DEFENSE ANALYSIS
CAPSTONE PROJECT REPORT

A REMEDY TO CRISES: DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT STABILIZATION ENGAGEMENTS

by

Birger E. Soerensen
Martin Madsen

June 2016

Project Advisors: Heather S. Gregg
Kalev I. Sepp

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
A REMEDY TO CRISIS: DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT STABILIZATION ENGAGEMENTS

Birger E. Soerensen and Martin Madsen

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number N/A.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

In 2013, the Danish government crafted a policy to guide its integrated stabilization efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states, emphasizing the prevention of violent conflict. This capstone project provides recommendations and guidelines for Danish politicians and the Danish defense command to operationalize this policy and define the supportive role that Danish special operations forces (DANSOF) can play. The capstone draws from a rich body of stabilization literature to provide working definitions for a whole-of-government approach; goals, measures of success, and risk assessment; capacity- and state-building strategies; and the incorporation of intelligence and information operations. This research also considers DANSOF capabilities and recent involvement in Afghanistan to identify the various roles DANSOF can play in stabilization operations. To increase the chances of successful stabilization efforts, it is essential that international efforts be well coordinated, including goals, ways, and means. This capstone recommends that DANSOF can support these efforts in roles such as prevention, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and assessment, security, capacity building, support to national and international agencies, and liaison with international agencies and local authorities.

fragile states, conflict-affected states, whole-of-government, stabilization, prevention, special operations forces, capacity building, state building

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

UU
A REMEDY TO CRISSES: DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT STABILIZATION ENGAGEMENTS

MAJ Birger E. Soerensen, Danish SOF    LCDR Martin Madsen, Danish SOF

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2016

Reviewed by:
Heather S. Gregg    Kalev I. Sepp
Project Advisor    Project Advisor

Accepted by:
John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis
ABSTRACT

In 2013, the Danish government crafted a policy to guide its integrated stabilization efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states, emphasizing the prevention of violent conflict. This capstone project provides recommendations and guidelines for Danish politicians and the Danish defense command to operationalize this policy and define the supportive role that Danish special operations forces (DANSOF) can play. The capstone draws from a rich body of stabilization literature to provide working definitions for a whole-of-government approach: goals, measures of success, and risk assessment; capacity- and state-building strategies; and the incorporation of intelligence and information operations. This research also considers DANSOF capabilities and recent involvement in Afghanistan to identify the various roles DANSOF can play in stabilization operations. To increase the chances of successful stabilization efforts, it is essential that international efforts be well coordinated, including goals, ways, and means. This capstone recommends that DANSOF can support these efforts in roles such as prevention, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and assessment, security, capacity building, support to national and international agencies, and liaison with international agencies and local authorities.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................1

B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................2

C. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................3

D. HYPOTHESIS ............................................................................................3

E. OUTLINE ...................................................................................................4

## II. DISE POLICY AND ITS APPLICATION

A. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................5

B. SUMMARY OF DISE CONTENT................................................................5

1. Approaches .....................................................................................6

2. Key Tools ........................................................................................7

3. Whole-of-Government Integration...............................................8

4. Goals and Ambitions.......................................................................9

C. MAKING KEY TERMS OPERATIONAL ..........................................11

1. Stabilization Engagements ..........................................................11

2. The Whole-of-Government Approach .......................................14

3. Goals and Measurements of Success..........................................21

4. Capacity- and State-Building ......................................................22

D. FACTORS UNDERREPRESENTED IN DISE ....................................27

1. Intelligence ....................................................................................27

2. Information Operations...............................................................29

E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................31

## III. DANISH SOF

A. SOF DOCTRINE AND CHARACTERISTICS........................................33

1. SOF in NATO Doctrine ...............................................................33

2. Additional U.S. Core Tasks..........................................................34

3. DANSOF Core Tasks .................................................................37

4. SOF Distinctive Characteristics..................................................38

B. ORGANIZATION OF DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCES ...................................................................................................41

1. Danish Special Operations Command .......................................41

2. Danish SOF Units .........................................................................42

3. DANSOF Limitations ..................................................................43

C. SOF BEST PRACTICES IN STABILIZATION

ENGAGEMENTS ....................................................................................44
1. Lessons from Task Force 7..........................................................44
2. Key Principles Derived..............................................................48
3. Lessons from RAND....................................................................50

D. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................53

IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS..............................................55
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO OPERATIONALIZE DISE..................55
1. Prevention.....................................................................................55
2. Information Activities.................................................................56
3. Intelligence....................................................................................57
4. Risk Management ..........................................................................58

B. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE USE OF DANSOF IN A
   DISE FRAMEWORK .............................................................................58
1. Rapid Reaction...............................................................................58
2. Whole-of-Government Functions...............................................59
3. Capacity Building..........................................................................60
4. DANSOF Cross-Collaboration....................................................61

C. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................62

LIST OF REFERENCES..................................................................................65

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................71
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. NATO’s Spectrum of Conflict and Associated SOF Principal Tasks. ......12
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. DISE: Five Principal Approaches and Six Tools...........................................6
Table 2. Stabilization Engagements Across Different Kinds of Conflict.................13
Table 3. Comparison of NATO and U.S. SOF Doctrine Applicable to Stabilization Engagements.................................................................37
Table 4. Summary of Recommendations for DANSOF Support to DISE.............62
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSOS</td>
<td>building-stability-overseas strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>civil-affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISE</td>
<td>Danish Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information-support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDEFCO</td>
<td>Nordic Defense and Security Policy Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security-force assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned, aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to express our sincere gratitude to our advisors, Heather S. Gregg and Kalev I. Sepp, for their useful and extensive remarks, engagement, comments, and discussions throughout this capstone project. Their attention to detail and critical review kept us on our toes.

We also extend our gratitude to the Naval Postgraduate School and, in particular, the professors and staff of the Department of Defense Analysis for challenging us and providing a framework, not just for our academic performance and research, but for our future military paths.

We thank Kristian Fischer of the Danish Ministry of Defense and Major Lars Henrik Ehrensvärd Jensen of the Royal Danish Defense College for their valuable comments, suggestions, and insight.

Finally, we thank our fellow students at the Naval Postgraduate School, American as well as international, for the many discussions we enjoyed and for sharing their personal experiences and views.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have erupted in fragile states around the world, posing frequent challenges to regional and global security. This proliferation of conflicts and the various interventions attempted have exposed a need for more holistic approaches that better integrate the tools of intervention. For this reason, a whole-of-government approach, as opposed to strictly military action, is now a crucial part of international stabilization efforts.

Several countries have developed strategies and doctrines for preventing or addressing conflicts in fragile states. In the United Kingdom, for example, stability strategies focus primarily on preemption through early warning, rapid crisis prevention and response, and “upstream” prevention—that is, defusing conflicts before they become violent.1 Collectively, these activities help predict emerging conflicts, ensure fast and effective responses, and assist fragile countries in building strong and legitimate institutions.

The U.S. security strategy of 2015 also emphasizes a need for bolstering fragile states and preventing violence from erupting: “we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict”2 and “[we] have a strong interest in leading an international response to genocide and mass atrocities when they arise, recognizing options are more extensive and less costly when we act preventively before situations reach crisis proportions.”3

Denmark has developed policies for assisting fragile states as well, emphasizing violence prevention in its 2013 adopted policy on stabilization efforts in conflict-affected

---


and fragile states. Drawing on lessons from Danish engagements in Somalia, Mali, Syria, and Afghanistan, the policy, known as “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilization Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World” (DISE), prescribes a whole-of-government approach to stabilization and seeks to integrate political, developmental, and security-related activities in a comprehensive program, whether before, during, or after a conflict. The policy emphasizes that integrated stabilization efforts may include military elements and asserts that Denmark must continue supporting the joint stabilization efforts of its international partners, which include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN).

Denmark’s responsibilities as an ally and its commitment to international peace and stability present Danish policymakers with important considerations in the use of the armed forces. As a small nation with limited military capacity, declining military budgets, and a general dissociation from too many casualties, Denmark must ask why it should deploy a large military force and commit extensive resources to the peace and stability of a fragile state if a smaller contingent and lesser efforts can perform the mission. The role of Danish special operations forces (DANSOF) in enacting DISE policy is a critical question.

This capstone identifies Danish governmental, military, and particularly DANSOF capabilities and actions that may prevent conflicts from emerging or mitigate crises once they occur.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

This research asks, how may DANSOF best be used to support a policy of integrated stabilization engagement in fragile and conflict-ridden areas of the world?

---

C. METHODOLOGY

This capstone employs two broad methods to examine the potential of DANSOF in DISE operations. First, it surveys the rich body of theoretical literature on such topics as the stabilization of fragile states; whole-of-government intervention; goals, measures of success, and risk assessment in fragile states; capacity and state-building strategies; and the importance of intelligence and information operations. The capstone then provides a summary of considerations and best practices for violence prevention and countermeasures.

Second, this research considers DANSOF capabilities and recent DANSOF involvement in Afghanistan to identify the Danish approach to security-force development and stabilization. The capstone further analyzes experiences of other nations with SOF units in Afghanistan and Iraq to support or qualify DANSOF lessons learned.

D. HYPOTHESIS

This capstone proposes that a number of DANSOF’s core capabilities are ideal for use in stabilization engagements, most notably the following:

- Early reconnaissance and intelligence gathering in the operational environment
- Assistance in planning, deployment, and execution of other agencies’ tasks
- Training and advising indigenous-partner security forces and developing their intelligence capacity
- Collaborating with international agencies and local authorities

These DANSOF capabilities support DISE in the key areas of rapid reaction, whole-of-government operations, and capacity building guided by cross-collaborative purposes.
E. OUTLINE

Chapter II of this capstone presents a summary of DISE policy, principal efforts, and stabilization tools. Literature, doctrines, and policy are investigated to define and explain

- Stabilization engagements
- The whole-of-government approach
- Goals, measurements of success, and risk acceptance
- Capacity- and state-building.

The chapter discusses two vital tools that should be included in Danish efforts overall—namely, intelligence and information activities.

Chapter III describes SOF doctrine and characteristics, the Danish special operations command and DANSOF. A narrative of DANSOF stabilization engagements in the province of Helmand in 2012 is provided, in which DANSOF trained an Afghan police provincial response company as part of a NATO-led international security-assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. An analysis of the Danish deployment and gleanings from allied experiences conclude the chapter.

