CIVIL WARS HIJACKED: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The United States continues to be drawn into complex conflict environments where multiple internal and external state and non-state actors (NSAs) compete for influence. This thesis seeks to address how an external state actor can establish influence in a civil war environment through effective support of non-state actors. The research question is addressed through an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990, using both qualitative and social network analysis to assess the strategies of three state actors in that conflict: Israel, Syria, and Iran. This study suggests that external state actors can increase influence in a civil war environment through a variety of strategies. However, the most dominant state actors are typically those that pursue a limited objective through a combination of direct and indirect support to a heterogeneous coalition of non-state actors employing a combination of violent and non-violent techniques. The lessons obtained from this analysis may provide valuable insights to planners tasked with the development of influence within a civil war through external support to NSAs.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Israel, non-state actor, surrogate warfare, proxy warfare, longitudinal social network analysis, civil war
CIVIL WARS HIJACKED: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR

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The United States continues to be drawn into complex conflict environments where multiple internal and external state and non-state actors (NSAs) compete for influence. This thesis seeks to address how an external state actor can establish influence in a civil war environment through effective support of non-state actors. The research question is addressed through an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990, using both qualitative and social network analysis to assess the strategies of three state actors in that conflict: Israel, Syria, and Iran. This study suggests that external state actors can increase influence in a civil war environment through a variety of strategies. However, the most dominant state actors are typically those that pursue a limited objective through a combination of direct and indirect support to a heterogeneous coalition of non-state actors employing a combination of violent and non-violent techniques. The lessons obtained from this analysis may provide valuable insights to planners tasked with the development of influence within a civil war through external support to NSAs.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJO</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>Lebanese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNM</td>
<td>Lebanese National Movement</td>
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<td>NLP</td>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>non-state actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front</td>
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<td>PCP</td>
<td>Palestine Communist Party</td>
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<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNSF</td>
<td>Palestinian National Salvation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>South Lebanon Army</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>social network analysis</td>
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<td>SNSP</td>
<td>Syrian National Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLA</td>
<td>Zgharta Liberation Army</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

The study seeks to assist U.S. policymakers addressing civil wars by focusing on how to better support non-state actors (NSAs) to increase U.S. influence in intrastate conflicts. Civil wars present significant challenges for state actors seeking strategies aimed at influencing the outcome. Some states have dealt with these conflicts successfully, largely through the employment of strategies that center on proxies such as NSAs. External state actors have sometimes achieved their national strategic objectives by forming successful partnerships with NSAs with relatively little resource investment compared to the outcome. By studying how these intervening states have effectively supported their NSA allies, a general set of principles can be developed for effective external support to NSAs in intrastate conflict.

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to inform a strategy for influencing civil wars by working through NSAs. The scope will focus on the case of the Lebanese Civil War, which resembles the Syrian conflict, to develop recommendations to increase state influence in civil war environment through effective support of NSAs.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis seeks to answer the following question: How can an external state actor increase its influence in civil wars by supporting local groups? This question will be addressed by evaluating a case in four areas:

- What was the intervening state’s objective?
- What types of NSAs did the state utilize to pursue its objective?
- What type of activity did the state conduct to support the NSA?
- How did the state channel its support to the NSA?

The research will focus primarily on the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1992) because its antecedent conditions resemble those of the Syrian conflict. The case study will be assessed using the above framework. The empirical evidence of a case study will
provide corresponding or non-corresponding evidence to the hypothesis. Lessons from this analysis might prove useful in the development of an effective strategy for the Syrian conflict and other civil wars.

C. HYPOTHESIS

This thesis will examine the utility of a hypothesis that an external state seeking influence in intrastate conflicts through NSAs is most effective when the sponsor pursues limited objectives through indirect support of a crosscutting coalition of NSAs capable of employing non-violent and violent techniques. The logic of this hypothesis is based on several causal mechanisms. First, sponsoring a crosscutting coalition of NSAs broadens the appeal of the movement. Second, incorporating non-violent techniques further increases the potential scope of recruitment and mobilization. Third, indirect non-kinetic external support reduces the perception of foreign influence and furthers NSA legitimacy. Fourth, violent techniques are necessary in conjunction with non-violence because an intrastate conflict reflects a violent struggle between two or more movements with relative parity within a state. Any movement that fully adopts purely non-violent techniques in an ongoing civil war will face destruction in a struggle that is primarily about force superiority.

D. METHODOLOGY

In order to test the hypothesis about what constitutes effective state support to NSAs in civil wars, the “most similar” case method will be used to validate a conceptual theoretical framework. The most similar case method identifies cases that are similar in all of their independent variables except for a couple of key variables, which explains a variance in their dependent variables.\textsuperscript{1} The similar case method relies on John Stuart Mill’s method of difference, which can sometimes fail to identify the causal variables properly.\textsuperscript{2} In order to mitigate the risk of excluding possible causal independent variables, the history of each NSA and its respective sponsor relationship will be

\textsuperscript{1} Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 51.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 51.
analyzed using process-tracing methods. Process-tracing analyzes the causal chain between independent and dependent variables, and whether other variables may have been excluded during the most similar case study. Each NSA-sponsor relationship history will provide numerous observations that will help identify variables that either increased or decreased sponsor influence in the civil war environment through its NSA. Through the analysis of numerous observations, some recurring variables that lend to effective state sponsorship should become apparent. Process tracing will confirm or deny causal relationships between the independent and dependent variables identified in the hypothesis, as well as highlight any variables that were not originally identified. Once the variables are properly validated, they can serve as a valuable reference for U.S. policymakers responsible for developing strategies to influence civil wars.

This thesis will use the Lebanese Civil War as the in-depth longitudinal case study that will help shape what types of support are applicable for Syria or other ongoing civil wars. Like the Syrian conflict, the Lebanese Civil War was typified as a deeply sectarian and brutal conflict involving multiple ethnically and religiously based violent NSAs with varying levels and origins of external state sponsorship that repeatedly shifted allegiances in the pursuit of victory as none could win on their own. Each conflict involves many of the same state actors, and similar ethnic and religious groups. However, there are differences between each case. The Lebanese conflict experienced multiple waves of large scale intervention by foreign conventional ground forces, while the Syrian conflict thus far has only seen limited direct foreign intervention, principally through air and special operations forces. The conclusions of this case study may prove useful to policymakers addressing Syria or other ongoing conflicts, but the unique conditions of each conflict must be taken into consideration before the application of any of this analysis.

Within the Lebanese Civil War, the thesis will focus on in-depth case studies of external state actors and their sponsored NSAs and outcomes. The state strategies of

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Israel, Syria, and Iran will be evaluated during three periods of the war: 1975-1976, 1977-1983, and 1984-1990. The periods separate eras of foreign dominance: first by Syria, then by Israel, and then again by Syria. Breaking them down in this manner enables a detailed comparative analysis of each of the state strategies through the three different periods, during which some states shifted strategies as necessary. The U.S. government policy toward Lebanon is not individually analyzed in this case study because they did not employ NSA relationships on the scale of the three other state actors, and U.S. policy often complimented rather than superseded other state’s strategies in Lebanon. For instance, in the 1977-1983 period, U.S. efforts largely supported Israel, while in the 1984-1990 period, U.S. policy eventually supported Syria in exchange for al-Assad’s participation in Operation Desert Storm. However, U.S. policy toward Lebanon will be discussed in relation to the three state strategies. Through the comparative analysis of these somewhat similar cases, this thesis will evaluate the impact of the four main variables on the effectiveness of external support through process-tracing. The variables that most significantly recur with successful cases will represent the most effective methods to increase external state influence of the civil war environment through effective support of NSAs. The effective methods identified at the conclusion of the analysis will provide planners with a list of lessons for consideration in the development of a strategy for developing influence in civil wars.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Civil wars are on the rise, longer in duration, transnational, and more and more involve non-state actors (NSAs). Syria stands as a stark example of the current trends in conflict across the globe. In Syria, similar to some the other Arab Spring countries, non-violent protests grew into a resistance movement. Popular non-violent resistance soon gave way to violent conflict as the state’s brutal repression led to the militarization and fragmentation of the opposition movements. Regional, and eventually, international powers became heavily involved in the conflict for their own individual reasons. NSAs continue to play an important role in the conflict as all sides employ them. Confronted with this very complex environment, states seeking to influence the conflict in pursuit of their national interests seek to employ NSAs as proxies. A key to succeeding in this environment will be the development and employment of NSAs whose capabilities and objectives align with the state sponsor’s objectives. The literature will be evaluated by four questions: What is the external state’s objective? What type of NSA can be utilized to pursue this objective? What type of activity the state can conduct to support the NSA? Moreover, how can the state channel its support to the NSA?

A. DEFINING THE INTERVENING STATE’S OBJECTIVE

The state’s objective will be categorized in accordance with U.S. military doctrine as follows: disrupt, coerce, or overthrow. These are the objectives of unconventional warfare, which is typically the mission of U.S. forces tasked with influencing civil war.

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environments on behalf of counter-state resistance. Disruption seeks to foster internal disorder in the targeted state in an effort to influence strategic outcomes. Coercion seeks to employ disruption to change targeted state behavior. Finally, overthrow is when the state seeks to completely change the targeted state’s leadership. Scholars vary on which technique is preferred, and much of this is situation dependent. However, the consensus is that overthrow is becoming less acceptable, overt or covert, and that disruption and coercion are the more reasonable and acceptable state pursuits in light of today’s political environment.

Stephen Kinzer argues that the United States historically pursued regime change in pursuit of its national interests abroad, beginning with the overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy in 1893. This long history of regime change via boots on the ground was temporarily halted during the Cold War as the Soviet Union challenged the United States’ freedom of maneuver overseas. During this period, the United States employed clandestine operations to overthrow regimes. However, with the end of the Cold War, and the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States once again pursued regime change via boots on the ground. Kinzer stands alone in this argument as other scholars argue that blatant regime change, especially via direct intervention, is no longer a viable national strategy. These experts advocate more limited approaches that emphasize disruption or coercion.

Contrary to Kinzer’s argument that the end of the Cold War ushered in an era of free reign for the United States, Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan argue that the post-Cold War trend has been for states to

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8 When intervening on behalf of the state, U.S. forces typically conduct foreign internal defense and security force assistance, during which the objective is to build state capacity to provide security and governance. It will be shown that in some of the following case studies, state actors were conducting state reinforcement rather than counter-state support.

9 Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 103.


11 Ibid., 2.

12 Ibid., 2.

13 Ibid., 2.
adopt more limited objectives. In the absence of the superpowers, regional powers have become more prevalent and their aims are necessarily more limited due to scarce resources. Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca also identify the tendency of states to use this indirect, more limited approach, in pursuit of influencing regional rivals through cooperation with their opponent’s internal enemies. However, this strategy often results in escalating tensions between the two states, thereby threatening the direct confrontation the influencing state sought to avoid through its indirect strategy. Navin Bapat also argues that states are adept at using their opponent’s internal rivals through a form of coercive diplomacy in order to achieve their national interests. In a similar vein, Idean Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham argue that states often support moderately strong resistance movements against their rivals as a tool to destabilize their rivals, not necessarily to overthrow them. Essentially all these scholars agree that states tend to pursue more limited objectives, such as coercion or disruption, rather than overthrow, in the pursuit of their national interests.

B. SELECTING A NON-STATE ACTOR

The literature suggests possible NSA candidates for state support can be broadly categorized as violent or non-violent and centralized or decentralized. Erica Chenoweth, Maria Stephan and other scholars advocate the power of non-violent movements, even opposed to repressive governments. Chenoweth’s research indicates that from 1900 to 2006 non-violent movements succeeded 53 percent of the time while violent movements succeeded only 26 percent of the time. Chenoweth admits this is not a universal

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14 Byman, Trends in Outside Support, 103.
15 Ibid., 103.
17 Ibid.
principal, but highlights that non-violent groups can more easily gain internal and external support at the loss of the target regime due to their greater perception of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{21} This success rate is likely linked to the increasing effects of propaganda thanks in large part to the greater distribution and accessibility of information technology.

Though there is ample evidence of the potential for non-violent movements to succeed, the scholarly debate on violent resistance movements indicates a clear trend toward failure. In spite of seemingly conflicting opinions that violent guerrilla movements are increasingly winning (though still not the majority of the time) while non-violent movements are actually more successful, many scholars are pointing out that modern trends in insurgency are rendering violent movements less effective.\textsuperscript{22} These scholars differentiate networked versus hierarchical organizational structures, but in social network analysis (SNA), everything is a network. What they describe as a network organization will be described as decentralized rather than centralized for the purpose of this thesis. Steven Metz identifies three models of insurgency that have prevailed historically, but today the prevalent model is the network, or what we will label from here forward as decentralized.\textsuperscript{23} This decentralized model, he argues, is more survivable and persistent, but in the end is much less likely to succeed because the decentralized insurgents do not grow beyond their hard-core base and gravitate toward terrorist activity instead of building popular support and establishing sanctuary.\textsuperscript{24} Thomas Rid and Mark Hecker argue along the same lines in \textit{War 2.0} as they describe militant groups as more resilient but at the same time less dangerous than they were in the past because of their lack of a popular base due in large part to their focus on organizing with like-minded extremists via information technology.\textsuperscript{25} Thomas Rid, Mark Hecker, and Steven Metz

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\textsuperscript{22} Steven Metz, ““The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency,”” \textit{Parameters} (Autumn, 2012), 81 and Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, \textit{War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age} (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 208.

\textsuperscript{23} Steven Metz, ““The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency,”” \textit{Parameters} (Autumn, 2012), 81.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 81.

\textsuperscript{25} Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, \textit{War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age} (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 208.
argue that decentralized organization is driving resistance movements toward terrorism, which historically consistently results in failure.26

Violent resistance has a much lower success rate than non-violent movements as shown above, but terrorism fares even worse. Max Boot emphasizes that terrorism is a technique used by resistance movements who cannot produce a guerrilla force and these terror-centric movements are less successful than guerrillas.27 Seth Jones also emphasizes the fact that excessive brutality by insurgents supports government victory.28 In addition, Jones points out that resistance groups employing suicide terrorism have never won an insurgency.29 Despite their historic lack of success, terror movements persist. While modern terror movements have been successful at achieving attention, acknowledgement, and recognition, they rarely achieve authority or governance.30 Bruce Hoffman highlights the role new media plays in facilitating the spread of terror propaganda, and these movements continue to evolve their techniques.31 Religious terror groups like al Qaeda employ violence to promote recognition and support for their ideology.32 While violent movements may not be the best NSA to support in pursuit of state interests, groups conducting terrorism should be avoided.

Much like the scholarly debate over the strategic utility of violent versus non-violent movements, the debate over decentralized versus centralized organizations is quite contentious. As stated earlier, scholars such as Rid and Metz argue that the decentralized model of resistance movements is less successful than previous insurgent models. According to them, decentralized insurgents do not effectively develop the

29 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 228.
32 Ibid., 290.
popular base necessary to achieve victory. They remain focused on their internal network and isolated from the population, leading them to adopt more violent tactics that only isolate them further. Decentralized network advocates, such as John Arquilla, argue quite the opposite.

John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and the network advocates argue that thoroughly decentralized but highly connected networks are increasingly winning against hierarchical, or rather centralized, organizations. Centralized organizations are more top-down driven, bureaucratic, and often less flexible than decentralized organizations, which are often bottom-up, flat, and highly flexible. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue that centralized organizations are ineffective at fighting decentralized connected networks because it takes a similarly decentralized network to defeat another decentralized network. Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s decentralized networks are dispersed but held together by a common ideology or strategy, and can rapidly assemble for attacks and disperse just as rapidly. They attribute the rise of NSAs to the fact that they are predominantly decentralized networks capable of outmaneuvering centralized networks of states. Some scholars agree that these decentralized and connected networks are becoming prevalent, but are less effective, while other scholars advocate for centralized networks over the decentralized network model.

Advocates of institutionalized organizations see strength in centralized command and control and view the decentralized networked organization as less effective largely due to its apparent disorganization and fragmentation. Citing research done by the University of North Texas, Seth Jones argues that highly centralized insurgencies achieve victory 46 percent of the time while insurgencies with low centralization win only 15 percent of the time.

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34 Arquilla, Networks and Netwars, 27.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker argue the first point in War 2.0, 208, while Seth Jones argues the second point in Historical Lessons, 8–9.
percent of the time. However, the decentralized organization advocates would point out that comparing what they term a networked organization to a decentralized one is not appropriate. Similarly, Jon Alterman’s analysis of the Arab Spring challenges the perception that technologically connected organizations dominated the movements and set the conditions for revolution. Alterman points out that social media (internet and cell phones) actually had much less of an impact on the movement than mass media (television and newspapers). Mass media is still a very institutionalized medium that enables centralized organizations while social media enables a decentralized organization. In addition, Alterman argues that old-fashioned political groundwork truly brought the resistance to the tipping point; technology played a role, but ultimately it was the hierarchical, or centralized, political organizations that dominated the movement.

Their concept of networked organizations implies a decentralized network of individuals or groups that are united by common aims and are capable of massing rapidly for operations and then quickly dispersing, while decentralized organizations often lack the ability to coordinate without great effort due to a lack of connecting tissue through resilient communication networks, common ideology, or other binding ties. The failure of decentralization without binding ties is apparent in Syria where a plethora of localized guerrilla groups occasionally coordinate locally but fail to coordinate nationally for strategic effects.

C. SELECTION OF STATE ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT NSA

Once the NSA is selected the state’s decision makers must decide what kinds of support will be provided: kinetic or non-kinetic. Daniel Byman argues for four types of support to insurgent groups that have proven important: safe havens, financing, political support, and direct military support. Only one of these means of support is kinetic. Due

38 Seth Jones, Historical Lessons, 8–9.
40 Ibid., 103.
41 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 2.
to the trends highlighted above, it is apparent that initially non-kinetic support is immediately preferable to kinetic for a number of reasons. Non-violent movements can be transitioned, if necessary, to violent ones. In contrast to predominantly violent movements, non-violent movements that adopt violence are more capable of moderation while violent movements are likely to further radicalize. Therefore, supporting non-violent movements through non-kinetic actions may be the most preferred initial activity of the state sponsor.

General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, “New Generation Warfare” concept highlights the non-kinetic approach to state support, and if necessary, its evolution to kinetic support. In the first phase the concept advocates fostering civil unrest through local opposition movements supported from affair by state-to-state threats against oppression of the unarmed movement. Eventually civil resistance crosses the state’s threshold of tolerance and results in a repression, which the Russian government is quick to capitalize on through a well-developed propaganda campaign. With justification for legitimate intervention established, the Russian government leverages all instruments of national power, diplomatic, information, economic, and military, to support the resistance movement. This new Russian approach highlights the synthesis of kinetic and non-kinetic means toward achieving a strategic objective through non-state surrogates, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

In terms of kinetic support, it could be provided through either direct combat or support to combat. Jeffrey Record’s analysis of external assistance to insurgency indicates that high levels of direct military assistance were often critical in insurgent success throughout history. This support was not necessarily direct combat, but support

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
to combat forces through large infusions of military assistance.\textsuperscript{48} Daniel Byman’s analysis discovered that of 74 insurgencies since the end of the Cold War, that external assistance played a critical role in 45 of them.\textsuperscript{49} Max Boot also points out that the strongest correlation with success is outside support to the insurgent, especially via conventional ground force support.\textsuperscript{50} However, many scholars advocate a non-kinetic assistance approach, in the end, force of arms either direct or support to, may have to be the deciding factor in NSA success.

\section*{D. DETERMINING HOW TO CHANNEL SUPPORT TO THE NSA}

In discussing channels for support the scholars fall into categories in line with their preference for the type of activity. That is, non-kinetic advocates typically favor the indirect support approach while kinetic advocates favor the direct approach. In pursuing the more limited objective of coerce or disrupt the state is also likely to channel that support through indirect channels for a number of reasons. By utilizing indirect channels through a third party, such as another NSA, the state can establish some level of deniability as is often required in leveraging NSAs for diplomatic purposes. Daniel Byman points out that states can even provide support indirectly by essentially doing nothing.\textsuperscript{51} A state may understand that by allowing an NSA to gather support for its movement in its territory they are by default facilitating that NSA’s growth.\textsuperscript{52} The potential for a state’s acquiescence to NSA activities within its borders provides opportunities for NSAs to develop support networks anywhere across the globe.

As stated in the previous section, kinetic advocates often simultaneously highlight the importance of direct channels. Kinetic support indicates a level of commitment well beyond the level of non-kinetic support. Kinetic support, whether through direct combat or support to combat, indicates that the supporting state has likely placed a high priority on overthower or strong coercive action. Byman highlights that proxy warfare to depose

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{48} Jeffrey Record, “External Assistance,” 48.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Byman, “Give Selected Insurgents Selected Kinds of Support,” 17.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Boot, \textit{Invisible Armies}, 566.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Byman, \textit{Trends in Outside Support}, 106–107.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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an opponent’s government requires an exponential increase in support compared to sustaining an insurgency for limited objectives such as disruption in pursuit of foreign policy goals.\textsuperscript{53} Byman also argues that although NSAs can be utilized effectively to provide support to other NSAs, overall the greater impact often comes from direct state support.\textsuperscript{54}

This section has discussed how states provide effective support to NSAs by reviewing scholarship on supporting state’s objectives, the state’s selection of NSAs, the selection of types of activity to support the NSA, and the channel for state support. After analyzing the literature it is apparent that significant agreement exists in terms of the rise of non-state actors, the importance of external state support in NSA success or failure, and the preference for limited objectives such as disrupt or coerce versus more unlimited objectives such as overthrow. The literature leaves a lot to be desired in terms of what factors should be combined to construct a strategy for states supporting NSAs in intrastate conflicts in pursuit of policy objectives. This thesis aims to fill this gap by analyzing what types of external support are more associated with effective NSAs.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
III. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1975-1976

By the end of 1976, Syria’s direct intervention in the Lebanese Civil War appeared to have brought the conflict to a conclusion. As war broke out in April 1975, Syria, always an active participant in Lebanese politics, kept a watchful eye on events as the conflict transitioned into a civil war between the Maronite Christian status-quo bloc versus the predominantly Muslim revisionist bloc. Throughout the period President Hafez al-Assad’s Regime in Damascus focused on two policy objectives: 1) that Lebanon remain a unified state, and 2) the Palestinian resistance forces remain a viable threat to Israel from southern Lebanon. The Syrian government’s pursuit of these policy objectives was ultimately practical rather than ideological, shifting support between various officials and organizations in order to achieve its objectives. From April 1975 to December 1976 Syrian strategy toward Lebanon went through three phases: diplomatic mediation, indirect intervention via proxy militias, and finally direct intervention with Syrian ground forces. By the end of 1976 an Arab League agreement had given Assad’s military occupation of Lebanon an heir of legitimacy and had ensured that partition along confessional lines would not occur. Additionally, much of the Palestinian resistance forces were coordinating with rather than opposing Syrian leadership.

