NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

RISING SUN OVER AFRICA: JAPAN’S NEW FRONTIER FOR MILITARY NORMALIZATION

by

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June 2016

Thesis Advisor: Robert Weiner
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Japan’s current military operations in Africa, little known and underreported, have challenged its established security doctrine and led it to a more “normal” military that employs its self-defense forces in ever-greater roles. By examining Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF) missions in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan against a backdrop of Japan’s greater strategic approach to Africa, this thesis uncovers the unexpected impact that these missions have had in Japanese policy-making at home. Whereas the lack of a constrained institutional framework in the Gulf of Aden mission naturally enables revisionists to push for unprecedented security reforms to meet evolving mission requirements, the mission in South Sudan has also contributed unexpectedly to impactful security reforms to meet its own evolving mission requirements within the construct of the United Nations (UN). Mission success in increasingly challenging and dangerous roles in Africa has allowed the JSDF to not only become an integral part of Japan’s comprehensive development efforts on the continent, but has also influenced the ability of Japan’s revisionists to chart a new course in the post-Cold War world.

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RISING SUN OVER AFRICA: JAPAN’S NEW FRONTIER FOR MILITARY NORMALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Japan’s current military operations in Africa, little known and underreported, have challenged its established security doctrine and led it to a more “normal” military that employs its self-defense forces in ever-greater roles. By examining Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF) missions in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan against a backdrop of Japan’s greater strategic approach to Africa, this thesis uncovers the unexpected impact that these missions have had in Japanese policy-making at home. Whereas the lack of a constrained institutional framework in the Gulf of Aden mission naturally enables revisionists to push for unprecedented security reforms to meet evolving mission requirements, the mission in South Sudan has also contributed unexpectedly to impactful security reforms to meet its own evolving mission requirements within the construct of the United Nations (UN). Mission success in increasingly challenging and dangerous roles in Africa has allowed the JSDF to not only become an integral part of Japan’s comprehensive development efforts on the continent, but has also influenced the ability of Japan’s revisionists to chart a new course in the post-Cold War world.
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<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCECC</td>
<td>China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGPCS</td>
<td>Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF–HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREC</td>
<td>China Railway Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRTC</td>
<td>Djibouti Regional Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Energy Information Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPSA</td>
<td>Enhanced Private Sector Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP NESTOR</td>
<td>European Union Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCL</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRTC</td>
<td>Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCG</td>
<td>Japan Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JETRO</td>
<td>Japan External Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>Japanese Shipowner’s Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Staff Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLIT</td>
<td>Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPF</td>
<td>People’s Armed Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMPF</td>
<td>Puntland Maritime Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation on Agreement on Combating Piracy Against Ships in Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Japan’s evolving military presence in Africa promises improved regional security, humanitarian assistance, and economic ties with African nations, but also provides an opportune mechanism to further a normalization agenda and achieve Japan’s own brand of “proactive pacifism.” As a key objective of Japan’s current administration, developing Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) into a more “normal” military goes well beyond the military itself, and has national implications as Japan charts a new course in a post-Cold War world. Though less constrained by legal restrictions originally designed to pacify a potentially resurgent militarist Japan, the JSDF still faces three major challenges, among others, in its evolution toward a truly “normal” military: the prevalence of self-imposed legal roadblocks, the effect that a renewed Japanese military has on perceptions abroad, and a general lack of operational experience. Africa presents a valuable opportunity for Japan to confront all three of these issues through its various international engagements on the continent and the legal reinterpretations necessary to take part in them, moving Japan well beyond the traditional role of home defense by leading it to employ the JSDF in ever greater roles. Africa is not without its risks, however: open conflict in South Sudan poses a serious threat to Japanese troops, while recent hostage crises in Algeria and Tunisia claimed the lives of several Japanese civilians, directing greater inquiry into the increased use of the JSDF as a tool of Japanese foreign policy.

This thesis attempts to bridge the gap of understanding between the larger normalization debate—whether the JSDF should assume the role of a military not limited to self-defense alone—and Japan’s deployed forces in Africa by identifying how military involvement on the continent has challenged established security doctrine and, in turn, contributed to furthering a normalization agenda. Analysis revolves around two case studies, each investigating Japan’s respective JSDF missions in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan. In order to frame Japan’s military efforts in Africa in the correct context, an examination of the overall normalization debate, its regional foreign aid practices, peacekeeping operations, economic initiatives, and the activities of its chief rival, China, are included. Finally, conclusions are offered based on the various forms of evidence
provided. The scope of the thesis is limited to a military-centric analysis of Japan’s activities in Africa—although Africa does not merely represent a mission space to be exploited by Japan, an examination of the various other factors relevant to a discussion of Japan’s activities in Africa requires research dedicated to each. Japan’s military operations in Africa, though little-known and relatively unpublicized, have an important place in the normalization debate and will continue to have foreign policy implications on one of the world’s most influential nations, in turn offering a glimpse into a future security trajectory new to the post-war era.

A. JAPAN’S SECURITY IDENTITY

The current international environment presents both challenges and opportunities for the further normalization of Japan’s JSDF. As a country defined by a dichotomy of old and new and subject to the lessons of its past, Japan has viewed these challenges and opportunities through the lenses of both its pacifist norms and its pragmatic understanding of its role in the world. These same underpinnings that guided Japan’s policies since the end of World War II continue to provide a useful conceptual framework to better understand Japan’s current military involvement in Africa.

Japan’s perception of itself, largely based on a long-standing security identity of anti-militarism following World War II, combined with other intangible factors, such as increasing expectations of the international community, nationalism, and reactions to a weakening economy, has played a key role in the overall normalization debate.1 This unique identity has structured policy debate and choices over national security-related issues for so long because it is widely supported by Japan’s strong democracy and because of the perception that it has contributed greatly to the country’s post-war success.2 While under the American security umbrella, Japan’s economic success as the “lead goose” among Asian nations enabled Japan to contribute increasing amounts of aid

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to the preservation of international peace. When Japan took a more direct approach to international peace by becoming involved in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, it legitimized the role of the military in the eyes of the Japanese public, and the JSDF started to become socially acceptable after years of being dismissed. More recently, the JSDF’s image was further strengthened given its contributions during Japan’s 3.11 “triple disaster,” its earthquake response efforts in Kumamoto, and the Japanese public’s renewed focus on the U.S./Japan relationship given East Asia’s changing geo-political landscape.3

Japan’s residual anti-militaristic sentiment, its junior alliance relationship with the United States, and a general reluctance to aggressively pursue military capabilities commensurate with its economic power suggest that Japan will likely continue to be a constrained military actor for some time to come.4 At the same time, Japan’s self-proclaimed status as the “largest maritime democracy,” its membership in the world’s liberal community, and increasing international expectations that accompany its global status suggest the need to be able to protect its democracy, rule of law, and freedom of expression from outside threats.5 The recent emphasis placed on the international community, democratic norms and values, and human rights by Prime Minister Abe, commonly referred to as the “Abe doctrine,” is itself unprecedented.6 This doctrine, proclaimed at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Jakarta on January 18, 2013, clearly places Japan among other law-abiding democracies that seek to preserve the political status quo through international cooperation and the rule of law.7 Therefore, despite Japan’s currently being a constrained military actor, slowly evolving


6 Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara, “Japan’s Abe Administration,” 7.

7 Ibid., 8.
norms and geo-political posturing suggest a long-term trajectory aimed at more assertive regional and global security roles.⁸

The pragmatic, realist approach to national security, embodied by nationalists and revisionists in Japan, proposes a more “normal” Japan—one that generally pursues a proactive international foreign policy and security role that abandons self-imposed constraints on the exercise of military power, enables Japan to become a more reliable U.S. ally, and empowers it to become a more assertive military actor.⁹ This infers the implicit dilution of Japan’s pacifist identity that has supposedly hindered its ability to properly respond to past threats. As Article IX of Japan’s “peace constitution” symbolizes this pacifist identity, it must be subject to reinterpretation that eventually renders it more and more insignificant over time, or to outright revision in order to eliminate the threat it poses to Japanese sovereignty. In subscribing to this viewpoint, Japan’s counterintuitive imbalance between its strong economy and weak political voice, an arrangement maintained for generations under the American security umbrella, must be corrected, especially given the recent swing in the balance of power toward China. Recently, with the mention by the Japanese government of China as a “threat” and as a state that “attempts to change the status quo by coercion,” such perceived threats are indeed institutionalized in the policymaking process.¹⁰

As regional concerns, such as the rise of China and an increasingly unpredictable North Korea, increase, the effects of a pacifist identity can become increasingly overwhelmed by realist considerations. Prime Minister Abe’s hawkish stance on foreign policy issues highlights the apparent erosion of Japan’s pacifist identity given a more proactive foreign policy that seeks a more assertive military role in East Asia and beyond.¹¹ Even before Prime Minister Abe, former Prime Minister Ichiro Ozawa, then Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), realized during the

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¹⁰ Oros, “International and Domestic Challenges to Japan’s Postwar Security Identity,” 145.
Persian Gulf crisis of 1991 that the means to resolve this conflict, considered the first international crisis of the post-Cold War period, would define the new international order and security environment. Likewise, Japan’s lack of military contributions to the crisis would have a detrimental effect on Japan’s international standing.12 A more realist-minded approach since the 1990s has subsequently led some to question an apparently superficial peace-loving security narrative, or to go as far as to claim outright the irrelevance of modern Japan’s pacifist identity.

B. **THE NORMALIZATION DEBATE**

Japan’s “normalization debate”—the debate on whether Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) should assume the role of a normal military—is centered around Article IX of Japan’s post-war “peace constitution,” the strikingly concise section that addresses Japan’s ability to wage war. Included in its text is a renunciation of war as a means to solve international disputes, the inability to maintain war potential, and the refusal to recognize the right of belligerency.13 Since its ratification in 1946, constitutional restrictions have played an overbearing role in restricting Japanese defense policy and perpetuating civilian controls that limited the ability of the JSDF to effectively conduct military operations. While Japan’s post-war leaders were focused on economic growth and receiving assurances of America’s willingness to provide a security umbrella over Japan, it remained politically explosive to suggest a greater military role for the fledgling JSDF. This system of strict civilian control nevertheless served its intended purpose of impeding the basic functions of the JSDF throughout much of the Cold War.

The intent of Article IX, mainly to keep imperial Japan in check while ensuring the survivability of an initially weak American-led interim government, was gradually lost in the evolving context of the Cold War and beyond. Despite Article IX’s clear terms, Japan’s JSDF has gradually expanded its roles and become less constrained

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through opportunistic constitutional reinterpretation pushed mostly by revisionist leaders.\textsuperscript{14} Starting with the Korean War, the perceived need to normalize arose from the evolving security arrangement between Japan and the United States in response to the rising communist threat. After the Cold War, Japan found itself with no explicit adversaries, only non-traditional threats, including involvement in America’s “war on terror” and North Korea’s weapons development program. This allowed Japan to start looking seriously at global issues, indicating the high priority placed on stabilizing maritime commons and constructing a desirable security environment.\textsuperscript{15} Fortunately for the JSDF, this noticeable shift toward a more proactive defense posture has slowly gained steam to the point that security laws have taken less and less time to be approved by the Diet, starting with the passing of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, the first reinterpretation of the ban on dispatching forces overseas, and shortly thereafter the approval of the JSDF Law amendment in 1994.\textsuperscript{16} Defense operations initiatives, such as the revision to the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law in 2001, the decision to send JMSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to support the coalition’s Afghan campaign that same year, and the 2004 JSDF deployment to Iraq, were all approved within a mere month of submission to the Diet. Beginning with initial efforts to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to ministry status in 1954, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was finally created in 2006, granting the new ministry and the JSDF newfound powers in government through direct control over budgets and policy. Finally, the integration of Japan’s Joint Staff Office (JSO) represents the biggest transfer of authority to uniformed personnel in Japan’s post-war history. Today, Japan now clearly finds itself in the midst of a major overhaul of its defense establishment. While defense reforms in other


\textsuperscript{15} Keitaro Ushirogata, “Japan’s Security Environment: Its Transition and Strategic Challenges,” (presentation at JMSDF Command and Staff College, Tokyo, October 20, 2015).

