide, even if they reject the idea. Worth noting is that NORSOF has a tradition of trying out unconventional approaches to emerging operational requirements, as it did when it established a female unit within the NORSOF community for future counterinsurgency and urban surveillance purposes.\textsuperscript{260} Needless to say, such a project also generated important political goodwill for NORSOF in a country where gender equality is politically important.

2. Training, Exercise, Education

NORSOF training currently encompasses the full range of military skills necessary for MA, apart from training to achieve expert-level knowledge about weapon systems used in other countries. The larger issue is “non-military” MA-specific training and education. The FFI survey results suggest that such training will not be prioritized if this is left to individual squadrons, a finding which correlates with what occurs in other “full spectrum SOF” units. Prioritization can only be achieved from the top-down and needs to be anchored by some of the more experienced formal/informal influencers within NORSOF: The MA community of practice network.

a. Basic Training

While acknowledging that Norwegian basic training courses are already packed, we believe some modifications should be considered. Management of expectations is


\textsuperscript{259}Offering a CONOPS is a practice termed “Policy by CONOPS” in the U.S. SOF community.

important for all potential SOF candidates; therefore, familiarity with the range of
missions NORSOF may encounter should be included as part of basic training. We
propose a course in which NORSOF’s doctrinal tasks are placed in historic and strategic
context. The course should also offer an introduction about the most important enabling
functions, such as SOF C2, logistics, intelligence, fires, and so on. Examples should be
given by experienced instructors of the kinds of personal skills and traits that are
necessary to do MA, and the strategic importance of NORSOF MA missions should be
highlighted. Names should be cited, and exemplary individual MA efforts should be
briefed. Younger SOF personnel tend to mirror their elder ones, and expanding the
“hero” cabinet to include extraordinary NORSOF MA personnel is culturally important.

Such a short course could be combined with exercises in discussing opposite
viewpoints and dilemmas that commonly arise. More emphasis should also be placed in
note-taking and writing summaries; these skills will help with selection of candidates
who acquire new knowledge quickly and are able to report the essence of complex
subjects. These are especially important skills for SR and not just MA, but may help
NORSOF select officer candidates and candidates for MA at earlier stages.

Our research also suggests that NORSOF is no different than U.S. SOF in that
time spent on teaching pedagogical skills has decreased as a result of increased attention
to SR and DA. Serving in the training units obviously provides great MA training; if
possible, more junior NORSOF personnel could also be given instruction duties at earlier
stages in their careers: for example, instructing different conscript units in NORSOF.
Some operators spend their careers “being taught” and merely move through pre-planned
events, stages, scenarios, courses, and exercises that others have set up for them. Such
personnel might function as expert instructors when everything is in place, but planning
and not just executing is the real MA skill. It is possible that sharing such training
responsibilities, when appropriate, will teach more NORSOF personnel what it actually
takes to make great training events and experiences. Creating great training and learning
experiences is, after all, the crux of MA at the tactical level. Sharing such a responsibility
early in a SOF career also reinforces other skills: self-reliance, creativity and “figuring
out things from A to Z.”
b. Advanced

Training for MA has to be ongoing throughout a person’s career. What would be most beneficial is to not segregate MA training, thereby causing it to be a distraction from all other training; rather, as with most other SOF skillsets, synergies have to be found. With regards to more advanced training after the basic course, there are obvious synergies between MA training and basic HUMINT/Liaison training. All SOF operators are sensors: most will end up doing MA, and some will do liaison duty. Training in establishing rapport, expanding the social comfort zone, preparing meetings and talking points, developing negotiation skills, using interpreters, and providing accurate reporting/documentation are skills needed.²⁶¹ English military language skills are crucial for all functions and should be used during such training when possible.²⁶² This training should use a generic framework with culturally specific training to be added dependent on the theater of operations. Some of the capacity to conduct such training already exists within NORSOF; it is possible that elements within the Intelligence community could have valuable inputs.

c. Exercise

There is currently no internal, separate MA exercise, and no training of “indigenous players” in NORSOF’s official exercise program. The respondents participating in the FFI survey highlighted both the positive effects of training other Norwegian CF and real-life MA exercises like Flintlock during the preparation phase for MA operations.²⁶³

Increasing the MA capability (including increasing the numbers of skilled MA trainers) calls for an exercise (or several exercises), on top of selection and training. Participating in exercises like Flintlock should have a high priority. If possible, vertical implementation of NORSOF advisors above the tactical level should be included in such

²⁶¹ See also list in Chapter 2, Section C.2 Training and personnel, MA-specific traits and skills.
²⁶² English STANAG testing for all should be considered.
²⁶³ It is debatable whether Flintlock is an exercise or an operation. We believe it should be recognized as the latter.
exercises. We also envision smaller exercises based on the U.S. SF’s Robin Sage concept, whereby NORSOF infiltrate and then train the “civilian” Home guard and other reserve units in specific skills or mission-specific tasks for mutual gain. Other Norwegian CF should also be the subject of such training on exercises as well.

d. Education

The establishment of a credible and knowledgeable MA community of practice requires specific education outside of NORSOF. Occasionally, NORSOF attracts highly educated personnel with relevant master’s degrees. After a few years on operational duty in one of the operational squadrons, these individuals tend to seek other kinds of challenges. Officer education in the military academy is not what they are looking for; they do not aim to have a career in the NORSOF command track. For those who seek a career in NORSOF without becoming commanders, NORSOF could initiate a program that offers these individuals spots in the trainee program in the Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA).264 Paid for by NORSOF, the intent would be for them to spend three years at MFA, then to complete three to six years of obligatory service in NORSOF, working specifically with MA and interagency coordination. On-the-job training is an important part of the MFA trainee course. NORSOF trainees should work for MFA at embassies in areas where NORSOF has, or is likely to have, an MA footprint, in attaché-like functions. This suggestion is inspired by the JFK special forces warfare center and its Powell program initiative, which provides prospective SOF personnel with opportunities to create synergies between the DOD and MFA.265

There are several options for prospective NORSOF officers. Since SOF-specific officers education only can be acquired at the Naval academy, we recommend a strengthened SOF-specific education program based on the existing SOF track for all prospective NORSOF officers. This SOF-specific education should be the final training


module of this three-year education. This final year could also serve as a qualifying
course for senior-level NORSOF NCOs.

Acknowledging the need for more NORSOF officers in higher positions during
MA operations (enabling vertical implementation), we recommend a slightly larger quota
of NORSOF officers to attend the USSOCOM-sponsored special operations and irregular
warfare (SO/IW) program, and the information strategy and political warfare curriculum
at NPS.266 Both programs feature a wide range of academic and operational specialties,
especially relevant for indirect approaches, but also for other SOF functions and tasks.
NORSOF Intel specialists could be considered for certificate programs (which can be
completed in three to six months) at the CORE lab at NPS, which specializes in data
collection and analysis of the human domain in support of SOF.267 Datasets relevant for
NORSOF MA operations could be utilized in direct support of the NORSOF J-2.

We also support the previous recommendations from the Norwegian institute of
international affairs suggesting that that MA should be a larger part of the curriculum and
receive more attention at the Norwegian military academies and at the Staff college,268
and we believe this could become reality as a consequence of the new focus on SFA in
the forthcoming Norwegian land doctrine. The SOF chair at the Norwegian Staff college
is a natural proponent of SOF MA in these efforts.

Finally, we recommend that NORSOCOM establish a working group consisting
of SOF personnel from Forsvarets høysskole (FHS), people with extensive MA
experience and deep knowledge about NORSOF, to propose a more balanced education
system for NORSOF based on NORSOF 2025 and this report.

3. Incentive Systems

Our research suggests that “cultural attitudes” and “economic incentives” are
factors that likely will impede NORSOF’s ability to fill the “MA community of practice”

268 Hansen, Lurås, and Nikolaisen, “Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT),”
positions suggested in NORSOF 2025, as well as NORSOF’s ability to educate enough officers for “vertical implementation” at higher levels during future MA operations.