Chapter IV makes recommendations concerning Danish integrated-stabilization efforts and proposes effective ways in which DANSOF can support DISE.
II. DISE POLICY AND ITS APPLICATION

A. INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the Danish ministries of foreign affairs, defense, development cooperation, and justice drafted a document titled, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World” (DISE), enunciating a policy to “establish a common framework and concept clarification for the various partners involved in stabilisation efforts.” This policy, adopted in September 2013, focuses on fragile states incapable of providing basic governmental functions such as security, development, and human rights. These deficiencies may lead to crises such as genocide, massive refugee flight, humanitarian disasters, piracy, and terrorist safe havens. The overall goal of Danish stabilization efforts is to strengthen government capacity and institutions and improve accountability so as to prevent potential crises from ever unfolding.

B. SUMMARY OF DISE CONTENT

DISE policy identifies resources for preventing state failure, ranging from humanitarian relief to military intervention, and outlines five principal approaches and six tools toward this end, as summarized in Table 1.

---

1. **Approaches**

The approaches of DISE policy are summarized as follows:

- **Develop Social Institutions, Economic Capacity, and Democracy**

  The main focus of DISE is to help countries build vital social institutions and create economic growth, employment, democratic inclusion, and democratic control.

- **Promote Justice and Security-Sector Reform**

  DISE encourages justice and security-sector reform and recognizes the need to assist judicial institutions, the police, the prison system, border control, etc. The creation of durable local entities through advisement, education, and mentoring is emphasized.

---

6 Adapted from “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ.
c. **Use Diplomacy**

DISE stresses the importance of diplomacy in creating a unified international direction, responsibility, and consensus. Local trust and understanding of stabilization efforts must also be built.

d. **Support Civil and Non-Governmental Efforts**

DISE encourages improvements in civil society by supporting collective capacity-building efforts that foster durable governmental institutions. DISE recognizes that a decisive effort to provide interim basic services through civilian or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) means may be needed until a weak state is strong enough to take over. International civil-society organizations, partner nations, and NGOs are invaluable as partners.

e. **Emphasize Human Rights**

DISE emphasizes human rights as a pillar of sustainable capacity building. Denmark acknowledges that persistent human-rights education, especially as part of justice- and security-sector reform, is necessary for long-term success.

2. **Key Tools**

To enable these approaches, DISE names six keys tools to be used in stabilization engagements:

a. **Negotiation**

The use of diplomacy, in support of negotiations and political settlements to potential or unfolding conflicts, is invaluable. The Danish diplomatic corps is involved with international and local networks that may identify the root causes of crises and promote dialogue “based on trust and understanding developed during a long-term presence.”

---

7 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 16.
b. Development

Denmark has a long tradition as a strong, credible development partner. These capabilities are given direction by the Danish development strategy, “The Right to a Better Life,” which centers on a “poverty-oriented development policy with a focus on human rights, democracy, green growth, employment and sustainable development.”


c. Military and Police

The third and fourth tools, military and policy capabilities, support the development of self-sustaining justice and security sectors, which may be nonexistent or weak in a fragile state. Military capabilities may be used to provide security so that the work of other stabilization capabilities can proceed. In extreme situations, the military may participate in peacemaking—for example, directly combating insurgent forces on behalf of the state.

d. Civilian Experts

Civilians may supplement other capabilities by bringing special expertise. For example, Denmark has posted civilian experts to the Afghan ministry of education to guide its design. The Danish Peace and Stabilization Response, an organization controlled by the ministry of foreign affairs, coordinates these civilian capabilities.

e. The Danish Emergency Management Agency

Finally, use of the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), a civilian agency under the ministry of defense, may aid natural- and humanitarian disaster relief, both in the short term and in the long-term development of local emergency-management capabilities.

3. Whole-of-Government Integration

DISE stresses that these tools and capabilities must be integrated in a whole-of-government approach as a priority. To this end, the government has established a
committee to examine whole-of-government stabilization activities, comprising representatives from relevant ministries, to coordinate which capabilities to use where. The committee also determines the goals and strategies of a mission to ensure a unified effort. Likewise, at the tactical level, agencies must coordinate their efforts. For example, DISE calls for joint pre-mission training as well as coordination during mission execution. Because Denmark will rarely work alone in stabilization engagements, DISE emphasizes cooperation with international partners and organizations to achieve unity of effort. DISE specifically names the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), NATO, and Nordic Defense and Security Policy Cooperation (NORDEFCO) as important partners in stabilization. DISE draws on a global agreement among fragile and conflict-affected states, international development partners, and civil society, published as “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” to create a common vision. In addition, DISE emphasizes collaboration with regional organizations such as the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), created by the African Union in July 2004.

4. Goals and Ambitions

The DISE document outlines the goals and ambitions that should frame Danish intervention in fragile countries.

a. Prevention

The foremost ambition is to prevent conflicts before they begin, with the goal of saving resources and obviating suffering; thus the root causes of a conflict must be identified before they erupt into open strife. Denmark divides its approach into two categories: regional, cross-borders efforts with long-term capability and capacity-building components that address the drivers of the conflict; and quick responses deployed when a conflict escalates unexpectedly. These efforts are reinforced by a fund of DDK 930 million that the stabilization committee may use in support of either category. DISE

---

9 “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was crafted by the International Dialogue and signed by more than 40 countries and organizations at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness on 30 November 2011 in Busan, Korea.
stresses the need for pre-planning and cooperation between all relevant Danish departments, ministries, and capabilities to ensure quick responses.

b. **Sustainability**

Second, Denmark places great emphasis on efforts that lead to long-term sustainability for a local government. DISE stresses early dialogue and mutual understanding with local authorities to build sustainable capacities and institutions and create common, realistic goals. This process tends to generate local ownership of the stabilization process and create enduring results.

c. **Realistic Risk Assessment**

Third, DISE underlines the need for realistic, up-front risk assessment of stabilization initiatives. Stabilization is a complex endeavor, with no guarantee of success. Political leaders and stakeholders must acknowledge that political goals may be unattainable and investments may be lost. DISE discusses this uncertainty and the need for high flexibility and a willingness to allow actors on the ground to improvise. The fragile nature of the setting tends to increase security threats and physical risk to personnel—these risks must be weighed against the benefits of intervention. A shared understanding of risk is especially necessary among decision-makers, the public, and participants in the missions.10

d. **Analysis**

To ensure that proficiency in stabilization operations is rigorously developed, DISE calls for systematic evaluation and documentation of stabilization efforts. Initiatives to identify best practices and lessons are currently ongoing in the Stabilization Leader’s Discussion Forum, an assembly that analyzes recent engagements. The forum includes foreign stabilization leaders—for example, foreign affairs and defense ministers from Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and other Western countries.

---

C. MAKING KEY TERMS OPERATIONAL

For the analysis in this research, defining several key terms is needed. This section offers in-depth discussions and working definitions for stabilization engagements, the whole-of-government approach, goals and measures of effectiveness, and capacity- and state-building.

1. Stabilization Engagements

In defining stability engagements, it is important to distinguish between military definitions of stabilization operations and an integrated, whole-of-government concept. U.S. doctrine defines the military contribution to stabilization as activities to “protect and defend the population” and places stability operations as a subset of, for example, a larger counterinsurgency campaign.\(^\text{11}\) NATO doctrine considers military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction a subset of crisis-response operations, distinguishing it from other crisis responses such as counterinsurgency, peace support, and humanitarian assistance.\(^\text{12}\) The whole-of-government approach as described in DISE calls for whatever military means and methods are necessary to make a safe and secure environment, including non-military assets such as, for example, diplomats and experts in agricultural development.

To refine the definition of stabilization engagements, it is necessary to look at those conflicts that require stabilization as a response. NATO defines a spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1), in which stabilization operations begin after major combat has ended and preventive stabilization efforts are linked to peace support.\(^\text{13}\)


Figure 1. NATO’s Spectrum of Conflict and Associated SOF Principal Tasks.14

By contrast, DISE, like the British “building stability overseas strategy” (BSOS), defines integrated, whole-of-government engagement that uses diplomatic, development, and security efforts to bolster fragile states before, during, and after crises occur.15 Thus, in the context of a whole-of-government stabilization engagement, it is useful to expand the discussion of how stabilization proceeds across different kinds of conflicts, ranging from pre-conflict conditions, to intrastate conflict, to major state-on-state war, as shown in Table 2.

---


Table 2. Stabilization Engagements Across Different Kinds of Conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of conflict</th>
<th>Pre-conflict</th>
<th>Intrastate</th>
<th>State-on-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>No warfare</td>
<td>Irregular warfare</td>
<td>Conventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya, present</td>
<td>Afghanistan 2002–present</td>
<td>1984, UK–Argentine, Falklands war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different kinds of conflicts are shaded blue and the DISE focus is in red.

In pre-conflict environments, a fragile government unable to provide services may lead to instability. A natural disaster may further aggravate this condition. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for example, transformed a fragile state with weak governance into a massive humanitarian crisis.

Internal, or intrastate, conflicts are another source of instability. The Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan that began in 1994 is an example of an irregular intrastate conflict that further destabilized a government. Whereas the intervention in Haiti focused on providing the government with services in the aftermath of an earthquake, the intervention in Afghanistan required the military to counter an insurgency and provide a safe and secure environment for building government services.

State-on-state wars require a different approach. For example, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq began as a conventional state-on-state war that destabilized a government and employed a primarily military solution, at least initially. The intrastate conflict that emerged after the war required an international stabilization engagement with a strong and prolonged military presence. Thus, in state-on-state-conflict, a stabilization engagement becomes the means to ensure peace or solve an ensuing intrastate conflict. However, the stabilization effort may be initiated before the end of the state-on-state war.
In sum, stabilization engagements are not restricted to a certain type or duration of conflict. Military power may be necessary, but should be part of a whole-of-government approach that allows flexible strategies for countering instability.

Based on the DISE, the following working definition is employed in this research: stabilization engagements are those that counter instability in fragile and conflict-affected countries, tailored to the situation using the necessary tools of government and focusing on durable, long-term efforts in pre-conflict and intrastate conflicts.

2. The Whole-of-Government Approach

The multifaceted problems of stabilization engagements exceed the capabilities of military forces working alone. The whole-of-government approach builds on stabilization operations in a more integrated, holistic way by involving multiple governmental departments and agencies. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, defines a whole-of-government approach as one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the agencies within that government to co-ordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.

Similarly, U.S. Joint Publication 3–07, Stability Operations, defines the whole-of-government approach as one that “integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG (U.S. government) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” The diverse goals, incentives, capabilities, and interests of departments and agencies involved in stabilization efforts may hamper effective stabilization, particularly because of conflicting goals, poor communication, and weak coordination. Thus, it is important to establish a common framework for objectives in stabilization engagements.