“mature” democracies usually take place at the margins, Japan’s reforms are taking place at the core.\textsuperscript{17}

Paradoxically, Japan has managed to build one of the largest militaries in the world without making a single change to its constitution. The JSDF presently has the fifth largest defense budget in the world (U.S. $44.4 billion) and employs 300,000 active duty and reserve personnel.\textsuperscript{18} Its Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) utilizes 1,000 tanks and 1,300 armored vehicles, its Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) maintains 370 aircraft, and its Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) maintains 160 ships. It regularly conducts major training missions with coalition partners and is able to respond to real-world crises, such as those occurring in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan, in some cases better than supposedly “normal” militaries. Despite these capabilities, with no revisions since its endorsement, Japan’s constitution essentially states that the JSDF has no due process of law in which to engage in warfare and instead must rely on highly-scrutinized case-by-case parliamentary approvals by the Diet (essentially passing a new law) to mobilize or even make minor structural changes.\textsuperscript{19} In this respect, Japan faces the opposite problem of many of the world’s new defense establishments in that its strong civilian base is slowly incorporating a physically strong but politically weak military.\textsuperscript{20} The need to reconcile its supposedly defense-oriented military with its official policies remains a persistent problem in Japan and has continued to hinder the development of an efficient and effective defense establishment.\textsuperscript{21}

The current prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, is the current head of Japan’s long-ruling LDP and is seen as a right-wing nationalist. Having already served as prime


\textsuperscript{18} Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2016 Budget Bill,” Japan Ministry of Defense, last modified March 13, 2016, \url{http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/280215.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{20} Bruneau and Goetze, “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control”, 76.

minister in 2006–07, before being ousted due to his over-emphasis on normalization at the cost of the economy, he has pursued a new economic formula, “Abenomics,” which has given him a platform to accomplish his normalization objectives. After reassuming power, the LDP, led by a renewed Prime Minister Abe, was eager to attend to unfinished business, including Abe’s efforts to establish a National Security Council (NSC) and implement a law allowing the dispatch of JSDF troops without a UN resolution.\textsuperscript{22} Several other security reforms were subsequently introduced by Prime Minister Abe: an increase in the defense budget (2013), the introduction of a National Security Strategy (NSS) (2013), a relaxation of arms exports limitations (2014), further reinterpretations of Article IX (2014), and new policies on the exercise of collective self-defense (2015).\textsuperscript{23} On September 18, 2015, Japan’s parliament voted to authorize overseas military responses for the first time since World War II in an apparent response to an increase in Chinese military activity.\textsuperscript{24} Interestingly, many of these changes were set in motion not by Prime Minister Abe’s LDP, but by the opposition party, the left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ was the first to lift restrictions on arms exports and proposed quick and flexible responses to emergency situations, including a southward-looking focus for JSDF forces as opposed to a country-wide defense posture.\textsuperscript{25}

Recent reform efforts have been stimulated by the perception of a more challenging security environment, changes in Japan’s policy environment, and lessons learned from the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011.\textsuperscript{26} Prime Minister Abe has made Japan’s national security one of his top priorities, and financial backing indeed reflects this: the defense budget is the largest it has been in 14 years, at U.S. $42.38


billion, up 2.2 percent from 2015.\textsuperscript{27} It is important to note that Japan is thought to limit defense-related expenditures to 1 percent of total GNP, a significant amount considering Japan is one of the world’s largest economies, yet defense expenditures have consistently exceeded the 1 percent limit since the 1980s, actually fluctuating between 1.1 percent and 1.5 percent. This is possible because the defense budget is not calculated on a NATO basis, which would include pensions and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) expenses, as well as the use of deferred payments and so-called “hidden budgets” that grant the government flexibility in surpassing the formal 1 percent limit.\textsuperscript{28} Regardless, Prime Minister Abe’s reversing of a more recent trend of consecutive decreases in defense spending (attributable mainly to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute) occurred simultaneously with defense reforms, essentially allowing Japan to eliminate geographic constraints, authorize support to non-U.S. troops, expand the range of allowable logistical support, allow allied interaction in gray-zone scenarios, enable more timely deployment of the JSDF for multilateral operations, create less restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE), and, finally, allow the JSDF to protect friendly nations’ military assets.\textsuperscript{29} These changes modify but undoubtedly strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, indicating that Japan is finally moving out of the Cold War and into the forefront of regional security affairs.\textsuperscript{30}

To some critics, especially those countries supposedly seeking to mischaracterize Japan’s recent defense reforms, Japan’s continued constitutional reinterpretation renders its “peace constitution” meaningless and indicates a resurgent militarist Japan. Others may argue, however, that Japan’s new perceived strategic environment dictates that it can no longer be purely defensive. Japan does indeed face undeniable threats: North Korea continues to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, China is rapidly modernizing its


\textsuperscript{28} Hughes, \textit{Japan’s Remilitarisation}, 39–40.


military and perhaps attempting to polarize the region, and there is a perception that the security commitment from the United States could possibly falter. However relevant these threats may be, critics of Japan’s normalization efforts often overlook a process that has been ongoing since the Cold War, and oftentimes dismiss a logical consequence of a country now ready to become “normal” after over 71 years of peace. By using his coined term, “proactive pacifism,” announced at the UN General Assembly in September 2013, Prime Minister Abe is simultaneously attempting to confront these issues with a transformed notion of self-determination while still maintaining a commitment to peace as a guiding principle.

At the very least, Japan’s defense budget and military strength grant it significant power-projection capabilities beyond its home shores, even though its current procurement and utilization of military assets is generally intended for defense-oriented power projection. These assets of course have latent offensive power, however, and when given expanded authorities, allow increased support to UN peacekeeping missions, overseas deployments, and global contingencies, also creating a new potential mobile shield for U.S. offensive power.31 In addition to existing interoperable capabilities such as an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, the use of Japan’s advanced naval, amphibious, and airlift capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Iraq, and, recently, the Kumamoto earthquake response attest to Japan’s significant military strength and partnership with the United States.32 Given Japan’s new assumed international responsibilities, recent defense reforms simply augment allied deterrence and defense capabilities and serve to preserve peace in Asia while checking growing regional security threats.33 Interestingly, as of February 2016, more than 90 percent of the Japanese public has a favorable impression of the JSDF, a sign that adds credibility to the JSDF and supports its legitimacy as a global peacekeeping force.34

31 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 51
32 Ibid.
Japan finds itself in a world much different than that of the Cold War: a multipolar world in which the effect of nuclear deterrence is now questioned, one in which powerful states are now competing to establish a new global status quo, and one in which wars are not fought at the strategic level of a full industrial war in cycles of war and peace, but rather through a dynamic of frequent confrontation and conflict.\textsuperscript{35} To Japan, emerging threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, cyber-attacks, and a shifting in the global balance of power to China, in particular, indicate a more severe security environment than past years. China’s defense budget, 3.3 times larger than Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY 2015, itself has increased 360 percent in the past 10 years, and 4,100 percent in the past 27 years.\textsuperscript{36} Japan has responded to these new-world threats by focusing its military efforts on both high-intensity, conventional conflicts, and maritime law enforcement capabilities for use in low-level disputes. In these efforts, maritime deterrence in defense of the current global, liberal economic status quo and the difficulty in responding to frequent territorial disputes divides Japan’s military resources between homeland defense and stabilization of the maritime domain.\textsuperscript{37} Japan has responded to this dilemma by recognizing the increased significance of coordination with its allies and global organizations, such as the UN, to portray Japan as a democratic and law-abiding country to make it easier for countries and institutions, such as ASEAN, to align themselves with Japan.\textsuperscript{38} Japan’s approach to ensuring its national and maritime security and strengthening its diplomatic efforts naturally extends to Africa, and has played an important role in allowing the JSDF to develop its capabilities in order to respond to the array of events unfolding there. Likewise, by taking advantage of opportunities in global conflict, revisionists can better pursue their domestic goal of achieving a more normal military in the process. In the next chapter, we will explore the historical context of

\textsuperscript{35} Ushirogata, “Japan’s Security Environment: Its Transition and Strategic Challenges.”

\textsuperscript{36} Katsuro Kitagawa, “Japan’s Security Policy,” (presentation at JMSDF Command and Staff College, Tokyo, on October 14, 2015).

\textsuperscript{37} Ushirogata, “Japan’s Security Environment: Its Transition and Strategic Challenges.”

\textsuperscript{38} Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara, “Japan’s Abe Administration,” 4.
Japan’s involvement in Africa, then apply the lessons learned from its foreign aid, peacekeeping, and defense-industry initiatives on the continent to gain a better understanding of its security-related motivations.
II. JAPAN IN AFRICA

The relationship between Africa and Japan may at first seem counterintuitive—after all, they are located on opposite sides of the world and have had relatively little historical interaction. Association with Africa, however, has evolved and strengthened over the years to reach a prominent place on Japan’s current foreign policy agenda. Starting with mere resource extraction in support of its economic engine in the 1960s, Japan increased its interest in solidifying political guarantees to those resources and gaining international prestige following the two major oil crises in the 1970s.³⁹ In the 1980s and 1990s, visits by Japanese foreign ministers to Africa signified the beginning of a boom in foreign aid and relationship-building. Incredibly, in 1989 and from 1991 to 1998, Japan’s aid contributions surpassed offerings from any other country in the world (as a percentage of GDP), establishing foreign aid as a key characteristic of Japan’s role in Africa.⁴⁰ Japan, eager to assume a greater role in ensuring peace and stability in the region, took part in its first African UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique in 1993, leading to participation in several others across the continent. Attention gradually shifted to integrating its development-focused aid, which reached U.S. $1.5 billion in 2008 despite economic setbacks at home, with investments increasing from U.S. $8.8 billion in 2001 to $34.3B in 2008.⁴¹ Japanese leaders also began to indicate their eagerness to establish improved ties in the region, beginning with Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit in 2001 and Prime Minister Mori’s visit in 2006.

Human rights, human security, and peace-related values have always had an influence on the formation of Japan’s policies in Africa, combining idealist elements with


⁴⁰ Ibid., 623.


realist designs based on national interest.\textsuperscript{42} Japan’s humanitarian involvement in the region started as far back as the 1950s, yet scant media attention on these efforts indicated a perception of Japan as a country that was atoning for its previous war exploits, or one that was simply being overshadowed by larger international efforts.\textsuperscript{43} In any case, its growing status as a leader in African development and the notion of Japan as the “intellectual leader in the field of African aid” granted it political dividends that would help to raise its political stature on the world stage.\textsuperscript{44} With a booming economy, Japan also benefited from its early aid contributions to geopolitically significant or resource-rich countries such countries as Egypt, Tanzania, Kenya, and South Africa. Its use of aid contributions as an overt economic tool ended, however, given the passage of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter of 1992 that explicitly tied Japanese aid to the hegemonic neoliberal order of the “West” and Japan.\textsuperscript{45} At its core, the ODA Charter attempts to submit recipient countries to the disciplines of neoliberalism with four outlined preconditions:

1. Recipients must “commit themselves to the adoption of free-market economies.”
2. Recipients must promote democratization and human rights.
3. Recipients must consider environmental conservation in their development.
4. Recipients must curtail military expenditures and not use aid for military purposes.\textsuperscript{46}

The ODA Charter signified a fundamental change in Japan’s approach to Africa and soon resulted in Japan’s suspending its aid to China in 1996 due to that country’s military exercises in the Strait of Taiwan, and its later suspending aid to Sudan, Nigeria, China, and Indonesia due to their membership in the Non-Aligned Movement.\textsuperscript{47} With the passage of the ODA Charter, Japan’s foreign policy became aligned with the neoliberal order of the “West” and Japan, and its aid was used as an economic tool to further its geopolitical interests in the developing world.\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Howard P. Lehman, editor, “Japan and Africa: Globalization and Foreign Aid in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,” Routledge, New York, 2010, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Rose, “Discourses on Japan and China in Africa,” 229.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 623.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 615–24.
\end{itemize}
and Gambia due to associated Charter violations. At the same time, Japan’s promotion of neoliberal democracies in Africa naturally led it gradually to direct its aid to the combination of economically profitable and politically like-minded countries. On the normalization front, Japan’s efforts to achieve legitimacy through the liberal internationalist order likewise helped to insulate it from accusations that Japan’s revisionism would bring it back to its pre-war militaristic policies.