To shift cultural attitudes toward MA, especially among the younger personnel in NORSOF, we recommend the following:

- Targeted recruitment of personnel with potential interest
- Increasing knowledge of MA requirements and effects through a course offered as part of basic training
- Highlighting successful MA efforts, expanding the NORSOF “hero” cabinet, and initiating storytelling related to these successful efforts
- Rewarding extraordinary MA efforts on par with extraordinary SR and DA efforts
- Making MA an exclusive, selective assignment and making education for MA more attractive. Positions in the MA community of practice are, after all, not for everyone.

Finally, this is a leadership challenge. If there exists a subculture in NORSOF (as the survey suggests) that frowns upon MA activity and officer training, countering this trend is a task for NORSOF leaders and influencers at all levels. We believe NORSOF is easier to change than some of its more bureaucratic SOF peers. The power-distance between officers and enlisted is more compressed in NORSOF, and key officers have considerable “informal” power as well as formal power, they can utilize.

Economic incentives are also important for building MA capabilities. Currently, MA is not highlighted as an important task in its own right, and very few positions and exercises are dedicated to this activity. A large portion of NORSOF pay is activity-based. Economic “codes” do not exist for many of the components of MA activity. For example, a sniper can experiment with a chronograph to measure ammunition velocity late in the evenings, register this as work, and receive pay. It is difficult, however, for an NCO who is reading volumes about Syrian-based opposition groups and Jordanian culture in preparation for his upcoming MA mission to file the time spent as paid work. This is both a cultural and technical problem; such activities must be valued on par with other operational preparations, and the necessary resources have to be allocated to such activities. The main recommendation is, therefore, to recognize the “warrior-diplomat”
and “SME” tracks recommended in NORSOF 2025 in the human resource management systems; if these career tracks go unrecognized, it’s doubtful NORSOF personnel will become MA experts on their own initiative.

We have also described the challenge in NORSOF of motivating personnel to apply for officer training at the military academies. For vertical implementation in MA operations to be possible in the future (as well as to select the best personnel for command-track careers), economic incentives must be used. Few are willing to lose one-third of their pay once they leave the operational squadrons. It is beyond the scope of this report to recommend changes to the pay system; however, it seems evident that some economic benefits should be kept for personnel who go through such education.

D. SUMMARY

Production of a doctrine-like document for NORSOF will have at least four outcomes. It will produce coherence within NORSOF, educate policymakers, enhance interagency coordination, and elevate decision makers’ understanding of how to use NORSOF most effectively in the future. Another recommendation is to emphasize the importance of seeking synergies between national (mainly direct) and international (mainly indirect) missions. Small-footprint missions directed toward national strategically important objectives, along with partners who fit NORSOF, will benefit Norwegian interests the most. Demand for NORSOF to conduct MA missions is not likely to decline, which leads us to also recommend an increased number of enablers and experts within several areas of expertise, in addition to an increased numbers of NORSOF officers. The latter recommendation is made mainly to render vertical implementation of NORSOF possible in future operations.

Two distinct options for how to organize NORSOF have been discussed in this report. We recommend organizing NORSOF via “horizontal development” in the future. A comprehensive commitment to horizontal development will most likely require changes in some NORSOF attitudes. If this approach is to succeed, changes to initial SOF-selection, basic SOF training, advanced SOF training, and the SOF exercise schedule must be operationalized. In addition, the importance and recognition of some
types of academic education must be stressed. Also, the SOF personnel management system, the SOF talent management system, and various incentive systems would need to be adjusted. In short, a range of changes would need to be made which would be supported by, and not just initiated from, the top-down and by key influencers.
V. MA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

One of the purposes of this report has been to explore how NORSOF can increase its strategic utility through the development of its MA capability. We have described a future requirement for more cost-effective MA operations directed at key strategic objectives. One of the main findings of NORSOF 2025 was that the organization should be utilized more when opportunities arise to support Norwegian strategic objectives.\(^\text{269}\) NORSOCOM is a newly established organization, and even though NORSOF currently has considerable credibility with the political elite,\(^\text{270}\) it would be fair to say that knowledge about NORSOF’s capabilities is still limited among key government decision-makers. This knowledge must be maintained and even broadened, especially because NORSOF will need to change and evolve with the times.

One way to contribute to achieving Norwegian security objectives, while at the same time educating and challenging decision-makers on the smart use of NORSOF, is to “recommend operations in support of policy and to influence policy by identifying opportunities in sync with national interests.”\(^\text{271}\) This is also known as “policy by CONOPS.” One example has already been proposed. In the previous chapter we described an option for mentoring, training, and assisting willing Kurds in Norway to enroll fighting IS in northern Iraq.

In this chapter, we describe three MA CONOPS that support security policy objectives. Our aim is to propose feasible, new concepts for future NORSOF MA operations. By doing so, we do not want to imply that current NORSOF MA operations in Afghanistan, Jordan/Syria, and the Baltic states do not represent a smart use of the NORSOF MA capability for strategic purposes. On the contrary, we believe they do. Our


\(^{270}\) Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces.”

aim here is to investigate additional options, broaden the field of possibilities, and offer food for thought.

The proposed courses of action are limited to unclassified descriptions, and they draw on some of our findings from the previous chapters. Consequently, they seek to:

- Utilize the GSN as an extended capability for NORSOF
- Exploit synergies between national tasks and skillsets, and MA operations
- Exploit cost-effective solutions with a small NORSOF footprint
- Seek Norwegian vertical implementation joint/interagency when possible
- Support Norway’s most important security policy objective: credible deterrence of Russia
- Support Norwegian strategic niches/comparative strengths in the international system: reassurance of Russia and taking advantage of Norwegian conflict resolution capabilities

One final caveat is that these COAs are not fully developed; what we present must instead be viewed as initial drafts.

B. COA 1: MA IN SUPPORT OF DETERRENCE

The Norwegian Home guard was the institution that pursued the Company Linge heritage after the Second World War.

—NORSOC 2015

A developed network of Home guard soldiers will potentially provide essential support to NORSOF in national crises.

—NORSOC 2015

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273 Ibid., 15.
1. Strategic Context

To set the scene: Russia has established strategic objectives that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors and threaten the stability of the international system. Russia has selectively employed tools across the full range of state power—including the overt and covert use of force—to consolidate these objectives.\footnote{Stephen Dayspring, “Countering Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’: Acknowledging the Nature of Modern Conflict,” \textit{CTX} 6 (forthcoming).} According to the latest assessment from the Norwegian Intelligence service, Russia has lately reopened bases in the High North and re-established arctic brigades and command structures.\footnote{Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), \textit{Annual Assessment by the Norwegian Intelligence Service: FOCUS 2015} (Oslo, Norway: NIS, 2015), 17.} The same assessment states that; “Russian threat arise from a combination of capability and intention, and though Russia is increasing its capabilities, it is difficult to envision any rational basis for Russian military action against Norway in the short to medium term.”\footnote{Ibid., 17.} It also points out; “Intentions, however, can change over time.”\footnote{Ibid., 17.}

According to the Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy:

credible deterrence must build upon allied engagement from the very outset of a severe crisis. Escalation must be as seamless as possible, ensuring that the build-up of Norwegian forces and allied reinforcements takes place simultaneously and in an integrated manner.\footnote{Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, \textit{Unified Effort}, 6.}

The Norwegian defense strategy may be described as a threshold defense, one which functions to close the gap between crises which are too large for Norway, but too small for NATO. The 40,000 man Norwegian Home guard (NHG) has important roles to play in the defense of Norway and may prove effective against elements of Russian “hybrid” warfare: these roles may range from making use of civilians with local networks to detect and report abnormal activity, to securing key infrastructure and working with allied reinforcements, as well as providing a well-organized and equipped resistance movement in case strategic areas are occupied.
2. **COA Purpose/End State**

To deter future Russian aggression against Norwegian strategic interests, the credibility of the Norwegian “threshold defense” should be strengthened. To achieve this, NORSOF will utilize its current position and contacts in the global SOF Network to facilitate U.S. SF military assistance of Norwegian territorial Home guards. The assistance will be directed toward prioritized NHG capabilities and districts.

Deterrence is about signaling. U.S. SF development of Norwegian Home guard capabilities sends an important signal about the priority and credibility of the NHG. This signaling effect would not be the same if anyone other than U.S. SF conducted this training.