In contrast to Syria’s dominant position within Lebanon at the conclusion of 1976, the Israeli government ultimately found itself settling on the best of three bad options concerning its policy toward Lebanon. As the Syrians directly intervened in the summer of 1976, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin debated three options: 1) intervene directly and risk a war with Syria that could spoil its newfound detente with Egypt, 2) let Syria dominate the Lebanese state unhindered, or 3) accept the Syrian intervention with caveats. Ultimately, the Israelis chose the third option, communicating via third parties to the Syrian government a series of red lines that

ultimately reinforced the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) position in Lebanon rather than reduce it.\textsuperscript{58} With the Civil War over at the end of 1976, the conflict transitioned more into one dominated by interstate conflict as Israel, unsatisfied with its weakened position, competed with Syria for influence in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{59} In the period between April 1975 and December 1976 the Syrian government increasingly dominated the Lebanese landscape while its strategic rival, the Israeli government, acquiesced to Syrian designs for Lebanon only to discover by the end of that period that its policy had greatly reduced its own national security.

\textbf{A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1975-1976}

As the war broke out, the factions generally aligned on two sides, those that sought to retain the current confessional system based on the 1943 National Pact that essentially favored the Maronites, versus the revisionists who sought to uproot this system in order to spread power more equitably among the predominate confessions of Maronites, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims. Throughout the conflict the government of Lebanon continued to exist, but under the political stalemate former government officials and even current ones would employ their political party’s respective militia in order to alter the physical and political environment. As the fighting intensified in 1975, the Syrian government implemented a strategy of mediation, which occasionally achieved ceasefires between the warring factions, though with only short lived success.\textsuperscript{60} While diplomatic mediation remained the focus of the Syrian government through 1975, al-Assad and his senior leadership did not refrain from indirect intervention through the occasional employment of proxy militias where necessary. In July 1975, for instance, a Syrian-backed Palestinian guerrilla unit crossed the border from Syria to restore order on behalf of the Beirut government in Tripoli in northern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} Avi Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 347.


intensified and threatened to permanently divide the country, indirect intervention via Syrian-backed proxy forces became increasingly preferred. In January 1976 the Syrian government’s preference for indirect proxy intervention became the norm.\textsuperscript{62}

In order to support primarily Muslim revisionist forces fighting Maronite status quo militias in Beirut, on January 19, 1976 the al-Assad government dispatched two brigades of its Palestinian proxy militia units across the border to assist the revisionists.\textsuperscript{63} While this event ushered in a shift in Syrian strategy, mediation still remained critical to al-Assad’s efforts in Lebanon. Shortly after dispatching its proxy forces to assist the revisionists, the Syrian government began a new diplomatic initiative in order to modify the confessional system in order to split parliament 50:50 between the Muslim and Christian communities, rather than the current 40:60 split, which favored the Christians.\textsuperscript{64} A longtime ally of Syria in Lebanon, and the dominant faction of the revisionist Lebanese National Movement (LNM) coalition, Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), rejected the Syrian proposal and continued fighting.\textsuperscript{65} The belligerence of Jumblatt toward al-Assad’s mediation efforts forced a break in their alliance, and contributed to a dramatic shift in the Syrian government’s strategy in Syria. Another major contributing factor to al-Assad’s direct intervention was the breakup of the Lebanese Army in March 1976.\textsuperscript{66} With the loss of this stabilizing force, no longer would the occasional application of relatively small proxy militias be able to tip the balance in favor of Syrian policy.\textsuperscript{67} During the indirect intervention phase the Syrian government did not blatantly supporting either revisionist or status quo forces. However, as the LNM began rapidly gaining power in the spring of 1976 the Syrian government decided to directly intervene on behalf of the LNM’s opponents in order to prevent their victory.

\textsuperscript{62} Herrmann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 85.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} The 19,000 strong Lebanese Army broke partly along confessional lines as various Muslim and Maronite commanders established their own militias, though much of the officer corps stayed loyal to the government. The garrison commander in Beirut, a Muslim, attempted a coup on 11 March 1976 and failed. Half of the enlisted ranks deserted as the army disintegrated. Weinberger, Syrian Intervention, 194.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
In response to a rising tide of LNM victories over the Maronite militias in the spring of 1976, the Syrian government decided to shift to a strategy of direct military intervention on behalf of the status quo Lebanese government in order to prevent an LNM victory or possibly the breakup of Lebanon.\(^{68}\) Prior to their direct military intervention in Lebanon on 1 June 1976, the al-Assad government gained tacit approval for its actions from the U.S. and Israeli governments by pledging that their forces were intervening on behalf of the Christian-dominated Lebanese government.\(^ {69}\) Though the Syrian government was acting in its own interests in Lebanon, Lebanon’s President Sulieman Franjiah, a Christian, did request al-Assad’s forces intervene on his government’s behalf.\(^ {70}\) By the fall of 1976 Syrian forces, assisted by their proxy Palestinian militias and other militia allies in Lebanon, had the LNM and its PLO allies on their heels, spurring Arab League diplomatic intervention on their behalf in October 1976.\(^ {71}\) At the conclusion of the October 1976 ceasefire, the Arab League agreed to sponsor an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) that would essentially consist of mostly Syrian forces nominally under the command of newly elected Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis, but in reality under the command of a Syrian general.\(^ {72}\) The agreement also reaffirmed Lebanon, Syria, and the PLO’s commitment to the 1969 Cairo Agreement, whereby Yasser Arafat’s guerrillas were allowed to operate against Israel from Lebanese territory so long as they did not interfere with Lebanese sovereignty.\(^ {73}\) As 1976 closed, Syrian forces under the umbrella of the ADF quietly took their positions across Syria as a fragmented society exhausted by the first stage of the Civil War licked its wounds.

While the Syrians were rapidly escalating their involvement in Lebanon throughout 1976, the Israelis were also taking action to improve their influence on the civil war environment. In the years prior to the war the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) averaged two territorial violations of Lebanon a day in their war against Palestinian

\(^{68}\) Winslow, *Lebanon*, 196.

\(^{69}\) Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 85–86.


\(^{71}\) Ibid., 225.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 229.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.
guerrillas operating there.\textsuperscript{74} In the first year of the civil war those incursions increased dramatically to an average of seventeen a day in the first eight months of 1975.\textsuperscript{75} Beginning in the spring of 1976, Israel pursued ties with both the Maronite community in Beirut and to the north as well as in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border.\textsuperscript{76} Starting in March of 1976, Israeli officials began evaluating suitable Christian militias in the Beirut region to support, meeting with Pierre Gemayel of the Phalange Party, and Camille Chamoun of the National Liberal Party (NLP) via Israeli missile boats.\textsuperscript{77} In the south, Israel built ties to the Christian villages through the “Good Fence” policy whereby Christian Lebanese could easily cross the border to conduct commerce in Israeli villages.\textsuperscript{78} In response to Syria’s direct military intervention in June 1976, Israel communicated a series of red lines to include demands that Syria not advance south of the Zahrani River and not to interfere with Israeli aircraft operating over Lebanese airspace.\textsuperscript{79} Though the Rabin government chose to tolerate Syria’s direct intervention in Lebanon, by the end of 1976 the Israelis were providing small arms, antitank missiles, light tanks, and millions of dollars in assistance to the Maronite militias.\textsuperscript{80} Ironically, by the end of 1976 it appeared as though the two remaining belligerents in the Arab-Israeli conflict were supporting the same side in Lebanon’s civil war.

B. SYRIAN STRATEGY

1. Objective

Syria’s objective throughout its three-phase intervention in the civil war through December 1976 was to maintain the unity of the Lebanese state and maintain leverage over the PLO by way of reinforcing the existing government in Beirut. The policy in

\textsuperscript{74} Abul-Husn, \textit{The Lebanese Conflict}, 61.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 345.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 346.
\textsuperscript{80} Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 346.
Lebanon was part of a greater policy focused against Israel. Following its loss of Egypt as a strategic ally against Israel during the post-1973 rapprochement between the two states, Syria sought a new strategic balance.\textsuperscript{81} Dissatisfied with previous negotiations with Israel that favored either the Palestinians or Egyptians over Syrian interests, al-Assad sought to create a new strategic situation that would give Syria the necessary military strength to negotiate bilaterally in order to regain the Golan Heights through negotiation.\textsuperscript{82} By way of controlling Lebanon and gaining greater influence over the PLO’s campaign against Israel from Lebanon, al-Assad hoped to realign the strategic balance in order to enable eventual bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria.\textsuperscript{83}

Reinforcing the existing government in Beirut did not just support Syria’s primary objective of gaining greater parity with Israel, it also served a number of secondary interests. First, by intervening in Lebanon al-Assad hoped to minimize the threat of spillover from a conflict that was amongst many of the same confessions that divided his own society.\textsuperscript{84} The al-Assad government is, in fact, not only a minority Alawi regime, but also one reliant on the al-Assad clan itself for rule, and the primary threat to power came from within the Alawi community itself and then from the other religious factions.\textsuperscript{85} Second, intervention in Lebanon offered the Syrian government economic incentives by the fact that the instability threatened the hundreds of thousands of Syrians working abroad there, and the occupation brought greater access to Lebanese capital and markets.\textsuperscript{86} However, as with any military occupation, there were significant costs involved for Syria, but ultimately the policy proved to be worth the possible expense for the al-Assad government.\textsuperscript{87} While the secondary reasons for the Syrian government’s intervention were notable, ultimately al-Assad and his advisors chose to intervene in

\textsuperscript{81} Abul-Husn, \textit{The Lebanese Conflict}, 64.
\textsuperscript{82} Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 80–81.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{84} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention}, 237.
\textsuperscript{86} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention In Lebanon}, 235–236.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 236.
order to reinforce the Lebanese government as a part of a broader government policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

While Syria eventually resorted to direct military intervention in order to prop up its allies in Lebanon, throughout its entire campaign during the 1975–1976 period, the Syrian government leveraged relationships with both state and non-state actors. Syria’s reinforcing strategy toward the Lebanese government implied that al-Assad was committed first and foremost to his political allies within the Lebanese government. The Lebanese Civil War consisted largely of former and current political officials within the Lebanese government fighting each other via their militias, but the presidency and prime minister position remained functional through much of the war despite the constitutional requirement that a Christian hold the presidency and a Sunni Muslim serve as prime minister.  

During Syria’s indirect intervention phase, al-Assad continued to back President Franjiah but also coerced him into accepting an early election for his replacement in exchange for Syrian support against the LNM militias that opposed him.  

On 8 May 1976, Syrian-backed Elias Sarkis, assisted by the presence of Syrian proxy militiamen from the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and Saiqa, won the early elections for the presidency against the LNM-backed Raymond Edde.  

As Syrian forces under the ADF banner assumed their occupation of Lebanon in November 1976, President Sarkis met with the prominent leaders of the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) in order to convince them to accept the arrangement. The Lebanese Prime Minister throughout this period, Rashid Karami, was also under Syrian influence, which helped facilitate the Syrian intervention under the guise of supporting the Lebanese government. By maintaining significant political influence over the heads of the Lebanese state, the Syrian government also gained influence over the Lebanese security forces.  

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89 Weinberger, Syrian Intervention, 195.  
90 Ibid., 201.  
91 Weinberger, Syrian Intervention, 230.  
92 Winslow, Lebanon, 202.
influence over the Lebanese state and its armed forces was central to his strategy prior to the army’s collapse in March 1976, after which his NSA allies would become central in his efforts to reinforce the Lebanese government.

While the Syrian government would ally with Lebanese militias as opportunities and necessities to do so arose, al-Assad first leaned heavily on his Palestinian proxy forces to conduct armed intervention on his behalf. The two principal Syrian proxy forces were Saiqa and the PLA. Saiqa, the Syrian acronym for the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War, was a Palestinian commando organization based in Syria, trained and led by Syrian officers.93 The PLA was another Palestinian militia operating from Syria that took orders from al-Assad.94 While both Syrian proxies were Palestinian and under the overall command of the PLO under Yasser Arafat, they in fact took their orders from the Syrian President.95 These units were repeatedly used to doing al-Assad’s bidding, almost to their breaking point during the period of Syrian direct intervention. As the Syrian government increased its indirect intervention via its Palestinian proxy forces in the spring of 1976, these forces were not only used to fight revisionist forces under the LNM, but also Palestinian forces that were fighting alongside the revisionists.96 The internecine fighting amongst the Palestinian factions induced many defections during the summer of 1976, as Syrian-backed Palestinian fighters refused to fight their brothers in Lebanon.97 As a result of its blind allegiance to the Syrian President, the PLO expelled Saiqa from the organization.98 While Syria’s Palestinian proxy forces proved quite useful throughout the intervention, al-Assad’s repeated attempts to throw them against other Palestinian factions in Lebanon nearly left them broken by the end of 1976.

Following direct intervention in June 1976, the Syrian government continued to seek out alliances with other NSA’s that aligned with its interests. Throughout 1976

93 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 10.
94 Winslow, Lebanon, 202.
95 Weinberger, Syrian Intervention, 206.
96 Ibid., 215.
97 Ibid.
Syrian forces showed a willingness to work with any group that proved willing and able, whether Christian, Sunni Muslim, Shiite Muslim, or otherwise. Though Syrian intervention against the LNM temporarily drove the Lebanese Arab Army (a Muslim faction of the Lebanese Army that had broken away from the army during the March collapse) and the PLO toward the revisionists, al-Assad’s forces proved adept at gradually breaking up the alliance.\textsuperscript{99} During Syria’s indirect intervention in the spring of 1976, Amal, the only major Shiite militia at the time, officially distanced itself from the LNM and would remain a loyal ally to the Syrian government through the remainder of the war.\textsuperscript{100} By mid-June 1976 the Syrian army was attracting defectors from the LAA to its new Lebanese army effort called the Vanguards of the Lebanese Army.\textsuperscript{101} The PLO’s agreement with the Arab League during the October 1976 ceasefire ended its alliance with the LNM and the organization returned to al-Assad’s orbit.\textsuperscript{102} The plethora of Christian militias, through the influence of President Sarkis, also agreed to accept Syrian occupation by the end of 1976.\textsuperscript{103} Syria’s strategy sidelined the major militias by either allying with them or coercing them into sidelining themselves. It is no coincidence that Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the LNM and the pernicious thorn in the side of al-Assad’s efforts throughout 1976, was assassinated in March 1977.\textsuperscript{104}

3. **Methods of Supporting Allies**

Syrian support for its allies in Lebanon was comprehensive and included political, logistical, and direct military support. Syrian political support focused on supporting those Lebanese politicians and organizations that would support Syrian policy. Throughout the mediation period of al-Assad’s intervention he sought to prevent either sect from becoming too dominant within Lebanon, which could threaten Syrian interests.

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\textsuperscript{99} Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 212.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 190.

\textsuperscript{101} O’Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon*, 52–53.

\textsuperscript{102} Winslow, *Lebanon*, 211.

\textsuperscript{103} Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention*, 230.

\textsuperscript{104} O’Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon*, 62.
there.\textsuperscript{105} He ensured that the politicians he backed remained in power. In January 1976 Prime Minister Karami threatened to resign in frustration, but al-Assad convinced him to stay on, thus gaining greater influence.\textsuperscript{106} By the spring of 1976, under attack from LNM militias, President Franjiah agreed to cut his own presidential term short in exchange for Syrian indirect intervention on his government’s behalf via Saiqa and PLA militia units.\textsuperscript{107} Al-Assad’s support for President Sarkis (who replaced President Franjiah in a Syrian-influenced election) was reciprocated when the Lebanese President accepted Syrian occupation under the terms of the October 1976 Riyadh Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{108}

The Syrian government also provided political support to its allied NSAs in order to legitimize their actions within Lebanon. In October 1975 al-Assad formulated the Damascus Agreement with Arafat and PM Karami that allowed units of the PLO to patrol Muslim parts of Beirut, essentially legitimizing the PLO’s policing actions in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{109} The Syrian government’s commitment to the Cairo Agreement also reinforced the PLO’s legitimacy in Lebanon, as the agreement reaffirmed the Palestinians’ rights to carry out their struggle for the liberation of Palestine from southern Lebanon. Syria’s proxy forces, the PLA and Saiqa, were both legitimized politically by instances where the Lebanese government called for their use in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{110} Syrian government lines of political support fostered a reciprocal relationship of political support between the Syrian and Lebanese governments, and its inroads with the government further legitimized the efforts of its proxy forces in Lebanon.

While the Syrian government did not provide significant logistical support to the Lebanese government, its support to both its Palestinian proxies and Lebanese NSA allies was significant. The al-Assad government provided safe haven to multiple Palestinian militias operating from within its borders. Saiqa was the most capable Palestinian force

\textsuperscript{105} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 42.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{107} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention In Lebanon}, 200–201.
\textsuperscript{108} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 59.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{110} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention}, 163–164.
operating from Syrian territory, whose leadership was Syrian officers, received Syrian training and military equipment as well as safe haven by operating from Syrian territory.\textsuperscript{111} The PLO’s assistance from the Syrian government proved so significant that President al-Assad repeatedly used its support as a carrot for PLO cooperation. In exchange for their signature to the October 1976 agreement, al-Assad reopened the “Arafat Trail,” an illicit supply route to PLO forces in Lebanon through Syria.\textsuperscript{112} Al-Assad even supported the PSP up until Jumblatt objected to the Syrian proposed reforms and subsequently had their Syrian supplies cut.\textsuperscript{113} During their invasion in the first week of June 1976, Syrian forces faced stiff resistance from LNM and Palestinian forces, many of which were equipped with antitank missiles provided by Syria itself.\textsuperscript{114} Syrian support of its proxies, allies, and former enemies was so generous it helped ensure that Lebanon was awash with weapons, and while it created circumstances where its own weapons were used against it, it left little doubt to those seeking a sponsor in Lebanon that President al-Assad was willing to hand out weapons to any group that would take his orders, even occasionally.

The Syrian government’s direct military intervention in the conflict in June 1976 reflected its willingness to undertake widespread-armed intervention, but both before and during the direct intervention Syrian leadership often proved effective at determining when and how to use military force judiciously. Despite the apparent brazenness with which the Syrian government undertook direct intervention in Syria, the al-Assad government took deliberate steps to avoid inciting unnecessary conflict with state actors and NSAs within Lebanon. Syria’s preference for employment of its NSA proxies rather than its regular forces typified the government’s cautious approach to direct military support. While Syrian proxies were intervening on the behalf of the al-Assad government from the summer of 1975, the first direct intervention of Syrian forces in Lebanon was in April 1976 under an incursion into the Bekaa Valley during which it took over positions

\textsuperscript{111} Robert Fisk, \textit{Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon} (New York: Touchstone, 1990), 75.
\textsuperscript{112} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 59.
\textsuperscript{113} Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 85.
\textsuperscript{114} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention In Lebanon}, 213.
occupied by its PLA and Saiqa proxies.\textsuperscript{115} During Syria’s direct intervention in June, heavy fighting with LNM and Palestinian units convinced them to adopt a different military strategy as its summer campaign continued into the fall. As fighting continued and centered on urban areas, Syrian forces adopted a strategy of attrition by operating across the country, cutting off its opponents from their supply lines, while employing its proxies and allies as necessary to directly fight its opponents.\textsuperscript{116} In September 1976 Syrian forces applied the lessons they learned during the June invasion in an effective campaign against the LNM and their PLO allies, which proved so successful that the Arab League was compelled to intervene diplomatically on Yasser Arafat’s behalf.\textsuperscript{117} Syria’s direct military intervention to support its state and NSA allies within Lebanon was done in synch with its other lines of efforts both politically and logistically to support its allies. The transition to direct intervention did not cause Syria to lose sight of its other efforts, and the Syrian government proved flexible in applying military force where necessary, and indirect force whenever possible.

4. \textit{Assessment of Strategy}

At the end of 1976 Syria dominated the Lebanese landscape politically, economically, and militarily under the diplomatic veil of the Riyadh Agreement of October 1976. A large part of the success of this plan was the Syrian government’s commitment to a limited objective of regime reinforcement. President al-Assad’s strategy for Lebanon was a critical subset of his overall policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and thus justified the incredible cost requisite with direct military intervention. However, the Syrian government’s strategy evolved over time, beginning with mediation, then indirect intervention via proxy militia, and finally direct military intervention as the situation required. Each shift in strategy reflected the government’s reactive response to an increasingly unstable and violent situation that threatened Lebanese partition and possible Israeli intervention. Ultimately the objective remained limited in that instead of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 49–50.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention In Lebanon}, 232.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
outright regime change, the policy was regime reinforcement, where over time Syrian officials leveraged their influence in the conflict to empower their own political leaders in Lebanon thus establishing a reciprocal political relationship where each government mutually legitimized the other’s efforts.

Syrian strategy also succeeded because it adapted to utilize an indirect rather than a direct approach. The al-Assad government only resorted to direct military action when it found it essential to achieve its strategic objectives for Lebanon. Prior to its full-scale direct intervention in the conflict in June of 1976, the Syrians repeatedly attempted mediation to resolve the conflict in their favor. By November 1976 55 previous ceasefire agreements, many of which were negotiated by Syrian mediators, had been broken. In multiple situations requiring armed intervention the Syrians used indirect means via their Palestinian proxy forces rather than applying their own military forces. Using these indirect forces, some of which were employed at the request of the either the Lebanese President or Prime Minister, furthered the legitimacy of the proxy forces themselves as well as the government officials they were representing. In the instances where Syria eventually felt compelled to intervene directly, these efforts brought great strain on their political allies in the Lebanese government as much of the population questioned the legitimacy of officials who would support the interference of outsiders in Lebanese affairs. However, typically whenever possible, even after direct military intervention, the Syrian officials preferred to resort to indirect means in order to put a Lebanese, or at least Palestinian face, on an action rather than a Syrian one. Even the diplomatic legitimacy afforded to the Syrian occupation by the Riyadh Agreement highlighted the indirectness of the strategy as Syrian units operated under the orders of the Lebanese President within an Arab League coalition.