The common medium through which Japan’s aid donations to Africa are now directed is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), a multilateral forum initiated by Japan in 1993 and co-hosted by the UN Development Program, the World Bank, and the African Union Commission (AUC). With heads of state, international governments, donors, private companies, and civil society organizations in attendance, TICAD, now held every 3 years starting in 2016, is a vital extension of Japan’s Afro-Asian bloc diplomacy. By granting specified countries duty-free access to exports destined for Japan, it signifies Japan’s attempt to bring Africa into the global economy by promoting links between African and Japanese investors. In essence, it aligns Japan’s aid contributions, now one of its primary foreign policy enablers, with its own unique economic neoliberalism agenda by “adapting Asian models [of development] to the African setting,” as indicated by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). This creates an alternate development model somewhere in between Western neoliberal economics and the loose economic governance offered by China. The next TICAD summit (TICAD VI), scheduled for August 27–28, 2016, will take place in Nairobi, Kenya, and will be the first to be held in Africa. Its being held in Kenya is no accident—Japan’s contributions to Kenya include annual aid commitments of U.S. $200–300 million, U.S. $100 million in grants and technical cooperation in 2013, and direct

47 Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 624.
48 Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara, “Japan’s Abe Administration,” 8.
50 Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 621.
involvement in such projects as the Mombasa Port and country-wide power generation upgrades.\textsuperscript{52}

Japan’s perception as a developed but non-imperial power has made it an especially attractive lender to Africa, allowing Japan to incorporate foreign aid, peacekeeping, business, and now security to achieve its foreign policy goals. The first use of Japan’s status as a “lender of first resort” to propel a security agenda, however, actually took place in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, after Japan contributed to the successful anti-piracy mission in the Straits of Malacca through the Regional Cooperation on Agreement on Combating Piracy Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) program, the world’s first regional organization established solely to combat piracy.\textsuperscript{53} Through financial assistance, the donation of defense-related equipment, and the coordination of anti-piracy efforts among several Southeast Asian nations, this security initiative not only allowed Japan to secure a vital transit point for its merchant fleet, but also utilized its civil law enforcement arm, the JCG, for the first time overseas. This legacy continues today with Japan’s extensive financial contributions to African security initiatives to ensure uninterrupted trade access and to promote a stable environment suitable to business interests. Indeed, there are increasingly more business interests to protect: from 2001 to 2008, Japan’s trade with Africa increased from U.S. $8.8 billion to U.S. $34.3 billion, representing a 366 percent increase in African exports to Japan and a 200 percent increase in Japanese exports to Africa.\textsuperscript{54}

Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to the Ivory Coast, Mozambique, and Ethiopia from January 10–14, 2014, was particularly indicative of Japan’s comprehensive and renewed interest in the continent. With meetings with thirteen heads of state on several occasions, this trip was the first full-scale visit to Africa by a Japanese prime minister in


\textsuperscript{54} Alam and Gupta, “Destination Africa,” 192–93.
8 years, and the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to Francophone West Africa. Considered regional entry points by Japan, the three host countries welcomed a total of thirty-three Japanese companies, organizations, and universities accompanied by the Prime Minister, who himself signed a total of fourteen agreements. These agreements largely aim to secure raw materials, promote local investment, and guarantee a stable energy source for Japan, especially given the setbacks from the nuclear disaster in Fukushima.

Mozambique, with one of the largest natural gas fields in the world and one of the largest coking coal fields in Africa, provides an excellent example of a preferred aid recipient that, through its vital natural resource exports, sees a vested security interest from Japan. As a country in which Japan had previously conducted UN operations in, Japan’s substantial investments in Mozambique led President Guebuza of Mozambique to applauded Japan’s leading role in Africa’s development as a “proactive contributor” in regional and global peace and stability. These investments include Mitsubishi Corporation’s partnership with Mozaal, a major joint project in the country, leading to the building of an aluminum smelter that remains the largest industry in the country to-date. Japan also plans to invest an additional U.S. $670 million in ODA on the development of Mozambique’s resource-rich Nacala Corridor region.

At his last stop at the headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abe—by highlighting its value of human resources and creative


56 “Prime Minister Abe’s Visit to Africa (Outline and Outcomes).”


58 “Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe at the Mozambique-Japan Investment Forum.”

ingenuity—appealed to African nations to incorporate Japan’s unique approach to development in their future development plans. In his keynote address, “Japan’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Strengthening Each Individual, One by One,” Prime Minister Abe referred to a gradual cultural shift toward Japanese work practices and business collaboration, increasingly enjoyed by Southeast Asian countries, as now emerging in Africa.\textsuperscript{60} Ethiopia is also important to Japan as an intermediary in discussions on peacekeeping operations in South Sudan through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).\textsuperscript{61}

Japan’s extensive aid contributions in Africa, now mainly granted to promising states willing to incorporate the Japanese model of development, take on a regional perspective as Japan hopes to achieve wider political appeal on the continent by also contributing to “outlying countries,” or those countries that have not yet seen substantial aid contributions from Japan, in the hope of incorporating them into the Japanese model.\textsuperscript{62} In 2011, for instance, Japan was one of the first countries to announce its assistance to Mali at the outset of its civil war with Islamist militants.\textsuperscript{63} At a speech to the African Union in 2014, Prime Minister Abe offered U.S. $320 million in total funds directed to conflict resolution and disaster response in such areas as South Sudan (U.S. $25 million), the Sahel region (U.S. $83.4 million), and the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (U.S. $3 million), while doubling the amount of Enhanced Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) loans (which are co-financed by Japan and the African Development Bank).\textsuperscript{64} In conjunction with government efforts, some private companies are also investing in outlying countries, such as Yamaha


\textsuperscript{61} “Prime Minister Abe’s Visit to Ethiopia (Outline and Outcomes),” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/et/page18e_000045.html.

\textsuperscript{62} Alam and Gupta, “Destination Africa,” 196.

\textsuperscript{63} “Japan’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Strengthening Each Individual, One by One.”

\textsuperscript{64} “Prime Minister Abe’s Speech on the occasion of Banquet hosted by President of Cote d’Ivoire,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000024188.pdf.

“Japan’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Strengthening Each Individual, One by One.”
Corporation’s venture to teach Mauritanian nationals shipbuilding techniques, giving that country its first modern shipyard.65

An analysis of Japan’s military activities in Africa would not be complete without also considering China’s growing influence in the region given the strategic rivalry between the two countries. For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, China and Japan employed dissimilar strategies in Africa—Japan’s ties, at least on the surface, were non-political and focused on raw materials, while China overtly promoted Maoism in the 1970s then afterwards retreated from Africa during its economic modernization program at home.66 It was not until the 1990s that both countries recognized the potential of Africa as a useful tool to support their respective political goals in the international system which required the facilitation of a sympathetic support base across Africa.67

China’s current approach to Africa generally provides an alternative to the “aid with conditions” approach, used by some Western nations and Japan in varying degrees, by stressing its non-interference in domestic politics. For this reason, among others, politically unstable and corrupt regimes in Africa have been more than willing to open their doors to Chinese investment. Prime Minister Li Peng indicated this position as early as 1990 by stating that, “no country is allowed to impose its will on other countries [or] to interfere in the international affairs of developing countries, or pursue power politics in the name of human rights, freedom, and democracy.”68 Capable of exploiting its status as a supposedly besieged and non-imperial country itself undergoing development, China poses a direct challenge to Japan’s once-unique position as Asia’s primary aid provider in Africa.69 Africa naturally serves as an additional venue for competition between the two countries, and this is exacerbated by China and Japan’s strained relations at home, originating mainly from the challenge posed by a more powerful China to Asia’s post-

65 “Japan’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Strengthening Each Individual, One by One.”
66 Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 615–16.
67 Ibid., 616.
68 Ibid., 618.
69 Lehman, Japan and Africa: Globalization and Foreign Aid in the 21st Century, 1.
Cold War security arrangement and its assertive island seizing operations in the East and South China Seas. A general consensus in Chinese sources criticizes Japan’s apparent fears of being left behind in Africa by a rapidly growing China and accuses Japan of fabricating prerogatives to transform itself into a normal power.\textsuperscript{70} Because China represents increased competition for strategic influence in the broader international community, Japan’s current mission commitments in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan risk being overshadowed by China’s overwhelming economic and political initiatives.\textsuperscript{71} To further explore this Japanese concern, an examination of China’s activities in Africa relative to the two JSDF missions in the Gulf of Aden and South Sudan will be presented in the respective case studies.

If Prime Minister Abe’s trip to Africa can serve as any indication, it would suggest a refocus of Japan’s efforts in Africa to a few key states, those that represent viable complements to Japanese aid and investment, which in turn showcase the Japanese model to other states across the continent. This development-focused strategy would therefore differ from previous aid-focused efforts that carried with them more explicit diplomatic goals.\textsuperscript{72} In any case, Japan’s disproportionate economic assistance to Africa and its creation of and participation in regional multilateral organizations has undoubtedly brought the level of its political power closer to its well-established economic power. Aside from just promising economic benefits, Africa therefore represents to Japan a viable opportunity to increase its international status, evolve into a “normal nation,” and enhance its soft power through the marketing of its own development model.\textsuperscript{73} While the Japanese public, media, and government previously had little perceived incentive to engage with Africa other than resource extraction, Africa’s economic, political, and geo-strategic relevance to Japan’s larger foreign policy goals has increased and now demands attention.

\textsuperscript{70} Rose, “Discourses on Japan and China in Africa,” 226.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 222.
\textsuperscript{72} Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 626.
\textsuperscript{73} Rose, “Discourses on Japan and China in Africa,” 226.
III. THREE OUTCOMES AND ASSOCIATED HYPOTHESES

Japan’s two current JSDF missions in Africa—the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan—provide useful case studies through which to determine whether JSDF activities in Africa challenge established security doctrine and in turn contribute to furthering a normalization agenda. Given our understanding of the general normalization debate and Japan’s overall geo-political strategy in Africa thus far, each of the case studies should fall into one of the following three categories: 1) The mission contributed, and will continue to contribute to normalization, 2) The mission may have initially contributed to normalization, but now finds itself locked in the specific mission set for which it was assigned, or 3) The mission did not make any substantive contributions to normalization.

An initial observation of Japan’s military response in the Gulf of Aden, unprecedented and outside of the construct of the UN, leads me to hypothesize that this mission contributed, and will contribute to, expanding the role of the JSDF. As multinational operations there continue indefinitely and Japan slowly increases its footprint in Djibouti, it is perhaps safe to assume a more dedicated presence that could support any number of operations that themselves promote a more normal military. Japan’s participation in the UN mission in South Sudan, however, represents a more conventional path to normalization that has been utilized in some form or another since the 1990s. This leads me to hypothesize that this mission, like all other UN missions, incrementally contributes to normalization but that its mission scope limits other opportunities to expand the role of the JSDF, thus rendering itself locked into the specific mission set for which it was assigned. To explore these hypotheses, we begin with the Gulf of Aden case study.
IV. CASE STUDY I: GULF OF ADEN

A. AN OVERVIEW OF SOMALIA-BASED PIRACY

The Horn of Africa, once a relative economic backwater, lies astride the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime energy transport artery in which, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), 3.8 million barrels of crude oil pass through each day, making it the world’s 4th busiest maritime chokepoint.74 Djibouti, nestled close to the narrow Mandeb Strait that links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, has thus become an important and relatively stable beachhead in the region, occupying a strategic location that sees 10 percent of the world’s oil exports and 20 percent of its commercial exports pass by each year (see Figure 1).75 Piracy is a major concern for Japan and other nations that are heavily dependent on sea lanes to ensure their ongoing national prosperity and security. In 2007, Japan imported 99.6% of its oil, 100% of its coal, and 96.4% of its natural gas, with virtually all of it transported through waters deemed unsafe by the Joint War Committee of Lloyds of London.76 Japan’s merchant fleet is also the second largest in the world, with 3,751 ships over 1,000 gross tons as of January 1, 2010.77 The number of pirate attacks around the Horn of Africa gradually rose until reaching the same levels experienced at the height of piracy in Southeast Asia in 2007–08, and then nearly doubled again in 2010 (219 attacks total).78 Starting with the attack on the chemical tanker Golden Nori off the coast of Somalia in 2008, several Japanese-owned ships were hijacked, elevating piracy to a top foreign policy issue in Japan.

77 Ibid., 205.
78 Ibid., 204.
The business of piracy in the region demonstrated itself to not only be a viable but an especially lucrative enterprise: from 2005 to 2013, pirates were rewarded with average annual ransoms of U.S. $53 million. Even more incredible was the often overlooked U.S. $18 billion in annual increased trade costs associated with insurance requirements, altered trade routes, and increased cruising speeds, as well as the U.S. $1 billion to U.S. $1.3 billion in annual military costs associated with anti-piracy efforts footed by the international community. Somalia’s giant scale, almost the length of the entire eastern seaboard of the United States, and its porous borders naturally contribute to a lack of governance that pirates can exploit. Mogadishu’s continuous effort to build a central regime via the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) also runs counter to the autonomous, decentralized, fluid, and traditional nature of the Somali clan culture. Clans quickly aligned, dissolved, then realigned on numerous occasions to adapt to the rapidly

81 Ibid.

changing political landscape resulting from state collapse in 1991, the subsequent rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Ethiopian military occupation, and the rise of the Islamic insurgency. Continuous unrest provided the necessary weapons needed for the pirate attacks and a certain moral justification for piracy—from the Somali perspective, outside forces had unnecessarily intervened in Somali affairs, as evidenced by the sudden pullout of U.S. forces, the subsequent loss of foreign aid, and the destruction of the ICU, which led to another violent insurgency. Though other illicit trades prospered in the south of Somalia in this environment, the southern region of the country was actually too unstable to establish the complex patronage networks needed to cash in on piracy. Mogadishu, as well as many of Somalia’s bordering countries, were therefore not as concerned with infringements on international trade and perceived the threat posed by piracy to be distant in nature. Business links between pirates and officials in Puntland, the semi-autonomous region in Northeast Somalia, however, were firmly established, and capitalized on this lucrative business while it still remained economically viable. Puntland provided the pirates their much-needed free access to the coast, and protection against law enforcement officials and competing criminal groups.