The desired end state would be achieved when the NHG’s capacity to counter Russian proxy “hybrid” warfare elements is proved credible, and when Russia’s cost/benefit analysis with regard to aggression toward Norway had been influenced in accordance with Norwegian interests.

3. **COA Outline**

Through their contacts in the global SOF Network, including the NORSOF U.S. SOCOM LNO and NSHQ, NORSOF would investigate whether training the Norwegian Home guard to counter elements of Russian full-spectrum warfare could be authorized as part of the “Green Beret Volckman Program,” or whether it could be justified as a contingency plan under another U.S./NATO operation. NORSOF and Home guard staff would work out training and assistance requirements, with a particular focus on countering Russian hybrid threats, and would meet with U.S. SF representatives to discuss options. The Home guard training center might be one possible organizational hub for facilitation, as described in Chapter 4 DOTP Options, Section B2 Organizations in Norwegian DOD and MA. DOD strategic IO would then coordinate an IO plan with the U.S. embassy in Norway. We propose that the scope of such an operation would be

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“small footprint, long duration” for all involved parties: U.S. SF, Home guard, and NORSOF.

4. Secondary Effects

A number of secondary effects might be derived from this COA. First, U.S. SF would have the opportunity to train in unconventional warfare by conducting foreign internal defense with “civilian indigenous units” in a permissive environment, yet with a strategic purpose in a NATO flank country. “Bridging the UW gap” is an integral part of U.S. SF capability development. Second, U.S. SF would gain considerable geographical familiarity with the NATO country with the longest border (sea/land) with Russia, and would build important networks with and through their Norwegian counterparts. Third, NORSOF would participate in the training of the Home guards as part of the MA capability development described in this report, and use this as an arena for basic MA training. Fourth, U.S. SF, NORSOF, and Norwegian Home guards would develop greater levels of coordination and cooperation, and the historic bonds between these organizations would be strengthened.

5. NATO Justification

This COA fits well with COM JFC Brunssum’s 2015 initiative for NATO SOF to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint “hybrid defense” approaches to counter “Grey zone/phase 0” challenges in Europe. General Domrose particularly emphasized the importance of MA operations, led by SOF officers who were adept in working within both civilian and military structures.

The Commander of NSHQ expressed in the NSHQ hybrid warfare seminar in June 2015 that he viewed NATO SOF’s objectives related to countering future hybrid threats to be:

1. To Understand: “Get out there and figure out what is happening.”

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280 United States Army, Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022, 13.

2. To Enhance: “Show that you are out there and use your network.”

3. To (En)counter: “Use force if necessary, but it should not be necessary.”

According to LG Webb, MA is a prioritized task for NATO SOF. He argued that NATO SOF should embrace operational and strategic-level MA activities through the conduct of long-lasting MA operations with a wide spectrum of partners. LG Webb further argued that such activities are most relevant and less challenging to approve in NATO before a conflict erupts, and that SOF is well positioned to fill this role through utilizing opportunities made available via the global SOF Network.282

6. Historic Justification

NORSOF’s origins lie in the Independent company 1, also called the “Linge company” after its first leader. This was a British special operations executive (SOE) group formed in March 1941 with Norwegian special forces soldiers, who performed raids, sabotage, and training of indigenous units in Norway. These men were crucial in the development of the Norwegian Home guard after WWII.

William E. Colby, the legendary director of the Central intelligence agency, met the forerunners of the current Home guards (Milorg) when his OSS Jedburgh team jumped out of an airplane together with soldiers of Norwegian descent over Trondheim, Norway, in 1944 as part of operation “Rype” (Grouse).283 He later praised the importance of the Norwegian Home guard organization, and one of the NHG units in Trondheim carries the name “Rype” to honor this operation.284

As previously noted, Norwegian Home guard and early NORSOF units trained in guerrilla warfare with U.S. SF since 1960, first in the U.S. and then in Germany. From 1963 through the mid-1980s, U.S. SF and Norwegian Home guard conducted joint


training and exercises as part of the U.S. Military assistance program.\textsuperscript{285} From September 1970, 10th Special forces group soldiers with recent experience in Vietnam contributed significantly to the courses taught at the Home guard training center at Dombås. At the time, this activity fell under the Flintlock umbrella, the same exercise which continues in a number of countries with NATO SOF participation.\textsuperscript{286}

7. **Impact for NORSOF MA Capability Development**

This NORSOF-USSF-NHG COA is different from other NORSOF MA operations in the sense that it would be carried out \textit{in} Norway, and mainly by the largest partner in the global SOF network. NORSOCOM participation would be limited to the initiation phase, though the SOF-to-SOF connections would be maintained throughout the \textit{operation}. For instance, NORSOF tactical units would participate in different phases of the operation, and would make use of the training arenas to prepare their own MA trainers for future MA deployments abroad. The network of MA practitioners in NORSOF could use the operation as an opportunity to expand their network, and to recruit and educate other elements in DOD for NORSOF MA purposes.

C. **COA 2: MA IN SUPPORT OF REASSURANCE**

\textbf{We must think differently,} seek greater understanding of local, regional and global contexts, and strengthen \textbf{trust} through interagency and \textbf{partner cooperation}.

—Adm. William H. McRaven, SOCOM 2020\textsuperscript{287}

SOF represent \textbf{diplomacy conducted by other means}, and as such are usually subject to strict political or military control at the highest levels.

—Maurice Tugwell and David Charters\textsuperscript{288}

\textsuperscript{285} Brox, \textit{Norwegian Homeguard 50 Years}, 110–112.

\textsuperscript{286} Forsvarets spesialkommando, \textit{The National Home Guard’s Role in the NORSOF Mindset after 1945}, 9.


\textsuperscript{288} Source: Tugwell and Charters, “Special Operations and the Threats to United States’ Interests,” 34, emphasis added.
1. **Strategic Context and Background**

Norway has a common border with the Kola Peninsula, perhaps Russia’s most strategically important area. From a Russian perspective, this necessitates maintaining strategic defensive depth beyond its immediate border areas. Norwegian defense and security policy throughout the postwar period has been characterized by deterrence through membership in NATO, and reassurance through a number of self-imposed restrictions, including both a basing and nuclear policy that have restricted allied operations on Norwegian territory close to the Kola Peninsula.

It has been Norwegian policy to engage Russia through cooperation whenever possible. The strategic objective has been to ensure stability and predictability, especially in the High North. From the early 1990s, Norway and Russia have cooperated on the “safety side” of the security spectrum in managing non-military crises, search and rescue in the North, oil spill response, and border control.\(^{289}\) Beginning in 1998, the Norwegian Coast guard and the Russian border units (FSB/FPS) developed a partnership through the annual bilateral exercise, Barents. Military cooperation increased after 2000, and a major Nordic-Russian exercise, Barents rescue, was initiated in 2001.\(^{290}\) There were also student exchanges between the Norwegian and Russian military academies.\(^ {291}\) Starting in 2008, Norway has participated in what was originally a U.S.–Russian exercise, Northern eagle. Norway established a separate bilateral exercise with Russia in 2010, and this exercise, POMOR, has included preparations for joint operations, as well as anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.\(^ {292}\) Significantly, despite all of these exercises and exchanges, NORSOF and RUSOF have never participated in any of them. The only known encounter between Norwegian special operations forces and the Russian military


\(^ {290}\) Ibid., 558.

\(^ {291}\) As a young cadet, one of us witnessed the 9/11 attacks on America together with Russian units at a shooting range close to Murmansk. The Russian officers’ sympathy for the United States and anger toward the terrorists appeared real.

occurred in 2008. NORSOF personnel parachuted together with the Russian 76th Air
land division in Pskov as part of a program led by the Ministry of the foreign office.
According to the NORSOF officers who participated, this visit seemed like a one-time
event—a symbolic act—without any long-term strategic purpose.²⁹³

From the Norwegian perspective, military cooperation was a key factor in the
normalization of relations between NATO and Russia after the Cold war. This period was
not without bilateral challenges and incidents, yet progress was real. Perhaps the most
important result of Norway’s policy was the settlement of the 40-year-long border dispute
between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea, signed by Prime minister Dmitri
Medvedev, Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, former Prime minister Jens Stoltenberg
(now secretary-general of NATO), and former foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in 2010
(see Figure 21).