---


18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (JP 3–07), B-1.

a. **Primary Objectives**

The OECD stresses that the primary objectives should concern political, security, economic, and developmental issues, and describes a set of principles distilled from the experience of seven countries,\(^{20}\) including the following desiderata:

- Efforts must be based on a common understanding of what a fragile state is.
- Relevant government actors and agencies must be engaged as appropriate to the circumstances.
- Joint analysis must be made to define overall objectives and assess, prioritize, and improve joint activities.
- Joint strategies, planning, monitoring, and evaluation for engagements must be practical and country specific.
- Effective coordination between departments and ministries must be established, with a capable lead coordinator.
- Resources can be aligned by creating the right incentive structures through a joint policy statement.
- The creative use of methods and tools promotes joint efforts toward a common goal.
- Partners must develop a shared information-management system.\(^{21}\)

b. **International Peace Academy Recommended Actions**

A study by the International Peace Academy confirms OECD recommendations.\(^{22}\) Based on comparative assessments of seven leading donor governments engaged in fragile states, the publication examines government efforts to promote coherent policies in order to integrate their resources and political instruments.

---

\(^{20}\) OECD, “Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 181. Countries include: Australia, France, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.


The report recommends a number of actions to donor governments, and include the following:

- Committing to “honest national dialogue about how to balance and prioritize the multiple goals and objectives”
- Encouraging the development of “a unified and country strategy for each fragile state”
- Developing “an institutionalized, integrated system for early warning and assessment”
- Making “pooled funding…contingent upon genuine agreement on strategic priorities set strategic priorities and joint oversight of implementation”
- Not letting national “policies within donor governments preclude the harmonization of international efforts”
- Aligning “whole of government approaches…with the priorities of local actors”

**c. The German Approach**

Germany is also interested in learning how to intervene successfully in fragile states. A 2013 policy paper published by the Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security analyzes the engagements of four governments—the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada, and Australia—in fragile and conflict-affected states to provide recommendations for improving the German approach. It is suggested that the German government should follow example nations in creating a high inter-ministerial board to oversee and coordinate engagements and an inter-ministerial unit to monitor, analyze, and provide crisis response to support the ministries. They recommend a jointly administered fund for conflict prevention, crisis response, and peace building. They also call for strategies to coordinate diplomatic, developmental, and security objectives by

---

23 Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?*, 139–144.
encouraging cooperation across the government and including outside experts in policymaking.  

All these reports recommend a joint and integrated approach, based on dialog, to promote cooperation among departments and ministries. This can be difficult. In a book on the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor detail the troubled cooperation and information sharing among the senior officials of the National Security Council (NSC). Former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld played a vital role in planning the invasion. According to Gordon and Trainor’s research, “Rumsfeld fully understood the weakness of the NSC system and took advantage of it,” because “[information] was power, and Rumsfeld did his best to control the flow.” The authors claim that this had a deleterious influence in the relationship between Rumsfeld and secretary of state Colin L. Powell and in their implementation of a post-invasion phase.

d. The British Example

A good example of a whole-of-government approach—perhaps the best example—comes from the United Kingdom. In 2007, the British created an integrated civil–military operational unit, or stabilization unit, “designed to be agile, responsive, and well-equipped to operate in high threat and high risk environments.” The unit, funded by conflict, stability, and security funding and reporting to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, and Department of International Development, integrates civilian expertise with police and military personnel, and “increasingly delivers UK support to multilateral efforts in conflict prevention,


stabilisation, statebuilding and peace building.”

In 2011, the unit was engaged in Libya, where it developed relationships with “people at all levels within the infrastructure and utilities sectors.” Their task was to “feed back information to the international bodies to help them understand the situation on the ground and understand what the Libyans really need to keep the water supply running.”

In Somalia in 2012, the unit facilitated a number of key engagements with leaders of militia groups, the Somali government, representatives of the AU [African Union] force, the regional body, IGAD [Intergovernmental Authority on Development], and the UN—to maintain momentum for the fragile agreement.

e. **Best Practices for Preventive Action**

In an attempt to respond proactively to violent conflicts early in the process, international actors have developed warning systems to prevent full-scale conflicts from erupting and reduce costs in lives and material support. Measures aimed at preventing full-scale conflicts include

- Understanding the problem
- Ensuring that responses are diverse, flexible, and sustainable
- Investing time in planning and strategy
- Being conflict-sensitive (i.e., an organization should understand the context of a conflict)
- Not pushing technical solutions onto political problems
- Balancing speed, ownership, and coordination

To support these best practices, several specific considerations are required.

---


(1) Eyewitness Intelligence

To take appropriate action, decision makers need accurate, timely information about the situation on the ground. Though modern technology can provide much information, it is crucial that eyewitnesses onsite confirm assessments, because decisions made on misinformation may be counterproductive, injurious, or fatal. It is furthermore important to respond to problems with a robust set of political tools, whether economic, development, diplomatic, or military, and to focus on long-term solutions, recognizing complexity and being willing to invest considerable time. Finally, it is important overall to create a comprehensive and coherent strategy.

(2) Alignment of Resources

DISE stresses the need for joint training among governmental organizations as a strategy to prepare for preventive engagements. A 2009 report by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) echoes this point and proposes improving Danish civil and military coordination by analyzing the approaches of the Netherlands and United Kingdom, which boast advanced interagency collaboration. The report stresses the importance of civil and military personnel participating in joint national and multinational exercises as a necessary means of improving interagency coordination and collaboration.32 The DIIS report notes that a stabilization unit like the UK’s could “facilitate more systematic cooperation at the operational level, filling an operational gap between development efforts, military campaigns and national-level political initiatives.”33

---


(3) Coordination Among Partners

Another issue concerns “close cooperation with our international partners,” which may be governmental or non-governmental organizations. A 2014 study from the Centre for Military Studies, which analyzes cooperation among international organizations during complex emergency actions in East Africa, provides an example of poor coordination. The sheer number of countries, agencies and actors, which differed in size, resources, motivation, and willingness to cooperate, was staggering, as were the divisions between government and non-governmental organizations and for-profit and non-profit organizations. The report suggests that Denmark should take a leading role in coordinating multinational operations to increase its influence for optimal use of foreign aid and use, for example, International Dialogue on Peace and Statebuilding (International Dialogue), a political forum that links fragile and conflict-affected countries with development partners and NGOs.

(4) Prevention as a Priority

DISE, the BSOS, and U.S. national-security strategy stress the importance of preventive actions, including diplomatic, development, and security measures as appropriate. A donor nation should develop an early warning system to detect developing conflicts in fragile states and prepare the instruments needed for a timely preventive response.

Findings and recommendations concerning the whole-of-government approach stress the need for joint and integrated policies that harness relevant governmental

34 Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 9.


agencies for each country-specific case. Common goals and objectives, alignment of resources, preventive measures, coordination between departments and ministries, and high political priority and focus are imperative.

3. Goals and Measurements of Success

DISE addresses a need to identify goals and measurements of success in stability operations; nevertheless, how to do this may be difficult to answer. Goals will vary depending on the problem and stakeholders involved—they must be identified on a case-by-case basis.

a. Benchmarks

A 2006 United States Institute of Peace study led by stabilization analyst Craig Cohen supports DISE in advocating goals based on analysis of those factors that are driving the conflict and instability in a given situation. Cohen proposes measurements of success that allow stakeholders to create benchmark goals and develop clear methods of evaluating progress. Clear-cut indicators must be provided that accurately gauge the “ability to reduce means and motivation for violent conflict in a society and to build local and state capacity to sustain peace.” These measurements should be adjustable to reflect developments on the grounds that challenge the original intentions of the intervention.

b. Social Criteria

Another approach to setting goals and measuring success comes from U.S. insurgency analyst Andrew Krepinevich, who emphasizes winning the population, as opposed to destroying the enemy. Krepinevich’s measures of success include criteria such as political participation and social reforms. By this reckoning, a kinetic focus of

---


neutralizing the opposition is less important than addressing the grievances of the people and winning them over to the government side.\textsuperscript{41}

c. Risk Assessment

In addition to identifying goals and devising ways of measuring effectiveness, DISE calls for pre-deployment assessment of risk, stressing cognizance of two factors: risk to outcomes and risk to the actors on the ground. These risks are defined both politically and operationally. Risk to outcome concerns the success of the mission. If success criteria are not met, decision makers face the political risk of flagging public support for the mission and their overall policy; in terms of the operation itself, failed policies may drive a contested population to support state adversaries. Risk to the actors on the ground include, most importantly, the wounding or killing of Danish soldiers and civilians, which may also deflate public support. Operationally, fatalities conduce to lower morale and a slower operational tempo for the actors on the ground.

4. Capacity- and State-Building

A government has core functions it must fulfill to maintain a safe and secure environment for the population. Failure to provide basic services may lead to intrastate conflict, terrorist safe havens, massive refugee flows, and regional instability. External actors may intervene to build the capacity of the government, strengthen civil society, and amend deficiencies in the state—this is capacity- and state-building, or “an endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations.”\textsuperscript{42}

a. The OECD Definition

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines capacity development as

\textsuperscript{41} Andrew Krepinevich, \textit{The Army and Vietnam} (Baltimore, ML: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 10–12.

the process by which individuals, groups, and organizations, institutions and countries develop, enhance and organize their systems, resources and knowledge: all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives.\(^{43}\)

Based on four decades of experience, evaluation, and analysis by bi- and multilateral donors, the OECD provides a framework for capacity development in a 2008 report affirming capacity building as critical in fragile states\(^{44}\) and recommending that efforts focus on core state functions to create a minimum level of effectiveness. Besides macroeconomic and public financial management, capacity building also includes restoring essential services and security.\(^{45}\) External supporters should respect the context of local institutions and social capital and the informal norms and rules that govern society and build trust. Focused on long-term gains, progress should be allowed to unfold gradually; external models for capacity building should not be forced upon existing structures.\(^{46}\)

**b. The Ghani and Lockhart Framework**

Some practitioners offer guidelines for effective state-building. For example, Ghani and Lockhart offer a framework of ten functions that a state must perform, as follows:

- Rule of law
- A monopoly on the legitimate means of violence
- Administrative control
- Sound management of public finances
- Investment in human capital
- Creation of citizenship rights through social policy
- Infrastructure services


• Commercial markets
• Proper management of public assets
• Effective public borrowing\textsuperscript{47}

The authors argue that these functions are necessary for a state to function in the international arena. While they constitute a general plan by which to initiate state-building,

Consensus on these functions would allow the delineation of each function through a capacity-building program with timelines, benchmarks and indicators that serve both as goals toward which the public can be mobilized, and also as a means of accounting by which the momentum and achievements of the program can be reported to the public.\textsuperscript{48}

In other words, for a framework to be an effective instrument in state-building, it must include goals with clearly defined objectives and a “step-by-step plan for operationalizing these goals.”\textsuperscript{49}

c. \textbf{The United States Institute for Peace Framework}

The United States Institute of Peace outlines another framework for successful state-building, developed to make the process simpler and more flexible. The institute names five desired outcomes for post-conflict countries, as follows:

• A safe and secure environment
• Rule of law
• Stable democracy
• A sustainable economy
• Social well-being\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, \textit{Fixing Failed States} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 125–160.