Roger Middleton from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, also recognized Puntland’s role in the piracy problem, stating that “Top Puntland officials benefit from piracy, even if it might not be instigating it…all significant political actors are likely benefiting from piracy.” Djibouti, a small but strategically-located country adjacent to Somalia, presented a viable base of operations from which they could best address this threat.

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B. THE GULF OF ADEN MISSION

The Japanese contribution to anti-piracy efforts includes the deployment of two JMSDF destroyers and daily patrols by two P-3C aircraft, mainly in the vicinity of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. While the ships utilize the Djibouti Harbor, a P-3C squadron operates from Japan’s first overseas base since World War II, officially entitled the “Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy Mission in Djibouti.” This “facility,” whose name implies a short-term presence, is semi-permanent in design and located adjacent to the Djibouti International Airport, employing roughly two hundred personnel. Japan’s military investment and activities in the region distinguish it as being one of the most active countries in the fight against Somalia-based piracy, achieving a near-constant sea presence and flying the most reconnaissance missions of any other nation. As a mission not limited by the scope of the UN or any specific mission set, Japan’s operations in Djibouti represent a new and unconventional path to normalization while also providing a venue for future operational commitments.

Pressure to intervene in the region first came from the Japanese Shipowners’ Association (JSA) in 2006 after it deemed the area a significant threat to Japanese ships and crew. Soon afterwards, in 2007, the Golden Nori, a Japanese-owned chemical tanker, was hijacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia. Merely expressing a hope that “the government would pass legislation to deploy the JMSDF,” the JSA’s proposal was later supported by a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) and growing international participation in the anti-piracy effort. Before any such legislation could be passed, however, the constraints imposed on out-of-area missions by Article IX, including an

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interpretation at the time that limited the right of collective self-defense, had to once
again be reexamined. In Japan, the Diet must also approve a special law required for each
proposed mission along with annual votes granting extensions to that mission. The LDP
soon backed a proposed measure to deploy forces to “keep in step with the international
society,” with Prime Minister Taro Aso adding that piracy constitutes a crime as opposed
to an act of war and that “the protection of the Japanese people’s property is the most
fundamental duty of the government.”88 He also framed the debate in Japan’s larger geo-
political context, indicating that for resource-dependent Japan it was a matter of “life and
death” and that the region was in the midst of a “dramatic increase” in the number of
pirate attacks.89 Opposition parties, some of which reject the idea of a self-defense force
altogether, capitalized on the anti-militarist sentiment generally present in the Japanese
public to prevent any supposed misuse of military power. At the start of deliberations,
Mizuho Fukushima, leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), stated that “the
dispatch could very well induce the first use of armed force overseas by the Self-Defense
Forces” and that “to allow the dispatch under the circumstances would become a
precedent that would allow the dispatch of the JSDF anywhere, anytime, at any cost.”90
Rebuttals such as these from opposition members obliged some government figures who
had been actively pursuing a greater role for the JSDF to appeal to international
pressure—by this time, China, South Korea, and eighteen other countries had already
deployed forces to the area. The Yomiuri Shimbun, a center-right-leaning newspaper, was
also publishing stories on Japan’s lack of contributions compared to China.

To analyze the potential for sustained operations in the area while deliberations
were taking place, a field investigation team consisting of both MOD and JSDF personnel
visited Bahrain, Djibouti, Oman, and Yemen in February and early March, 2009.91 Soon
afterward, on March 14, 2009, and before any new laws were passed, two destroyers

90 Ibid.
91 “Field Investigation in Countries around the Gulf of Aden,” Japan Ministry of Defense, last
were deployed to the region. Under Article 82 of the JSDF Law, the deployment of JSDF units without prior approval from the Diet is allowed when “special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea.”\textsuperscript{92} This deployment coincided with the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), making Japan a founding member and granting it significant influence in future decision-making. The CGPCS, an international organization established in 2010 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and sanctioned by UNSC resolutions, coordinates military, policing, legal, and capacity-building efforts among various stakeholders participating in the anti-piracy mission.\textsuperscript{93} As a founding member, Japan is not only an active participant in the formation of legal frameworks of other countries in the region, but also benefits from international recognition that grants it a measure of legitimacy to conduct missions that could easily be construed as violating collective self-defense restrictions and other laws limiting military operations. Despite this legitimacy gained from CGPCS, Article 82 of the JSDF Law is not intended for long-term operations. To the LDP, a permanent law to allow the JMSDF to protect any ship, regardless of nationality, was needed to provide the legal foundation for a long-term mission in the Gulf of Aden.\textsuperscript{94} After only one week of debate, the Japanese House of Representatives approved such a bill on April 23, 2009, albeit one that authorized non-permanent deployments due to opposition pressures within the Lower House. The bill, however, still had to be considered by the House of Councillors (the Upper House), which at the time was majority-ruled by the opposition party, the DPJ. Despite the subsequent rejection in the House of Councillors, the LDP was able to pass the measure in a second vote in the House of Representatives in mid-June 2009, authorizing full participation in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and essentially allowing the JMSDF to become a fully-functioning, independent deploying force.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Vosse, “An Independent Deployer in Informal Organizational Structures,” 2.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 4.


\textsuperscript{95} Vosse, “An Independent Deployer in Informal Organizational Structures,” 3.
This new measure was Law No. 55, officially entitled the *Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy* or Anti-Piracy Law, and granted the government the political, legal, and moral authority to deploy military forces to the affected area.\(^\text{96}\) As opposed to the *Japanese Seafarers Laws* that only defined “serious marine accidents,” the Anti-Piracy Law clearly defined maritime piracy and granted the government the rights and responsibilities to protect commercial vessels from this newly-defined threat.\(^\text{97}\) This new legislation also allows Japan to respond better to so-called “gray-zone contingencies,” or threatening actions by state or non-state actors.\(^\text{98}\) By granting the JMSDF to take action against supposedly non-state actors to protect foreign ships, previously unthinkable, the Anti-Piracy Law would later influence the ability to fully exercise collective self-defense in March 2016.\(^\text{99}\) Incidentally, the new law also allowed the JSA and other industry leaders to forge deeper relations with the MOD in the process of deliberations, providing an alternate channel to the government aside from its primary go-between, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT).\(^\text{100}\) Even shortly after the passing of Japan’s Anti-Piracy Law, in December 2013, the JMSDF destroyer JS *Samidare* was granted authorization by the government to join Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 outside of the IRTC on its anti-piracy patrols.\(^\text{101}\)

Were it not for the success of the ongoing JCG-led anti-piracy mission in Southeast Asia and the legal foundation those operations established to address non-traditional security threats, the Japanese mission in the Gulf of Aden may not have been able to materialize in the first place. As a civilian agency under the MLIT and a non-military entity according to Article 25 of JCG law, the JCG was a useful medium to expand Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia, a region once apprehensive of Japanese-led

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\(^{96}\) Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #5.”


\(^{98}\) Pryor, “Japan’s Security Policy Under Abe.”

\(^{99}\) Christopher Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, 88.

\(^{100}\) Michael Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #5.”

security initiatives. Overall, the use of the JCG for anti-piracy missions in Southeast Asia showed that it was also capable of testing constitutional limitations, but most relevant was the JCG’s involvement in ReCAAP, the world’s first regional organization established solely to combat maritime piracy, and a future model for anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Experience in the implementation of ReCAAP in Southeast Asia, including the use of Information Sharing Centers (ISC) to facilitate the distribution of information across institutional boundaries, proved highly effective in coordinating international efforts. In the case of the CGPCS, these ISCs were located in Sana’a, Yemen, Mombasa, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and greatly improved the overall effectiveness of the anti-piracy mission.

The Gulf of Aden, however, was much farther away from Japan than Southeast Asia and presented its own unique challenges and legal considerations. A JCG-only deployment, aside from being impractical so far from home waters, is limited by the assets it has available to fulfill its numerous mission requirements. Nevertheless, the JCG needed to play a central role in the Gulf of Aden because in Japan, piracy is considered a criminal offense and therefore a law enforcement issue. Therefore, the JMSDF ships merely provide support to JCG officers acting under the original Japanese Coast Guard Law of 1953. Under the Anti-Piracy Law, only JCG officials, and not the JMSDF, could use weapons provided the “perpetrator or the ship disobeys other measures to deter and continues the acts of piracy and that there is probable cause to believe in the lack of any other appropriate measures to stop the navigation of that ship.” This authority differed from past missions, such as in Japan’s at-sea refueling mission in the Indian

104 Ibid., 4.
105 Ibid.
Ocean in support of America’s War on Terror and the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2011, in that the defense minister, with the approval of the prime minister, now had the power to direct JSDF units. Starting in March 2009, JCG personnel operated alongside JMSDF cohorts in the Gulf of Aden under the Anti-Piracy Law and Article 80 of the JCG Law, which delineated the JCG as a paramilitary force due to the practice of bringing the JCG under the Minister of Defense at times of JSDF mobilizations. The decision to send the JCG and the JSDF in this capacity was supported by opinion polls that showed a relatively high general public approval rating of 57 percent in favor of a JSDF response in the Gulf of Aden.

![A suspected pirate vessel is located by a Japanese P-3C that then reported the vessel’s location to a nearby Danish coalition warship. Gulf of Aden, November 12, 2011.](image)

**Figure 2. Suspected Pirates in the Gulf of Aden.**

As a civilian institution, the JCG was also used to provide security training to international partners and to export Japanese-made equipment to international law enforcement agencies before the reversal of Japan’s self-imposed ban on defense exports, including the donation of armed patrol vessels to Indonesia and the Philippines. Similarly, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a civilian government agency, played a key role in circumventing existing limitations on arms exports to bolster the security capabilities of various governments, some of which were in Africa. In the Japanese sense, arms could refer to military equipment or relatively inconspicuous

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109 Hribernik, “Japan Coast Guard (JCG) as a Foreign Policy Instrument in Southeast Asia.”
components with mainly civilian applications that nevertheless have some type of military use, as opposed to complete weapons systems. However, inconspicuous components such as sensors and aircraft parts are highly marketable and, aside from political reasons, important to Japan in increasing its industrial demand and providing access to defense-industry partners to utilize economies of scale. For much of Japan’s post-war history, however, arms exports were banned, given the “Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines” of 1967 and a collateral policy guideline in 1976, resulting in Japan’s arms exports’ never reaching any level of significance, aside from limited exports of dual-use technologies with China, Southeast Asia, and Africa in the 1960s. Self-imposed arms restrictions therefore forced Japan to develop its own indigenous capabilities just to be able to support the JSDF; however, many Japanese companies found it difficult to compete in the international marketplace for defense-related equipment, especially when Japan’s defense budgets reached all-time lows in the 1990s. Subsequently, lawmakers and industrialists sought various ways to increase international defense collaboration through the partial or total lifting of the arms export ban.

Some of the methods employed to chip away at the ban included a new interpretation by the MOD of a Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Statement of 2004 as authorizing joint research and development in anti-terrorism and anti-piracy related measures, as well as the export of new and used unarmed patrol craft to various countries, mostly in Southeast Asia and Africa. Prime Minister Abe also supported the export of non-lethal military equipment and the providing of training to civil authorities from

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111 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 73.

112 Ibid., 72.

113 Ibid., 73.

114 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 76.
various countries near areas affected by piracy. This practice placed the JICA, a government agency that normally promotes overseas development, in the somewhat awkward position of an intermediary inadvertently supporting external security operations. This new role for JICA nevertheless proved useful in opening new markets to Japanese arms, including efforts to bolster the Kenyan navy and, in 2013, to provide equipment support to a new international customer capable of addressing the piracy problem directly: Somalia. Similarly, the incorporation of Japan’s security efforts into the JICA development aid infrastructure also signified the entrenching of JSDF assets in Japan’s institutional framework in Africa. JICA was not initially focused on Djibouti, but this changed given the establishment of the Japanese facility there and the associated government efforts in securing Japan’s vital trade and energy routes through the region.