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²⁹³ Information from NORSOF officer present at the actual exchange
²⁹⁴ Source: Thomas Nilsen, “Norway and Russia Sign Maritime Delimitation Agreement,” Barents
maritime-delimitation-agreement.
As described in the preceding COA, Russia has recently established strategic objectives that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors and threaten the stability of the international system. Russia has selectively employed tools ranging from the overt to covert use of force—to consolidate its objectives. Together with other NATO countries, Norway consequently placed most of its bilateral cooperation efforts with Russia on hold in 2014. However, Norway has maintained limited contact in the northern areas, and the Norwegian joint headquarters still maintains open channels with the Russian northern fleet in order to de-conflict military activity in the High North. In short, Russia is a geographic and geo-political fact and will remain the dominating factor in Norway’s security strategy for the foreseeable future.

The COA we are about to describe would require, but would also help to bring about, a different political atmosphere between Norway and Russia than the one that currently exists.

2. **COA Purpose/End State**

The strategic purpose of this COA is to re-establish trust between Norway/NATO and Russia sometime in the future, based on common security interests in the High North. As is the case with deterrence, reassurance is all about signaling. Few, if any, bilateral military activities signal trust or the credibility of intent more effectively than cooperation between special forces. In this COA, NORSOF will use its experience with maritime counterterrorism operations to conduct joint CT training and exercises with RUSOF during future bilateral exercises like POMOR.

Based on bilateral energy agreements, it is still possible that future transnational oil and gas fields in the Barents sea will be exploited as a joint venture; personnel from both countries at the same installation is therefore a future possibility. Furthermore,

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295 Dayspring, “Countering Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare.’”

the Northern sea route\textsuperscript{297} will likely become a vital route for global shipping and arctic tourism in the future. HRO at sea, with both Norwegian and Russian lives at stake, is therefore also a real possibility. Cooperation with Russia could (and arguably should) be developed through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that would enable joint actions to be taken against terrorism and/or sabotage on Snøhvit (Snowhite) and future Shtokman oilfields, and the protection of petroleum transport and shipping in the Barents sea.\textsuperscript{298} NORSOF has the experience, knowledge, and procedures to implement integrated operations with other countries’ military forces—to include countries with whom Norway normally does not share intelligence and information.\textsuperscript{299}

The end state to be achieved via this COA would be to see Norway’s and Russia’s mutual security concerns regarding infrastructure at sea be jointly met without bilateral misunderstandings. The end state would also be achieved when mutual trust is re-established and when Russia’s cost/benefit analysis with regards to aggression toward Norway has been influenced in a positive way for Norway.

3. Secondary Effects

While the strategic purpose of this COA is to use a strategic asset like NORSOF to re-establish trust between Norway/NATO and Russia in the future, there are also some secondary effects.

First, countering terrorism is a shared policy objective both in Norway/NATO and in Russia. It is therefore possible that joint CT training is not as politically sensitive as other military activity. Both NORSOF and RUSOF units have repeatedly fought Islamist terrorists willing to die for their cause, yet have done so using different equipment, different ROEs, and different TTPs. RUSOF also have valuable COIN and MA

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The sharing of experiences might be tactically beneficial for both parties.

Second, Russia’s ambition is to assert itself as a regional actor, and possibly re-establish itself as a global actor. RUSOF is currently active in conflicts where NATO SOF is present. NATO has recently encountered substantial challenges in de-conflicting Russian and NATO activity in a “shared” battlespace, most notably in Syria. Norway has operational experience with such de-confliction, primarily through its routine NJHQ communications with the Northern fleet, to include personal visits between commanders. Over time, the COA we have described could contribute to the establishment of similar person-to-person relations and trust between NORSOF and RUSOF commanders. In the future, NORSOF personnel might assist not only with de-confliction, but perhaps even cooperation between RUSOF and NATO SOF by utilizing these ties in places like Syria. However, persistent engagement is needed to build such levels of trust: it cannot be rushed.

Third, Serdiukov’s establishment of the new, small, and lean Russian special operations command was inspired by western SOCOM models. Although it might seem far-fetched today, Norway should not exclude the possibility of exchanging perspectives on the use of SOF, doctrinally speaking, in a distant future. Russians have a well-deserved reputation for being innovative military thinkers and producers of efficient doctrine. It is likely that the West could learn from this, but also influence Russian perspectives, particularly if the current geo-political environment changes. If so, this COA might position Norway as a potential bridge between NATO and Russia.

In short, future cooperation between NORSOF and RUSOF is an investment in “diplomacy by other means” which could help bridge the mistrust that currently exists between Russia and Norway/NATO.

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300 Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Dr. Tor Bukkvoll made a presentation entitled “The Russian Military since 2008 and Russian Special Operations Force” to the “Low Intensity Warfare in Europe” class at NPS on November 18, 2015.

301 McRaven, SOCOM 2020, 2.

302 Ibid.
4. NATO Justification

Of all of NATO’s partner relations, none holds greater potential than that between NATO and Russia. But today that potential is not being fully met.

—Anders Fogh Rasmussen
NATO Secretary General 2009–2014

The basic problem, I think, is very simple. It is the lack of trust. It is the lack of trust on both sides.

—Marek Menkiszak
Head, Russian Department, Centre for Eastern Studies

SOF-related challenges similar to those described in this COA have been discussed between NATO and Russia for years. The NATO-Russia council (NRC) provides a “mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision-making, and joint action.” Russia shares borders with several of the countries in which terrorists are clearly being mobilized and trained. According to former Norwegian foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, the NRC has benefited from Russia’s knowledge of Afghanistan in connection with the fight against illegal drugs, issues relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Russia’s prior experiences with terrorist actions, all of which are SOF-related challenges.

James Sherr argues that:

Russia is a multinational state which is threatened by extremism and the growing sophistication of globally organized terrorist movements, and that the work that NATO and Russia can do together is obviously important.

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304 Source: Ibid.


306 Jonas G. Støre, Foreign Policy Speech on Relations between Norway and Russia, Oslo 18 June 2008 (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008).

307 Interview with James Sherr, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, in NATO Review, “NATO and Russia.”
Wilhelmsen argues that the radicalization of Russian Muslims, both in Chechnya and other areas, is the biggest internal security threat facing Russia. Russian researchers estimate the real number of Russian IS fighters to be nearly 8,000, a substantial number.308

One initiative NATO and Russia have unveiled is the STANDEX project, “which aims to prevent terrorists from gaining opportunities to use explosives against commuters on mass transit systems.”309 Both the STANDEX project and the cooperative airspace initiative are examples of successful NATO-Russian cooperative efforts.310 Both work well because of two important elements, which are also present in our proposed COA: first, both sides benefit equally. Second, neither involves extremely politically sensitive issues. Both these projects are technical in character and address real challenges.311 We believe the COA we have described also addresses concrete, technical problems related to common security interests in the High North, and, therefore, it should be welcomed by both parties and NATO.

General Robert Mood is Norway’s senior military representative at NATO HQ. He recently argued that Norway’s military dialogue with Russia should be strengthened: “There is no reason why there should not be closer links both between Russia and NATO, and Russia and Norway. It is a dialogue that is required, not least in crisis.”312

The former SACEUR, General Philip Breedlove, describes Norway as occupying an extremely utterly important strategic niche: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in


309 NATO Review Magazine, NATO and Russia: Uneasy Partners?


311 NATO Review Magazine, NATO and Russia: Uneasy Partners?

the way it handles relations with Russia. Norway has a long history of working with Russia in the border areas. You have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”

5. **Impact for NORSOF MA Capability Development**

This Russia-Norway-NATO COA we have described would create synergies between national tasks and MA capabilities. It would require NORSOF senior officers deeply knowledgeable about Russian doctrine, military organization, and the history of prior Norwegian-Russian relations, to develop this knowledge in younger NORSOF operators. Gaining proficiency in the Russian language would certainly help build mutual trust over time. Selected NORSOF officers could be chosen to invest in this skill. When appropriate, NORSOF officers at NJHQ could use the dialogue between NJHQ and the Northern Fleet as a springboard to that trust, especially if personal visits between these two organizations commenced in the future.