Syrian strategy in Lebanon succeeded in this period partly because of their ability to maintain a rather heterogeneous and flexible coalition of individual groups that were generally homogenous in their own makeup. Al-Assad’s strategy in Lebanon followed

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the principals of Realpolitik: “Syria ha[d] neither eternal allies nor perpetual enemies.”119 In practice, this meant that al-Assad was willing to shift his support amongst the various confessions and NSAs as he saw fit in order to ensure the success of his policy in Lebanon. Throughout the 1975–1976 time period the Syrians shifted their allegiance between Maronite and Muslim factions, and amongst Palestinian groups, and at any given time they were aligned with members of each faction simultaneously. The Realpolitik strategy provided Syrian officials flexibility in Lebanon, and their emphasis on practicality rather than ideology allowed them to maintain a strong enough heterogonous coalition that the opponents arrayed against it could not seriously obstruct the Syrian coalition.

Syrian policy in Lebanon during the first phase of the war also succeeded due to a balanced use of both violent and non-violent techniques by its own allies and proxies as well as Syrian forces themselves. The Syrian strategy in Lebanon first emphasized a non-violent mediation approach at the state level, accompanied by the judicious application of violence where necessary in order to break political stalemate. However, when fighting threatened Syria’s interests in Lebanon, the Syrian coalition did not refrain from excessive use of violence to achieve its objectives. President al-Assad was by no means a peace advocate, but he did take into account that containing excessive violence was vital to his project of maintaining the unity of the Lebanese state. In numerous instances in this period, al-Assad acted militarily either directly or indirectly in order to ensure that a negotiated agreement that challenged his influence did not occur. In one example, on the eve of the June 1976 invasion, the leader of the LNM, Kamal Jumblatt, communicated a desire to cooperate with the newly elected President Sarkis, but the Syrian intervention destroyed any prospect of rapprochement between the Syrian-backed Lebanese President and their main Lebanese-NSA rival.120 Syria’s strategy in this period succeeded in part because the government judiciously applied violent techniques where necessary, and used non-violent political mediation whenever possible.

120 Winslow, Lebanon, 206.
Overall Syrian strategy from 1975 to 1976 succeeded in Lebanon because the government pursued a limited objective through principally indirect means in support of a heterogenous coalition of both state and NSA allies employing both violent and non-violent techniques. This strategy was far from perfect, and Syrian intervention did suffer significant consequences domestically as a result of its intervention on behalf of a Christian-dominated government in Beirut. In the following years, a terror campaign and insurgency by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood pointed to al-Assad’s Lebanese intervention as a major cause for action.\textsuperscript{121} Additionally, the apparent success of the Syrian intervention at the end of 1976 only lasted so long, as fighting escalated to a scale Syrian officials probably did not foresee.\textsuperscript{122} At the end of December 1976 the future was far from certain, but the Syrian government would not have been unreasonable in claiming success based on the fact that their politicians were in power in Lebanon, the country was relatively peaceful under Arab League sponsored Syrian occupation, and its principal enemy at the time, the LNM, appeared sidelined.

\section{ISRAELI STRATEGY}

\subsection{Objective}

Following Syria’s direct intervention in Lebanon in June 1976 the Rabin Administration adopted a policy of reinforcing the status quo Lebanese political system. As the civil war unfolded, two factions within the Rabin administration emerged: those that supported intervention, and those that opposed it. Foreign Minister Yigal Allon led the pro-interventionist wing of the government, advocating direct intervention in Lebanon in order to establish two states, one Christian and the other Druze.\textsuperscript{123} Prime Minister Rabin represented the other wing. Rabin was cautious toward Israeli meddling in Lebanese political affairs, and advocated reinforcing the status quo against the PLO backed revisionist coalition.\textsuperscript{124} After Syria intervened in June 1976, PM Rabin settled on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Van Dam, \textit{The Struggle for Power in Syria}, 72.
\item Ibid.
\item Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 343.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
his policy of reinforcing the status quo, though with caveats communicated to the Syrians via third parties.\textsuperscript{125} The Israeli policy placed them on the same side as the Syrian government, as the Syrian army directly intervened to reinforce the Lebanese status quo government.\textsuperscript{126}

The Rabin policy toward Lebanon proved advantageous for several reasons. First, this option reduced the chances of igniting another Arab-Israeli war due to direct conflict with Syria in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{127} Second, Israel’s NSA enemy in Lebanon, the PLO, was also a target of the Syrian offensive in the summer of 1976.\textsuperscript{128} Third, this policy was in line with Israel’s most important ally, the United States, which had come to view Syria as a stabilizing force in the chaotic civil war environment.\textsuperscript{129} The Israeli government later found that by the end of 1976, their policy toward Lebanon not only strengthened Syria, but also the PLO, thus contributing to a decline in Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis its remaining enemies in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

Israel’s allies in Lebanon consisted primarily of a largely homogenous coalition of Maronite Christian political leaders and their respective militias. Israel began meeting members of the various Maronite factions as early as March 1976 via nighttime transits between the Christian controlled port of Jounieh in Lebanon and the Israeli port of Haifa using Israeli missile boats.\textsuperscript{130} After numerous meetings over a span of months, the Israelis settled on supporting Pierre Gemayel and his Phalange militia under the command of his son, Bashir.\textsuperscript{131} The Israeli decision to support the Phalange did not come lightly. During one pilot team operation the Phalange showed off body parts they had

\textsuperscript{125} Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 343–344.
\textsuperscript{126} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 500.
\textsuperscript{127} Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall} 344.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 503.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
collected as war trophies in recent fighting with Palestinians. Nevertheless, as early as May 1976 the Israelis were shipping weapons to the Maronite militias in the Beirut area via the port of Jounieh.

The Israelis also built ties with NSAs in southern Lebanon as well. In 1976 Israel adopted the “Good Fence” policy along the southern border near Lebanese Christian villages in order to allow Lebanese Christians to cross the border to conduct commerce, work as laborers, and receive medical care. The policy facilitated the development of Israel’s proxy force in the south, under the command of a salaried major in the Lebanese Army. The border policy also enabled the transit of Maronite militiamen from the Beirut area into southern Lebanon via the Israeli border. By the end of 1976, the Rabin government had developed two NSA allies within Lebanon, a principally Phalange based militia in the Beirut area as well as a Christian proxy militia of its own making in the southern border region.

3. Methods of Supporting Allies

During this period of Israel’s involvement in the Lebanese Civil War the Rabin government’s support of their NSA allies in Lebanon consisted primarily of logistical and indirect military support. Both Israel and their Lebanese allies in central Lebanon avoided overt political support of each other because of the negative implications for the Christians in Lebanon had their Israeli support become common knowledge at the time. During one meeting, Pierre Gemayel communicated to the Israelis that he was ashamed to have to ask for their support. The Israeli government did provide broad political support to the Christian community, which directly benefited their NSA allies. Via backchannel communications the Israelis received guarantees from the al-Assad

134 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 65.
135 Winslow, Lebanon, 202.
136 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 349.
137 Morris, Righteous Victims, 504.
government that the direct intervention was intended to protect the Christian community.¹³⁸

Due to the political sensitivity involved, the Israeli government primarily used indirect means to provide extensive logistical support to its Christian NSA allies in central Lebanon, while in the south they employed both indirect and direct means of providing logistical support. Shortly after committing to arming the Maronite militias, Israel began providing small arms, antitank guided missiles, and obsolete tanks.¹³⁹ Israeli financial investments in the Maronite militias amounted to $150 million in the first three years alone.¹⁴⁰ The Israeli “Good Fence” policy provided economic advantages to the Christian community in the south.¹⁴¹ In some villages their water and electrical systems were even connected to Israeli ones.¹⁴² To the Phalange and its allies in the Christian coalition of the Lebanese Forces, Israeli naval dominance of the Lebanese coast allowed the continued flow of support via the Christian controlled port of Jounieh.¹⁴³ Israel also provided extensive military support to its NSA allies in Lebanon.

The Israeli government not only provided indirect military assistance to its allies in Lebanon such as military training, they also repeatedly intervened directly with its armed forces against Palestinian militia units, though whether those actions in this period benefited its Christian allies is questionable. The Israelis were actively involved in training its proxy militia in southern Lebanon.¹⁴⁴ In addition to military training for its allies in the south, the IDF would frequently conduct cross border raids to attack Palestinian forces in order to disrupt their attempts to launch cross-border attacks into Israel.¹⁴⁵ However, this is not to argue that the raids necessarily benefited its Christian allies in the south. The repeated violation of Lebanese sovereignty by Israeli forces

¹³⁸ Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 344.
¹³⁹ Ibid., 346.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid.
¹⁴¹ O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 65.
¹⁴² Ibid.
¹⁴³ Winslow, Lebanon, 218.
¹⁴⁴ O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 67.
¹⁴⁵ Morris, Righteous Victims, 499.
increased antipathy toward Israel from across Lebanese society. In 1968, one such raid and the inadequacy of the government’s response forced the Lebanese government to resign in the face of mass protests.\textsuperscript{146} As the war progressed in the south, Israel increasingly provided military support to its Lebanese allies, to include cross-border artillery support.\textsuperscript{147} The IDF also supported its allies in Lebanon by maintaining a naval blockade on LNM and PLO controlled ports, to include Sidon and Tyre in southern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{148} Israel’s military support of its Christian allies focused on the south throughout 1976, as the IDF fought to destroy the Palestinian resistance forces operating there. While Israel often provided direct military support in the south, principally for its own defense rather than to aid its Christian allies at this time, their NSA allies in central Beirut received primarily indirect non-kinetic military support consisting of military training at this time due to both Phalange and Israeli leaders’ political concerns.

4. Assessment of Strategy

At the end of 1976 the Israeli government found that its policy toward Lebanon and the Syrian military intervention had permitted a dramatic increase in its state and NSA rivals’ influence there while reducing its own. In a way though, Israel’s policy objective to reinforce the status quo Lebanese government was accomplished. The Rabin government’s acquiescence to the Syrian intervention ensured that the status quo forces would retain political power in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. Israel achieved its limited objective in Lebanon, though it was directly the result of its archrival’s actions rather than its own. However, as Syria was undertaking its direct intervention in Lebanon, the Israeli government executed a deliberate campaign to develop influence in Lebanon through the Maronite militias. Though this strategy did not show signs of success or failure by the end of 1976, some aspects of the strategy should have raised a number of red flags at the time and did result in problems for Israeli policy in Lebanon as the civil war continued beyond the period discussed in this section.


\textsuperscript{147} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 67.

\textsuperscript{148} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention In Lebanon}, 219.
The Israeli government principally employed indirect measures to support its NSA allies in central Lebanon, but relied more on direct methods in the south. The indirect approach to support the Maronites in central Lebanon was necessary politically to protect its allies and avoid heightening tensions with the Syrians. Initially those measures included covert political communications with the al-Assad government in order to gain guarantees of protection for the Christian community. Simultaneously Israeli pilot teams were meeting covertly with Maronite politicians and militia commanders in a deliberate operation to vet the Maronite NSAs in order to select viable partners. In the same month that the Syrians were staging their forces along the border, the Israeli government was already funneling weapons to its newfound Phalange militia allies north of Beirut. In the south, Israeli support of its Christian allies was far more direct. However, given the long established free reign of Israeli forces south of the Litani River by that time, the Israelis wasted little effort attempting to covertly provide support for their proxies there. This certainly contributed to a rising trend of antipathy toward the Israelis amongst southern Lebanese, given their years of exposure to repeated Israeli military operations into Lebanese territory to destroy the Palestinian resistance.

Another sign of trouble to come for the Israelis was their development of a narrowly homogenous coalition. The Israeli strategy pursued an alliance with the Christian communities of Lebanon. In the north, that resulted with an alliance with the Maronites, principally by supporting the Phalange militia. The Phalange militia was formidable. Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War the Phalange had the most powerful militia in Lebanon. An uncomfortable reality for Israeli decision-makers was that the Phalange were modeled after the Nazi Party; Pierre Gemayel having been motivated by a 1936 trip to Berlin to found his own fascist party in Lebanon. However, the Phalange demonstrated a willingness to go after the PLO and its multitude of factions operating within Lebanon. The Civil War started in April 1975 with fighting between the Phalange

150 Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 349.
and Palestinian militants and fighting between the communities continued intermittently since then. While the Israeli policy in central Lebanon built a strong relationship with an ally that shared their desire to fight the PLO, it also ignored a number of other factions that could have joined—or at least coordinated with an Israeli backed coalition. The Shiite community’s Amal militia is one such organization that could have served as a viable partner, given its confession’s anger toward the Palestinian militias and the near impunity with which they operated from Shiite parts of southern Lebanon.

In southern Lebanon Israeli officials fostered the development of its own proxy militia force that again emphasized Christian ties over all others. Perhaps more so than the north, the south offered greater potential for a heterogonous coalition. In the south both the Christian and Shiite Lebanese community were frustrated with the PLO presence there. In a small sign of extending their hand beyond the Christian community, the Israeli government did extend “Open Fence” policy privileges to some Shiites. As the Israeli proxy militia developed in 1976, Israeli officials entrusted Major Saad Haddad, a Christian and paid officer in the Lebanese Army, to bring his army remnants and Israeli-supported militia under his command. Haddad named his force the Army of Free Lebanon (AFL), and Israel intended to use it much like Syria used Saiqa. The successor to the AFL, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), claimed thirty percent of its members were Shiite and Druze in the 1980s. However, the AFL/SLA was always a majority Christian rank and file organization commanded by a Christian officer. Just as in central Lebanon, Israeli policy would favor a homogenous organization of Christians, leaving the rest of the confessions that it did not have a relationship with to align against its isolated allies.

The Israeli government also favored organizations with a preference for violence. The Phalange militia helped kick off the Lebanese Civil War and continued to escalate the violence through its campaigns against Palestinians and then Muslims in general. In

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153 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 65.
154 Blanford, Warriors of God, 24.
155 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 105–106.
156 Morris, Righteous Victims, 502.
January 1976 the Phalange was leading efforts by Christian militias to clear remaining Palestinian and Muslim sections of predominantly Maronite enclaves of Beirut.\textsuperscript{157} During one pilot team operation into central Lebanon where Israeli officials met with Maronite militiamen to include Pierre and Bashir Gemayel, the Christians asked for arms “so that they could slaughter the Palestinians.”\textsuperscript{158} While the militias forming in the south under Haddad did not yet show this preference for extreme violence, the warning signs for the Israelis were in the forefront even prior to their decision to support them in May 1976.

The Israeli strategy in Lebanon had succeeded by the end of 1976 because the objective of reinforcing the status quo government was achieved by the Syrian intervention. The success was primarily due to the Rabin Administration’s willingness to accept the al-Assad government’s military intervention to reinforce the status quo. As a result of its decision to cooperate with its archrival, Israel did not have to leverage its limited influence over a narrowly homogenous coalition of NSA allies within Lebanon in order to pursue its objectives there. The challenges of Israel’s partner development within Lebanon would become more apparent as the war escalated following 1976. While the objective of reinforcing the status quo government in Beirut was accomplished, the Israeli government found its strategic position far weaker compared to the start of the war. First, Syria now had more influence than ever within Lebanon through an occupation legitimized by both the Lebanese government Israel favored as well as the Arab League. Second, the PLO had actually grown in strength as they operated freely in a buffer zone established by Israel’s red line policy toward Syria and with increased Syrian support following the Riyadh Agreement.\textsuperscript{159} Though Rabin saw his objective achieved by the end of 1976, the government’s decision to permit the Syrians to act unilaterally put Israel in a strategically weakened position versus its last remaining state rival in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

\textsuperscript{157} Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 85.
\textsuperscript{158} Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 345.
\textsuperscript{159} Creveld, \textit{The Sword and the Olive}, 287.
D. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES

1. Qualitative Analysis

The Syrian strategy in Lebanon from 1975 to 1976 proved more effective to that of Israel because the Syrians pursued a limited objective through a highly fluid combination of direct and indirect means to support a heterogonous coalition of both state and non-state actors. The Syrian government pursued a limited objective of reinforcing the existing Lebanese government with which they further developed preexisting political relationships in order to gain greater influence. The Israelis adopted the same policy objective in Lebanon as the Syrians, but by conceding to their state rival the freedom of maneuver to accomplish that objective for them, the Rabin administration found the Israeli strategic situation weakened at the conclusion of 1976. While both sides pursued similar limited objectives in Lebanon, Syria was better able to influence events on the ground due to its effective strategy.

The al-Assad government favored the indirect approach as much as possible until resorting to direct intervention. But even while its troops occupied Lebanon, Syrian leadership continued to utilize indirect measures whenever possible. Following some hard lessons in June 1976, the Syrians adopted more indirect means by using proxies and allies in more populated areas while concentrating their conventional forces on the periphery of the country’s population centers where they could simultaneously cut off the logistics of its opponents while providing indirect fire and direct support to allies when necessary. The shift to a more indirect approach militarily weakened the coalition of revisionists and Palestinians arrayed against Syrian forces, even causing some units of the Lebanese Arab Army to defect by late summer. In contrast, Israeli officials continued to employ a very direct approach in southern Lebanon while in the north their methods were indirect out of necessity. In the south, Israeli forces repeatedly conducted raids against PLO targets in the years prior to the civil war. Disturbed by the increasing strength of the PLO in the south, the Israelis established their own indirect policing force

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161 Ibid., 220.
162 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, 61.
with the Army of Free Lebanon militia. The proxy force was largely ineffective on its own, and would soon be repeatedly reinforced by direct Israeli military intervention as the war continued beyond 1976.

The Syrian government’s ability to develop a large heterogeneous coalition contributed significantly to their success by the end of this period. The al-Assad government’s Realpolitik strategy allowed Syrian commanders to develop a broad heterogenous coalition that included multiple homogenous NSAs and politicians. This policy was highly flexible and non-ideological, allowing Syrian leaders to switch alliances as necessary in order to accomplish their objectives on the ground. At any given time in this period Syria could claim allies in the Lebanese government, as well as militias from all three major confessions in Lebanon as well as Palestinians. The Israeli coalition was narrow and homogenous, leaving a sea of various militias outside their influence and free to align with the Syrians who were more practical in their deal making.

The Syrian strategy also gained strong inroads into Lebanese politics, allowing the employment of non-violent techniques in combination with the violent techniques employed by its multiple militia partners. The Syrian government moderated multiple conflict mediations, and was able to bring parties to the table in part due to their strong connections to individuals and organizations on both sides of the conflict. Israel’s influence in contrast, ultimately relied on NSA’s with a preference for violence, due to the government’s lack of influence within the Lebanese political realm.

The success of the Syrian strategy became apparent to the Israelis when at the end of 1976 they found their two most significant enemies in the Arab-Israeli conflict in a stronger position. Syria had gained control over much of Lebanon with both Lebanese government and Arab League political backing and logistical support. Following their renewed cooperation with Syria under the Riyadh Agreement, the PLO grew stronger than ever in southern Lebanon both militarily and politically as the Palestinian population became more dependent on their services due to the decline in Lebanese government

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164 Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 86.
services during the war.\textsuperscript{165} Israel’s strategic position was far weaker at the end of 1976 largely due to the Rabin administration’s decision to permit Syrian intervention in Lebanon. In response to the increased strength of its strategic rivals, the Israeli government would leverage its homogeneous NSA coalition to pursue its strategic interests within Lebanon as the war continued.

2. Social Network Analysis

A social network analysis of the 1976 organizational network of the Lebanese Civil War provides additional support to the conclusions drawn from the qualitative analysis of the previous section.\textsuperscript{166} As will be shown, by December 1976 the Syrian government had developed a large heterogenous coalition of multiple homogenous organizations across confessional lines, while the Israelis had built a narrow and homogenous coalition of Christian groups. The network consisted of twelve individuals and forty-two organizations. Figure 1 presents a visualization of the organizational network at the end of 1976. Node size varies by betweenness centrality, a measure that captures the extent to which an individual actor lies on the shortest path between all other pairs of actors in a network.\textsuperscript{167} The nodes are colored by type: States are colored green and NSAs are colored blue. The thickness of the ties between organizations reflects the un-scaled value of the relationship.\textsuperscript{168} Isolates were removed from this visualization.

\textsuperscript{165} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 501.

\textsuperscript{166} The methodology used for social network analysis (SNA) is detailed in the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{167} Sean Everton, \textit{Disrupting Dark Networks} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 397.

\textsuperscript{168} How relationships were measured and scaled is detailed in the Appendix.
Figure 1. Lebanese Civil War Organizations Network 1976

\textit{a. Network Topography}

The network topography measures of the standard network analysis are presented in Table 1. In 1976 the network consisted of 42 nodes and 87 directed ties. The characteristic path length (i.e., the average path distance between connected pairs of actors) was 11.915, which suggests a relatively distributed network. As we will see this remained relatively the same in 1983 but dropped considerably by 1990. Network density was 0.049, indicating that 4.9% of total possible ties existed. By 1990 network density doubled, but this may be misleading because density is sensitive to network size because as additional nodes join a network the number of potential ties grows exponentially. That is why analysts generally turn to average degree centrality (i.e., the average number of
ties per node) when comparing networks that differ in size, as we are here. In 1976 average degree centrality was 17.69, and this will almost double to 30 by 1983 before dropping slightly in 1990 to approximately 27. In 1976 network cohesion, which measures the number of pairs of organizations that have either direct or indirect ties to one another, was 0.861, or 86.1%. This too increased over time; in fact, by 1990 every organization had a direct or indirect tie with one another. In 1976 the network was also quite hierarchical, as captured by Krackhardt’s measure of hierarchy (0.780, or 78%), which indicates that in 1976 the majority of relationships were directed rather than reciprocal. Indeed, the low reciprocity value of 0.076 (7.6%) indicates that only a small number of ties are reciprocal.

Table 1. Network Topographic Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topographic Metrics</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Path Length</td>
<td>11.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Degree Centrality (Unscaled)</td>
<td>17.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Fragmentation</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Cohesion</td>
<td>0.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krackhardt Hierarchy</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Subgroups

Subgroup analysis was used in order to compare and contrast each state’s network influence. The results for clique analysis are presented in Table 2. Cliques are highly interconnected small subgroups of size three or greater in which every node is directly tied to one another. As the table indicates, fourteen cliques were identified. Of those, Syria was in six, while Israel was only in two, one of which consisted of a clique that included Syria, the United States, and Phalange. Syria’s membership in nearly half of all cliques is a strong indicator of the prestige the al-Assad regime had attained in the network by 1976.
Newman group analysis was also used to identify important subgroups. Newman “subgroups are defined as having more ties within and fewer ties between groups than would be expected in a random graph of the same size with the same number of ties.”\textsuperscript{169} In short, Newman group analysis seeks to determine whether any observed clustering is unlikely to have resulted from random interactions. Table 3 presents the results of the Newman group analysis. As it indicates eight total groups were detected, of which three are of particular interest. Although Syria was not assigned to the largest group, the group to which it was had the highest number of external links (15), which suggests it possessed a greater ability to influence other organizations outside of its group. Though Israel’s

\textsuperscript{169} Everton, \textit{Disrupting Dark Networks}, 194–195.
group has fewer outside ties (6), its group is twice as dense as Syria’s, suggesting a high degree of cohesion among members of the group.