The new Japanese facility in Djibouti, costing about U.S. $40 million, was established on July 7, 2011; and at its opening ceremony, Akimitsu Ashida, president of the JSA, commended it as “a great deterrence against the pirates.” Though certainly that, it is also an unprecedented move for the Japanese, and can be thought of as a major step in the evolution of financial and capacity-building initiatives beginning with the First Gulf War, to support for America’s Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, and then the key role that the JCG played in ReCAAP in Southeast Asia. Japan’s experience with ReCAAP primarily led to its initiation of and significant support toward the international trust fund that finances anti-piracy efforts around the Horn of Africa, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Djibouti Code Trust Fund, otherwise known as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Japan’s initial contribution to the fund in 2011 of U.S. $14.6 million was by far the single largest amount donated by any country. This put Japan in a leading role in the financial support of humanitarian, reconstruction, and capacity-building missions in the area, a position it had grown more and more comfortable with as a world leader in foreign aid donations. This role, and its significant financial assistance,

115 Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report: JICA Officials Share Perspectives.”
116 Ibid.
117 “Japan’s Actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.”
allowed Japan to become directly involved in such local initiatives as the establishment of the Djibouti Regional Training Center (DRTC), with Japan providing U.S. $2.5 million of the required U.S. $2.628 million in associated costs. Japan’s commitment to this and other training and enforcement efforts in Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, and Somalia, coupled with ODA projects, has given it a significant voice in the affairs of East African states. For Japan, participation in anti-piracy missions and its extensive involvement in the institutional framework of the region has become an important exercise in joint operations outside of traditional UN peacekeeping operations.

C. SOMALIA-BASED PIRACY SINCE 2012

Starting in 2012, a sharp decrease in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia led many international observers to offer a cautious “job well done” for the safeguarding of strategic waterways in the area. A number of factors are cited in reducing incidents of piracy (“incidents” include vessels pirated, attacked, approached, or disrupted) from 265 in 2011, to 66 in 2012, 18 in 2013, and only two in 2014. These factors include international intervention in the form of naval patrols, the use of ship defense measures and private armed security teams, and the influence of a more stable Somali central government. By 2013, 60% of the vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, many of which were Japanese-owned ships, had armed guards. Though the use of armed guards had previously been out of the question before the piracy problem arose, revisions in 2013 to the Japanese Firearms and Swords Control Law, which granted the use of armed guards aboard Japanese flagged vessels, was highly influenced by other countries that now considered this a generally accepted practice when transiting through the area. The passing of this law was most likely influenced by the increasing usage of security.

120 Ibid., 10.
123 Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #3.”
personnel by other CGPCS nations and the 2011 IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct interim
guidance on this practice.

Even within Puntland the pirates were facing new threats: though many officials
there previously tolerated or even enabled piracy in the past, the government began to
support, at least formally, outside efforts to combat piracy to legitimize its hold on power
in the semi-autonomous region. The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a local
militia funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) outside of UN sanctions, had its own
operational successes, intercepting a North Korean vessel illegally dumping in local
waters, disrupting pirate bases on the ground, and, in December 2012, rescuing twenty-
two foreign sailors on board the vessel, MV Iceberg, from pirates—the first operations of
their kind in Somalia’s history.\textsuperscript{124} The recent improvements in maritime security,
however, have only allowed other nations to exploit Somalia’s territorial seas, mostly
through illegal fishing, which poses the greatest threat to the livelihoods of many Somalis
and is one of the main reasons large-scale piracy occurred in the first place. Abdiwahid
Mohamed Hersi, Chief Executive of Global Sea Food International, a company based in
Somalia, recognized this consequence by commenting that “If [the foreign navies] have a
mandate to protect the [shipping] lanes from the pirates, they have to protect the
resources of these poor people against illegal fishing.”\textsuperscript{125}

The Puntland government, not to mention the Somalia government, has
nonetheless turned much of its attention away from piracy to the large oil reserves
purported to exist in Puntland, and likewise overcoming the UN sanction that formally
blocks oil exploration there to avoid exacerbating domestic unrest in a country slowly
recovering from its long civil war. According to the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute
for Policy Studies, oil deposits in Puntland and Somaliland may amount to 110 billion
barrels (Saudi Arabia has 266 billion) prompting a resource race with several foreign

\textsuperscript{124} James M. Bridger, “Searching for a Somali Coastguard”. Center of International Maritime Security

\textsuperscript{125} Jillian Keenan, “Puntland is for Pirates”, Foreign Policy, last modified March 20, 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/20/Puntland-is-for-pirates/.
companies currently surveying the area. If successfully tapped outside of UN sanctions, however, there is a high probability that oil revenues would turn Somalia into the equivalent of other oil-dependent African “narco-states,” and not the proactive security partner that Japan and other countries are trying to mold. Nigeria’s dysfunctional oil industry, for example, and the region’s violent politics are considered the root cause of the violent grab-and-go style of West African piracy. In 2014, the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa accounted for 19% of pirate attacks worldwide, considered by some the next piracy “hotspot.” For now, it appears that Puntland, and Somalia in general, will continue to work with interested partners to expand its security infrastructure in order to increase its legitimacy, partly for the purpose of gaining control and access to its newfound oil and other natural resource riches.

The fact that the number of piracy-related incidents off the coast of Somalia has nearly reached zero begs the question of why the international security commitment there remains so high. From the first UN-authorized naval intervention in 2008, thirty nations have participated and twenty-four nations are now actively involved in anti-piracy missions. Likewise, there is no shortage of international donor states and organizations now flooding into Somalia—the UAE, United Kingdom, Norway, and Japan, as well as international organizations such as the European Union, NATO, IMO, and Djibouti Code of Conduct, have all indicated a willingness to help Somalia through local capacity-building efforts, such as the development of its own coastguard. On 10 November

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130 Bridger, “Searching for a Somali Coastguard”.
2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) reauthorized international naval action against piracy around Somalia, claiming that “while the threat from Somali pirates has declined, it still remains a matter of grave concern.” However, due to the fact that multilateral initiatives sponsored by major international institutions are generally inflexible, accompanied by specific conditions, and limited in their ability to operate on the ground in Somalia, private companies are often the ones to profit most from international security initiatives taking place at sea. For example, the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the UN Trust Fund for Somalia are well-funded and offer policy recommendations, but have yet to offer actual training or procurement solutions within Somalia. NATO’s *Ocean Shield* conducts exercises with Djibouti, Oman, and Yemen, but engagement with Somalia remains limited only to humanitarian assistance and consultation. Europe’s EUCAP NESTOR is mandated by the UN to assist Somalia directly but was limited to only providing coastguard and legal training to Djibouti, Kenya, and the Seychelles since 2012, though new field offices were recently established in Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

Rear Admiral Michael Franken, prior commander of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), stated that “it may take as much as a generation before anti-piracy operations will no longer be necessary.” Major General Thierry Caspar, prior commander of the French forces in Djibouti, recognized that “the answer [to comprehensive security in the region] is not on the sea but on the ground.” This consensus was also shared by Japan’s prior ambassador to Djibouti, Jun Shimmi, who indicated that “The reality is that we won’t find a just cause to withdraw for the foreseeable future,” adding that “Since there is neither a quick fix nor a panacea, Japan has no choice but to continue with our assistance to Somalia as measures to address the root cause of the problem.” Because the current mission in the Gulf of Aden exists to

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131 “U.N. Reauthorizes Anti-Piracy Ops.”
132 Bridger, “Searching for a Somali Coastguard.”
134 Kato, “SDF’s New Anti-Piracy Base Creates a Dilemma.”
135 “Japan’s Actions against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.”
fight the symptom, not the cause, of piracy, no one will be able to claim victory over piracy until the numerous problems that lead to it are resolved on the ground, which is unlikely to happen any time soon. The root cause of piracy in Somalia, whether recognized as illegal fishing, ongoing conflict, or general poverty, will indeed take many years to rectify, allowing Japan and other CGPCS nations to continue their engagement in the region and pursue their own interests.

Likewise, according to a senior official at Japan’s Ministry of Defense, Japan is eager to expand the utility of its facility in Djibouti in the near future “based on the government’s principle of ‘proactive pacifism,’ [claiming that] it is a natural matter of course to develop a strategy to utilize more of the JSDF’s lone foreign operational base.”136 This includes the future use of the facility for rescue missions in Africa and the Middle East, general emergencies, terrorism-related responses, and to serve as a logistics hub—all new capabilities beyond just the anti-piracy effort. This is likely in response to a number of Japanese civilians that were killed or injured recently in terrorist incidents in the region: one crewmember was injured on board the Japanese tanker M. Star (2010), ten engineers were killed in Algeria (2013), three tourists were killed in Tunisia (2015), and two reporters were executed in Syria (2015). Though the facility was built on a semi-permanent basis solely to support anti-piracy operations, the facility will most likely need to be expanded or improved to support these new missions. Along these lines, there is a strong concern in the government that the significant decrease in pirate attacks may lead to the eventual disbandment of the CGPCS altogether.137 Additionally, the increase in pirate attacks in West Africa, particularly near oil-rich Nigeria, may potentially shift international attention away from Japan’s significant security investments already made in East Africa to an area in which Japan has far less stake.138

138 Ibid.
D. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE GULF OF ADEN MISSION

The Gulf of Aden mission differs markedly from the past JSDF deployment to the Middle East in support of coalition forces, Operation Iraqi Freedom. On that mission, the JSDF fulfilled strictly support and humanitarian-oriented roles, and the mission was assumed to be short-term in the first place, finally being abruptly halted in 2007 when government opposition overruled a renewed deployment. On the other hand, considering the American withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 during the Somali Civil War, Japan’s closest ally will likely be unwilling to again commit forces to an operation within that country and therefore strongly supports Japan’s indefinite presence in the region. Likewise, the mission’s focus on peace and security, as well as the magic of the word “piracy,” makes it much more acceptable to the Japanese government and public. Pirate attacks, however, need to be kept in perspective: though damaging, pirate attacks affect only a tiny fraction of worldwide shipping, while it remains difficult for Japanese ships and planes to intervene and stop an actual attack before it takes place. Nevertheless, the piracy problem, Japan’s desire to increase its international commitments, and the strength of the ruling coalition were sufficient to influence the passing of several new laws that further reinterpreted the constitution and allowed Japan to become a major player in the region. This newfound “responsibility to protect” has essentially given Japan the legal right to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states and has moved the country into a new era of greater self-reliance.

Japan’s facility in Djibouti is indispensable to Japan’s continued efforts to expand its operational capabilities and display this greater self-reliance in Africa. In October 2013, Japan decided to increase the number of JSDF attachés/intelligence officers in Africa from two to nine, one of which is stationed in Djibouti, to better respond to crises in the region.139 As the position in Djibouti is not directly related to the anti-piracy mission, this suggests an intention to continue operating the base despite the lack of

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pirate activity. Japan’s successful anti-piracy operations afford it the opportunity to non-confrontationally demonstrate its expanding military capabilities in a somewhat regulated environment, but even this has begun to evolve. The Ministry of Defense recently decided that P-3C aircraft returning from anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia will favor refueling stops in countries bordering the South China Sea, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, as opposed to its previous stops in such countries as Singapore and Thailand. Recent high-level visits by the Defense Minister in May 2014 and January 2015 and by the Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense in May 2015 to Djibouti indicate that the security institution of Japan will still play a big part in the region.

Japan’s contributions to the Gulf of Aden mission undoubtedly had a ‘boomerang effect’ on Japanese policy-making, making it easier for security-related initiatives to materialize. These include the establishment of a new NSC in 2013, a new Dynamic Joint Defense Force doctrine, a gradual increase in defense spending, the relatively assertive defense policy outlined in both the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Five-year Defense Program for 2014 through 2018, and finally the June 2014 decision to allow the use of collective-defense measures. The anti-piracy mission also played a significant role in challenging long-held beliefs in Japanese society regarding the use of weapons in self-defense. More generally, Japan’s operations in the Gulf of Aden have influenced domestic policy-making, laws concerning the deployment of its military forces, the enhancement of JSDF and JCG capabilities, and altered prior interpretations of the peace constitution. Some who wished to preserve Japan’s image as a peace-loving nation yet also supported JSDF deployments pointed out that constitutional reinterpretation was necessary in this case as it emphasized the building of civilian law

enforcement (through the JCG) and presents a non-conventional alternative (a military force under strict regulations) for other states to adapt.

E. THE CHINA FACTOR—PULLING NORMALIZATION FROM THE OUTSIDE?

In the last part of the Gulf of Aden case study, I will explore China’s economic and military activities in Djibouti in relation to its larger strategy in Africa, providing an idea of how Japan’s main rival could be prompting Japan’s own military normalization. Japan’s operations in Djibouti are of keen interest to China, itself a country with limited experience in executing overseas military operations and interested in the idea of utilizing anti-piracy and counterterrorism missions as justification for a military presence relatively safe from international criticism. As with Japan, China’s military activities in the Gulf of Aden, starting in 2008, have, according to U.S. Army General David Rodriguez, granted it “a more confident blue-water navy and given China a strategic win in a venue outside its traditional comfort zone.” No stranger to Japan’s legal reinterpretations on the use of its military force, China has created new national security and antiterrorism laws which, according to the officer in charge of the Central Military Commission’s Legal Affairs Bureau, allow it to “[carry] out UN-led peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief, maritime escorts, and military operations to protect China’s overseas interests.” Essentially, these laws authorize the deployment of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) assets overseas to protect Chinese assets and personnel abroad.