D. **COA 3: MA IN SUPPORT OF NEGOTIATIONS**

You need a network to fight a network.”

—Dr. John Arquilla

1. **Strategic Context**

Norway is often described as a “superpower” when it comes to conflict resolution. Norway has a well-developed diplomatic reputation for neutrality, and the requisite financial resources, patience, endurance and network.” Arguably, Norwegian involvement in a series of negotiations is what has granted it stature, standing, and strategic access beyond its size. Since 1993, Norway has been involved in more than 20 peace processes or attempts to reconcile warring groups in places as disparate as South

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313 A. Langved, “Interview with SACEUR General Philip M. Breedlove, Titled: “Bakkestryker Er Nøkkelen Til Suksess” (Ground Forces Is the Key to Success),” *Dagens Næringsliv*, February 3, 2016.


315 Hanssen-Bauer, “Norwegian ‘Model’ for Conflict Resolution.”

115
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia, the Philippines, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Myanmar, Guatemala, Colombia, Afghanistan/Taliban, and Libya.

One of the more tangible successes in Norwegian peace diplomacy was the peace agreement in Guatemala in 1996, which was reached after years of negotiations. It came in the wake of the groundbreaking peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians three years earlier. Despite the later collapse of the “Oslo agreement,” this was still viewed as a strategic victory for a small nation in light of the difficulties of attaining any kind of lasting peace in the Middle East.

The 2005 peace agreement in Sudan confirmed Norway’s reputation as a small superpower that highly successfully was able to negotiate and get a peace agreement signed. The cooperation with the United States was especially close during these negotiations. One favorable side effect was that Norwegian “soft power” opened doors for Norwegian politicians to the “hard power” Washington yields. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, Norway established contacts with Taliban leadership in 2007 and worked actively to influence internal processes in Washington until 2011, when the United States for the first time called for negotiations with the Taliban. Norway then mediated contact between the parties and conducted high-level meetings with the Taliban leadership in Pakistan, Oslo, and Doha, Qatar.

In the case of Libya, Norwegian diplomats were involved in secret negotiations with Muammar al-Gadhafi’s son from 2010. Allegedly representatives of the rebels and Saif Gadhafi met about 30 times in Tunisia, Istanbul, Paris, and Oslo without reaching an agreement before operation Unified protector reached its most intense phase in 2011.

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319 Godal et al., *NOU 2016*.
320 Ibid.
Norway has also been involved in the peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia for decades. Norway is the official facilitator, along with Cuba, for the talks between the Colombian government and FARC-EP. These talks finally resulted in a peace agreement between FARC and the Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, being signed in June 2016. A number of hostages were released over the course of this process, often with direct Norwegian involvement.

Worth noting is that of the 61 conflicts that ended during the last 35 years, 77% did so through a peace agreement, and 16.4% through military victory by one of the parties. The culture of negotiation has thus become an important reality, and Norway has been a major, even integral participant. However, as Helgesen argues, “Norway struggles to square the circle of being a loyal military team player, helping to demonstrate a united international front against terrorism, while at the same time supporting negotiated solutions to conflicts in which one side is labeled a terrorist organization.”

Interestingly, the NORSOF community is positioned in the middle of this seeming contradiction between (military) counterterrorism and (civilian) negotiations, and thus, potentially may help bridge it. NORSOF has capabilities that may support one or both of these lines of effort.

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In Figure 22, which is borrowed from SOF 2030, the Norwegian intelligence service (NIS) provides full spectrum intelligence support to the Norwegian government, including support for negotiations. The Norwegian Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) engages in overt and clandestine diplomacy and negotiations, and development and aid through government and non-government organizations. SOF’s role, in contrast, is to deal with the armed “others”—whether foreign militaries (e.g., FID) or supported groups (e.g., UW), or anti-state/system actors like terrorists (e.g., SR/DA), as described in SOF 2030. All of these are important actors in negotiations.

2. COA Outline

In this interagency COA, MFA is the supported agency; NIS and NORSOF are supporting agencies. Through the interagency liaison network in Oslo and at select embassies, NORSOF MA experts will provide MA to MFA and NIS in support of specific negotiation efforts. NORSOF may offer a range of services:

- NORSOF can increase the reach and capability of the negotiating teams through their contacts in the global SOF network (GSN). The GSN offers alternative access to critical information (especially host nation information [HNI] and friendly forces information requirements [FFIR]). The GSN offers a global, physical, and clandestine SOF infrastructure that may be utilized for negotiation purposes, as well as SOF resources that enable physical access to hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

327 Source: Simons, “SOF 2030.”
328 Simons, “SOF 2030.”
329 Godal et al., NOU 2016, 138.
330 Simons, “SOF 2030.”
NORSOF can provide MA expertise to negotiating teams, especially with regard to assessments of what is feasible and possible to achieve through “traditional” disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, for which MA is a critical component.

NORSOF can support “second generation DDR” activities if the preconditions for traditional DDR are not in place. This includes the establishment of liaisons between parties in semi/non-permissible environments, quickly securing personnel, or infrastructure important for the negotiating efforts, and supporting local negotiation programs using an evidence-based approach (much like recent SOF efforts in Afghanistan).

During negotiated cease-fires, NORSOF can assist in assessing the disposition of specific forces (e.g., strength, locations, and morale). NORSOF could also be used to establish liaisons with local commanders to ensure the mapping process can be completed.

NORSOF can locate and mark suitable drop zones for food/medical drops, ensuring that the much-needed aid reaches the right people, and so as to establish trust while negotiations are underway. NORSOF also has a “role 2” hospital platoon that it could insert by airdrop (this includes the infrastructure and the surgeons). The hospital platoon might even serve as a high-end confidence-building measure to support a cease-fire and/or establish trust during negotiations.

NORSOF can help increase HRO readiness and forward-deploy HRO capabilities during high-risk negotiations. NORSOF can also assist with the build-up of escape & evasion (E&E) networks for civilian actors engaged in the negotiation efforts, and provide relevant E&E training in Norway.

If the end result of a peace agreement is that one or more of the opposing actors engage in some kind of security sector reform (SSR), NORSOF can assume a traditional MA role, directed at several levels of the mentored organization, hereby achieving vertical implementation of MA.

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332 Ibid.

3. **Historic Justification**

According to “traditional” views, MA is normally associated with training, mentoring, and assistance of military or police-like organizations or groups. This COA broadens the spectrum of who might receive military assistance, to include negotiators and intelligence agencies. This is not something new; in reality, this COA just readjusts Norway’s focus back to full spectrum interagency support to negotiations.

For instance, during the negotiations on Sri Lanka, “Norwegian military experts helped work out the military technicalities of de-escalation, advanced positions, and front lines.” In the Balkans, NORSOF acted as liaisons and advisors between the peacekeeping force and the former warring parties. Under the “Joint commission observers” (JCO) program, NORSOF established contact between hard-to-reach decision-makers from all parties, often preventing episodes from turning into open conflict. Other SOF roles in the Balkans included assessing the disposition and strength of specific forces, often through directly liaising with warring commanders, and locating and marking suitable drop zones for UN food drops. NORSOF also has organizational experience with DDR processes, both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. For example, during operation Essential harvest in Macedonia in 2001, NORSOF contributed to the allied collection of over 50,000 weapons.

4. **Implications for NORSOF MA Capability**

Because this interagency COA requires increased knowledge about and trust in NORSOF capabilities across the Norwegian interagency community, it would depend on the establishment of a “MA network of practice” in NORSOF, and the creation of “SME” and “warrior-diplomat” career tracks.