Table 3. Newman Group Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>PSP, Mounibatoum, October 24th Movement, LAA, PFLP, PLO, PFLP-GC, DFLP, Fatah, LNM, Organization for Communist Action, Syrian National Social Party, Syrian Baath Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lebanon, Syria, Saiqa, PLA, Lebanese Communist Party, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Sudan, Vanguards of the Lebanese Arab Army, USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Phalange (Kataeb), NLP, LF, ZLA, Guardians of the Cedar Militia, USA, Israel, Army of Free Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Analysis of Individual Actors

Table 4 presents several centrality measures that were estimated in order to compare the potential influence of Syria and Israel. As they indicate, Syria ranked first across all measures, and its scores were significantly higher than all of Israel’s. Its high betweenness centrality indicates the organization’s superior position of brokerage between other influential nodes. Its total degree centrality score of 0.066 indicates that the organization possessed the highest number of relationships in the network. The al-Assad government’s superior in-degree and out-degree centrality scores indicate that the organization had the greatest number of both incoming and outgoing links, another indication of the state’s superior influence, and its top eigenvector, hub, and authority centrality scores provide additional evidence of its dominance at this time.170 The values and rankings shown on Table 4 add further quantitative support to the previous qualitative argument that the Syrian strategy was highly successful in building influence in Lebanon through a heterogeneous coalition of many homogenous organizations.

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Table 4. Actor Centrality Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Degree Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Degree Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Degree Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvector Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hub Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Calculated using UCINET 6.0.*

**d. SNA Conclusion**

The SNA of the Lebanese organizational network at the end of 1976 quantitatively supports the qualitative thesis that Syria’s strategy to influence the Lebanese civil war environment proved more effective than that of Israel’s because the Syrians pursued a limited objective through a heterogeneous coalition of multiple homogenous NSAs supported by a combination of indirect and direct means. The subgroup analysis revealed that the Syrian government obtained membership in multiple influential subgroups, far more than its state rival. Additionally, a comparison of multiple node level measures revealed that Syria’s influence extended far beyond its clique and Newman groups, but throughout the network. In comparison, the Israeli government’s influence was far more limited beyond its small subgroup.

**E. CONCLUSION**

A combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses of the Lebanese Civil War in the period from 1975 to 1976 provides a useful comparison of state strategies to influence civil war environments through the support of NSAs. The Syrian government eventually decided to directly intervene in the civil war in the summer of 1976 as its NSA allies alone proved unable to stabilize the situation. However, following their direct intervention, the Syrians adhered to an overall strategy that emphasized indirect methods through a broad coalition in pursuit of a limited objective. Direct intervention by Syrian
forces typically only occurred where surrogates failed to secure al-Assad’s objectives. The Israeli government consented to its strategic rival’s direct intervention with the understanding that the al-Assad government shared their objective in Lebanon of reinforcing the status quo government. However, yielding control over the intrastate conflict almost entirely to its enemy, and failing to effectively prepare an NSA coalition on par with its rival’s, Israel was ill prepared for the new strategic situation that had elevated the status of both Syria and the PLO by the beginning of 1977. The Syrian and Israeli experience in Lebanon in the 1975 to 1976 period reinforces the value of adopting limited objectives, and pursuing those objectives through indirect and direct support to a broad coalition of NSA allies employing both violent and non-violent techniques.

In June 1982 the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in order to destroy the PLO, install a pro-Israel Christian President in Beirut, and force the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Like the Syrians six years before, the Israelis sought dominance in Lebanon in order to secure their national interests. Whereas the international community cautiously accepted President al-Assad’s intervention in 1976, Prime Minister Begin’s campaign was widely condemned and drew a strong international response as Israeli forces entered the outskirts of Beirut. Despite diplomatic pressure, by the end of August 1982 the Israeli government was on its way to securing all of its objectives as the PLO withdrew from Beirut under the supervision of a western Multi-National Force (MNF), the Syrians were confined to the Bekaa Valley east of Beirut, and Israel-backed Bashir Gemayel was elected president under the influence of Israeli forces. However, Begin’s hopes for Israeli supremacy in Lebanon were crushed in September as President-elect Gemayel was assassinated and subsequent massacres by Gemayel’s Phalange militia permanently destroyed the legitimacy of Israel’s presence in Lebanon. Israeli forces gradually withdrew from central Lebanon, and in their place the Syrian government became more dominant in Lebanon than before the Israeli invasion. The 1982 invasion also hastened the arrival of another state actor whose Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would help local Lebanese Islamists establish a new militia through a small coalition of violent individuals and groups.

A study of the June 1982 to December 1983 period of the Lebanese Civil War provides a valuable case study of three state actors and their efforts to influence a complex civil war environment because during this period a strategic shift occurs under direct Israeli intervention. The Israeli government pursued a limited objective of regime reinforcement through direct military intervention in support of a homogenous coalition of NSAs. The Syrian government continued to pursue its limited objective of regime

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171 Morris, Righteous Victims, 549.
reinforcement through a combination of indirect and direct means in support of a broad heterogeneous coalition of NSAs and state allies. Upon their entrance into the war, the Iranians pursued an unlimited objective of regime overthrow through indirect support of a homogenous coalition of exceptionally violent NSAs. The following analysis will evaluate each strategy separately and then compare and assess the successes and failures of each. The analysis will focus on state objectives, their use of indirect and direct means, the composition of their allies in Lebanon, and the degree to which they employed violent and non-violent tactics.

A. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1977-1983**

From 1977 on the Lebanese Civil War became increasingly influenced by regional actors seeking influence in the conflict through their respective proxies.\(^{174}\) While inter-communal warfare between Christians and Muslims still reflected much of the struggle, conflict resolution remained difficult due to the inability of any group to achieve victory, and external state support ensured weak NSAs continued to survive without a base of support.\(^{175}\) In this environment Syria dominated, continuing al-Assad’s Realpolitik strategy to ensure as much indirect control of the Lebanese landscape as possible. By 1978 the Syrians had formed a new coalition with its former enemies in the LNM, who joined a renewed Syrian-PLO alliance against Syria’s former allies of the Maronite status quo coalition.\(^{176}\) The Syrian alliance with the PLO, and the red lines enforced by the Israelis against Syrian forces entering south Lebanon, created an environment in which the Palestinians could build upon their state-within-a-state in Lebanon.\(^{177}\) Syrian dominance in Lebanon, the growing strength of the PLO, and domestic politics contributed to a movement to adopt interventionist policies within the Israeli government during the late 1970s.

\(^{174}\) Winslow, *Lebanon*, 213.  
\(^{175}\) Ibid., 212–213.  
\(^{176}\) Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 67.  
\(^{177}\) Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 347.
As Syrian and PLO strength in Lebanon grew, a shift in Israeli politics ensured that the Israeli government adopted a pro-interventionist policy. The May 1977 Israeli elections brought Menachem Begin into power. Prime Minister Begin held a strong ideological affinity for the Maronite community of Lebanon, comparing their plight in Lebanon with the Jews in Europe.\textsuperscript{178} While the Rabin government had initiated the Maronite-Israeli alliance, Begin’s government would elevate it to a new level. In the south, the Israeli government built its SLA proxy force under the command of Major Haddad, often conducting ground operations to attack PLO positions and reinforce SLA control in the area.\textsuperscript{179} In central Lebanon, the Rabin government increased support to Bashir Gemayel, assisting his successful campaign to consolidate Phalange control over the Maronite militias under the banner of the Lebanese Forces by 1980.\textsuperscript{180}

In March 1978, following a Fatah raid into northern Israel, Rabin launched Operation Litani to destroy PLO infrastructure and establish a ten kilometer wide security zone inside Lebanon.\textsuperscript{181} Due to a weather delay, the Palestinians had advance knowledge of the operation and were mostly north of the Israeli operational area as the operation began.\textsuperscript{182} The only tangible benefit from the operation for the Israeli government was the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon as a buffer between Israeli and Palestinian forces.\textsuperscript{183} However, the Rabin government learned two critical lessons from Operational Litani that would influence its policy toward Lebanon. First, the Israelis learned that an operation to destroy the PLO must extend beyond southern Lebanon, and second, only a resolution to Lebanon’s political instability could permanently eliminate the influence of the Palestinians there.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{178} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 504.

\textsuperscript{179} Winslow, \textit{Lebanon}, 218.


\textsuperscript{181} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 74.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{183} Creveld, \textit{The Sword and the Olive}, 288.

Before the Begin government could apply these lessons in the final campaign to destroy the PLO, they needed to make further political gains domestically.

In the June 1981 elections, Begin’s Likud-led coalition won more seats, and as a result, they replaced anti-interventionist cabinet members with pro-interventionist ones, giving the administration far greater power in crafting an interventionist policy toward Lebanon. Frustrated with their inability to defeat the PLO through incursions, air strikes, and proxy forces, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon began planning for the invasion of Lebanon from his first day in office. Despite the unprecedented calm along the Israel-Lebanon border in the year leading up to the invasion, the IDF launched Operation Peace for Galilee in June 1982.

Israel had advanced to Beirut by mid-June 1982, despite repeated claims that the IDF would advance only 25 miles into Lebanon. As August 1982 came to an end, Israel had secured the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon under international observation, Bashir Gemayel was elected President under strong Israeli influence, and Syria was confined to the mountains east of Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Syria adopted a war of attrition strategy against Israel, employing proxies to fight Israeli and international forces in order to force their withdrawal from Lebanon. In September 1982 Syrian proxies assassinated President-elect Bashir Gemayel. In the following days, Gemayel’s Phalange militia massacred Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut, for which an Israeli government commission would find Israeli officials, to include Ariel Sharon, indirectly responsible. The IDF slowly retreated south into the security zone where its forces would remain for the rest of the war, while al-Assad’s coalition of NSAs reestablished Syrian influence over the country. Following Israeli withdrawal from the Beirut region, the Phalange fought on largely alone, and its ties with

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188 Ibid., 539.
Israel were broken by 1983. Assisted by their newfound Iranian allies, the Syrians continued the war of attrition against the IDF and its last remaining Lebanese ally, the SLA, long beyond December 1983.

B. ISRAELI STRATEGY

1. Objective

The Begin government invaded Lebanon in 1982 with three major war aims: to reinforce Christian dominance under the status quo confessional system in order to gain a Lebanon-Israel peace agreement, to destroy the PLO, and to force the Syrians to withdraw. The Israeli objective of regime reinforcement is not to be confused with regime overthrow. The Begin government planned to ensure the election of Bashir Gemayel to the presidency within the current governmental structure of Lebanon. In November 1981 Gemayel officially declared his intention to run for President Sarkis’s position at the conclusion of his term in September 1982, but understood that his candidacy would only succeed with Israeli intervention. Once Gemayel was in power, Begin hoped, he would sign a peace agreement with Israel, making Lebanon the second Arab country to do so, and setting the conditions for the permanent removal of the PLO from Lebanon. Begin’s policy in Lebanon directly supported his government’s long-term plans to annex the West Bank and Gaza into “Greater Israel.” By breaking the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon and dominating the region upon the successful conclusion of the war, the Begin government believed they could have unchallenged control of the Palestinian territories. In June 1982 the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in pursuit of a limited objective of regime reinforcement through nearly unlimited and direct means.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

Israel did not have political allies in the Lebanese government during the lead up to the June invasion, but the invasion implanted their long-time ally into the presidency. The invasion set the conditions for Bashir Gemayel’s election to the presidency in August 1982, thus enshrining Begin’s most important ally in Lebanon with the perceived legitimacy of the presidential office. In reality, his election by the participating members of the Lebanese government was heavily influenced by the Israelis as some votes were bought for a reported half a million dollars and other officials were transported to the election by the IDF.\(^{197}\) Despite investing an incredible amount of blood and treasure to emplace Gemayel in power, he and his affiliated militia forces were far from reliable allies for the Israeli government.

Bashir Gemayel and his Maronite militia signaled to the Israeli government on numerous occasions that they would not act as an Israeli-proxy in Lebanon, and the Israeli government was divided over Begin and Sharon’s proposals. Sharon developed a personal relationship with Gemayel, and placed a strategic value on the Israel-Phalange alliance despite reservations from Israeli intelligence.\(^{198}\) IDF intelligence warned that Bashir Gemayel was only using the Israelis to secure political power, and once in place, he would move Lebanon closer to the Arab world and away from Israel.\(^{199}\) Though Gemayel never actually held political office due to his assassination, there were multiple events that validated the IDF’s intelligence estimate. During the invasion he refused to attack the PLO in support of the IDF, and following his election he declared his intent to pursue neutrality toward Israel and Syria.\(^{200}\) At a meeting between Begin, Sharon, and Gemayel on 1 September 1982, the President-elect indicated that he would act independently of Israel on a number of matters, which infuriated Begin and resulted in the meeting ending abruptly following a shouting match.\(^{201}\) The alliance continued

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\(^{198}\) Ibid., 505.


\(^{201}\) Ibid.
however, and prior to his assassination on 14 September 1982 the two sides had agreed on a plan to clear the remaining Palestinians resistance from west Beirut and following that, to sign a peace treaty within the next month.202

The death of Bashir Gemayel destroyed the central pillar of the Begin government’s strategy for Lebanon, the establishment of a friendly government in Beirut. The Israelis backed President Sarkis to assume the presidency, ironically the Syrian-backed president of Lebanon since 1976, but instead Bashir’s brother Amin won the election.203 Amin Gemayel was more political than his brother, abstaining from involvement in the Maronite militias his brother commanded, and because of his political focus he maintained links with the Muslim community since the inception of the war.204 President Amin Gemayel did sign a treaty with Israel on 17 May 1983, under which the Israelis agreed to withdraw their forces to the south, but the agreement was largely engineered through American diplomatic efforts rather than Israeli influence with Amin.205 In early 1984 President al-Assad rolled out the red carpet for President Gemayel during an official visit to Damascus, thus signaling the degree to which the Lebanese government had swung back into Syrian orbit.206 By the end of 1983 the Israelis had no political allies within the Beirut government.

Israel’s NSA allies in Lebanon through this period consisted of the Lebanese Forces (LF) and Israel’s proxy, the SLA. The Lebanese Forces were composed primarily of Bashir Gemayel’s Phalange militia, which had consolidated the major Maronite militias under his command during the course of a violent campaign from 1978 to 1980.207 By 1982, the LF claimed over eight thousand militiamen.208 The degree to which the LF were willing to employ violence against their own community and others

202 Morris, Righteous Victims, 540.
203 Ibid., 546–547.
204 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 118.
206 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 537.
207 Winslow, Lebanon, 225–227.
was not exceptional in the Lebanese civil war landscape, but Israeli officials did caution
the LF to restrain themselves during the 1982 invasion. The Israelis coordinated with
the LF to conduct a clearance of the Palestinian refugee camps of fighters prior to Bashir
Gemayel’s death, and following his assassination the operation commenced hastily,
resulting in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacre. Once the massacre became
public, the Phalange, the bulk of the militia forces responsible for it under the LF, blamed
the attack on Israel’s other critical NSA ally in Lebanon, the SLA, in an effort to shift
responsibility for the atrocity onto the Israelis and their proxy.

The SLA was an Israel-backed proxy force that operated across southern Lebanon
to secure the area for the IDF. The SLA was never sufficient to secure the border zone
without significant Israeli direct support. They usually claimed around two thousand
militiamen under their command. Backed up by the IDF, they controlled an area of
five hundred square miles and one hundred thousand mostly Christians as many Muslims
fled the area. The SLA’s commander since its inception, Major Haddad, died in
December 1983 of cancer, yet another loss of an important leader in Israel’s narrow
Lebanese coalition during this period. The SLA and Phalange maintained ties in the
years prior to the Israeli invasion, but as demonstrated by the willingness of the Phalange
to blame them for the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, their ties were clearly strained by the
fall of 1982.

3. Methods of Supporting Allies

The Israeli government provided political, logistical, and direct military support to
its allies in Lebanon through a combination of direct and indirect means. Prior to the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon its political support for its LF allies was principally indirect

209 Morris, Righteous Victims, 542.
210 Ibid.
211 Schiff, Israel’s Lebanon War, 277–278.
212 Morris, Righteous Victims, 555.
213 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 77.
214 Ibid., 88.
215 Ibid., 135.
while in the south political support to its SLA allies was direct. Israel’s support of Bashir Gemayel and his Maronite coalition came principally through broad political statements referencing Israel’s interest in protecting the Lebanese Maronite community. As early as 1978, the Begin administration had publicly declared its obligation to prevent the genocide of Lebanese Christians, as the IDF conducted over flights of Syrian forces in Lebanon and increased its ground forces in the Golan Heights in order to force a cease-fire between Syrian and Phalange forces.\textsuperscript{216} On 3 June 1981, speaking in front of the Knesset, Begin pledged to come to the defense of Lebanese Christians if attacked by the Syrian air force, declaring the survival of the Christian community in Lebanon a vital Israeli interest.\textsuperscript{217} Repeated declarations by the Israelis to come to the aid of the Christian community in Lebanon provided essential political support to Bashir Gemayel’s militia as they repeatedly challenged Syrian authority in the years leading up to the Israeli invasion. In order to ensure Bashir Gemayel received the vote in the August 1982 election, the Israelis supported him by buying votes and physically escorting some delegates to the election.\textsuperscript{218} With Bashir in place, the Israelis looked forward to the peace agreement that would politically legitimize its efforts in Lebanon permanently, but Bashir’s assassination brought about the collapse of Begin’s political designs in Beirut.

The Israeli government also provided strong and direct political support to its SLA proxy militia. In April 1979 MAJ Haddad declared the south an independent Christian enclave, and in response the government officially discharged Haddad and those in his command from the Lebanese Army.\textsuperscript{219} The Begin government continued their political support of the SLA, reinforcing Haddad’s efforts to establish governance and collect taxes in the south.\textsuperscript{220} Under the 17 May 1983 Israel-Lebanon treaty, the Israelis sought and gained the Amin Gemayel government’s agreement to incorporate the SLA into the Lebanese Army, thus achieving recognition of its proxy force as a

\textsuperscript{216} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 505.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 505–506.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 538–539.
\textsuperscript{219} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 87.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
legitimate government force.\textsuperscript{221} However, the political recognition of the SLA dissolved with the abrogation of the 17 May agreement in the spring of 1984.

Israeli logistical support for their SLA and LF allies was significant. In the lead up to the 1982 invasion the Israelis estimated their yearly contributions to the LF at $25 million.\textsuperscript{222} In addition to Israeli support, the LF received $10 million a year in support from the Reagan administration at that time.\textsuperscript{223} Between 1977 and 1982 the Rabin government sold more than $118 million of arms to the LF and SLA.\textsuperscript{224} Following the Israeli invasion, in the spring of 1983 the Israelis were supporting the SLA by collecting taxes for their funding.\textsuperscript{225} The “good fence” policy of 1976 continued in the south, providing Christians the opportunity to conduct commerce and work in Israel and some villages received electricity and water from Israel.\textsuperscript{226} The Israeli government provided significant logistical support to its NSA allies in Lebanon, but the SLA, positioned along the Israeli border, and essential to the Rabin government’s border security plan, received the most comprehensive support.

While the Israeli direct military support for both of its NSA allies in Lebanon was significant in June 1982 as thousands of IDF soldiers invaded Lebanon, prior to the invasion Israel provided direct support to both NSAs. Prior to and after the invasion, the IDF repeatedly supported the SLA, and the two often conducted combined operations together. The Israeli government only occasionally provided direct military support to the Phalange in central Lebanon in the years prior to the invasion. In one battle between Phalange and Syrian forces in April 1981, the IDF shot down two Syrian helicopters.\textsuperscript{227} Both forces received military training in Israeli territory. Between 1978 and 1982 the Israelis trained 1,250 Lebanese officers at a facility in the Negev desert.\textsuperscript{228} Following the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{221} Fisk, \textit{Pity the Nation}, 482.  \\
\footnote{222} Zahar, “Fanatics, Mercenaries, Brigands,” 119.  \\
\footnote{223} Woodward, \textit{Veil}, 204.  \\
\footnote{224} Bickerton, \textit{A Concise History}, 214.  \\
\footnote{225} O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 124.  \\
\footnote{226} Ibid., 65.  \\
\footnote{227} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 506.  \\
\end{footnotes}
Israeli invasion the IDF supported the Phalange directly across central Lebanon, but that support dwindled as the Israeli government gradually withdrew their forces back to the south by the end of 1983. In July 1983 for instance, Christian forces fighting Druze in the Shouf did not receive any support from IDF units stationed nearby.²²⁹

4. Assessment of Strategy

In 1982 the Israeli government pursued a limited objective by providing direct military support to a homogeneous coalition of Christian militias. While Begin sought to replace the Lebanese president through the election of his own Lebanese political ally, he did not seek the complete overthrow of the entire Lebanese political system. In fact, the Begin government wanted to ensure that the confessional system underlying the distribution of power in Lebanon remained in place as it benefited the Christians over all the other confessions. However, the Israeli strategy produced nothing short of a political and military defeat for Israel. In the years following 1982 the policy produced four major failures: in military defeat in Lebanon the PLO moderated under Yasser Arafat thus further compromising Begin’s Likud Party’s plans for the West Bank, Syrian dominance of Lebanon became stronger than the pre-1982 era, the Christians were weakened rather than strengthened by the campaign, and the PLO militants were replaced by the more radical Hezbollah.²³⁰ In the year following the invasion, Defense Minister Sharon was removed and Prime Minister Begin resigned voluntarily but did not publicly specify his reasons for doing so.²³¹ Part of Israel’s failure in Lebanon can be attributed to its strategy of support for a homogeneous Christian coalition.

The Israeli government’s emphasis on direct methods rather than indirect put great strain not only on its own forces but also on its NSA allies. While Bashir Gemayel and his Maronite coalition repeatedly requested Israeli intervention prior to the invasion, the direct intervention by the Israeli government in an Arab state’s internal political affairs came with great cost. Prior to his death, Bashir Gemayel did demonstrate a

comprehension of the degree to which direct Israeli political support could undermine his political future in Lebanon. In January 1982, during a meeting between Sharon, Bashir and his father Pierre, Pierre Gemayel guffawed at Sharon’s suggestion that Lebanon sign a peace agreement with Israel, proclaiming that they were not traitors. Bashir knew he would have to tread carefully following his election in order to create distance between himself and Israel while still receiving their support. In a meeting with the Israelis on the evening of his election, Bashir said he would pursue a more neutral path going forward, which meant a pro-Syrian position to the Israelis. Following Bashir’s death, Begin had no other legitimate politician with which he could replace Bashir. Israeli officials’ preference for direct methods also undermined their efforts to build support from other confessions within Lebanon, though those efforts to go outside the Maronite alliance were limited in the first place.