\textsuperscript{50}
These end-states are interconnected and mutually influential. Each end-state contains measurable and well-defined objectives to promote a structured process and enhance the chances for a successful intervention.51

The framework stresses leadership responsibilities across all end-states for the successful development of a state and the overseeing of the process. The point of strong leadership is to create unity of purpose among the organizations involved, including military officials, NGOs, international organizations, government authorities, and the private sector. Leaders should develop and integrate plans, ensure sufficient authority, “build and maintain legitimacy,” “engage the international community,” and “build constituencies for peace.”52 All organizations, public or private, need leadership to function well; history provides countless examples in which leadership was critical, and many efforts at state-building have failed due to its absence, with the former-Yugoslavia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia providing recent examples. If responsible leadership is lacking from state-building, success is impossible and the engagement may be protracted.

d. Balancing Dilemmas

One of the key challenges of state-building is balancing military involvement with other governmental efforts. Political scientist David Edelstein describes the dilemma of military intervention as a state-building tool, specifically the duration and footprint dilemmas.53 Edelstein argues that a large force might well accomplish security goals, but at the risk of alienating the people by appearing as intruders and by forcing military solutions on problems perceived as non-military. A smaller force might be more


successful, appearing less invasive and allowing elements of indigenous national power to have a voice. 54 The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, illustrate the dilemmas of employing a relatively light footprint (in Afghanistan) and a large footprint (in Iraq).

[Afghanistan has to] some extent avoided provoking nationalist resistance, but at the cost of limited control over Afghanistan’s more remote provinces. In Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition attempted to be more assertive in taking control of the country, but the visible and intrusive presence generated costly resistance that made the tasks of postwar state building more difficult. 55

The size of a given intervening force is a dilemma that must take a number of factors into consideration—among them, time available, financial and human costs, preexisting collaborations between government ministries and the military, the security situation on the ground, and the local perception of a foreign military’s presence. 56 Staying too long in a fragile state invites resistance from the host population. Thus, the dilemma is between staying long enough to build a sustainable state and leaving too soon and risking a resurgence of the conflict. 57

e. Cultural Awareness as a Factor

Cultural awareness of a host nation’s customs, values, religions, language, and rituals are important to success in fragile states that are significantly different from Western. Because the conflicts involved are population centered, gaining the people’s trust and respect is critical. The U.S. military’s joint publication Stability Operations argues that disregard for local customs and religion may increase tension and resistance toward allied forces and efforts.

Cultural awareness and sensitivity are necessary to dispel the natural tensions that arise when external authorities dictate the terms and conditions of SSR [security, stability, and reconstruction] for the HN [host

54 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” 90.
57 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” 84.
nation]. Responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to local culture help limit resentment and resistance to reform while generating local solutions to local problems.\textsuperscript{58}

Developing cultural understanding among those deployed not only helps the overall success of a mission, it may also defend the safety of those deployed. Cultural awareness is especially essential in a counterinsurgency, where information and support from the populace is vital.

Engaging in capacity- and state-building in a fragile state is complex and difficult. It involves focusing on the core functions of a state, such as security, a justice system, viable governmental institutions, and a liberal economy. However, success requires the joint engagement of donor countries—not just at the national, but the international level. It requires working with the host nation and developing the trust of the people.

D. FACTORS UNDERREPRESENTED IN DISE

1. Intelligence

A critical factor that receives little discussion in DISE is intelligence. Military intelligence, for example, uses a variety of intelligence tools. Some depend on technology, such as imagery intelligence (IMINT), which studies and interprets pictures, or signal intelligence (SIGINT), which monitors and exploits signal systems. Other tools may rely on human sensors, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), in which human operators gather intelligence themselves or through mediators.\textsuperscript{59}

a. Focus on the Population

In conventional combat operations, the intelligence focus is on revealing the enemy’s force structure and anticipating his intentions on the battlefield. To that end, the military-intelligence effort relies heavily on IMINT, including unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellites, and other platforms, or on SIGINT monitoring of the enemy’s communications. By contrast, in stabilization engagements, intelligence should focus on

\textsuperscript{58} Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Stability Operations (JP 3–07)}, C-18.

the population, whose support is the key to success. In a counterinsurgency stabilization engagement, insurgent infrastructure—meaning the ways the insurgents can gain financing, supplies, shelter, recruits, intelligence, and freedom of movement through the population—is of paramount interest. Intelligence should also focus on popular needs and vulnerabilities to allow government to meet these needs specifically and thus drive a wedge between the insurgents and the population.60

The same principle applies to engagements in fragile states where conflict has not erupted. To arrest further destabilization or conflict emergence, intelligence should focus on infrastructure, the population, and other vulnerabilities that criminals or potential insurgents may exploit. Lieutenant Colonel David Galula of the French army recommends a focus on the population in insurgencies, based on his experiences from WWII and irregular wars in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria.61 Galula provides laws and principles for fighting insurgency, emphasizing that the population is the objective in a counterinsurgency: “[the insurgents] will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”62 In defeating an insurgency, Galula observes that intelligence about the insurgency has to come from the locals, but if the people do not feel safe, they will not talk.63 Understanding the people and enemy is not easily achieved by technological tools alone; these should be used to supplement HUMINT, which remains the central effort.64

b. Use of Indigenous Police Forces

Military intelligence units and personnel are proficient in HUMINT, particularly those within special-operations forces, and have experience in low-intensity conflicts. For

63 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 50.
64 Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (FM 3–24), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 8.4–8.5.
this reason, the military is a valuable intelligence-gathering tool in stabilization engagements. However, as a RAND study on the Malayan insurgency argues, military intelligence generally fails to capture deep knowledge of the adversary’s infrastructure or the population; police forces are better trained for this, and police knowledge, experience, and daily interactions with the people make them the ideal HUMINT tool in stabilization engagements.65

c. Cultural Intelligence

Cultural intelligence adds needed depth in understanding a local environment. U.S. Navy intelligence analyst John Coles defines cultural intelligence as a holistic “analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors.”66 This knowledge is essential for decision makers who maneuver not only against adversaries, but also with “coalitions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), host nations, and other regional power brokers.”67

In sum, intelligence activities in stabilization engagements should focus on the population and insurgent infrastructure in an attempt to facilitate the alienation of the population from potential or actual anti-state forces. This focus should be reinforced by a strong emphasis on using the HUMINT skills of the local police.

2. Information Operations

Information operations is another topic on which DISE does not provide guidance. Nevertheless, historical stabilization efforts from Malaysia to Afghanistan suggest that information operations are key in alienating anti-state adversaries from the population and persuading international stakeholders. In the Malayan counterinsurgency

---

67 Coles, “Cultural Intelligence & Joint Intelligence Doctrine,” 1.
campaign of 1948–1960, for example, government information operations ranged from assuring insurgents that they could surrender without repercussions to disseminating information on current developments and the consequences of cooperating with the insurgency. 68

NATO defines information operations as the “coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC-approved parties 69 in support of alliance mission objectives.” 70 This focus on the adversary, however, is linked to conventional state-on-state conflict. In stabilization engagements, the adversary is unquestionably important, but a more holistic focus on all actors in the environment, with special attention to the population, is required.

Furthermore, in whole-of-government stabilization, military information operations should be subordinate to what this capstone refers to as “information activities,” which consist of whole-of-government efforts to inform and influence a target audience. The military framework uses public affairs (PA), an information-operations-related field, to educate a population factually about events with the goal of gaining public support. To further influence and inform target audiences, the military uses a variety of information-operation capabilities, including psychological operations (PSYOP), deception, key leadership engagements (KLE) and civil–military cooperation (CIMIC). PSYOP seeks to influence by encouraging behaviors favorable to force objectives, through a variety of media sources and face-to-face contact; deception misleads adversaries by feeding them false or manipulated information; KLE engages leading members of different entities to inform and influence them; CIMIC fosters relationships among the military, civilian agencies and the local population to catalyze

---


69 Adversaries, potential adversaries, decision makers, cultural groups, elements of the international community and others who may be informed by Alliance information activities.

military operations.\textsuperscript{71} The NATO doctrine is quick to point out that CIMIC must be used cautiously to avoid compromising military credibility in the relationship.\textsuperscript{72}

Within the overall discussion, it is important to note that counter-state adversaries have their own information activities. These adversaries may be physically weak but proficient at using information activities to gain popular support. Insurgents have the advantage of direct access to and a keen understanding of the population, and can exploit modern information channels. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, insurgents have used the Internet to show videos of their tactical success on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{73} The state’s information activities should counter adversarial messages and deliver content of its own as a non-kinetic means of eroding support for adversaries.\textsuperscript{74} To that end, the information activities should be closely linked to other stabilization efforts employed.\textsuperscript{75}

Militaries have logged much experience in information operations employed toward stabilization over the last decades. The military functions and capabilities of information activities may support other whole-of-government agencies and encourage an efficient, combined effort.

E. CONCLUSION

The principles and tools described in this chapter are culled from the findings, recommendations, and conclusions of diverse international reports, including the OECD and RAND. They identify the importance of a holistic, joint approach to stabilization for optimal success. This includes greater cooperation and coordination among civilian and military entities within the government. The focus of stabilization should be providing security to the population and empowering the host nation to develop a sustainable environment with effective institutions. Where possible, early intervention may forestall

\textsuperscript{71} NATO, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations}, (AJP-3.10), 1.8—1.13.

\textsuperscript{72} NATO, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations}, (AJP-3.10), 1.12.