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334 Sørbø et al., *Pawns of Peace*, 36.
VI. VISUALIZATION 2025

Having presented our main recommendations in Chapter IV, and having offered three different courses of action for how MA can be put to new strategic use on behalf of Norway, here we conclude with a visualization of what an improved NORSOF MA capability might look like in 2025. Our visualization is based on the findings and recommendations in this report, but we have allowed ourselves to speculate quite a bit concerning geo-strategic developments. Fasten your seatbelts and project yourself into 2025…

By adopting a systematic, thorough approach to the development of individual MA specialists, MA officers, and task organizations for MA across both units and sections beginning in 2017, MA today is an inseparable part of what NORSOF does, just as with SR and DA. “The MA mindset” has been woven into the NORSOF fabric starting with recruitment. Expectations are well managed. Operators understand the lifelong opportunities available to them; they have been learning about MA since selection and basic training. Throughout their advanced training and education, this vital capability in the NORSOF toolbox has been clearly defined. Pride in MA is discernible throughout NORSOF, and this thoroughness breeds confidence in NORSOF and is well appreciated by political decision-makers who continue to strongly support NORSOF, thanks in large part to MA successes. The strategic utility of the force has increased. So has its size.

Traits and skills important for MA operators prominently mentioned in NORSOF’s recruitment campaigns are directed at a new generation of increasingly individualistically oriented Norwegians who have grown up during the era of globalization at the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution. The overall message is that NORSOF is for a select few. Physical and mental stamina far above average is essential, but not enough. NORSOF needs the brightest minds: people with cultural knowledge, language proficiency, and technological skills as well. DOD recruiters are actively advertising and screening for SOF talent in institutions concerned with foreign area studies, foreign languages, technology, and engineering.
The Norwegian defense has been attracting increasingly higher numbers of recruits from minority groups, and the best end up in NORSOF, where diversity in human potential is valued and pragmatically exploited. At the same time, Norway’s “Powell program,” continues to send, motivated, and educated NORSOF personnel to slots in the MFA trainee program. We now have more than a decade and a half’s worth of SOF personnel who have worked in and with the Interagency.

The initial NORSOF selection process still mainly focuses on physical, mental, and psychological stamina and the ability to work in a team, but the positive selection and training for MA starts during the basic course. From the outset, prospective NORSOF candidates are introduced to the range of possibilities a life-long NORSOF career can offer. MA is one of those possibilities, and candidates learn that this track offers several opportunities for life-long learning at exclusive institutions.

“Planning and teaching how to teach others” is introduced to candidates step by step, while NORSOF simultaneously screens for officer talent. Combined exercises are introduced early on; infiltration followed by training of Home guards or other units in a tactical setting. Sometimes this is done jointly with U.S. SF. This increases NORSOF personnel’s self-reliance and ability to plan and to take a holistic approach to tasks. More experienced personnel train them in basic HUMINT, liaison, and other MA skills. The focus is on building, exploiting, and influencing human relationships for information, coordination, and cooperation purposes. Reporting and information management related to progress and results are integral parts of such training.

The ratio of enablers/supporting personnel (qualified subject-matter experts) to operators has increased; this has been necessary to keep the range and number of operator skills required to a manageable level, and to insure these skills do not erode over time. Enablers are recruited when required since their competencies are not developed best in the NORSOF system, but elsewhere. Enablers are trained to the standard of paratroopers, while the “hunter spirit mindset” is cultivated in such a way as to assisting in solving the social, analytical, technical, and human domain problem in which they are experts.
NORSOF officer candidates and senior NCOs go through their final year in a SOF-specific track at the Naval academy. The Naval academy has attracted a small but recognized cadre of faculty and guest lecturers who have a particular focus on SOF and unconventional warfare. The program also “facilitates constructive interaction across the whole of NORSOF.” The numbers of NORSOF officers attending the master’s level programs at the Naval postgraduate school and King’s college have also increased.

NORSOF’s career management system oversees a tailored education and training program for MA experts and officers that focuses on individual aptitudes to fully exploit the potential of each individual operator. By taking a lifetime perspective, it aims to maximize the output of all NORSOF personnel over careers that can span up to 38 years. Education increasingly pays off in the long run, and incentive systems and pay are regulated to reward lifelong learning. After a long career in the operational squadrons, a number of senior NORSOF specialists and officers are now MA specialists and see further operational development of NORSOF’s MA capabilities as their main focus. These people advise, train, and influence the rest of the NORSOF system through their internal “MA network of practice.” The seniors in this network represent NORSOF as well as the rest of the Norwegian defense forces in interagency arenas and in working groups concerned with MA concepts and strategic opportunities.

In 2018, Norway adopted a classified national SOF doctrine, which is not covered in NATO doctrine. Perspectives on NORSOF specialties and niches and NORSOF’s position in the global SOF network are explained. This document serves as a useful guide for prioritization among doctrinal tasks and capabilities, criteria for use in support of strategic objectives, and NORSOF concept development.

NORSOF is still active with MA efforts in the MENA area, especially in the smaller maritime countries, and works in concert with other Norwegian agencies. The symbolic strategic significance of doing this is reciprocity toward the United States and NATO. The functional strategic significance is to counter threats to the alliance in their places of origin. NORSOF’s ability to assist through “vertical implementation” is well

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Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” Chapter VII.
respected; NORSOF MA officers are represented at the highest levels of command in the mentored forces as well as in the mentoring organization. NORSOF MA specialists are able to assist across the full range of military and police functions (the local variants of NATO’s 1–9 functional structure).

Norwegian conflict negotiation efforts continue around the globe. NORSOF is supporting MFA in these efforts through enabling physical access and communication between negotiators and parties, and by providing security and facilitation of meetings in a discreet or covert manner when needed. NORSOF supports the negotiation teams with deep knowledge of DDR processes and with the advice about what is feasible and achievable through military assistance, as DDR or SSR permits.

By 2025, U.S. SF and NORSOF’s efforts to advise the Norwegian Home guard have contributed to the development of increased strategic relevance for a networked Home guard, which has enabled the Norwegian Defense to finally abandon its 20th Century ambition to mirror U.S. Air-land-battle doctrine (with its focus on winning tactical victories with small armored forces, in mountainous terrain over vast distances without strategic movement capability against an initially superior aggressor). The Army and parts of the Navy have, just like the Home guards, started to evolve into a swarm-like networked structure. The Norwegian strategy has shifted from a focus on tactical victories to avoiding decisive battles while protracting the fight in order to achieve cumulative strategic effects over time (with NATO’s support). NORSOF leads the way in this doctrinal change through its MA efforts with its own Army, as small unit guerilla tactics augmented by superior firepower are another NORSOF specialty. Russia calculates that this new strategy makes it harder to achieve its strategic goals via military aggression on Norwegian territory. NORSOF’s deterrent effect continues to prove its worth.

Simultaneously, Norwegian efforts to reassure an ever more bankrupt and desperate Russia that both its elites’ and its population’s interests are best served through increased cooperation with Norway and NATO (especially in the High North) is showing progress. Personal contacts between NORSOF officers at NJHQ and RUSOF representatives from the Leningrad military district (LEMD) have been established.
Based on common security interests in the High North, the first small unit exchange between NORSOF and RUSOF is now being discussed at the highest political levels. The basis for possible future cooperation is maritime counterterrorism in the Barents area. NATO HQ is informed about the progress, and the effort gains support through discussions in the NAC. Norway’s niche as a functional partner engaged in dialog with Russia is strengthened, and Russia is reassured that its security interests in the economic sector in the High North are best taken care of through cooperation, not aggression.
APPENDIX. FFI SURVEY: ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN NORSOF

A. INTRODUCTION

This capstone report has used data from a pre-collected survey, On Military Assistance in NORSOF, conducted by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI). The survey was constructed jointly by FFI and NORSOCOM, related to NORSOCOM’s desire to enhance NORSOF MA capabilities. The data from this survey is assessed to be highly relevant for this capstone report, and it is used mainly in Chapter III.

The survey was directed toward NORSOF personnel possessing MA experience, and it was organized as an anonymous and volunteer survey consisting of 27 overarching questions. This survey is categorized as a perception study among the population of Norwegian MA-experts from the SOF/community. The respondents were given the option to comment on all of the overarching topics. This means that the dataset from the survey consists of both quantitative and qualitative data regarding the status and viewpoints regarding MA in NORSOF. The questions used in the survey fall within six different categories: Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Personnel, and Policy (Use/Misuse of SOF).