Israel’s strategy of direct support of a Maronite coalition pitted virtually every other faction in Lebanon against it. In the south, the Israelis had a brief window of opportunity to align with the only major Shiite militia in Lebanon in 1982, the secular Amal. Israel and Amal shared the same enemy, the PLO, and Amal assisted Israeli efforts against the organization in 1982. However, Israel did not attempt to align with Amal, and instead focused on recruiting Shia into its SLA proxy. On 16 October 1983 an Israeli patrol blundered into an Ashura procession, incurring a violent exchange resulting in the death of two Lebanese. The incident mobilized the Shiite community against Israel, the few Shiite militias within the Israeli proxy force deserted, and Amal joined a growing umbrella of Islamist groups fighting Israeli occupation of the south. As Israeli ties to the Phalange came under strain in late 1982, the Israelis reached out to the Druze

232 Morris, Righteous Victims, 511.
233 Ibid., 538–539.
234 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 120.
235 Ibid.
237 Blanford, Warriors of God, 58.
PSP, but were rebuffed.\textsuperscript{238} Strained ties gave way to a complete divestment of the Israeli-Phalange alliance by 1983.\textsuperscript{239} At the end of 1983, the Israeli government’s last remaining ally in Lebanon was its SLA proxy force, confined to a narrow security zone in south Lebanon.

The loss of the Begin government’s only legitimate political ally in September 1982, forced Israel to rely increasingly on violent NSAs in a far bleaker campaign to gain influence in the Lebanese civil war environment by force. The pitfalls of a coalition dependent upon violent NSAs became apparent in the days following Bashir Gemayel’s death as his Phalange militia killed thousands of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. The massacre actually had far greater impact on Israeli policy due to the domestic response rather than that of the Lebanese. The reformist camp of Syria, Muslim, and PLO groups were quick to blame the IDF and SLA for the massacre and reconcile with the Phalange in order to avoid continued fighting and ensure presidential succession under their terms.\textsuperscript{240} The reports of the massacre, and the implication that the IDF may have been involved, kicked off the largest demonstration in Israeli history in Tel Aviv, launching a government commission of inquiry, and eventually bringing about the political downfall of those most responsible for the war.\textsuperscript{241} After the murder of Israel’s only significant political ally in Lebanon in September 1982, the Sabra and Shatilla massacre signaled the challenges of maintaining influence in the civil war environment through violent NSAs alone.

In 1982 Israel pursued a limited objective of regime reinforcement through direct means in support of a homogeneous coalition of Christian militias. Even before 1983 began, the Israeli policy was a failure. The Israeli objectives of establishing a pro-Israel government in Beirut, forcing Syrian withdrawal, and destruction of the PLO were only temporarily accomplished. By the end of 1983 the government in Beirut had again become pro-Syrian, as the Syrian forces were again expanding their presence in the

\textsuperscript{238} Zahar, “Fanatics, Mercenaries, Brigands,” 123.
\textsuperscript{239} Schiff, \textit{Israel’s Lebanon War}, 305.
\textsuperscript{240} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 546–547.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 548.
country, and while the PLO headquarters and thousands of fighters had withdrawn to Tunisia and other countries, they would be back. Israel’s influence would never extend beyond the security zone in southern Lebanon after 1983 for the duration of the civil war.

C. SYRIAN STRATEGY

1. Objective

Syria’s limited objective during the Israeli intervention remained the reinforcement of a pro-Syrian regime in Beirut in order to ensure Syrian influence throughout the country. Al-Assad’s objective would secure two important national interests for Syria. First, Syria’s presence in Lebanon would help promote stability and reduce the chances of the conflict spreading to Syrian territory. Second, al-Assad hoped to create a counterbalance to Israeli power in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the wake of the loss of Egypt by asserting its influence over “Greater Syria,” which included Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians. While the objective remained the same, the Syrians had to adapt their strategy against Israel and the foreign forces that had inserted themselves into the conflict. The Syrian government adopted a war of attrition through proxy in order to drive the IDF and MNF from Lebanon. The employment of proxy forces was critical to the Syrian strategy as the country was not strong enough to fight alone against the Israelis or the MNF.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

The Syrian government maintained ties to a number of state-level politicians and multiple NSAs through the Israeli intervention period. Prior to the Israeli invasion, Syrian-backed Elias Sarkis held the presidency since his 1976 election. The Syrians supported Sarkis because despite being a Christian, he was a political reformer, who held no communal leadership position and was not affiliated with any militias, and as a result

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242 Morris, Righteous Victims, 519.
244 Morris, Righteous Victims, 539–540.
he was dependent on Syrian support. While the Israeli intervention successfully removed Sarkis from power when Bashir Gemayel was elected, the Syrians acted quickly to prevent the Israeli-backed militia commander from assuming the presidency. On 14 September 1982, a Syrian agent assassinated Bashir Gemayel with a remote controlled bomb. At the time the identity of the perpetrators was unknown, but some suspected a rival Christian clan of the attack. By the end of September Amin Gemayel, Bashir’s brother, was elected president with the blessing of Muslim and Syrian leadership due to his moderate political record toward the other confessions. As the Israelis withdrew from Beirut in 1982, the struggling Lebanese Army continued to decline into 1983, and as the MNF prepared for departure at the end of 1983, Amin Gemayel was pulled into al-Assad’s influence. Over time Amin became al-Assad’s man in Beirut.

Al-Assad’s NSA coalition was large before the Israeli invasion, and increased in the aftermath. In the years since its intervention to support the status quo Christian groups in 1976, Syria had realigned with the reformist coalition as status quo resistance against Syrian occupation grew. The most significant NSAs cooperating with Syria in the pre-Israeli invasion period were the Druze PSP at 3,000 fighters, and Shiite Amal, which claimed 30,000 fighters in 1982. The Syrians also maintained their Palestinian proxy forces in the PLA and Saiqa, each of which numbered in the low thousands. Syrian relations with the PLO were under severe strain prior to the Israeli invasion, as al-Assad suspected that Arafat was supporting Islamist rebels fighting the Alawi government. During the siege of west Beirut by Israeli forces from June to August 1982, Syrian and Palestinian forces trapped there fought together, but outside of that localized conflict the

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246 Morris, Righteous Victims, 541.
247 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 118.
248 Ibid.
249 Morris, Righteous Victims, 552.
251 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 16, 113.
PLO was largely alone in its fight against the Israelis during 1982.\textsuperscript{253} As the PLO command left Lebanon in 1982, al-Assad encouraged a rebellion within Arafat’s own Fatah organization in order to gain further Syrian influence over the PLO coalition.\textsuperscript{254} In the summer of 1982 the Iranians, with Syrian support, began working with Islamist groups in the Bekaa valley in order to establish a front for Islamic revolution in Lebanon and to fight the Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{255} By the end of the 1983 al-Assad had increased his coalition of NSA and state allies in Lebanon, gaining greater influence over Lebanon than existed prior to the Israeli invasion.

3. Methods of Supporting Allies

The Syrian government supported its allies in Lebanon politically, logistically, and through indirect military support in the post-Israeli invasion period. The Israeli invasion and dominance of Beirut, and subsequent international intervention led by the United States, temporary limited the degree to which al-Assad could provide political support to his allies in Lebanon. Within the first week of the Israeli invasion, al-Assad’s forces had to first secure their own survival following the destruction of their air defense network in the Bekaa Valley, and fighting off an Israeli advance to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway in central Lebanon. When the Americans brokered an Israel-Syria cease-fire on 11 June 1982, the Syrians accepted while the Israelis felt cheated out of victory over the Syrian forces.\textsuperscript{256} During Israel’s siege of west Beirut in the summer of 1982, Syria and the PLO worked through the Arab League to negotiate the departure of their forces from the city in August.\textsuperscript{257} The Syrian assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel undercut Israel’s political gains, and the election of Amin Gemayel represented a political victory for Syria’s reformist allies in Beirut only a month after the last Syrian forces were forced to withdraw from the city. In response to Gemayel’s acceptance of the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel, al-Assad encouraged PSP leader Walid Jumblatt to

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{255} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 552.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 529–530.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 536.
form a National Salvation Front (NSF) of reformist groups opposed to the government’s agreement.\textsuperscript{258} The NSF was a powerful coalition of Lebanese political and militia leaders that included Nabih Berri from Amal, Walid Jumblatt from the PSP, former Prime Minister Karami, and former President Franjiah, a prominent Christian politician who also controlled a militia.\textsuperscript{259} Through 1983, al-Assad and his proxies continued to harass the Israeli forces and MNF in Beirut through direct and indirect fire, and suicide bombings that forced the withdrawal of the entire MNF by early 1984, thus reopening the political landscape to overt Syrian influence.

As the Syrian army recovered in the Bekaa Valley following its retreat from Beirut, the Syrians and their newfound Iranian allies provided significant logistical and indirect military support to their proxies and allies carrying out their attrition campaign against the MNF and Israeli forces. The Islamists gathering in the Bekaa Valley following the Israeli invasion were provided safe haven, financing, weapons, military training, and intelligence from the Syrian government.\textsuperscript{260} In May 1983 Syria began providing both weapons and direct military support to the PSP fighting in the mountains east of Beirut against the LF.\textsuperscript{261} Those PLO forces that rebelled against Arafat’s leadership following their evacuation from Beirut were extended support from al-Assad while those that remained loyal were cornered in Tripoli by Syrian-backed Baathists supported by Syrian artillery, eventually agreeing to retreat to Tunis via French escort.\textsuperscript{262} As per al-Assad’s Realpolitik policy, those Lebanese NSAs that agreed to ally with the Syrian government were soon rewarded with logistical and military support.

4. Assessment of Strategy

Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, the Syrian government successfully accomplished its limited objective of regime reinforcement primarily through a

\textsuperscript{258} Fisk, \textit{Pity the Nation}, 485.


\textsuperscript{260} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 536.

\textsuperscript{261} Ibid., 550.

\textsuperscript{262} Fisk, \textit{Pity the Nation}, 529.
heterogeneous coalition of NSA and state allies supported by both direct and indirect means. The Syrian government’s assassination of Israel’s only hope of political success, and the subsequent massacres of Palestinians by Israeli-supported militias, led to the collapse of domestic support for the conflict and subsequent withdrawal of Israel from much of Lebanon under international pressure by September 1983.\textsuperscript{263} Syrian-backed Amal and PSP militia actions against Gemayel’s struggling Lebanese Army brought his government into Syrian orbit, and simultaneously convinced the MNF to begin planning for their exit from Beirut.\textsuperscript{264} The Syrian indirect attrition strategy through proxy forces enabled al-Assad to return Syrian influence to most of Lebanon by the end of 1983.

The Syrian government’s influence over a broad coalition of NSAs enabled al-Assad to pressure his enemies in Lebanon indirectly from multiple locations. Incapable of confronting either Israel or the MNF directly in the post-Israeli invasion period, the Syrians employed surrogate forces to conduct a war of attrition against their enemies in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{265} Syria’s indirect methods provided al-Assad a degree of deniability, preserved his military strength, and effectively eroded the morale of his enemy’s soldiers and citizens. In part due to their campaign in Lebanon, Islamist insurgents challenged the al-Assad government domestically, but the authoritarian government was able to stay the course in Lebanon unlike the democratically elected government of Israel.\textsuperscript{266} By reasserting its influence in Lebanon and subsequently over the Palestinians, and confining the Israelis to the security zone in the south, al-Assad had accomplished a critical piece of his grand strategy to establish a “Greater Syria” alliance against Israel.

\textsuperscript{263} Hermann, “Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad,” 89–90.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{265} Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 74.
\textsuperscript{266} The Islamic resistance in Lebanon began with an assassination campaign against predominantly Alawi Baath party officials. On 16 June 1979 a Sunni officer supporting the Islamists killed 32 Syrian military cadets, prompting a countrywide counterinsurgency campaign against the threat. The resistance declined precipitously following the Battle of Hama in February 1982 in which thousands of civilians and Islamist fighters were killed. In spite of the opposition faced at home, the grievances for which were only partly related to the Lebanon policy, the al-Assad regime saw its involvement in Lebanon as a vital national interest. Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 72, 91, 111.
D. IRANIAN STRATEGY

1. Objective

The Iranian government entered Lebanon in the summer of 1982 with the unlimited objective of regime overthrow in order to establish another Islamic regime in its own image. Lebanon offered the Iranian government the best prospect to spread Islamic revolution and to confront Israel and the United States. During the period of Israeli intervention, Iranian foreign policy focused on spreading Islamic revolution and establishing contacts with the Third World while maintaining neutrality toward the superpowers. By inserting its forces into Lebanon with Syrian approval, the Iranians not only sought to develop their own Islamic resistance there, but also to extend support to the Palestinian cause in order to undermine the development of a unified Arab bloc in support of Iraq against Iran. The fact that Iranian and Syria objectives for Lebanon were directly opposed was less important than the high value each government placed on their alliance. For Syria, Iran provided a valuable ally against both Iraq and Israel. For the Iranians, having an Arab ally reduce the Arab-Persian dynamic of the Iran-Iraq war, and Syria facilitated direct access to Lebanon where a large Shia population offered the potential mass base with which to foment Islamic revolution. With these objectives, the IRGC entered the Bekaa Valley in June 1982 in order to build an Islamic revolutionary movement to overthrow the Lebanese government.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

Iranian Lebanese allies from 1982 to 1983 were solely NSAs—though the government could exert limited influence on Lebanese officials through Syrian channels. It must be noted how vital Syria was to Iranian actions in this period. Two days after the

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267 During its early period, Hezbollah’s objectives, which were transplanted from Iran, were threefold: establish an Islamic state in Lebanon, expel the foreigners, and liberate Jerusalem. Azani, Hezbollah, 242.
268 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 18.
269 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 41.
270 Ibid., 42–43.
271 Ibid., 90.
272 Ibid.
Israeli invasion, an Iranian delegation led by their defense minister reached an agreement with the al-Assad government whereby the IRGC would begin an Islamic resistance movement in Lebanon with al-Assad’s blessing in exchange for Iranian oil.\textsuperscript{273} The Iranians set about building a Shia based Islamic resistance with a coalition of breakaway factions, prominent Islamists leaders (many of whom were long-time friends of the Iranian revolutionary leaders), and recruits from the multitude of factions fighting across Lebanon.\textsuperscript{274} In August 1982 Ayatollah Khomeini met with members of the Lebanese Shiite ulama and urged them to return to Lebanon and fight the Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{275}

Husayn al-Musawi’s Islamic Amal established the core of the IRGC coalition taking shape in the Bekaa in 1982. Inspired by the Iranian revolution, and dissatisfied with Amal leader Nabih Berri’s secular ideology, Musawi broke away from Amal just one month prior to the Israeli invasion, bringing many prominent Islamists with him to the Bekaa Valley.\textsuperscript{276} The Iranians also benefited from close personal ties between Ayatollah Khomeini’s clerics and the Lebanese Shia clerics, many of whom attended the same religious schools in Najaf, Iraq or Qom, Iran.\textsuperscript{277} The IRGC, Islamic Amal, and other NSAs built an Islamic resistance coalition that slowly spread across the Shiite community in Lebanon, fueled by growing anger toward the Israeli occupation. The coalition did not officially adopt the name Hezbollah, or Party of God, until early 1984.\textsuperscript{278}

The other significant ally for the Khomeini government in this period was Yasser Arafat’s PLO. In 1972 Ayatollah Khomeini and Arafat signed an agreement under which Fatah would train Iranian revolutionaries in its camps in south Lebanon.\textsuperscript{279} Many of the

\textsuperscript{273} Blanford, \textit{Warriors of God}, 43–44.
\textsuperscript{274} Blanford, \textit{Warriors of God}, 46.
\textsuperscript{275} Hamzeh, \textit{In the Path of Hizbullah}, 24.
\textsuperscript{277} Hamzeh, \textit{In the Path of Hizbullah}, 18–19.
\textsuperscript{278} Blanford, \textit{Warriors of God}, 47.
Iranian revolutionaries received training from Arafat’s Fatah in Lebanon during the 1970s, to include Mohsen Rafiqdost, who assumed command of the IRGC in 1982.\textsuperscript{280} During the Iranian Revolution Arafat ordered Fatah to “provide ‘any assistance’ requested to ‘protect’ the Iranian revolution,” placing his entire network at the disposal of Khomeini and his followers.\textsuperscript{281} Following the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini handed Yasser Arafat the keys to the former Israeli embassy in Tehran.\textsuperscript{282} While the Iranian resistance network was not capable of extending support to the Palestinians in the summer of 1982, by 1983 its forces were capable of conducting terror attacks against targets with strategic implications.

While the IRGC fully embraced the Islamic Amal offshoot, and many individual defectors from Amal itself throughout the period, the Iranians distanced themselves from Amal for a variety of reasons. Amal’s secular ideology under Nabih Berri conflicted with the Iranian Islamists’ designs, and Berri’s willingness to cooperate with other confessional groups through the National Salvation Front increased the ideological divide between the two groups.\textsuperscript{283} Amal’s leadership did not share the Iranians affinity for the PLO, and saw the Palestinians as a threat to traditional Shiite homelands in south Lebanon and Beirut.\textsuperscript{284} When Amal did reach out to the Iranians in 1982, they told Amal leadership that they would have to work under their terms.\textsuperscript{285} While the Iranians rejected an alliance with Amal, their coalition’s growth was made possible by Amal’s years of organizational development of the Shiite community and the Iranian coalition grew on top of Amal’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{286}

A final organization that warrants mention is the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). IJO was established under great secrecy in 1982 under the direction of Sheikh

\textsuperscript{280} Norton, \textit{Hezbollah}, 32.
\textsuperscript{281} Baer, \textit{See No Evil}, 130–131.
\textsuperscript{282} Norton, \textit{Hezbollah}, 32.
\textsuperscript{283} Azani, \textit{Hezbollah}, 47.
\textsuperscript{284} Norton, \textit{Hezbollah}, 32.
\textsuperscript{286} Azani, \textit{Hezbollah}, 47.
Hossein, an ethnically Arab IRGC officer with wide ranging authorities.\textsuperscript{287} Sheikh Hossein recruited Imad Mughniyah, a Lebanese Shia with years of experience in the Islamist wing of Fatah.\textsuperscript{288} The Iranians provided Mughniyah a commission in the IRGC, and ample resources with which to development a terrorist organization largely by recruiting old friends from his PLO days.\textsuperscript{289} Mughniyah’s network shared strong familial, organizational, and geographic ties, the combination of which made the IJO extremely difficult to crack due to the high degree of mutual trust.\textsuperscript{290} The Syrians were left in the dark, and only a handful of other IRGC officers were aware of an operational command that extended from the Ayatollah himself through Hossein to the IJO.\textsuperscript{291} The IJO was the conduit for the transfer of Iranian martyrdom operations to Lebanon, conducting their first suicide attack on the IDF headquarters in Tyre on 11 November 1982.\textsuperscript{292} They executed the U.S. embassy bombing in Beirut in April 1983 and the barracks bombings of the French and U.S. Marines in October 1983.\textsuperscript{293} The bombings were a major contributing factor in the Reagan administration’s decision to withdraw the Marines in February 1984.\textsuperscript{294} Through IJO, the Iranians were able to establish a degree of deniability to its Islamist coalition of resistance forces being established in the Bekaa Valley during this period.

3. Methods of Supporting Allies

Khomeini’s government supported their NSA allies in Lebanon primarily through logistical and military indirect support, and political support through its alliance with the al-Assad government. The Iranian government’s close alliance with the al-Assad government granted the Iranian coalition the safe haven within the Bekaa Valley in which

\textsuperscript{287} Baer, \textit{The Devil We Know}, 62–64.
\textsuperscript{288} Blanford, \textit{Warriors of God}, 46.
\textsuperscript{289} Baer, \textit{The Devil We Know}, 62–65.
\textsuperscript{290} Baer, \textit{See No Evil}, 114.
\textsuperscript{291} Baer, \textit{The Devil We Know}, 64–65.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 214.
\textsuperscript{293} Fisk, \textit{Pity the Nation}, 520.
\textsuperscript{294} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 376.
to develop their resistance force. Syrian political support also facilitated a stream of Iranian logistical support to flow across the border. Iranian financing of the Islamic resistance was in the area of $100 million annually during this period.\textsuperscript{295} Demonstrating the investment the Iranian government was making in Lebanon at the time, their embassy in Damascus, from which much of its assistance to its NSA allies was filtered, had an estimated operating budget of $400 million annually and a staff of 200.\textsuperscript{296}

In addition to significant logistical support, the Iranian government developed its Islamic coalition in the Bekaa through its revolutionary vanguards, the IRGC. In the weeks following the invasion, 1500 IRGC guards established a training center near Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley.\textsuperscript{297} Some of the Iranian advisors were from Iran’s predominantly Arab Khuzestan Province, and spoke Arabic fluently.\textsuperscript{298} Contrary to the other state actors thus far, the Iranians were far more patient in their approach. Initially the IRGC focused on spreading their ideology amongst the local Shiite population around Baalbek, providing religious classes and showing propaganda films.\textsuperscript{299} Resistance volunteers had to apply in writing and possess a reference from two Shia clerics, and sometimes waited up to six months for approval to attend a training course.\textsuperscript{300} The first two training courses were run by IRGC advisors and trained 150 recruits for a couple months.\textsuperscript{301} Starting with the third iteration of the course the Lebanese cadres became the trainers, and the Iranians taught the more advanced skills, sending promising recruits to Iran for three-month advanced courses.\textsuperscript{302} Through this train-the-trainer model the Iranians were able to develop a sufficiently sized force to compete for influence in the civil war. While the resistance forces were being developed in 1982, the Iranians were able to conduct an effective terror campaign against Israeli and MNF forces through a

\textsuperscript{296} Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 31.
\textsuperscript{297} Blanford, Warriors of God, 44.
\textsuperscript{298} Baer, The Devil We Know, 53.
\textsuperscript{299} Blanford, Warriors of God, 44.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid., 56.
proxy terrorist organization, ensuring their NSA coalition in the Bekaa plausible deniability while it grew in numbers.