\textsuperscript{75} Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 28.
the escalation of a conflict; however, when deploying military forces, it is essential to conduct thorough assessments of how the intervention may be perceived and the general security situation in the host country. This information is used to estimate the likely scope and duration of military intervention, bearing in mind that an overt military presence may have undesirable consequences in the security environment. A joint plan, including realistic goals and measurement of success, is essential in assessing whether the intentions and effort represented by an international intervention are justified. Finally, it is noted that DISE fails to emphasize intelligence capabilities and information operations, two important factors in the stabilization arena.
III. DANISH SOF

This chapter examines Danish special operations forces (DANSOF), comparing the demands of DISE with the capabilities DANSOF provides. An overview of international and DANSOF doctrines and a discussion of DANSOF capabilities and organization are presented, with a summary of DANSOF deployment in Afghanistan as a case study. The chapter also considers best SOF practices, based on DANSOF deployment and the partnership capacity of international SOF units.

Ultimately, this capstone proposes that SOF characteristics and capabilities make them suitable for whole-of-government stabilization engagements, especially given their ability to deploy rapidly and operate in small groups with minimal logistical support and their unique adaptability in new or insecure environments. These capabilities are key in both prevention and active conflicts.

A. SOF DOCTRINE AND CHARACTERISTICS

On the premise that the Danish armed forces work mostly in combination with allied countries, DANSOF uses NATO doctrine for its primary guidelines, supplemented by U.S. and UN doctrine as required. This section compares and analyses NATO and U.S. doctrines in order to suggest how this, being Denmark’s combined SOF doctrine, supports stabilization engagements.

1. SOF in NATO Doctrine

NATO doctrine describes the three main tasks of SOF as direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and military assistance (MA).

DA is precise, offensive operations against well-defined targets to destroy, capture, or recover an objective.

SR is operations to gather intelligence in support of subsequent actions.

MA activities support friendly assets and include capacity-building assistance for indigenous security forces, engagement with leadership, and civic actions to
influence the population. An important element in MA is contact with useful factions—that is, liaison efforts with various local factions to gather intelligence and understand the local situation.

In the Danish context, other SOF tasks include protection of important personnel such as ambassadors or ministerial staff and special assistance to the Danish police.

DA, SR, and MA support various NATO activities related to stabilization engagements:

Counterinsurgency (COIN), which is “the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances”.

Counterterrorism (CT), or offensive measures to counter the vulnerability of allied interests, individuals, and forces to terrorism

Countering weapons of mass destruction, which is to disable and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [check]

Hostage-release operations (HRO), that is, operations to recapture personnel, facilities or sensitive materiel

2. Additional U.S. Core Tasks

In U.S. doctrine, internal defense and development (IDAD) is a full measure of the steps taken by host nation, “focus[ing] on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions” to “prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion.” As such, IDAD reflects the intention of stabilization engagements as laid out in DISE.

U.S. doctrine defines additional SOF core tasks that may be used in stabilization engagements, whether led by SOF or supported:

---


a. **Foreign Internal Defense**

Foreign internal defense (FID) supports a host nation’s IDAD to counter internal threats to security and stability, training and developing host capabilities involving “integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power,” and addressing the root causes of instability.  

FID, when described from a U.S. military perspective, most closely approximates a combination of NATO’s doctrine on military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction (MCSR) and the intrastate content of military contribution to peace support (MCPS). MCSR varies from providing security to fostering justice to facilitating livelihoods in unstable states during and after a crisis, using a comprehensive and integrated international response. MCPS includes “efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace. Peace support efforts may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building.”

U.S. SOF doctrine provides more detail than its NATO counterpart in describing how SOF core tasks may supplement or support a host nation’s IDAD and FID efforts. Direct action, special reconnaissance, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, hostage rescue and recovery (HRR) and countering weapons of mass destruction for all practical purposes replicates their NATO doctrinal equivalent, as described earlier. However, the designations of security-force assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information-support operations, and civil-affairs operations are of note.

b. **Security-Force Assistance**

Security-force assistance (SFA), when used to support FID, focuses on developing a host nation’s security sector in order to counter internal and transnational security threats. As such, it is closely related to NATO military assistance.

---


c. **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) aims to reduce human suffering, disease, and hunger in disaster areas. It is usually carried out by a government agency in the framework of an international organization such as the United Nations. This is similar to NATO humanitarian assistance, which is defined as “aid provided to a crisis-affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population.”  

---


---

d. **Military Information-Support Operations**

Military information-support operations (MISO) seek to influence a specific target audience, primarily through messaging, and are coordinated with other security-related activities. This function is reflected in NATO’s definition of information operations, which is the “coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC-approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.”

---

e. **Civil-Affairs Operations**

Civil-affairs operations (CAO), when used in FID, “facilitate the integration of U.S. military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation” and address underlying causes of instability, particularly in civil society. NATO doctrine lacks a direct equivalent, because this crucial integration is expected to take place at all levels among military and civilian agencies.
3. **DANSOF Core Tasks**

While countering weapons of mass destruction, CT, and HRO may all be a part of stabilization engagements, they are not the focus of the DISE policy. Therefore, this study concentrates on DANSOF’s contribution to the NATO tasks identified, namely, DA, SR, MA, MCPS, MCSR, HA, COIN, IO and their U.S. equivalents. Table 3 provides a comparison of NATO and U.S. SOF doctrines. The focus of DISE policy is shaded gray.

Table 3. Comparison of NATO and U.S. SOF Doctrine Applicable to Stabilization Engagements.88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO SOF Doctrine</th>
<th>U.S. SOF Doctrine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Action (DA)</td>
<td>Direct Action (DA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Reconnaissance (SR)</td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance (SR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Contribution to Peace Support (MCPS)</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense (FID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction (MCSR)</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance (SFIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance (MA)</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance (HA)</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency (COIN)</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (COIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations (Info Ops)</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations (MISSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (CT)</td>
<td>Counterterrorism (CT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Release Operations (HRO)</td>
<td>Hostage Rescue and Recovery (HRR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

SOF tasks may be conducted through joint-military service efforts; DANSOF may be deployed from the sea, air, and land, using parachutes, helicopters, fixed-winged aircraft, ships, boats, a variety of motor vehicles, and animal transport. Thus, DANSOF is ideal for reaching remote places quickly and, if need be, with a small footprint. DANSOF training equips the force to work in all environments, from deserts to tropical rain forests or the arctic.

Because SOF is a limited resource, it is important to use this tool where it has the potential for greatest impact. This may be at the strategic or operational levels, where SOF can support, facilitate, or duplicate other whole-of-government tools, or in tactical missions where the completion or sensitivity of a task has significant political implications.89

4. SOF Distinctive Characteristics

In an environment where the wrong focus can derail an entire engagement, how tasks are performed, and how efficiently, is at least as important as what a force can do. Danish special-operations researchers Anton Johnson and Gitte Christensen distinguish two key characteristics of SOF to emphasize what sets SOF apart from other military units: tactical superiority, a military characteristic in which SOF excels, as compared with conventional forces; and innovative90 mindset, which sets SOF apart from a conventional military context and allows creative, unexpected and cross-institutional solutions.91 These categories are further elaborated in combination with the SOF doctrine:

a. Tactical Superiority

(1) Quickly Deployable

SOF units are quickly deployable because they are relatively few in number and require less logistics than conventional forces. As described earlier, SOF forces are also


90 Anton Asklund Johnson and Gitte Høstrup Christensen use the word “anti-systemic” throughout their article.

able to deploy faster and through a variety of means, making them a quick-reaction force.92

(2) Indirect and Balanced Approach

Extensive weapons and tactic training, combined with sophisticated technology, allows SOF to work in uncertain or hostile areas more effectively than other forces, providing better security for service members and agencies. SOF training in cultural awareness, combined with the mature, reflective nature characteristic of SOF operators, may often yield an indirect, non-confrontational solution to an insecure or sensitive situation. These two aspects of SOF are important tools in decreasing personnel and political risk.

(3) Precise and Discreet

SOF methods and weapons allow very precise solutions that may minimize collateral damage. In addition, the small size and advanced skills of SOF allow them to work under the radar and perform discreetly, minimizing political risk.

b. Innovative Mindset

(1) Adaptable

Contrary to their popular image, SOF operators are not primarily aggressive, assault-oriented personnel, but older, mature, experienced personnel, often with families. Danish SOF operators are selected with a strong emphasis on a balanced and empathetic mindset. This mentality makes SOF members reflective by nature and sensitive to the politics and cultural challenges of uncertain environments. Combined with an ad-hoc organization that promotes adaptability and creativity, SOF forces are an ideal tool for complex, uncertain, or fast-changing environments. Adaptability is a significant asset in

pre-mission planning, where SOF tailors itself to the task at hand, and also in response to swiftly evolving situations in the mission area.93

(2) Cross-Institutional

Cross-institutional functionality is an important SOF benefit.94 As part of both doctrine and training, SOF integrates army, navy, air force, interagency, and indigenous forces.95 Supplementing this integration, SOF may also perform tasks on a limited basis for other agencies. For example, SOF is trained in specialized intelligence collection, diplomatic engagements, and other forms of key leadership engagement. This makes SOF ideal for first-in deployment, because it can step in for other agencies (to some degree) until the security environment allows agency personnel to take over. In cases where capabilities and tasks are too sensitive or complex to hand over to special forces, SOF’s interagency training allows it to support the agency’s deployment, security, and mission execution.

(3) Exploring the Unthinkable

An ability to be creative and exploit the unexpected96 is key to SOF effectiveness. SOF encourages innovative thinking unrestricted by perceived limitations, creating solutions outside the conventional military context and challenging routine military procedures. SOF is capable of planning and executing missions and using technology in novel ways, creating solutions that may be “unthinkable” to the adversary.97 Thus, SOF may fulfill difficult tasks and devise critical tactical surprises that increase success and mitigate personnel and political risks.

96 Anton Asklund Johnson and Gitte Højstrup Christensen use the word “unexpectancy,” throughout their article.
B. ORGANIZATION OF DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

In 2012, a government coalition signed the Danish Defense Agreement 2013–2017, directing how the ministry of defense “will continue to contribute to safeguarding Danish foreign and security policy interests, while also our national security is safeguarded by international deployment of military capabilities.” The document sets the overall framework for the purpose, organization, role, goals, priorities, and budgets of the armed forces. The agreement recognizes NATO and the UN as the cornerstones of Danish security and defense policy.

1. Danish Special Operations Command

A new development in the defense agreement was the recognition of a need to strengthen and increase DANSOF capabilities and capacities by placing the two DANSOF units, the army Jægerkorpsset (JGK) and naval Frømandskorpsset (FKP), under a new and permanent special operations command (SOKOM), which became part of the Danish joint command. The overall political purpose of this command is to enable DANSOF to engage in strategic challenges rather than serve in a solely tactical capacity. SOKOM was established in 2014, and in June 2015, DANSOF units were placed beneath it, with a two-star general or admiral commanding under the chief of defense. The organization is staffed by 65 employees and divided into development and production divisions, which are further divided into sections. SOKOM is responsible for force development, force-production polices, doctrine, training requirements, resource management, administration, procurement, personnel administration, and logistics. The command intends to reach an initial operational capacity for a Danish contribution to a strategic SOF-led mission by 2020.