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145 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”

146 Ghiselli, “China’s First Overseas Base in Djibouti.”

147 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
Policy Paper,” released in December 2015, emphasizes the importance of close military and counterterrorism cooperation with its regional partners.148

China, like Japan, is also interested in bolstering its presence in Djibouti to provide the necessary capabilities to safeguard its citizens living and working in the region and to respond to nontraditional threats. For example, China employed its naval forces to evacuate 35,680 of its citizens from Libya in 2011, and later utilized Djibouti’s port facilities when it evacuated 629 Chinese and other foreign nationals during Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen in March 2015, soon after the China-Djibouti defense agreement was signed.149 The growing number of Chinese workers in Africa, currently about one million, highlights its desire to establish regional facilities to better support non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), among other capabilities.150 Chinese workers have also been the target of terrorist attacks such as the one that took place in Bamako, Mali, in November 2015, killing three engineering executives, and the execution of a Chinese citizen by the self-proclaimed Islamic State.151 An increased military presence to respond to these threats will also allow China to better exert its influence in the region, such as through its participation in naval exercises with Russia in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 using the same ships that took part in its Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols.152

A relative latecomer to Djibouti, China gained military access to the country in 2014 when Djiboutian Defense Minister Hassan Darar Houffaneh signed a defense agreement with Chinese Minister of National Defense General Chang Wanquan.153 In exchange, Defense Minister Houffaneh asked for military hardware to “safeguard security in the country and help consolidate peace and security in the sub-region,” for

148 Ghiselli, “China’s First Overseas Base in Djibouti.”
149 Braude and Jiang, “Djibouti is Jumping.”
150 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
151 Ghiselli, “China’s First Overseas Base in Djibouti.”
153 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
which China donated one of its domestically-built MA-60 turboprop airplanes and one of its WZ551 armored personnel carriers a mere four months later. In early November 2015, General Fang Fenghui, Director of the PLA’s General Staff Department and therefore the PLA’s top operations officer, visited Djibouti to negotiate the establishment of a Chinese base to be constructed in Obock, an isolated coastal town in the northern part of the country (see Figure 2). In a symbolic gesture, President Guelleh granted permission to this request just one day after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s own unprecedented visit, also commenting on the Japanese effort by bluntly saying that “the Japanese want to protect themselves from piracy—and now the Chinese also want to protect their interests.” As the United States is paying U.S. $63 million annually to rent the land on which Camp Lemonnier stands compared to the projected rent for the Chinese base of U.S. $100 million, Djibouti has much to gain from serving as the host to global power rivalries.

Figure 3. Djibouti.

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154 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
When granting permission to the Chinese request, President Guelleh also made it clear that “The Djibouti government will always adhere to the ‘one-China’ principle” and remain friends.\(^{158}\) The willingness of African leaders to entertain China’s aims of diplomatically isolating Taiwan, including South Africa’s recent recognition of Beijing’s sovereignty over the island, provides strong evidence of China’s current political clout in the region—currently, only eight out of fifty-three nations in Africa officially recognize the Taipei government.\(^{159}\) Africa’s willingness to appease Chinese interests is not entirely new—many African elites were hesitant to overtly criticize Beijing after the Tiananmen Square incident and likewise displayed suspicion of the Western world’s response given the large amount of Chinese aid received. China, more willing to capitalize on this political tool immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident, scrambled to win over even more allies by increasing its overseas aid from U.S. $223.4 million in 1989 to U.S. $374.6 million in 1990.\(^{160}\) Having more support across Africa also means that China can better resist Western minority pressures in international organizations, such as the UN.\(^{161}\)

Unconstrained by constitutional limitations, China has placed an increased emphasis on securing its growing overseas interests. According to its bi-annual defense paper (\textit{China’s Military Strategy}, released May 2015), its armed forces “will actively participate in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China’s overseas interests,” and “China’s armed forces will work harder to create a favorable strategic posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means.”\(^{162}\) In January 2016, the PLA conducted an exercise involving thousands of marines and special-operations personnel in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,


\(^{159}\) Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 622.

\(^{160}\) Ibid.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 618.

\(^{162}\) Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.” Braude and Jiang, “Djibouti is Jumping.”
an area similar to the terrain of much of North and East Africa, suggesting preparations for future contingency operations in Africa.\textsuperscript{163} Most of all, China’s new base and its associated increased military presence forces other countries to seriously consider China’s presence on the continent, something that, according to some Chinese commentators, did not happen when England, France, and the United States stepped outside of the UN construct in Libya and allowed the destruction of U.S. $1 billion in Chinese assets.\textsuperscript{164}

In 2011, China’s investment on the continent reached U.S. $3.17 billion, compared to Japan’s U.S. $460 million, according to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and Chinese trade data.\textsuperscript{165} Likewise, Africa’s markets have seen U.S. $90 billion in Chinese investments alone between 2000 and 2013, and are estimated to reach an incredible U.S. $400 billion total by 2020.\textsuperscript{166} Though bilateral trade between China and Djibouti only amounts to about U.S. $200 million per year (though greater than the U.S. $10 million in bilateral trade between Japan and Djibouti), Chinese investment in Djibouti’s infrastructure since 2015 has reached roughly U.S. $14 billion as China attempts to ensure better access to Africa’s bigger markets.\textsuperscript{167} Djibouti’s local interests have been met in part by China’s construction of its presidential palace, its main administration building, a national war memorial, a stadium, and two sports complexes. More noteworthy development was achieved, however, when two companies—China Railway Group (CREC) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC)—successfully restored rail service between Djibouti and Merebe Mermersa.

\textsuperscript{163} Braude and Jiang, “Djibouti is Jumping.”
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Braude and Jiang, “Djibouti is Jumping.”

south of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2015. As 70 percent of landlocked Ethiopia’s total trade was previously transported to the Port of Djibouti using trucks, the rail link is a welcome sight to both Chinese and local interests. The Doraleh Container Terminal, outside of Djibouti City, handles three million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU) of cargo per year with its 18-meter draft and 1,050 quay, giving it one of the highest capacities of all of East Africa. China Merchant Holdings (International), the port operations division of China Merchants Group, acquired two-thirds of this container terminal for U.S. $590 million and a 23.5 percent stake in the Port of Djibouti for approximately U.S. $185 million. As Chinese influence grows in Djibouti, it is only natural that its ability to influence the country’s decision-making will grow along with it.

According to Japan’s NSS, Japan seeks to construct a “mutually beneficial relationship [with China] based on common strategic interests” and encourages China to “play a responsible and constructive role for peace, stability, and prosperity.” It will indeed be a challenge to find common strategic interests in the region that both countries can share. China’s recent basing initiative in Djibouti, which will be its first permanent base in the Indian Ocean, will go well beyond a convenient place to berth ships conducting anti-piracy missions, and instead signifies a turning point in China’s overall strategy—one that is increasingly sidelining Japan, still seen as mainly a donor state, and other economic competitors in the region. This has already taken place on the economic front, with Japan-Africa trade doubling from 2001 to 2009 but Chinese trade expanding nearly 1000 percent in the same time. In 2011, China’s investment was about seven times that of Japan, while Chinese exports to Africa were about five times greater. With further dredging and construction, the port facility at Obock, already improved with

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168 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
169 Ghiselli, “China’s First Overseas Base in Djibouti.”
170 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
171 Kitagawa, “Japan’s Security Policy.”
prior American investment, can grant China exclusive access to a proposed airstrip and provide an alternate access point to African trade. According to U.S. Army General David Rodriquez, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, China’s desire for “long-term military access at a quasi-base level is a massive about-face,” while Djibouti is “helping to catalyze a potentially significant symbolic and substantive shift in China’s foreign security policy.” Once a relatively obscure country, Djibouti may prove to be a vital link to Xi Jinping’s signature maritime “silk road” and an enabler of China’s Middle East policy as it seeks to attain superpower status in the security realm.

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173 Singh, “Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean.”
174 Ghiselli, “China’s First Overseas Base in Djibouti.”
V. CASE STUDY II: PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTH SUDAN

A. JAPAN AND PEACEKEEPING

The U.S.-Japan security alliance formulated in the 1950s and Japan’s pacifist norms granted Japan a security umbrella under which it could concentrate on its postwar economic recovery, but would leave it with limited means to gain international political stature commensurate with its growing economic strength.\textsuperscript{175} Japan eventually chose the UN to achieve this goal, an internationally sanctioned organization that would take center stage in Japan’s continued diplomatic efforts to regain the world’s trust. Starting in the early post-Cold War period, Prime Minister Nakasone and other revisionists realized that Japan’s “narrowly-defined security policy was incongruent with the new security culture of the early post-Cold War period.”\textsuperscript{176} As early as 1980, a special study group to the MOFA suggested that the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in Namibia, with its absence of hostilities, would allow Japan to “play a more positive and broader-ranging role in peacekeeping operations.”\textsuperscript{177} The nature of the mission, limited to monitoring elections, also fit into Japan’s promotion of liberal democratic norms.\textsuperscript{178} It was not until 1989 that thirty-one Japanese electoral observers were actually sent in-country, but this opened Africa up to new possibilities for Japanese engagement. Since UNTAG, Japan has utilized UN peacekeeping missions to include the JSDF in roles not usually associated with military operations in order to slowly expand the scope of their operations to address non-contemporary threats.\textsuperscript{179}

Increased political pressure to find ways to normalize the JSDF in the 1990s resulted in an apparent regime shift in Japanese politics which to revisionists,

\textsuperscript{175} Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 620.
\textsuperscript{178} Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 624.
\textsuperscript{179} Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization,” 910.
peacekeeping was seen as the most appropriate and least controversial method of international engagement that allowed it to send its military forces overseas. In 1991, JMSDF minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf in support of the American-led mission, Operation Desert Storm. The next year, the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (also known as the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL)) opened the door to JSDF involvement, not merely observation, in UN peacekeeping operations starting in Cambodia in 1992. In Angola, three Japanese election observers monitored presidential and legislative elections held there in 1992 as part of the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). From 1993 to 1995, Japan dispatched roughly 150 personnel to Mozambique to serve as staff officers, logistics specialists, and electoral observers in what would be Japan’s third overall UN mission, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Though the mission in Mozambique attracted less public attention than Japan’s unprecedented use of JSDF forces in the UN mission in Cambodia a short time earlier, Japan’s next African UN mission in the eastern part of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) proved to be more difficult and potentially dangerous. This mission utilized elements of the GSDF in providing medical services, road construction, and logistics expertise as part of Japan’s first humanitarian relief operation in aiding refugees fleeing from genocide in neighboring Rwanda. Japanese personnel returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006, when it contributed thirteen election observers to presidential and legislative elections taking place in Kinshasa and later provided similar electoral support in Burundi and Tanzania. Accumulating a total of thirty-six separate missions since passage of the IPCL, Japan has been directly involved in fourteen UN peacekeeping missions (with four in Africa), five humanitarian relief missions (with one in Africa), and nine election observing missions (with two in Africa) as well as the providing of material support to others (see Table 1).180

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Table 1. Japan’s UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, Post-IPCL.\(^{181}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</td>
<td>Electoral Observers</td>
<td>Sep.–Oct. 1992</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</td>
<td>Staff Officers, Troops (Movement Control Unit) and Electoral Observers</td>
<td>May 1993–Nov. 1994</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees</td>
<td>Troops (Refugee Relief Unit and Airlift Unit)</td>
<td>Sep.–Dec. 1994</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo presidential and national assembly elections</td>
<td>Electoral Observers</td>
<td>Jul.–Nov. 2006</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>Staff Officers and Troops (Engineering Unit)</td>
<td>Nov. 2011–present</td>
<td>240–350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prime Minister Abe and other revisionists have been successful in capitalizing on the international norm of burden-sharing to increasingly utilize military intervention to pursue global peace and gain more relevance in international affairs.\(^{182}\) UN peacekeeping operations remain one of the primary tools used not just by Japan but by the global community to promote and maintain peace in Africa, a continent that experiences 88 percent of conflict-related deaths worldwide.\(^{183}\) Though none of these conflicts had ever


posed a direct security threat to Japan, its deliberate use of a UN-centered diplomacy in Africa has largely succeeded in garnering economic and political influence and provided leverage to support its larger foreign policy goals. Japan’s recent UN peacekeeping contributions to the African continent, however, should be kept in perspective. Between 2000 and 2010, only 3 percent of Japan’s total number of personnel embedded in peacekeeping operations were in Africa, the majority being sent instead to Central and Southeast Asia. At the same time, 73 percent of the total deployed UN military personnel from various nations were in Africa. In 2009, only thirty JSDF personnel out of a total force of roughly 240,000 personnel were deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, as U.S.-led or UN-authorized coalition-type missions received the most attention at the time. Though Japan’s current significant participation in the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) suggests a refocus of attention toward Africa in this regard, its minimal participation in its prior missions left it open to international criticism, with accusations of a strategy more focused on leveraging international prestige than one that was focused on actually achieving peace and security. This general criticism of its limited engagement, by virtue of its legal roadblocks and unwillingness to put its personnel in harm’s way, especially in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, also placed Japan’s underlying motives of internationalization and military normalization under review as potentially compromising more effective engagement and achievement of sustainable peace.