4. **Assessment of Strategy**

The Iranian strategy in Lebanon from post-Israeli invasion in June 1982 to the end of 1983 produced significant results. Though they were the only state actor evaluated in this period pursuing a total objective of regime overthrow to establish an Islamic revolutionary regime in Beirut, the patience with which the Iranian guards pursued that objective afforded a sense of initial success for their long-term strategy. While the Iranians were far from accomplishing regime overthrow by the end of 1983, let alone dominance within the Lebanese-Shiite community itself, in a short period they contributed to the development of a growing resistance movement. However, that coalition’s survival was far from certain, and its influence over the Shiite community by the end of this period still paled in comparison to its Shiite rival Amal, which claimed thousands of fighters and was one of al-Assad’s closest allies in Lebanon.

Despite the Iranian emphasis on indirect support, and the patience with which the IRGC developed the resistance forces, it was common knowledge that the Islamic resistance was largely an Iranian proxy force. In Baalbek, where the IRGC’s training camps were concentrated, the Iranians forced their brand of Islam on the local population. IRGC guards wore their uniforms, their clerics proselytized to the locals, alcohol was removed from stores and hotels, women began wearing full-length black chador, and Baalbek’s town square was renamed after Khomeini. The resistance’s propaganda often included Iranian flags and the intentional absence of Lebanese ones, and Iran’s conflict with Iraq was often referenced with depictions of the trampling of the Iraqi flag. Support for the Iranian-backed Islamic resistance would continue to grow however, as they took up the mantle of fighting off the Israeli occupation, which became

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304 Ibid.
a major grievance of the Shiite community following the October 1983 Ashura incident in Nabitiya.306

The Iranian decision to employ martyrdom operations also created a number of problems for its allies in Lebanon. While the Iranians established the IJO in a veil of secrecy, its activities were widely attributed to the Islamic resistance centered in the Bekaa Valley by late 1983. The Beirut barracks bombings of October 1983 brought significant international attention and direct attacks on the organization.307 The barracks bombings brought direct attacks against not only the Islamic resistance, but also Syrian forces and their PSP allies in the final months of 1983.308 Perhaps because the IJO terror campaign was directed against Israeli and other foreign forces at the time, the Islamic resistance did not face any major setbacks due to the implications of its involvement in the terror campaign. The Iranian proxy’s employment of martyrdom operations was highly controlled and aimed at tactical targets that produced strategic effects, and was far from indiscriminate in its application as targets were typically military or governmental during this period.309

The Iranian pursuit of regime overthrow through the development of a homogenous coalition of violent NSAs produced some significant strategic results in the 1982–1983 period. While the Iranians were far from achieving their objective of an Islamic regime in Beirut, they had successfully established a growing Islamic resistance movement in pockets of the Shiite community in eastern, central, and southern Lebanon. Despite the centrality of the Islamic resistance to Iranian designs for Lebanon, the IJO sewed the greatest harvest for the Iranian government during this period of the war through its strategic martyrdom bombing campaign against the Israelis and MNF. However, if you conflate the IJO with Hezbollah, as multiple historians do, the contributions of the Islamic resistance in this comprehensive view looks far more

307 Journalist Robert Fisk asked Hussein al-Musawi, leader of Islamic Amal, if his organization was involved in the bombings. Musawi denied any connection, but then heaped praise on the operation. Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 521.
308 O’Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon*, 133.
309 Baer, *The Devil We Know*, 205, 221.
Either way, the effectiveness with which Iranian strategists developed influence in Lebanon in this period cannot be denied.

E. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES

1. Qualitative Analysis

As with the 1975–1976 period of the Lebanese Civil War, this period ended with the domination of Lebanon by the Syrian government. The direct Israeli intervention to force what amounted to a coup d'état ended in disaster. The Israeli strategy can attribute its failure mostly to its own doing. The objective upon which the strategy was based was the ultimate demonstration of hubris. Overconfident with their ability to forge a path through the application of violence, the Begin government, encouraged by Defense Minister Sharon’s aggressive strategy, put the bulk of the IDF into an operation that should never have been pursued in the first place. Freed from their decades-long conflict on its southern border through the Israel-Egypt peace agreement, absorbing the incorrect lessons from Operation Litani, and determined to destroy the PLO in order to ensure the future annexation of the West Bank, the Begin government ordered the IDF into the Lebanese quagmire. While the Israeli government had nearly achieved all three of its objectives in Lebanon by August 1982, the following month brought about the death of their only politically credible ally in Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatilla massacre by the hands of its sole NSA ally in central Lebanon. Following the events of September 1982, the Israeli actions alienated nearly every faction in Lebanon to include its closest ally outside of the south. The political fallout domestically proved an even greater obstacle.

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310 Robert Baer distinctly separates the IJO from the other groups that would become Hezbollah in the 1982–1983 period. He claims the IJO was actually the main effort of Iran’s campaign in Lebanon while the resistance, principally Islamic Amal, were a façade to distract the MNF. Nicholas Blanford does not describe the relationship between the IJO and Hezbollah, but does reference a former Hezbollah official’s claim that Hezbollah was responsible for the bombing of the Marine barracks. It is more likely these groups were tied together in some ways in this period, but that the Iranians were giving the orders as Baer describes. Most historical works on Hezbollah describe their early period as principally a proxy organization for Iran, and only later in the 1980s did they gain greater independence and control over the IJO. It is not historically accurate to label the growing resistance forces as a cover for IJO’s operations, as Iran’s main objective in Lebanon was to develop an Islamic resistance movement and spread revolution. The development of the Islamic resistance was the main effort of this strategy. Baer, The Devil We Know, 62–63. Blanford, Warriors of God, 59.

311 Morris, Righteous Victims, 541.
to the Israeli government, and by the end of 1983 Begin had resigned. Israeli forces and their SLA proxy remained confined to the security zone along the Israel-Lebanon border through the rest of the civil war, never to effectively challenging Syrian influence north of the UNIFIL occupied buffer zone.

The Syrian government, partly assisted by their ally Iran and their own NSA coalition, effectively established its dominance over Lebanon like no period before 1982. While the Iranian sponsored IJO terror campaign contributed significantly to the MNF’s withdrawal from the country, thus removing a major barrier to Syrian re-entry into Beirut, it was not the sole contributing factor. The Syrian strategy of attrition through proxy also contributed to first the withdrawal of the IDF from central Lebanon in 1983, and second to the withdrawal of the MNF by early 1984. Al-Assad’s indirect strategy helped avoid a direct confrontation with either the IDF or the western forces, both of which were independently capable of destroying the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon. The Syrian government’s ability to maintain ties to a broad heterogeneous coalition of Lebanese politicians, NSA allies, and proxies allowed al-Assad to indirectly pressure his enemies to withdraw from Lebanon and in their wake establish influence over much of the country indirectly. Unlike the Israelis, Syrian forces did not have to be present in large numbers in order to extend al-Assad’s influence in an area, as its multiple allies and proxies could serve as stand-ins in a complex and fluid system of indirect rule. While Iranian influence would continue to grow in the post 1983 period, the remainder of the conflict would be dominated by the march toward Pax Syriana.

2. Social Network Analysis

The SNA of the 1983 organizational network lends additional support to the conclusions drawn from the qualitative historical analysis above. At the conclusion of 1983, Israel’s homogeneous coalition of Christian militias was broken and lacked influence over the network, the Iranians had built a closely connected homogeneous coalition with expanding influence, and the Syrians had solidified their dominance of the

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312 Morris, Righteous Victims, 559–560.
313 The methodology used for social network analysis (SNA) is detailed in Appendix 1.
Lebanese civil war environment through their influence over a broad heterogeneous coalition of state and NSA allies in Lebanon. In 1983, the network consisted of twenty agents and thirty-five organizations.

Figure 2. Lebanese Civil War Organizations Network 1983

Figure 2 presents a visualization of the Lebanese Civil War organizational network at the end of 1983. As before, isolates are hidden, the size of the nodes reflects betweenness centrality, nodes are colored by type where states are green and NSAs are blue, and tie thickness reflects the un-scaled value of the relationship.
a. **Network Topography.**

The network topography measures are presented in Table 5. In 1983 the network consisted of 35 nodes and 100 directed ties. The characteristic (average) path length was 11.891, which is relatively unchanged from 1976. Both network density (0.082) and average degree (30.0) were double of what they were in 1976, while network cohesion had increased slightly to 0.887. Krackhardt’s measure of (0.408) was much lower than it was in 1976 while the reciprocity score increased slightly from 0.076 to 0.125.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Path Length</td>
<td>11.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Degree Centrality ( Unscaled)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Fragmentation</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Cohesion</td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krackhardt Hierarchy</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Subgroups**

As in the previous chapter subgroup analysis was used in order to compare and contrast each state’s influence. The clique analysis results are presented in Table 6. A total of eleven cliques of size three or larger were identified. Of those, Syria was a member of six, while Israel and Iran were members of two. Each of the cliques of which Syria was member possessed a minimum of twenty-four external links, while Israel’s had less than nine each and Iran’s had a minimum of sixteen, thus providing additional evidence of Syria’s influence across the network.
Newman group analysis identified four groups. The results are presented in Table 7. Israel was assigned (partitioned) to the largest Newman group, and nearly 90% of that group’s ties were internal rather than external. Iran and Syria were partitioned into separate groups, and both of their groups’ ties were evenly split between internal and external ties, which suggests that each country possesses the ability to extend its influence beyond the borders of their Newman group.

Table 7. Newman Group Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lebanon, SLA, NLP, LF, Phalange (Kataeb), Guardians of the Cedar Militia, Israel, USA, France, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fatah (Abu Musa Faction), DFLP, PFLP, Syria, USSR, Iraq, Arab Democratic Party, PLA, Siaqqa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>PLO, IJO, Dawa Party, Islamic Resistance, Lebanese Communist Party, Iraq, PFLP-GC, Fatah, PCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PSP, Amal, Islamic Amal, NSF, ZLA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Analysis of Individual Actors

Table 8 presents the same centrality measures as before in order to assess Syria’s influence in the network. As the table indicates, Syria ranked first in all categories but one (authority centrality), and typically by a substantial amount when compared to the other state actors. The one exception was betweenness centrality, where Israel ranked exceptionally high. This was principally because in 1983 Israel served as one of only two actors that brokered between the two major clusters in the network. By contrast, Iran’s betweenness score is low because it did not function as a significant broker in the network. This can be seen in in Figure 2, which clearly shows Israel as a broker between the two network clusters, while Iran is located in the center of the largest cluster. The low ranking of the rest of Israel’s centrality scores suggests that it exerted very little influence within Lebanon by the end of 1983.

The Syrian government’s lead in nearly all centrality measures provides strong evidence of its superior network influence. Its total degree centrality score of 0.078 indicates that it had the highest total number of connections in the network, while its in-degree and out-degree scores indicate that it had a similar number of outgoing and incoming directed ties. Its high ranking and substantially higher eigenvector, hub, and authority scores provide further evidence of its superior influence in the network.314 While Iran was not as influential as its ally Syria, the scores indicate that within only 18 months the Iranians built a high degree of influence in a network of which they were not a part in 1976.

Table 8. Actor Centrality Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness Centrality</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Degree Centrality</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.051</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.337</td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Degree Centrality</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>0.076</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.337</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out-Degree Centrality</td>
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<td>0.103</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvector Centrality</td>
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<td>0.495</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.337</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>0.508</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.281</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>0.508</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authority Centrality</td>
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<td>0.495</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.337</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>0.508</td>
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<td>0.508</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Calculated using UCINET 6.0.

**d. SNA Conclusion**

The SNA of the Lebanese organizational network environment at the end of 1983 quantitatively supports the qualitative analysis of the same period. Begin and Sharon’s policy in Lebanon resulted in Israel having some of the lowest centrality scores, indicating extremely low influence over the network. The analysis reveals that Iran’s unique strategy had developed greater network influence than Israel’s strategy, positioning the state as one of the most influential actors within Lebanon. The SNA supports the conclusion that the Syrian government had built significant influence over the Lebanese network following the Israeli invasion and subsequent withdrawal from central Lebanon. The Syrian strategy of pursuing a limited objective through a combination of direct and indirect support to a large heterogeneous coalition of NSA and state allies in Lebanon had developed the most influential state network in Lebanon at the end of 1983.

**F. CONCLUSION**

The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 1982 to 1983 period of the Lebanese Civil War provides a thorough evaluation of three different state strategies to influence an intrastate environment. This section demonstrated the ineffectiveness of a strategy that emphasizes direct and unilateral means to achieve a limited objective. While the Israeli government did not intend to overthrow the Lebanese government, but merely to ensure the election of a Lebanese politician who had declared his bid for the
presidency months before the invasion, the lack of political and organizational depth within its homogeneous alliance contributed to its failed policy. The Iranian government’s pursuit of regime overthrow through the primarily indirect support of a small homogenous coalition produced significant influence by the end of the period in spite of a combination of features that can often result in failure. Lastly, the analysis reveals that the Syrian strategy of pursuing of a limited objective through a combination of indirect and direct means in support of a large heterogeneous coalition was highly effective.
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V. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1984-1990

From 1984 on the war in Lebanon was in part a proxy war between Israel and the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The Syrian government increasingly dominated Lebanon, as al-Assad established influence over the majority of the country through a combination of direct and indirect means. The Iranians played a supporting role, but their ideology and strategic objectives often conflicted with that of their ally, resulting in multiple proxy wars between Iranian and Syrian surrogates. The Israeli government gradually withdrew its forces from central Lebanon until by 1985 they were confined to a five-mile security strip on the southern border, their forces there harassed by a plethora of militias and terrorist groups. Despite the stark differences between Syrian and Iranian policy in Lebanon through the mid-1980s, eventually the Iranian government’s foreign policy moderated, thus ensuring the successful implementation of the Pax Syriana—in no small part aided by Iranian efforts. By the end of 1990 the Syrian government’s strategy had achieved a settlement in Lebanon and secured its objective of Syrian-backed governance throughout much of the country. The Syrian policy succeeded in part because the al-Assad government consistently pursued a limited objective of government reinforcement through a combination of direct and indirect means to support a broad heterogeneous coalition of NSAs employing both violent and non-violent tactics. The Iranians remained significant players in Lebanon largely due to their strategic alliance with Syria, but also because they adopted limited rather than unlimited objectives through indirect support of a homogenous coalition of NSAs that evolved to incorporate both violent and non-violent techniques.

A study of the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil War from 1984 to 1990 reveals relevant lessons for states seeking to establish influence in civil wars through the effective support of NSAs by both direct and indirect means. The Israeli policy had clearly failed by as early as the fall of 1982 with the death of Bashir Gemayel, and as a result their influence remained confined to southern Lebanon as Israeli forces and their

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proxy the SLA focused on security there. Israeli policy will not be analyzed in this section because its role in shaping the direction of the conflict was severely weakened throughout this period beyond the south. The Iranian policy reflects the ability of state actors and their surrogates to moderate over a short period of time. The Iranian government’s adoption of pragmatism over revisionism spread subsequently to Hezbollah, and this transition proved critical to the state’s continued influence in Lebanon beyond the 1990 period. The Syrian policy remained consistent throughout the conflict. The al-Assad government’s policy in Lebanon validates the merits of a long-term commitment to a limited objective through the combination of indirect and direct support to a broad heterogeneous coalition of NSAs employing both violent and non-violent tactics. In this section, both Iranian and Syrian policy will be evaluated separately and then compared in the conclusion using both qualitative analysis and SNA.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1984-1990

Following the failed Israeli intervention, the Syrian government continued to reestablish influence across Lebanon from 1984 to 1987, primarily through indirect means; fighting was increasingly typified as both inter-confessional and cross confessional in the post-Israeli intervention period. In 1985 alone there was conflict amongst the Maronites between three different factions, amongst the Shia between Hezbollah and Amal, and the Sunni Muslims were split largely along regional lines.\footnote{Winslow, \textit{Lebanon}, 251.} Syria attempted to reinforce the Beirut government primarily through proxies; in some instances Syrian-backed militias fought Iranian-backed ones, straining the Syria-Iran alliance on multiple occasions. In one instance in 1984, the Iranian backed Sunni Islamist group Tawheed fought a Syrian-backed Alawi militia for control of Tripoli.\footnote{Ehteshami, \textit{Syria and Iran}, 131–132.} Often these proxy conflicts in Lebanon would be mediated through direct negotiations in Damascus between the two-states and their respective proxy leaders.\footnote{The ceasefire that ended the 1984 Tripoli fighting was negotiated in Damascus between Tawheed, Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah officials. Ehteshami, \textit{Syria and Iran}, 131–132.}
As in early 1976, the Syrian government drifted toward direct intervention to secure its objectives in Lebanon as indirect methods proved insufficient. In February 1987, 7,000 Syrian troops entered Beirut to establish security and prevent the defeat of its ally Amal by Hezbollah and their allies, and by April their forces were patrolling as far south as Sidon.\textsuperscript{319} In May 1988 fighting between Amal and Hezbollah once again drew direct Syrian intervention in Beirut. The fighting subsided under another ceasefire fire, but not until after tense exchanges between the two state sponsors, during which the Iranians threatened to use IRGC troops directly against al-Assad’s forces.\textsuperscript{320} By the end of 1988 however, a crisis was developing within Lebanon that proved a far greater threat to Syrian designs.

In September 1988 there occurred a presidential succession crisis in Lebanon as a major Maronite faction continued to prevent Syrian efforts to secure the election of a new al-Assad-backed president to replace Amin Gemayel at the expiration of his term.\textsuperscript{321} By the end of the month, the outgoing president handed presidential powers over to a new Christian prime minister, General Michel Aoun, resulting in the government splitting between PM Aoun and existing PM Slim al-Hoss.\textsuperscript{322} Despite the years-long civil war, this was the first time the Lebanese government institutions had been semi-officially divided between the warring factions.\textsuperscript{323} The Syrians and their coalition of NSA allies and proxies backed the Muslim supported al-Hoss government, while the Aoun government received support from their mutual enemy Iraq. Despite continued inter-confessional and cross-confessional fighting, the rest of the war would be dominated by the struggle between the two governments.

In the final years of the war, the coalition behind the Syrian-backed al-Hoss government grew to include not only the entire reformist camp of the Lebanese NSAs,

\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 182–183.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 185–187.
\textsuperscript{322} Winslow, \textit{Lebanon}, 267.
\textsuperscript{323} Zahar, “Fanatics, Mercenaries, Brigands,” 113.
but also the entire Arab community except for the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{324} The Saudi brokered Taif Agreement reinforced the legitimacy of the al-Hoss government in the fall of 1989. The Taif Agreement addressed many of the reformist grievances, decreasing the power of the Christian president, increasing the number of deputies in the National Assembly, splitting delegates evenly between Christians and Muslims.\textsuperscript{325} The Maronite political leaders supported the agreement except for Aoun, who rejected the clauses permitting the continuation of Syrian occupation.\textsuperscript{326} A coalition of pro-al-Hoss forces, both Maronite and Muslim, fought Aoun’s forces, but were unable to achieve victory by the summer of 1990. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990 however, Syria’s participation in the coalition against him earned the state a green light from the George Bush administration, bringing Aoun’s forces to heel in the final major battle of the Lebanese Civil War in October 1990.\textsuperscript{327} The U.S. government’s consent to al-Assad’s control over Lebanon in exchange for Syria’s participation in Desert Storm was critical in light of the decline of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new geopolitical reality.\textsuperscript{328} While the Iranians publicly opposed Taif, their position had moderated following Khomeini’s death in 1989, and they exchanged acceptance of al-Assad’s policy in Lebanon for Syrian recognition of Hezbollah as both a military and political force.\textsuperscript{329} By 1991 the Syrians had 40,000 troops in Lebanon propping up the Hrawi government, their presence legitimized by the Lebanese and regional governments under the Taif Agreement.\textsuperscript{330}

\textsuperscript{324} Abul-Husn, \textit{The Lebanese Conflict}, 69.  
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid., 194–195.  
\textsuperscript{327} Winslow, \textit{Lebanon}, 279.  
\textsuperscript{328} Azani, \textit{Hezbollah}, 74–75.  
\textsuperscript{329} Ehteshami, \textit{Syria and Iran}, 137–138.  
\textsuperscript{330} Winslow, \textit{Lebanon}, 280–282.
B. SYRIAN STRATEGY

1. Objective

Throughout this period the Syrian government remained focused on reinforcing the existing government in Lebanon, with a preference toward the reformist vision of the Muslim community rather than the status quo Christian vision. The objective was limited, as al-Assad supported political reforms that would create a more equal distribution of political power between Christians and Muslims, while still retaining the overall political structure established by the 1943 National Pact. By establishing a pro-Syrian government in Beirut, al-Assad hoped to use Syrian influence in Lebanon in order to rebalance the Arab-Israeli conflict more in Syria’s favor.

Syrian policy in Lebanon was a component of its overall national strategy to rebalance the Arab-Israeli conflict away from Israel in the hopes of bringing forth negotiations that would recover the Golan. By dominating the Beirut government the Syrians could block Israeli influence. Through the presence of its NSA allies in southern Lebanon, al-Assad had a bargaining chip in any future negotiations for the Golan Heights. The alliance with Iran was a critical part of this rebalancing, as it helped replace the loss of Egypt in the conflict and reduced the threat from Iraq. For al-Assad the calculations in Lebanon were consistently pragmatic, non-ideological, and limited, committed to establishing Syrian dominance in Lebanon in order to shift the Arab-Israeli conflict in their favor.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

The Syrian government continued to develop a large heterogeneous coalition of NSAs consisting of powerful political leaders, political parties, and militias through to the resolution of the conflict. By 1990 this coalition consisted of NSAs from every major

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331 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, 69.
333 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 200.
334 Winslow, Lebanon, 284.
335 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 90.
confessional group, to include Maronites. The Syrians were able to rebuild influence within the Lebanese government as early as 1982. Despite his election occurring under Israeli occupation in September 1982, the Syrian government increased its influence over President Amin Gemayel as the Israelis withdrew from central Lebanon and the MNF withdrew from Beirut in 1984.\textsuperscript{336} Partly through its influence over Gemayel, by 1985 the Syrian position in the country was more influential than at any other period since the beginning of the war.\textsuperscript{337} However, years of Syrian influence over Gemayel did not prevent his decision on 22 September 1988, under great pressure from the Maronite political bloc, to appoint Lebanese army General Michel Aoun as Prime Minister in order to satisfy the concerns of the Maronite community over Muslim dominance following his departure.\textsuperscript{338} The Syrians, and much of their coalition of NSAs, backed the current PM al-Hoss and his government and helped ensure its eventual victory over the Aoun government.