---


100 As of 19 January 2016, the number of employees is 43; (internal Danish organizational chart).

Regarding military operations and political interests, SOKOM will contribute with “small, operational, and rapid deployable capabilities.” SOKOM intends to develop a capability that can be deployed to “minimize the risk that military forces are engaged in protracted conflicts or that unwanted escalation is created” and develop a staff capacity that can contribute to a special-operations component command such as NATO’s. Unlike other branch commands, SOKOM may take operational control of a mission. SOKOM plans to develop SOF units that can deploy both a maritime and land-task group, and, in the future, an air group. Overall, SOKOM’s objective is to deliver strategic effects that support Danish political and security interests.

2. Danish SOF Units

Denmark currently fields the FKP and JGK. The FKP maritime SOF unit was created in 1957 to perform DA, SR, and MA missions. The unit can conduct insertion and infiltration by sea, air, and land, with its primary expertise in maritime operations. FKP has participated in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia (Operation Ocean Shield).

The JGK was created in 1961; like the FKP, its primary tasks are DA, SR, and MA, and it is capable of insertion and infiltration by land, air, and sea, with a primary expertise in land operations. The JGK has participated in international operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including the U.S.-led Task Force K-Bar in Afghanistan in 2002, as part of an international SOF coalition and in conjunction with the FKP.

102 Specialoperationskommandoen, [Paradigm Shift: Commander SOCOM’s Framework Dir], 5.
103 Specialoperationskommandoen, [Paradigm Shift: Commander SOCOM’s Framework Dir], 5.
104 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Special Operations Component Command Manual – NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) 80–002,” (Mons, Belgium: NSHQ, October 2014), 13. NATO Special Operations Component Commands (SOCC) are non-standing headquarters within NATO Force Structure that, when assigned for missions, will have a number of special operations task groups and a command and control element.
105 In the summer of 2015, the two units came under command of the Danish Special Operations Command.
From the beginning, these units have trained and participated in exercises jointly and with SOF units from the United States of America, Norway, Holland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and as a result have tactical military standards and skills comparable to these foreign units. Selection and training requirements are also similar, and Danish equipment is generally of the same quality and technical functionality.

3. **DANSOF Limitations**

Though the FKP and JGK enjoy special strengths and capabilities, they also operate under significant limitations, especially in numbers, intelligence assets, and aviation.\(^{107}\)

\(a. \quad \textbf{Small Numbers}\)

Historically, both units train between five and seven new operators annually. This scarcity may affect unit endurance significantly. For example, during Task Force 7 (TF7’s) mission in Afghanistan (2012–2013), the FKP was also engaged in a national police mission and Operation Ocean Shield, a NATO counter-piracy mission off Somalia.

Because DANSOF has limited capacity and resources, it is necessary to draw support from other military units, including infantry, military police, army engineers, interpreters, aviators, and the national intelligence service. Civilian agencies such as the Danish national police have also supported SOF missions. Thus, a DANSOF task force may draw on resources from all the military services, as well as outside agencies, to fulfill a specific task.

\(b. \quad \textbf{Intelligence Assets}\)

Another DANSOF limitation is few intelligence assets. Generally speaking, SOF missions are intelligence-driven. Currently, however, Danish SOF lacks the substantial intelligence capability of comparable countries. Experience from previous missions shows that it is necessary for DANSOF to draw on intelligence from coalition partners to be effective.

\(^{107}\) Number classified.
c. Aviation

While the Danish air force does not have dedicated SOF aviators, conducting SOF missions is one of its capabilities. Helicopter pilots often train with the FKP, JGK, and the special operations unit of the Danish national police. In addition, the air force has sent a helicopter pilot to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s defense-analysis program, which focuses on special operations and irregular warfare, to improve understanding and support of SOF operations and SOKOM.\textsuperscript{108}

C. SOF BEST PRACTICES IN STABILIZATION ENGAGEMENTS

This section describes how DANSOF has applied SOF doctrine historically and outlines a specific mission. Focusing on Task Force (TF7) and how it built the Afghan provincial response company Helmand (PRC-H) between February 2012 and December 2013, the narrative reveals how TF7 managed the expectations of the Danish government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) joint-force command (JFC),\textsuperscript{109} and ISAF SOF, the component command\textsuperscript{110} overseeing TF7. Lessons from other sources are also explored.

1. Lessons from Task Force 7

Denmark supported the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan almost from the beginning, sending SOF as early as 2002. From 2006–2014, the Danish military focused its main efforts on Helmand province, including a relatively large conventional battalion battle group of around 700 soldiers stationed close to the city of Gereskh. Other offices of the Danish government were present in Helmand, including a police detachment and advisors for coordinating Danish efforts concerning governance, law and order, human

\textsuperscript{108} Værnsfælles Forsvarsommando, Flyverstaben [Danish Joint Command, Air Staff], “Effektive løsninger i ansvarlig balance – Chefen for Flyverstabens rammedirektiv for flyvevåbnet [Effective Solutions in a Responsible Balance—Chief of Air Staff’s framework directive for the air force], VFKDIR F.121-0.” Værnfælles Forsvarskommando: Karup, September 2015, 12.

\textsuperscript{109} The Joint Force Command is the headquarters (HQ) in charge of a theatre of operations; for example, Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{110} A Component Command is a HQ under the Joint Force Command in charge of one of the services: Army, Navy, Air Force or SOF.
rights, and education. These missions generated valuable lessons with respect to DISE operations.

In early 2011, DANSOF sent a fact-finding team to Kabul to join U.S. Task Force 10 and ascertain how its MA missions were conducted. In April 2011, a Danish fact-finding team joined TF10, which comprised SOF from U.S. 10th Group Special Forces and embedded SOF from Hungary and Romania. The variety of SOF units involved allowed DANSOF staff and operators to observe different approaches to training, advising, and assisting the provincial response companies.

In its three months with the task force, the staff detachment participated in planning sessions, monitored TF10 missions, and recorded lessons from TF10 staff personnel. Foremost was the lesson of building a self-sustaining provincial response company. To that end, TF7 required a keen grasp of the culture so as to understand Afghan methods, routines, and operations and build a truly sustainable Afghan force, not merely a Western-style unit. The experience with Task Force 10 also taught DANSOF that it was necessary to be sensitive to Afghan culture while also introducing the right amount of organization, which the Afghans required. Another lesson was to avoid putting too much emphasis on combat troops, such as platoons and teams, and not enough on staff—which is the part of a unit critical to achieving indigenous self-sustainment. To correct imbalances, TF7 decided to focus on the entire PRC from the commander down to policemen.

After pre-mission training in Denmark, DANSOF established TF7 by sending a preparation team to Lashkar Gah, the Helmand province capital, in January 2012 with the responsibility to initiate training, intelligence, and operations procedures necessary for the mission. TF7 also began to liaison with Task Force Helmand, a British-led brigade that operated from the main operating base, Lash (MOB Lash). MOB Lash became the main base for TF7, and Task Force Helmand was essential in providing quick-reaction

---


112 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 8.
forces and other key support such as counter-improvised explosive device (IED) teams, medics, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

In February 2012, TF7 began partnering with and training its Afghan counterpart. The provincial response company was in poor shape on all scores: manning was at 50 percent of the planned 125 policemen; the base infrastructure was decrepit; bad hygiene was creating sickness; and food was poorly prepared, non-nutritious, and meager. To meet staffing demands, the PRC commander had hired anyone available. Most of the 60-odd policemen could best be described as farmers with a gun in their hand.

Given the ground conditions, TF7 met with the Afghan commander and updated the two-year plan for partnering with PRC-H, which TF7 had initiated during pre-mission training in Denmark. The components of the plan were to:

- Establish a timeline with milestones for development of the PRC over a two-year period.
- Foster relationships and cooperation with key Afghan units, headquarters, and legal entities.
- Create a balanced and self-sustaining PRC by training all sections of the headquarters, staff, and combat units. For this effort, an advisor from the Danish police and a military judicial advisor were included.
- Develop Afghan instructors as soon as possible to support self-sustainment.
- Select and train future leaders of the PRC as soon as possible.

a. Unexpected Challenges

Despite these efforts to create a plan, surprises occurred weekly, if not daily. Most of the problems stemmed from trying to create a self-sustaining force in less than two years. For months, TF7 struggled with manning its forces, selecting operational targets, and interacting with the Afghan judicial system, which was weak and ineffective, while slowly raising the PRC’s administrative and operational proficiency to acceptable levels. In addition, TF7 had to balance teaching the PRC critical warfighting skills and letting them learn by their own mistakes. Throughout, TF7 did all it could to protect the PRC from overly complicated or dangerous missions. Sometimes TF7 took the lead if they thought the gain from a mission was worth the risk. TF7’s determination to make the
Afghans stand on their own and be self-sufficient was so firm that the task force sacrificed operational success for a time.

Several other issues slowed PRC development. One was getting the right operational equipment; TF7 constantly pushed for gear that the PRC could maintain by itself, consistently discouraging the Afghans from using equipment they could not maintain after the task force left. Another problem was corruption, which plagued all aspects of the Afghan system, including the police. It was a constant challenge to judge whether an act of corruption was worth prosecuting or should be ignored. For example, after only two months on the ground, TF7 had to ask the Helmand chief of police to fire the PRC commander upon evidence of corruption and abusing his authority. The PRC commander left with some of his best men, however, setting the PRC back. Ultimately it proved a good decision—a new commander with special police experience arrived a month later and was essential in making the PRC into a self-sustaining force over time.

In addition to Afghan- or ISAF SOF-initiated operations, TF7 and PRC-H occasionally supported Task Force Helmand. However, this task force usually conducted operations with large armored infantry units using conventional search-and-destroy tactics contrary to efficient counterinsurgency tactics. These British operations seldom achieved much, because the Taliban simply refused to engage large units and withdrew to the hinterlands. Task Force Helmand provided an important lesson about the value of “going small” and partnering efficiently with local forces.

b. Successes

After ten months of building PRC proficiency, TF7 reached a milestone: the PRC went on its first operation with a warrant signed by the Lashkar Gar prosecutor and judge. PRC-H was one of the first special police units to go on a legally sanctioned operation of this nature, and it was used as an example throughout the ISAF system.