The survey consisted of questions of different character. For instance, some questions asked the respondents to rank different factors relatively to each other; other questions asked the respondents to state whether they agreed with qualitative statements—on a 6-leveled scale ranging from “completely agree” to “completely disagree”—while some topic-related questions solicited qualitative answers in an “unlimited” comment field.

B. PURPOSE

The main purpose of the pre-collected survey was to gain insight to how MA-experienced members from NORSOF view and understand a range of issues, especially related to the future use of NORSOF within the MA mission set.

Additionally, the survey was conducted both to identify potential gaps between NORSOF understanding and common perceptions within the broader SOF literature in order to determine whether NORSOF, “as a whole,” is (actually) motivated to enhance its MA capabilities; and to identify potential differences in opinion/understanding across different demographic categories of personnel within NORSOF. (For example, is there a difference in opinion between selected operators and non-selected personnel, or is there a difference in opinion if personnel are categorized by level of military education?)

C. RESPONDENTS/POPULATION

NORSOCOM assisted in identifying the population for this pre-collected FFI survey. The population that best fit the FFI survey was described as “NORSOF personnel above platoon-level, with personal experience with Military Assistance operations.”

The three main reasons for defining the population in this fashion were: (1) several of the questions asked, and topics addressed in the survey, demanded personal MA experience for a respondent to be able to answer them. (2) Putting MA experience as a prerequisite, ensured that the respondent was a military employee within NORSOF, having at least five years of military experience. (This relates to the particularities of the Norwegian selection, training, and education system). (3) The personnel in this population were assessed to consist of the current and, most likely, future leadership in NORSOF.

Eighty-five respondents filled out the survey, which represents a substantial number of respondents when the total numbers of NORSOF are taken into account. Of the 85 respondents who participated in the survey, 15 did so in a manner by which their surveys can only be defined as “incomplete.” Also, only 69 of 85 respondents stated that...
they had the relevant MA experience required to be able to answer the survey in a relevant manner.

As noted earlier, 15 surveys were registered as incomplete. The reasons for doing so varied, and a few of those reasons are technical in nature. First, within this category (of 15 respondents) some respondents answered the whole survey, but did not push/choose the “register as complete” direction which followed the last “question” on the survey. Second, some respondents only opened the survey; in other words, they initiated the survey, but decided to quit before answering any questions at all, or after answering only a few.

The reasons why personnel without the relevant MA experience were issued this survey are not known, but we assume that NORSOCOM wanted to reach as many respondents as possible and issued the survey to a wider “population” than necessary. That being said, the survey was constructed in a way that identified personnel who lacked the relevant experience early and did not give them a chance to answer the remaining questions.

D. USE OF THE DATA

This capstone report has used the data from the pre-collected survey by conducting several types of analyses. The first analysis was an overall frequency analysis related to the individual questions—simply what percentage of NORSOF agreed/disagreed, or ranked a factor as number 1. The second analysis was a more detailed frequency analysis based on how different demographic categories and sub-groups answered individual questions. The third level of analysis consisted of f-tests, t-tests, and regression analysis. These compared the differences in opinion across the demographic categories in order to evaluate whether the differences were statistically significant or not.
1. Demographic Categories

This survey was constructed so that it is possible to categorize the respondents demographically in several ways. It was constructed this way to be able to identify differences in opinions/perceptions across different categories of personnel.

This specific capstone report has mainly utilized three different demographic categorizations to confirm whether there are any differences in opinions/perceptions: (1) military educational level; (2) selected operator vs non-selected personnel; (3) current function within NORSOF.

2. Sensitivity Analysis of the Different Demographic Categories

1. Military Educational Level

The survey made it possible for the respondents to give their military educational level in four different sub-groups: Level 1, officer candidate school or equivalent; Level 2, military academy or equivalent; Level 3, command and staff college or equivalent; and Level 4, other military education.

This resulted in the following distribution.
- Level 1, officer candidate school or equivalent: 10 respondents
- Level 2, military academy or equivalent: 35 respondents
- Level 3, command and staff college or equivalent: 21 respondents
- Level 4, other military education: 1 respondent.

2. Selected Operator vs. Non-Selected Personnel

The survey made it possible for the respondents to indicate which personnel category they belong to within NORSOF, the selected operator category, or the not-selected personnel category.

From that question, the following distribution was derived:
- The Selected operator category: 42 respondents.
- Not selected personnel category: 25 respondents.

3. Current Function within NORSOF
The survey made it possible for the respondents to identify their current function in NORSOF, by choosing from five different functions: Leadership, Staff, Support, Operative Sabre Squadron, and Other Functions. (For the category other functions, the survey made it possible to describe the current function in more detail).

This led to the following distribution regarding respondents’ current function in NORSOF:

- Leadership function: 21 respondents.
- Staff function: 23 respondents.
- Support function: 5 respondents.
- Operational Sabre Squadron function: 11 respondents.
- Other function: 7 respondents.

The number of respondents in each category is not the same, which means that one respondent’s answer in one category appears more valued than another respondent’s answer in another category when presented in different types of analyses. For example, let us use the category of Military Educational Levels to explain. In a frequency analysis, one respondent from the level 1 group, which consists of 10 respondents total, constitutes 10%, while one respondent from level 2, which consists of 35 respondents in total, constitutes 2.9%.

Another noteworthy matter in regard to the military educational level category is that only one respondent was stated to hold, “other military education.” This makes this specific category irrelevant, since it will be impossible to conduct any statistical analysis based on only one respondent.

Because of these aforementioned facts/conditions, this capstone report has conducted several types of statistical analyses: f-tests, t-tests, and regression analysis. The t-tests were used to confirm whether any identified differences across categories are statistically significant or not. A significance level of 95% is used to determine whether a difference across categories is significant.
In the next two sections, the survey is presented, first, as a compressed overview of the different questions in five tables, and second, as the survey appeared to the respondents when they conducted completed the survey.341

341 FFI, FFI Survey
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question/Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Intro and Consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>We recommend that you copy the link below! (info)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Definitions: Capability and Capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d</td>
<td>Definition: Military Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>At what level do you have personal experience with Military Assistance? (highest level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Have you conducted the Norwegian Special Operations Operator Selection Course?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Categorize your current function?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>What is your highest level of military education?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Do you have civilian education at higher level than High School?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree with this statement related to SOF in general?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most academics who have studied SOF, argue that the strategic effect/importance of SOF indirect approach (e.g. MA) is relatively higher than the direct approach (e.g. DA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree with this statement related to NORSOF specifically?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some academics who have studied SOF, believes that the strategic effect/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>importance of SOF indirect approach (e.g. MA) is relatively larger than the direct approach (e.g. DA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments related to the strategic effect of MA operations versus other SOF operations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rank the importance of the following capabilities for NORSOF:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10a</td>
<td>Most of the time during NORSOFs operations abroad the last 15 years have been used to capacity building, or Military Assistance, in one shape or form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10b</td>
<td>Most of NORSOF future operations abroad will consist of capacity building, or Military Assistance, in one sense or the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10c</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11a</td>
<td>SR/DA should be NORSOF’s “Core capabilities.” MA capability is a “Bi-product” of this, and should not be maintained/developed if it will diminish the SR/DA capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11b</td>
<td>MA is where SOF has the highest strategic utility. This should be reflected in NORSOF selection, training, education and organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11c</td>
<td>MA could principally be conducted/solved by conventional forces. It is therefore no obvious reason why MA doctrinally is a SOF-function within the Norwegian armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11d</td>
<td>MA is a specialist function that requires tailored selection and training. Hence, the function belongs in NORSOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11e</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