Over time, however, Japanese peacekeeping missions have gradually increased, become more complex, and covered a broader geographical area, in addition to shifting from places where conflict has ceased to where conflict is ongoing, such as in South Sudan. This reflects a general trend in UN peacekeeping missions around the world, which have evolved from more traditional and neutral-oriented missions of supervising ceasefires and troop withdrawals to more intrusive ones, such as those involved in

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185 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 84.
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, nation-building, and the protection of civilians in conflict areas through the use of restrained force.\textsuperscript{187} Though UN missions were becoming more dangerous, some in Japanese political circles were hesitant to change the country’s principle of neutrality and impartiality and continued to insist on the presence of a ceasefire agreement between parties, as stipulated in the original interpretation of the IPCL, indicating a potential unwillingness to continue Japan’s UN-centered diplomacy. Likewise, attention focused more on the legality of the JSDF’s use of weapons, potential rescue missions, and the associated risk to JSDF personnel, not necessarily in meeting the needs of modern UN peacekeeping operations. Aside from self-imposed legal restrictions, there was also the fear of harsh criticism that would surely arise should a JSDF member get hurt or killed.

Partly to keep pace with the evolving nature of UN missions, on September 19, 2015, the government approved the \textit{Legislation for Peace and Security}, establishing a legal basis for Japanese troops to better act on their own discretion and the ability to provide the necessary military response to protect the lives of its citizens.\textsuperscript{188} Most notably, it authorizes participation in a wider range of peacekeeping operations and internationally-coordinated efforts, permits logistics support in instances deemed threatening to Japan’s peace and security, and allows Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense, provided its “Three New Conditions” are met.\textsuperscript{189} The legislation also clarifies Prime Minister Abe’s new concept of “proactive force” in the protection of civilians and military personnel while performing non-combat related duties. Japan’s first NSS of December 2013, a document from which the \textit{Legislation for Peace and Security} was derived, likewise recognized the evolving nature of UN security missions and indicated that Japan will continue to be an active contributor to peace and stability through its ongoing participation in UN missions, capacity building assistance, and its


\textsuperscript{188} Kitagawa, “Japan’s Security Policy.”

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
promotion of ODA funds.\textsuperscript{190} This has translated into expanded roles for JSDF officials, including as UN peacekeeping operation commanders and the utilization of JSDF troops in planning, coordination, and intelligence. By indicating its willingness to contribute to and participate in ever more dangerous UN missions, Japan appears ready to make increased contributions to world peace and security while in turn loosening self-imposed restrictions on its JSDF personnel, not just building up an already long track record of UN peacekeeping successes.

Japan’s current distinction of being the second largest financial contributor to the overall UN peacekeeping operations budget (10.83 percent), only behind the United States (28.38 percent), clearly indicates it is not abandoning a UN-centric foreign policy agenda.\textsuperscript{191} A key reason for this activism revolves around its desire to attain a permanent seat on the UNSC as many African nations hold voting power in the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{192} A permanent seat would grant Japan veto rights and allow it to better control how its peacekeeping personnel, mostly members of the JSDF, are utilized. Japan, along with Brazil, has spent more time on the UNSC as a non-permanent member than any other country after first being elected to the council in 1958—Prime Minister Abe has used this fact to argue that Japan, as well as Brazil, Germany, and India, should also be granted permanent seats.\textsuperscript{193} By 1991, Japan had sat on the UNSC seven times as a non-permanent member, more than any other country, thanks in part to the backing of influential African states that in many cases had received Japanese aid.\textsuperscript{194} Japan’s desire for “UNSC reform” (referring to it being granted a permanent seat), as called for in its NSS, faces its biggest obstacle from China, itself a permanent member with the ability to exercise full veto power. Though it rarely exercises its veto power on issues deemed not

\textsuperscript{190} Kitagawa, “Japan’s Security Policy.”


\textsuperscript{192} Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 620.


\textsuperscript{194} Cornelissen and Taylor, “Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa,” 620.
directly related to Chinese interests, Japan’s bid would likely be seen as threatening to Beijing and would probably result in China blocking the proposal. The sensitive nature of Japanese security matters in relation to China, as well as a general Chinese distrust of Prime Minister Abe, likely means that Japan will have to settle for a non-permanent seat for some time to come.

B. THE SOUTH SUDAN MISSION

Recently gaining its independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, after a long civil war, South Sudan lies at a strategic crossroads of Africa. Following a brief moment of peace in the world’s youngest nation, political infighting and a coup attempt against President Salva Kiir by former Vice President Riek Machar led to renewed violence in December 2013, increasingly along Dinka and Nuer ethnic lines, and created a humanitarian disaster in its wake. Conditions further deteriorated in April 2015, when government forces launched an offensive in the oil-rich Upper Nile region, killing or displacing thousands of civilians and perpetuating today’s ongoing conflict for a monopoly on access to revenue streams created from its promising natural resources.

Japan’s involvement in the region began when two liaison officers were sent to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) headquarters in Khartoum in 2008 to explore a dedicated Japanese presence in the South.195 South Sudan’s independence immediately led to the UNSC’s establishment of UNMISS on July 8, 2011, aimed primarily at nation-building efforts, while that same year JSDF personnel conducted field visits to South Sudan to evaluate security concerns and lay the groundwork for a larger JSDF presence. Initially adopting a “wait and see” approach following the triple-disaster in Fukushima, the dispatch of JSDF troops to South Sudan was the second time Japan participated in a UN peacekeeping operation under a DPJ-led administration, the first being in Haiti in 2010.196 A gradually increasing number of Japanese personnel have participated in

195 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, 84–85.
UNMISS, currently reaching upward of 350 staff, engineering, and National Support Element (NSE) personnel in various construction projects in support of UN nation-building efforts. Many of the projects are used to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, such as roads and a river port project completed in May 2015, in cooperation with JICA at a cost of U.S. $27.7 million. Infrastructure development projects such as these are usually assigned to the JSDF by the UN, but local coordination units also frequently coordinate with JICA and other Japanese humanitarian organizations. Japanese personnel primarily work out of the capital city of Juba, also the location of UNMISS Headquarters and the Japanese Embassy, on a year-by-year rotational basis and have worked alongside members in varying capacities from at least sixty three other countries in the UN’s third largest mission. Additionally, a contingent force was established in neighboring Uganda, also Kenya when needed, to handle logistics support (see Figure 3).


C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND CHINESE OIL INTERESTS

Beyond the scope of advantages offered to it by the UN, South Sudan itself offers much in terms of natural resources, including one of Africa’s few sources of crude petroleum, drawing possible connections to Japan’s selective engagements in other resource-rich African countries. The inaccessibility of these resources, the lack of a developed industrial base, and ongoing violence among other factors, however, results in South Sudanese exports’ representing just a tiny fraction of Japan’s total imports. This is not the case for Japan’s rival, China, which receives over 80 percent of South Sudan’s oil exports, distinguishing China as having a unique interest in the country relative to other extra-regional states.\(^{201}\) China’s involvement in the Sudanese oil market accelerated after UNSCR 1564 was imposed on Sudan for atrocities committed in the Darfur region, leaving other countries unwilling to invest in this highly unstable region.\(^{202}\) Ongoing

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\(^{202}\) Daiss, “Trying to Catch China, Japan Pledges South Sudanese Oil Pipeline.”
conflict, however, has resulted in oil production from China’s facilities, now mostly located in South Sudan, dropping from 245,000 barrels per day in 2013 to 163,000 barrels per day in 2015, leading Ma Qiang, the Chinese ambassador to South Sudan, to state that “We have huge interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater effort to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire.” China’s greater effort came in the form of seven hundred additional troops to the UNMISS mission—relatively significant considering that this is triple the amount of troops previously stationed in South Sudan, that China only began sending a limited number of troops as soon as 2013, and that these troops are engaged in inherently dangerous patrol and security-related duties. China’s own UN-centric approach to securing its investments in South Sudan differs markedly from its previous strategy of arming the South Sudan government with roughly U.S. $20 million in weapons—fully legal, however controversial, given the lack of an arms embargo. Today, China is taking part in several UN missions in Africa, including ones in Congo, Liberia, and Sudan, employing roughly 1,800 troops in total.

China’s involvement in the South Sudanese oil industry and its utilization of Sudan to transport this oil affords China key advantages in future oil extraction efforts in the region, assuming a reasonable level of peace can be achieved. A proposed pipeline from Juba to Lamu, Kenya, however, could undermine this arrangement and open South Sudan’s oil to greater international competition, in turn altering the geo-political dynamics of East Africa (see Figure 4). With cost estimates ranging from U.S. $4 billion to U.S. $16 billion, no agreement for such a pipeline has been implemented to date, only a Memorandum of Agreement (MoU) that was signed by heads of state from Ethiopia,

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205 Tiezzi, “China Sold $20 million in Arms.”

Kenya, and South Sudan.207 One of the companies that reportedly bid on this project, according to the Sudan Tribune, was Toyota Motor Corporation, though the bidding price was not disclosed.208 In any case, Kenya’s fortuitous location at a key juncture of East African development has likewise afforded it a high level of interest from China, Japan and the United States.

![Map of South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda with marked locations: Juba, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Lamu, Mombasa, Isiolo, and Nairobi.]

Figure 5. Proposed Pipeline from Juba, South Sudan, to Lamu, Kenya.209

D. UNMISS AND NORMALIZATION

Whether Japan’s intentions in South Sudan are to reengage Africa for the purpose of economic access or to counter a growing Chinese presence in the region, involvement in UNMISS helps to highlight Japan’s continued contributions to the international community, indicates Japan’s desire to establish itself within the confines of the UN framework as a reliable partner, and signifies a desire to undertake an incremental expansion of its force capabilities. As the protection of civilians is a central tenet of the UNMISS mandate, the JSDF mission there provided useful justification for Japan’s

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207 Daiss, “Trying to Catch China, Japan Pledges South Sudanese Oil Pipeline.”
208 Ibid.
newfound ability to exercise collective self-defense in this and future missions.\textsuperscript{210} Also, as one of the most dangerous missions Japan has participated in to-date, Japan’s acceptance of risk to its JSDF personnel is greater than ever-escalating violence prompted the UN Security Council to double the number of total peacekeepers in South Sudan to 13,000 troops and 2,001 police in December 15, 2015.\textsuperscript{211} The sharp increase in violence in recent years and the ongoing threats to civilians and UN personnel, resulting in the total deaths of twenty-one UN troops, one military observer, and two police officials, obviously present a direct challenge to Japan’s prior hesitation on its use of force.\textsuperscript{212} Additionally, between 2004 and 2014, there were twenty-two notable incidents of losses of weapons stockpiles from UN convoys, patrols, and fixed sites.\textsuperscript{213} Ever since Atsuhito Nakata, a Japanese UN volunteer, was killed taking part in the UN mission in Cambodia, Japan has been especially mindful of the security of its personnel serving in UN missions, though it is important to note that the mission there was continued and the mission in Mozambique was approved shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{214}

Prime Minister Abe’s announcement at the UN General Assembly of an increased troop presence in South Sudan in 2013 indicates a new level of resolve to the UN mission and a continued evolution of the security roles of the JSDF, a process that has occurred across political lines since the start of UNMISS.\textsuperscript{215} With his added “proactive contribution to peace” agenda, Prime Minister Abe likely has no intention of limiting this dual-party political leverage to push military normalization. There are limitations, however, to the speed at which Japan can pursue these efforts. In 2014, the UN requested


\textsuperscript{215} Taylor and Walsh, “UN Operations in Africa Provide a Mechanism.”
that the Japanese government provide an officer to assume the role as chief-of-staff of
UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. The MOD agreed, however, Japan’s
Cabinet Legislation Bureau prevented this from happening as the UN Peacekeeping
Activities Cooperation Law did not explicitly allow Japan to protect others in their
care. Nevertheless, the implementation of Japan’s new collective self-defense laws in
March 2016, which essentially mean that Japan can come to the aid of other countries’
troops or UN personnel in line with their expanding missions, was very influential in
legitimizing a Japanese presence in South Sudan that will last at least until October 2016,
following the UNSC’s decision to extend the mandate of UNMISS until the end of July.
Given Japan’s new security posture as a result of the passing of the collective self-
defense laws, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani stated simply that “JSDF personnel need to
do training and enhance their capability in a bid to fulfill their duty.” Prime Minister
Abe, on the other hand, indicated during a House of Representatives Budget Committee
session that “Since the legislation has been passed, we are thinking of assigning (the
GSDF personnel to new) duties. It requires a great deal of preparation and training.”
As of February 2016, the government was still deciding on how to use their newfound
roles in the larger security context, appearing to delay this discussion until at least
November to avoid controversy in the House of Councilors election this summer. For
now, by just demonstrating the JSDF’s superior performance in expanding roles, the
MOD hopes to achieve trust within the UN and state-building organizations.