As TF7’s departure date in December 2013 approached, PRC-H achieved other successes that set it apart from similar Afghan units: it was close to full manning; it had a

---

113 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 11.
solid cadre of officers and NCOs; it was well integrated into the Afghan police organization; and it could conduct successful, independent operations based on intelligence from its surveillance unit or provincial police headquarters. Given these milestones, TF7 felt they could hand over the PRC as a self-sustaining Afghan special police unit tailored to Afghan conditions.

2. **Key Principles Derived**

The DANSOF experience with TF7 yields two principal lessons for partnering with a host nation for stabilization and the roles that DANSOF in particular can play.

a. **Focus on the Population**

The first is to focus on the population, not the enemy. Initially, TF7 had a good understanding of the mission from their superiors in ISAF SOF, which was to deliver a self-sustaining PRC in two years. This goal seemed ambitious, but possible, so long as the PRC was developed gradually. ISAF SOF agreed that kinetic operations, at least in the beginning, would come second to the training and general development of the unit. However, though ISAF SOF agreed in theory, the reality was different, and a conventional military focus of attacking the enemy became the principal effort.

Furthermore, though TF7 was initially allowed to focus on building the critical self-sustaining elements of the PRC, after three months ISAF SOF ordered TF7 to push the PRC harder toward kinetic operations than had been agreed. Other ISAF SOF task forces following these orders used the Afghans as an excuse for kinetic operations, rather than developing PRC proficiency and self-sufficiency. They most likely chose this approach because it was rewarded by higher command, was highly measurable in the form of enemies killed or captured, and was consistent with a belief that the main effort should be to neutralize the enemy faster than he could recruit new fighters.

This focus on fighting the enemy directly contradicted several counterinsurgency and stabilization principles. It is considered essential to separate the insurgents from the population by working by, with and through the host system to deny insurgents access. If not, insurgents will likely reproduce and sustain themselves by drawing from the
population, despite attrition from kills. To this end, an indigenous police force that can create separation by independently providing intelligence and manpower must be built.\textsuperscript{114} This point echoes lessons from the British-led Malayan counterinsurgency, where the British massively employed local police in identifying and denying the infrastructure and population that the insurgents were exploiting.

\textit{b. Build Independence}

The second principal lesson learned is to stand up forces and organizations that can operate independently of foreign advisors and support. Several established SOF principles support this aim:

First, when possible, build on local, existing organizational structures, rather than organizing units in Western fashion. In the TF7 case, this was realized in the construction of the PRC and its relationships to various Afghan headquarters and the judicial system. If a Western-style organization had been created, it would most likely have collapsed as soon as its sponsors were not there to uphold it. The same holds true for tactics, techniques, and procedures; they had to endure after TF7 left, and thus were not as detailed and structured as a Western unit would prefer.

Second, use local equipment, which can be supplied and maintained easier than Western. An important consideration of TF7 was to use equipment the Afghans were familiar with and could maintain, such as Kalashnikov rifles and heavy machine guns. Although superior weapons systems were available, it made no sense to make the Afghans dependent on, for example, mortars or unmanned aerial vehicles, because these systems were unsustainable over time.

Third, it is not enough to empower the fighting elements of a unit. Staff and support functions must be equally developed, because they are the elements that create sustainability in the long term. This focus takes time and oversight, consuming scarce resources. The temptation is to sideline staff and support functions in favor of urgent priorities and the tangible measurements of success the fighting elements can deliver.

\textsuperscript{114} Krepinevich, \textit{The Army and Vietnam}, 10–11, 13.
Finally, managing corruption and other problems requires a local, as opposed to a Western, mindset. Corruption was an ever-present dilemma and it was impossible for TF7 to comprehend all its dimensions. TF7 tried to achieve balance by accepting some level of corruption as an integral part of Afghan life, while at the same time coming down hard when corruption was averse to building a reliable police force the people could eventually trust.

3. Lessons from RAND

In addition to the TF7 experience, research on other SOF deployments is useful for gleaning best practices and lessons learned. The RAND Corporation published a report in 2015 on building Afghan SOF and special police units. The report is based on field research and interviews of U.S. and coalition SOF units deployed in 2013, including those of Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and host-nation partner units. The report also examines SOF partnerships in Iraq and Colombia. Findings are grouped according to operational tempo and sustainability, depth of partnership and rapport, and continuity and training.

a. Tempo and Sustainability

The report recommends that “operations must be subordinated to capability development.” Examples from Afghanistan show that indigenous forces were tactically proficient, but lacked the structure necessary to support their own operations, as well as operational planning, intelligence collection, and logistics. The lack of intelligence capabilities within Afghan SOF and conventional forces weakened the PRC’s ability to conduct operations; partner forces were needed to build and enable these functions.

Owing to the short time available for missions, it is important that operations be conducted with an eye toward long-term sustainability. In Afghanistan, indigenous SOF


116 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, 73.
forces conducted their operations using assets from international partners. This borrowing becomes a problem when the partner force leaves. Although it is counterintuitive that a partner force withholds its full assets, deliberate measures must be taken to wean indigenous SOF from unsustainable support.\textsuperscript{117} An undue focus on conducting operations with dispatch can leave a residue of underdeveloped and unsustainable capabilities. Capacity building should start in the early stages of a partnership and include not only tactical skills, but also supporting structures.

\textit{b. Depth of Partnership and Rapport}

The RAND report emphasizes the importance of achieving a deep partnership by building rapport\textsuperscript{118}—for example, by reassigning members of partner units back to their previous indigenous unit. The report also encourages partner units to participate in social events with indigenous to strengthen cultural understanding and respect. This requires maturity among the operators. In Afghanistan, Norwegian, Lithuanians, and British forces shared social events such as Christmas and Muslim holidays, dancing with the Afghans, and even holding hands.\textsuperscript{119} It recommends that partner units live together with indigenous forces if possible; but the report notes the threat of insider attacks and advises this should occur on a case-by-case basis. Another essential observation in the report is that only experienced seniors should be assigned to key mentorship positions,\textsuperscript{120} raising again the necessity of maturity. To develop appropriate respect and trust, personnel must have experience of working with indigenous forces and understand how relationships are built. The successful capacity and capability development of indigenous forces requires thoughtful measures to foster rapport and trustful relationships.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Austin Long et al., \textit{Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond}, 77.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Austin Long et al., \textit{Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond}, 81.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Austin Long et al., \textit{Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond}, 82.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Austin Long et al., \textit{Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond}, 87.
\end{itemize}
Continuity and Training

Continuity of operations must be maintained to avoid “reinventing the wheel.” This includes returning units to their previous areas of deployment to strengthen familiarity; using a staggered relief-in-place rather than have entire units rotate in and out with little or no overlap; ensuring proper handoff of information between outgoing and incoming units; and creating a multiyear plan for deployments. However, these recommendations are not always easy to uphold, due to the small number of operators and that SOF may be engaged in missions elsewhere. Part of continuity is setting goals for the indigenous force to assess the development of its performance, looking at the functional capabilities of the host unit at the tactical and staff levels. Key performance tasks should be described and developed to allow the mentoring force to monitor progress. However, the RAND report also suggests that a host-nation force conduct self-assessments to become capable of evaluating their own performance. Hence, an effective assessment method should be adopted and introduced as early in the process as possible. RAND has published a sample report that provides an assessment framework for building partner capacity.

Another element for successful rapport building is pre-mission training. Proper and sufficient training and exercise prior to deployment prepares the operators for the specifics of a mission and helps prepare them for the mental transition of providing mentorship and advisement, as opposed to kinetics. Examples from Iraq and Afghanistan stress the importance of a positive and respectful atmosphere between host and mentor forces. To encourage trust and partnership, pre-mission training should include cultural and religious awareness and basic language proficiency.

121 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, 88.
122 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, 89.
123 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, 91.
125 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, 84–85.
D. CONCLUSION

This chapter describes SOF doctrine and characteristics, primarily in the context of stabilization operations, and outlines the Danish special operations command and two SOF units, noting their core capabilities and range of skills. The chapter then highlights lessons learned from DANSOF training of the Afghan provincial response company in Helmand province.

SOF’s ability to deploy rapidly and operate in small groups with little logistical support provides decision makers with a tool they can use on short notice and with little political and military impact. When engaging in building security capacity, it is crucial that the functions of the entire force be considered throughout the effort. Tactical ability and operational skills rarely prevail alone; staff and support elements are equally important in achieving lasting results.

The final chapter concludes with summary thoughts and recommendations for using DANSOF in stabilization operations.
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this capstone is to operationalize Denmark’s policy for integrated stabilization engagements in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world (DISE) by considering key concepts and providing recommendations on how DANSOF can support political efforts aimed at stabilizing fragile states.

Chapter II began with a summary of the DISE, describing and identifying Denmark’s principal efforts and key tools for stabilizing fragile states and conflict-affected areas. The chapter then defined and explained key terms, including stabilization engagements; a whole-of-government approach; goals, measurement of success, and risk acceptance; and capacity and state-building. The chapter also identified and explained two less mentioned yet critical tools that affect overall stabilization efforts: intelligence, and information activities. Chapter III gave a summary of SOF doctrine and characteristics, in addition to outlining the organization of Danish Special Operations. The chapter then gave an example of DANSOF in a stabilization engagement, describing its experience with Task Force 7 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in 2012, and summarizes lesson learned from allied stabilization engagements as outlined in a RAND report.

This chapter offers general recommendations for operationalizing DISE, followed by recommendations for employing DANSOF within the goals of the DISE framework.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO OPERATIONALIZE DISE

This capstone makes recommendations for operationalizing DISE on prevention, information activities, intelligence collection, and managing risk.

1. Prevention

DISE stresses the importance of preventive measures to keep emerging conflicts from growing into full-scale crises. To ensure a timely response to emerging conflicts, Danish agencies should prepare for stabilization engagements in peacetime, including training and planning among government agencies and the military. Interagency
collaboration exercises in particular would strengthen understanding of how each organization within the Danish government works, what its capabilities and limitations are, and how to develop standard operating procedures for rapid reaction to potential or actual conflict. Joint exercises would also allow the key leaders of the various agencies to know each other and develop a network before a crisis erupts.

In addition, Denmark should prepare for stabilization interventions by creating an interagency force equivalent to the UK stabilization unit, which is an integrated civil–military unit of experts, police officers, and military forces that operates in high-threat and high-risk environments.