Syria also maintained a broad heterogeneous coalition of militias and proxy forces throughout the latter years of the conflict, in some cases encouraging internecine fighting to ensure that its surrogates dominated their respective confessions but were never strong enough to stand without Syrian support. Despite the NSA’s competing vision for Lebanon, the Syrian government supported Hezbollah in part to ensure that its competitor Amal did not become strong enough to reject Syrian influence.\textsuperscript{339} A similar strategy was used against the PLO. Al-Assad had a long-standing policy of securing influence over the PLO and supplanting Arafat’s leadership with a pro-Syrian Palestinian, which became Abu Musa. From 1982 on al-Assad supported his Syrian backed Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF) under Abu Musa to fight and effectively supplant Arafat’s

\textsuperscript{336} Cleveland,\textit{ A History of the Modern Middle East}, 389.
\textsuperscript{337} Cleveland,\textit{ A History of the Modern Middle East}, 389.
\textsuperscript{338} After months of the Aoun bloc obstruction to any Syrian-backed replacement for Gemayel, the President’s final day in office came in late September 1988. A lack of quorum prevented Gemayel and the officials present from choosing a presidential successor, so instead Gemayel selected Aoun as the PM. The Maronites did not want the presidency to lapse, as the presidential powers would then pass to the Muslim PM al-Hoss. However, the 1943 pact mandated a Christian president and Muslim PM, and the Muslim political bloc, and some Maronites, supported the al-Hoss government over Aoun. Winslow,\textit{ Lebanon}, 267.
\textsuperscript{339} Norton,\textit{ Hezbollah}, 34–35.
leadership in Lebanon by summer 1987. The Syrians also supported a Maronite militia
under Elie Hobeika who fought the Christian Lebanese Forces militia under the command
of Samir Geagea. The Syrian coalition, though not directly tied to the Syrian
government but supportive of the Syrian-backed al-Hoss government, quickly expanded
with the political consensus of Taif. Following the acceptance of Taif by the Lebanese
Assembly in 1989, three major Maronite political parties and their respective militias
backed the agreement, and some fought against Aoun backed by the Syrians in the 1990
campaign to defeat him. By the end of 1990 the list of significant militias within the
Syrian coalition was far longer than those that opposed it; with the Aoun faction defeated
the remaining holdouts were principally the Palestinian rejectionists.

3. Methods of Supporting Allies

The Syrian government employed political, logistical, and direct military support
to its NSA allies in Lebanon to secure their policy objective. Al-Assad aggressively
supported its political allies in Lebanon, in some cases resorting to assassination to ensure
his surrogate’s success. Simultaneously, the Syrian government was quick to support
politicians who were willing to come into the fold. Following months of propaganda
deriding him as a puppet, in early 1984 al-Assad welcomed President Amin Gemayel at
the Damascus airport during his first official visit, securing the Lebanese government’s
abrogation of the Israel-Lebanon accord in March 1984. Syrian officials also
intervened repeatedly to negotiate ceasefires and agreements in order to protect their
proxies and allies. In November 1990 the Iranian and Syrian governments negotiated the
second Damascus Agreement between Hezbollah and Amal after which fighting between
the groups ended. The Taif Agreement is the best example of the Syrian government’s

340 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 158, 181.
341 Ibid., 158.
342 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 194–195, 205.
343 Winslow, Lebanon, 285.
345 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 537.
346 Blanford, Warriors of God, 90.
proficiency at securing its policy objectives in Lebanon through political support of its allies. Under the agreement, the Syrian-backed al-Hoss government was further legitimized along with the Syrian occupation.347

Syrian logistical support to its allies in Lebanon was principally through arms shipments and controlling cross-border routes from Syria into Lebanon. The Syrian economy did not provide the government a large budget for the sponsorship of its allies. In spite of its Iranian oil subsidy beginning in 1982, the Syrians had amassed a debt to Iran of five billion dollars by 1989.348 Some of Syria’s closest allies were able to foster their own resource base however, and relied principally on Syria for what it had plenty of: Soviet-bloc weapons. Syria’s ability to supply arms to isolated Iran was also an important part of their mutual logistical support during this period. The Syrian economy did not provide the government a large budget for the sponsorship of its allies. In spite of its Iranian oil subsidy beginning in 1982, the Syrians had amassed a debt to Iran of five billion dollars by 1989.348 Some of Syria’s closest allies were able to foster their own resource base however, and relied principally on Syria for what it had plenty of: Soviet-bloc weapons. Syria’s ability to supply arms to isolated Iran was also an important part of their mutual logistical support during this period.349 Two of Syria’s major NSA allies, the Druze PSP militia and the Shia Amal militia, were social movements that were able to operate primarily using internal resources. Their logistical dependence on Syria was largely for arms shipments.350 However, internal resourcing had its limits, and those organizations that could leverage substantial external resources often held a competitive advantage over those that relied primarily on internal resources. In the case of Amal, the lack of significant external support from its ally Syria proved a major handicap when confronted with the Iranian-financed Hezbollah.351 Despite their economic challenges, Syria’s geographic location and control of routes into the country and its ample supply of arms provided sufficient logistical support to many of its Lebanese NSA allies.

Syrian direct military support to its proxies and allies proved significant by the late 1980s through to the last major battle of the conflict in October 1990. Since the 1976 intervention, and even during the Israeli intervention, the Syrian army maintained

347 Ehteshami, *Syria and Iran*, 75.
349 Ibid., 95.
thousands of troops in Lebanon, concentrated in the Bekaa Valley.\textsuperscript{352} Prior to 1987, the Syrian army typically intervened where necessary to support its proxies, and reinforced the Lebanese government’s authority in the absence of an effective Lebanese army. In 1987 however, possibly frustrated by the inability of its proxy forces to secure Beirut, al-Assad sent 7,000 troops there to attempt to stabilize the situation on behalf of the Syrian-backed Lebanese government.\textsuperscript{353} By the spring of 1988 Syrian forces were conducting operations as far south as Sidon, far closer to the southern border than the Israelis had previously tolerated.\textsuperscript{354} In order to ensure the victory of the official Beirut government under Taif, al-Assad’s forces destroyed General Aoun’s forces in October 1990.\textsuperscript{355} The Syrian’s destruction of Aoun’s forces with the support of both the Lebanese government and the Syrian multi-confessional coalition of NSAs served as a powerful warning to those militias that did not agree to demobilization under the implementation of the Taif Agreement.\textsuperscript{356} Once the Syrian forces effectively established a monopoly of force in the country, it disarmed its opponents, while allowing its closest allies to avoid demobilization so long as they confined their activities to the Bekaa Valley and in the south against Israel.\textsuperscript{357}

4. **Assessment of Strategy**

Syria achieved its policy objective in Lebanon by the end of 1990 largely through direct support of a heterogeneous coalition of NSAs that employed both violent and non-violent tactics. The Syrian government consistently pursued a limited objective of government reinforcement with minor modifications to the confessional makeup of the government. Although following the Israeli intervention Syrian means of support were primarily indirect, by 1987, unable to secure its objectives through its proxy forces alone,

\textsuperscript{352} Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 519.

\textsuperscript{353} Winslow, *Lebanon*, 263.

\textsuperscript{354} O’Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon*, 174–176.

\textsuperscript{355} Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 112.

\textsuperscript{356} Winslow, *Lebanon*, 280.

and no longer faced with the direct threat from Israeli forces in central Lebanon, the Syrians increasingly relied on direct methods to enable its NSA allies. These direct methods secured the Syrian-controlled Lebanese government a monopoly of force within Lebanon, and enabled demobilization of most of the militias that had fought throughout the war.

The Syrian direct methods contributed to the gradual expansion of its NSA coalition so that by the end of 1990 there were no significant militia forces willing to oppose its coalition. Another significant factor in securing the monopoly of force was the fact that many of these NSAs were the militias of political parties that had been participating in the Syrian backed negotiation process for years, and were familiar with both violent and non-violent tactics. Though some of its allies were not satisfied with the Taif Agreement reforms, most notably the PSP, they did voluntarily decommission their militia forces at the conclusion of Taif as their leaders returned their focused to politics. However, some militias were allowed to retain their weapons because of their usefulness in Syria’s strategy to leverage resistance in the south as a bargaining chip in the Arab-Israeli conflict.358 Partly as a result of its alliance with Iran, the Syrians secured an exception for Hezbollah to both maintain its resistance force, and to simultaneously participate in the political process so long as its forces were solely used against Israel and not the Lebanese.359 The factions of the PLO that rejected Arafat’s leadership were allowed to retain their weapons and operate from the safe haven of the Bekaa Valley while the rest were disarmed.360 However, in some cases long-time Syrian allies decommissioned their militias voluntarily. Amal, Syria’s staunch ally in Lebanon since the late 1970s, voluntarily disarmed in 1990 as Nabih Berri focused on politics.361 While the Syrian NSA coalition was formidable at the end of this period, significant factions within it were willing to disarm following the effective implementation of Taif,

358 Winslow, Lebanon, 284.
359 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 135.
360 Zahar, “Peace by Unconventional Means,” 578.
361 Winslow, Lebanon, 281.
demonstrating the value of maintaining a coalition of organizations that employed both violent and non-violent techniques.

C. IRANIAN STRATEGY

1. Objective

During much of the 1980s the Iranian revolutionaries pursued a revisionist foreign policy focused on exporting Islamic revolution throughout the region, especially in Lebanon where the Shia population was uniquely open to radicalization. Following Khomeini’s death, Ayatollah Khamenei succeeded him, and with President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, Iran adopted a pragmatist foreign policy. During the first extraordinary conclave in Tehran that same year, the pragmatists in Hezbollah also won out, thus the organization gradually adopted the Iranian policy. The pragmatist policy aligned Iranian objectives in Lebanon with the Syrian government’s, thus ensuring that under the new Pax Syriana the Iranians and Hezbollah would have a seat at the table.

2. Allied Agents in Lebanon

The Iranian government’s NSA allies in Lebanon were principally Hezbollah and some smaller Islamist groups, most notably Tawheed in Tripoli. While Hezbollah was largely dependent upon Iran in the mid-1980s and fully embraced its ideology, by the late 1980s the organization had developed more freedom to set its course within Lebanon’s multi-confessional landscape, much of which rejected Islamist ideology. The NSA and its sponsor remained strong allies throughout the period. Even though similar pragmatist and revisionist wings of each organization were vying for dominance in the late 1980s, neither of these groups advocated separation between Hezbollah and Iran. At some point in the 1980s the command of Islamic Jihad (IJO) passed over from the IRGC

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362 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 30.
363 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 109–110.
364 Ibid.
366 The pragmatists argued for accommodation with Syria and ending conflict with Amal while the revisionists wanted to subdue Amal and pursue Islamic revolution. Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 142–143.
commander in Lebanon to officials in Hezbollah’s shadowy security apparatus, further empowering the organization. By 1990 Hezbollah had successfully established its dominance of resistance in the south and gradually moved toward political participation within the Lebanese system rather than rejection. By the end of the 1980s Hezbollah could field a total of 10,000 fighters if necessary.

Iranian support of predominantly Islamist NSAs with revolutionary objectives during the mid-1980s frequently brought them into conflict with Syrian forces. The Iranians fostered ties with Saeed Shaaban, of Tawheed in Tripoli, a Sunni Islamist group that supported Islamic revolution in Lebanon. During the mid-1980s Tawheed fought intermittently with the Syrian backed Arab Democratic Party (ADP), drawing Syrian troops into the fighting, and subsequently forcing state level mediation between Iran and Syria to broker ceasefire agreements. Repeated fighting between Hezbollah and Amal often brought Syrian military intervention and subsequent Iranian diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict. However, as the pragmatist policy came into being, Iran-Syria proxy conflict diminished, most significantly after the signing of a ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Amal in 1990.

3. Methods of Supporting Allies

Tehran primarily supported Hezbollah through logistical and political support. The Iranian government leveraged its political influence with Damascus through their alliance in order to secure Hezbollah safe haven, logistics, and political legitimacy from Syria. Iran depended upon Syrian political support in order to maintain its support of Hezbollah, which the revisionists were reminded of in the summer of 1987 as Syrian forces restricted their surrogate’s logistics in response to Hezbollah-Amal fighting in

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367 Baer, *The Devil We Know*, 161.
During the late 1980s, Iranian officials elevated the status of Hezbollah’s leadership by setting up face-to-face negotiations with senior officials of Hezbollah and Syria, and sometimes using Hezbollah leaders as brokers between the Syrian government and other NSAs in Lebanon. Iran-Hezbollah moderation in the late 1980s aligned the organizations’ objectives with Syria, thus reducing the friction between the groups and legitimizing Hezbollah’s armed resistance following Taif implementation.

The Iranian government’s logistical support to Hezbollah was critical to the organization’s rise, as well as the Iranian government’s ability to exert influence over the group. Through the 1980s Hezbollah received anywhere from $16 to $120 million annually from Iran while its primary competitor, Amal, had to rely on domestic sources of funding. Iranian funding made it possible for Hezbollah to provide social services to the Shia community, essentially building loyalty by providing government services in the absence of the Lebanese state. Amal could not compete with the extensive social service programs that by the mid-1980s were providing medical care, subsidized pharmaceuticals, welfare benefits, and subsidized grocery stores. The financing also ensured that Hezbollah fighters were some of the best paid. The commander of Israel’s proxy, the SLA, complained that Hezbollah fighters were paid three times more than his fighters. While Hezbollah would develop domestic sources of funding through the 1980s, its rapid rise was in part due to its strong external logistical and political support from Iran. Hezbollah’s logistical dependence upon Iran in the late 1980s also ensured that the pragmatists maintained leverage over the organization in the event they attempted a return to revisionism.

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373 Ehteshami, *Syria and Iran*, 133.
375 Ehteshami, *Syria and Iran*, 134.
376 Ibid., 144–145.
379 Ibid.
4. Assessment of Strategy

The Iranian government secured long-term influence in Lebanon by evolving its objectives in Lebanon to better align with its strategic ally, Syria, for which its involvement in Lebanon depended. The pursuit of revisionist objectives in Lebanon through its surrogate Hezbollah brought Iran into conflict with Syria multiple times prior to the moderation of Iranian strategy following Khomeini’s death. Once Iranian policy had moderated, they pursued a limited objective of influence in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict through indirect support of a homogenous NSA employing violent and non-violent tactics. The key to continued Iranian influence was in its relationship with Syria, which the pragmatists had successfully ensured as early as 1989 by aligning their policy with its ally’s.

While the Iranian strategy of indirect support of a homogenous and predominantly violent NSA evolved in the late 1980s, Iranian policy in Lebanon frequently brought Hezbollah and its affiliates in conflict with powerful enemies, to include its only state ally in the region. In March 1985 a CIA sponsored operation by local surrogates attempted to kill the suspected leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, but failed. In actuality Fadlallah was not a part of the Hezbollah leadership, although many Hezbollah members revered him. Hezbollah’s war with Amal repeatedly escalated tensions between Syria and Iran, and on one occasions Syrian forces attacked Hezbollah and killed dozens of members. In response to this attack on its forces, and any attack that could be leveraged for propaganda purposes, the Islamists conducted mass funerals, demonstrating their popular support as a highly effective warning to their enemies. Ultimately however, the Iran-Hezbollah coalition adopted restraint and moderated their approach, conducting fewer terror attacks as the 1980s went by, and altering their policy toward the kidnapping of westerners.

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381 Woodward, Veil, 393–397.
382 Blanford, Warriors of God, 75.
383 O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 174.
384 Ibid.
385 Ehteshami, Syria and Iran, 136.
D. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES

1. Qualitative Analysis

Following the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, both Syria and Iran pursued vastly different objectives despite their alliance. Al-Assad, consistent with his policy since the first years of the civil war, pursued a limited objective of regime reinforcement in order to secure influence in Lebanon and gain greater balance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Iranian revolutionary government, eager to spread Islamic revolution across the region, initially pursued a total objective of overthrowing the Lebanese government through a radical movement. The conflicting state objectives proved contentious, as fighting between Iranian and Syrian proxies occurred multiple times until the pragmatists solidified their control of the government of Tehran and pursued a more realist foreign policy. Once the pragmatists led by President Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei transitioned Iranian policy away from revisionism toward pragmatism and aligned their policy in Lebanon with their Syrian allies, the two states largely cooperated in order to support Syria’s efforts to establish dominant influence in Lebanon.386

The strategies of both states were widely different throughout this period. The Syrian government pursued its limited objective in Lebanon through a combination of indirect and direct support to a broad heterogeneous coalition of both violent and non-violent NSAs. The Iranians pursued their revisionist objective in Lebanon indirectly through support of a small homogeneous coalition of largely Shia radicals with a preference for violent methods. Prior to the pragmatist evolution of the late 1980s, Hezbollah did develop an Iranian-funded network of social services, which developed a large mass base amongst the Shia lower classes and helped broaden the scope of the movement’s tactics to include non-violent techniques such as mass protest.387 As the pragmatist evolution solidified in the late 1980s, Hezbollah reduced its employment of terrorism and focused its violence against Israeli forces and their proxies in south

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387 Ibid., 144–145.
Simultaneously, encouraged by the Iranians, Hezbollah gravitated toward politics and additional non-violent means to gain influence, though this transition was only beginning in 1990.

On the surface, the Iranian strategy demonstrates the relative speed with which a state can develop influence in an intrastate environment through the employment of a homogeneous coalition of NSAs that emphasize violent techniques. However, the key to the Iranian government’s success in Lebanon was Syrian government tolerance of Iranian activities. Al-Assad’s foreign policy decision to maintain the alliance was primarily based on the value Iran added to his efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not on economic and domestic factors that would have led to the opposite decision. Taif was backed by the Arab League with a two billion dollar reconstruction fund by 1990, and al-Assad was strongly encouraged by the Saudis and other Arab states to break with Iran. From al-Assad’s perspective, Iran was far more effective at assisting Syria against Israel than were the Saudis, and as a result the alliance remained strong since its inception in spite of the domestic and economic reasons to abandon it. As Syria and its NSA coalition had demonstrated numerous times over the course of the conflict, any NSA that resisted the objectives of the Syrian bloc was sure to face substantial repression. While the Iran-Hezbollah coalition proved effective at quickly building influence across Lebanon through this period, their success was ultimately the direct result of Syrian approval.

The Syrian government’s strategy of direct means to support a heterogeneous coalition of violent and non-violent NSAs proved effective but was highly costly for a state with such limited means. In spite of its small economy, the Syrian government held many advantages in Lebanon by the late 1980s that enabled its policy there. The Syrians

390 Baer, *The Devil We Know*, 193.
393 Baer, *The Devil We Know*, 194–195.
shared a cultural identity with the Lebanese, in spite of the many different religious confessions in each country; they shared a common language and historical experience under both the French mandate and Ottoman rule. The Syrian government’s near pariah status amongst the community of nations was mitigated through its strong alliance with the Soviet Union, which supported Syrian policy in the United Nations.\footnote{\textit{The USSR rejected a French UN Security Council resolution in 1984 that would have approved UN peacekeepers for Beirut. O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon}, 140.}} As the USSR dissolved in 1990, Syria took advantage of the growing international response to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, which earned the Syrian army carte blanche to destroy the remaining opposition to the Syrian-backed Lebanese government.\footnote{\textit{Baer, \textit{The Devil We Know}, 190–191.}} The international community, to include France and the U.S, supported the Taif Agreement.\footnote{\textit{Zahar, “Peace by Unconventional Means,”} 573.} Through its occupation of Lebanon the Syrian government is suspected to have benefited economically as the war died down, gaining access to the world economy via Lebanon, its citizens earning over one billion dollars annually employed there, and the Syrian army made money through smuggling and trade rackets.\footnote{Ibid., 575.} Ultimately the policy did achieve al-Assad’s primary objective, to establish dominance in Lebanon in order to alter the balance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Syria’s favor. The Syrian government’s success at dominating Lebanon demonstrates the potential of a weak state with high levels of external support to directly influence a complex civil war environment through a long-term and expensive commitment largely funded by external sources.

2. **Social Network Analysis**

The SNA of the organizational network of the Lebanese Civil War at the end of 1990 supports the qualitative assessment that the Syrian government dominated the network.\footnote{The methodology used for social network analysis (SNA) is detailed in Appendix 1.} No longer challenged north of the security zone by the IDF, the Syrian government built a large and heterogeneous coalition of NSA allies that effectively defeated the last remaining holdout in the final months of 1990. The Iranian government
and Hezbollah, after moving away from revisionism and adopting pragmatism, largely cooperated with Syria, thus increasing their own influence in the network while reinforcing al-Assad’s influence. The SNA also reveals that the Israeli government’s influence was nearly insignificant. The network consists of sixteen individuals and twenty-nine organizations. Figure 3 presents a visualization of the Lebanese Civil War organizations network at the end of 1990. The size of each node reflects betweenness centrality. The nodes are colored by type. States are colored green and NSAs are colored blue. The thickness of relationship links is based on the un-scaled value of the relationship and the arrows depict the direction of the relationship. Isolates were removed from this visualization.

Figure 3. Lebanese Civil War Organizations Network 1990
a. Network Topography

Network topography measures for the 1990 organizational network are presented in Table 9. The network consisted of 29 nodes and 86 directed ties. The characteristic path length was 8.843, which was substantially lower than it was in 1976 (11.915) and 1983 (11.891), indicating that the network is less distributed and more connected than before. Network density was 0.102, which was twice what it was in 1976 and nearly 25% greater than in 1983. This increase in density is somewhat misleading because network was smaller in 1990 (29) than it was in 1983 (35). Indeed, average degree centrality (26.97) decreased from 1983 (30), which indicates that the network was less dense in 1990 than it was in 1983. Nevertheless, average degree centrality in 1990 was still substantially higher than it was in 1976 (17.69). Network cohesion was 1.0 (100%), which indicates that all of the organizations with at least one tie were either directly or indirectly tied to one another. Krackhardt’s measure of hierarchy was 0.313, which is substantially lower than it was in 1976 (78%) and 1983 (40.8%), while the percentage of reciprocal ties (20.7%) was much higher than it was in 1976 (7.6%) and 1983 (12.5%). Overall the 1990 network topography values indicate that the network has become far more compact and flatter, as organizations share more links (compared to 1976, and only slightly less than 1983) along shorter paths, and a larger portion of which are reciprocal rather than directed. Research indicates that networks that have higher degrees of cohesion are more likely to adhere to accepted norms and behavior. The broad consensus amongst the organizations to move toward conflict resolution in 1990 is qualitative evidence of the network’s greater cohesion and acceptance of established norms compared to the other periods.

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399 The 100% cohesion value means there were no isolates in the 1990 network. The 1976 and 1983 networks each had isolated nodes (organizations with no connections) and as a result those networks had lower cohesion scores.