342 Source: FFI, *FFI Survey*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question/Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Today, NORSOF is best suited to conduct MA directed at the tactical level with the respondent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12b</td>
<td>Today, NORSOF is best suited to conduct MA directed at the operational level with the respondent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12c</td>
<td>Today, NORSOF is best suited to conduct MA directed at the strategic level with the respondent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a</td>
<td>NORSOF has an untapped potential within MA directed at the strategic level with the respondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b</td>
<td>NORSOF has an untapped potential within MA directed at the operational level with the respondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13c</td>
<td>NORSOF has an untapped potential within MA directed at the tactical level with the respondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13d</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14a</td>
<td>I fear that the extensive focus on MA among the political- and military decision makers will lead to misuse of NORSOF, where political gain becomes more important than preconditions to succeed with the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14b</td>
<td>Do you have any concerns regarding possible misuse of NORSOF-capacity in the future?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15a</td>
<td>I have experienced that it has been unclear to me which Norwegian strategic interests the specific operation I have been a part of is supporting, while conducting MA-operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15b</td>
<td>It is not terribly important to me which Norwegian strategic interests MA operations supports. It is not my job to assess Norwegian strategic gains of every single mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15c</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16a</td>
<td>Which of the following doctrinal tasks is NORSOF currently best organized to solve? Rank in order from 1–4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16b</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17a</td>
<td>Rank the doctrinal tasks in order based on how effectively NORSOF as a system is prepared to solve them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17b</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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343 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question/Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18a</td>
<td>Optimization of NORSOF capability to conduct MA directed at the operational and strategic level of the respondents, requires a career new career-track within NORSOF where suitable personnel are educated as MA-officers in parallel to, or after the period as SR/DA “specialist” has come to an end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18b</td>
<td>MA is fundamentally different from SR/DA. Optimization of NORSOF capability to conduct MA at the operational and strategic level of the respondents requires a specialized unit within NORSOF, where personal traits/abilities and expertise to conduct MA operations is the main focus during selection and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18c</td>
<td>Like in the U.S., NORSOF should be divided in two where some specialize within indirect approach operations (including MA) while others specialize within direct approach operations (including DA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18d</td>
<td>NORSOF is dependent on external recruitment of personnel with specific expertise to enhance the MA-capacity directed towards the operational- and strategic level at the respondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18e</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments—personal opinions on the organization of MA in NORSOF:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>NORSOF’s MA operations have been an unconditional success. If the capacities we have contributed to establish are not functioning, it is because of shortcomings in overarching strategies/internal power struggles/other factors beyond our control, not because of the way we solved the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19b</td>
<td>I have contributed in MA operations where the training has been of such a character that other Norwegian professional military units, besides SOF, could have done it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19c</td>
<td>I have missed having NORSOF personnel at several/multiple levels within the respondent organization at the same time (also known as “vertical implementation”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19d</td>
<td>It is not possible to separate the importance of MA specific or SR/DA specific skills. Professional SR/DA skills has been a required, inseparable part of the MA operations I have participated in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19e</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Several actors below may have contributed to reduce MA-effect in operations. Pick three factors and rank them in importance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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344 Ibid.
Table 4. FFI Survey, Questions 21a–26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question/Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21a</td>
<td>The current selection, training and education of personnel makes NORSOF best suited to conduct SR/DA. Therefore, they can also carry out MA towards the tactical level. If NORSOF ambition is to perform MA aimed at the operational and strategic levels at the respondents, it requires some new thinking regarding selection, training and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21b</td>
<td>To be a competent Military Advisor, one must master SR and DA, because MA is primarily to train local security forces in the basic techniques we already master because of the SR and DA skillsets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21c</td>
<td>MA specific training and education is emphasized to the same extent as SR/DA training and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21d</td>
<td>One of the tactical units in NORSOF has “Thoroughness Breeds Confidence” as their motto. Regardless of your unit affiliation, to what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statement: “Our approach to MA is as thorough as it is for SR, DA and other national tasks”?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21e</td>
<td>Currently, NORSOF produces officers who specialize in MA aimed at operational and strategic levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21f</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments—your personal opinion regarding training/education within MA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Do you have training/education specifically related to Military Assistance? Explain briefly what this is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23a</td>
<td>Has your unit formally established a “Master Instructor (HI)” position within the various tasks/mission sets?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23b</td>
<td>Personal complementary comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24a</td>
<td>Selection and training in my unit is MOSTLY based on operational requirements related to SR and DA. MA specific traits are not part of the current selection criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24b</td>
<td>Perfection of NORSOF’s MA-capability requires other types of SOF personnel than we select and educate today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24c</td>
<td>In my unit, we have identified specific MA related traits and skills, and we evaluate these during selection, training and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24d</td>
<td>We are primarily a combat system. MA activity is something we do when we have to, not because we want to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24e</td>
<td>I have never experienced a lack of English proficiency in the unit as a problem during MA missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24f</td>
<td>Should there be a separate selection process for MA personnel?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>What personal traits and skills do you think are most important for Military Advisors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Are MA efforts valued/appreciated differently compared DA efforts internally in NORSOF?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

345 Ibid.
Table 5. FFI Survey, Questions 27a–27c\textsuperscript{346}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question/Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27a</td>
<td>In various literature and articles NORSOF personnel are described as a mix of “Warriors” and “Diplomats.” If you MUST choose one of these two identities, what do you choose?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27b</td>
<td>When you press “Forward” your answers will be final. You are no longer able to change your answers!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27c</td>
<td>Thank you very much for your time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid.
The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) invites you to participate in a survey regarding Military Assistance (MA). The survey is completely anonymous, which means that we cannot track your identity, either directly (IP or URL address) or indirectly (identified through a combination of answers in the survey).

The disadvantage of using a completely anonymous survey like this is that it is not possible to forward a reminder to those who have not responded. Therefore, all reminders are to be sent out to everyone we have invited to participate. If you have responded to this survey once, you do not have to answer it again! The (technical) advantage of using an anonymous survey is that you can forward the link and the survey to others in your community without breaking the link. In short; everyone who receives the link to the survey, regardless of the sender, can reply/answer anonymously to the survey.

An anonymous survey also means that you will not be recognized in publications or presentations of survey results.

It is voluntary to participate in this anonymous survey, and you may at any time withdraw your consent without any given reason. By consenting (check the box below) you certify that you participate voluntarily and acknowledge that the survey is completely anonymous.

If you have questions regarding the survey, please contact Frank Brundtland Steder at The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) on email address frank.steder@ffi.no.

☐ I consent to participate in this survey
☐ I do not wish to participate in this survey

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347 Ibid.

138
Figure 24. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1b\textsuperscript{348}

Figure 25. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1c\textsuperscript{349}

\textsuperscript{348} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.

139
This survey defines Military Assistance (MA) as in AJP 3.5:

MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. SOF conducts MA within their field of expertise. More specifically, MA activities may include:

Training; These are activities that train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills, provide assistance to designated leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures, thus enabling a nation to develop individual, leader, and organizational skills.

Advising; These are activities that improve the performance of designated actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

Mentoring/Partnering; These are activities conducted by small teams of subject matter experts who are tasked to work closely with designated personnel and provide direction and guidance, which may concern the conduct of military or security operations.

The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population.

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Figure 26. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1d

Figure 27. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 2

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350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
Figure 28. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 3 and 4

Figure 29. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 5 and 6

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352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
Figure 30. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 7a, 7b, and 8\textsuperscript{354}

Figure 31. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 9\textsuperscript{355}

\textsuperscript{354} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid.
Figure 32. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 10a, 10b, and 10c

Figure 33. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, and 11e

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356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
Figure 34. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 12a, 12b, 12c, and 12d\textsuperscript{358}

Figure 35. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 13a, 13b, 13c, and 13d\textsuperscript{359}

\textsuperscript{358} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid.
Figure 36. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 14a and 14b

Figure 37. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 15a, 15b, and 15c

360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
Figure 38. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 16a and 16b

Figure 39. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 17a and 17b

362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
Figure 40. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 18a, 18b, 18c, 18d, and 18e

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364 Ibid.
Figure 41. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 19a, 19b, 19c, 19d, and 19e

Figure 42. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 20

365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
Figure 43. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 21a, 21b, 21c, 21d, 21e, and 21f

\[367\] Ibid.
Figure 44. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 22\textsuperscript{368}

Figure 45. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 23a and 23b\textsuperscript{369}

\textsuperscript{368} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid.
Figure 46. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 24a, 24b, 24c, 24d, 24e, and 24f

Figure 47. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 25 and 26

370 Ibid.
371 Ibid.
Figure 48. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 27a\textsuperscript{372}

Figure 49. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 27b\textsuperscript{373}

Figure 50. FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 27c\textsuperscript{374}

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid.
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