Because for policy reasons Denmark is unlikely to act in isolation, it is important to coordinate efforts not only with domestic agencies, but international partners as well, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.126

2. Information Activities

In the information age, getting messages out and countering anti-government communications is essential in stabilization engagements. ISIS’ successful recruiting campaign is a recent reminder of the importance of knowing an audience and reaching it successfully to counter adversarial messaging.

To underscore the need for integration in information efforts, this capstone uses the term “information activities” to describe actions in this field. To achieve maximal synergy and effect from the whole-of-government approach, information activities should be coordinated centrally by a lead agency. This centralized coordination is not expected to hamper individual agency messaging, but rather, to ensure that all messaging efforts work in the same direction. This is true for both civilian agencies and the military, including DANSOF.

126 Due to the Danish defense opt-out within the EU system, Denmark cannot participate in EU efforts that involve the employment of military forces, Danish Ministry of Defense, website, accessed 05 May 2016, http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheDanishDefenceOpt-Out.aspx.
Finally, the Danish government should incorporate and support information activities that allow the host nation to spread its own message and contradict anti-government communications. Fragile governments generally have a keen understanding of the importance of controlling the information flow, but may gain valuable organizational and procedural knowledge from a partner country. Information activities should be closely coordinated with the local government to allow it to take ownership of the process and continue after the engagement ends.

3. Intelligence

Intelligence efforts are crucial for understanding the problems of fragile states and how to intervene productively. They should focus on two broad collection targets: those that identify potential or actual insurgent infrastructure, and those that concern population vulnerabilities. Insurgent infrastructure provides the means to gain finances, supplies, shelter, recruits, intelligence and freedom of movement. The government needs to understand these capabilities to counter them and draw popular support away from the insurgents—which is the ultimate goal of such efforts. The government’s creation of on-the-ground human intelligence networks is critical for interdicting insurgent infrastructure.

Stabilization efforts must pay particular attention to the population and understand its vulnerabilities and desires. Cultural intelligence helps identify social, political and economic factors that influence the local environment, providing understanding of customs, beliefs and behavior and creating awareness of grievances and how to address them. Intelligence tools should include open-source and open dialog with the different actors in the engagement area, such as government institutions, civic institutions, religious leaders, and local warlords. Gathering and analyzing cultural intelligence should begin as early as possible so that actors on the ground are prepared before they arrive.

The police force is an important potential resource for long-term intelligence gathering on the population and nefarious networks. Benefiting from daily contact with the people and wielding a thorough knowledge of local communities and insurgent infrastructure, the police have a tremendous advantage over other forces. To develop this
dimension, the Danish government should pursue an effort that balances the robustness and early readiness of the military intelligence with a focus on encouraging the local police to become the main source of intelligence.

4. Risk Management

Assessing and mitigating the risks actors face on the ground run the gamut from preventing disease to foiling insider attacks to combat. One important measure in risk management is to provide training in cultural understanding. Understanding local customs, values and behaviors so as to gain the empathy needed to act in a well-adjusted manner can relieve tensions and prevent culturally offensive actions. The Danish government should also ensure personal-security training that combines cultural awareness with physical protection to decrease risk in a population-centric environment.

Denmark can mitigate risk in stabilization engagements by focusing on the end state, not on short-term gains and losses. Working in close coordination with on-the-ground actors, the government should devise and monitor benchmarks for progress. Such a practice, together with common understanding of the goals of the engagement, may improve long-term mission success.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE USE OF DANSOF IN A DISE FRAMEWORK

DANSOF offers a range of skills to be employed in realizing DISE goals, including conflict prevention and pre-conflict engagements. In particular, DANSOF specializes in rapid reaction; whole-of-government synergy; and capacity building. For maximal benefit, these efforts must be guided by a cross-collaborative intention. A summary is laid out in Table 4.

1. Rapid Reaction

DANSOF is a sophisticated tool for responding quickly to emerging or violent conflicts, due to its small size, logistical self-sufficiency, and diversity in deployment methods and tasks. Specifically, DANSOF can be used for the following rapid-reaction tasks:
a. **Reconnaissance, Intelligence, and Contact**

DANSOF is valuable in early reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, contact with useful factions, and assessment of the engagement area—including contact and initial report with host forces, agencies, non-governmental factions, and international entities. These early, on-the-ground skills are part of DANSOF’s special reconnaissance capability.

b. **Initial Execution of Whole-of-Government Tasks**

DANSOF may be used to fulfill initial task execution for other whole-of-government agencies, and provide these services until the agencies arrive on scene. Activities may range from diplomatic engagements to intelligence missions. DANSOF emphasizes cross-institutional training among Danish agencies in peacetime to prepare for such missions. Combined with an ability to deploy anywhere, this capability makes DANSOF ideal for vicarious assignments.

c. **Strengthening of Host Security Forces**

Rapid strengthening of host-nation security forces is a DANSOF area of expertise. For example, DANSOF can partner with local security forces to engage counter-state elements ranging from criminal organizations to insurgents. If needed, DANSOF can work and conduct operations independently until local security forces are sufficiently trained.

2. **Whole-of-Government Functions**

When a rapid reaction has fulfilled its purpose, achievements may be sustained through a long-haul effort. DANSOF offers a range of long-term capabilities that foster synergy between the different agencies involved in a whole-of-government approach. As a cross-institutional force oriented toward joint and interagency performance, DANSOF trains extensively in peacetime to work efficiently with all appropriate elements—for example, intelligence and diplomatic personnel. In Danish whole-of-government stabilization efforts, DANSOF can be used for the following functions:
a. **Initial Execution of Whole-of-Government Tasks in Hostile Environments**

DANSOF can execute whole-of-government tasks in environments too dangerous for other agencies, performing them until the situation improves or the agencies acquire training that allows them to assume responsibility.

b. **Support for Other Agencies**

Support for other agencies’ tasks, including planning, deployment, and execution of stabilization efforts, is ideally assigned to DANSOF. This is relevant where other agencies’ capabilities and tasks are too sensitive or complex to be handed over or where an agency’s deployment in a remote, dangerous, or inaccessible area can be handled by DANSOF. An important aspect of interagency support is DANSOF’s ability to lower risk to the agency supported.

3. **Capacity Building**

Capacity building covers a range of tasks devoted to developing sustainable capabilities within the host nation. DANSOF is particularly trained for this purpose. Specifically DANSOF can be used for the following activities:

a. **Training and Advising Local Military**

Training, partnering with, and advising local military forces is a DANSOF core mission and one for which it is uniquely qualified. DANSOF’s main efforts should be on local SOF, both units and headquarters, with a focus on the strategic and national level, where limited DANSOF resource may have greater impact, as discussed in Chapter III.

b. **Training and Advising Local Police**

For DANSOF, the main effort in training, partnering with, and advising local police forces should be on building the capacity of the special police, both units and headquarters. These forces should be trained and advised cross-institutionally with police and judicial advisors, as described in the case study on Task Force 7. As part of their interactions, DANSOF can help military and police forces combat criminal elements and
insurgents. This may involve DANSOF’s carrying the brunt of the combat effort in the early phases and supervising later stages.

c. Supporting Intelligence

DANSOF is equipped to develop and support improved intelligence-gathering capacity within the military and police for the purpose of identifying potential or actual insurgent infrastructure and population vulnerabilities. The main intelligence focus of the stabilization engagement should be on building police capacities. DANSOF can help develop this capability cross-institutionally with police advisors.

4. DANSOF Cross-Collaboration

Emphasizing that international and interagency cross-collaboration is essential to DISE goals and a critical DANSOF skillset, this capstone recommends two key policies in the employment of DANSOF, as follows.

a. Cross-Institutional Cooperation

DANSOF should work closely with relevant government agencies, both national and international. To create smooth collaboration and thus be prepared for timely prevention of violence, this cooperation should start with peacetime training and continue throughout pre-mission preparation and planning, execution, and evaluation of tasks and missions.

b. Local Sustainability

DANSOF should work by, with, and through local agencies in fragile states to support self-sustaining capabilities that can work independently when the engagement is over. DANSOF should avoid technology, procedures, and organizational structures unsuited to the local culture or environment. A focus on short-term wins against anti-government forces, using, for example, advanced weapons or communication systems, may backfire by making long-term success dependent on technology and equipment that local forces cannot maintain after DANSOF leaves.
Table 4. Summary of Recommendations for DANSOF Support to DISE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid reaction</td>
<td>• Early reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, liaison, and assessment&lt;br&gt;• Initial execution of other agencies’ tasks until they arrive&lt;br&gt;• Rapid support to the security sector; rapid combating of criminal elements and insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole of government</td>
<td>• Execution of other agencies’ task until environment becomes permissive&lt;br&gt;• Support to other agencies’ tasks, including deployment, planning, execution, and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>• Train, partner and advice military forces: SOF units and HQ. &lt;br&gt;• Train, partner and advice police forces: special police units and HQ. &lt;br&gt;• As part of train, partner and advice combat criminal elements and insurgents. &lt;br&gt;• Support the creation of military and police intelligence capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross collaboration</td>
<td>• Cooperation with other agencies, both national and international.&lt;br&gt;• By, with and through local agencies aiming at local self-sustainability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. **CONCLUSION**

Stabilization efforts by international actors in fragile states and conflict-affected areas play a vital role in peace and security—before, during, and after conflicts erupt. Denmark’s DISE policies reflect the government’s intention of playing an active role in such efforts. Through experience derived in international engagements, Denmark has realized the potential of integrated political approaches to fragile-state conflicts, by which a combination of diplomatic, development, defense, and economic efforts are applied in a preventive rather than reactive way. Denmark can strengthen this whole-of-government approach by prioritizing these efforts at the highest political level and increasing inter-governmental collaboration and coordination. To this end, DISE policy should include an organization focused solely on stabilization efforts, integrating capabilities from diverse
departments and ministries. It is paramount that international efforts be well coordinated, including goals, ways, and means. Denmark can and should take the initiative toward a “whole international community” approach by the judicious use of existing organizations. This capstone recommends that DANSOF can support Denmark’s stabilization efforts by performing tasks such as prevention, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and assessment, security, capacity building, support to national and international agencies, and liaison with international agencies and local authorities.
LIST OF REFERENCES


———. “AJP-3.4.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction.” NATO Doctrine, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) © NATO/OTAN, draft.


Værnsfælles Forsvarsommando, Flyverstaben [Danish Joint Command, Air Staff]. “Effektive løsninger i ansvarlig balance—Chefen for Flyverstabens rammedirektiv for flyvevåbnnet [Effective Solutions in a Responsible Balance—Chief of Air Staff’s framework directive for the air force], VFKDIR F.121-0.” Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando: Karup, September 2015.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California