UNMISS also presented a key opportunity to challenge Japan’s original arms
export ban when, in 2013, Prime Minister Abe received a request through the UN to

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216 Yujiro Okabe, SDF in Africa, SDF expands participation in intl missions in Africa, The Japan

217 “Japan extends peacekeeping mission in South Sudan through October,” Japan Times, last
modified February 9, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/09/national/japan-extends-
peacekeeping-mission-south-sudan-october/#.VxFJTnn2biV.

218 “Abe mulls expanded SDF role in South Sudan,” Kyodo News, last modified February 4, 2016,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-mulls-expanded-sdf-role-
south-sudan/#.VxphDnn2biU.

219 Ibid.

220 “About Dispatch of SDF Personnel to South Sudan,” 6.
resupply South Korean peacekeepers in South Sudan with 10,000 rounds of ammunition. At the time, the security situation was deteriorating so rapidly that the lives of roughly three hundred South Korean forces and numerous other refugees were potentially at stake. Interestingly, the bullets carried by the JSDF in South Sudan happened to be the only ones compatible with the weapons that the South Korean forces were using there. The Abe administration determined that within the context of the UNMISS mission, the nature of the crisis necessitated immediate action and therefore lie outside of the “old” Three Principles, though based on strict conditions of use.221 The exchange commenced, only to later be derailed by diplomatic posturing from various political figures that objected to Korea’s supposed tacit consent of Abe’s expanded role of the JSDF, resulting in all ammunition’s being returned to the JSDF. The fact that Japan’s NSC circumvented the ban and created a new interpretation for the Peace Cooperation Law in the first place, however, indicated a willingness to create new precedents on Japan’s handling of arms. At the same time, however, it showed that the ability to promote military normalization through peacekeeping operations had its political limitations.222

The handover of ammunition to the South Koreans in South Sudan, however controversial, encouraged Prime Minister Abe’s efforts to achieve collective defense and arms export reform. On April 1, 2014, in conjunction with Japan’s NSS of December 17, 2013, the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” was introduced, establishing a new set of principles on arms exports, despite a 66 percent level of public opposition to such an amendment.223 The “new” Three Principles expands the number of cases in which exports of arms are authorized to a total of eleven, boosts the domestic defense industry through sales of equipment, and better allows Japan to increase its participation in joint development projects with the United States and other

221 “Contribution in Kind to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary),” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, last modified December 24, 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2013/1224unmiss_ccs_e.html.
222 Taylor and Walsh. “UN Operations in Africa Provide a Mechanism.”
223 Kitagawa, “Japan’s Security Policy.”
Taisuke Hirose, “Japan’s New Arms Export Principles.”
partners. Industrial ties with the United States may be the real prize—the first agreement utilizing the new principles allowed third party sales of American and Japanese SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptor technology—but the door has opened wide to other potential markets around the world. The Japanese government, intent on securing its interests at home and abroad, sees dual utility in closer relations with all of its potential customers and a stronger and more sustainable defense industrial backbone as outlined in its NSS. Since the new principles were implemented, other political initiatives have also boosted industrial demand, such as the bilateral accords which allowed the Philippines and Vietnam to receive defense-related equipment intended to protect against Chinese claims in the South China Sea.224

Given the lifting of arms export restrictions, it is unclear, however, if growth in the Japanese arms industry is sustainable. According to Yuzo Murayama, a professor and defense expert at Doshisha Business School in Kyoto, “People outside Japan think that Japan is really opening up its defense industry…it’s not true. This will take a long time.”225 Japan is still not included in many weapons-development ventures required to produce complex and expensive weapons systems, meaning that as long as production remains limited, Japan will need to pay two to three times what other countries pay for similar weapons.226 Though obstacles to selling weapons systems and components remain, even in a saturated niche market for non-lethal equipment, Africa represents an arms market too big to ignore. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military expenditures on the continent have grown by an amazing 65 percent from 2004 to 2013, increasing by 8.3 percent in 2013 alone (see Figure 5).227 These figures alone represent numerous potential opportunities for which Japan can export its peace and security to achieve a viable arms export industrial base for its JSDF.

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226 Ibid.

Military spending in Africa has surpassed that of any other continent.

Figure 6. Percentage Change in Military Spending (2004–2013). 228

Japan’s utilization of the UN to promote its soft-power strategy in Africa has not been without its challenges, but it has allowed Japan to slowly evolve from observation missions to ones that demand more than ever from the Japanese military establishment, while allowing it to overcome its own constitutional limitations that would have otherwise never happened at home. 229 As Japan’s chief guarantor of peace, the United States is also pressuring the Abe administration to allocate more of its resources to peacekeeping missions. In 2014, President Barack Obama asked Prime Minister Abe directly to take a more active role in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa as a way to limit terrorist activity on the continent. 230 Though the JSDF is currently only involved in one of the UN missions out of the nine in Africa, American pressure and Prime Minister Abe’s insistence that Japan will be more engaged in global peace and stability may bring

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228 Source: “Arms and the African.”
the JSDF to new parts of the continent. Continued success in future UN peacekeeping missions will likely increase the prestige of the JSDF and indicate an additional step toward a more autonomous Japan in which the legitimacy of the JSDF is not questioned. In this light, Japan’s participation in UNMISS suggests not only a reemergence of its UN-centered diplomacy in Africa, but one that promises unprecedented engagement within the UN construct.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. THREE OUTCOMES AND ASSOCIATED CONCLUSIONS

Prior to presenting the case studies, I stated that in each case, we should see either that 1) the mission contributed, and will continue to contribute to normalization, 2) the mission may have initially contributed to normalization, but now finds itself locked in the specific mission set for which it was assigned, or 3) the mission did not make any substantive contributions to normalization. In regards to the Gulf of Aden mission, I hypothesized that the mission contributed, and will contribute to normalization; based on the research presented, I believe that this is indeed the case. As a Japanese mission outside of the traditional UN framework, new laws and interpretations to expand the role of the JSDF were instrumental in Japan’s participation in the anti-piracy mission, and included several “firsts” in Japan’s post-war history. This was the first time that the JMSDF worked directly with the JCG under the Anti-Piracy Law and Article 80 of the JCG Law. This was the first time that Article 82 of the JSDF Law was used to permit the deployment of JSDF units prior to approval from the Diet. After the new Anti-Piracy Law was ratified, authorizing full participation in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and essentially allowing the JMSDF to become a fully-functioning, independent deploying force, approval of collective self-defense measures, likely influenced by this mission, enabled the JSDF to act more as a normal military in grey zone scenarios. Furthermore, Japanese ships transiting the area benefited from revisions to the *Japanese Firearms and Swords Control Law*, which granted the use of armed guards aboard Japanese flagged vessels. Though the practice began in Southeast Asia, the circumvention of arms export laws by the JCG and JICA in various African countries led to the eventual loosening of arms export restrictions, providing a potential boost to a more normal Japanese defense establishment. As a founding member of the CGPCS, Japan is also in a strong position to exert influence on how its military forces are utilized in this mission. Japan’s military facility in Djibouti, the first of its kind since World War II, provides a base of operations for future missions and contingencies that further push normalization and expand its original mission. Similarly, in 2013, authorization was
given to a Japanese ship to operate outside of the established IRTC to address threats beyond the scope of its original mission. Likewise, P-3C’s returning to Japan from Africa are now addressing Japanese concerns in the South China Sea before returning home. Finally, the general level of international involvement and competition playing out in the Gulf of Aden and Djibouti is like none other experienced by Japan in Africa, influencing its perceived security needs from the outside-in.

In regard to the UN mission in South Sudan, I hypothesized that this mission, like all other UN missions, incrementally contributes to normalization, but unlike the Gulf of Aden mission, its mission scope limits any other opportunities for normalization. Some attributes are similar to Japan’s past UN missions, including a reliance on extensive financial contributions and a reluctance to put JSDF forces in harm’s way, leading one to expect a continuation of a trend often seen since the 1990s. The economic and geopolitical impact of this mission is relatively high, however, perhaps increasing a Japanese resolve to ensure their troops can continue to participate in the mission despite its increasing demands. The incremental contribution to normalization is observed to the extent that Japan is merely trying to keep pace with the evolving nature of UN missions that are themselves becoming more dangerous; however, UNMISS has provided unique opportunities, relative to past UN missions, to challenge prior assumptions of the JSDF and to operate as a more normal military. For example, by authorizing the issue of ammunition to South Korean forces taking part in UNMISS, Prime Minister Abe challenged prior arms export restrictions, and the incident likely had an influence in the eventual ratification of the “new” arms export laws in 2013. The security threat presented by UNMISS also influenced the Legislation for Peace and Security, a groundbreaking law ratified in 2015 that granted the JSDF new authority to exercise self-defense akin to normal militaries while expanding their roles within the UN mission. Specifically, it authorized participation in a wider range of peacekeeping operations and internationally-coordinated efforts, permitted logistics support in instances deemed threatening to Japan’s peace and security, allowed Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense, and clarified Prime Minister Abe’s new concept of “proactive force” in the protection of civilians and military personnel while performing non-combat related duties. Finally, the
fragile security environment in South Sudan influenced Japan’s collective self-defense laws which, when ratified in March of 2016, enabled the JSDF to come to the aid of other countries’ troops or UN personnel in line with their expanding missions. Given the influence that a challenging mission like UNMISS had to Japan’s new security legislation, I believe that it has, and will continue to contribute to normalization in regards to how other “normal” militaries operate when taking part in UN missions.

B. FUTURE PROSPECTS

The evolution of Japan’s security policies and the increased use of the JSDF has called into question the way that postwar Japan views itself and its place in the world. The current international environment especially presents both unique challenges and opportunities for Japan to reassess this identity. Successful mission accomplishment in Africa has allowed the SDF to gain credibility in the eyes of the Japanese public, and therefore allowed it to conceivably become an instrument of peace, rather than a reminder of the past. Motivated initially by a need for resources, Japan’s approach to Africa has gradually evolved into one that ties its political ambitions and humanitarian concerns with its security interests. Likewise, through successful mission accomplishment far from home, Japan’s military operations in Africa have reduced the limitations imposed on the JSDF, allowed the JSDF to improve its international prestige, and granted it useful operational experience on a scale not seen in Japan’s post-war history.

As a more legitimate and active arm of Japanese foreign policy, the JSDF is now an integral part of Japan’s comprehensive development efforts in Africa, especially as Japan shows a willingness to export its principles of peace and security in order to protect its core interests. Likewise, at TICAD V in June 2013, the Japanese government placed peace and security as one of its top priorities in achieving its development objectives on the continent.231 This is a trend that started long before Prime Minister Abe, as Japan’s ability to “wage peace” has gotten stronger and stronger with each mission and with each constitutional reinterpretation. Japan’s partnership with Africa helps it to achieve its

231 Walsh, “Kakehashi Trip Report #3.”
broader strategic objectives—securing natural resources, opening growing markets to Japanese goods, strengthening its international standing, and defying an increasing Chinese presence—in an international competition for regional power under the brand-name of peace. This also creates new expectations for international engagement that will likely lead Japan to continue to export its peace in other parts of Africa.

According to its NSS, Japan seeks to “improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community,” making Japan more and more a security provider and less a security consumer. This “normalcy” helps develop its global security role in partnership with the United States, especially given Prime Minister Abe’s assurances of being able defending a U.S. warship under attack in the Pacific under Japan’s new policy of collective defense, a policy influenced by Japan’s military operations in Africa. This alone shows that JSDF missions in Africa play a key role in Prime Minister Abe’s “historical mission” to amend the constitution. With Africa’s rich resources and its position adjacent to the vast energy resources of the Middle East, any conflict in the Pacific will surely have wider, global implications.

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