400 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 10.
Table 9. Network Topographic Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topographic Metrics</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Path Length</td>
<td>8.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Degree Centrality (Unscaled)</td>
<td>26.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Fragmentation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Cohesion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krackhardt Hierarchy</td>
<td>0.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Subgroups**

Subgroup analysis was conducted in order to compare each state actor’s influence in the network. The results for clique analysis are presented in Table 10. The clique analysis detected eleven total cliques of size three or larger, all of which Syria was a member. Iran was in two cliques while Israel was not in any. Of the two cliques in which both Iran and Syria were members, these cliques held two of the three highest numbers of external links. The Syrian government’s presence in all of the cliques supports the conclusion that Syria had a dominating influence in the network. Although Iran was only in two of the eleven cliques, its presence in two of the most externally connected cliques suggests that its presence helped reinforce the Syrian government’s influence.
Newman group analysis identified five groups. The results are presented in Table 11. Israel’s Newman group was the smallest and had the fewest external links: three. The Syrian Newman group was one of the largest, but more importantly it possessed 29 external links, 19 more than Iran’s group. Its far greater number of external ties is another indicator of the degree to which it and its closest allies were able to influence the network.
Table 11. Newman Group Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hezbollah, IJO, PLO, Tawheed, Iran, Iraq, USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>FNSF, Amal, DFLP, PFLP, Syria, Salqa, ZLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>PSP, ULF, LCP, ADP, Baath Party, SNSP, Mourabitoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lebanon, LF, Phalange (Kataeb), NLP, Saadi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SLA, USA, Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Analysis of Individual Actors

Table 12 presents the same centrality measures we examined in the previous chapters. Once again, they suggest that Syria was the most influential country. It ranked first in every centrality measure. Its betweenness centrality (0.738) was far higher than its competitors and indicates the state’s potential to broker communication between groups and organizations in the network. Its total degree centrality (0.055) reflects the high number of connections it had across the network relative to its competition, and its greater number of incoming and outgoing ties further demonstrates its superior influence. Syria also had far higher eigenvector, hub, and authority centrality scores than its competition, indicating its ability to both receive and distribute resources across the network.\(^{401}\) Iran ranked in the top four of every centrality measure except one. However, its scores are more than a standard deviation below those of Syria. Israel’s influence was very low according to the centrality measures. In the few cases where the Israeli government was ranked in the middle, its actual centrality scores were still far below those of Syria, Iran, and other organizations. Taken together, these results provide further quantitative evidence that the Syrian government had established not just high degrees of influence but near dominance over the network.

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Table 12. Actor Centrality Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th></th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th></th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Degree Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Degree Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Degree Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvector Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hub Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority Centrality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Calculated using UCINET 6.0.

\[d.\] SNA Conclusion

The SNA of the Lebanese Civil War organizational network in December 1990 supports the qualitative conclusion that the Syrian government had come to dominate the country of Lebanon through influence over a broad coalition of NSAs. The Syrian government was a part of the most influential clique and Newman subgroups. Al-Assad’s government also had the highest centrality scores of any organization in the network, and often by far greater margins than its nearest competitor. Additionally, Iran, in part due to its cooperation rather than competition with the Syrian government’s policy in Lebanon, also had a significant degree of influence in the network. Israeli influence in the network was very low according to the SNA, and any influence it did have in Lebanon came through its strong relationship with the U.S. government. The SNA of the organizational network at the end of 1990 confirms that Syrian influence in Lebanon far exceeded that of any other external state actor in the country. Additionally, Syria’s nearest state competitor for influence was often its own ally, whose actions by this point were largely beneficial to Damascus.

E. CONCLUSION

Analysis of the final years of the Lebanese Civil War provides valuable historical insights to state actors seeking to influence civil wars. Largely free of Israeli government interference beyond southern Lebanon following the failure of its 1982 intervention, the
Syrian government succeeded in achieving its limited policy objective for Lebanon by the end of 1990 through direct support of a heterogeneous coalition of violent and non-violent NSAs that dominated the country. The Syrian government’s strongest regional ally, the Iranian government, complemented the Syrian policy through their support of a homogeneous coalition of NSAs transitioning into a more pragmatic approach that emphasized both violent and non-violent means by the end of the period. The establishment of Pax Syriana in Lebanon by the end of 1990 provides an example of what a relatively weak state can accomplish if given strong external logistical and political support. While the Iranian strategy effectively developed influence through the use of violence through the 1980s, their policy succeeded in the end because their leadership, and that of Hezbollah, moderated their approach in order to ensure long-term influence in Lebanon under the good graces of the dominant Syrian regime. The next chapter will provide an in-depth longitudinal SNA of the war to further refine the lessons gathered from these case studies.
VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis provides useful insights for the employment of surrogate warfare and direct military intervention in order to develop influence in civil wars. The similarities between Lebanon and Syria make these observations most useful for those governments and agencies currently addressing the ongoing conflict in the Levant, but these conclusions may prove useful in informing policy towards civil wars in general. This chapter will summarize the qualitative analysis of each state strategy through the conflict. A longitudinal SNA will further complement these qualitative insights. A compilation of the lessons learned will provide planners with a short list of the most relevant observations gathered from this study. The research limitations section provides a cautionary note as to the overall accuracy of the analysis. Finally, the conclusion will address how this study could prove useful to policy makers addressing ongoing civil wars.

A. QUALITATIVE TEMPORAL ANALYSIS

An in-depth historical analysis of external state efforts to influence the Lebanese Civil War reveals the successes and failures of three state strategies. The Syrian government’s strategic objective and efforts remained consistent throughout the war, earning al-Assad a dominant role in Lebanon as the conflict subsided. The Israeli government, disturbed by Syria’s dominance at the end of the first period, resorted to a direct approach that ultimately met with failure by the end of the second period, yielding influence over much of Lebanon to Syria from then on. The Iranian government, latecomer to Lebanon, adopted a very aggressive and effective strategy in the middle period, but by the end of the conflict moderated their strategy in order to ensure their future role in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A review of all three state strategies provides informative lessons to policymakers responsible for addressing civil wars.

The Israeli approach toward the conflict in Lebanon began cautiously. In 1976, the Labor government under Yitzhak Rabin settled on a middle of the road strategy that
in the end afforded its enemies increased influence in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{402} As the Israeli government changed in 1977, so did its strategy in Lebanon. In 1982 the Likud government under Menachem Begin pursued regime reinforcement through direct military support of exclusively Christian militias under Bashir Gemayel. The new strategic approach created far more enemies of Israel in Lebanon than allies, and by the mid-1980s Israeli influence was confined to a narrow strip of land along the Israel-Lebanon border. The Israeli government’s approach of direct military support to a Christian coalition with a preference for violence was a failure.

Seizing the strategic opportunity largely created by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, the Iranian government entered the conflict with the permission of its strategic ally in Damascus. The Iranians initially pursued a revisionist objective of regime overthrow through largely indirect support of a tight-knit homogeneous coalition of mostly Shia Islamists. While the strategy proved effective at coercing the other foreign forces in Lebanon to withdraw, conflict frequently arose between Iran’s ally Hezbollah and Syrian forces and their respective NSA allies, straining Iran’s ability to shape the course of the civil war in its favor. Following a transition in the leadership from revisionists to pragmatists in Tehran in the late 1980s, and subsequent moderation within Hezbollah’s leadership, Iranian influence within Lebanon began to increase.\textsuperscript{403} By aligning their overall interests with that of its ally in the region, and upon which its involvement in the country largely depended, Iranian and Hezbollah influence became legitimized under the Pax Syriana.

Syrian government strategy throughout the Lebanese Civil War remained focused on securing its influence over the country as a critical subset to its national strategy to rebalance the Arab-Israeli conflict in Syria’s favor.\textsuperscript{404} During the first period, Syrian forces directly intervened in the conflict when it became clear to their leadership that indirect support of NSAs could not secure their objectives.\textsuperscript{405} Following the Israeli

\textsuperscript{402} Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, 347.
\textsuperscript{403} Ehteshami, \textit{Syria and Iran}, 136–137.
\textsuperscript{404} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{405} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention In Lebanon}, 194.
invasion, Syrian forces adjusted their strategy to emphasize more indirect support to its NSA allies in light of their inability to directly confront the IDF and the foreign intervention that followed. As Israeli and foreign forces departed central Lebanon in the mid-1980s, the Syrian government gradually increased its direct means of support to its allies across the country. Encouraged by its strategic rival’s unwillingness to confront them beyond the southern border, and a more tolerant international climate as the final period came to a close, the Syrian government’s influence grew to dominate Lebanon. The long-term commitment by a relatively weak state to provide support to a large and heterogeneous coalition of NSA allies capable of employing both violent and non-violent techniques proved successful for Syria.

B. LONGITUDINAL SNA

A longitudinal social network analysis of the three organizational networks further highlights the successes and failures of each state strategy. It reinforces the conclusions drawn from the qualitative historical analysis of the three periods of the conflict. Syrian direct intervention, and Israeli tolerance in the first period temporarily secured the al-Assad government’s dominance of Lebanon. The Israeli government’s strategy of direct intervention in the middle period of the conflict earned it increased influence, and simultaneously decreased the influence of Syria. However, the combination of Syrian persistent engagement combined with Iran’s indirect support of violent NSAs quickly undermined the Israeli strategy and by the final period of the conflict Syrian influence was quantifiably dominant.

Figure 4 presents the topographic metrics examined in this thesis over time. From 1976 to 1990 the network became more cohesive, denser, and less hierarchical, with a greater degree of individual connections, more of which are reciprocal. By 1990 the network’s density has doubled; however, because network density is sensitive to network size, we need to rely more on average degree centrality in order to gain a sense of how internally connected the network became over time. Turning to average degree centrality, we see that it reached a peak in 1983 before dropping slightly in 1990. Nevertheless, the average degree centrality score in 1990 was still significantly higher than it was in 1976.
The network also became more cohesive over time. The network also became more heterarchical, or decentralized, over time as indicated by Krackhardt’s measure of hierarchy, as well as his measure of reciprocity. In sum, the longitudinal scores of the topographic metrics reflect a network that became more connected and less centralized, and as noted earlier, research suggests that networks with higher levels of density and connectedness are more likely to adhere to established norms and behavior. Qualitatively, the 1990 network displayed this greater quantitative connectivity by the fact that most of the organizations in the network accepted conflict resolution rather than continued resistance.

![Figure 4. Longitudinal Scores of Topographic Metrics](image)

A longitudinal analysis of the Newman subgroups offers further insights into the effectiveness of each state’s strategy over time. A graph of each state’s Newman group size and the number of external links is presented in Figure 5. The Israeli government’s Newman group increases slightly in 1983, but the state’s strategy emphasizing support to a homogeneous coalition of NSAs results in a decrease in connections beyond its subgroup. Israel’s Newman group membership was at its lowest point by 1990, further

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406 Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 10.
quantifying the government’s lack of influence. The Iranian Newman group size and external links were the largest in 1983 and declined in 1990, suggesting that by closely aligning its objectives with those of Syria, it may have sacrificed some of its influence. The Syrian Newman group evolution is perhaps the most interesting. Its size declined over time, but the number of external links rose, which may have offset any loss in influence.

![Figure 5. Longitudinal Newman Subgroup Size and External Links](image)

The longitudinal analysis of each state’s centrality scores provides the strongest evidence for the effectiveness of each state’s strategy to develop influence throughout the Lebanese Civil War. Graphs of each country’s centrality scores over time are presented in Figures 6, 7, and 8. Four of Syria’s centrality scores (Figure 6) reflect a decline in influence immediately following the Israeli intervention period. By 1990 Syria’s dominant influence in the network is clearly reflected by the government’s significantly higher betweenness, eigenvector, hub, and authority centrality scores compared to the previous two periods. Israel’s centrality scores are dismal over the same periods, with a peak in betweenness centrality in 1983. However, as was already explained in the 1983 chapter, this outlier centrality score is principally due to Israel’s position as a broker.
between the two components of the network. Iran’s influence is substantial according to its centrality scores in 1983, but by 1990 the state’s influence decreased as shown by the decline of all centrality measures except for betweenness. This conclusion is contrary to the widely accepted view that Iranian influence within Lebanon has consistently grown since 1982. However, this analysis is specific to influence within the organizations network within Lebanon. Clearly, since this period Iranian influence in Lebanon has grown dramatically through its own favored NSA, Hezbollah.

Figure 6. Longitudinal Scores of Syria’s Centrality Measures
Figure 7. Longitudinal Scores of Israel’s Centrality Measures

Figure 8. Longitudinal Scores of Iran’s Centrality Measures
The longitudinal SNA of the Lebanese Civil War organizational network offers additional support for the conclusions drawn from the qualitative historical analysis. A visual comparison of the three networks in Figure 9 provides a visual synopsis of this overall analysis. Observe how in 1976 the network appears to contain multiple hubs, all of which appear to be a part of one overall component. This highlights the dominance of Syria in Lebanon in that period, with Israel accepting its influence at the time. In the 1983 network there is an obvious schism as the network is divided into two major components as a result of the Israeli intervention. This visualization highlights the divide between the weakening Israeli coalition and growing Syrian one at the end of 1983. Finally observe the 1990 network, where there is clearly one major component dominated by Syria, and assisted by Iran, with Israel out on the edge of the network with few ties to other organizations. While the previous quantitative analysis of the longitudinal SNA data provides the detail to support the qualitative conclusions of this study, a comparison of the network visualizations provides a very simplified version of the story of Syrian success and Israeli failures in the Lebanese Civil War.

Figure 9. Networks over Time (1976, 1983, 1990)

C. LESSONS LEARNED

- Weak states with high levels of external support are capable of effectively developing influence in complex civil war environments. Despite Syria’s weak economy, domestic instability, and military vulnerabilities the al-Assad government’s approach in Lebanon was effective where other states with far more resources had failed. Compared to its competitors, Syria held a number of advantages to include a shared culture and history with the local population and extensive external
support from the Soviet-bloc, Iran, the Arab League, and in the end even the United States. The Syrian experience highlights the potential for strongly supported weak states to influence complex intrastate conflicts in which they share a common heritage with the local population and an enduring commitment to the conflict.

- **Homogeneous coalitions have limited value in complex civil wars.** Both Iran and Israel preferred highly homogeneous coalitions largely based on a religious and cultural identity. In Lebanon this proved highly problematic given the fragmentation of the society along confessional lines. Both state strategies proved moderately successful at achieving high levels of influence amongst the targeted confessions, but faced significant challenges when it came to developing influence into other confessions.

- **Heterogeneous coalitions are more effective at facilitating sponsor influence in complex civil wars.** The Syrian government employed a pragmatic policy of working with any group that would serve its practical interests. While this strategy could often appear fickle as al-Assad’s forces occasionally switched between allies, over time the strategy developed an expansive coalition that included NSAs from every major confession in Lebanon.

- **Balancing between indirect and direct means of support proved a more effective strategy to develop influence rather than relying on one or the other.** Iran’s strategy through the second and third period was the most consistently indirect, and did produce significant results for Tehran and its allies in Damascus. However, the Iranian government’s policy in Lebanon was entirely dependent on Syrian approval and tolerance for its activities. The Syrian government also tried to rely on indirect methods as much as possible, but on multiple occasions resorted to direct methods in order to accomplish their objectives when indirect methods proved insufficient. The Israeli government’s over reliance on direct methods largely served to limit its influence in Lebanon.

- **Direct support comes with inherent risk whether employed by democratic or authoritarian governments.** Direct support comes with many inherent risks for the sponsor as well as the surrogate. For the sponsor, the government risks blowback for directly intervening in another state’s affairs, especially if domestically it has the appearance of supporting the wrong side. The blowback the Israeli government experienced led to the collapse of its policy in Lebanon. The al-Assad government also faced an insurgency partly fed by the perception that in 1976 the regime intervened on behalf of Christians rather than fellow Muslims. For the sponsored, direct intervention calls into question the legitimacy of the surrogate’s own cause.
• **Violent surrogates that are dependent upon external support are capable of moderation.** Following the Iranian government’s adoption of a more pragmatic foreign policy, the leadership of Hezbollah underwent a similar transition, thus adopting more political and non-violent techniques and reducing the organization’s employment of violence. While the transition was made possibly largely through the strong ties between the sponsored and the sponsor, the Iranian moderates also had the option of withholding assistance in the event that its surrogate force failed to moderate.

• **Sponsored NSAs are most effective when they combine both violent and non-violent techniques.** The employment of violence alone is not enough for surrogates to succeed in an intrastate conflict. Many of the dominant NSAs in the Lebanese Civil War were political parties that also controlled a militia. In many cases, the political parties long preceded the militias, many of which were formed just before or after the beginning of the conflict. The NSAs that emphasized politics over violence were adept at switching as necessary between the two tactics, and in some cases decommissioned their militias once their political objectives were achieved at the end of the conflict.

• **Political support through negotiated ceasefires and power sharing agreements, no matter how temporary and difficult to achieve, can provide significant support to surrogates.** Throughout the conflict Syria negotiated dozens, possibly hundreds of local ceasefire agreements in support of its NSA allies and proxies. These arrangements sometimes prevented significant defeats of its allies, providing them valuable respite from fighting to reconstitute their forces, and helped legitimate them diplomatically on a scale far beyond local politics. For Syria, these agreements allowed the state to conserve its resources, applying direct military support only when necessary.

**D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS**

The qualitative historical analysis and SNA of the Lebanese Civil War was limited in three ways. First, the data was skewed by individual researcher bias and data availability. After an initial assessment of the conflict, the three most significant external state actors were selected and research focused on each state’s strategy throughout the war. While conducting the research, there was a subconscious effort by the researcher to focus principally on groups of interest that came to dominate the Lebanese Civil War environment at the conclusion of hostilities. Employing a variety of sources focused on different historical periods, organizations, and individuals across the conflict mitigated
this selectivity bias. Secondly, contemporary writing on the Lebanese Civil War emphasizes the history of the perceived winners of the conflict because of their prominence in Lebanon today, most notably Hezbollah and Iran. The problem this creates when using recently published sources is the potential for an actor that is more relevant today being perceived as more relevant during a period of the conflict in which their influence was quite limited. For instance, the impact of Hezbollah in resisting Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1983 may be highly exaggerated because of its contemporary relevance, whereas in reality at that time Hezbollah’s rival Amal, or other NSAs may have been more relevant at that time but failed to make the history books because of their later demise. While Hezbollah’s actions certainly were the primary reason for eventual Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon years after the civil war, during the middle period of the war Hezbollah was one of many groups fighting Israel in the south. The commitment to use both contemporary and older references helped mitigate this research limitation. Third, and finally, this research is far from exhaustive and the possibility exists that there are organizations that are for more relevant to this analysis than were revealed by the references explored. An analysis of fifteen years of conflict conducted over a relatively short period of time by a novice is likely to contain a number of research gaps and limitations. It should not be assumed that the lists of relationships in the SNA coding are exhaustive, and in reality there likely were many other relationships unobserved or simply unknown within the network. Further research could refine the organizational network of the three periods and could reach somewhat different overall conclusions. However, the overall conclusions from this study are strongly supported by historical evidence and should not be discounted based on research limitations.

E. CONCLUSION

The analysis of state strategies to influence the Lebanese Civil War environment provides useful insights to planners currently responsible for developing policies toward civil wars. The Lebanese Civil War is an informative case study for policymakers addressing the ongoing war in Syria because of the similarities between the two conflicts. Both conflicts are typified by highly complex intrastate fighting combined with extensive levels of external support and direct intervention. Despite the numerous confessional
divides within the two countries, the populations share a common cultural and historical background. Some of the same confessional divides that existed in Lebanon exist in Syria today. However, aside from the Kurds, the Syrian confessions have not yet fully mobilized under powerful social movements as occurred in Lebanon amongst the Druze, Maronites, and Shia. Much of this study focused on the actions of Hafez al-Assad’s government, whom Bashar al-Assad succeeded. Iran and Hezbollah were major players in the Lebanese Civil War and are currently actively involved in the ongoing Syrian conflict, continuing to back their staunch ally in Damascus. Israel is involved to a lesser extent in the conflict today than it was in Lebanon, but its policy of occasional direct military intervention to address the growing capabilities of its NSA rival Hezbollah shares similarities to the periods of the Lebanese conflict where Israeli forces targeted PLO bases. Though not all of the lessons from this study are transferable to the ongoing conflict, they should provide some applicable lessons learned compared to other historical case studies because of their similarities. The lessons of this case study are unique to the specific conditions of the war in Lebanon, and any application of lessons learned to other conflicts must be considered in light of that conflict’s unique conditions. It is the author’s hope that this thesis can help inform current policy through the lens of the Lebanese Civil War, providing policymakers a wider range of strategic options when developing strategies for civil wars.
APPENDIX. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

All three networks consist of both state and non-state actors that were significant players during their respective period. The non-state actors consist of both individuals and groups. The individuals are those major political and organizational leaders who, according to historical sources, were key actors during this period. The organizations are primarily the prominent militias of this time period. Each section was coded using a minimum of 19 primary and secondary sources. The complete list of sources used for SNA coding is in the list of references.

The data was coded in terms of seven different types of relations, which are intended to reflect the organizations network in Lebanon at the end of the year noted. The six relations were: Alliances (organization-to-organization), political support (organization-to-organization), political support (organization-to-individual), logistical support (organization-to-organization), direct military support (organization-to-organization), and members (individual-to-organization). The Alliance network consists of relationships between organizations and an alliance based organization such as: the status quo Lebanese Front (LF), the revisionist Lebanese National Movement (LNM), or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The three political support networks reflect political support between nodes. The logistical support network reflects lines of logistical support between organizations that included financing, equipment, transportation, safe haven, or any combination thereof. The direct military support network consists of relationships reflecting direct military support, both kinetic and non-kinetic. Direct military support consists of any of the following types of ties: training, indirect fire support, close air support, or coordinated ground operations. The members network reflects individuals and their roles in their respective organization.

All relationships were assessed on a scale of one to three, with a three being the strongest link. The strongest relationships were consistently those between states and their respective proxies and members to their organization. A two is a moderately strong link. An example of this would be ties between members of an alliance who only infrequently acted in the interest of the alliance organization’s goals. A one reflects a
weak link, an example of which would be two organizations that fought together but were no longer allied by the end of 1976. The scaling of relationships enabled a more accurate reflection of the constantly changing organizational network of the Lebanese environment. For instance, while the PLO was no longer in alliance with the LNM at the conclusion of 1976, they still shared a weak link to that organization because of their past ties.

The six networks were analyzed as follows. Some of the networks were two-mode, where two different types of nodes were present. The two-mode networks were converted to one-mode organization-to-organization networks using Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA). The six one-mode networks were then aggregated into a single network, which was then was used to conduct all network analysis.407

407 Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) was used to estimate all SNA metrics. See ORA-NetScenes, Kathleen M. Carley, Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, Copyright 2001—2016).
LIST OF REFERENCES


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